People vs. Siyoh 141SCRA356 Facts: The group of Antonio de Guzman is merchants.

On July 11, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. After selling their goods in Pilas, they went to the house of accused Omarkayam Kiraam at Pilas. The following day, the group together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh started selling goods. The next day, they were again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh. On July 13, 1979, Kiram suggested the group to go to Baluk-Baluk to sell their goods. The group then went to Baluk Baluk. Thereafter, they returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them. On July 14, 1979, the group went again to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh. They used the pumpboat of Kiram. At that time, Kiram and Siyoh were armed with barongs Upon arrival at Baluk-Baluk, Kiam and Siyoh went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling their goods.KIram and Siyoh were seen talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize. After selling their goods, the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. Kiram was the one who operated the engine of the pumpboat. On their way to Pilas, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted with red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat. Thereafter, two gun shots were fired from the pumpboat as it moved toward them. There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armalites. De Guzman recognized them to be the same person he saw Kiram conversing with in the house at Baluk-Baluk Island. Whenthe boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other boat which towed de Guzmans group towards Mataja Island. On their way to Mataja, de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram. Kiram and his companions ordered the group to undress.After taking theirmoney and dress, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman then jumped into the water and he was able to survive. An order of arrest was then issued against all of the accused but only Jlaide Siyoh and Omarkayam Kiram were apprehended. After trial, the accused were convicted of the crime Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murde under P.D.532, and was sentenced each one of them to death, however, a commutation to life imprisonment was recommended in consideration of the provision of the Sec. 106 Code of Mindanao and Sulu. On appeal, the accused contends that the lower court erred in finding that their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held: The caused of death of the victims as attested by the death certificate is Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gun shots wounds. The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked and that the appellants were armed with barongs while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites. Thus, finding the decision to be in accord with both the facts and the law, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Milo vs. Salanga 152 SCRA 113 Facts: On Aril 21, 1973, accused Juan Tuvera Sr., , a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fist blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, accused Juan Tuvera Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lodge and lock said Amado Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven hours. An information for Arbitrary Detention was then filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal against Juan Tuvera Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Accused Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information contending that he can not be charged with arbitrary detention for he is not a public officer. The respondent Judge Salanga then granted the motion to quash. Thus this petition. Issue: Whether of not the accused barrio captain Tuvera, is a public officer who may be charged with Arbitrary Detention

Held: The Supreme Court Held that Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of this crime are that the offender is a public office, that he detains a person, and that the detention is without legal grounds. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order to detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. Long before P.D. 229 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants, now barangay captains were recognized as persons in authority. Thus, barrio captain Tuvera, being a public officer may he held liable for Arbitrary Detention.

People vs. Gatang-o 168 SCRA 717 Facts: On May 30, 1984, a civilian informer informed Pat. Celestino de la Cruz of the Narcotics Units of the Angeles City that three igorots were arriving in Angeles City that evening to well twelve kilograms of marijuana to interested buyers. The information was then relayed to the station commander and they prepared an entrapment operation for the suspects with Sgt. Raquidan acting as poseur buyer. At around 12:30 in the morning of May 31, 1984, the civilian informer accompanied by the suspects went to the Deangs Marketing Store. The civilian informer introduced the suspects the poseur buyer Sgt. Raquidan and after some negotiations, raquidan agreed to purchase marijuana from Baracbar. Thereafter, the two suspects handed over Raquidan a plastic bag containing one kilogram of marijuana. Upon ascertaining the contents of the plastic bag, Raquidan gave the signal to the other policemen by putting his hand on his head. The policeman then approached the suspects, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested them. They were brought to the police station for investigation and thereafter, they were detained at the Angeles City Jail. An information was then filed by the Second City Assistant Fiscal of Angeles charging the accused for violation of Sec.14 Art ii of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After the arraignment and trial, the accused was found guilty. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the arrest of the accused is valid Held: Entrapment is a way and means resorted to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto. The idea to commit the crime originated from the accused. Nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense. Sgt. Raquidan went trough the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appealants who produced and delivered marijuana. There was no need to hand in marked money to the appellants in payment thereof since the crime is consummated by the delivery of the goods. The examination of the contents of the plastic bag that was taken from the accused proved to contain marijuana. They were caught in the act of selling marijuana to Raquidan, hence the arrest is valid.

Torres vs. Gonzales 152 SCRA 273 Facts: The petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate imprisonment of 11 years, 9 months, and 1 day to38 years and to pay 12, 728.75 as indemnity. The convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the president of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was subsequently released from confinement. However, it was found out that the petitioner violated the conditions of the pardon for he committed several crimes like estafa, other forms of swindling, grave treats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of B.P.22 and violation of P.D.772. Some of the charges however were identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed. The Board of Pardons then recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the Petitioner and on September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon. The Minister of Justice issued by authority of the President an order of arrest and recommitment. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in the Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Petitioner now impugns the validity of the order of arrest and recommitment contending that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the subsequent criminal cases. He also contends that he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before petitioner can be validly arrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence Held: The Supreme Court held that a convict granted conditional pardon, who is recommitted must be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offenses can be imposed upon him in conformity with the provision of Art. 159 of the revised penal code. However, the determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either purely executive act, not subject to the judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code,or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction thereof by final judgment of a court, in order that the convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec. 64 (1) of the revised administrative code. The choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. People vs. Ochavido 142 SCRA 193 Facts: Ochavido and De Ocampo were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On January 1, 1978, while they were inside the Brigade 13 of the said penal institution, they stabbed to death another inmate, Gavino Caponpon. The stabbing was testified to by the appellants. An information was then filed against the accused stating they killed the victim with evident premeditation, trachery with aggravating circumstance of quasi recidivism, the accused having committed the crime charged while serving their sentence in the new Bilibid Prison. After trial, they were sentenced wit the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder attended with evident premeditation, treachery with aggravating circumstance of quasi recidivism Held: The claim that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation is well take. There is nothing in the record to show that the appellants had deliberated to kill the deceased. From their testimony, especially that of Ochivado, it appears that the killing was casual incident a spur of the moment when deceased went to the premises of the appellants. Upon the other hand, the record shows that he killing was qualified by treachery as testified by Ochivado that the victim was sitting down and was not in the position to defend himself (Caponpon) when he (Ochivado) stabbed him. The aggravating circumstance of quasirecidivism has not been proved and this is conceded by the Solicitor General in respect with Ochivado. As to de Ocampo, the Solocitor general claims the application of the circumstance because he admitted having shot someone for which he was sentenced 10 to 17 years. But there is nothing in the record to show that he was serving a final sentence, thus his crime can not be said to be aggravated by quasi-recidivism. In view of the foregoing, crime committed by the accused appellants is murder qualified by treachery without any attendant circumstance. The Supreme Court then modified the judgment of the trial court and sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnity the deceased jointly and severally the amount of P30, 0000.

Fajelga vs. Escarael 167 SCRA 350 Facts: Fajelga is the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle which he later on sold to Serenico Ablat, however, the deed of sale between them was not registered with the Bureau of Transportation. On November 5, 1979, Ablat signed and executed a deed of absolute sale of the said Kawasaki motorcycle for eight thousand five hundred pesos in favor of the government of Batanes represented by Provincial Engineer Telesforo Castillejos. The motorcycle was still then under the name of Fajelga. The motorcycle was purchased to be used by the Provincial Auditor Felix Balasi. However, the sale was not consummated because Felix resigned and the new Provincial Auditor, Eklena Alcantara, deemed the motorcycle impractical for her own use. Therefore, the sale was cancelled. Mrs. Alcantara then gave the cancelled vouchers and other supporting documents related to the sale, which she had received from the Provincial Treasurers office to the petitioner who allegedly placed the document in a cabinet in the Provincial Auditors office which was subsequently burned in a fire which occurred in the said office. Castillejos and Ablat was later on indicted for violation of R.A.3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, but were then acquitted. However, petitioner and his co-accused were convicted in a criminal case of falsification of public document by a public officer under paragraph 4, Art. 171 of the RPC. The petitioner was also held liable in criminal case of infidelity in the custody of documents under Paragraph 2, Art. 226 of the RPC. The petitioner moved for reconsideration and the Sandiganbayan modified its decision in the first criminal case by finding the petitioner and his co-accused guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence as defined and penalized under Art. 171 (2) in relation to Art 365 (1) of the RPC. Reconsideration of the second criminal case against the petitioner was however, denied. Petitioner now alleges that he can not be convicted of falsification under either par.2 or 4 of Art 171 of the RPC for he was not a party to the questioned deed of sale, nor did he impersonate anybody in furtherance of the sale. He also contends that to convict him with par.4 of art 171 would be to deprive him from his constitutional right against double jeopardy and that he can not be held liable for the sale was not consummated.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may be held liable for falsification under paragraph 2 and 4 of Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether or not the petitioner may be held liable for infidelity on the custody of documents under paragraph 2, art 226 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed Php 5,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: XXX par.2 Causing it to appear the persons have participated in any acts or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. XXX par.4 Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Commenting on the above provisions, Justice Albert, in his well-known work on the revised penal code, observes, on the authority of U.S vs. Reyes, that the perversion of truth in the narration of facts must be made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person; and on the authority of U.S vs. Lopez, the same author further maintains that even if such wrongful intent is proven, still the untruthful statement will not constitute the crime of falsification if there is no legal obligation to disclose the truth. With the authority of the same author, it has been said that in falsification of public document or official document under Art.171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is not enough that the falsification be committed by a public officer, it is also necessary that it should be committed by a public officer with abuse of his office, that is, in deeds, instruments, indentures, certificates, etc., in the execution of which he participates by reason of his office. In the instant case, however, the information alleged that the petitioner, although a public officer, acted in his private capacity. Hence there was no abuse of official position. In view thereof, the petitioner can not be convicted of falsification under Art. 171 if the Revised Penal Code. As to the petitioners conviction for infidelity in the custody of documents, it was held that the petitioners act does not constitute the said crime since not all of the elements which are. 1. that the offender be a public officer, 2. that there be a document abstracted , destroyed or cancelled; 3. that the document destroyed or abstracted be entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office; 4. that the damage of prejudice or to that of a third person be caused the removal, destruction or construction or concealment of such document are present. Hence, the petitioners act or omission, not having been met all the requisites of the offense of infidelity in the custody of documents exist, he can not be held liable thereof.

The People of the Philippines vs. Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores 113 Scra 613, April 27, 1982 Facts: On or about the 13th day of June, 1964, at the Magallanes Gate in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Masbate, Philippines, Rudy Regala stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., while in his performance of his official duty, when the latter prevented the entry of the former and his co-accused Delfin Flores to the exit gate of Magallanes. After the victim was stabbed by Rudy Regala, he, together with his co-accused ran away. An information was then filed against the accused by the provincial fiscal of Masbate with the Court of First Instance of Masbate contending that the accused killed the victim with evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of nighttime. After the trial, Rudy Regala was convicted for the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority with a penalty of death. However, acuused Delfin Flores was found guilty only as an accessory with a penalty of prision mayor. The accused then contends that the trial court erred in failing to give the accused of fair trail. Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied the due process of law. Held:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IGNACIO NABONG G.R.No. 36426, November 3, 1932 Facts: The appellant is was found guilty of the offense of sedition under Section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692 for the speech he delivered during the meeting of a communist group in Sta. Rosa Nueva Ecija. The speech was delivered in Tagalog, occupying some twenty minutes, in the course of his speech, Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary, using words substantiall to the following effect: They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug.-In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government of the poor. Use your whip so that there be marks on their sides. After the delivery of such speech, he was arrested. Issue: Whether or not the words used in the speech of Nabong is seditious under Sec. 8 of Act 292 Held: The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word overthrow could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip, an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have use impute to the language. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the Government, in violation of Section 8 of Act 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended The law is not aimed merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against constituted authorities.

CRISANTO EVANGELISATA VS. TOMAS EARNSHAW G.R. No. 36453, September 28, 1932 Facts: Plaintiff Crisanto Evangelista is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippines, a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence of men and women in ranks. On March 2, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant Mayor Tomas Earnshaw, the plaintiff requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones to be followed by a parade and to deliver to the Governor-General a massage from the laboring class. However, the defendant denied

the plaintiffs petition. In view thereof, the defendant contends that the Communist Party was deprived of a constitutional right and he further prays that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings and parade by the Communist Party in Manila. In his answer and special defense, the defendant stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-mentioned permit, it was discovered that an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said communist party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws. Issue: Whether or not the defendant violate the right of the Communist Party of peaceful assembly Held: The principal ideal of the C.P.P. in the desire to head the Philippine Government is different from the burgess political parties. It aims not to strengthen the capitalist government but to engender- as it cannot be avoided-the war of the classes and to bring about its downfall. By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant to the said Communist Party of the Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid association in different parts of the City to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up enmity against the insular and local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of the laborers and as tools of a capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the said laborers. The doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speech uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty. Considering the actions of the Communist Party, it is evident that he can not except that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades. The respondent mayor, whose sworn duty is to see that nothing should occur which could tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or the order of the government, did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law.