A Report On The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project

Submitted to: Prof. Jayasankar Variyar

By: Mayur Agrawal (11BCE1101) Avishek Banerjee (11BEE1010) Anurag Aryan (11BEE1079) Abhineet Singh (10BEE1006) Adarsh Modi (10BME1006)

SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

Narmada means ever-delightful, one of the holiest rivers in the country of India They say that even the site of the river will cleanse all of your sins

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The Narmada River is India's fifth longest river, starting in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and flowing west through the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat to the Gulf of Khambhat. The Sardar Sarovar Dam is only one of a proposed thirty large dams-ten to be built on the Narmada itself, and the rest on its tributaries. In addition to these 30 major dams, the Narmada Valley Project also envisions 135 medium and 3,000 minor dams. Proposals for damming the Narmada have been around for many decades but were delayed until the mideighties because of political wrangling over the sharing of the costs and benefits among the three states. The dream of political leaders and planning officials within Gujarat for many years, the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project finally commenced in 1987. Dam building is integral to India's development vision, which until recently was modelled on the Soviet style centralized, state-led economic development with an emphasis on industrialization. INTRODUCTION Sardar Sarovar Project is one of the biggest projects of Indian government which consists of more than 3000 dams including 30 big dams constructed on the river Narmada, a 1,312 km river which flows towards west from Amarkantak in Madhya Pradesh, touching Maharashtra and ending its course in Gujarat. The SSP is a multipurpose dam and canal system; its primary objectives are power generation, irrigation and drinking water. It is situated in Gujarat. It is the

second biggest of all the dams proposed on the Narmada River and its canal system is projected to be the largest in the world. Gujarat gets most of the benefits from this dam because the dam is situated in Gujarat only. The total land which is submerged due to this project is 37,533 hectares which is primarily affecting the state of Madhya Pradesh (around 55%) and also state of Maharashtra.

Sardar Sarovar will comprise a 455 feet-high dam ( but it now stands at 340 feet), a 214 kilometer-long reservoir, a riverbed powerhouse, power transmission lines, main canal, canal head powerhouse, and an extensive irrigation network. The irrigation envisaged shall be carried out through an 80,000-kilometer long network of canals. All this shall require approximately 85,000 hectares of land, complex engineering, and immense resources. As initially planned the key feature of SSP was to be a 138 meter high dam across the Narmada River in eastern Gujarat that is to provide irrigation water for 1.8 million hectares and have hydropower installed capacity of 1,450 megawatts. How what the Indians refer to as Resettlement and Rehabilitation 1 was to be carried out was stipulated by the 1979 report of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (the Tribunal). Because the Project authorities have ignored the Tribunals provisions from the start, opposition began to build up in the early and mid1980s. Several NGOs were involved. Initially their main concern was to improve the resettlement process according to the Tribunal and the guidelines of the World Bank. As it became increasingly clear that the political will to undertake a credible resettlement program not only was absent, but that the project authorities were willing to use the police to harass project affected people, the activities of all but one of the major NGOs shifted to opposition in the second half of the 1980s. Since then opposition has strengthened. Firstly, the fact that this project involves four states Gujarat, MP, Maharashtra and Rajasthan with the state of Gujarat receiving most of the benefits of the project have repeatedly led to

disagreements among the concerned states. Secondly, the nature of Indian water law, which makes control over water largely a prerogative of the States with some oversight of the Central government in inter-state matters, provided the background for the setting of complex inter-state institutional machinery to oversee the development of the project. This was also the basis for the setting up of a special tribunal, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), to adjudicate the claims of the concerned states. Thirdly, the involvement of the World Bank in the SSP was also a landmark. It not only led to the commissioning of an independent enquiry of an on-going project but also led the bank to take the unprecedented step of withdrawing from a funded project. This withdrawal had further significant repercussions at the international level. In particular, it led the World Bank to set up its first internal accountability mechanism, the Inspection Panel. The SSP fiasco also constituted one of the triggers for the setting up of the World Commission on Dams. Fourthly, the SSP is also a landmark project from the point of view of social movements. While it is now very likely that the dam will be completed as projected by the project promoters, the work undertaken by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and other organisations and individuals in the context of the SSP has had important impacts in India and abroad. Thus, to take but one example, before the NBA brought the issue of displacement to the forefront of the policy agenda, oustees had merely been seen as incidental costs of development, so much so that until the early 1990s there were no figures indicating the extent of displacement generated by projects.1 Overall, regardless of whether oustees are actually resettled or not according to the legal framework put in place and regardless of whether the project eventually fulfils all the environmental and other conditions that have been set over time, the SSP will remain a milestone that has significantly contributed to transforming and redefining people's movements and activism in India and abroad. Throughout agriculture is dominated by food crops for local consumption and sale. Rain fed agriculture, livestock management, and foraging, complemented by flood recession agriculture and fishing along the Narmada, are the main village activities in the tribal areas. Upriver in Madhya Pradesh, wealthier peasants irrigate their fields from wells and by pumping water from the Narmada. Crops are marketed locally with Badwani (35,000 in the mid-1980s) being the largest affected town. Within the peasant villages class and caste divisions are even more pronounced in the Narmada valley than they are in the rest of the country, perhaps due to the middle Narmada basin being relatively isolated from the rest of India.

SALIENT FEATURES OF SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT

I. LOCATION State District Taluka River II. HYDROLOGY Watershed area of the river above dam site. Mean annual rainfall Annual run-off at dam site at 50% dependability at 75% dependability at 90% dependability Designed flood (1 in 1000 years) III. RESERVOIR 138.68 m (455 ft) 140.21 m (460 ft) 110.64 m (363 ft) 25.91 m (85 ft) 0.95 Million ha m (7.70 MAF) 0.37 Million ha m 2.97 MAF 0.58 Million ha m (4.73 MAF) 0.06 Million ha m (0.5 MAF) 37533 ha Full 1 3 4 Gujarat Narmada Rajpipla (Nandod) Narmada 88000 sq km (33970 sq.mile) 1 120mm (44.10 inch.) 4.10 Mha m (33.20 MAF) 3.36 Mha m (27.22 MAF) 2.44 Mha m (19.77 MAF) 87000 Cumecs (30.7 lakh cusecs)

Full Reservoir Level (FRL) Maximum Water Level (MWL) Minimum Draw Down Level (MDDL) Nonnal tail Water Level (NTWL) Gross Storage Capacity Dead Storage Capacity Live Storage Capacity Annual evaporation Submergence at FRL 138.68m(455 ft) No. of villages affected Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Gujarat Total

Partial 192 33 19 244

No. of families affected Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Gujarat Total IV. DAM Type Length Maximum height Top of dam Crest Spillways Service spillway Auxiliary spillway Crest gates Type Size Constructiun siuices at EL. i8.0m River sluices at EL. 53.00m V. POWER INSTALLATION (CHPH) General Location No. of units Rated capacity of each unit Installed capacity Type of turbines Type of Power House Turbine Rated speed Dia. of runner Max. head race level Min. head race level Max. tail water level Min. tail water level Output at 46.13 m head (Max.) Output at 36 m head (Design) Output at 18.12 m head (Min.) Discharge at 46.13 m head (Max.) Discharge at 36 m head (Design) Discharge at 18.12 m head (Min.)

33104 3698 4728 41440 Concrete Gravity 1210.02m 163.00 m EL 146.50 m EL 121.92 m 23 bays 60 ft (18.30 m) each 7 bays 60 ft (18.30 m) each Radial 18.30 mx 16.76 m (23 Nos.) 18.30 mx 18.30 m (7 Nos) 2.10 m x 2.74 m (10 Nos) Closed in Feb 94 2.5m x 3.6 m (4 Nos.)

Right bank 5 50 MW 250MW Kaplan (Conventional) Surface 136.4 RPM 4.7 m 138.20 m 110.18 m 95.10 m 92.07 m 56.4 MW 51.265 MW 18.575 MW 135.5 Cumecs 157.6 Cumecs 118.5 Cumecs

Generator Generator rated output Max. cant. output Line voltage Power Factor Frequency VI. POWER INSTALLATION (RBPH) General Location No. of units Rated capacity of each unit Installed capacity Type of turbines Type of Power House Turbine Rated speed Dia of runner Max. head race level Min. head race level Max. tail water level Mill. tail water level Turbine Mode Output at 116.6.6 m head (Max.) Output at 100 head (Design) Output at 75 m head (Min.) Discharge at 116.6 m head (Max.) Discharge at 100 m head (Design) Discharge at 75 m head (Min.) Pumping Mode Input at 114 m head (Max.) Input at 100 m head (Design) Input at 81 m head (Min.) Discharge at 114 m head (Max.) Discharge at 100 m head (Design) Discharge at 81 m head (Min.) Generator Generator rated output Line voltage Power Factor (Generating Mode) Power Factor (Motoring Mode) Frequency 136.36 RPM 5.7 m 138.68 m (FRL) 110.64 m (MDDL) 25.91 m 20.80 m 224.4 MW 204 MW 138 MW 212.3 Cumecs 227.5 Cumecs 219.1 Cumecs 204.5 MW 209.2 MW 207.5 MW 168.4 Cumecs 197.5 Cumecs 233.4 Cumecs 222.22 MVA 13.8 + 10% KY 0.9 (lag) 0.95 (lead) 50 (3% Hz) 50.556 MVA (50MW) 61.111 MVA (55 MW) 11.0 + 5% KY 0.9 (lag) 50(+3%) Hz

Right Bank 6 200 MW 1200 MW Francis (Reversible) Underground

VII. CANAL SYSTEM FSL at head regilator of main Canal Type of Canal Length

Base width in head reach FSD in head treach Discharge capacity in head reach Gross Command Area (GCA) Cuturable Command Area (CCA) Annual Irrigation VIII. Cost (Rs. Crore) Price Level Unit -1 Unit-II Unit-III Group-IV (Dam & Appurtenant works) Main Canal Hydro Power Works Branches & Dist. System Total Cost of the Project

91.45 m (300ft) Lined contour canal 458 Km upto Rajasthan border and 74 Km in Rajasthan 73.1 m 7.6 m 1132.68 cumecs (40000 cusecs) 34.286 lakh ha 21.190 lakh ha 17.92 lakh ha

1986-87* 1019.45 1588.54 979.95 2818.10 6406.04

1996-97** 4473.75 4410.00 2184.75 11850.00 22918.50

2000-01*** 6036.78^ 5216.35 2728.07 14578.17 28613.37

BENEFITS OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

WILD LIFE SANCTUARY

Many wild life centuries have been started in these areas like "Shoolpaneshewar wild life sanctuary" on left Bank, Wild Ass Sanctuary in little Rann of Kachchh, Black Buck National Park at Velavadar, Great Indian Bustard Sanctuary in Kachchh, Nal Sarovar Bird Sanctuary and Alia Bet at the mouth of River.

IRRIGATION

Sardar sarovar dam provides irrigation facilities to a large area of land around the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. It provides irrigation facilities to 18.45 lac hectares of land, covering 3112 villages of 73 talukas in 15 districts of Gujarat. It will also irrigate 75,000 hectares of land in the strategic desert districts of Barmer and Jallore in Rajasthan and 37,500 hectares in the tribal hilly tract of Maharashtra through lift. About 75% of the command area in Gujarat is drought prone while entire command (75,000 ha.) in Rajasthan is drought prone. Assured water supply will soon make this area drought proof. DRINKING WATER SUPPLY

It provides drinking water to a large number of villages and cities. A particular amount of water is provided for drinking to around 135 urban centers and 8215 villages (45% of total 18144 villages of Gujarat) for present population of 18 million and prospective population of 40 million by 2021. All the villages and urban centers of arid region of Saurashtra and Kachchh and all the villages who have no source of water who are affected by drought, salinity are benefitted. Water from dam is also supplied to various industries to meet their demands which help in industrial development also. POWER There are two power houses viz. River bed power house and canal head power house with an installed capacity of 1200 MW and 250 MW respectively. Power developed is shared by three states Madhya Pradesh - 57%, Maharashtra - 27% and Gujarat 16%. This power is very much useful for states who have very limited hydel power production at present. Apart from this several micro hydel power stations are also installed on branch canals where good amount of power can be produced.

FLOOD PROTECTION It will also provide flood protection to riverine reaches measuring 30,000 hectares covering 210 villages and Bharuch city and a population of 4.0 lac in Gujarat.

A Typical Flood Control Dam outflow graph

It will also provide flood protection to riverine reaches measuring 30,000 hectares covering 210 villages and Bharuch city and a population of 4.0 lac in Gujarat.

OTHER BENEFITS Benefits to small and marginal Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe farmers would be as under : Marginal farmers (< 1 ha.) Small farmers (1 to 2 ha.) Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FLOODING OF NAURAL HABITATS Frequent flooding of natural habitats leads to extinction of plants and animals. The riverine forests close to the river are more prone to damage. LOSS OF TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE The filling up of the hydroelectric reservoirs cause floods and many species of wildlife drown due to these floods 28.0 % 24.4% 8.7% 9.1%

INVOLUNTARY DISPLACEMENTS Construction of huge hydroelectric projects leads to the displacement of the people living nearby. These displacements cause great difficulty to the people as they have to adapt to new surroundings. DETERIORATION OF WATER QUALITY

The damming of rivers lead to reduced oxygenation and dilution of pollutants in water causing water decay. The lack of oxygen and underwater decay make the water unfit for drinking. DOWNRIVER HYDROLOGICAL CHANGES There can be a vast change in the ecosystem due to periodic flooding, water decay and other toxins caused by the hydroelectric project. River edge and coastal corrosion are prone to occur and even the formation of rivers and estuaries are affected by the dam. Induced desiccation of river below dam affects the flora and fauna as they are highly dependent on the river. WATER RELATED DISEASES Diseases such as malaria and typhoid often occur in warm climates and densely populated regions near the dam. The consumption of contaminated water can also lead to cholera, dysentery etc. FISH AND OTHER AQUATIC LIFE Hydroelectric projects have large effects on fish and other aquatic life. It has some positive effects such as increasing the area of available aquatic habitat which helps many fishes to breed and develop. Even though it has some good effects, the net impacts are often negative, some of the reason for this are: 1. The pathway for upriver and downriver migration is blocked.

2. Many aquatic species addicted to flowing water cannot survive in artificial lakes. 3. Change in the river flow pattern adversely affects many species. 4. Change in the water quality (such as amount of oxygen and other gases) in or below reservoirs kills fish and damage other aquatic habitats such as mollusks, crustaceans and other benthic organisms with limited mobility. FLOATING AQUATIC VEGETATION Floating aquatic vegetation can rapidly multiply in reservoirs with stagnant water, causing problem such as 1. Degradation of habitat for aquatic life 2. improved breeding ground for mosquitoes and other parasites 3. restricted swimming and navigation 4. Clogging of electro-mechanical equipment at dams 5. Increased water loss from some reservoirs LOSS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY Reservoirs basically inundate whole region on which dam is built thus causing destruction and loss of cultural property, archaeological property, and historical, paleontological and religious sites such as (OMKARESHWAR). Sometimes it floods whole city causing loss of roads, houses and other things. It is evident that the river Narmada along with its two banks and the adjoining regions had seen the early men bustle with activities. Indeed the entire region bears traces of Lithic, Iron, and Copper and Chalcolithic cultures. The Narmada basins besides providing shelter to the Pre and Protohistoric man had also been the home of many early Indian dynasties. Thus flourished the Mauryas, the Shungas, the Guptas, the Pushyabhutis, the Gurjara Pratiharas, the Rashtrakutas, the Kalachuris and Paramaras etc... The artifacts left by them made the entire region a treasure house of antiquities, a repository of different cultures, and a fact that always attracted the attention of the scholars. Surveys, explorations and excavations were carried out. Much was done by them but more remains to be done yet. RESERVIOR SEDIMENTATION Over long period of time, live storage and power generation are reduced by reservoir sedimentation, such that much of some projects hydroelectric energy might not be renewable over the long term. GREENHOUSE GASES

Greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide and methane) are released into the atmosphere from reservoirs that flood forests and other biomass, either slowly (as flooded organic matter decomposes) or rapidly (if the forest is cut and burned before reservoir filling). Greenhouse gases are widely considered to be the main cause of human-induced global climate change. Many hydroelectric reservoirs flood relatively little forest or other biomass. Moreover, most hydro projects generate sufficient electricity to more than offset the greenhouse gases which would otherwise have been produced by burning fossil fuels (natural gas, fuel oil, or coal) in power plants. However, some projects which flood extensive forest areas, such as the Balbina Dam in Amazonian Brazil, appear to emit greenhouse gases in greater amounts than would be produced by burning natural gas for many years of comparable ACCESS ROADS As dams are usually built in hilly areas which are sparsely populated, the environmental impacts of access roads generally exceed that of the reservoir. New access roads involve deforestation and induce major land use changes which results in loss of biodiversity, accelerated erosion and other environmental problems. Such an example is of Arun II in Nepal. POWER TRANSMISSION LINES Power transmission lines often result in reduction and fragmentation of forests so as to improve physical access to them for humans. Thus they indirectly facilitate further deforestation. Large birds are also sometimes killed in collisions with power lines in mountainous regions, or sometimes by electrocution. QUARRIES AND BORROW PITS Hydroelectric projects require quarries and borrow pits to provide materials for construction of the dam and other complementary works. Thus they decrease the area of natural habitats and agricultural lands which are lost to the project.

POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT LARGE DAMS MINIMISE THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS DETERIORATION OF WATER QUALITY
Water pollution control measures (such as sewage treatment plants or enforcement of industrial regulations) may be needed to improve reservoir water quality. Where poor water quality would result from the decay of flooded biomass, selective forest clearing within the impoundment area should be completed before reservoir filling.

LOSS OF TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE

Instead of drowning, the captured and relocated animals typically starve, are killed by competitors or predators, or fail to reproduce successfully, due to the limited carrying capacity of their new habitats. Wildlife rescue is most likely to be justified on conservation grounds if (a) The species rescued are globally threatened with extinction and (b) The relocation habitat is ecologically suitable and effectively protected. The most effective way to minimize wildlife mortality in hydroelectric projects is to choose dam sites which minimize the wildlife habitat flooded.

DOWNRIVER HYDROLOGICAL CHANGES

These adverse impacts can be minimized through careful management of water releases. Objectives to consider in optimizing water releases from the turbines and spillways include adequate downriver water supply for riparian ecosystems, reservoir and downriver fish survival, reservoir and downriver water quality, aquatic weed and disease vector control, irrigation and other human uses of water, downriver flood protection, recreation (such as whitewater boating), and, of course, power generation. Environmental management plans for hydroelectric projects should specify environmental water releases, including for dams owned or operated by the private sector.

WATER RELATED DISEASES

Corresponding public health measures should include preventive measures (such as awareness campaigns and window screens), monitoring of vectors and disease outbreaks, vector control, and clinical treatment of disease cases, as needed. Control of floating aquatic weeds near populated areas can reduce mosquito-borne disease risks.

FISH AND OTHER AQUATIC LIFE

Management of water releases may be needed for the survival of certain fish species, in and below the reservoir. Fish passage facilities (fish ladders, elevators, or trap-and-truck operations) are intended to help migratory fish move upriver past a dam; they are usually of limited effectiveness for various reasons (including the difficulty of ensuring safe downriver passage for many adults and fry). Fish hatcheries can be useful for maintaining populations of native species which can survive but not successfully reproduce within the reservoir. They are also often used for stocking the reservoir with economically desired species, although introducing non-native fish is often devastating to native species and not ecologically desirable. Fishing regulation is often essential to maintain viable populations of commercially valuable species, especially in the waters immediately below a dam where migratory fish species concentrate in high numbers and are unnaturally easy to catch.

FLOATING AQUATIC VEGETATION

Pollution control and pre-impoundment selective forest clearing will make reservoirs less conducive to aquatic weed growth. Physical removal or containment of floating aquatic weeds is

effective. Where compatible with other objectives (power generation, fish survival, etc.), occasional drawdown of reservoir water levels may be used to kill aquatic weeds. Chemical poisoning of weeds or related insect pests requires much environmental caution and is usually best avoided.

LOSS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

Structures and objects of cultural interest should undergo salvage wherever feasible through scientific inventory, careful physical relocation, and documentation and storage in museums or other appropriate facilities. However, it is often not possible to replace the loss of, or damage to, unique or sacred sites which may have great religious or ceremonial significance to indigenous or other local people.

RESERVOIR SEDIMENTATION
If effectively implemented, watershed management can minimize sedimentation and extend a reservoirs useful physical life, through the control of road construction, mining, agriculture, and other land use in the upper catchment area. Protected areas are sometimes established in upper catchments to reduce sediment flows into reservoirs. Aside from watershed management, other sediment management techniques for hydroelectric reservoirs may at times be physically and economically feasible; they include, among others, upstream check structures, protecting dam outlets, reservoir flushing, mechanical removal, and increasing the dams height.

ACCESS ROADS
The siting of any new access roads should be in the environmentally and socially least damaging corridors. Forests and other environmentally sensitive areas along the chosen road corridor should receive legal and on-the-ground protection. Road engineering should ensure proper drainage, to protect waterways and minimize erosion. Environmental rules for contractors (including penalties for noncompliance) should cover construction camp siting, gravel extraction, waste disposal, avoiding water pollution, worker behavior (such as no hunting), and other construction practices.

POWER TRANSMISSION LINES

Power lines should be sited to minimize these concerns and built using good environmental practices (as with roads). In areas with concentrations of vulnerable bird species, the top (grounding) wire should be made more visible with plastic devices. Electrocution (mainly of large birds of prey) should be avoided through bird-friendly tower design and proper spacing of conducting wires. ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project affected people's economic security in some very fundamental ways. Many people who were directly displaced as a result of the project received no economic

compensation whatsoever. People who were displaced as a result of the canal system, for example, were not considered to be covered under the 1979 Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal ruling concerning "oustees," and thus were not deemed to be entitled to resettlement. Indeed, many received little or no compensation for land lost, and no compensation for other resources, such as fruit trees, destroyed by the Sardar Sarovar project. For those who were supposed to be covered under the resettlement and rehabilitation program, there were still many forms of economic victimization. Many, if not most, of the people to be displaced by the development project were tribal "encroachers" on state land because they held no legal title to that land. Both the state of Maharashtra and the state of Madhya Pradesh chose to interpret the Tribunal ruling regarding "oustees" to mean that only those with formal title to land, and their adult sons, would be given land for land, despite the fact that this would make tribal people, who hold their land by customary usage, landless oustees . What must be understood here is that landlessness is an economic disaster for these people's well-being since land is their source of subsistence and knowledge of their local environment is their major skill. As the Narmada Control Authority stated in 1984, "For tribal, there is no rehabilitation more effective than providing land as the source of livelihood". Even for those who are covered under the resettlement and rehabilitation segment of the development project, their economic security was in many cases jeopardized, even to the point of displacing some family members from one mode of production (that of cultivator) to another, more insecure, mode of production (that of wage earner). In many cases, land which was given was too little or of poorer quality. In addition, the resettlement and rehabilitation policy did not recognize other aspects of economic livelihoods. It did not take into account economic practices such as fishing, pastoralism, and gathering. Also, the levels of economic productivity which result from local environmental and cultural knowledge has been, for the most part, ignored. Nor did the policy properly take into account the forms of economic security that arise as a result of people's social ties-"[people attribute their economic security to a long established web of human and geographical links within their community". These links, of course, would be destroyed where the community was not resettled as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the fact that even in the best case scenario for resettlement and rehabilitation, the process of displacement precedes that of relocation and rehabilitation. In other words, there is that period of time wherein people are living a transitory, double existence. There are relocation costs which often have to be paid out before compensation is given. There is also a readjustment period, wherein land must be made ready to cultivate, and the general quirks of a new and different environment adjusted to. Baviskar gives an example of one aspect of the transitionary impact that the Sardar Sarovar Project had on Anjanvara, the village she had lived in just prior to the dam project: A hand-pump for the village was sanctioned several years ago, but never installed because the village lies in the submergence zone of the dam. So the last few years and the present have been held captive to an uncertain future. All of these transitionary problems negatively impact on economic security. In some cases, they may even prove to cause yet further displacement in the future. CULTURE

Many of these people are also victimized in terms of their cultural well-being. Perhaps the most important means of cultural victimization is the policy stance taken by both the state of Maharashtra and the state of Madhya Pradesh. "Oustees" have the choice of being resettled within their own state, but for many there is very little in the way of a real choice. Most "oustees" in these two states would be considered landless oustees (eligible only for a house lot) because they hold no legal title to land. However, in the state of Gujarat they would be given a minimum of 2 hectares of land. Also, the state of Gujarat has more land available in larger sections, allowing for the potential of at least some families or community groups to resettle together worse and Berger. However in cultural terms, resettling in Gujarat is a loss. For many it would mean moving away from other important family and other social ties. As well, language would become even more of a barrier, since few tribal men and no tribal women know languages other than their own and even then it would be only the official language of the state that they live in. Resettlement threatens to culturally victimize people in other ways. These displaced people must adapt their lifestyle in that they are often "moving from relative isolation and independence to a high degree of dependence on public institutions and services to protect against disastrous consequences of the move". Also, the caste system and a general lack of social ties has meant that for those resettled, there is almost always little in the way of social bonding with other established communities in the area, leading to social isolation. In all cases where people have resettled, they have expressed a feeling of loss over leaving their home and their gods. Included in this list of losses are even the basics of privacy-many women who were interviewed bemoaned the loss of privacy that the forest provides for bathing and performing their "ablutions". HEALTH The physical and psychological wellbeing of all of those who experienced a drop in the standard of their living would potentially be threatened as a result of the resettlement process. As discussed earlier, the loss of one's culture, place, and economic security would certainly affect psychological well-being. And in many cases, even a temporary drop in economic livelihood could result in a loss of access to an adequate and nutritious diet, which would especially affect the health of the very young. "In 1988, the Tata Institute reported unusually high mortality rates among Manibeli oustees, especially children, for the first years of relocation". Stress and anxiety which would result simply from the anticipation of having to move could quite possibly have both physical and psychological effects. In addition, many of the resettled areas are lacking in basic infrastructure, such as working water pumps and proper, comfortable housing

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

The first and the foremost is that Sardar Sarovar claims to but cannot solve the water crisis of Gujarat. The project is planned; they claim to irrigate 14 % of Gujarat's cultivatable land and to supply drinking water to 8215 villages and 135 towns and cities in Gujarat. It is pertinent to note here that the claimed SSP command area includes only 9.24% cultivable land of Saurashtra and 1.5% cultivable land of Kutch. Drinking water is an aspect - they have begun publicising much more during the last two to three years than before since the other benefits have been exposed to be unfounded. And yet, you may

be shocked to know that not one paisa is allocated for water supply (lifting pipeline etc.) in Sardar Sarovar Project. This clearly indicates the Governments priority for drinking water benefits which are left to the mostly bankrupt Gram-Panchyats and Municipal councils as well as for corporations to implement. The fact is that drinking water, as was stated in the Gujarat's proposal to the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) was never a priority or planned benefit for the rural Gujarat. Only the Municipal areas were to receive some water along with industries therein (the combined magnitude being about one ninth of Gujarat's share from SSP, not even clearly divided into two sub-categories). The number of villages said to be receiving drinking water is swollen merely on political grounds, including all villages, in Kutch and Saurashtra, without any basis, neither any change in allocation of water nor finances. The displacement created by the dam has a number of direct and indirect impacts. A large number of families were displaced but there was no fixed estimate about the exact number of families who were displaced. The figure kept on rising. The state governments were not having enough land to resettle displaced people nor were they having enough funds to buy land. Madhya Pradesh state was severely affected by this problem. So the case of resettlement was failure to large extent in case of SSP. However the affected families which have been provided resettlement and rehabilitation were provided with the following:Resettlement and Rehabilitation Package for Project Affected Families 2 hectares irrigable Agriculture land. Residential plot of 500 Sq. Mts. Assistance of Rs. 45000/- for the construction of house. Subsistence allowance of Rs. 4500/-. Assistance of Rs.7000/- for procuring productive assets like bullocks and agricultural equipments. Resettlement grant of Rs. 750/-. Street light and internal electrification of 1.5 point free of cost in Core House. Personal accident insurance etc. A school and children's park in each resettlement site. Dispensary in each site where MP and MH oustees are resettled. Since there was delay in the starting of the Sardar sarovar project therefore it caused a huge loss to the Indian government. Earlier when the project was started the authority officials claimed that siltation is not going to cause much problem in this project. But when the project started then the amount of siltation was very much as compared to what predicted before so the government decided to get rid of this problem as this decreased the energy production which also costed a lot to the Indian Government.

CONTROVERSIES OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM Narmada Struggle Fact Sheet 30 Big Dams, 135 Medium Dams, 3000 Small Dams Height of Sardar Sarovar Dam 455 feet Benefits Irrigation, Electricity Beneficiaries Industries and rich farmers Displacement 400000 tribals and marginal farmers Submergence Area - 36,000 ha Current Height - 340 feet Status of Rehabilitation 50000 families in need of rehabilitation

Ruke na jo Ruke na jo, jhuke na jo, dabe na jo, mite na jo, Hum who inquilab hein, julm ka jawab hein. (Lines used during protest) Controversy over the dam projects on the Narmada, a river running through central India and the axis of life for countless rural and tribal communities living on its banks, erupted in the nascent stages of planning and shows little sign of receding. Songs like the one above, sung at community gatherings protesting the dams, underscore the defiance, resolution, and anger of a people forced to live in uncertainty for decades. The Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), which is spearheading the protest, says the project will displace more than 200,000 people apart from damaging the fragile ecology of the region. NBA activists say the dams will submerge forest farmland, disrupt downstream fisheries and possibly inundate and salinate land along the canals, increasing the prospect of insect-borne diseases. Some scientists have added to the debate saying the construction of large dams could cause earthquakes. They say that in a country as disorganised as India, it is likely that the necessary maintenance of these dams may suffer. But those in favour of the project say that the project will supply water to 30m people and irrigate crops to feed another 20m people. In what was seen as a major victory for the anti-dam activists, the World Bank withdrew from the Narmada project in 1993.

Several other international financial institutions also pulled out citing human and environmental concerns. The construction of Sardar Sarovar dam itself was stopped soon afterwards. Go ahead However, in October 2000, the Indian Supreme Court gave a go-ahead for the construction of the dam. The court ruled that the height of the dam could be raised to 121.92 metres and no higher, until cleared by an environmental authority appointed to undertake the task. This is far below the proposed height of 130 metres, but higher than the 88 metres that the anti-dam activists want. Opponents of the dam question the basic assumptions of the Narmada Valley Development Plan and believe that its planning is unjust and iniquitous and the cost-benefit analysis is grossly inflated in favour of building the dams. They claim that the plans rest on untrue and unfounded assumptions of hydrology and seismicity of the area and the construction is causing large scale abuse of human rights and displacement of many poor and underprivileged communities. They also believe that water and energy can be provided to the people of the Narmada Valley, Gujarat and other regions through alternative technologies and planning processes which can be socially just and economically and environmentally sustainable. They claim that large numbers of poor and underprivileged communities (mostly tribals and dalits) are being dispossessed of their livelihood and even their ways of living to make way for dams being built Large dams imply large budgets for related projects leading to large profits for a small group of people. A mass of research shows that even on purely technical grounds, large dams have been colossal failures. While they have delivered only a fraction of their purported benefits, they have had an extremely devastating effect on the riverine ecosystem and have rendered destitute large numbers of people (whose entire sustenance and modes of living are centred on the river). For no large dam in India has it been shown that the resettled people have been provided with just compensation and rehabilitation. Critics say that Sardar Sarovar takes up over 80% of Gujarats irrigation budget but has only 1.6% of cultivable land in Kutch, 9% of cultivable land in Saurashtra and 20% cultivable land in North Gujarat in its command area. Moreover, these areas are at the tail-end of the command and would get water only after all the area along the canal path get their share of the water, and that too after 2020 AD. In summary, they fear that all available indicators suggest that these needy areas are never going to benefit from the Sardar Sarovar Project. So as the anti-dam activists ponder their next move, the government has started again with construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam. PROTESTS The dam is one of India's most controversial dam projects and its environmental impact and net costs and benefits are widely debated. The World Bank was initially a funder of the SSD, but withdrew in 1994. The Narmada Dam has been the center of controversy and protest since the late 1980s.

Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that mobilised tribal people, adivasis, farmers, environmentalists and human rights activists against the Sardar Sarovar Dam being built across the Narmada River, Gujarat, India. Their mode of campaign includes hunger strikes and garnering support from noted film and art personalities (notably Bollywood film actor Aamir Khan). Narmada Bachao Andolan, together with its leading spokespersons Medha Patkar and Baba Amte, were the 1991 recipient of the Right Livelihood Award. Narmada Bachao Andolan is the voice of hundreds of thousands of indigenous people and peasants who are losing their land and livelihoods to large dams on the Narmada River. The nonviolent satyagraha (insistence on truth) of the displaced people for their rehabilitation has spanned two decades, challenging the centralized development programs and envisioning alternatives. The movement has won policy changes in World Bank and other multi-lateral funding agencies. The demands of NBA include land-for-land rehabilitation of the displaced people and equitable distribution of natural resources and benefits of such projects. There were a lot of protests regarding the dam, the protest by Medha Patkar, the leader of the "Narmada Bachao Andolan" the "Save Narmada Movement. The movement was cemented in 1989, and was awarded the Right Livelihood Award in 1991. Protests also came from Indian

author Arundhati Roy, who wrote the extended essay "The Greater Common Good" in protest of the Narmada Dam Project. While its resettlement requirements, such as resettlement and rehabilitation six months before inundation, continued to be ignored by the project authorities, the main response of the Supreme Court during 2001 was to issue contempt notices to the most prominent opposition leaders when they questioned the Courts decision. Again outrage was expressed by different levels of Indian society as well as by such prominent outsiders as author Salman Rushdie who asked in an August 7, 2001 New York Times article Can it be that the Supreme Court of the worlds largest democracy will reveal itself to be biased against free speech and be prepared to act the bidding of a powerful interest group a coalition of political and financial interests behind the Narmada Dam? Construction work on the Sardar Sarovar Dam site, which had continued sporadically since 1961, began in earnest in 1988. At the time, nobody, not the Government, nor the World Bank were aware that a woman called Medha Patkar had been wandering through the villages slated to be submerged, asking people whether they had any idea of the plans the Government had in store for them. When she arrived in the valley all those years ago, opposing the construction of the dam was the furthest thing from her mind. Her chief concern was that displaced villagers should be resettled in an equitable, humane way. It gradually became clear to her that the Government's intentions towards them were far from honourable. By 1986 word had spread and each state had a peoples' organisation that questioned the promises about resettlement and rehabilitation that were being bandied about by Government officials. It was only some years later that the full extent of the horror - the impact that the dams would have, both on the people who were to be displaced and the people who were supposed to benefit - began to surface. The Narmada Valley Development Project came to be known as India's Greatest Planned Environmental Disaster. The various peoples' organisations massed into a single organisation and the Narmada Bachao Andolan - the extraordinary NBA - was born. In September 2001 the Government of Maharashtra agreed under pressure to set up a Joint Task Force on resettlement with NBA and other non-governmental members. The Task Forces 2002 report concluded that resettlement was incomplete with 3,100 families yet to be physically relocated as required, while rehabilitation was incomplete for the 500 families that had moved. Yet in May 2002 the dam was further heightened to 95 meters. Rising waters during the JulySeptember monsoon devastated crops and houses in still to be resettled villages. Further ignoring noncompliance with its requirements, in September 2002 the Supreme Court closed the door to further legal challenges by dismissing, without reviewing the issues, a NBA case challenging the legality of raising the height of the dam beyond 90 meters. The following May 2003, further heightening to 100 meters was approved. The 2003 monsoon began with heavy rains in July with flooding worsened when water was released from the upriver Tawa Dam. By the end of August, over 12,000 yet to be resettled families had been adversely affected by flooding. 3,000 of those families lived in Maharashtras 33 affected villages; 10,000 families lived in over 80 villages in Madhya Pradesh. Throughout the 2000-2003 periods, the project authorities made promises to carry out their legally required R & R responsibilities only after fasting threatened the lives of protestors, including Medha Patkar in both 2002 and 2003, or after visits by prominent persons. Once fasts ended and visitors left promises were either ignored or dealt with in a token fashion.

In the meanwhile, police in both Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh continued to abuse village and NGO protestors while the three governments continued to deny benefits to categories of people covered by the Tribunal. The situation reported from Chimalkhedi Village in Maharastra illustrates the unacceptable behaviour of government personnel including the police. During the 2003 monsoon, the village became an island surrounded by floodwater. Since houses and some fields had not been inundated, the villagers were denied resettlement benefits. Fearing bad publicity if some drowned, the police arrested and removed 74 people and had some of their houses destroyed while they were absent. 3 Across the Narmada in Madhya Pradesh, the Government, claiming no land was available, continued to pressure villagers to accept cash compensation in violation of both the terms of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court. By the end of the 20th century, the Narmada River has become a symbol for two cultures in conflict that advocate very different futures for the Indian sub-continent. The first supports a free flowing river without dams, with living standards to be raised by a wide range of community-based initiatives with central and state government and NGO assistance. The second, believing the flow of monsoon rains into the Arabian Sea to be a waste, takes the large project approach. It advocates the most ambitious program of river basin development in Indian history and perhaps in the world. Arising relatively recently, the conflict between these two visions has become a major national issue, with international implications, that has involved the Supreme Court of India as well as the current President and various Prime Ministers. These conflicting visions for the Narmadas future arose only recently because of the earlier inability of the three states to agree on how the Narmadas water resources should be divided between them. As in other river basins throughout India, ambitious development plans had been drawn up in the 1950s and 1960s. Having failed in previous attempts to adjudicate an agreement between the states, the Government of India appointed a Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (the Tribunal) in the late 1960s. Illustrating the complexities involved, it took the Tribunal over ten years to produce a final report in 1979 that was acceptable to the three states, plus Rajasthan which was to benefit from receipt of irrigation water. Not only did the Tribunals Report allocate benefits and financial costs for SSP between the four states, but it also detailed the conditions under which resettlement from the reservoir basin was to be carried out. Gujarat as the main beneficiary would be responsible for all resettlement costs as was the case with Egypt in connection with the Aswan High Dam. The reports provisions were to be legally binding on the four states for a forty-five year period. HEIGHT ISSUES

In February 1999, the Supreme Court of India gave the go ahead for the dam's height to be raised to 88 m from the initial 80 m. In October 2000 again, in a 2 to 1 majority judgment in the Supreme Court, the government was allowed to construct the dam up to 90 m. In May 2002, the Narmada Control Authority approved increasing the height of the dam to 95 m. In March 2004, the Authority allowed a 15 m height increase to 110 m. In March 2006, the Narmada Control Authority gave clearance for the height of the dam to increase from 110.64 m to 121.92 m. This proposal was declined by the Supreme Court. There was a hunger strike conducted by Narendra Modi due to the government allowing the increase of the height of the dam. The increasing height only led to the increase in displacement of people.

Why Modify Sardar Sarovar Project by choosing other alternatives to the project?
Gujarat has experienced very catastrophic earthquakes of very high magnitude on the Richter scale and the damaging consequences of Bhuj earthquake are similar to those caused by catastrophic Himalayan Earthquakes. The Sardar Sarovar project being located over a major fault zone surrounded by several lineaments, major earthquakes are bound to occur in the dam area during its life time when the dam may experience fissures similar to the ones experienced by the Koyna dam and result in its failure. The seismic co-efficient of 0.125g used for the design of the dam is unsafe because of the location of the dam in the rift zone on a seismic highway. The old concept of a seismic design used by civil and structural engineers for major structures has

been shattered by the failures of major structures under Kobe earthquake of Japan. Since there are major dams upstream of Sardar Sarovar, the failure of one or more of these dams during torrential cyclonic rains may cause extreme floods at Sardar Sarovar when the dam may collapse, thereby unleashing extensive peak floods that will cause a major disaster for millions of people and industries in the extensive region covered by Baroda and Bharuch districts. Several dams were unscientifically designed by the engineers of Gujarat and the Central Government and some of them including Machchu-II dam failed because the engineers failed to visualize that the highest observed floods could be more than the spillway design flood used by them. There is no guarantee that the Sardar Sarovar dam has been scientifically designed by using peak maximum flood likely to be experienced under the worst meteorological conditions influenced by the increasing global warming effects and hence Sardar Sarovar dam may fail due to extreme flood events also. Hence further increase in the height of the dam should be immediately stopped and fresh Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report must be prepared as envisaged by the Supreme Court by taking into consideration the latest seismological changes caused by the Bhuj earthquake and the Mumbai flood havoc of July 2005 caused by the crucial weather events due to the global warming effects. In the alternative the hydro-power sought to be generated by this project must be produced by using alternate energy sources like coal, oil and natural gas. The irrigation water supply for Kheda district must be provided by the Sardar Sarovar canal and the Mahi river water from Kadana dam thus saved must be supplied to Rajasthan by taking up a link canal so that extensive upland areas of North Eastern Gujarat districts may get the benefit of substantial drinking and irrigation water supplies. In the downstream of the dam there are a number of towns and cities and several villages which might be affected in case the proposed dam bursts due to a maximum credible accident caused by floods, earth quakes and other causes. Hence a preliminary dam, break analysis has been carried out to create public awareness on the project and its environmental impacts. so that the social workers and intellectuals along with the industrialists in the Bharuch and Vadodara districts can come forward to grasp the basic fact that while the existing peak floods are already causing untold public misery and industrial damage at an enormous cost the additional incremental increase of the peak floods will be several times higher with the result that millions of people in the downstream districts of Sardar Sarovar dam will be washed away into the Arabian sea if the dam were to burst during the night hours in the peak rainy season when there could be torrential rains due to cyclonic weather conditions that persist for a considerable length of time as had happened in Mumbai flood havoc of July 2005.

SELECTED OUTPUT DATA ON INUNDATION DOWNSTREAM OF SARDAR SAROVAR DUE TO A HYPOTHETICAL DAM BREAK CAUSED BY A MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT

Distance of stations from dam (Km) 000 10.586 20.290 30.771 40.102 50.211 60.087 70.585 80.514 90.356 100.114 110.220 120.530 130.528

Max. Elevation of flood (m) 58.54 52.84 48.13 43.19 39.07 34.33 30.04 27.04 24.99 23.19 21.46 19.66 17.92 15.94

Max. flood flow (cusecs) 350838 325657 315550 305421 288175 270148 255076 237416 220748 205438 190640 173935 149777 125027

Hours for Max flood to reach station 2.275 2.950 3.750 5.075 6.400 8.100 10.500 13.200 15.475 17.500 19.10 20.70 22.30 23.90

Max velocity (m/s)

10.40 7.46 5.84 5.34 4.69 4.24 3.13 2.40 2.10 1.90 1.75 1.59 1.51 1.63

Resettlement
Introduction To document the duplicity of SSP authorities at both the state and central levels it is necessary to analyse in detail the resettlement planning and implementation process over a forty year period. One issue is pulled out for separate analysis. That describes the lengths to which the Government of Gujarat went to discourage resettlers from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh from resettling within the SSP command area an option that was required by the Tribunal to spread irrigation benefits beyond Gujarat. Overview: The 1960s In April 1961 Prime Minister Nehru laid the foundation stone for the Sardar Sarovar Dam. Resettlement began that year with the eviction of villagers from what became the Kevardia construction community adjacent to the dam site even though the three states had yet to agree on how to share the Narmadas water resources. Kevardia was carefully designed for the benefit of those overseeing project implementation with little attention paid to how current residents might benefit or to the contribution that the construction colony might make to the future regional development of the surrounding area. As with others resettled before the May 1985 World Bank SSP agreement with the governments of India and the three states, all those involved were to receive, retroactively, the same benefits as those relocated after May 1985. In 1993, when the remainder of the World Bank SSP loan was cancelled, such benefits had yet to be received. Depending on definitions, six to eight villages were displaced. Number of families involved is unknown. Based on the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, policies for acquiring land not only were

restricted to cash compensation, but provided such compensation only to those with legal title to official revenue lands. That excluded those cultivating fields in government declared forests or wastelands regardless of how long such land had been under cultivation and regardless of whether or not it had been previously cultivated under customary tenure. Also excluded were all families and their heirs that had joint use under customary tenure arrangements of legal land that the government had listed under only one name. According to the two NGOs working in the area in the 1980s ARCH-Vahini and the Rajpipla Social Services Society such joint tenancies often involved three or more families whose welfare depended on continued use. Resettlement placed most at risk since government-recognized owners could now terminate the rights of the other families that had been recognized under customary law. Since some individuals did just that, this aspect of official resettlement policy not only increased resettler poverty, but also created enmity between father and sons, brothers, and other kin who formerly had worked together as joint users. Informed by Gujarat officials those 165 revenue landholders and 120 landless families were displaced, the Independent Review estimated that 950 individuals would have undergone compulsory resettlement in the early 1960s. Landless families would have received no compensation even though their welfare might have depended on the sharecropping or loan of the more than 50 per cent of village lands that were acquired by the project. As for those who received at least some compensation, what evidence is available and there is no reliable counter evidence from government sources is that it was insufficient to acquire equivalent lands. Though I did not have time to look into the situation in detail in the 1980s, what I did learn caused me to write in a notebook in 1984 that in general those who received compensation were miserable and those who did not were even more miserable. Nine years later the Independent Review noted that the government of Gujarat continued to ignore the plight of those involved. The 1970s As far as resettlement is concerned the main event of the 1970s was the release of the Tribunals Report in 1979. Though its provisions advanced Indias resettlement policy, they also had major limitations. The advances related primarily to families from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra who lost to the project 25 per cent or more of the land to which they had legal title. So as to spread the irrigation benefits of the SSP more widely, each such family, as well as their major sons who were 18 years of age or older, had the option to resettle in Gujarat on two hectares of irrigable land within the SSP command area.

That land-for-land requirement was a major advance on previous policies based primarily on cash compensation. Landless families had the same option of resettling within the SSP command area, although the only land they would be entitled to would be a house plot. Similar conditions were to apply if resettlers opted to remain in their home state. As with those going to Gujarat, the Tribunal also stipulated as a guiding principle that all resettlers should be moved in social units of their own choice, with new communities to be provided with potable water, roads, schools and other social infrastructure. As for major weaknesses, resettlers from Gujarat were ignored as were those in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra who were landless or cultivators on government lands called encroachers, the latter were considered as landless people even though they may have been cultivating the land involved for many years and though it may have been land over which they formerly had had customary tenure. Furthermore, even the best features of the Tribunals provisions might be relatively meaningless, since the global experience with resettlement suggested that the large majority of MP and Maharashtra resettlers would wish to remain within their home states. That proved to be the case in both states so long as people had an option. In Madhya Pradesh 86 percent of potential oustees [the Indian term for resettlers] stated a preference to relocate within 50 km of their current homes, with 54 percent preferring resettlement within 20 kilometers of their village. In Maharashtra 26 of the 36 villages preferred local resettlement. A year later the Government of Gujarat passed a resolution that provided similar benefits to legal owners of land in their own 19 villages with the exception that it was not stipulated that the two hectares of irrigable land would be within the SSP command area. That omission provided project authorities with a loop hole that they subsequently used to avoid the two hectare requirement and the need to provide community infrastructure. Knowing that the villagers had a strong preference to relocate no further than 25 kilometres from their current homes so as to remain within village clusters that were linked together by marriage networks, the authorities offered land at a greater distance 100 km in one case and 220 km in another. As stated in my

1983 report, That such land was offered at all suggests, at best, insensitivity to the preferences of oustees and, at worst, a conscious attempt on the part of officials to intentionally reduce the number of oustees seeking rehabilitation in government provided centres (such centres not only require government to provide blocks of land, but they also require more time and finance to implement). When resettlers refused to move to such distant lands among unfamiliar people, they were given cash compensation instead. Though some help was provided in finding land, with a few exceptions, insufficient land was acquired to allow people in resettle in social units of their choice. Moreover, cash compensation was based on the assessed value of the land rather than on its replacement value. In an inflationary land market, monies received were seldom sufficient for purchasing equivalent land. As for the landless and encroachers, they were ignored under the 1979 resolution. The number of villages that would receive drinking water was zero in 1979, 4,719 in the early eighties, 7,234 in 1990 and 8,215 in 1991. When challenged, the Government admitted that these figures for 1991 included 236 uninhabited villages! Every aspect of the project is approached in this almost cavalier manner, as if it's a family board game. Even when it concerns the lives and futures of vast numbers of people. In 1979 the number of families that would be displaced by the Sardar Sarovar reservoir was estimated to be a little over 6,000. In 1987 it grew to 12,000. In 1991 it surged to 27,000. In 1992 the Government declared that 40,000 families would be affected. Today, it hovers between 40,000 and 41,500. (Of course, even this is an absurd figure, because the reservoir isn't the only thing that displaces people. According to the NBA the actual figure is 85,000 families - about half a million people.) The estimated cost of the project bounced up from Rs.6,000 crores to Rs.20,000 crores (officially). The NBA says that it will cost Rs.40,000 crores. (Half the entire irrigation budget of the whole country over the last fifty years.) The Government claims the Sardar Sarovar Projects will produce 1450 Mega Watts of power. The thing about multi-purpose dams like the Sardar Sarovar is that their 'purposes' (irrigation, power production and flood-control) conflict with each other. Irrigation uses up the water you need to produce power. Flood control requires you to keep the reservoir empty during the monsoon months to deal with an anticipated surfeit of water. And if there's no surfeit, you're left with an empty dam. And this defeats the purpose of irrigation, which is to store the monsoon water. It's like the riddle of trying to ford a river with a fox, a chicken and a bag of grain. The result of these mutually conflicting aims, studies say, is that when the Sardar Sarovar Projects are completed, and the scheme is fully functional, it will end up producing only 3 per cent of the power that its planners say it will. 50 Mega Watts. The Sardar Sarovar Dam as Unethical Development

Development is supposed to be beneficial. It is supposed to be the creation of a better life. Within the context of a nation, the state is supposed to be committed to the development of the people as a whole. It has a responsibility to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of development projects, especially when they are state projects. Yet the potential benefits of the creation of the Sardar Sarovar Dam are to accrue to a better-off segment of Indian society-those who can afford electricity and those who hold land in Gujarat or Rajasthan which would become properly irrigated as a result of the development project. In turn, the costs are largely being born by an already disadvantaged segment of society- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Many members of these groups do not have formal title to their lands and therefore little recourse to mainstream legal channels when it comes to compensation. This leaves the vast majority of displaced people with practically no bargaining power over their fate. Although there are provisions to resettle and rehabilitate at least some of the people who will be displaced as a result of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, resettlement still generally means a drop in the quality of living.(An exception are those resettled in the "model" sites which proponents of the dam project have topping the tour list.) The resettlement and rehabilitation project, which is supposed to be a "development opportunity," is, in actual fact, undermining the economic livelihoods and quality of life of these people. Over the long term, this might even mean further displacement as essential needs are not met. As such, resettlement is not improving the standard of living as defined by the displaced people themselves. In addition, there are all those who, though harmed in various ways by the dam project, are not receiving even the inadequate compensation of rehabilitation, because they hold no formal title to the land or waters that they use for economic livelihood purposes. The Sardar Sarovar Dam is a case of a development project which is both directly and indirectly causing a massive amount of environmental displacement. This displacement is not limited to the present. Rather, the effects of both the dam project and its accompanying resettlement and rehabilitation project are setting the stage for further displacement by increasing people's economic vulnerability. Those who must bear the majority of the development costs in this project were neither properly consulted, nor compensated in ways acceptable to them. Moreover, the Sardar Sarovar Dam is development on the backs of the poor, as the people being displaced are amongst India's most vulnerable and disadvantaged social groups. For these reasons, the Sardar Sarovar Dam project cannot be considered to be ethical development.

REFERENCES The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project website- www.sardarsarovardam.org SSCAC's website- www.sscac.gov.in www.wikipedia.org URL- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sardar_Sarovar_Dam www.narmada.org URL- www.narmada.org/sardarsarovar.htm www.narmada.org/ENV/index.html www.supportnarmadadam.org URL- www.supportnarmadadam.org/sardar-sarovar-benefits.htm Google Images- http://www.google.co.in/imghp?hl=en&tab=wi Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 19 (SARDAR SAROVAR: AN EXPERIENCE RETAINED) The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: An Overview by Philippe Cullet The Greater Common Good, an article by Arundhati Roy A Narmada Diary, a film by Anand Patwardhan A Damaging Report, an article in The Hindu (Chennai edition; dated 31-04-2010)