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Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe

Later Medieval Europe


Managing Editor

Douglas Biggs
Waldorf College

Editorial Board Members

Kelly DeVries
Loyola College

William Chester Jordan


Princeton Iniversity

Cynthia J. Neville
Dalhousie University

Kathryn L. Reyerson
University of Minnesota

VOLUME 1

Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe


Essays in Honour of John H.A. Munro

Edited by

Lawrin Armstrong Ivana Elbl Martin M. Elbl

LEIDEN BOSTON 2007

On the cover: Seal of the port of Portsmouth, 13th c. (Actual wax seal impression: private collection (M.M. Elbl). Photograph: M.M. Elbl.) Brill has done its best to establish rights to use of the materials printed herein. Should any other party feel that its rights have been infringed we would be glad to take up contact with them. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 18727875 ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15633-3 ISBN-10: 90-04-15633-X Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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J. H. A. MUNRO
AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO) OCTOBER 2006

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LIST OF FIGURES

Changing Composition of the Exchequer Assignment (Household) ............................................................................ 219 Changing Composition of Assignments for Moradias of the Portuguese Royal Household ..................................... 230 Flanders and Adjacent Regions (Map) ................................. 317

Regional Groupings in Flanders and Its Environs (Map) ....................................................................................... 318 Places with Regulated Textile Industries by 1382, Castellany of Ypres and Environs ......................................... 323 Von Thnen Rings with an Interaction Model .................... 366 ......... 367

A Von Thnen System with Multiple Market Centres

Price of Gold (1360=100): Mediterranean Levantine Ports .................................................................... 384 Price of Gold (1360=100): Northern Europe ...................... 385

Price of Gold (1360=100): The Western Mediterranean ........................................................................ 386 African Gold Trade, 1310-1370 (Map) African Gold Trade, 1445-1454 (Map) ................................. 388 ................................. 390 ............................ 395 ....................... 397

Price of Gold (1360=100): The Maghrib

Price of Gold and Silver (1360=100): Egypt Bi-Metallic Ratios

................................................................... 398 ...................... 414

West-Central Sahara and the Maghrib (Map) The Tuat and Gurara (Map)

................................................. 422 ............. 443

Selected European Copper Mining Centers (Map) The Borromei Family (Selected Genealogy)

......................... 462

, 1438

LIST OF TABLES

Revenue-Generating Approaches

...........................................

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Gold and Money Receipts of the Guinea House, 1476-1505 ............................................................................... 116 Manresan Annual Tax Revenues, 1254-1418 ....................... 125 .................. 127

Revenue from Some Specific Taxes in Manresa

Nominal and Real Royal Income from Manresa, 1254-1380 ............................................................................... 128 Known Extraordinary Payments Levied at Manresa, 1325-1378 ............................................................................... 130 Tolls on Some Common Trade Goods Occurring in Local Toll Lists .................................................................. 158 Tolls on Some Common Trade Goods Occurring in Lists of Public Works Tolls ............................................... 159 Revenues for Household Assignment (Exchequer) .............. 218

Revenues Assigned to Pay the Moradias of the Portuguese Royal Household ................................................. 229 Ships in Naval Service, the Bordeaux Wine Trade, and Pilgrim Transport ........................................................... 246 Percentage Distribution of Complementary Input Supply Clauses in Sample, by Time Periods ........................ 282 Estimated Coefficients of Multinomial Logit Number of Debt Recognitions per Year Regional Groups Cases by Region ....................... 288

............................... 335

..................................................................... 336 ..................................................................... 337 ......................... 338

Fairs as Percentage of Regions Total Cases

Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs Debts Payable at Fairs

....... ....... ....... ....... .......

. .

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CONTRIBUTORS

JOHN DRENDEL received a doctorate in Medieval Studies from the University of Toronto in 1991 and now teaches at the Universit du Qubec Montral. His published work on medieval Provence includes studies of Jews, credit, women and family. He is currently editing a collection of articles for Brill devoted to the influence of Michael Postan upon French historiography. IVANA ELBL (Ph.D., University of Toronto, 1986) is Associate Professor of History, Trent University, and Chief Editor of the Portuguese Studies Review. Her research focuses on the societal dynamics of late medieval Portugal and on the early Portuguese overseas expansion. MARTIN ELBL (M.A., University of Toronto, 1981) is an adjunct member of the Department of History, Trent University, Managing Editor of the Portuguese Studies Review, and a professional computer graphics artist and cartographer. His research and publications focus on late medieval Italian and Iberian relations with North Africa, as well as on Jewish history, the Balearic Islands, and colonial military presence in the Maghrib. He currently works on a study of decision-making in the Datini Compagnia di Catalogna. SUSANNAH HUMBLE FERREIRA received her Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University, and now teaches Medieval History at the University of Guelph in Canada. She specializes in the political culture in late medieval Europe and is currently working on a study comparing the development of the royal court in England and Portugal. JEFFREY FYNN-PAUL received his Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 2005. His dissertation was entitled The Catalan City of Manresa in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: A Political, Social, and Economic History. His research focuses on structural aspects of Western Mediterranean society during the decades following the post-Black Death crisis. FRANCESCO L. GALASSI was a student of John Munro both in undergraduate and graduate courses. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and subsequently taught in Spain (Universidad Carlos III) and England (University of Leicester and Warwick University) before returning to his native Italy. He is currently an Associate Fellow of Warwick University, a lecturer in Economic History at the University of Ferrara, and the Technical Director of InMetrica srl, a consultancy.

CONTRIBUTORS

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FRANCESCO GUIDI BRUSCOLI, a ricercatore in Economic History at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Florence and Senior Research Fellow of the Department of History at Queen Mary, University of London, is a specialist in European banking history of the late medieval and early modern periods. MARTHA HOWELL is the Miriam Champion Professor of History at Columbia University, New York. She specializes in the social and economic history of the Burgundian Netherlands, with particular interest in gender, urban society, and commerce. Her publications include Women Production and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities; The Marriage Exchange; and (with Walter Prevenier) From Reliable Sources (in German as Werkstatt des Historikers). She is completing a book called Commerce Before Capitalism. LUTZ KAELBER received his Ph.D. from Indiana University and is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Vermont. His research interests include Weberian studies, social theory, comparative historical sociology, and the boundaries between pilgrimage and tourism. He is the author of Schools of Asceticism: Ideology and Organization in Medieval Religious Communities (1998), which received the 1999 Best Book award of the American Sociological Associations Sociology of Religion section, and the translator of Max Webers dissertation, The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages (2003). His most recent book, as co-editor, is The Protestant Ethic Turns 100 (2005). MARYANNE KOWALESKI is Joseph Fitzpatrick, S.J., Distinguished Professor of Social Science and History at Fordham University, where she also serves as Director of the Center for Medieval Studies. Her publications include books and articles on maritime history, towns and trade, and women and family. CHARLOTTE MASEMANN teaches history at Carleton University in Ottawa. She is a recent graduate of the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto, where John Munro was her Ph.D. thesis supervisor. Her academic areas of interest are agrarian and environmental history, urban-rural relations, and material culture. JAMES MASSCHAELE is Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, where he has also served two terms as Director of Medieval Studies. He is the author of Peasants, Merchants, and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England (1997) and his recent articles have appeared in Speculum (2002), Past & Present (2006), and The Black-

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CONTRIBUTORS

well Companion to the Middle Ages (forthcoming, 2007). He is currently writing a book on the medieval jury system. DAVID NICHOLAS is Kathryn and Calhoun Lemon Professor Emeritus of History at Clemson University. He is the author or editor of fifteen books and numerous major articles on medieval Flanders and comparative pre-modern urbanisation. He has received fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. He is currently writing a study of elements of regional cohesion in Germanic Europe in the late Middle Ages. RICHARD W. UNGER succeeded John Munro teaching medieval economic history at the University of British Columbia where he is a professor, specializing in the history of shipping, shipbuilding and energy use from late antiquity through the eighteenth century. His most recent works deal with the history of brewing in medieval Europe and with Renaissance cartography. HERMAN VAN DER WEE is Professor Emeritus and former holder of the Chair of Social and Economic History at the University of Leuven (Belgium). He is a member of the Royal Academy of Belgium and a foreign member of the Academies of the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. His main research is focused on socio-economic and financial history of Europe, in particular of the Low Countries, from the Middle Ages to the present, and on the history of the world economy during the twentieth century.

PREFACE
Herman Van der Wee

Threea magical number and, in this case, the number of unique reasons to accept with both hands the invitation to write a preface to the liber amicorum that is being offered to John H. A. Munro to mark his retirement. In the first place, this preface provides a formal framework within which to record, in an informal fashion, the joys of many years of friendship. Secondly, it serves as a vehicle to express the admiration for and appreciation of John Munros impressive academic oeuvre. Lastly, it affords me the pleasure of introducing the reader to the various chapters constituting the book, whether they address themselves to Munros own academic field of work or to his broader academic interests. It is surprising to note how wide that field of work actually is and how many historians of different specializations it has brought together. For all these reasons, it is a privilege for me, a fellow-traveller of long standing, to introduce this book. My friendship with John Munro dates back to the beginning of the 1970s. At that time, he was preparing for publication his doctoral thesis Wool, Cloth and Gold: Bullionism in Anglo-Burgundian Commercial Relations, 1348-1478, very successfully defended in 1964 at Yale University. A sabbatical leave fellowship during the 1970-1971 academic year allowed John to resume his research in Belgian archives and libraries, with the intention to add to the original data bank and to incorporate the analysis of the new data and its results into the upcoming volume. A visit to a colleague in the course of that year brought us into chance contact, and the acquaintance grew into a warm friendship, thanks chiefly to Johns regular trips to England, the Netherlands and Belgium during the summer holidays to indulge in a methodical plundering of our archives in order to satisfy his constant hunger for research. However strictly John held to the opening and closing times of archivesno minute could be lostmany evenings and weekends were kept free for cultural relaxation and get-togethers with friends. I can still see him, on his arrival in Brussels, making a detour to

HERMAN VAN DER WEE

pick up concert programmes in the Bozar (Palais des Beaux Arts), in order to lose himself in music during the solitary after-work hours; music, indeed, is no mean rival in his life to historical research. In fact, a weekend with John was never complete without a musical event. More than once, moreover, we have spent delightful summer hours at the seaside, the flow of absorbing academic discussion giving way to chin-wagging about what was close to our heartsfamily, friends, the pleasure of being together and, of course, music. What for me has been the cement of such a long-lasting friendship is without doubt Johns generosity, a quality that I have come to value more and more over the years. He has always been prepared to share new ideas and theories, as well as his own hypotheses and discoveries, with anyone interested in them. He does so with great openness, without waiting for the success of any publication of his own. The same generosity is to be found in his interest in other peoples work. He is open to new approaches and, as a true academic, knows how to value a well-constructed piece of work, all the while reading and assessing everything with a sharp, critical eye. In a word, he has been and is an interested and lively travelling companion along the sometimes lonely paths of late medieval and early modern history. The second reason for my pleasure at being asked to write this preface involves my admiration for John Munros impressive academic career. The publication in 1973 of his PhD thesis under the new title of Wool, Cloth and Gold. The struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade, 1340-1478 was a milestone in the historiography of Anglo-Dutch relations during the Late Middle Ages. Subsequent research prompted him to analyse this complex problem more deeply and, through contributions to various international journals, to make considerable improvements to his initial hypotheses. In this, his approach was two-pronged: it was aimed not only at refining the monetary and financial analysis but also at deepening the research on the history of textiles. The results were staggering and led the publisher Variorum to collect Johns most important article-length contributions in two publications: Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500 and Textiles, Towns and Trade. At the same time, John extended his field of work in space, in time and in theme. In the area of monetary history, he sought an

PREFACE

explanation for the European depression of the Late Middle Ages: was its cause monetary, demographic, commercial or industrial? His conclusions produced important new insights into this episode in monetary history. In financial history, he focussed on the development of modern financial techniques in North-Western Europe, including the innovations of the early modern period. Closely connected with this area of research was the analysis of the development of economic thought, with particular emphasis on the problem of usury. The extension of the geographical horizon also involved commercial development, a constant in John Munros oeuvre. In consequence, the trade between the Netherlands and the Hanseatic towns, and between North-Western Europe and the Mediterranean region, by both land and sea, became more integrated into his research. John Munros work also continued to maintain its central focus on the industrial history of the Netherlands. Employing an international, comparative angle, he studied the development of the textile industry, including the attendant technological and technical advances in that sector. He also analysed the industrial and commercial policies of both the central and local governments, the impact of guilds and crafts, the history of prices and wages, and the development of purchasing power and the standard of living. His two crucial chapters in the recently published Cambridge History of Western Textilesentitled respectively Medieval Woollens: Textiles, Textile Technology and Industrial Organisation, c. 800-1500 and Medieval Woollens: The Western European Woollen Industries and Their Struggles for International Markets, c. 1000-1500not only represent the pinnacle of years-long research but are as farreaching in their effect (other things being equal) for the history of textiles as the invention of the flying shuttle for the development of the textile industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In consequence of this impressive academic activity, John Munro has become one of his generations most outstanding scholars in respect to the history and economy of the Low Countries in medieval and early modern times. No topic of the social and economic history of those regions during those periods has escaped his eagle eye, and his contribution to our profession has been immense. When discussing with him the writing of an article, a chapter, a book, or the preparation of a colloquium or a conference paper, I have always been amazed by his massive erudition, his analytical

HERMAN VAN DER WEE

power, his understanding of the underlying context and his mastery of economic theory. The combination of all these intellectual gifts enables him to fit all the pieces of a research puzzle together admirably. He has not only constructed a huge data bank on social and economic life in medieval and early modern times, but, as an outstanding historian and economist, has also created a fully viable framework for historical explanation. Furthermore, his writings have not only kept us wide awake, but have also prompted ushis colleagues and students aliketo get down to work as well. Thank you, John! Students and friends have indeed got down to work. On the occasion of his retirement, they organized in March 2004 at the University of Toronto a colloquium under the title Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: An International Workshop in Honour of John Munro. With their papers, the friends sought to demonstrate the extent of the inspiration they have drawn from John Munros academic oeuvre. For their part, the students looked to emphasize how fruitful his teaching and supervision have been in their university education and no less in their own research. As could be expected, the colloquium was a resounding success. The papers are now presented here in book form and, insofar as a book can, reflect the broad range of academic interestpassion would be a better wordapparent in Johns publications. The central theme running through the book is the business of trade, money, credit and finance during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. In respect of trade, Mark Aloisio, Ian Blanchard, Jeffrey Fynn-Paul, Martin and Ivana Elbl, Francesco Guidi Bruscoli and J. L. Bolton present the results of their recent research on the Mediterranean region, Maryanne Kowaleski and James Masschaele those of their research in England, and Richard Unger (having slipped across the Channel) those of his research on commercial activities in the Netherlands. Studies on the development of finance and credit, andclosely linked to thisstudies on the problem of usury in economic thought are among the contributions of Martha Howell, Lawrin Armstrong, David Nicholas, Lutz Kaelber, Susannah Humble Ferreira and Martha Carlin. The contributions on institutional history by John Drendel and Francesco L. Galassi are very much in line with John Munros own important research in this field. For their part, Kelly DeVries and

PREFACE

Maryanne Kowaleski (again) study certain aspects of the Hundred Years War, especially with reference to England; their contributions hark back to one of the earliest themes of John Munros research, Anglo-Dutch relations. Unlike him, both authors focus particularly on the problem of Anglo-French relations, although Anglo-Dutch relations were never far from centre-stage in that troubled period. At first sight, the contribution of Charlotte Masemann on horticulture in Lbeck appears to fall outside the scope of reference, but to say that would indicate only a superficial reading of her study. It is true that she takes horticulture as her subject, but the research has clearly been placed against the background of the interplay between purchasing power and consumption, a theme that has very much gripped Johns attention these last years and that has found expression in his most recent publications on prices and wages. The way in which this collection of academic contributions of the highest quality is presented is a clear reference to the remarkably wide field of research that John Munro has tilled during his academic career. For him, detailed, in-depth research and a tenacious attachment to primary source material are not goals in themselves, but a point of departure for setting out viable hypotheses, for the depiction of a living society, in which the place and function of each actor are marshalled in the correct perspective. This liber amicorum now offered to John is therefore a deserved tribute to an unrivalled master, teacher and faithful friend. 12 March 2004

INTRODUCTION
Lawrin Armstrong, Ivana Elbl, Martin M. Elbl

The essays in this volume have been compiled in honour of Professor John H. A. Munro on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Toronto in June 2003. During his thirty-five years in the Department of Economics and the Centre for Medieval Studies, John Munro had a profound impact on medieval and early-modern economic history not only through his extensive publications, his collaboration on several large-scale research projects and his participation in international colloquia and economic history associations, but also through his influence on several generations of doctoral candidates in Medieval Studies, Economics and History. The idea of a conference and Festschrift to honour John Munro was conceived separately by three of his formers studentsLawrin Armstrong, Maryanne Kowaleski and Ivana Elblwho joined forces in 2002. They convened an international workshop under the title Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe in Toronto on 12-14 March 2004, at which seventeen of Munros colleagues and former students presented papers. Thirteen of these appear in the present volume, along with six further papers solicited by the editors. The essays reflect the wide range of John Munros own research interests and those of his colleagues and students: international, regional and local trade, public finance, war economies, peasant studies and economic ethics. The conference organizers and editors sought to strike a geographical balance between the northwith an emphasis (in keeping with Munros own enduring focus) on the Low Countries, England and Franceand the south: the Iberian peninsula, Provence and Italy, along with commercial ramifications in the Middle East, North and West Africa. Our aim was also to assemble a cross-section of junior, senior and mid-career historians, as well as a mix of scholars trained in Toronto and elsewhere. All the papers embody fresh research, in many cases (in the spirit of Munros own work) based on archival sources or understudied texts. John Munro is perhaps best known for his research on late medieval trade and finance, topics reflected in four of the seven

L. ARMSTRONG, I. ELBL, M. ELBL

thematic sections that follow. International commerce is the focus of three papers. Ian Blanchard considers the impact of changing trans-Saharan patterns of trade on Egyptian specie markets and ultimately on gold prices in western Europe, manifested most dramatically in the gold crisis of the early fifteenth century. Drawing on the rich resources of the Datini archive in Prato, Martin Elbls paper complements that of Blanchard with an exploration of the fourteenth-century trade in Venetian-supplied copper via the Balearics and the Sahara desert to the Western Sudan. The Datini material is set in the context of an analytical synopsis of recent research on late medieval European copper mining, which ranges from the historical literature to geological and mineralogical studies. Francesco Guidi Bruscoli and J. L. Bolton consider the role of Italian merchant banks in adjusting international trade balances in the mid-fifteenth century in a paper that outlines the initial results of their ambitious project to study and make accessible the records of the London and Bruges branches of the Borromei Bank in a digital format exploitable through software designed to manipulate ledgers and account books kept in the double-entry system. Mark Aloisio, David Nicholas and Richard Unger assessor reassessinstances of market integration in high and late medieval Europe. Mark Aloisios examination of the Sicilian-Maltese grain trade in the fifteenth century challenges the assumption that royal policies necessarily facilitated regional market integration. David Nicholas invokes the economic geographers concept of central place to sharpen our understanding of the function of thirteenthcentury Ypres as a credit market integrated into wider economic flows in Flanders, northern France and at the Champagne fairs. Richard Unger reviews the economic factors at play in the southern Low Countries during the fifteenth century, arguing that the high degree of market integration observed by historians in the sixteenth century was by no means an inevitable outcome. Three papers highlight local and regional economies. Martha Carlin maps the complex retail market of thirteenth-century Paris, with excursions across the Channel to England, using didactic and dictaminal texts to showcase evidence related to trade. The paper includes, in appendix, new critical editions and translations of selected key texts. Martha Howell takes up and develops themes she has touched on in earlier studies in a paper on the shifting social functions and juridical definitions of property in the rapidly

INTRODUCTION

changing economic environment of late medieval Ghent. Finally, drawing on a range of documentary and, more importantly, archaeological evidence, Charlotte Masemann creates a detailed profile of the market-garden economy of late medieval Lbeck. Ivana Elbl, Jeffrey Fynn-Paul and James Masschaele examine the relationship between public finance and broader economic and social trends. Ivana Elbl offers a wide-ranging reassessment of Portuguese royal policy in West Africa that stresses continuity with earlier, medieval models of revenue extraction and fiscal administration. Jeffrey Fynn-Pauls close study of the relationship between demographic and fiscal crises in the late fourteenth-century Catalan city of Manresa proposes a model for interpreting similar phenomena in other European city-states dependent on funded public debt. James Masschaele focuses on surviving records of tolls and toll collection to develop a model for assessing the volume and nature of trade in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England. According to a medieval clich, money is the sinews of war, and much of Munros research has focussed on the late medieval crisis, in which warfare played such a key role. Three essays take up this theme. Kelly DeVries examines the financing of the Hundred Years War and highlights the effects on military outcomes, a problem hitherto largely ignored by traditional military history. Building on her pioneering research on medieval Exeter, Maryanne Kowaleski offers a positive assessment of the wars impact on the economies of English port towns. In an essay comparing the royal households of Henry VII of England and Manuel I of Portugal, Susannah Humble Ferreira argues that the tendency to enlarge the royal household underpinned the fiscal reforms of both kings. Peasant studies as such have not been a major focus of Munros work, but the two papers included here nevertheless reflect his methods and approach. John Drendel brings economic criteria to bear on the question of the apparent revival of servile labour in late medieval Provence. Francesco Galassi takes a quantitative look at adaptations in Italian share-cropping contracts over a period of seven centuries. The study develops a tentative, broadly applicable theory of contract-clause adoption, invoking a biological analogy approach to the emulation, mutation, and transmission of institutional norms. One of Munros earliest publications revisited the Weber thesis and has proved prophetic of the current revival of Weber studies

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exemplified by the work of Lutz Kaelber, who here argues for the centrality of the usury prohibition in Webers account of the medieval economy. Lawrin Armstrongs paper takes up this theme by considering the vexed relationship between medieval canon law and moral theology expressed in two influential fourteenth-century treatises on usury by the jurist Giovanni dAndrea and the ethicist Gerard of Siena. The editors and contributors offer the essays collected here as a fitting tribute to an inspiring teacher, friend and colleague, and a testimony to the continuing vitality of the field to which he has devoted his career. *** The editors and conference conveners wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Centre for Medieval Studies, the Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, the Departments of Economics and History (University of Toronto), the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto), and the Department of History, Trent University (Peterborough), for their liberal sponsorship of the workshop that gave rise to this volume. We are particularly grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and to the Department of Economics, University of Toronto, who underwrote the costs of preparing the manuscript for publication. We also wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of Andy Orchard and Rosemary Beattie of the Centre for Medieval Studies in planning the workshop; of Jamie Smith, a doctoral candidate in the Department of History, and Elizabeth Archibald and Nicole Hamonic, graduate students at the Centre for Medieval Studies, in its execution; of several colleagues at the University of Toronto who moderated sessions; and of Katherine Walker, formerly of Trent, now McMaster University, for her contribution to copy-editing the manuscript. Martin Elbl typeset the volume, prepared the production versions of various maps, and finalized the camera-ready copy for printing on the presses of the Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden. Finally, we wish to record our gratitude to Herman Van der Wee of the University of Leuven for his encouragement of and participation in the workshop and for his kindness in supplying an elegant preface to this book. Lawrin Armstrong, Ivana Elbl, Martin M. Elbl September 2006

JOHN H. A. MUNRO: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS

Monographs and Books


Munro, John H. A. Wool, Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade, ca. 1340-1478. Brussels: ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles; and Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Pp. xii + 242. Van Cauwenberghe, Eddy H. G., Rainer Metz, Franz Irisgler, and John Munro. Coinage in the Low Countries (14th-18th Centuries), Vol. I: AntwerpBruges-Brussels-Ghent. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988. Pp. 292. Aerts, Erik and John Munro, eds. Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History. Studies in Social and Economic History, Vol. 19. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990. Pp. 124. Munro, John. Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Pp. xvi + 312. Munro, John. Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Pp. xvi + 326. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History. Ed. by Joel Mokyr (editor in chief), Maristella Botticini (assistant editor), Maxine Berg, Loren Brandt, Erik Buyst, Louis Cain, Jan de Vries, Paul Lovejoy, and John Munro (area editors), in 5 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Articles in Scholarly Journals and Essays in Books and Collected Studies


Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth: An Incident in the Shift of Commerce from Bruges to Antwerp in the Late Fifteenth Century. Revue belge de philologie et dhistoire/Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis 44 (1966): 1137-59; reprinted in John Munro. Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS

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Thomson, and James McConica, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 4: Letters 446 to 593, A.D. 1516 to 1517. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. Industrial Protectionism in Medieval Flanders: Urban or National? In The Medieval City, edited by Harry Miskimin, David Herlihy, and A. L. Udovitch, 229-68. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Wool-Price Schedules and the Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages, ca. 1270-1499. Textile History 9 (1978): 118-69; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. The 1357 Wool-Price Schedule and the Decline of Yorkshire Wool Values. Textile History 10 (1979): 211-19; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272-1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice. In The Dawn of Modern Banking, edited by The Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies of the University of California (Fredi Chiappelli, director), 169-239. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Monetary Contraction and Industrial Change in the Late-Medieval Low Countries, 1335-1500. In Coinage in the Low Countries, 880-1500: The Third Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History, edited by Nicholas Mayhew, 95-161. British Archeological Reports, International Series No. 54. Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1979. Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Sir Roger Mynors, Douglas Thomson, and Peter Bietenholz, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 5: Letters 594 to 841, A.D. 1517 to 1518. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979. Mint Policies, Ratios, and Outputs in England and the Low Countries, 1335-1420: Some Reflections on New Data. The Numismatic Chronicle 141 (1981): 71-116 [formerly listed as: 8th series, Vol. I]; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries,

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1350-1500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Sir Roger Mynors, Douglas Thomson, and Peter Bietenholz, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 6: Letters 842 to 992, A.D. 1518 to 1519. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Medieval Monetary Problems: Bimetallism and Bullionism. Journal of Economic History 43 (March 1983): 294-98. Economic Depression and the Arts in the Fifteenth-Century Low Countries. Renaissance and Reformation 19 (1983): 235-50; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of LateMedieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour. In Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E. M. Carus-Wilson, edited by Negley B. Harte and Kenneth G. Ponting, 13-70. Pasold Studies in Textile History No. 2. London: The Pasold Research Fund and Heinemann Educational Books, 1983; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. In Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, edited by John F. Richards, 97-158. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1983; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 13501500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Monnayage, monnaies de compte, et mutations montaires au Brabant la fin du moyen ge. In tudes dhistoire montaire, XIIe- XIXe sicles, edited by John Day, 263-94. tudes de lUniversit de Paris VII et du Centre National des Lettres. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1984; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. In Mnzprgung, Geldumlauf und Wechselkurse/Minting, Monetary Circulation and Exchange Rates, edited by Eddy Van Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler, 31-122. Trierer Historische Forschungen, 7: Akten des 8th

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International Economic History Congress, Section C-7, Budapest 1982. Trier: University Press, 1984. Hemp. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 6, Grosseteste-Italian Literature, 153-4. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88, [1985]. Linen. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 7, Italian Renaissance-Mabinogi, 584-6. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88, [1986]. Political Muscle in an Age of Monetary Famine: A Review. Revue belge de philologie et dhistoire 64 (1986): 741-6. Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Sir Roger Mynors, Douglas Thomson, and Peter Bietenholz, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 7: Letters 993 to 1121, A.D. 1519 to 1520. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Money and Coinage of the Age of Erasmus. Appendix A, on The Coinage of the Burgundian-Hapsburg Netherlands, Before and After 1521. Appendix B: Official Coinage Rates: February and August 1521. In The Collected Works of Erasmus: Correspondence, Vol. 8: Letters 1122 to 1251, A.D. 1520 to 1521, edited by Sir Roger Mynors, Douglas Thomson, and Peter Bietenholz, 347-50. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988. Also in this volume: Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus. Scarlet. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 11: Scandinavian Languages to Textiles, Islamic, 36-7. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88 [1988]. Silk. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 11: Scandinavian Languages to Textiles, Islamic, 293-6. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88 [1988]. Textile Technology. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 11: Scandinavian Languages to Textiles, Islamic, 693-711. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88 [1988]; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Textile Workers. In Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., edited by Joseph R. Strayer et al., Vol. 11: Scandinavian Languages to Textiles, Islamic, 711-15. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/MacMillan, 1982-88 [1988]; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected

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Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Deflation and the Petty Coinage Problem in the Late-Medieval Economy: The Case of Flanders, 1334-1484. Explorations in Economic History 25 (4) (October 1988): 387-423; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992. Petty Coinage in the Economy of Late-Medieval Flanders: Some Social Considerations of Public Minting. In Precious Metals, Coinage and the Changes of Monetary Structures in Latin-America, Europe and Asia: Late Middle Ages-Early Modern Times, edited by Eddy H. G. Van Cauwenberghe, 25-56. Studies in Social and Economic History, Vol.2. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989. Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Sir Roger Mynors and James Estes, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 9: Letters 1252 to 1355, A.D. 1522 to 1523. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competition in the Textile Industries of the Late-Medieval Low Countries. In Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History, edited by Erik Aerts and John Munro, 41-52. Studies in Social and Economic History, Vol. 19. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c. 1290c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis? In Before the Black Death: Studies in the Crisis of the Early Fourteenth Century, edited by Bruce M. S. Campbell, 110-48. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991. Reprinted by Manchester University Press in a paperback edition in 1992; and reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. Die Anfnge der bertragbarkeit: einige Kreditinnovationen im englischflmischen Handel des Sptmittelalters (1360-1540). In Kredit im sptmittelalterlichen und frhneuzeitlichen Europa, edited by Michael North, 3969. Quellen und Darstellungen zur hansischen Geschichte, vol. 37. CologneVienna: Bhlau Verlag, 1991. The International Law Merchant and the Evolution of Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. In Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di piet nellEuropa preindustriale: Amministrazione,

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tecniche operative e ruoli economici, Atti della Societ Ligure di Storia Patria, edited by Dino Puncuh, 49-80. Nuova Serie, Vol. XXXI. Genoa: Societ Ligure di Storia Patria, 1991; reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442. Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1994. The Central European Mining Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low Countries and England, 1450-1550. In Money, Coins, and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern Times), edited by Eddy H. G. Van Cauwenberghe, 119-83. Studies in Social and Economic History, Vol. 2. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991. Footnotes and headnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Sir Roger Mynors, Alexander Dalzell, and James Estes, eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 10: Letters 1356 to 1534, A.D. 1523 to 1524. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), xxi, 515. Footnotes on coinage, monetary, financial, and numismatic topics in the correspondence of Erasmus, in Alexander Dalzell and Charles G. Nauert, Jr., eds. The Correspondence of Erasmus, Vol. 11: Letters 1535-1657, A.D. 1525. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. xxiii, 476. Patterns of Trade, Money, and Credit. In Handbook of European History in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, 1400-1600, Vol. I: Structures and Assertions, edited by James Tracy, Thomas Brady Jr., and Heiko Oberman, 147-95. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994. The Coinages of Renaissance Europe, in 1500. In Handbook of European History in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, 1400-1600, Vol. I: Structures and Assertions, edited by James Tracy, Thomas Brady Jr., and Heiko Oberman, 671-78. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994. Industrial Entrepreneurship in the Late-Medieval Low Countries: Urban Draperies, Fullers, and the Art of Survival. In Entrepreneurship and the Transformation of the Economy (10th-20th Centuries): Essays in Honour of Herman Van der Wee, edited by Paul Klep and Eddy Van Cauwenberghe, 37788. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994. Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-Time and Seasonal Wages. In Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries, edited by Ian Blanchard, 65-78. Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series, no. 116. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994. Abwertung [Debasement], Aufwertung [Revaluation/Renforcement], Bullionismus [Bullionism], Diskont [Discounting], Gold-SilberRelation [Bimetallic Mint Ratios], Greschamsches Gesetz [Greshams Law],

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Inhaber-Klausel [Order Clause], Inhaber-Schuldschein [Bill Obligatory], Instrumentum ex Causa Cambii, Mnzkosten [Brassage], Schlagschatz [Seigniorage], Wechsel [Bill of Exchange]. In Von Aktie bis Zoll: Ein historisches Lexikon des Geldes, edited by Michael North, 15-6, 26, 66-7, 85-7, 142-4, 146-7, 171-2, 172-4, 174-5, 263, 357, 413-8. Munich: C.H. Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995. Textiles. In The Garland Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, edited by William W. Kibler, Grover Zinn, John Bell Henneman, Lawrence Earp, and William Clark, Vol. II: Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, 903-5. New York and London: Garland Press, 1995. Anglo-Flemish Competition in the International Cloth Trade, 13401520. Publication du centre europen dtudes bourguigonnes, 35 (1995): 37-60 [Rencontres dOxford (septembre 1994): LAngleterre et les Pays Bas bourguignons: relations et comparaisons, XVe-XVIe sicle, edited by Jean-Marie Cauchies]. Varieties of Medieval Latinity, Section FJ: Textiles. In Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide, edited by Frank A. C. Mantello and A. George Rigg, 474-84. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996. The Origins of the English New Draperies: The Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry, 1270-1570. In The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, 1300-1800, edited by Negley B. Harte, 35-127. Pasold Studies in Textile History no. 10. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Crisis and Change in the Later Medieval English Economy. Journal of Economic History 58 (1) (March 1998): 215-9. Review article based on Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, edited by Richard Britnell and John Hatcher. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Cloth Manufacture and Trade. In Medieval England: An Encyclopedia, edited by Paul Sarmach, M. Teresa Tavormina, and Joel Rosenthal, 194-7. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1998. Precious Metals and the Origins of the Price Revolution Reconsidered: The Conjuncture of Monetary and Real Forces in the European Inflation of the Early to Mid-Sixteenth Century. In Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500-1808. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Economic History Congress at Madrid, August 1998, edited by Clara Eugenia Nez, 35-50. Seville: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1998. Textiles as Articles of Consumption in Flemish Towns, 1330-1575. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis 81 (1-3) (1998): 275-88. Special issue on: Proeve t al, t is prysselyck: Verbruik in Europese steden (13de-18de eeuw)/Consumption in the West European City (13th-18th Century): Liber Amicorum Raymond Van Uytven. With a Dutch summary.

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Edmund King, Peterborough Abbey, 1086-1310: A Study in the Land Market (1975), reviewed in The Journal of Economic History 36 (1976): 767. B. H. Slicher Van Bath et al., eds., Acta Historiae Neerlandicae (Studies in the History of the Netherlands), 6 (1973), reviewed in Revue belge de philologie et dhistoire 55 (1977): 327-9. Maureen Mazzaoui, The Italian Cotton Industry in the Later Middle Ages, 1100-1600 (1981), reviewed in Business History Review 56 (1982): 487-8. Terence H. Lloyd, Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages (1982), reviewed in the American Historical Review 88 (1983): 661. Artur Attman, The Bullion Flow Between Europe and the East, 1000-1750 (1981), reviewed in The Journal of Economic History 43 (Sept. 1983): 748-9. Kathryn Reyerson, Business, Banking, and Finance in Medieval Montpellier (1985), reviewed in The Canadian Journal of History 21 (Dec. 1986): 411-3. Chandra Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism (1983), reviewed in The Journal of Economic History 46 (Dec. 1986): 1044-6. Harry Miskimin, Money and Power in Fifteenth-Century France (1984), reviewed in Revue belge de philologie et dhistoire 64 (1986): 741-6. James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515-1565 (1985), in The American Historical Review 92 (April 1987): 434-5. Raymond Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems: A Historical Comparative Study (1987), reviewed in The Journal of Economic History, 48 (September 1988): 807-9. Peter Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (1986), reviewed in Speculum: Journal of Medieval Studies 63 (October 1988): 998-1000. Martha C. Howell, Women, Production, and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities (1986), reviewed in The Journal of Modern History 60 (December 1988): 735-7. Terence Lloyd, England and the German Hanse: A Study of Their Trade and Diplomacy (1991), reviewed in The American Historical Review 98 (Oct. 1993): 1233-4. John J. McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, The Beginnings of Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money Currents of Early Modern Europe (1991), reviewed in The American Historical Review 99 (April 1994): 544. Elizabeth Gemmill and Nicholas Mayhew, Changing Values in Medieval Scotland: A Study of Prices, Money, and Weights and Measures (1995), reviewed in Albion: Journal of British Studies 28 (3) (Fall 1996): 542-4.

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Richard Britnell and John Hatcher, eds., Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller (1996), reviewed in Journal of Economic History 58 (1) (March 1998): 215-9. David Jacoby, Trade, Commodities, and Shipping in the Medieval Mediterranean. Variorum Collected Studies Series CS572 (1997), reviewed in The International History Review 21 (1) (March 1999): 17-9. David Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (1996), reviewed for EH.Net Review <ehreview@eh.net>, 24 February 1999. Jean Favier, Gold and Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle Ages, trans. Caroline Higgitt (1998), reviewed for The International History Review 21 (4) (December 1999): 976-8. S. M. H. Bozorgnia, The Role of Precious Metals in European Economic Development from Roman Times to the Eve of the Industrial Revolution, Contributions in Economics and Economic History no. 192 (1998), reviewed for Journal of Economic History 59 (4) (December 1999), 1090-1. Robert-Henri Bautier and Janine Sornay, eds., Les Sources de lhistoire conomique et sociale du moyen ge. Les tats de la maison de Bourgogne, tome II: Archives centrales de ltat bourguignon (1384-1500), vol. I/1: Archives des principauts du Sud and, vol. I/2, Les principauts du Nord (supplment), Institut du Recherche et dHistoire des Textes, and Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (2001), reviewed for the Journal of Economic History 62 (3) (September 2002): 856-7. Franois Crouzet, A History of the European Economy, 1000-2000 (2001), reviewed for The Journal of Economic Literature 40 (September 2002): 956-7. Philip Jacks and William Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence: Fortunes of a Renaissance Merchant Family ( 2001), reviewed for The International History Review 24 (4) (December 2002): 876-7. Sevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (2000), reviewed in EH.Net Review <ehreview@eh.net>, 1 November 2002. Alan Stahl, Zecca: The Mint of Venice in the Middle Ages (2000), reviewed for Medieval Prosopography 23 (2002): 319-23. Michael McCormick, Origins of the European Economy. Communications and Commerce, A.D. 300-900 (2001), reviewed for The International Journal of Maritime History 15 (2) (December 2003): 377-80. Roger Schofield, Taxation under the Early Tudors, 1485-1547 (2004), reviewed for <eh net-review@eh.net>, 15 June 2005. Stuart J. Borsch, The Black Death in Egypt and England: A Comparative Study (2005), reviewed for <eh net-review@eh.net>, 13 March 2006.

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Working Papers Posted on the Internet


Working Paper Archive of Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis (http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/) The Maze of Medieval Mint Metrology in Flanders, France and England: Determining the Weight of the Marc de Troyes and the Tower Pound from the Economics of Counterfeiting. JEL Classification: N1, N2, N4, E4, E5; READ PAPER/PDF [111 Kbytes]; [UT- ECIPA-MUNRO-98-01]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/ UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-01.html The Industrial Crisis of the English Textile Towns, 1290-1330. JEL Classification: N1, N6, N7, L1; READ PAPER/PDF [285 Kbytes]; [UTECIPA-MUNRO-98-02]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UTECIPA-MUNRO-98-02.html The Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles: Urban Institutions and the Changing Fortunes of Cloth Manufacturing in the Low Countries and England, 1280-1570. JEL Classification: N1, N3, N4, N6, N7; READ PAPER/PDF [296KBytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-03] READ PAPER/PDF [296KBytes]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-03.html Textiles as Articles of Consumption in Flemish Towns, 1330-1575. JEL Classification: N3, N6, N7, L1, J3; READ PAPER/PDF [66 Kbytes]; [UTECIPA-MUNRO-98-04]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UTECIPA-MUNRO-98-04.html Monetary Policies, Guild Labour-Strife, and Compulsory Arbitration during the Decline of the Late-Medieval Flemish Cloth Industry, 13901435. JEL Classification: N1, N3, N4, N6, L1, J2, J3, E3, E4, F2; READ PAPER/PDF [159 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-05]; http://www.chass. utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-05.html English Backwardness and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th Centuries. JEL Classification: N1, N2, N4, N7, E5l; READ PAPER/PDF [251 Kbytes] [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-06]; http://www. chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UT- ECIPA-MUNRO-98-06.html The Low Countries Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes. JEL Classification: F1, F2, L1, N6, N7; READ PAPER/PDF [137 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-99-01]; http://www.chass. utoronto.ca/ecipa/ archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-99-01.html The Monetary Origins of the Price Revolution Before the Influx of Spanish-American Treasure: the South-German Silver-Copper Trades, Merchant Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540. JEL Classification: E3, E5, E6, F4, G2, H5, H6, N1, N2, N7; READ PAPER/PDF [211 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-99-02]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/ archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-99-02.html

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The New Institutional Economics and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs. JEL Classification: F1, F3-4, G2, K2, K4, N2, N4, N7, R4; READ PAPER/PDF [1580 Kbytes]; UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-01; http:// www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-01.html Flemish Woollens and German Commerce during the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Cloth Prices and Markets,1290-1550. JEL Classification: F1-2, J3, L1-2, L6, N4, N6-7; READ PAPER/PDF [1581 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-02]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/ UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-02.html Wage Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late- Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300-1470: Did Money Really Matter? JEL Classification: F4, J1, J3, J4, J5, N1, N3, N4, N6; READ PAPER/PDF [538 Kbytes] [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-03]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-03.html Figures 1-34: Wage Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. PDF [29.3 Mbytes]; http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/RWCharts3.pdf The West European Woollen Industries and their Struggles for International Markets, c. 1000-1500. JEL Classification: F1, F2, F3, F4, H2, H3, J3, J5. K2, L1, L6, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N7, N8; READ PAPER/PDF [2872 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-04]; http://www.chass.utoronto. ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-04.html Wool and Wool-Based Textiles in the West European Economy, c. 8001500: Innovations and Traditions in Textile Products, Technology, and Industrial Organisation. JEL Classification: F1, F2, F3, F4, H2, H3, J3, J5. K2, L1, L6, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N7, N8; READ PAPER/PDF [1320 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-00-05]; http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/ecipa/ archive/UT- ECIPA-MUNRO-00-05.html Money, Wages, and Real Incomes in the Age of Erasmus: The Purchasing Power of Coins and of Building Craftsmens Wages in England and the Low Countries, 1500-1540. JEL Classification: B0, E3, E4, E5, E6, F2, F4, J1, J2, J3, J4, J6, N1, N3, N4, N7, Q1 READ PAPER/PDF [717 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-01]; http://www.economics.utoronto. ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-01. html The Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Responses to Impediments from Church and State in Western Europe, 1200-1600. JEL Classification: B1, E5, E6, F3, F4, G1, G2, H3, H6, K4, N2, N4, P5; READ PAPER/PDF [400 Kbytes]; [UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-02.html]; http://www. economics.utoronto.ca/ecipa/archive/UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-01-02.html Industrial Energy from Water-Mills in the European Economy, Fifth to Eighteenth Centuries: The Limitations of Power. JEL Classification: L6,

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vain, Belgium) on 12 March 1971 (and published by this institute in mimeographed form as Report No. 7103 of the Centrum voor Economische Studin). This paper was subsequently delivered also to the Seminarie voor Streeks- en Agrarische Geschiedenis of the Rijksuniversiteit Gent (Ghent, Belgium), on 25 March 1971. La lutte bullioniste anglo-bourguignonne: sa contribution la chute de lindustrie drapire de luxe et lessor des nouvelles draperies en Flandre et en Brabant, 1430-1480. Paper delivered to the Seminarie voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis of the Vrije Universiteit te Brussel (Brussels, Belgium) on 19 April 1971. Depression and Culture in Fifteenth-Century Flanders and Brabant. Paper delivered to the American Musicological Society, 32nd Annual Meeting, at Duke University (Durham, North Carolina) on 18 November 1971. A prcis of this paper has been published in Abstracts of Papers Delivered to the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Musicological Society (Chapel Hill and Durham, N.C., 1971), 40-1. The Coming of Spanish Wools to the Low Countries: An Industrial Transformation of the Fifteenth Century. Paper delivered to the Midwest Medieval Conference, 11th Annual Meeting, at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, on 6 October 1973. Also delivered to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, in November 1973. Scarlets and the High Cost of Dyeing in the Middle Ages. Paper delivered to the Colloquium on Medieval Textiles in the Mediterranean Basin, in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the Medieval Academy of America, at the Royal Ontario Museum of Toronto, on 11 May 1977. Mint Outputs, Monetary Change, and Economic Contraction in LateMedieval England and the Low Countries. Paper delivered to the Comparative World History Workshop: Conference on Pre-Modern Monetary History, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 30 August-3 September 1977. Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272-1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice. Paper presented to the Conference on The Dawn of Banking, at the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 23-26 September 1977. Scarlets and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour in the Middle Ages. A revised version of Scarlet and the High Cost of Dyeing in the Middle Ages, delivered to the Five Colleges Medieval Seminar at the University of Massachusetts, at Amherst, Mass. on 5 December 1977; and again to the Social History Group of Ontario (Toronto) on 5 February 1978. Bullion Movements and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. 1235-1500 A.D. A revised version of Mint Out-

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puts, Monetary Change, and Economic Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, delivered to the University of Toronto Economic History Workshop, on 16 January 1978. Monetary Contraction, Depression, and Industrial Change in the Late Medieval Low Countries, 1335-1500. Paper delivered to the Third Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History: Coinage and Economic Development in the Low Countries, on 10 September 1978. The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour. A very considerably revised and expanded version of Scarlets and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour in the Middle Ages, delivered to the University of Toronto Economic History Workshop, on 20 October 1980. Economic Depression and Culture in the Fifteenth-Century Low Countries. A much revised version of Depression and Culture in FifteenthCentury Flanders and Brabant, delivered to University College Symposium Four, The Renaissance: Rediscovery and Exploration, at the University of Toronto, on 21 January 1982. Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Paper delivered to the Theme C-7 section, on Minting and Monetary Circulation, of the 8th International Economic History Congress, Budapest, 18 August 1982. The Late-Medieval Bullion Famine and Deflation in North-West Europe: A Critique of the Postan Thesis. Paper delivered to the Workshop on Medieval Monetary Problems: Bimetallism and Bullionism, at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, 23 September 1982, Baltimore, Maryland. The Luxury Trades of the Silk Road: How Much Did Silks and Spices Really Cost? Paper delivered to the Royal Ontario Museum Continuing Education Symposium Silk RoadsChina Ships, 12 October 1983, University of Toronto. The Fullers Guild and Industrial Strife in the Low Countries, 13401500. Paper delivered to the Thirteenth Medieval Workshop, University of British Columbia, Late Medieval Urban Institutions, 19 November 1983. Minting, Moneys-of-Account, and Monetary Change in Late-Medieval Brabant. Paper delivered to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, 5 December 1983. Inflation, Deflation, and the Big Problem of Petty Coinage in LateMedieval Flanders, 1334-1484. Paper delivered to the Nineteenth International Congress of Medieval Studies, at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, on 13 May 1984. Flemish Textile Production and the Changing Structure of Market De-

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mand, 1270-1500. Paper presented to the 44th Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, 21-23 September 1984, at Chicago, Illinois. Industrial Change in Textile Manufacturing in the Late Medieval Low Countries: Responses to Market Adversities. Invited lecture given at Rutgers University, Department of History and Center for Medieval Studies (New Brunswick, New Jersey), 16 April 1985. The Nature of Price Changes in the Late-Medieval Economy: A Critique of the Postan Thesis. Lecture-seminar given at Rutgers University, Department of History and Center for Medieval Studies (New Brunswick, New Jersey), 17 April 1985. Environment, Land Management, and the Changing Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages. Paper presented to the 20th International Congress on Medieval Studies, 10 May 1985, at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Role of Petty Coinage in Monetary and Price Fluctuations in the Low Countries, 1334-1484. Public lecture sponsored by the Department of History, University of Trier, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 June 1985. Petty Coinage in the Economy of Late-Medieval Flanders: Some Social Considerations of Public Minting. Paper presented to The Stockton Colloquium of 1985: Production and Transfer of Precious Metals and Changes in the Monetary Structures of Latin America and Europe, 15001800, at the University of the Pacific, Stockton, California, on 3 October 1985. The Behaviour of Wages During Deflation in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Paper presented to the Ninth International Economic History Congress, 26 August 1986, in Bern, Switzerland. Structural Changes in Late-Medieval Textile Manufacturing: The Flemish Responses to Market Adversities, 1300-1500. Public lecture delivered at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Louvain, Belgium) on 5 November 1986. Wage Movements and Deflation in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Public lecture delivered to the Universitaire Faculteiten SintIgnatius, Universiteit Antwerpen (Antwerp, Belgium) on 13 November 1986. The Central European Silver Mining Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low Countries and England, 1450-1550. Paper delivered to the Second International Conference on The Production and Transfer of Precious Metals and Monetary Structures in Asia, America, and Europe, 15th to 19th Centuries, at Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, on 9 June 1987.

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Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Industrial Urbanization in the Low Countries, 1200-1600. Paper presented to the conference An Urban Context: Medieval and Modern Cities, organized by the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies and the Arizona State College of Business, at Phoenix, Arizona, on 26 March 1988. The Flemish New Draperies: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Industry, 13th to 16th Centuries. Paper presented to the Anglo-Low Countries Conference on the New Draperies, sponsored by the Pasold Research Fund, London, and the Workshop on Quantitative Economic History, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, at Leuven, Belgium, on 14 April 1988. The New Draperies: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Flemish Industry, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries. Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, on 24 October 1988. [Revised and extended version of The Flemish New Draperies: The Death and Resurrection of an Old Industry, 13th to 16th Centuries]. Oriental Spices and Their Costs in Medieval Cuisine: Luxuries or Necessities? Lecture delivered to the Canadian Perspectives Committee, Senior Alumni Association, University of Toronto, at University College, 8 November 1988. International and Local Banking in Medieval and Renaissance England. Paper delivered to the International School on the History of Banking and Finance (University of Siena-C.N.R.), at the Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, Italy, on 20 June 1989. Industrial Transformations in the Northern Textile Trades, ca. 1290-ca. 1350: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis? Paper delivered to the Historical Geography Research Group, Third Anglo-American Seminar on the Medieval Economy and Society, held at Chester College, Chester, England, on 15 July 1989. On the Origins of Negotiability: Some Credit Innovations in AngloFlemish Trade, c. 1360c. 1540. Paper delivered to the Second SalzauKolloquium, Kredit im Sptmittelalter und Frher Neuzeit, sponsored by Die Ministerin fr Bildung, Wissenschaft, Jugend und Kultur des Landes Schleswig-Holstein und die Christian-Albrechts-Universitt zu Kiel, held at the Herrenhaus Salzau, Schleswig-Holstein, 23 April 1990. Monetary, Price, and Wage Fluctuations during the Late-Medieval Great Depression: Did Money Matter? Paper delivered to the Tenth International Economic History Congress, Session C.16: The Economic Depression of the Renaissance Revisited, at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, in Leuven, Belgium, 21 August 1990. Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competition in the Textile Industries of the Late-Medieval Low Countries. Paper delivered to the Tenth Inter-

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national Economic History Congress, Session B-15: Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History, at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, in Leuven, Belgium, on 23 August 1990. The International Law Merchant and the Origins of Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries. Paper presented to the Convegno internazionale: Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di piet nellEuropa preindustriale: amministrazione, tecniche operative, e ruoli economici, held at the Universit di Genova, Genoa, Italy, on 2 October 1990. On the Origins of Negotiability: Credit Instruments and the Law Merchant in Anglo-Flemish Commerce, 1353-1507. Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop, University of Toronto, on 5 November 1990. The Belgian Archives. Lecture delivered to the Centre for Medieval Studies, Sources and Resources Committee, at the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, on 22 March 1991. Coinage Debasement as a Fiscal Policy: The Economics and Mechanics of Medieval Mint Manipulations. Paper delivered to the 38th Annual Convention of The Canadian Numismatic Association, 1991 Educational Forum, at the Westbury Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, on 26 July 1991. Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Urban Institutions in the Decline of the Medieval Flemish Woollens Industry, ca. 1350-1500. Paper delivered to the 27th International Congress on Medieval Studies, at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, on 7 May 1992. Bimetallic Ratios, Exchange Rates, and Labour Strife in the LateMedieval Flemish Cloth Industry. Paper delivered to the Annual meeting of the Medieval Academy of America, at the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, on 2 April 1993; Labour Economics Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, on 8 April 1993; Economic History Workshop, Northwestern University, at Evanston, Illinois, on 22 April 1993; Economic History Workshop, University of Illinois at Champagne-Urbana, on 23 April 1993. Monetary Fluctuations, Entrepreneurship, and Labor Strife in the Flemish Textile Industry, 1390-1435. Paper delivered to the 28th International Congress on Medieval Studies, at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, on 6 May 1993. Monetary Policies, Wage Fluctuations, and Labour Strife in the LateMedieval Flemish Cloth Industry, 1390-1435. Paper delivered to the Economic History Workshop, University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario), on 23 November 1993. Maritime and Overland Trade in Textiles between the Low Countries and Italy, 1200-1600: Which was the More Cost Effective? Paper delivered to the 29th International Congress on Medieval Studies, at Western

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Michigan University (Kalamazoo, Michigan), Session 201 (Trade and Transit Markets in Northwestern Europe, 1350-1550"), on 6 May 1994. The True Weights of the Marcs de Troyes in Late-Medieval France and Flanders: Evidence from Flemish Counterfeiting and Monetary Ordinances, 1388-1469. Paper delivered to the First International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, Session 419: Medieval Arithmetic and Calculation, on 5 July 1994. Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-Time and Seasonal Wages. Paper delivered to the 11th International Economic History Congress, Session B-3a, Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries, at the Universit Bocconi, Milan, on 13 September 1994. Anglo-Flemish Competition in the International Cloth Trade, ca. 1340-1520: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in the English Victory. Paper delivered to the Colloque dOxford, of the Centre Europen des tudes Bourguignonnes, at St. Johns College, Oxford, on 24 September 1994. Revised version delivered to the Economic History Workshop, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 14 April 1995. Flemish Woollens and Hanseatic Commerce during the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Markets and Cloth Prices, 1290-1550. [38 pp.]. Paper presented to the Hanseatic conference, at the Burgkloster zu Lbeck, 10-12 March 1997, Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum, 1300-1800: Vergleichende konjunkturstatistische und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts- und Handelsgeschichte im Sptmittelalter und in der frhen Neuzeit. Lecture presented to the Department of History, Universiteit AntwerpenUniversiteit Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius te Antwerpen, 11 December 1997. Real Wage Determination and the Problem of Nominal Wage- Stickiness in the Late-Medieval European Economy. Seminar paper delivered to the Graduate Students Workshop, ECO 4060Y, Economics Department, University of Toronto, on 27 March 1997. The Industrial Crisis of the English Textile Towns, c. 1290-c. 1330. [64 pp.] Paper presented to the Seventh Annual Conference on ThirteenthCentury England, at St. Aidans College, University of Durham, 1-4 September 1997. English Backwardness and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th centuries. [58 pp.] Paper presented to the Colloque Universiteit GentUniversiteit Antwerpen (IUAPStedelijke Samenlevingen in de Laatmiddeleeuwse Nederlanden): Internationale Handel in de Nederlanden (14de-16de eeuw: Kooplieden, Organisatie en Infrastructure/International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th centuries): Merchants, Organisation, and Infrastructure),at the Universiteit Antwerpen, 13 December 1997.

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Disputes About Mint Metrology in Late-Medieval Flanders, France and England: Determining the Weight of the Marc de Troyes and the Tower Pound from the Economics of Counterfeiting, 1388-1469. [29 pp.] Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Classical and Medieval Numismatics Society, at the Primrose Hotel, Toronto, on 21 February 1998. The Industrial Crisis of the English Textile Towns, c. 1290-c. 1330. [64 pp.] A revised version of The Industrial Crisis of the English Textile Towns, c. 1290-c. 1330 above. Delivered to the Center for Early Modern History, at the University of Minnesota (Minneapolis), on 6 March 1998. Precious Metals and the Origins of the Price Revolution Reconsidered: The Conjuncture of Monetary and Real Forces in the European Inflation of the Early to Mid-Sixteenth Century. [56 pp.] Paper presented to Session B.6, Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500-1808, at the Twelfth International Economic History Congress in Madrid, 25 August 1998. The Low Countries (Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes. [32 pp.] Paper presented to Session C.2: Means of Communication, Spread of Information and European and Mediterranean Commerce, 10th-17th Centuries, at the Twelfth International Economic History Congress, in Madrid, 26 August 1998. Determinanten der Entwicklung von Preisen, Lhnen unde des Geldes, 1135-1820/The Chief Determinants of Price, Wage, and Monetary Movements in Western Europe, 1135-1820: A New View of Long-Waves. [39 pp.] A paper presented to the conference Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum 1300-1800: Verleichende konjunkturstatistische und wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts- und Handelsgeschichte im Sptmittelater und in der frhen Neuzeit, at Lbeck, Germany, on 30 July 1999. Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late- Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300-1450. [49 pp.] Paper presented to the international conference on New Trends in Late Medieval Studies, at The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, in Copenhagen, Denmark, on 24 August 1999. Commentator on three papers in 19th-century German Demography: Stephan Klasen (Munich), Gender Bias in Mortality in a Comparative Perspective: Excess Female Mortality in Germany in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries; Terence McIntosh (North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Urban Demographic Stagnation in Early Modern Southwest Germany: A Computer Simulation; Simone Wegge, Self-Selection of NineteenthCentury German Emigrants: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Hesse-

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Cassel. Papers presented at the First Conference on German Cliometrics, at the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 23-26 September 1999. The New Institutional Economics and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Transaction Costs, Warfare, and Textiles( [54 pp.] Paper presented to the Annual Conference, the 32nd Settimana di Studio, of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica Francesco Datini, on Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, secoli XIII-XVIII, in Prato, Italy, 10 May 2000; Revised version of the paper presented to the Economic History Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, on 13 October 2000. Wage Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300-1470: Did Money Really Matter? [93 pp.] Paper presented to the Economic History and Labour Workshops, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, on 23 February 2001; Paper presented to the Workshop in Money, History, and Finance, Department of Economics, Rutgers University (New Brunswick, New Jersey): on 26 March 2001. Commentary on and Agenda for Symposium: New Approaches to International Trade, c. 1000-1500. For the Seventh Anglo-American Seminar on the Medieval Economy and Society, held at Trinity College Dublin and the Royal Irish Academy, in Dublin, 13-16 July 2001. The Late Medieval Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Responses to Impediments from Church and State in Western Europe. Paper presented to the 61st Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, on Finance and Economic Modernization, at Loews Philadelphia Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 26 October 2001. Industrial Energy from Water-Mills in the European Economy, Fifth to Eighteenth Centuries: the Limitations of Power. Paper presented to the 34th annual meeting of the Settimana di Studio, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica Francesco Datini da Prato, on the theme Economia ed energia, secoli XIII-XVIII, in Prato, Italy, on 16 April 2002. Prices, Wages, and Prospects for Profit Inflation in England, Brabant, and Spain, 1501-1670: A Comparative Analysis. Paper presented to Session 15: Global Monies and Price Histories, XVIth-XVIIIth Centuries, of the XIIIth International Economic History Congress, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 22 July 2002. Industrial Change in the Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Low Countries: The Arrival of Spanish Merino Wools and the Expansion of the Nouvelles Draperies. Paper presented to Session 16: Wool: Products and Markets (XIIIth-XXth Centuries), of the XIIIth International Economic History Congress, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 26 July 2002.

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Postan, Population, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and Flanders. Paper presented to the Colloque de Montral: Postan-Duby: Destin dun paradigme. Peut-on comprendre les crises conomiques de la fin du moyen ge sans le modle malthusien? Montral: Universit de Qubec Montral, 10 October 2002. The Late-Medieval Origins of the Modern Financial Revolution: Overcoming Impediments from Church and State. Paper presented to the Economic History Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Toronto; in the Coach House Conference Room, on 17 April 2003. Builders Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries, 1346-1500: A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes. Paper presented to the the 36th annual meeting of the Settimana di Studio, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica Francesco Datini da Prato, on the theme Economia ed energia, secoli XIII-XVIII; in Prato, Italy, on 30 April 2004, on the theme: LEdilizia prima della Rivoluzione Industriale, Secoli XIII-XVIII, Prato, 26-30 aprile 2004. Changing Patterns of Colours and Values of Woollen Textiles in the Southern Low Countries, 1300-1550: The Anti-Red Shiftto the Dark Side. Paper presented to the 12th International Medieval Congress, at Leeds, England, on 12 July 2005 (to session 804: Transforming Textiles). Commentary on the paper of Maristella Botticini, Social Norms, Demographic Shocks, and Dowries in Florence, 1250-1450. Presented to the 68th Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, on War and Economic Growth, Session 4A, Bombs, Germs, and Invaders, Westin Harbour Castle Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, 17 September 2005. Flemish Woollens and Hanseatic German Commerce During the Later Middle Ages: Changing Trends in Cloth Markets and Textile Values, 1290-1570. Paper presented to the conference on Medieval Global Economies, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 11 November 2005. Real Wages and the Malhusian Problem in Anwerp and South-Eastern England, 1400-1700: A Regional Comparison of Levels and Trends in Real Wages for Building Craftsmen. Paper presented to the Second Dutch-Flemish conference on The Economy and Society of the Low Countries in the Pre-Industrial Period, Universiteit Antwerp, 20 April 2006. South-German Silver, European Textiles, and Venetian Trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire, c. 1370 to c. 1720: A Non-mercantilist Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem. Presented to the XXXXVIII (38th) Settimana di Studio, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica Francesco Datini, Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, Secoli XIII-XVIII, 5 May 2006.

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Research Projects in Progress (for more detailed information see http://www.economics.utoronto/munro5/)


Wage Structures and Wage Movements in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: 1260-1530. Recasting the Phelps Brown-Hopkins Price-Index for the Basket of Consumables, 1264-1700. The Mint Outputs and Monetary Statistics of the Low Countries, 13341789. Cloth Prices in the Low Countries (1300-1570) for: Forschungsprojekt Wirtschaftliche Wechsellagen im hansischen Wirtschaftsraum, 1300-1800.

MONEY AND ETHICS

LAW, ETHICS AND ECONOMY: GERARD OF SIENA AND GIOVANNI DANDREA ON USURY1
Lawrin Armstrong

In the Threepenny Opera, Brecht, in the character of Mackie Messer, asks, whats robbing a bank compared to founding a bank?2 He was expressing an ethical critique of usury that he probably knew via Marxs Capital, but which had originated as early as the fourth century B.C., when Aristotle, in the Politics and the Ethics, condemned profit on loans as an unnatural and asocial use of money, which is a measure of value and medium of exchange, not a source of value in itself.3 Medieval ethicists and jurists were in agreement
This paper is offered to John Munro, mentor and colleague, on the occasion of his retirement. The usury prohibition has long been of interest to Munro, and my own research on the topic was inspired by his 1987-1988 graduate seminar on the Dynamics of the European Economy, 1350-1750. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the panel on Ethics and the Higher Learning at the Renaissance Society of America Annual Meeting in Cambridge, April 2005, and I am grateful for the critical comments I received from colleagues there. The following legal abbreviations have been used in the notes: Inst. (Institutiones Iustiniani); Dig. (Digesta Iustiniani); Decretum Grat. (Decretum Gratiani); X (Decretales Gregorii IX); VI (Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifacii VIII); and Clem. (Constitutiones clementinae). Reference is to the critical editions: Theodor Mommsen et al., eds., Corpus iuris civilis, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1872-1895); and Emil Friedberg, ed., Corpus iuris canonici, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1959). Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own. 2 Was ist ein Einbruch in eine Bank gegen die Grndung einer Bank? Bertolt Brecht, Die Dreigroschenoper, Act 9, in Ausgewhlte Werke, vol. 1: Stcke 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 267. A similar remark is commonly attributed to Brecht: Bank robbery is the business of amateurs: the real professionals found a bank (Bankraub ist eine Unternehmung von Dilettanten. Wahre Profis grnden eine Bank). 3 There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honourable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest [tokos, lit. parturition, offspring], which means the birth of money from money, is
1

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with Aristotle and Marx: to profit from a money loan was a violation of the function of money and an offence against justice. The objective of this paper is to consider the relationship between medieval ethics and law with regard to the problem of usury, which medieval and early modern theoristsincluding, it should be noted, Protestant reformers such as Luther and Melancthonregarded as any profit on a loan of money or fungible goods.4 I shall do so by
applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural, Aristotle, Politics 1.10.1258a-b, trans. Benjamin Jowett in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1141. Aristotle touches on usury in the Ethics in a discussion of liberality, where he includes the usurer in the species of the miserly who exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people, and those who lend small sums and at high rates. For all those take more than they ought and from the wrong sources, Nichomachean Ethics, 4.1.1121b, trans. W. D. Ross in Basic Works of Aristotle, 988. Marx cites the Politics passage in his discussion of merchants and usurers capital in Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen konomie, Volume 1 (Berlin: Dietz, 1974), 2.4.2, p. 179. For a review of the controversy over the ethical content of Marxs concept of justice, see Norman Geras, The Controversy about Marx and Justice, New Left Review 1/150 (March-April, 1985): 47-85; and Norman Geras, Bringing Marx to Justice: An Addendum and Rejoinder, New Left Review 1/195 (September-October 1992): 37-69. On the influence of the Aristotelian concept of justice on Marx, see most recently James Daly, Marx and Justice, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2000): 351-70. Brecht began studying Marx in 1926 and was familiar with Capital, Vol. 1, by the time he was working on the Threepenny Opera in 1928; Ronald Hayman, Brecht: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 120. 4 There is an extensive literature on the usury prohibition. The only comprehensive survey is John T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). For brief overviews, see John Gilchrist, The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages (London and Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 62-76, with documents in translation, 155-225; and Lawrin Armstrong, Usury, in Joel Mokyr, ed., Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5: 183-5. The fundamental study of the canonical usury doctrine is T. P. McLaughlin, The Teachings of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV Centuries), Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 81-147 and 2 (1940): 1-22. Important recent studies of usury include Amleto Spicciani, Capitale e interesse tra mercatura e povert nei teologi e canonisti dei secoli XIII-XV (Rome: Jouvence, 1990); Odd Langholm, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget,1984); and Odd Langholm, Value, Money and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 29 (Leiden: Brill, 1992). On the Protestant reformers, see most recently Eric Kerridge, Usury, Interest and the Reformation (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002). For discussions of usury in the wider context of scholastic ideas about economic ethics, see Odd Langholm, The Medieval Schoolmen (1200-1400), in Ancient

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a review of two texts: the Question on Usury (Questio de usura) of the Augustinian friar and theologian Gerard of Siena ( c. 1336), which historians of economic thought now consider the most influential formulation of the natural law argument against usury in late medieval Europe; and the report and critique of Gerards quaestio by the influential fourteenth-century canonist Giovanni dAndrea (c. 12701348) in his Quaestiones mercuriales. Before turning to the texts themselves, however, some preliminary observations on the relationship between law and ethicsor, more precisely, between law and theologyin medieval Europe are in order.5 The development of canon law as a system of positive law distinct, on the one hand, from theology and, on the other, from secular legal systems was peculiar to the medieval west.6 In the early church, ecclesiastical norms were deduced from scripture or articulated by councils of bishops; there was no autonomous discipline of canon law. In the Byzantine empire, church law was subsumed to imperial law, reflecting the union of secular and ecclesiastical authority in the emperor. In the west, however, the expansive jurisdictional claims of the popes, the rise of universities and the recovery and systematic study of Justinians Roman law compilations created the conditions for the birth of systematic canon law.7 With the publication of the first version of Gratians
and Medieval Economic Ideas and Concepts of Social Justice, ed. S. Todd Lowry and Barry Gordon (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 439-501; and Diana Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 5 Ethical and moral questions as they related to revelation were a branch of theology. Moral theology as the name of this discipline is an early modern usage; see Johann Theiner, Die Entwicklung der Moraltheologie zur eigenstndigen Disziplin (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1970); on the medieval period, see esp. pp. 37-55. The boundaries between law and theology were not always entirely clear with respect to ethical problems; see, for example, Joseph Goerings discussion of the post-Gratianic penitential literature in The Internal Forum and the Literature of Penance and Confession, Traditio 59 (2004): 175-227. 6 For a recent introduction to medieval canon law, see James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London and New York: Longman, 1995). My comments in this paragraph are also inspired by the observations of Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 85-269; and Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000-1800, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law 4 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1995). 7 A recent overview of the recovery and assimilation of Roman law in medi-

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magisterial textbook, the Decretum, around 1140, canon law quickly defined itself as a discipline and a body of norms distinct from theology. The latter found its authoritative statement in Peter Lombards almost contemporary handbook, the Sentences, which soon became the central text of the theology curriculum.8 Canon law exercised a profound influence on the character and development of western Christianity, but the fact that the subject matter of the canons was often identical to that of theology also created certain tensions of which intellectuals were acutely conscious. Theology had little to say, for example, on the procedures for papal elections or the rules concerning benefices, but on the behavioral normsfor example, the norms governing marriage, penance or usurymoral theologians claimed a competence equal or superior to that of canonists. One example will suffice to illustrate the tension between law and theology with regard to economic questions. Henry of Susa (c. 1200-1271), best known by his sobriquet Hostiensis, was the most influential and creative canonist of the thirteenth century.9 In his monumental Summa on the Decretals of Gregory IX, published around 1253, Hostiensis privileged Roman
eval Europe can be found in Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38-103. Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratians Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) is the most important recent study of the emergence of canon law in twelfth-century Bologna and its relationship both to the revived Roman law and to theology. 8 On the successive recensions of the Decretum and dating, see Winroth, The Making, 122-45. 9 He was appointed cardinal bishop of Ostia in 1262 by Urban IV. For biographical information, see Thomas Diplovatatius, Liber de claris iuris consultis, pars posterior, ed. Fritz Schulz, Hermann Kantorowicz and Giuseppe Rabotti, Studia Gratiana 10 (1968): 141-5; Johann Friedrich von Schulte, Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Enke, 18751880; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1956), 2: 123-9; Charles Lefebvre, Hostiensis, in Raoul Naz, ed., Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique (Paris: Letouzey et An, 1953), 5: cols. 1211-28; and Kenneth Pennington, Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis), in Kenneth Pennington, Popes, Canonists and Texts, 1150-1550 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1993), XVI: 1-12. On the relationship between theology, Roman law and canon law in Hostiensis thought, see Gabriel Le Bras, Thologie et Droit romain dans loeuvre dHenri de Suse, in tudes historiques la mmoire de Nol Didier, ed. Facult de Droit et Sciences conomiques de Grnoble (Paris: ditions Montchrestien, 1960), 195-204. I am grateful to Dr. Susanne Lepsius for providing me with a copy of this article.

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law concepts over ideas derived from theology in the analysis of canonical problems. He devoted extensive portions of most titles of the Summa to Roman law definitions and distinctions, noting (but generally minimizing) dissonances between Roman law on the one hand and canon law or theology on the other, and attempting to reconcile Roman law with ecclesiastical authority on points where the two were clearly at variance.10 Hostiensis discussion of usury, for instance, contains a veritable digest of the Roman law of usury: how it was contracted, for what reasons and at what rates of interest.11 Acknowledging that such contracts were now disallowed by virtue of the canonical prohibition, he nevertheless defended the (Christian) emperor Justinians approval of usury on the grounds of social necessity: thus with respect to human law; for on account of worldly need the emperor could not entirely annul the burden of usury, although he diminished it.12 Similarly, the Hostiensis routinely chided theologians for applying rigid and abstract standards to economic problems. Prescription was a mode of acquiring ownership through an extended period of uncontested possession. Theology and law, however, differed over the necessity of good faith, the prescribers honest belief, even if mistaken, that he was not in violation of anothers right. But what, Hostiensis asked,
if, after prescription, [the prescriber] becomes aware that he possesses the property of another, say he learned for certain that the utensils he prescribed belonged to Martin: should he return them to Martin? The theologians say that he should ... while the masters of the canons commonly say the opposite, because according to both laws [canon and Roman] once prescription is complete he who prescribed is secure ... It seems to me that on this question the conscience of the theologians is too angelic ... Therefore, if somebody who has legitimately prescribed thinks that he sins mortally by retaining the thing prescribed, I do not consider him a theologian so much as a fraud,
10 Le Bras, Thologie et Droit romain, 202-3; Charles Lefebvre, Hostiensis, cols. 1219-20. 11 Summa aurea, X 5.19 de usuris, nn.5-7 (Venice, 1574; repr. Turin: Bottega dErasmo, 1963), cols. 1615-19. 12 Hoc de iure humano. Nam propter mundi necessitatem non potuit imperator ex toto cassare obligationem usurarum, sed tamen minuit, Summa, X 5.19 de usuris, n.7 (ed. cit., col. 1619). For a detailed discussion of juridical opinion on this point, see McLaughlin, Teachings, 1: 84-95.

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for he fears what is above suspicion. ... Nevertheless, if he cannot compose his conscience, he should obey it and return the thing, for otherwise he places himself at risk.13

Restitution of usury was another point on which theologians and canonists differed. Moral theology insisted that usurers make complete restitution of the sums extorted from their debtors. By contrast, Hostiensis (and most other canonists), urged discretion in exacting restitution, maintaining that if a debtor freely remitted part of the amount due to him by way of restitution, the usurer was thereby absolved. I do not, he insisted,
write this in favour of usurers, for I owe them nothing. But neither do I want to be so unfair as to comfort the theologians and drive people to desperation and lay snares for their souls ... Therefore it should be said and maintained that, provided there was no [prior] agreement between the parties, a usurer may ask or a court order that part of the amount owed in restitution be forgiven, and I say that a usurer so forgiven is thereby absolved.14

A similar tension may be observed in Giovanni dAndreas adoption and critique of Gerard of Sienas natural law case against usury. Of

13 12 Sed quid si iam completa praescriptione conscientiam rei alienae incipiat habere, puta audivit et pro certo quod haeres quas praescripsit erant Martini: numquid ipsas debet reddere Martino? Theologi dicunt quod sic ... Magistri canonum communiter contradicunt, quia completa praescriptione tutus est qui praescripsit secundum utrumque ius ... Mihi videtur quod in hac quaestione conscientia theologorum est nimis angelica ... igitur si quis credit peccare mortaliter retinendo rem praescriptam legitime, ipsum non theologum iudico sed fraudulosum, cum id timeat quod nulla suspicione est dignum. ... Si tamen eius conscientia ratificari non potest, reddat rem and sequatur conscientiam, nam aliter ... periculum non evadet, Summa, X 2.26 de praescriptionibus, rubricella de praescriptione rerum immobilium, n.3 (ed. cit., col. 726). On Hostiensis privileging of conscience, see Le Bras, Thologie et Droit romain, 201; and Charles Lefebvre, Aequitas canonica et Periculum animae dans la doctrine de lHostiensis, Ephemerides iuris canonici 13 (1952): 319. 14 Non scribo hoc in favorem usurariorum, quia nec eis astrictus sum; sed nolo a rationabili recedere ut theologis faveam et in desperatiam inducam homines, ac parem laqueum animarum ... Dicendum est igitur et tenendum quod precibus possit vel iussu iudicis sine pactione partium remissio fieri, et sic dicam talem usurarium absolutum, Summa, X 5.19 de usuris, n.12 (ed. cit., col. 1634).

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Gerard himself we know almost nothing.15 He was, as his sobriquet suggests, a Sienese, possibly patrician by birth, who joined the Augustinian friars, probably in the first decade of the fourteenth century. After studies in Italy, perhaps in the canon law faculty of Bologna, he went to Paris, where he was admitted bachelor of the Sentences in 1325 and master of theology in 1329. His commentary on the Sentences enjoyed great authority in the fifteenth century, but for historians of economic thought it is his disputed question on usury that is of greatest interest.16 The Questio is a redaction of a public disputation Gerard presided over as a master of theology, most likely in Paris in 1329 or 1330, though possibly somewhere in Italy, where he appears to have taught in the early to mid1330s.17 The basic question Gerard posed in his disputation was this: is usury illicit because it is forbiddenthat is, simply because of positive law, which is mutable, and the evidence of this is that usury is permitted in Roman but not in canon lawor is it forbidden because it is illicit by nature.18 As Gerard himself put it, is usury by the nature of the thing itself wicked and bound up with malice; illicit, that is to say, according to some meta-legal standard.19

15 For the scant details, see Schulte, Die Geschichte, 2: 204-5; P. Glorieux, La littrature quodlibtique, La Bibliothque Thomiste 21, 2 vols. (Paris: Vrin, 1925-1935), 2:97; and Adolar Zumkeller, Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und Philosophisch-Theologische Lehre, Analecta Augustiniana 27 (1964): 208-9. For additional references, see Langholm, Medieval Schools, 549. 16 Gerards status among fifteenth-century theologians of his order is attested by Zumkeller, Die Augustinerschule, 209. For an assessment of his place in the history of economic thought, see Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, esp. 30-1 and 118-28; and Langholm, Medieval Schools, 549-60. 17 According to the cartulary of the University of Paris, Gerard presided there as a regent master in 1330 (Glorieux, La littrature, 2: 97). According to Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, cod. 625, one of the two extant copies of the Questio de usura, Gerard disputed the problem in Paris (fol. 209r). I am currently preparing an edition of the Questio de usura for the Toronto Medieval Latin Texts series based on the other surviving copy, Leipzig, Universittsbibliothek, MS 894. Quotations of the Questio are from my forthcoming edition with folio references to the Leipzig manuscript (hereafter referred to as Leipzig). For reasons of convenience, I provide parallel references to the more readily accessible edition of Angelo Vancio, Tractatus de usuris et de praescriptionibus (Cesena, 1630), 165-93 (hereafter Cesena). 18 Questio de usura, proemium; Leipzig, fols. 65r-66r; Cesena, 165-8. 19 Talis namque actus ex natura rei contrariatur virtuti et ex natura rei ha-

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In Gerards view, it is not altogether easy to assign a reason for the latter proposition20 and the most striking feature of the Questio is its demolition or fundamental revision of all of the traditional arguments advanced against usury.21 For example, it was often argued by lawyers and theologians that usury was illicit because it involved the sale of the time that elapses from the granting of a loan until its repayment. Time, however, like air and water, is common to all and therefore non-vendible.22 Gerard considered the argument frivolous (ista racio ... omnino videtur friuola) because the passage of time is a factor in many legitimately profitable contracts, such as rental and lease agreements.23 Or again, it was often maintained that a charge was only permitted in loans of things that deteriorate through use, that is, rentable things, such as houses or boats. Since coins do not deteriorate in use, it is illicit to charge for a money loan.24 However, as Gerard astutely observed,
bet a Deo auertere et deordinare ac per consequens ex natura rei viciosus et malicia conuolutus, Questio de usura, proemium; Leipzig, fol. 65r; Cesena, 166. 20 Assignare autem de hoc causam per quam euidencius demonstretur quod contractus usurarius habet ex natura rei viciositatem et maliciam conuolutam non puto omnino facile, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 67v; Cesena, 174. 21 Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fols. 67r-68v; Cesena, 173-6. 22 Decretum Grat. D.88 c.11 palea Eiiciens condemned the usurer for selling a thing given by God (ipse namque rem datam a Deo vendit), which most theorists interpreted as time. For theological opinion, see William of Auxerre ( 1229), Summa aurea, lib. 3, tractatus 48, cap. 3, q. 2, ed. Jean Ribaillier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, nos. 16-19, 4 vols. (Paris and Rome: Centre national de la recherche scientifique and Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1980-1986), 2: 831; and Bonaventure ( 1274), Collationes de decem praeceptis, collatio 6, cap. 19, in Opera omnia (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1891), 5: 528b. The argument was adopted by Innocent IV in his analysis of credit and discount sales; Commentaria, ad X 5.19.6, n.2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1570; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), fol. 517va. For a discussion of the theological texts, see Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, 111-8. 23 Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68r; Cesena, 176. Gerard took the critique from his fellow Augustinian Giles of Rome ( 1316); Langhom, Aristotelian Analysis, 112. For the text, see Giles of Rome, Quolibeta, quodlibet 5, q. 24 (Louvain, 1646, repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), 338a. 24 Canonical authority for the argument was provided by Decretum Grat. D.88 c.11 palea Eiiciens, which contrasts usury to rental: He therefore who lets a field or a house is seen to relinquish his own use of it and to accept money and, so to speak, to exchange one profit for another. ... Thirdly, a field or a house deteriorates through use. But money, when it is lent, is neither diminished nor does it deteriorate (Ideo qui locat agrum vel do-

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rental charges are not really compensation for damage, since occupation of a house, for example, often improves its condition.25 A more serious objection to usury, and the one usually adopted by canonists, derived from the Roman law definition of a mutuum, that is, a loan of a fungible, a thing like grain, oil or wine, whose use involved its consumption or destruction.26 Specieprecious metal in a minted statewas considered a fungible because its use necessitated its alienationits consumptionin exchange for other things. According to Roman jurists, in a loan of a fungible, ownership passed to the debtor, who was not required to repay the identical substance of the thing lent, but simply its equivalent in terms of quantity and quality. Because the debtor became the owner of the thing lent, it was unjust to charge him for the use of what had become his own property.27 Classical Roman law circumvented this purely conceptual problem by means of an additional contract termed stipulatio, by which the debtor promised an additional payment called usurae, a term which in Roman law had no negative connotations.28 However, from the eighth century onwards, the church in the west repudiated such agreements on the authority

mum, suum usum dare uidetur, et pecuniam accipere, et quodammodo quasi commutare uidetur cum lucro lucrum. ... Tertio ager vel domus utendo ueterascit. Pecunia autem fuerit mutuata, nec minuitur, nec ueterascit). See also Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum, lib. 3, distinctio 37, dubium 7, in Opera omnia (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1887), 3: 836a: Alia vero ratio est, quia pecunia, dum in usum vertitur, non consumitur nec deterioratur; non sic autem est de aliis rebus, quae secundum quod magis et diutius eis utimur, magis tendunt ad defectum. 25 Ista racio, si quis bene considerat, est digna derisione, quia videmus quod domus illa de cuius usu accipimus pensionem vel fructum sepe melioratur per habitacionem, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68r; Cesena, 176. For a discussion, see Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, 125. 26 Inst. 3.14.pr.: Mutui autem obligatio in his rebus consistit, quae pondere numero mensurave constant, veluti vino oleo frumento pecunia numerata aere argento auro. See also the parallel definition at Dig. 12.1.2.1. On the restriction of usury to fungibles, see Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 38-51; and McLaughlin, Teachings, 1: 98-102. 27 Inst. 3.14.pr. continues: ... quas res aut numerando aut metiendo aut pendendo in hoc damus, ut accipientium fiant et quandoque nobis non eaedam res, sed aliae eiusdem naturae et qualitatis reddantur. Unde etiam mutuum appellatum sit, quia ita a me tibi datur, ut ex meo tuum fiat. See also Dig. 12.1.2.2. 28 W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed., rev. Peter Stein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 464, n.3.

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of Lc 6.35, where Jesus commanded his followers to grant a loan without expecting anything in return (mutuum date nihil inde sperantes).29 In Gerards view, this argument is exceedingly elegant and clear but fundamentally flawed because, although ownership of the substance indeed passes to the debtor, ownership of the lent thing continues to vest in the creditor with respect to the identity and equivalence of the value, and it is this monetary value from which the usurer extracts his profit, not the substance of the coin or other fungible.30 The most persuasive theological argument against usury was a variation of the ownership analysis proposed by Thomas Aquinas ( 1274) and known to historians of economic thought as the consumptibility argument.31 It goes like this: the proper use of a fungible thing is its consumption; in such things it is impossible to separate the thing and its useas you can in the case of a rentable thing such as a house or a boattherefore to grant the use of the thing is to grant its ownership. The usurer, however, wants to sell coin and its use separately, and he therefore sells the same thing twice or sells something that does not exist, which is clearly unjust. In Gerards view, the analysis is doubtful (dubia), or at least in need of correction, since it could be maintained that although the

29 Gilchrist, The Church and Economic Activity, 62-3. Lc 6.35 was cited as an anti-usury tag in the decretal Consuluit (X 5.19.10) of Urban III (1185-87). See Langholms observations, Aristotelian Analysis, 75. 30 Hec autem racio, quamuis videatur valde pulchra et apparens, tamen videtur valde dubia quia licet maior proposicio sit manifesta, minor tamen videtur falsa. Cum enim dicitur quod fenerator exigit lucrum de re non sua, potest dici immediate quod est falsum, quia pecunia quam mutuat, quamuis transseat in dominium debitoris quantum ad ydemptitatem substancie, quia debitor non tenetur restituere eandem pecuniam secundum substanciam, remanet tamen dicta pecunia in dominio feneratoris quantum ad idemptitatem et equalitatem valoris. Et hoc ipsum videtur sufficere, quia ipse fenerator non exigit lucrum de pecunia quam mutuat in quantum talis substancie est, secundum quem modum ad eum non pertinet nec potest eam repetere, sed exigit magis de ea in quantum tanti valoris est, secundum quem modum ad eum pertinet, quia remanet in suo dominio, et semper potest eam licite expetere, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 67v; Cesena, 174-5. On this point, see Langholm, Medieval Schools, 558. 31 Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, q. 78, art. 1, in Opera omnia (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1897), 9: 155. For a detailed discussion, see Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, 81-9; and Langholm, Medieval Schools, 236-44. Gerard outlines the argument at Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fols. 67v-68r; Cesena, 175-6.

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use and ownership of a fungible are indeed logically separable, in a loan they are necessarily identical, since in the same way as [the creditor] transfers the thing itself, he also transfers its use, and vice versa, and therefore he does not separate the one from the other as the aforesaid reasoning supposes.32 Nor, in Gerards opinion, does it help to cite Aristotles view that it is unnatural that an artificial thing like a coin should give birth to another coin, since natural things such as wine and oil can also be the subject of usurious loans. Furthermore, artificial things such as houses legitimately give birth or produce profit in the form of rent.33 Thus it might be said that a house gives birth to a house when a landlord uses his profits to buy another house with a view to letting it out.34 Gerards correction of both Thomas and the canonists, characterized by Langholm as a theory of the self-valuation of fungibles, is very elegant.35 He began with the Roman law definition of a fungible as something that can be counted, measured or weighed.36 Fungiblesartificial (for example, specie) as well as natural (for example, wine or oil)he argues, derive from their measure, weight or number a fixed and determinate value that remains unchanged provided the measure, weight or number remains constant. If such things appear to increase or decrease in value, it is not because of any change in their intrinsic value expressed in
32 Ista eciam racio videtur dubia quia posset aliquis dicere quod fenerator non vendit usum rei quam mutuat sine ipsa re, immo simul vendit utrumque, quia alienat a se non solum usum rei sed eciam ipsam rem quantum ad substanciam et ideo quantum ad hoc idem iudicium videtur de utroque, quia eo modo quo transfert ipsam rem, transfert et ipsum usum et econverso, quapropter non separat unum a reliquo sicud supposuit dicta racio, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68r; Cesena, 176. Langholm discusses the argument in Aristotelian Analysis, 89-90. 33 For Aristotle, see above, n.3. 34 Sed nec ista racio videtur valere propter duo. Primo quia usura committitur non solum in artificialibus sed eciam in naturalibus, utpote in vino et oleo et similibus, et per consequens dicta racio non potest applicari tantum ad illa. Secundo quia videmus quod domus est quoddam artificiale et tamen usque ad certum tempus potest quis per unam domum lucrari aliam domum equiualentem, et sic domus pareret domum, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68r; Cesena, 176. 35 The description is at Langholm, Medieval Schools, 557. Gerards argument is contained in Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fols. 68r-70r; Cesena, 176-82. For a more complete discussion than that offered here, see Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, 118-28; and Langholm, Medieval Schools, 555-60. 36 See above, n.26.

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terms of number, weight or measure, but because of a fluctuation in the value of the things for which they may be exchanged.37 Thus, a bushel of wheat is always worth a bushel of wheat of the same quality, but in terms of another substance, say, goats or coin, it may, for example for reasons of scarcity, be worth more in February than in September. Natural and artificial nonfungiblesfor example, vineyards, houses or horsesderive their value from external and contingent variables, such as time, condition and place.38 For this reason they are not comparable to one another and cannot be the subject of a loan (mutuum). Contingent variables, by contrast, do not affect the value of fungibles: in terms of number, weight and measure, a fungible is never worth more than itself; a bushel of wheat is always worth a bushel of wheat of the same quality, not a bushel and a half; ten florins are always worth ten florins, not twelve. By demanding more than the amount lent, the usurer therefore violates the intrinsicthe naturalvalue of a fungible determined and fixed by its nature or art in terms of number, measure or weight. Gerard maintained that this analysis also provides a correction to the canonistic argument from ownership.39 Because fungibles have a naturally determinate value in terms of number, measure and weight, they are necessarily sterile:
Idcirco ab intrinsico sue nature potest certitudinaliter cognosci eorum valor, nec augentur nec minuuntur in suo valore quamdiu non distrahuntur in suo pondere. Et si videantur augeri vel minui, hoc non est propter aliquod augmentum vel minucionem valoris qui sit in eis sed per augmentum et minucionem nostre indigencie siue eciam propter augmentum vel minucionem in alijs rebus in quas commutantur. Et sicud de rebus que consueuerunt ponderari, in suo modo sic dico de alijs rebus que consueuerunt mensurari, sicut vinum, granum, oleum et consimilia, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fols. 68r-v; Cesena, 177. 38 Hoc autem ... non potest dici de rebus alijs naturalibus, quecumque sint ille, nam alie res naturales non se habent in sua natura ad unum aliquod determinate, ex quo possit earum valor pensari et certitudinaliter cognosci; immo est impossibile certitudinaliter cognoscere aliarum valorem, quia earum valor non potest pensari aliquo intrinseco ex necessitate sed ex diuersis causis extrinsecis et contingentibus, ut verbi gratia, valor istius vinee vel valor istius agri quandoque pensatur ex loco, quandoque ex tempore, quandoque ex condicionibus personarum, quandoque ex diuersis alijs circumstantijs que possunt multipliciter variari. Et sicud dico in vinea vel in agro, ita et in quibuscumque alijs rebus naturalibus que non ponderantur vel mensurantur, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68v; Cesena, 177-8. 39 See Langholm, Medieval Schools, 558-9.
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That a usurious contract causes a thing that does not generate fruit to generate a profit is clear because it is assumed in the foregoing argument that lendable things, in which usury is committed, have assigned to them by nature or art a determinate value, and as a result cannot increase in value and for the same reason cannot bear fruit, for a thing that bears fruit always increases in value along with the fruit, for it is of greater value when it is in fruit than when it is not.40

Therefore, although ownership of the value of the sum lent indeed vests in the creditor (only ownership of the substance passes to the debtor), to demand an increment in the form of interest represents a violation of the intrinsically sterile nature of a fungible. Gerards quaestio survives in only two manuscript copies, and the reason for this is that his argument was paraphrased by Giovanni dAndrea in a quaestio disputata of his own linked to a fragment of the title de regulis iuris in the Liber sextus that suggested the topic of usury: Sin is not forgiven unless the thing stolen is restored.41 Giovanni redacted the quaestio sometime between 1329-1330 and his death in the first visitation of the Black Death. In contrast to Gerard, we know a great deal about Giovanni.42 Born in Florentine
Quod autem contractus usurarius faciat rem non generantem fructum generare lucrum apparet quia presupponitur in precedenti processu quod res mutuabiles, in quibus usura committitur, habeant a natura vel ab arte sibi prestitutum determinatum valorem et per consequens non possunt in eo crescere et ex hoc ipso non possunt fructum generare, quia res que generat fructum semper excrescit in valore cum fructu, nam maioris valoris est quando est sub fructu quam quando est sine fructu, Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 69r; Cesena, 179. 41 VI de reg. iur. 4: Peccatum non dimittitur, nisi restituatur ablatum. For the text of the quaestio, see Johannes Andreae, In titulum de regulis iuris novella commentaria (Venice, 1581; repr. Turin: Bottega dErasmo, 1963), 62ra-66ra. The commentary is in fact a collection of questions Giovanni disputed on Wednesday afternoons during term and therefore known as the Quaestiones mercuriales. Giovanni subsequently arranged them according to the chapters of de regulis iuris. On the collection, see Cyprian Rosen, Notes on an Earlier Version of the Quaestiones Mercuriales, Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law, n.s. 5 (1975): 103-14; and O. Condorelli, Dalle Quaestiones Mercuriales alla Novella in titulum de regulis iuris, Revista internazionale di diritto comune 3 (1992): 125-71. 42 For biographical information, see Diplovatatius, Liber de claris iuris consultis, 229-39; Schulte, Die Geschichte, 2: 205-29; S. Stelling-Michaud, Jean dAndr, in Naz, Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, 6: cols. 89-92; Stephan Kuttner, Johannes Andreae and his Novella on the Decretals of Gregory IX:
40

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Tuscany around 1270 and educated in Bologna, he was the most celebrated canonist of his day. A counsellor of popes, friend of Petrarch and professor of canon law at Bologna, he left influential commentaries on the entire corpus of canon law and was posthumously dubbed the fount and trumpet of canon law by the civilian Baldus degli Ubaldi ( 1400).43 Giovannis enormous prestige meant that Gerards argument came to be associated with the more famous canonist; indeed, as recently as 1957, John T. Noonan described it as the Andrean argument against usury.44 It was the distinguished Norwegian economic historian Odd Langholm who corrected the attribution and established the importance of Gerards analysis for late medieval economic thought.45 Giovanni endorsed Gerards analysis, reproducing the Questio de usura almost verbatim, confining himself on the whole to inserting additional juristic allegations in support of Gerards points and to correcting inaccurate formulations of legal concepts.46 Most subseAn Introduction, The Jurist 24 (1964): 393-408; repr. in Stephan Kuttner, Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), xvi. There exists as yet no systematic study of the life and thought of this important jurist. 43 Iuris canonici fons et tuba; quoted by Kuttner, Johannes Andreae, 399, n.24. 44 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 67. 45 Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, 30-1; Langholm, Medieval Schools, 550, 556-7. The history of Gerards economic writings is additionally confused by the fact that the manuscript tradition sometimes also credited him with authorship of Pietro di Giovanni Olivis ( 1298) treatises on usury and restitution; see Dionisio Pacetti, Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzioni di Pietro Giovanni Olivi falsamente attribuito a Fr. Gerardo da Siena, Archivum franciscanum historicum 46 (1953): 448-57. These texts have been edited by Giacomo Todeschini, Un trattato di economia politica francescana: il De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuris, de restitutionibus di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, Studi storici, fasc. 125-6 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1980). 46 For example, Giovanni objected to Gerards use of the term owner (dominus) to describe the creditor: he owns neither the substance nor the value of the principal, but rather has an action for recovery of the sum lent: Tu dic quod non bene advertit hic disputans, quia si debitor haberet unum scrinium nummorum, non est dare quod creditor unus ex illis sit dominus; habet autem principalem actionem contra debitorem, Novella, ad VI de reg. iur. 4, Peccatum, n.11 (ed. cit. fol. 63rb). Similarly, Gerard incorrectly characterizes commodatum, the gratuitous loan of a non-fungible thing, as a profitable contract: see Questio de usura, art. 2; Leipzig, fol. 68v; Cesena, 175; and Giovannis comment, Novella, ad VI de reg. iur. 4, Peccatum, n.11 (ed. cit. fol. 63rb).

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quent canonistic authorities on usury, such as Giovanni Calderini ( 1365) and Lorenzo Ridolfi ( 1443), followed suit: indeed, the latter described Gerards argument as both useful and elegant.47 Nevertheless, Giovanniand later canonists echo him on this pointhad an important reservation about the argument as it stood. While agreeing that the valuation of fungibles in terms of number, weight and measure was a convenience, Giovanni declared that he did not understand why Gerard insisted that fungibles have a fixed and determinate value in such terms by nature:
I would readily concede that the valuation of fungibles is simpler, especially when concluding a contract, by restricting it to [a fixed and determinate measure], but I do not understand why fungibles should have an inalterable fixed and determinate value beforehand provided the weight, number or measure remains constant.48

Langholm suggests that Giovanni misunderstood or simply rejected the argument.49 But the text of Giovannis quaestio indicates that he did not understand Gerard to be arguing that the value of fungibles cannot fluctuate in terms of other commodities; that is, he did not misunderstand the argument.50 Nor, clearly, did he reject the argument in general. Giovanni seems to have objected to the proposition that the categories of number, weight and measure derive from the nature of fungibles; and this appears to be the burden of the qualifying antea (beforehand) in his comment. As applied

Sed quia hoc [that is, that usury is naturally vicious] utile et pulchrum videre est, paulisper in eo euagemur, Tractatus de usuris, pars 1, q.7, ed. Lawrin Armstrong, Usury and Public Debt in Early Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the Monte Comune, Texts and Studies 144 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003), 144. Giovanni Calderini refers his readers to Giovanni dAndreas quaestio in a repetitio on X 5.19.19 Naviganti; see Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2652, fols. 283v-284r. 48 Ego de plano concederem quod facilior est harum aestimatio et maxime tempore quo contrahitur restringendo ad illud, sed quod antea habeant certum et determinatum valorem durante pondere, numero vel mensura, non alternandum in plus vel minus, non capio, Novella, ad VI de reg. iur. 4, Peccatum, n.13 (ed. cit., fol. 63vb). 49 Langholm, Medieval Schools, 557. 50 See the passage immediately preceding that just quoted, which reproduces Gerards observation about the price of fungibles in terms of other things (see above, n.37); Novella, ad VI de reg. iur. 4, Peccatum, n.13 (ed. cit., fol. 63vb).

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to fungibles, number, weight and measure are conventional constructs that have significance only in a contractual context and more specifically in the context of a loan. The value of a fungible is fixed by the contractnot by natureand once the agreement has been concluded, the value cannot fluctuate with respect to number, measure and weight. With this caveat, the remainder of Gerards argument holds good. What does this appropriation and correction of a theologians argument by a jurist tell us about the relationship between law and ethics in the later Middle Ages? In a certain sense, Giovannis critique went to the heart of Gerards question and transformed the terms of the debate. Gerards objective was to reformulate the Thomistic consumptibility argument in a form that rendered it unassailable by resolving an inconsistency that derived in part from Thomas over-faithful adherence to Aristotles remarks about artificial fungibles. He appealed to the supra-conventional and metalegal standard of nature as the ground for distinguishing between fungibles and non-fungibles. Unfortunately, the only definition of a fungible to which he had access was one that itself derived from law and convention. It is precisely this point that Giovanni singled out, insisting on the conventional character of the definition. For Giovanni, there is nothing natural about number, measure and weight: they are conventions agreed upon by human society. In short, they are the product of positive law, which is the realm of canon law, whose function, as Gerard himself asserts, is to direct human society towards the common good in accordance with faith in God and in expectation of the future life.51 Gerard of Sienas sweeping critique of usury was very much in the spirit of the times, which witnessed an intensification of the usury prohibition. In 1317 John XXII promulgated a decree of the Council of Vienne (1311-1312) which increased the penalties for notorious usurers and imposed excommunication on public authorities who tolerated their activities.52 It would be a mistake to con51 Ius vero canonicum intendit dirigere in bonum commune secundum quod congruit humane societati, que non solum viuit ciuiliter sed eciam regulariter secundum fidem in Deum tendendo et vitam aliam expectando, Questio de usura, art. 5; Leipzig, fols. 71v-72r; Cesena, 190. 52 The decree Ex gravi (Clem. 5.5.1) condemned the legitimation of usury as quasi-heretical and forbade the public licencing of usurers. For a translation, see John W. Boyer and Julius Kirshner, eds., University of Chicago

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clude from Giovanni dAndreas reservations about Gerards argument that lawyers were somehow more accommodating of usury than their theological colleagues. On the contrary, Giovanni dAndrea was among the most severe critics of the so-called extrinsic titles to usury, most notably the title first proposed by Hostiensis according to which a merchant might claim compensation for legitimate opportunities to profit that he renounced by making a loan, namely, lucrum cessans (cessant gain), what modern economists call opportunity cost.53 In Giovannis view lucrum cessans furnishes a highway to usury and should therefore be rejected.54 Late medieval and Renaissance canonists were not, as the literature sometimes suggests, more business-friendly than theologians; indeed, most accepted Giovannis judgement on cessant gain and his endorsement of Gerards natural law argument against usury.55 The relationship between canon law and ethics in late medieval Europe is a subject that merits further study. Although the two disciplines were clearly in accord about behavioral norms, the existing scholarship on medieval economic ethics, particularly on the usury prohibition, and this (admittedly narrow) case study suggest

Readings in Western Civilization, vol. 4, Medieval Europe, ed. and trans. Julius Kirshner and Karl F. Morrison (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 317. Gerard does not cite the decree in his quaestio. On the penalties for usury, see McLaughlin, Teachings, 2: 1-22. 53 For discussions, see McLaughlin, Teachings, 1: 144-7; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, 115-28; and Spicciani, Capitale e interesse, 27-48. 54 Quid si habens pecuniam volebat ad nundinas ire et merces emere, ut alio deferret vel tempore servaret propter lucrum; ego indigens pecunia illam recipio, offerens me illam restituere cum lucro sperato in termino et loco? Dicit hic Innocentius quod licet quidam contrarium teneant, ipse putat hunc contractum usurarium, nec scit illum excusare. Hostiensis ... dicit quod tali mercatori obligatus sum ad interesse illius lucri, quod facturus erat verisimiliter ex pecunia, dummodo nil fiat in fraudem usurarum et dictus mercator dicto modo non consueverit pecuniam tradere ad usuram. Verius videtur dictum Innocentii et quod dicitur de interesse, illud locum habet post moram debitoris, et ex contrario pararetur aperta via ad foenus, staret enim usurarius paratus cum capello, ocreis et calcaribus ad modum Foroiuliensium, dicens se ad nundinas ire velle, si sibi liceret taliter stipulari sub colore lucri speranti aliquid ultra sortem, Novella, ad X 5.19.19, n.5 (ed. cit., fol. 77vb). 55 For a critique of some of the assumptions underlying the historiography, see Lawrin Armstrong, Usury, Conscience and Public Debt: Angelo Corbinellis Testament of 1419, in John A. Marino and Thomas Kuehn, eds., A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2004), 173-240.

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that a fruitful area of research will prove to be the relationship betweenand relative weight assigned by law and theology to nature and convention.

MAX WEBER AND USURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH1


Lutz Kaelber

Introduction Scholarly interest in usury varies widely across the disciplines. While medieval historians and economists continue to debate what if any effect the Catholic churchs ban on taking interest on loans had on economic development, sociologists have abandoned the topic. Only Benjamin Nelson has afforded it a detailed analysis.2 Nelson reconstructs the history of religious attitudes toward usury in the Western world using the Weberian theme of a transformation from an ethic of tribal brotherhood, or charity among kin, to one of universal otherhood, reflective of the dominance of purposive rationality in social relations. Relating his studies to Max Weber, he notes that Weber had analyzed provisions against usury in a variety of settings and contexts, including while being a student of commercial law and history under the auspices of the acclaimed authority in the field, Levin Goldschmidt.3 Yet Nelson provides no substantive discussion of Webers more intricate viewpoints, perhaps due to the fact, as he writes in the prologue to the second edition, that his book had been fully formed before he came across Webers writings.4 Since then few sociologists have acknowledged that Weber included references to the prohibition of contracting any increment above the principal of a loan in medieval Catholicism and in other

An earlier version of this paper was published under the title Max Weber on Usury and Medieval Capitalism: From The History of Commercial Partnerships to The Protestant Ethic, in Max Weber Studies 4 (2004): 51-75; reproduced here with permission of the journal. I would like to thank Nick Danigelis, Lawrin Armstrong, John Munro, the anonymous reviewers for Max Weber Studies, and Sam Whimster for their comments and suggestions. 2 Benjamin Nelson, The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). 3 Nelson, The Idea, 235. 4 Nelson, The Idea, xi.

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religions, and even fewer describe and analyze what these references entail and what they mean.5 This paper addresses the development of Webers views on usury. Fragmented and strewn, in bits and pieces, over a variety of his writings, these views nevertheless provide important insights. Usury was not a peripheral topic in Webers writings. The topic emerged in Webers dissertation and gradually came to constitute a part of Webers inquiries into the salvation economy of medieval Christianity. Moreover, Webers writings on the topic contain insights pertinent to recent scholarship. The content of Webers thought is discussed in three sections. The first section explores the emergence of Webers views in the context of his dissertation and first book, which contains his most extensive discussion of the medieval prohibition of usury and its effects on economic development. It also addresses similarities and differences between Webers views and those held by contemporary scholars, many of whom saw the emergence of certain economic institutions such as commercial partnerships as a means of evading the Churchs banan argument Weber refuted. The second section addresses usury in the context of Webers Protestant Ethic essay published in 1904-1905 and subsequent rebuttals of his critics. Here, Weber drew on his new explorations of the relationship between religion and the economy as well as his earlier studies on the German stock exchange to argue a point that was consistent with, but not identical to, his earlier approach. Drawing parallels between medieval guild members and modern stockbrokers, who found innovative ways to cope with the moral regulation of economic affairs and ultimately render them ineffective, Weber questioned the validity of Werner Sombarts materialist interpretation of the role of ethics in economic development. Had religion been merely the reflection of material conditions in the transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy, Weber argued, religious

See Wolfgang Schluchter, Paradoxes of Modernity, trans. N. Solomon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 226-7, 343 n.247, who notes that Weber considered the ban on usury a part of the traditionalist ethic of the pre-Reformation church that inhibited the emergence of modernity but does not explore the context of Webers argument and why Weber thought this to have been the case, and Richard Swedberg, Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 258 n.15, who acknowledges that Weber discusses usury quite a bit without further analysis.

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authorities would not have expressed heightened concern regarding usury in times of economic expansion. The third section addresses Webers views on usury as they derived from his comparative studies on the world religions and Economy and Society. Weber compared different religions usury provisions and demonstrated that their stringency did not correlate with economic development. Rejecting new claims by Sombart and others that the medieval Catholic churchs ban on taking interest on loans was a boon rather than a bane for investing assets, Weber thematized the development of markets and the development of usury prohibitions as countervailing rationalizations of the religious sphere and the sphere of the economy. While a discussion of the merit of Webers argument is beyond the purview of this paper, the conclusion endeavors some thoughts on how Webers views may inform current scholarly debates concerning the historical role of the religious prohibition of interest on loans in Western history.

The Role of Usury in Economic Development and the Relative Autonomy of Law and the Economy: Webers Dissertation Weber discussed usury as early as in his first book. Published in 1889 and based on his dissertation, it contains a legal analysis of medieval partnerships.6 In a little-known and heretofore never discussed section, Weber explores the topic to a greater extent than in any other writing and establishes the framework for later analyses. In The History of Commercial Partnerships, Weber responds to the argument that medieval partnerships were founded to circumvent canon laws prohibition of usury, which secular statutes adopted as well. He notes:
Endemann argued that even loans that represented, from an economic point of view, a loan of capital in return for the payment of
6 Max Weber, Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Enke, 1889); Max Weber, The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages, trans. L. Kaelber (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); see also L. Kaelber, Max Webers Dissertation, History of the Human Sciences 16 (2003): 27-56.

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fixed interest were constructed in the form of a partnership. We know of similar attempts to construct the purchase of perpetual rent as a hidden interest-bearing loan secured by a mortgage, but this view has been abandoned. The analyses by Arnold and others have shown that the purchase of perpetual rent developed gradually out of renting real estate in towns, and that it fulfilled independent economic needs and not at all acted as a stopgap for the missing interest-bearing loan. This holds true even when capital available for investment later employed this institutionbut not before it had come to fruition independentlyas a substitute for the non-existent interest-bearing mortgage loan ... While we have also seen that the commenda and the societas maris were indeed used as forms of investment, even for the property of wards, according to the statutes of Pisa, at that time these partnerships had already developed into their most advanced form in the Middle Ages. Therefore, it is a vast exaggeration to assume that capital invested in such a way had chosen this form of investment because there was no way for it to be invested in the form of an interest-bearing loan. There is no evidence for that; in fact, there is evidence of the contrary ... In the case in which a maritime venture experienced a catastrophic loss, the repayment of a loan taken out for the purpose of funding the venture had to appear highly questionable. This explains ... why the investment of capital took on the form of a share of the risk in exchange for a share of the profit, the latter of which nascent commerce, in need of capital, supplied willingly ... This institution corresponded to views prevalent in Mediterranean trade, the oldest area of large trade, which could not perceive of the investment of capital for the purpose of an expedition overseas in any other terms than as a participation in itthat is, as sharing its risk as well. Changes in these views reflect the fact that risk became more calculable. This, rather than a subtle attempt to circumvent the prohibition of usury, explains why part of the risk was assumed by capitalists. It also explains why forms of partnerships that economically resembled a loan still appear to have legally been constructed as partnerships with a fixed dividend. When the doctrine of usuryif one can agree that such existed appeared on the economic scene, the development of the forms of partnership, as Lastig has strongly argued against Endemann, had long been concluded. The role played by the canonical prohibition was therefore not a small one, in Italy as well as in other places. Almost all statutes addressed it ... But one cannot argue that the development of a new institution of law, or merely the further development of an existing institution, happened due to this prohibition. The prohibition led to the end of some institutions such as the dare

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ad proficuum maris; and otherwise, it also served a restrictive, not creative, function. Even the proficuum maris, which corresponds most poorly to the institution of a partnership but seems best suitable as a paradigm of Endemanns theory, appears to have been fully developed before the doctrine of usury took hold, and it later fell victim to this doctrine once it had fully taken hold. Its demise was not due to the way in which risk was distributed but happened because of the certum lucrum. These facts show clearly that the prohibition of usury did not give rise to the form of partnership.7

Weber makes four important arguments here, some of which are buried in obscure language and references. First, he does not advocate that usury laws were without impact. Weber distinguishes between loans for consumption and loans for investment purposes. For the former the prohibition of interest was indeed a constraining factor, whereas for the latter it led to the decline of the dare ad proficuum maris, which was based on a capitalists willingness (literally) to give for making profit on maritime voyages. That form of partnership developed in the later Middle Ages, when diminishing risks on commercial voyages to sea ports in the Mediterranean allowed for the calculation of an average profit, a share in which could then be reasonably guaranteed.8 While this arrangement took out the risk for the capitalist, who merely contributed his capital without further involvement and relied on a fixed dividend or rate of return (certum lucrum), it also made the partnership vulnerable to the accusation of usury and led to its ultimate demise, as Weber shows for the city of Pisa. The prohibition of usury was therefore not entirely without teeth. Webers second argument relates to the investment of capital in other, more common types of partnerships, both on land and at sea. The usury bans effect on those partnerships, he argues, was very limited. Investment loans were more important for economic development than consumption loans, and in the various forms of partnerships capital found ready investment opportunities. Since in
7 In this and other passages taken from English translations of Webers writings, I have made corrections or retranslated parts of them. Weber, Zur Geschichte, 111-4; Weber, The History, 137-9. 8 Weber, Zur Geschichte, 109-10; Weber, The History, 136-7. Its equivalent on land was the dare ad proficuum de terra in bottega vel alio loco, where an investor invested in a company operating out of a shop. See Weber, Zur Geschichte, 122; Weber, The History, 145.

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most medieval partnerships a partner who provided capital incurred the risk of losing it and sometimes involved himself in carrying on business, he could legitimately reap a profit. Such a profit was seen as entirely different from taking interest on a loan, which, with certain exceptions, was prohibited. Hence, the prohibition of usury simply did not apply to most of the commercial associations Weber explored. The third argument concerns the timing of the emergence of stricter usury laws and the legal development of partnerships in the later Middle Ages. In 1874 and 1883, the legal scholar Wilhelm Endemann had published a massive two-volume study on the economic doctrines in Roman canon law. It was not the first study that addressed usury, but compared to studies by Catholic theologians and authors such as Franz Xaver Funks,9 it focused more on usury laws legal construction, practical effects, and economic relevance than on their ethical aspects. Endemanns tome was considered the major study of this sort at the time, but while Weber acknowledges Endemanns contributions (as well as Funks),10 he takes issue with Endemanns contention that medieval partnerships developed mainly as a means of circumventing increasingly stringent usury laws. In doing so, Weber relies in part on the findings of a certain Arnold, whom he mentions in the quoted passage, which is a reference to the scholar of Roman and German history Wilhelm Arnold. Arnolds major study on the development of real property in German cities included census contracts (an annuity or perpetual rent), which did not emerge as a response to the prohibition of

9 Franz Xaver Funk, Zins und Wucher: Eine moraltheologische Abhandlung mit Berchsichtigung des gegenwrtigen Standes der Kultur und der Staatswissenschaften (Tbingen: Lauppsche Buchhandlung, 1868). 10 Webers History of Commercial Partnerships and his Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen ber Allgemeine (Theoretische) Nationalkonomie (Outline to the Lectures on General [Theoretical] National Economy) of 1898 mention Endemann on several occasions (Max Weber, Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen ber Allgemeine (Theoretische) Nationalkonomie (Tbingen: Mohr, 1990), 12, 16, 17). In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism of 1919-1920, Weber refers once more to Funk (whose name he misspells) and to Endemanns studies that, according to him, [are] today out of date in regard to detail yet still remain fundamental (Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, in Gesammelte Aufstze zur Religionssoziologie I (Tbingen: Mohr, 1988), 57 n.; M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 3d ed., trans. S. Kalberg (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2001), 176 n.32).

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usury.11 Yet Webers main argument derives to a much larger extent from his own studies, and those of the scholar of law Gustav Lastig, on medieval partnerships. In a pioneering analysis of documents in Italian archives, Lastig12 had launched an attack on Endemanns thesis for not sufficiently distinguishing between different types of partnerships and misrepresenting how capital was invested in them. Weber supports many of Lastigs views but he also goes beyond the latters studies by showing that changes in the legal arrangements of medieval commercial partnerships made them increasingly less similar to an interest-bearing loan or other such types of investments at the same time as the usury doctrine stiffened. Of the two main forms of commendas he studied, the unilateral and the bilateral commenda, Weber considers the first one to be historically older. In that arrangement, a capitalist provided capital to an enterprise in which a managing partner carried out the business transactions. The managing partner did not partake in the risk and gradually developed into the capitalists agent, buying and selling goods in his own name on the account of the principal. Weber argues that the unilateral commenda is therefore the medieval precursor to the modern form of commission agency. In the Constitutum usus, Pisas codified commercial customs dating back to as early as c. 1146-1154,13 this form of partnership was known as dare ad portandum in compagniam. It lacks a separate fund, which is a constitutive element of the bilateral partnership, for an investor contributes capital but is not made liable to third parties by his partners actions. The risk is thus limited to the investors contribution, and his involvement in the partnership is not transparent to third parties.14 In a bilateral partnership, on the other hand, a se11 W. Arnold, Zur Geschichte des Eigentums in den deutschen Stdten (Basel: Georg, 1861), 92. For a supportive assessment, see H.-J. Gilomen, Rente, Rentenkauf, Rentenmarkt, in Lexikon des Mittelalters (Munich: LexMa, 1995), 7: 736. 12 G. Lastig, Beitrge zur Geschichte des Handelsrechts, I, Zeitschrift fr das Gesamte Handelsrecht 23 (1878): 138-78; G. Lastig, Beitrge zur Geschichte des Handelsrechts, II, Zeitschrift fr das Gesamte Handelsrecht 24 (1879): 387-449. 13 P. Classen, Kodifikation im 12. Jahrhundert: Die Constituta usus et legis von Pisa, in P. Classen, ed., Recht und Schrift im Mittelalter (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1977), 311-7. 14 As Weber points out, the equivalent in modern German commercial law is the dormant partnership (Stille Gesellschaft). This institution of European

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dentary investor as well as a traveling partner each contribute capital and share the profits or losses. From a legal perspective the partnerships capital is separate from the investors personal assets, and partnership business is undertaken in a joint name, that of the firm. In the societas maris referred to in the Constitutum usus, the sedentary partners legal liability is limited to his capital contribution, whereas the traveling partners liability is unlimited; hence, Weber argues, the modern limited partnership had its root in the Pisan societas maris.15 Time is important in this analysis, for the shift away from unilateral partnerships and toward bilateral ones as a preferred form of investment was well underway before elaborations of canonical usury prohibitions began in the late twelfth century. This finding not only undercuts the argument that religious prohibitions affected these economic changes but also explains why Weber holds that, when the doctrine of usury got its teeth, the development of the forms of partnership ... had long been concluded. The fourth argument contained in the passage is implicit but nevertheless important. His viewpoint is based on the supposition that both law and the economy in the Middle Ages had sufficient societal autonomy to proceed along their own trajectories and that developments in either sphere could simply be adduced by reference to another social sphere such as religion. While interdependencies are always empirically observable, their existence does not allow for the conclusion that one sphere depends on another or merely mirrors developments in the other. Thus, Weber sees a differentiation of institutional spheres before modernity, and with regard to the concomitant increase in the spheres relative autonomy, he follows his academic teacher, the legendary scholar of commercial law Levin Goldschmidt, who stressed such autonomy throughout his writings. Goldschmidt also agreed substantively with

civil law does not have an exact equivalent in common law countries, including those who stand in the Anglo-American legal tradition, where undisclosed or silent partners have unlimited personal liability in the absence of a limited partnership agreement. See Weber, Zur Geschichte, 108; Weber, The History, 135. 15 Weber also traces the modern general partnership, which has joint and several liability, to partnerships in Florence, derivative of associations of craftsmen and domestic traders, see L. Kaelber, Max Webers Dissertation in the Context of His Early Life and Career, in Weber, The History, 22-7.

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Webers position. Rejecting Endemann, Goldschmidt stated that the prohibition of usury was not effective in throttling economic development, for even canon law had provisions that permitted the taking of interest, not to mention more lenient secular laws. At most usury laws introduced additional restrictions to the market for credit, thus increasing rather than decreasing interest rates.16 Correspondingly, Weber17 notes in the concluding chapter that the prohibition of usury was more unsettling to theoreticians than to practitioners.18 Weber was thus first exposed to the issue of the prohibition of usury and its effects on economic development in his studies of the medieval urban Italian economy, which he approached as a legal scholar. His arguments concerning the limited effect of religious restrictions on interest in Europes most advanced economy, based on his own documentary analyses, and laws and the economys relatively high degree of autonomy would affect his views when he revisited the topic as part of his Protestant Ethic studies fifteen years later. Usury and Medieval Religion: The Protestant Ethic Essays and Webers Rebuttals of Rachfahl After finishing his dissertation, Weber quickly moved on to other topics. He would not address the issue of usury in detail again until his two-part essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of CapitalL. Goldschmidt, Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (Stuttgart: Enke, 1891), 140-1. 17 Weber, Zur Geschichte, 151; Weber, The History, 170. 18 It seems impossible to determine who influenced whom. Presumably relying on Webers Italian case studies, Goldschmidt made his first extensive comments on the topic in 1891. However, it is likely that he had long before formed an opinion, which he may have expressed to Weber during the latters preparation of his dissertation. The agreement between the two scholars extended beyond usury. Despite Webers vociferous remarks toward the Poles in his Freiburg inaugural address (see, e.g., J. M. Barbalet, Webers Inaugural Lecture and Its Place in His Sociology, Journal of Classical Sociology 1 (2001): 147-70), they had similar views on German politics and economic policy at the time. Both were supportive of national liberalism and favored a limited intervention of the state in the economy. See K. Borchardt, Max Webers Writings on the Bourse: Puzzling Out a Forgotten Corpus, Max Weber Studies 2 (2002): 139-62; L. Weyhe, Levin Goldschmidt: Ein Gelehrtenleben in Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996).
16

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ism in 1904-1905 and replies to his critic Felix Rachfahl in 1910. In his Protestant Ethic essay, Webers approach broadens. He is now concerned with the practical aspects of religious ethics, specifically with the ways in which religion inhibited or contributed to the emergence of a modern capitalist ethos represented in modern vocational culture, for which he adopts Werner Sombarts term: the spirit of capitalism. Weber portrays the Middle Ages as a time before the modern notion of a calling (Beruf) broke the Churchs mold of medieval economic regulation. This mold he describes as follows:
The phrase Deo placere non potest was used in relation to the activity of the merchant. But, when compared to widely held antichrematistic views, this represented a considerable accommodation of Catholic doctrine to the interests of the financial powers of the Italian cities ... [G]ain as an activity pursued as an end in itself was basically a pudendum, which was tolerated solely because it had become an established institution. A moral view like that of Benjamin Franklin would have been simply unthinkable. This was also the position of those directly concerned. Their lifes work was, at best, something morally neutraltolerated, but on account of the constant danger of clashing with the Churchs ban on usury, spiritually dubious. The sources reveal that upon the death of wealthy people, considerable sums of money flowed into the coffers of the Church institutions as conscience money, some of it even going back to former debtors as usura wrongfully taken from them. Even skeptical persons not in sympathy with the Church tended to play safe and pay these sums in order to be reconciled with the Church just in case the worst came to the worst. It was an insurance against the uncertainties concerning the afterlife and because, after all (at least this rather lax view was widely held), outward conformity to the laws of the Church was sufficient to salvation. It is here that the amoral and in part immoral character of their actions becomes clear, as those concerned themselves saw it.19

Weber sees heterodox religion in the Middle Ages as accommodating, rather than being hostile to, economic activities in general, and

19 M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, I: Das Problem, Archiv fr Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20 (1904): 32-3; M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Other Writings, ed. and trans. P. Baehr and G. C. Wells (London: Penguin, 2002), 25.

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mercantile activities in specific. Accommodation consisted of practices that allow remorseful transgressors to return to the bosom of the Church, but no positive endorsement of methodically controlled acquisitive activity existed. Weber chooses the phrase Homo mercator vix aut nunquam deo potest placere (the merchant can hardly or never please God) in Gratians collection of church laws (c. 1140) as indicative of limitations on enterprise. What is interesting in the passages above, however, is that Weber refers to the prohibition of usury and the related restitution of wrongful gain to illustrate his point. In the accompanying footnote, he notes:
We can learn exactly how they used to come to terms with the ban on the taking of interest in, for example, Book I, chapter 65 of the statute of the Arte di Calimala .... : The consuls must ensure that they make confession to those brethren [confessors] whom they judge most likely to pardon them, and that they do it in the manner most appropriate to the gift, service or reward received, in terms of the interest exacted for the past year, according to custom. In other words, the guild obtains indulgence for its members through official channels and through submission to the Church. The instructions that follow are also highly typical of the a-moral character of capital gains, as well as, for example, the immediately preceding injunction (chap. 63) to record all interest and profits as gifts. Todays stock exchange blacklisting of those who refuse to honor forward contracts by invoking the margin defense (Differenzeinwand) in court can be compared to the vilifying of those who went before an ecclesiastical court pleading exceptio usurariae pravitatis.20

Weber thus continues to draw on his dissertation to inform his assessment of commercial (and religious) medieval practices. From his analysis of the statutes of the Florentine Arte di Calimala, the prestigious guild of merchants of imported wool, he comes to the same conclusion as he did about fifteen years earlier. International merchants, facing the issue of usury on an almost daily basis, did not simply ignore religious concerns regarding their activities but found ways to adapt to them and assuage lingering doubts. In part this occurred through the aforementioned restitution, which could occur on a merchants deathbed, in part through the corporate
20

Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, I, 33 n.1; Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Baehr and Wells, 51-2 n.36.

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practice of creative economic procedures that circumvented the prohibition of interest. At the end of the passage, Weber likens the defensive practices of medieval guilds to those of modern stockbrokers. The MWG edition of Webers writings on the stock exchange in 1894-189621 has made possible a better understanding of the origin of these words and their meaning, which has escaped all existing English translations of Webers Protestant Ethic writings. German civil law had traditionally not allowed forward or arbitrage contracts, which are contractual transactions based solely on the exploitation of the difference between an initially agreed-upon price and the price set later by the market or exchange. Since such contracts constituted gambling or betting, they were not enforceable, and the Differenzeinwand, or margin defense, was the legal defense used against claims in court lest such speculative contracts be enforced. However, stock market traders dealing among themselves could not invoke such a defense, and those who tried, in cases Weber encountered during his studies on the stock exchange, were indeed blacklisted and thus faced marginalization.22 As Weber puts it, the defense is analogous to medieval guilds strategies to vilify those invoking exceptio usurariae pravitatis, a defense based on the claim that one partys contractual obligation derived from the other partys depraved usury, rendering the contract unenforceable and thus the obligation non-binding.23

M. Weber, Brsenwesen: Schriften und Reden, 1893-1898, ed. K. Borchardt. MWG I/5 (Tbingen: Mohr, 1999). 22 K. Borchardt, Einleitung and Editorischer Bericht, in Weber, Brsenwesen, 28-31; Weber, Brsenwesen, 225, 507, 1040. 23 Weber, Brsenwesen, 220-1, 1044. Cf. the existing translations of the passage. For Talcott Parsons, traders who invoked the margin defense were brokers who hold back the difference between top price and actual selling price (M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1976), 204 n. 31); for Stephen Kalberg, these traders are those who criticize orthodox procedures and the exceptio usurariae pravitatis is a plea for an exemption to the prohibition of usury (Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. S. Kalberg, 178 n.35); and for Peter Baehr and Gordon Wells, the blacklisted traders are those who take profits from differential rates (Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Baehr and Wells, 52, n.36). Economy and Society contains a better translation of a similar passage, see M. Weber, Economy and Society, ed. and trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1189.

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In a different part of the essay, Weber takes issue with those who argued that modern capitalism emerged because nascent capitalist entrepreneurs were finally able to shed the ballast of religious constraints on secular activities. He mainly addresses Sombarts thesis in Der Moderne Kapitalismus (1902).24 Having written a splendid dissertation on the rural proletariats impoverishment and exploitation in the Roman campagna (1888) under the guidance of Gustav Schmoller, a leader of the younger Historical School of political economy, Sombart was attuned to a Marxist-materialist interpretation of economic history early in his career.25 In Der Moderne Kapitalismus, Sombart related to Karl Marxs26 notion that feudal economic structuresrather than the existence of usury laws in itselfprevented assets generated through usurious practices from turning into industrial capital. Sombart argued that the medieval economy was craft-based and the ban on usury reflected its traditionalist ethic.27 The corollary of this position is that lifting the prohibition of interest signified a boost for the new modern capitalist spirit. Weber is not convinced by Sombarts thesis. Simply put, because such restraints had not been a decisive factor in the Middle Ages, their relegation to marginal status in the early modern era could not account for the emergence of capitalism. Moreover, Weber argues, not only did Luther remain a traditionalist on usury and other economic matters, but also strands of ascetic Protestantism continued to be concerned about the morality of taking interest. Therefore, an alleged desire on their part to engage freely in what previously would have been considered a usurious transaction is squarely at odds with the historical record.28 He affirms this view a few years later in his rebuttals to Felix Rachfahls arguments, referring to Rachfahls peripheral points about church doctrine on usury in the Middle Ages, which for

24 W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1902). 25 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann, Introduction, in W. Sombart, Economic Life in the Modern Age, ed. N. Stehr and R. Grundmann (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), xiii-xv. 26 K. Marx, Capital, trans. B. Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 1: 915. 27 Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, 1: 184-7. 28 Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, I, 9 n.1, and 45; Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Baehr and Wells, 30, 46 n.13.

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economic development are not at all decisive.29 He traces the origins of the Churchs usury doctrine to a false reading of the Greek Vulgate translation of the Decretals,30 mentions the Churchs dealings with usury along with confession as examples of the ways in which the Church was willing to accommodate but not approve of moral shortcomings, including those that resulted in ethically questionable economic practices, and alludes to modern Catholicisms much more lenient dealings with those matters.31 This position not only reflects a shift in Webers work toward a sociology of medieval Catholicism32 but also echoes the views of Ernst Troeltsch, with whom Weber formed a friendship between experts that led to much cross-fertilization in their work.33 In articles later included in The Economic Teachings of the Christian Churches34 Troeltsch posited that the medieval Church affirmed its claim to absolute universalism through the establishment and enforcement of a unitary religious culture that bound all Christians together by a fellowship of love,35 and it rejected usury as a violation of the communitarian ethic of brotherhood.36 Such a process of universalizing ethical notions, Weber realized, necessitated the lowering of some standards (for the laity), including accommodating economic practices to a certain extent while formally drawing sharp distinctions between ethical and unethical activities. By 1910, with

M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, II: Kritiken und Antikritiken, 5th ed., ed. J. Winkelmann (Gtersloh: Mohn, 1987), 167; M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Webers Replies to His Critics, 1907-1910, ed. D. J. Chalcraft and A. Harrington, trans. A. Harrington and M. Shields (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), 73. 30 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mchte: Nachlass, Teilband 2: Religise Gemeinschaften, ed. H. G. Kippenberg. MWG I/22-5 (Tbingen: Mohr, 2001), 377 n.11. 31 Weber, Die protestanische Ethik, II, 341 n.20; Weber, The Protestant Ethic Debate, 129 n.20. 32 L. Kaelber, Schools of Asceticism: Ideology and Organization in Medieval Religious Communities (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 112. 33 F. W. Graf, Friendship between Experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch, in W. J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel, eds., Max Weber and His Contemporaries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 215-33. 34 E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. O. Wyon (New York: Macmillan, [1912] 1956). 35 Troeltsch, Social Teaching, 55-58. 36 Troeltsch, Social Teaching, 128, 319-20.

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Troeltschs input, usury had thereby become part of Webers reflections on the role of religion for economic development.

Usury in Comparative and Systematic Perspective: Webers Later Writings Several influences on Webers views are evident in the revised Protestant Ethic, his writings on the economic ethics of the world religions, and the sections on religious communities and secular and religious rulership in Economy and Society. Weber elaborated on Troeltschs views but also took on recent arguments by Franz Keller and Sombart. In the revised Protestant Ethic, medieval Catholicism is afforded a more prominent role. Two new insertions concern the prohibition of interest. In one Weber asserts the validity of his earlier remarks to Rachfahl, that for the emergence of modern capitalisms vocational ethic, and, as he underlines, only in this context, the canonical prohibition of usury played no significant role.37 In the other insertion, which is one of the longest, Weber responds to what can only be described as puzzling claims made by the Catholic theologian Franz Keller and by Sombart. In two separate publications, Keller38 and Sombart39 turned the existing paradigm concerning usury upside down. Keller claimed inter alia that the Churchs ban on usury pertained only to emergency loans made in cases of sudden privation. Such a tightly confined prohibition of the taking of interest helped rather than hindered capitalist development, he40 maintained, because it cut short entrepreneurs ability to make a profit through illegitimate means and prevented the loss of capital stock of temporarily impoverished craftsmen and others in need, who would soon again be able to contribute to the economy. Keller
M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, in Gesammelte Aufstze, 27/The Protestant Ethic, trans. Kalberg, 168 n.23. 38 F. Keller, Unternehmung und Mehrwert: Eine sozial-ethische Studie zur Geschftsmoral (Paderborn: Schningh, 1912). 39 W. Sombart, Der Bourgeois: Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1913); Luxus und Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1913); and The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man, trans. M. Epstein (New York: Dutton, 1915). 40 Keller, Unternehmung, 24-8.
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made this argument in the space of a few pages and with barely a reference to historical documents. Nevertheless, Sombart expanded on it in Der Bourgeois,41 perhaps influenced by Kellers favorable treatment of Sombarts previous work. Seemingly intent on finding the capitalist spirits roots in anything but Webers Puritans, Sombart advanced an ever-increasing hodgepodge of explanations. He attributed an important role in the genesis of modern capitalism to the Jews,42 trade in luxury goods,43 war,44 and, lastly, the fusion of adventure capitalism (for which he credits in part the European Jewry) with the modern bourgeois rational calculability.45 Sombarts claim was as simple as Kellers: by forgoing loans, money had to seek more productive purposes and was thus invested in business, since profit, unlike interest, was not affected by religious prohibitions.46 Like Keller, Sombart furnished few references to literature supportive of this view. In his response in the Protestant Ethic, Weber is as defensive as he had been against Rachfahl. Calling Sombarts publication a book with a thesis in the worst sense of this expression and the by far the weakest ... of his larger studies,47 he affirms his earlier positions:
The truth is that [1] the church began to reconsider the prohibition of interest only at a rather late time; [2] at the time when this happened the forms of purely business investment were not loans at a fixed interest rate but the foenus nauticum, commenda, societas maris, and the dare ad proficuum de mari ... yet other than by a few rigorous canonists they were not held to fall under the ban; [3] when investments at a fixed rate of interest and discounting became possible and common, they encountered discernable difficulties stemming from the

Sombart, Der Bourgeois; Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism. W. Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1911); W. Sombart, The Jews and Modern Capitalism, trans. M. Epstein (London: Unwin, 1913). 43 W. Sombart, Luxus und Kapitalismus (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1913); W. Sombart, Luxury and Capitalism, trans. W. R. Dittmar (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1967). 44 W. Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1913). 45 Sombart, Der Bourgeois. 46 Sombart, Der Bourgeois, 314-22. 47 Weber, Die protestantische, in Gesammelte Aufstze, 27 n.2; 57 n.; Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Kalberg, 168 n.25; 176 n.32.
42

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prohibition of usury, which led merchant guilds to adopt drastic defensive measures (blacklisting!); [4] the canonists treatment of usury was purely formal-legalistic, and without any such tendency to protect capital as Keller ascribed to them; [5] lastly, the Churchs attitude toward capitalism, in so far as it can be ascertained at all, was determined by, on the on hand, a traditional hostility, mostly diffusely held, toward the growing power of capital, which was impersonal and hence not readily amenable to ethical control ... ; on the other hand, the necessity for accommodation.48

Convoluted in the original German, this passage succinctly depicts Webers views on usury shortly before his death. They had not changed significantly since his studies under Goldschmidt. The ban on usury does not rank among the chief reasons capitalism, in its modern manifestation in form and spirit, did not develop in the Middle Ages, nor was the Churchs rejection of interest in return for giving loans, while firm,49 responsible for the investment of money in ethically less clouded forms of investments such as partnerships. Rather, as Weber notes in an earlier passage in the same note, parallels to the prohibition of interest are to be found in almost all religious ethics around the world.50 These views touch on two larger issues Weber raised in two main projects in the last decade of his life: the importance of external religious guidelines for secular action, and the relationship between religion (as a societal order) and the economy. Weber addressed the former in his comparative studies on the world religions and the latter in Economy and Society. Webers statement regarding a prominent existence of usury rules in religious ethics is an implicit reference to, and a result of, his comparative studies of the economic ethics of the world religions, where he transcends the Protestant Ethics much more circumscribed theme of religious contributions to modern capitalism. In the conWeber, Die protestantische in Gesammelte Aufstze, 57-8 n.; Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Kalberg, 176 n.32. 49 Cf. Webers other major critic, Lujo Brentano, who held that the Church had effectively given up on regulating interest rates in the late Middle Ages and accepted a ceiling on interest rates. Weber did not respond. See L. Brentano, Die Anfnge des modernen Kapitalismus (Munich: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1916), 21. 50 Weber, Die protestantische in Gesammelte Aufstze, 56 n.1; Weber, The Protestant Ethic, trans. Kalberg, 176 n.32.
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text of those studies Weber notes that Islam scorned usury,51 as did Indian Brahminism,52 whereas Confucianism and Taoism, due to their rationalism of world adjustment,53 did not at all or only to a very limited extent.54 Judaism is more difficult to characterize. Elaborating on remarks made in his studies on agrarian history in 1908, where he briefly touched on the issue of interest in Israel,55 Weber in his study on ancient Judaism traces religious provisions that allowed lending money at interest to strangers to the economic ethics of an oppressed people. Relevant passages in the Torah were interpreted, for both political and religious reasons, to mean that the taking of interest was allowed only from gentiles. Although voices existed which rejected this in-group versus out-group morality, the marginalization of Jews, for which Weber used the controversial concept of a pariah people, ensured the continued existence of this morality.56 However, Weber does not go nearly as far as the increasingly anti-Semitic Sombart, who argued that Jews had a special propensity to trade and barter and by extracting profit from money lending contributed to the emergence of the adventure spirit Sombart associated with modern capitalism.57 In terms of prohibiting the
51

Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 435; Weber, Economy and Society, 625. 52 M. Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Hinduismus und Buddhismus: 1916-1920, ed. H. Schmidt-Glintzer, MWG I/20 (Tbingen: Mohr, 1996), 118; M. Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and D. Martindale (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1967), 56; M. Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Abriss der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, ed. J. Winckelmann, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958), 235; M. Weber, General Economic History, trans. F. Knight (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981), 268. 53 W. Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, trans. N. Solomon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 85-116. 54 M. Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus: Schriften 1915-1920, ed. H. Schmidt-Glintzer, MWG I/19 (Tbingen: Mohr, 1989), 279, 354-5; M. Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth (New York: Free Press, 1964), 100, 159. 55 M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Tbingen: Mohr, 1988), 86, 90; M. Weber, Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, trans. R. I. Frank. London: Verso, 1998), 137, 142-3. 56 M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufstze zur Religionssoziologie III (Tbingen: Mohr, 1988), 357-58; M. Weber, Ancient Judaism, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and D. Martindale (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), 342-3. 57 For discussion, see Stehr and Grundmann, Introduction, xxxiii-xxxix.

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taking of interest, Weber makes clear, Judaism is not the most permissive religion, and it is not a crucial issue:
The core of the obstacle [to developing modern capitalism] did not lie in such particular difficulties [as bans on interest in money lending], which every one of the great religious systems on its way has placed, or has seemed to place, in the way of the modern economy. The core of the obstruction was in the spirit of the whole system.58

The taking of interest in return for a loan is thus only one of many prohibited or negatively stereotyped activities that could interpose obstacles to secular activities. Yet they were externally imposed; hence, unless accompanied by internal changes that redirected peoples motives, ideas, and interests, they do not prevent the economic process from running its course. A system of external religious prohibitions cultivated from the outside but not from the inside: it could not thoroughly penetrate economic actions with an inner value.59 This helps explain why in spite of variations in the prohibition of taking interestnone or little in Confucianism and Taoism, from other Jews in Judaism, from anyone in late medieval Christianitynone of these religions developed modern capitalism and introduced economic rationalization. The prohibition was not a decisive factor; if it had been, then areas influenced by Confucianism and Taoism should have been the first to usher in the modern rationalized economy. The role of medieval Catholicism in this process was traditional, for it did not provide psychological incentives for the pursuit of ethically tempered acquisitiveness. At best, it produced a nave affirmation of the world,60 not ascetic Protestantisms world mastery. Weber addresses this issue on a more general level in the context of the relationship between the economy and other societal orders in Economy and Society. Two chapters, both located in the older part,

58 Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Hinduismus, 194; Weber, The Religion of India, 112. 59 Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus, 457, 460; Weber, The Religion of China, 232, 235; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 348; Weber, Economy and Society, 562. 60 Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus, 115; M. Weber, From Max Weber, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 291.

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concern usury. One thematizes the relationship between secular and religious rulership, which is part of Webers sociology of domination;61 the other, on religious communities, ties his writings on the economy in its relationship to other societal orders to his comparative writings in the sociology of religion.62 Though the chapters foci differ, Webers references to usury are similar and some passages virtually identical.63 Weber notes that while Christianity from early on rejected ingroup versus out-group morality in its emphasis on what Troeltsch had called absolute universalism, it developed its strongest rejection of the countervailing ethics, those of the market, in its opposition to interest when confronting the acceleration of economic growth in the twelfth century. This reflects a principal struggle between an ethical and economic rationalization of the economy.64 The Church attempted to come to grips with the amoral forces represented by the economy by means of a rationalization of the ethics that governed its hierocratic means, the dispensation of grace. This took the form of elaborate casuistries by Canon scholars. Next to the notion of a just price (justum pretium) in economic transactions, usury was one of the foils against which they could construct a moral code of ethical behavior in the secular world vis--vis the impersonalization and a-morality brought about by the market place. As he did originally in his dissertation, Weber stresses repeatedly that the systematization of religious ethics did not reflect material conditions and the unfolding of usury prohibitions is inconsistent with a materialist conception of history.65 Moreover, he alludes to the same means of evading or circumventing

E. Hanke, Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie: Eine werkgeschichtliche Studie, in E. Hanke and W. J. Mommsen, eds., Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie: Studien zur Entstehung und Wirkung (Tbingen: Mohr, 2001), 19-46. 62 Schluchter, Rationalism, 411-32; H. G. Kippenberg, Einleitung, in Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 1-83; but see W. J. Mommsen, Max Webers Grand Sociology: The Origins and Composition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Soziologie, History and Theory 39 (2000): 364-83. 63 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 376-83; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 5th, rev. ed., ed. J. Winckelmann (Tbingen: Mohr, 1985), 710-12; Weber, Economy and Society, 583-87, 1188-91. 64 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 377-8; Weber, Economy and Society, 584. 65 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 377; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Winckelmann, 711; Weber, Economy and Society, 584, 1189.

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the ban on taking interest as in the original Protestant Ethic; i.e., the blacklisting of guild members who go before ecclesiastical courts, the purchase of general indulgences, and merchants testamentary gifts of conscience money and charitable endowments as posthumous restitution of usury. The latter together with the elaboration of the system of penance and the establishment of ecclesiastical pawn lending institutions in the montes pietatis signify provisions by which the Church acquiesced to ethical conundrums resulting from economic action.66 In all, the summary judgment is the same as it had been all along: the practical consequences of the Churchs ban on usury, while difficult to estimate, was that of being a burden on economic affairs, pushing it along the direction of a moral declassement and obstacle to a rational business ethic. Ultimately, it was nowhere really successful in cultivating the development of capitalism ... and increasingly became a mere impediment of commercial life.67

Conclusion: Weber, Medieval Catholicism, and Modern Debates on the Role of Usury This analysis has shown that usury was not of marginal importance in Webers writings. The fact that Weber considered the religious proscription of usurious practices at most a detriment and at least a nuisance to pre-modern economic development certainly does not imply that a sociological exploration of usury provisions and their impact on actual practices is unwarrantedjust as no one, by way of analogy, would want to argue that the analysis of Confucianism or Islam is unimportant merely because these religions, at least according to Weber, did not help bring forth modern capitalism. In fact, Weber considered the Churchs policies toward usury, next to its doctrine of a just price, its practices of penance, and its system of a monastic supererogatory accumulation of merit,68 to be a core element of medieval Christianitys salvation economy. Had
66 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 382-3; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Winckelmann, 711; Weber, Economy and Society, 587, 118990. 67 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Kippenberg, 381-3; Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Winckelmann, 711; Weber, Economy and Society, 587, 1190. 68 Kaelber, Schools of Asceticism, 46-55.

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Weber been able to carry out the remaining studies on the economic ethics of the world religions, he would have addressed the inner workings of this salvation economy in his intended study on Christianity. Usury, one might reasonably argue, would have played an important role in it. Given the time that has passed since Webers death, however, do his views have any pertinence to recent scholarship? Current scholarship on medieval religion is less inclined to provide a broad characterization of a period spanning close to a millennium than Weber, whose views were steeped in contemporary presuppositions of Cultural Protestantism with its anti-Catholic and anti-Lutheran elements.69 Even though Weber may have intended his statements to constitute ideal-typical depictions, many of them appear too general, without sufficient contextualization, and badly in need of revision in view of newer findings. For example, medievalists point to twelfth-century developments in the profit economy,70 religious dissent,71 reason,72 and literacy73 as crucial transformations toward more rationalized European societies even before the onset of the Italian Renaissance. Such studies shatter the impression of a relative continuity in medieval culture, and perhaps even backwardness, one might get from Webers admittedly fragmented remarks. They do, however, broadly support Webers (and Goldschmidts) notion of a relatively high degree of autonomy of the economic sphere from religious interference, and relate advances toward a modern type of market economy to developments in spheres other than religion. While usury has not been a topic of interest for sociologists since Nelson,74 it has received ample attention from medievalist econoG. Hbinger, Kulturprotestantismus und Politik: Zum Verhltnis von Liberalismus und Protestantismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Tbingen: Mohr, 1994). 70 L. K. Little, Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). 71 H. Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle Ages, trans. S. Rowan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). 72 A. Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 73 B. Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 74 Nelson, The Idea. An anonymous reviewer for Max Weber Studies took me
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mists and historians. Their studies fall into three categories: (1) neo-classical economists attempts at addressing the impact on usury; (2) comparative studies that have begun to expand Webers inquiries into other world religions and address Christian usury provisions in the light of other religions tenets and practices; and (3) a multifaceted controversy about Webers core question of how much the prohibition on taking interest on a loan impeded economic development. Economists have recently begun to address usury in the Middle Ages using neo-classical models. Robert Ekelund et al.75 proposed the following argument: leaders of the medieval Catholic church were no different from entrepreneurs heading economic firms in their attempts to become monopolistic suppliers of goods and services by establishing public policies that give them a comparative advantage over competitors. Such rent-seeking behavior can also be found, the authors contend, in the Churchs usury policies, designated to keep interest rates low and allowing the Church to borrow money more cheaply than in a competitive market environment, while at the same time restricting competition under conditions in which the Church was herself a creditor. Yet not only does this approach fit the historical development of the Churchs economic condition and its usury doctrines poorly,76 it is also inferior
to task for claiming Nelson all too readily as a sociologist with the argument that Nelson was a trained medievalist and only later turned to social science (Parsons, Freud, and Weber). It is true that Nelson received both his masters (in 1933) and doctorate (in 1944) in medieval history. However, as a prodigious reader, Nelson undoubtedly explored materials beyond the more specialized range of medieval/Renaissance studies as early as while preparing his dissertation, and with certainty extended his subsequent studies beyond those three scholars. The voluminous collection of Nelsons papers housed at Columbia Universitys Rare Book and Manuscript Library awaits exploration to shed more light on this topic. I wish to thank Dr. Donald Nielsen, once a doctoral student of Nelson, for kindly supplying me with some of this information. 75 R. B. Ekelund, Jr., R. F. Hbert, and R. D. Tollison, An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5 (1989): 307-31; R. B. Ekelund, Jr., et al., Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 76 See E. L. Glaeser and J. Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, Journal of Law and Economics 41 (1998): 1-36; C. G. Reed and C. T. Bekar, Religious Prohibitions Against Usury, Explorations in Economic History 40

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to Webers, for it relies on the assumption that the Churchs policies were driven by the intent to bring about economic results rather than moral reform. It is more compelling, Weber showed, to assume that when a hierocratic institution is embedded in a political and economic structure in which it can influence but not dominate public policies, it will respond to a rationalization in politics and the economy that intrudes into its own sphere (as in the twelfth century) by a rationalization of its own, namely in its ethical doctrine toward those spheres. Rather than being a reflection of changing material conditions, as some neo-classical economists want to have itone might recall Sombarts position outlined earlier in this paperusury policies may thus be in sharper conflict with economic practices. Such policies may become more, not less valuerational, as rationalizations in societal spheres develop according to their own logic and quite possibly in different directions, which may lead to sharper conflicts between these spheres.77 Webers political economy model of usury policies, which affords religion the ability to contribute autochthonous elements to such policies, therefore deserves more recognition in these debates. The neo-classical model, at least as currently applied to medieval ecclesiastical policy, appears to represent a step back from Webers studies and might benefit from drawing on some of Webers insights. The comparative aspect of Webers writings on usury has been taken up by an increasing number of studies that go beyond Christianity. One of the first scholars to engage in this line of work was Nelson, who prefaced his exploration of Christian usury doctrines with a study of usury provisions in Judaism.78 Since then, scholars have studied Jewish vis--vis Christian lenders in the Middle Ages,79 and Islamic views toward usury in this and other periods.80 A truly comparative analysis of religious prohibitions against usury that
(2003): 347-68. 77 Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus, 479-522; Weber, From Max Weber, 323-59. 78 Nelson, The Idea, xix-xxii. 79 J. Shatzmiller, Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); S. Herman, Medieval Usury and the Commercialization of Feudal Bonds (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993). 80 N. A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar, and Islamic Banking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); R. Lohlker, Das islamische Recht im Wandel: Riba, Zins und Wucher in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Mnster: Waxmann, 1999).

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includes doctrines81 as well as their secular impact appears to be still in its infancy, however. Finally, historians have paid much attention to the emergence of the usury doctrine in the Middle Ages and early modern era, and to the ways economic practice reflected them or reacted to it. Their findings defy simple description. In regard to development of doctrine, there exists now a rich literature on how Canon lawyers and Church theologians defined and classified usurious practices. This literature shows their teachings constituted no monolithic set of teachings but a sometimes discordant set of voices on a common theme.82 The variations in their views seem far too great to accord with the impression of a strong consistency one might get from reading Weber and his contemporaries. Yet Webers overall argument, that the ecclesiastical teachings did not simply become more capital friendly but rather more stringent on usurious loansas distinguished from other, actually or possibly legitimate forms of taking interest, including delayed repayment, cessant gain, emergent loss or damages, sharing of risk, annuities, and exchange dealing83is not refuted. Nor is there evidence that disputes over usury simply ceased with the Reformation, as if such disputes were merely a reflection of the advent of modern capitalism on the

81 For example, S. L. Buckley, Teachings on Usury in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2000). 82 See especially T. P. McLaughlin, The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV Centuries), Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 81-147; T. P. McLaughlin, The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV Centuries), Mediaeval Studies 2 (1940): 1-22; J. T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); O. Langholm, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1984); O. Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350 (Leiden: Brill, 1992). 83 These are discussed in the aforementioned literature. Regarding the Churchs accommodation of business lending and public finance, see C. Menning, Charity and State in Late Renaissance Italy: The Monte di Piet of Florence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) for the credit lending practices of the montes pietatis, and L. Armstrong, The Politics of Usury in Trecento Florence: The Questio de Monte of Francesco da Empoli, Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999): 1-44; L. Armstrong, Usury and Public Debt in Early Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the Monte Comune (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003) for the religious accommodation of interest on communal public debt in Florence.

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super-structural plane.84 On the contrary, such disputes were played out with particular intensity in ascetic Protestant groupings.85 Moreover, Weber seems vindicated in rejecting simplistic assumptions about individuals or corporate entities as simply being rational utility-maximizing agents in religious markets86 who operate on the basis of strategic economic interests rather than longstanding normative concerns and ethical principles.87 But the crux of the matter is actual practice. While there is evidence of merchants so bothered by soteriological implications of their usurious activities that they paid considerable restitution on their deathbed,88 which implies that Church doctrine had not deterred them from engaging in these activities in the first place, historians have achieved no consensus on the extent to which usury doctrine influenced business practices and was a detriment to economic development. The still dominant view, that the Churchs condemnation of usurious loans did nothing to shackle the development of capitalism89 and was never a hindrance to the growth

84 N. L. Jones, God and the Moneylenders: Usury and Law in Early Modern England (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); E. Kerridge, Usury, Interest, and the Reformation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 85 M. Valeri, Religious Discipline and the Market: Puritans and the Issue of Usury, William and Mary Quarterly 54 (1997): 747-68. 86 For example, Rodney Stark, SSSR Presidential Address, 2004: Putting an End to Ancestor Worship, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43 (2004): 465-74. 87 O. Langholm, The Merchant in the Confessional: Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Penitential Handbooks (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 88 B. Nelson, The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen and the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution, Journal of Economic History 7 (Supplement) (1947): 104-22; F. Edler de Roover, Restitution in Renaissance Florence, in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori (Milan: Instituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1957), 775-89; F. L. Galassi, Buying a Passport to Heaven: Usury, Restitution, and the Merchants of Medieval Genoa, Religion 22 (1992): 313-26; L. Armstrong, Usury, Conscience, and Public Debt: Angelo Corbinellis Testament of 1419, in J. A. Marino and T. Kuehn, eds., A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre for Renaissance and Reformation Studies, 2004), 173-240. 89 J. Le Goff, The Usurer and Purgatory, in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979): 25. LeGoff describes the birth of purgatory as a way of allowing usurers to avoid eternal damnation. See J. Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); J. Le Goff, Your Money or Your Life, trans. P. Ranum (New York: Zone, 1988).

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of credit institutions,90 has been tempered by the recognition, associated with the works of Raymond de Roover and others, that the prohibition had a certain steering function in guiding banking away from loans and toward exchange transactions and annuities.91 Since the prohibition applied to all loans but usury concerns could be circumvented much more readily in investment credit transactions, or avoided altogether in investments in most forms of commercial partnerships, such a function could indeed be readily observed in those areas of commerce and finance.92 Moreover, the ecclesiastical teachings were not equitably enforced. If anything, the petty pawnbrokers and small lenders of emergency loans for immediate consumptive needs were marginalized or forced out of the market if not legally protected by a charter or a license, which ironically drove interest rates up instead of down, while larger lenders and companies were less likely to suffer the opprobrium of usury when engaging in credit-bearing transactions.93 The research on evasive practices engendered by the prohibition of usury, together with the exploration of its unintended consequences, will likely continue to fuel debates among historians about religions role in the emergence of modern capitalism. Many themes in these debates still resonate with Webers exploration. While it is true that Weber relied on a much narrower base of documents than economic historians have access to today, his approach to studying usury provisions as an important example of the ways in which religious ideas might shape and direct secular mateR. Lopez, The Dawn of Modern Banking, in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 22; see also H.-J. Gilomen, Wucher und Wirtschaft im Mittelalter, Historische Zeitschrift 250 (1990): 265-301. 91 J. Kirshner, Raymond de Roover on Scholastic Economic Thought, in J. Kirshner, ed., Business, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), 32-33; J. Munro, The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiablity, International History Review 25 (2003): 505-62. 92 E. S. Hunt and J. M. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 70-4; D. Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 181-205. 93 For example, F. C. Lane and R. C. Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 75-8; Gilomen, Wucher, 290-5.
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rial interests can still be considered relevant to these debates.94 Usury, Weber thought, played a significant role in medieval religions moral economy and was an integral part of his sociology of religion and writings on the relationship between religion and the economy. Therefore it was an important topic; as an issue, it occupied institutions and sometimes posed stark ethical choices for individuals. Modern historians agree, and so did the fourteenth-century Italian Benvenuto de Rambaldis da Imola: He who commits usury goes to hell, he who doesnt, faces penury.95

94 Cf. K. L. Reyerson, Der Aufstieg des Brgertums und die religise Vergemeinschaftung im mittelalterlichen Europa, in W. Schluchter, ed., Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums (Tbingen: Mohr, 1988), 410-36. 95 Gilomen, Wucher, 265.

TAXATION AND REVENUE

THE KINGS BUSINESS IN AFRICA: DECISIONS AND STRATEGIES OF THE PORTUGUESE CROWN
Ivana Elbl

Introduction In his recent AHA presidential address, Joseph C. Miller called for return to a humanist approach to history and to rigorous historicism.1 There are few areas where this approach can be more useful than in assessing the nature and roots of the early overseas expansion. The entrepreneurial role of the Portuguese Crown in the overseas expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is intricately woven into debates on the origins of modernity and the capitalist economy. The purpose of these debates is to discover the historical moments of change, breaks with the old and the emergence of the new. As Lus Felipe Thomaz has recently pointed out, past historiography has created a double trap for those analysing the early Portuguese overseas expansion: the nineteenth-century tradition, which hailed the overseas expansion for its contribution to scientific discovery and the unfolding of human horizons, and the twentieth-century reaction to this heroizing approach, which stressed a societal and structuralist approach and sought answers in economic and social processes.2 Yet, in different ways, both trends saw the overseas expansion and the role of the Portuguese state as a break with the past and a foretaste of a modern, capitalist future. The role of the Portuguese Crown in the economy of the early overseas expansion is thus deeply entangled in an ideological and
Joseph C. Miller, Presidential Address: History and Africa/Africa and History, The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 25-32. 2 Lus Felipe Thomaz, Le Portugal, et lAfrique au XVe sicle: Les dbuts de lexpansion, Arquivos do Centro Cultural Portugus 26 (1989): 161-2. The article was reprinted, in Portuguese, in L. F. Thomaz, De Ceuta a Timor (Lisbon: Difel, 1994), under the title A evoluo da poltica expansionista portuguesa na primeira metade de quatrocentos (pp. 43-147). The foremost representative of the Braudelian school of economic historians in Portugal was Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, the leading figure in the study of economic aspects of the Portuguese overseas expansion.
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epistemological modelling that is essentially presentist. Rather than following the flow of history from a deeper to a more recent past, it looks back into the past from a contemporary viewpoint. While not without usefulness, this approach invites anachronistic and monist explanations, both of which have made a deep imprint on the historiography of the overseas enterprise of the Portuguese Crown.3 Many modern historians perceived the overseas enterprise of the Portuguese Crown as a substantial innovation in commercial capitalism. Manuel Nunes Dias enduring concept of the capitalismo monrquico portugus (Portuguese state capitalism) constitutes only one reflection of the essential place the Portuguese overseas ventures have been assigned in the various theories and historical models of the emergence of capitalism.4 It is easily overlooked, however, that the decisions and strategies that the Portuguese Crown had adopted in connection with its African enterprises were based on continuity with pre-existing practices and administrative methods,5 rather than on innovation and change.
3 For an excellent and extensive summary of the historiography of the early Portuguese expansion and its perceived links to the emergence of capitalism see Lus Felipe Thomaz, Expanso portuguesa e expanso europeia Reflexes em torno da gnese dos descobrimentos, in L. F. Thomaz, De Ceuta a Timor (Lisbon: Difel, 1994), 1-41. 4 Manuel Nunes Dias, O capitalismo monrquico portugus (1415-1549) (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, 1963-4), 2 vols. See in particular the section A definio do capitalismo monrquico (vol. 2, 189216). For the period he covered, the basic precepts of the economic part of Nunes Dias interpretation are still generally accepted by contemporary leading scholars. The main criticisms of his theory focus on his neglect of ideological factors. See for example Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Lus Felipe Thomaz, Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century, in Political Economy of Empires, edited by James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 301-2. Unlike the ideological aspects, the socio-economic and administrative history of the fifteenth and early sixteenth-century expansion has been somewhat neglected lately. The selection of articles in some of the recent collections, such as Tracy, The Political Economy of Empires, Mark A. Burkholder, ed. Administrators of Empire (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate) and David Armitage, ed., Theories of Empire (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1998) illustrates this trend clearly by focussing on the later sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. 5 For a seminal overview of the evolution of Portuguese state finances see Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, Finanas pblicas e estrutura do Estado,in Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, Ensaios II sobre histria de Portugal (Lisbon: Livraria S da Costa, 1968), 25-63. The late medieval Portuguese finances followed a pattern similar to those of Castile, explored in great detail by Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, in particular his Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252-1389)

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The Crowns response to overseas economic opportunities were grounded in contemporary needs and attitudes, in other words in the historical context which they were a part of. Like other late medieval noble enterprises, the Crown overseas ventures cannot be fully understood using the modern concepts of private or state enterprise, but require an appreciation of the economics of the noble household, with the royal household as its most complex form. The revenues of a noble household, including that of the king, were crucial but subordinate tools in fulfilling loftier goals, mostly social or political in nature. In other words, wealth was not a final objective, but a means through which the quest for power and honour could be satisfied. There was no strict division between economic and non-economic projects. On the contrary, economic enterprises and ideologically motivated goals tended to be mutually supportive, at least in principle. Late medieval states and other autonomous units, whether feudal or communal, were faced with growing expenditures, especially those associated with war. The problem of growing costs was compounded by a crisis in revenues, reflecting the triple scourge of epidemics, wars and famines, all of which contributed to a sharp demographic decline that did not begin to reverse itself until the second half of the fifteenth century. This decline affected both royal and noble revenues, whether they were generated by income from land holdings and rents, proceeds from regalian rights, or customs and taxes sanctioned by tradition. The resulting dissatisfaction among the noble elites constituted an explosive political issue, which most monarchs of the period had to face. The Portuguese Crown found itself in the unenviable position of not only having to deal with its own fiscal problems but also to alleviate the social and political crises experienced by its most powerful subjects.6
(Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993) and La hacienda real de Castilla en el siglo XV (La Laguna: s.n., 1973), For a summary of his findings in English see Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, Castile in the Middle Ages, in Richard Bonney, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 177-199. 6 For an excellent summary of these developments see the works of Lus Felipe Thomaz referred to above. For an extensive overview, see also A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Portugal na crise dos sculos XIV e XV (Lisbon: Presena, 1987); Joo Jos Alves Dias, ed., Portugal do renascimento crise dinstica (Lisbon: Presena, 1998); Jos Mattoso, ed., Histria de Portugal, Vol. 2, A monrquia feudal (1096-1480) and Vol. 3, No alvoroo da modernidade (Lisbon:

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The early overseas expansion represented a windfall for the Crown. It offered a partial solution to a number of severe problems confronting the kingdom. The overseas ventures were a source of socially sanctioned opportunities, new lands, and new sources of income. They also enhanced the Crowns power and the means to implement its will by significantly enlarging its revenues through enlarging the royal fazenda (direct holdings), and through creating opportunities to implement new taxation, customs fees, and other sources of monetary income. However, neither economic rationality nor revenue as such were the paramount factors in the Crowns decision-making: the ultimate objectives were prestige and political power at home.

Royal Power and the African Enterprise It is important to realize that the Portuguese Crown became a dominant economic player in the early overseas expansion not necessarily because of its share in the enterprise, but because of the paramount political and legislative power it wielded. The extensive rights the Crown claimed over the early overseas enterprise were derived from the medieval notion of the king's sovereignty over his realm. The king had the right to decide how the kingdoms resources were to be used for the common good and to divide the available wealth among his followers. The revertibility of fiefs and other holdings back to the Crown was one of the key precepts of feudal law. In principle, all unassigned or newly acquired resources belonged to the Crown, and the King had the right to use them as he saw fit. In the Iberian context, the formative experience and memory of the reconquista provided a vivid reinforcement to this fundamental idea. The Portuguese Crown based its policies concerning access to and trade with Africa and other non-Christian areas on these time-honoured principles, both in theory and in practice. Thus, although the first overseas explorations in Africa were undertaken on the initiative of private persons, such as Infante D. Henrique and Infante D. Pedro, the Portuguese Crown had the paramount claim to any tangible results of such ventures because they
Estampa, 1993); and A. H. de Oliveira Marques, ed., A expanso quatrocentista (Lisbon: Estampa, 1998).

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were carried out by sworn vassals of the king, in the name of the king and in the service of God and the King. In the international arena, the Crown first justified its title to overseas dominium invoking the rights of first discovery by its subjects. Subsequently, however, a more powerful justificatory argument was developed. On 8 January 1455, the hard-pressed Pope Nicholas V yielded to the skilful diplomatic pressure of the Portuguese delegation and issued the bull Romanus Pontifex, which declared that the Portuguese Crown was to hold dominium over the access to Africa south of Cape Bojador, to the exclusion of all other Christians, as a reward for its costly military effort against Islam. No power or person was to deprive the beneficiaries of the bull of their just reward. The revenues generated from the new terrritories were thus conceptualized as a redress for damages suffered and as a just reward for the Crowns service to God.7 Whoever should deprive the Crown of its well-deserved rewards, directly or indirectly, would show disrespect both for the Apostolic authority of the Pope and for the service rendered by Portugal to God. The Bull carefully spelled out the ecclesiastical prohibition against any military, commercial, and fishing expeditions not authorized by the King of Portugal or D. Henrique.8 Interloping south of the Cape Bojador, or even organizing or ordering interloping expeditions, were declared to be offences punishable by excommunication if the offender was an individual or by interdict in the case of corporate bodies.9 An excerpt from the Bull stipulating these measures was to be posted on the doors of principal churches and announced to the public from the pulpit, and also sent to major potentates within and outside of the Iberian peninsula.10 The Romanus Pontifex did not content itself with relying only on the argument of a just reward but exploited the long-standing canon law principle that the Pope possessed the right to regulate contacts

7 Joo Martins da Silva Marques, ed., Descobrimentos portugueses. Documentos para a sua histria, vol. 1, 1147-1460 (Lisbon: Instituto para a Alta Cultura, 1444), 505 (doc. 401). 8 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 1: 505-7 (doc. 401). 9 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 1: 507 (doc. 401). 10 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 1: 507-8 (doc. 401). For a surviving printed copy of the public notice see AN/TT (Arquivos NacionaisTorre do Tombo, Lisbon), Gaveta 10, mao 5, doc. 27. See also Ch. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (New York: Knopf, 1969), 22.

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between Christians and non-Christians, contacts which could potentially result in spiritual pollution or corruption. The Bull expressly permitted the king of Portugal, the Infante D. Henrique, and persons authorized by them, to associate with Muslims and pagans as long as trade in prohibited goods was not involved. The justification was that the Pope could trust the above mentioned parties that their primary motive was to advance the interests of God, whereas others might seek only fast profit or even supply weapons or iron to the Infidels.11 The two key arguments of the Romanus Pontifex, just reward and authorization to associate with non-Christians, provided the Crown with a rock-solid base from which to regulate the African enterprise to its greatest advantage. All subsequent royal legislation stressed the Crowns sole right to govern the modalities of contact with Africa, in order to maximize its revenue advantages. Violators of the royal decrees faced severe penalties. Secular punishments could be very heavy. While in the 1440s interloping in West Africa was punishable only by confiscation of property, with the Romanus Pontifex it became a capital crime, sometimes punishable by burning at the stake. The bull itself only threatened offenders with excommunication but made it clear the church was willing to lift the spiritual penalty if they settled with the Crown.12 Nevertheless, the full implications of Bull provided the secular arm of the law with an avenue to invoke a spiritual offence ultimately punishable by burning at the stake. In at least one known instance, this punishment was applied before the codification of the scales of interloping punishments in 1474. An interloper, caught by Diogo Gomes off the Senegalese coast in 1460, was publicly tortured on the wheel and burned in Lisbon, together with the gold he purchased in Africa and the swords he tried to sell, against papal prohibition.13 The 1474 decree became the first law regulating the West African trade to include a penal scale. Direct or indirect participation in the West African trade, unauthorized raiding in West Africa, and piracy against the legitimate traffic were all offenses punishable by death and loss of all property to the Crown. Ship captains guilty

Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 1: 505 and 507 (doc. 401). Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 1: 507 ( doc. 401). 13 J. M. Garcia, ed., As viagens dos descobrimentos (Lisbon: Editorial Presena, 1983), 46-7.
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of false declaration or concealment of goods over one mark of silver in value were also to suffer capital punishment. Smuggling or consent to smuggle and a host of other fraud charges called for various fines and in many cases for banishment.14 By 1514, the punishments had become even stiffer. Capital punishment applied to a greater number of offenses. Unauthorized trading or raiding in Guinea and piracy against the legitimate traffic were still punishable by death and loss of property to the Crown. So was, however, smuggling of goods over the value of six marks of silver to Guinea. Anyone caught trading illicitly in Guinea in goods worth more than one mark of silver in local value was to be put to death.15 The stiffening of the penal scale reflected, ironically, both the practical difficulties the Crown experienced in enforcing its laws, and the legal strength of its proprietary claims.

Revenue-Generating Options The Crown had two basic strategic options to choose from in managing its business in Africa: direct or indirect participation, aimed at maximization of revenue benefits (fiscalism)16 and political objectives. These options permitted numerous combinations, decided by situational dynamics and policy oscillations (Table 1). Well into the first half of the sixteenth century, the Crown believed that direct involvement would generate more revenue, although indirect exploitation of the overseas enterprise clearly constituted a less risky and labour-intensive mode of revenue generation. It habitually reserved for itself trade with gold-exporting regions (Arguim and the Gold Coast). However, in the rest of Western Africa the Crown employed mostly indirect methods of revenue gathering.

14 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, vol. 3, 1461-1500 (Lisbon: Instituto da Alta Cultura, 1971), 154 (doc. 115). 15 Antnio Brsio, ed., Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie (Lisbon: Agncia Geral do Ultramar, 1958), 2: 79-92 (doc. 28). 16 For a concise definition of these concepts see Richard Bonney, Introduction: The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815, in Richard Bonney, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4-5.

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favour of a more restricted policy, whether partial royal monopolies or monopolistic arrangements with private parties. The standing privileges of the Cape Verde Islanders notwithstanding, D. Afonso V leased, in 1469, exclusive rights to the West African trade to Ferno Gomes, a wealthy Lisbon merchant. The King reserved to himself specific commodities, in particular malagueta (grains of paradise), eventually compelling Gomes to negotiate a separate lease allowing him to trade the spice.20 The new Crown policy was far from consistent. In 1470 the King reaffirmed the licence system,21 de facto violating the Gomes contract. The ambiguities were resolved only in 1474 when the Crown Prince D. Joo assumed direct control over the African enterprise. The decree of 31 August 1474 prohibited all unlicensed traffic south of the Cape Bojador and reserved the right to profit from the trade with Atlantic Africa to the Crown or its designates. The decree forcefully reasserted the claim that the right to regulate contacts with Africa constituted a just reward for the royal services to God and Christianity and threatened transgressors with severe punishments.22 Its provisions were confirmed in 1481,23 and in principle reaffirmed in 1514.24 Although the assumption that a full monopoly was the most rewarding alternative formed the basic platform of the majority of the royal pronouncements on the early overseas ventures, the Crown attempted fully to impose such an option only briefly, in 15181520.25 Until then, it relied largely on regional and commodity monopolies, or on exclusive renewable contracts with private entrepreneurs. Hieronymus Mnzer, a German humanist and diplomat writing in the early 1490s, claimed that the Portuguese King had a monopoly on every major Atlantic import and export commodity and that private parties were left to trade in parrots, monkeys and
Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 129-30 (doc. 97); Joo de Barros, sia de Joo de Barros. Dos feitos que os Portugueses fizeram no descobrimento e conquista dos mares e terras do Oriente. Primeira Decada (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 1988), 72. 21 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 86 (doc. 60). 22 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 153-4 (doc. 115). 23 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 220-2 (doc. 152). 24 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 71-3 (doc. 26) and 7992 (doc. 28). 25 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 71-3 (doc. 26) and 7992 (doc. 28).
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straw mats.26 The real picture was not so dismal. The Crown kept direct control above all over the main source of African gold, the Gold Coast and Arguim, a fortified trading station off the coast of Mauritania, which constituted an important link to the Saharan trade networks. All other areas could be rented out or licences could be purchased for them. Even the Arguim trading station was leased out several times before 1521.27 Certain key commodities were indeed reserved for the Crown. The decree of 1470 claimed that trade in melegueta, other spices, civet cats, and rhinoceros horns was reserved to the Crown from the very beginning of the trade, and added brasil wood and precious stones to the list.28 In 1480, the same restrictions were placed on hanbels (voluminous Moroccan outer clothing)29 and conchas, red shells from the Canaries, because of their importance in the Gold Coast trade.30 In March of 1514, the Crown summarily prohibited trade in all goods sold on the Gold Coast, and outlawed the export of such commodities to the Cape Verde Islands.31 The penal code issued in June of 1514 proclaimed that private traders could deal only in merchandise and areas specified in the respective licence or contract.32 However, only one commodity required a special additional licence: civet cats, a source of valuable musk for perfume production.33 The severity of this decree was further blunted by the availability of special licences and contractual exemptions, or simply through the lack of enforcement.34 The Crown also used its legislative power to insert itself as a compulsory middleman. Thus Ferno Gomes contract demanded that he sell all his ivory to the Crown,35 as opposed to disposing
26 Mnzer, Itinerarium, in Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 1: 244-5 (doc. 31). 27 Viagens de Lus de Cadamosto e de Pedro da Sintra (Lisbon: Academia Portuguesa da Histria, 1948), 17-8; AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 9, fol. 96r; AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 58, doc. 155. 28 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 86 (doc. 60). 29 AN/TT, Leis, mao 1, docs. 144 and 185. 30 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 214-5 (doc. 147). 31 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 71-3 (doc. 26). 32 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 81 (doc. 28). These provisions were later incorporated into the Ordenaes Manuelinas 33 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 90 (doc. 28). 34 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 90 (doc. 28). 35 Barros, sia. Primeira Decada, 72.

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of it on the open market. The So Tom charters of 1485 and 1493 compelled the settlers to purchase all their manilhas (heavy brass or copper bracelets), an essential European export to West Africa, from the Crown (whether in So Jorge da Mina or in Lisbon). They further ordered the settlers to sell all malagueta, tailed pepper, and slaves to the Crown agencies for a fixed price well below the market value.36 These requirements significantly delayed the progress of So Tom settlement and, although they were significantly softened in 1500, continued to have negative impact on the supply of slaves to So Jorge da Mina.37 Measures such as these, in combination with the Crowns repeated changes of policy, caused severe shocks both to the traffic itself and to its administration. In the early 1470s, for example, the partial retraction of the Cape Verdian trading privileges and the imposition of the Gomes contract resulted not only in a sharp formal protest from the povo (third estate) in the 1473 Cortes but in near chaos, smuggling, and piracy in Africa, because even those who would have normally purchased a license resorted to interloping.38 In the late 1510s, the Crown almost destroyed the rapidly expanding slave trade with Upper Guinea by first requiring the Cape Verde Islanders to trade only in locally produced commodities and, a year later, forbidding them to buy slaves for export.39 The law of 1518 reserved the Guinea trade for the Crown alone. As a result, the Upper Guinea slave trade declined from c. 2,000 to 80 slaves per annum, forcing the Crown to revoked the restrictions shortly after 1520.40 These measures, in particular those introduced in the early sixteenth century, were based exclusively on the desire to maximize Crown profit by preventing competition from private participants and by monopolizing what appeared to be, under a given set of circumstances, a well-established, lucrative market. Direct Crown

Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 207 (doc. 200) and 428-9 (doc. 289). 37 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 587-8 (doc. 361). 38 The hardening of punishments for interloping and smuggling in the law of 1474 demonstrates the Crowns anxiety to master the situation. Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 153-4 (doc. 115). 39 Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 139-50 (docs. 43, 44, 45 and 47). 40 See Ivana Elbl, The Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade, 14501521, Journal of African History 38 (1997): 52 and 69.

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control was as a rule imposed on those commodities or in such regions and periods that happened to show remarkable growth or profit ratios. The jealously maintained and enforced monopoly on the Gold Coast trade is a prime example of this approach.

Problems of Direct Control The direct participation strategy frequently backfired because the Crown would overextend its resources and lose ability to act effectively, not to mention a loss of enforcement capability. Despite its political power, the Crown experienced problems faced by all large-scale medieval entrepreneurs engaged in complex ventures over large distances. These included daunting logistics, imperfect information, slow turnover, hard-to-control transaction costs, and agency problems. In addition, the Crown had to address far too many diverse concerns to give its overseas ventures the necessary and timely attention, or to view profit in strictly economic terms. The organizational structure of the royal West African enterprise emerged only gradually out of the general mechanism or the royal fazenda. In the 1440s and early 1450s, the Crown relied on shipborne expeditions administered through the Casa da Ceuta. The death of Prince Henry in 1460 brought the dual control of the West African trade to an end, and the Crown came into possession of its first shore-based West African outpost, Arguim. In the 1460s the West African enterprise graduated to the status of a special subdivision of the royal estate, as fazenda de Guin.41 The Lisbon office, established already in 1455, assumed a central, but not exclusive role in administering the West African ventures, and became eventually known as the Guinea House (Casa de Guin) or, later, Casa de Guin e Mina.42 D. Joo and D. Manuel hoped the Guinea House
Antnio J. Dias Dinis, Monumenta Henricina (Coimbra: Comisso Executive das Comemoraes do V Centenrio da Morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1973), 14: 280 (doc. 117). 42 The name Casa de Guin appears first in 1481, in a letter of quittance covering the period 1476-1481 (AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Joo II, liv. 1, fols. 53r-53v). However, the name of the agency varied. The older name trautos de Guin that was in use since 1455 survived into the sixteenth century. Since the 1480s, the most commonly used name of the agency was Casa da Mina e trautos de Guin (see for example Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 333-4 (doc. 217)). In some instances, the term nossos trautos de Guin or
41

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would be able to handle both the Crowns direct participation in the enterprise and the indirect revenues from it. This was not the case: merchandise continued to be cleared through regional customs and tax-collecting agencies (alfndegas and almoxarifados), despite orders to the contrary. The Guinea House was complemented by three satellite metropolitan agencies, the Casa dos Escravos, the Feitoria das Ilhas, and the Arsenal (Armazm), and by agencies located overseas, such as the North African factories, Arguim, and So Jorge da Mina. After the opening of the sea route to India, Asian trade was added to the official mandate of the factor of the Guinea House. The resulting workload was overwhelming. D. Manuel was forced to reform the system in 1509 by dividing the agency into two separate Houses, the Guinea House and the India House. The reform, however, was only partial. Both Houses still shared a single factor as chief executive responsible for all key decisions.43 As a result, the central agency was beset with inefficiencies which led to serious bottlenecks and slowdowns in turnover. The problem was rendered worse by the fact that the overseas agencies were responsible not to the factor of the Guinea House but directly to the King, whose authorization was required in even the simplest matters. The Guinea House acted only as a logistic and clearance center. The factor was responsible not only for its smooth operation and for enforcing royal instructions, but also for market research. It was his duty to collect up-to-date information on different trading regions in West Africa, and to make recommendations whether they should be rented out or administered directly by the Crown.44 At the beginning of each year, six months ahead of the next trading cycle, he prepared a list of supplies and merchandise needed for the African and, later, also Indian trade, so that his superiors, the vedores, superintendents of the royal fazenda could approve the list and orders could be placed. In urgent
nossos trautos e resgates de Guin were used, though obviously referring to the same agency (see Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 2: 339 (doc. 222) and 348-9 (docs. 231 and 232); AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Joo II, liv. 20, fols. 11r and 114r). The fluid and somewhat confusing nomenclature has led historians to believe that the central agency was effectively established in Lisbon only after 1481 (see for instance Nunes Dias, Capitalismo monrquico portugus, 2: 190-1). 43 See Damio Peres, ed., Regimento das Cazas das Indias e Mina (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, 1947). 44 Peres, Regimento, 6-7, 25-26.

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situations, he could request an authorization to make interim purchases.45 The supply process was time-consuming and inevitably placed a lag of as much as two years between African demand and its satisfaction. This was one of key problems characterizing the royal enterprise: by the time the goods arrived at their destination in Africa, the opportunities were often gone. Crown agencies were unable to react flexibly to the African demand, neither in terms of selection and quantity of the merchandise, nor in those of quality and logistical support. The Crown was unable to provide adequate merchandise or facilities even to the gold-producing Mina factory, the main focus of its entrepreneurial attention. The officials at So Jorge da Mina perennially complained about the poor state of the warehouses, the low quality of the merchandise, and the damage that it usually sustained on its way from Portugal.46 The factory facilities, built together with the fortress in 1482, were unsatisfactory from the very beginning, but in 1503 the factor of Mina still lobbied the King to order the construction of a larger factory suitable for the proper storing and display of textiles. It was not a logistical problem, as the factor pointed out to the king. Material and transport were both available; only a royal order was required. Meanwhile, cloths kept rotting unsold, and soon became unsaleable, to the kings great loss.47 In 1510, the Guinea House found itself unable to fill an order for painted hanbels and large basins desperately needed in Mina, despite the kings repeated and specific orders.48 Shortages of manilhas, one of the key Portuguese exports to the Gold Coast, occurred several times during the early 1500s, and hurt the trade so much that the King ordered the Guinea House to keep 100,000 manilhas in stock at all times,49 with doubtful results. In 1513 the factory was left completely deprived of suitable merchandise, because the supply ship failed to arrive. Trade was brought to a standstill. The older textiles from previous shipments

Peres, Regimento, 6-7. See for example AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 3, doc. 119 and mao 4, doc. 42; AN/TT, Gaveta 15, mao 1, doc. 14. 47 AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 4, doc. 42. 48 AN/TT, Gaveta 15, mao 1, doc. 14. 49 Peres, Regimento, 8.
46

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had to be placed in the second-hand cloth factory and sold off at a discount, and about 700 hanbels were lost this way.50 The Arguim factory, which was only of secondary importance to the Crown, was much worse off than Mina. Supply ships only arrived three or four times a year.51 Little effort was made to make attractive and fresh merchandise available during the first half of the year, when most of the trading took place.52 Shortages of brass and mastic cost the Crown much gold in missed opportunities, and damaged the factorys reputation, thus further hurting the trade.53 To the amazement and indignation of the Berber merchants, in 1509 the factor of Arguim found himself unable for two years to get from Portugal a special order delivery of merchandise paid for with a large quantity of gold, despite complaints and appeals to the King.54 The supply of victuals was an even more nagging problem. Each year, the summer brought a period of hunger to the Arguim fort.55 The factors faced chronic difficulties in securing transport to Portugal for the slaves they bought, or even enough casks to supply them with water. In 1509, many slaves starved while awaiting embarkation and, subsequently, en route to Portugal.56 The extent of the problems faced by Arguim officials is well reflected in the 1515 exchange of letters between Estevo Vaz, the factor of the Guinea House, and the secretary of state who acted as the Kings representative. Vaz informed the secretary that the small caravel servicing Arguim arrived in Lisbon with slaves and that it brought an urgent request for merchandise and food supplies. Vaz urged the secretary to send the vessel back immediately with merchandise, as an emergency measure, because a large ship able to carry grain would take too long to get ready and would first have to be requisitioned, probably from the Arsenal. It proved impossible for months on end, however, to make even a small vessel with emergency supplies ready to sail. The merchandise it was to carry remained to be ordered
AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 13, doc. 48. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 888, fols. 172r-177r. 52 AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 2, doc. 67 and mao 5, doc. 42. 53 AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 5, doc. 42. 54 AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 5, doc. 42. 55 In the summer, wheat rations decreased significantly both for the garrison and slaves. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 888, fos. 55-59. See also AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 5, doc. 42. 56 AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 5, doc. 42.
51 50

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from Flanders and other places abroad,57 and even under the best of conditions, a return trip to Flanders took a couple of months.58 It does not call for much imagination to picture how much time was required to process an order lacking urgency. The policy of micro-management and tight control over Crown employees and agents59 made it difficult to respond to the local demand and opportunities in a timely fashion. The conduct of trade was regulated by exceedingly detailed sets of binding instructions (regimentos) and price lists (taixas).60 On-the-spot initiative not only went mostly unrewarded but was often punished, either directly or through administrative chicanery, as demonstrated in the misfortunes of Francisco de Almada, the royal factor in Arguim from 1508 to 1511. Almeida sharply increased the supply of slaves to Arguim by fostering relations with mainland suppliers but ran into trouble because of disbursing unauthorized grain rations to feed the human merchandise. It took him eight year to clear his standing with the Crown.61 Almadas predecessor, Gonalo de Fonseca, received a
57

AN/TT, Gaveta 20, mao 2, doc. 67. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Hansa e Portugal na Idade Media (Lisbon, Tipografia Albano Tomas dos Anjos, 1959), 79. 59 All Crown agencies laboured in an environment of suspicion and distrust. The elaborate security measures included ship and personal searches, as well as complicated control of access to money chests, and an accounting system which was almost entirely geared towards inventory control, ending with a full audit of each ranking employee at the end of his turn of duty. See Peres, Regimento, 6-7, 8-9, 11-15, 23-4, 26-9, 89-80, 95. For documentary evidence pertaining to concrete situations see, for example, AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 8, doc. 72 (unauthorized trading during unloading); AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 17, doc. 4 (complaints about the transfer of goods between royal pilots and the officials of So Jorge da Mina; Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 86-87 (doc. 28). See also See for example Brsio, Monumenta Missionria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 89 (doc. 28); AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte II, mao 50, doc. 22 (the record of the trial of a royal official, Antnio Froes, filled with accusations and counteraccusations). 60 For examples of ships regimentos see A. Teixeira da Mota, A viagem do navio Santiago a Serra Leoa e Rio de S. Domingos in 1526 (Livro de Armao), Boletim Cultural de Guin Portuguesa 24 (1969): 562-7; Alan F. C. Ryder, An Early Portuguese Trading Voyage to the Forcados River, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 1 (1959): 301-5; A. Teixeira da Mota and R. Mauny, Livre de larmement du navire So Miguel de lle de So Thom au Benin (1522), Bulletin de lIFAN, sr. B, 40 (1979): 68-71. 61 See Anselmo Braacamp Freire, Cartas de quitao del Rei D. Manuel, Archivo Histrico Portuguez 2: 354 (doc. 237). AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte
58

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clearance of his accounts only in 1522, fourteen years after his term had ended, because he sold some of the merchandise confiscated from a captured Genoese interloper, Miguel Pardo, together with the Crown goods without first consulting Lisbon and obtaining a proper clearance.62 Fonseca was reproached and Pardos best goods were left to rot in the warehouse until they were finally incorporated into the factorys inventory several years later.63 Because they were not on the Arguim price list (taixa), none of the Arguim officials would take the risk of touching them without explicit orders. The commander of the ship that captured Pardo was theoretically entitled to a half of the cargo, but he died before the prize case was cleared, and his heiress finally received only a half of the expected sum. The rest was deducted, however ridiculous it may sound, as payment for the Crowns mediation in selling the merchandise.64 The Crown was aware of its inability to compete with private participants on the open market. As long as it believed, as it did during the Joanine and Manueline period, that direct trade was easier to administer and potentially more profitable than collecting revenues from a multitude of participants, it routinely resorted to legislation to preserve for itself access to trade in more profitable commodities or trade with more promising regions. The officials of the Guinea House were instructed not only to watch the royal market, but also to inspect the ledgers of private merchants newly returned from Africa in order to recommend which parts of the West African trade should remain open, which should be placed under an exclusive contract and for how much, and which should be reserved for the Crown. Each year, the Crown would be presented with an estimate of the revenues expected to come from a particular sector of its overseas enterprise. The figures usually reflected the amount of taxes and customs that trade with those regions would yield in a particular year.65 The Crown, under the impression that if it took over directly a promising part of the trade it would be able to achieve four times
I, mao 12, doc. 8. 62 Freire, Cartas, 8: 400-1 (doc. 642). 63 See the inventories from 1511 and 1514 (AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte II, mao 27, doc. 70 and mao 49, doc. 101). 64 AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte I, mao 16, doc. 94. 65 Peres, Regimento, 25-6.

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as much revenue, often dealt severe blows both to the trade with West Africa and to its own revenues. The most obvious example was the attempted take-over of the flourishing slave trade on the Upper Guinea Coast in 1517-1522. The Crown, claiming that the Cape Verde settlers caused major damage to its proveito e servio (profit and service) by competing vigorously, and to that section of the trade in general because they offered the Africans better terms than the Crown expeditions, prohibited most of the trade between the Cape Verde Islands and Upper Guinea.66 Revenues plummeted as a result, and the Crown was forced to reverse its policy before 1525, but this and similar instances tended to undermine private confidence in the safety of investing in West African ventures. In the course of the sixteenth century, the Crown came to see leasing and contracting out as more advantageous that direct participation, and eventually made all aspects of its African enterprise available to interested parties with enough capital to provide large sums up-front, or to those in need of rewards for services rendered. Leasing and tax farming came to be definitely preferred over a system of individual licences, often too dispersed to be managed effectively. Theoretically, the leaseholders (trautadores) had an unlimited right to trade in the leased region, to take partners, and to issue licences to other traders in the name of the Crown. The Crown promised not to send its ships to such areas, and not to licence access for other private traders.67 The leaseholders paid the Crown either a fixed annual fee, or a share of imported African goods.68 The Crown, however, seldom refrained from involvement in the leased-out areas and used general regulations limiting traffic in certain goods to extract extra payments.69 D. Henrique initiated this type of policy when he rented out the Arguim trade to a group of entrepreneurs for ten years around

Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 139-50 (docs. 43, 44, 45, and 47. 67 For a typical contract see AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 33, fos. 46v-47. 68 The original 1474-1479 contract on the coast from Pedra de Galee to Cape Bojador called for one sixth of all imports (AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 33, fols. 46v-47r). It was renegotiated in 1475 in favour of yearly payments of 28,000 ris (AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 30, fol. 132r). For other payments in specie see below. 69 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 129 (doc. 97).

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1455. The leaseholders were responsible for maintaining the fortress.70 Arguim was still under lease in 1463, when the royal collectors of revenue from Arguim, resident in Lagos, were stripped of their offices for mismanagement and replaced by a Lisbon treasurer.71 These actions indicated that the Crown intended to pursue a similar approach in the near future. In 1469, the entire Guinea trade was leased to Ferno Gomes for five years, for an annual fee of 200,000 ris.72 The rent was relatively low considering that twenty-five slaves would have covered it.73 Yet in 1473 Gomes still owed most of the rent,74 despite the fact that in 1472 the Crown exempted him from all taxes except a sisa on the sales of malagueta,75 waived all standing regulations in favour of his privileges,76 and had lent him a round ship to carry on the traffic in 1471.77 Undeterred, the Crown renewed the contract in 1473, although it imposed an additional fee of 100,000 ris on the malagueta trade, raising the total rent to 300,000 ris.78 The malagueta fee, however, did not apply retroactively to the previous years. Gomes general contract was terminated in 1474, but he still remained in control of the Arguim trade, probably for five more years.79 Bartolomeu Marchione, a Florentine merchant resident in Lisbon and a naturalized Portuguese subject,80 held a lease on the Niger Delta (Rios dos Escravos) between1486 and 1495. The fee was set at 1,100,000 ris annually.81 The size of the fee indicates that Marchione was entitled to trade not only in the Niger Delta but also in the rest of West Africa. In the subsequent years the lease on the Slave Rivers were much less than Marchione paid,82 and most of the
Viagens de Lus de Cadamosto, 17. AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 9, fol. 96r. 72 Barros, sia. Primeira Decada, 72. 73 In this period, a prime slave freshly arrived from West African coast sold for 8,000 ris. The calculation is 200,000 ris : 8,000 ris = 25. 74 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 129 (doc. 97). 75 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 112-3 (doc. 83). 76 AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 33, fol. 141r. 77 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 90-1 (doc. 65). 78 Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 129-30 (doc. 97). 79 AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 33, fols. 46v-47r. 80 AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Afonso V, liv. 30, fol. 68r. 81 Freire, Cartas, 3: 477-8 (doc. 404). 82 In 1502-1503 the yearly rent was 800,000 ris (Freire, Cartas, 2: 239-40 (doc. 220)).
71 70

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slaves that he imported to Portugal and sold to his associate, Cesare de Barchi, in the 1490s, were Wolof. Only a very small fraction came from the Niger Delta.83 Marchione could, however, have sold slaves from this part of West Africa in Mina. His original contract was for six years, but it was renewed for 1492-1495. Marchione made his payments to the almoxarife of the Slave House in Lisbon, and on the whole proved much more dependable than Ferno Gomes. He paid regularly, and when his contract was renewed he made an advance payment covering two-thirds of the total fee.84 Later on he invested heavily in voyages to India and in the spice trade.85 In 1504-1505, his payments to the Crown rose to 64,158, 968 ris. In 1507-1510 his activity expanded, but he proved unable to sell all the spices received from the Crown, and as late as 1514 he still owed the Crown 36,640,355 ris, of which 16,514,297 represented several malagueta shipments.86 Malagueta, one the most expensive spices in the late medieval period, was not selling very well in the early sixteenth century. In 1512 Calliro Redolho leased the entire malagueta trade for two years for a more realistic annual sum of 1,050,400 ris.87 Leasing became routine in the 1500s and 1510s.88 Arguim was farmed out in 1515-l516, after almost forty years of direct Crown administration.89 The Senegal River zone was rented out in 15111512 for 393,900 ris, payable in two instalments, in June 1511 and January 1512.90 The amount due in 1511 was 195,000 ris.91 Cantor and the Gambia River were leased to Mestre Felipe, a Jew, for a period running from St. Johns Day (June 24) of 1510 to St. Johns Day of 1514, for 1,363,500 ris, of which he paid 450,000 in 1511. The payments were due after the arrival of the ships and after
83 Vicenta Corts, La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los Reyes Catlicos (1479-1516) (Valencia: Excmo. Ayuntamiento, 1964), 217-471. For the link with Cesare di Barchi see year 1497. 84 Freire, Cartas, 3: 477-8 (doc. 404). 85 Nunes Dias, O capitalismo monrquico portugus, 1: 360-1, 86 Freire, Cartas, 1: 360-2 (docs. 109 and 110). 87 Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 247). 88 Peres, Regimento, 25-6, 30, 50. 89 AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte II, mao 58, doc. 155. It was also leased in 1525, for the staggering sum of 4,000,000 ris (AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 590, fol. 58r). 90 Freire, Cartas, 2: 440-1 (doc. 297). 91 AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 105r.

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allowing for expenditures.92 Guinea Rivers, the area between Gambia and Sierra Leone, were leased for three years, from 24 June 1509 to 24 June 1512. Over this period, 195,000 ris were paid in 15091510; 911,666 ris in 1511; and 1,376,620 in 1512.93 The annual lease amounted to 917,747 ris, and over the subsequent two years, covered by a contract in favour of Joham de Lila and his partners, it rose to 1,212,000 ris.94 Sierra Leone was leased prior to 1502 for 600,000 ris to Pero de Evora, and before that for 640,000 ris to another leaseholder. Antnio Fernandes, one of the past leaseholders, remained owing 84,600 ris.95 In 1510-1513 the lease dropped to about 540,000 ris annually.96 The Slave Rivers were leased in 1486-1495 for 1,100,000 ris,97 and in 1502-1503 for 800,000 ris yearly.98 Rio Primeiro, east of the Lagos Lagoon, was rented separately for 140,000 ris per year.99 Tax farming was probably less risky for the Crown than leasing, and was based on extensive precedent. Throughout the late Middle Ages, the Portuguese Crown, in accordance with general European practice, allowed most of its tax and customs revenue to be farmed out, and this policy eventually came to cover those Lisbon agencies which dealt with revenue from West Africa. Of these, the Slave House was particularly relevant because its head acted as receiver of most African regional and commodity rents. In 1509-1510 the Slave House was farmed out for 6,383,624 ris, or 3,191,812 ris yearly.100 Forty years later, in 1552 the annual rate was only slightly higher, standing at 3,400,000 ris.101 The Vintena House was farmed out in 1509-1510 for 3,884,275 ris, or 1,942,137 ris annually.102

92

Freire, Cartas, 2: 440-1 (doc. 297); AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol.

108r,
93 Freire, Cartas, 3: 472-3 (doc. 392); AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 112r; Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 297). 94 Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 297). 95 Freire, Cartas, 1: 243 (doc. 44). 96 Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 297). 97 Freire, Cartas, 3: 477-8 (doc. 404). 98 Freire, Cartas, 2: 239 (doc. 220). 99 Freire, Cartas, 2: 239 (doc. 220). 100 Freire, Cartas, 3: 392 (doc. 370). 101 Joo Brando, Grandeza e abastana de Lisboa em 1552, edited by Jos da Felicidade Alves (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1990), 59. 102 Freire, Cartas, 3: 472-3 ( doc. 392).

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The West African Islands represented a very attractive target for tax farmers. The revenue of the Cape Verde Islands, namely Santiago and Fogo, was farmed out to Duarte Rodriguez Pinto and Pedro Francisco for three years in 1504. They undertook to pay 2,100,000 ris during that period, one third being delivered in advance as security.103 This amounted to an annual rent of 700,000 ris, and the sum increased to 900,000 ris yearly in 1510, when Antnio Rodrigues farmed the revenue of Santiago, Maio, and Fogo for three years.104 In accordance with the provisions of the contract the amount, payable in slaves evaluated by the royal almoxarife, was later on further raised to 1,033,333 ris yearly.105 Antnio Rodrigues joined in partnership with Nicolo Rodriguez, and by the end of their contract they had paid the Crown 3,130,999 ris.106 The revenues were promptly farmed again, this time to Jorge Nunez, who held the contract until 1515.107 Graviel Rodriguez was the farmer in 1519-1521, when the Crowns repression of private trade reached its height.108 In 1525, the revenue increased again, and was farmed out for 1,200,000 ris.109 The revenue of So Tom was farmed out in 1509 to Diogo Fernandes Cabral, and in 1510 to Joham de Fomseca and Antnio Carneiro for the sum of 388,800 ris.110 Joham de Fomseca continued farming the So Tom revenues in 1511-1513, for a bulk payment of 535,500 ris. The revenues of Prncipe were farmed out in 1510-1514 to Antnio Carneiro for 535,500 ris,111 of which he paid 150,000 ris in 1511.112 The Ano Bom Island was a trading backwater, but it was still worth to Duarte Afonso and Duarte Bello, farming its vintena, some 70,130 ris during an unspecified period ending in 1513.113

103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

AN/TT, Corpo Cronolgico, parte II, mao 8, doc. 104. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 100r. Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 2: 41-5 (doc. 15). Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 297). AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fols. 90v, 97r. Freire, Cartas, 10: 4 (doc. 764). AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 590, fol. 58r. Freire, Cartas, 3: 392 (doc. 370). Freire, Cartas, 2: 440-1 (doc. 297). AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 116r. Freire, Cartas, 2: 441 (doc. 297).

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In 1514 Antnio Carneiro signed a four-year contract with the Crown, binding him to supply Mina with slaves from Benin in return for two thirds of the price of each slave sold in Mina, and a monopoly on the Niger Delta trade. This provision violated the privileges of the So Tomeans, who ignored it when they could not bypass it legally. So Tom had been a slave supplier to Mina since it was populated in the 1490s. D. Manuels administration tried to assure itself of a guaranteed supply in the early 1500s, and instead of depending on the open market it signed a partnership agreement with Ferno de Melo, captain of So Tom, under which the Crown supplied merchandise and Melo the necessary logistics in return for a share in the sales in Mina. Melo, however, did not have a monopoly on the supply. Carneiros monopoly contract was an exception in this respect, which was not repeated when a slave supply contract was signed with Duarte Bello in 1519 and Joo de Odon in 1525.114 The frequent changes in Crown policy and strategy reflect the difficulties presented by the logistical and administrative demands of a complex long-distance enterprise. The gradual move away from direct control of many of the African ventures reflects the hard lessons of the capitalismo monrquico (almost certainly a misnomer). The shift in revenue-collecting strategy in favour of guaranteed income was a result of a continual reassessment of Crown options, and an example of ongoing adaptation of past lessons from the management of royal domains and other revenues to the conditions presented by far-flung overseas enterprises. The Results While modern historians tend to be much more complimentary,115 contemporaries often criticized the Crowns business decisions as ill thought-out or even irrational when it came to profit or income maximization. The third estate (o povo), in protest against the Gomes contract, argued in the 1473 Cortes that the Crown could derive as much as 100,000 cruzados (39,000,000 ris) in revenues from the
114 John L. Vogt, The Early So Thom-Principe Slave Trade with Mina, 1500-1540, International Journal of African Historical Studies 6 (1973): 456-7. 115 Vogt, for example, praised the Crowns West African enterprise as a remarkable coordination effort (John L.Vogt, The Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469-1682 (Athens: University of Georgia Press), 72-73)).

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African trade if it was kept open.116 Since the Crown dues, which this sum represented, constituted 28.5% of the overall projected value of the trade, the Cortes believed the trade worth at least 120,000,000 ris only three decades after its opening phase. Given the fact that the Gomes contract came to only 300,000 ris annually, the povo certainly seemed to have a point here, well beyond mere self-interest. The Crown tended to voice only one kind of response to these and later protests by disgruntled subjects who pointed out that Crown policies were damaging to the latters own interests invoking the royal prerogative to decide what was to the proveito (benefit/good) of the kingdom at large, in other words invoking what amounted to executive privilege.117 It is important to realize that the Crowns idea of profit was not necessarily based on accounting principles. In contemporary usage the word proveito (profit) meant both benefit and profit in a bookkeeping sense. Like other medieval political bodies, the Crown had to consider both non-economic goals and the costs of revenue generation. Thus transaction costs were one of the key considerations the Crown kept in mind in its continual reassessment of overseas revenue sources. The licencing system and customs network represented a considerable burden for the royal bureaucracy, just as the collection of various taxes, tolls and dues did in the metropolitan area. In the fifteenth century, farming out tax collection and contracting out regalian rights were time-sanctioned, panEuropean methods of reducing overhead and securing a guaranteed, fixed income, even if it was lower that the potential overall revenue.118 It therefore does not come as a surprise that the Crown,
Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 1: doc. 68. Brsio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 2a srie, 1: doc. 68. 118 For a series of studies on medieval and sixteenth-century revenue collection methods and taxation strategies see the conceptually fundamental volume edited by Richard Bonney, The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, in particular Bonneys Introduction (1-17); also see Philippe Contamine, Jean Kerherv, and Albert Rigaudire, eds., Limpt au Moyen ge. Limpt public et le prlvement seigneurial, fin XIIe-dbut XVIe sicle, 3 vols (Paris: Comit pour lHistoire conomique et Financire de la France, 2002); J.-Ph. Genet and M. Le Men. eds., Gense de ltat moderne. Prlvement et redistribution (Paris: ditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987); For a general development of revenue administration in the West, since the Antiquity to modernity, see Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildawsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), particularly chapters 4 and 5.
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like its European counterparts, showed a marked preference for dealing with a small number of large entrepreneurs, rather than with the public in general. This approach increased predictability, focussed the eventual application of sanctions and deterrents, simplified bargaining, and thus lowered the Crowns transactions costs, albeit at the price of potentially lowering the income. The puzzling element in the early period of the Portuguese expansion is, in fact, precisely the one that has often been characterized as a progressive feature, namely the Crowns insistence on direct participation in commercial operations as the preferred option. One possible explanation may lie in the fact that its administrative and accounting practices left the Crown in no position to determine efficiently how much profit (proveito) it was in fact deriving from the West African enterprises, beyond a well-justified but useless notion that the revenue was considerable. The Crowns accounting system was geared towards inventory and agent control, not towards cost-benefit analysis or revenue-expense reconciliation. In essence, the Crown treated the African income the same way it treated its overall revenues: as a giant petty-cash box, from which money and goods were drawn as needed. The King drew on the Guinea House randomly and haphazardly to cover purchases for the royal household or to transfer money to other administrative departments which stood in need of a cash injection. Some of the merchandise arriving from West Africa was not even put on the market, but distributed in the form of presents thoroughly medieval and Renaissance a form of largesse. In 1486-1493, for example, only one third of the slaves registered as received by the Slave House were actually sold, the rest being distributed as gifts and favours according to royal dispositions in the matter.119 In 1511, the entire Crown share in the proceeds of the Atlantic slave trade went toward covering the enormous cost of building fortifications in Morocco. The revenue derived from regional leases and tax farms, similarly to some 80 per cent of overall Crown revenues, was assigned to defray social payments to the nobility.120

Freire, Cartas, 3: 396-7 (doc. 380). AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fols. 97r-121r, 190r. For the overall pattern, see Ivana Elbl, Overseas Expansion, Nobility, and Social Mobility in the Age of Vasco de Gama, Portuguese Studies Review 6 (1997-98): 53-80, in particular Figure 1, 67.
120

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The overseas expansion provided a valuable new source of rewards for powerful subjects or royal favourites, and thus constituted an important form of political and social capital. In this respect the Crowns approach can be considered economic only if the concept is enlarged to include the application of formal economic thinking to social and ceremonial interaction something that, it must be stressed, was rather alien to the actors involved in such processes at the time. Grants in the Atlantic Islands and in Africa were one of the ways in which the Regency sought to pacify the restless ambitions of Infante D. Henrique during D. Afonso Vs minority, yet such grants also became an expression of the Infantes political power once the King had come of age. After Henriques death, D. Afonso used overseas resources to offer boons to equally restless subjects, such as his brother D. Fernando and the celebrated D. Duarte de Meneses. In 1474, the African enterprise came under the direct administration of the Crown Prince, D. Joo, and its profits were assigned toward the maintenance of his household,121 establishing thus a precedent for subsequent heirs presumptive, D. Afonso and D. Manuel. In the 1510s, if not before, the revenues from various West African regions were merged into the pipeline of royal social payments to the nobility: assentamentos, tenas, and casamentos, becoming as inextricable a part of the system as the revenue from metropolitan fiscal districts.122 In 1511, the full amount of the assentamento of D. Manuels consort Queen Maria, amounting to 2,150,000 ris, drew on revenues of the Casa da Mina.123 At the same time, the African enterprise supported 45 per cent of the 4,460,000 ris to which amounted the assentamento of Queen Lenor, the widow of King Joo II and sister of the reigning King D. Manuel.124 The revenues from trade in malagueta (grains of paradise) covered the assentamento of the Excellente Senhora, D. Juana La Beltraneja, the daughter and heir of King Henrique IV, who lost her bid for the throne of Castile to Isabel the Catholic in 1474 but because of her betrothal to King Afonso V continued to be the financial responsibility of Portugal.125

121 122 123 124 125

Silva Marques, Descobrimentos portugueses, 3: 153-4, doc. 115. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fols. 98r-121r. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 176. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fols. 177-177v. AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fol. 177v.

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The annual oramentos (budget estimates) and the receipts of the Guinea House and its satellite agencies indicate that the West African enterprise contributed significantly to the royal income. In the 1473 oramento, for example, the overall domestic revenue of the Crown was estimated at 52,168,500 ris and in the 1477 one at 43,074,000 ris.126 In this context, the 300,000 ris of the Gomes contract look rather insignificant. However, within two years of Prince D. Joos assumption of control over the African enterprise, the gross yearly revenues exceeded 13,000,000 ris.127 While nowhere near the 39,000,000 estimated by the 1473 Cortes, the potential of the trade was undeniable. Moreover, as Table 2 indicates, the gross revenues of the Guinea House registered very rapid growth in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Yet it is important to realize that these figures represent gross receipts, not net income. None of the operating expenses, or the overhead, had been deducted by the Crown.128 Since these raw figures were used for casting up the annual oramentos, it is no surprise that the Crown was easily seduced into believing that its Guinea treasure chest was bottomless. The oramentos are more reliable when the estimates are based on leases and tax farms, rather than Crown receipts, because those represent actual net income. Two of these oramentos are available for the early sixteenth century, pertaining to 1511 and 1525. Both are incomplete but still comprehensive enough to be comparable. The 1511 oramento indicates that African revenues accounted for 17 per cent of the Crowns expected income, the rest coming from domestic sources.129 In 1525, domestic revenues declined to 68 per cent, but still formed the majority. Africa provided 16 per cent, India 14 per cent and the Azores 2 per cent (data for Madeira are missing).130 These figures suggest that Africa played an important role in the generation of royal revenues, but its share consistently

Jorge Faro, Receitas y despesas da Fazenda Real de 1384 a 1481 (subsdios documentais) (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Estatstica, 1465), 82-5 and 225-9. 127 AN/TT, Chancelaria de D. Joo II, liv. 1, fols. 53r-53v. 128 For some of the problems of Portuguese revenue estimates in sixteenthcentury Asia see Subrahmanyam and Thomaz, Evolution of Empire, 312, 316. 129 AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 532, fols. 1r-118v. 130 AN/TT, Ncleo Antigo, no. 590, fols. 1r-98r, 111r.

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lagged behind metropolitan sources. The emphasis placed on overseas income, at the expense of domestic revenues, shows the importance of perception and impression: clearly, the overseas enterprise was perceived as the dynamic element. It was the gross intake (see Table 2), rather than net income, that dazzled contemporaries and modern historians alike.

Conclusion The West African enterprise, just like the overseas enterprise in general, constituted a windfall addition to the existing (and limited) resources of the Portuguese Crown. From an administrative and strategic point of view the Crown handled this sector in the same manner as it did its metropolitan resources: as a means of attaining the short-term goals of solidifying and expanding its power under very difficult and turbulent conditions. The Crowns strategies were thus satisficingthey did not necessarily aim at maximizing revenue, but rather at achieving an acceptable and sustainable cash flow and securing means to satisfy political and social strategies. However, these strategies were deeply rooted in past practices and political choices (we might say that they were path-dependent) and can be best understood in the context of domain state fiscal system, as formulated by Bonney and Ormrod.131 This system grew out of medieval seigneurial estate and revenue management, an area that scholars have mostly neglected in their search for the roots of capitalist economy. The limitations characterizing the Portuguese royal enterprise in Africa, and the temporary barriers to private participation that the Crown erected in an effort to manage its short-term revenues had serious impact on the volume and regional development of early European trade with Africa. The relative volume of trade with various African regions is frequently seen as a reflection of their supply capacity and of effective demand for European merchandise. It is essential to realize, however, that the policies and strategies of the Portuguese Crown, as well as the inefficiencies of its various agencies, distorted the ability of African trading partners to sell and buy, both by limiting outsider access to African markets and by
131

Bonney, Introduction, 13.

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making the Crown unable to conduct such trade efficiently.132 It is particularly important to stress this in connection with the early Atlantic slave trade and the debate on the state of slave trade and slavery in the coastal regions of West Africa in the opening period of the European overseas expansion.133

132 For comparison, see John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 2 The Development of Commerce between Europeans and Africans (pp. 43-71); and George Brooks, Landlords and Strangers. Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000-1630 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), chaps. 7-9. 133 For an elaboration of this argument see Elbl, The Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade, 74-5.

CIVIC DEBT, CIVIC TAXES, AND URBAN UNREST: A CATALAN KEY TO INTERPRETING THE LATE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPEAN CRISIS
Jeffrey Fynn-Paul

This paper describes a phenomenon that has not received its due share of attention from historians writing on the European crisis of the later fourteenth century: the effect of unforeseen short- and long-term population loss on urban polities which had contracted fixed debt levels on the assumption that a steady level of urban taxes, usually consumption taxes, would be available to pay interest on that debt. The case study will be Catalonia, and especially the Catalan city of Manresa, but the principle deduced here can be applied to cities throughout Europe. To the mix must be added the effects of war, which during these decades was often protracted and desperate, and which demanded every surplus penny from combatants treasuries, especially since the price for failure on the battlefield was often a loss of sovereignty. By the 1340s, when a long-term cycle of plagues was inaugurated by the Black Death, European war was funded almost entirely though deficit financing. Since warfare was frequent and widespread in late fourteenth-century Europe, it often happened that cities would contract a debt burden at the utmost limit of their citizens ability to pay, only to have a wave of plague reduce the urban population by some significant amount during the repayment period. Since civic debt simply had to be paid in order for the financial machinery of the state not to fail, the taxes which paid this debt had to be sustained at a constant rate, resulting in an increased tax burden per capita. Since the taxes used to pay civic debts were often consumption taxes on such goods as meat, wine, and wheat, the increased burden was felt most keenly by the poor. This is not to say that the middle and upper classes in many cities were not severely harried, especially when it became clear that consumption taxes alone would not be enough to make the next round of interest payments. Squeezed, therefore, in a quadruple vise of depopulation, war, debt and taxation, urban householders throughout Europe were frequently in an untenable situation during the decades

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between 1350 and 1400. The persistent urban unrest which characterizes this period may often have arisen from precisely this combination of variables, as it did in Manresa during the 1360s and 1370s. The conclusion of this paper applies the theory derived from the Manresan evidence to some famous cases of urban unrest in Genoa, Florence, and Venice between 1350 and 1400.

The Development of Regular Tax Systems in the Catalan Cities, 1285-1330 In order to understand the effects of urban tax and debt systems on late fourteenth-century Catalan cities, it is necessary to describe the evolution and functions of these systems. Catalan urban institutions, both political and financial, were slow to coalesce into what might be called a typical late-medieval form. Although there had been experiments with systems of urban consellers in Catalonia during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, these were abandoned for somewhat mysterious reasons. It was not until 1274 that Barcelona received a definitive urban government of the type it would retain until the end of the ancien rgime.1 As might be expected, the pace of innovation in the smaller Catalan cities tended to lag behind Barcelona, often by a period of decades. Manresa itself was a royal city by the late twelfth century, but as late as 1254 it was granted as a fief to Viscount Ramon Folc IV of Cardona for the duration of the viscounts life. Ramon Folc survived until 1274, meaning that until that very late date Manresa was both a feudal possession and outside of the main stream of Catalan urban development. In 1276, however, the new King Pere II reorganized the Catalan administration system. Manresa and certain other towns now became the capitals of their own veguerias, which were large territorial administrative units similar in extent and function to English counties.2
1 Philip Daileader, The Vanishing Consulates of Catalonia, Speculum 74 (1999): 65-94; for Vic, see Paul Freedman, An Unsuccessful Attempt at Urban Organization in Twelfth-Century Catalonia, Speculum 54 (1979): 479-91; and also Paul Freedman, Another Look at the Uprising of the Townsmen of Vic (1181-1183), Acta Medievalia 20-21 (2000): 177-86. 2 For the creation of the Manresan vegueria, see Jeffrey Fynn-Paul, The Catalan City of Manresa: A Political, Social, and Economic History, PhD

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In 1291 King Jaume II ascended the throne, and his farsighted policies, implemented over the course of a long and pacific reign (d. 1327), did much to turn Manresa from a feudal market town into a thriving regional capital. In 1315, Jaume elevated Manresa from the status of villa (town), to that of civitas (city). More tangibly, in the same year Jaume also gave the Manresans permission to form a conciliar government. A third element of Jaumes political policy was to purchase the towns bailiwick from a noble family, the de Manresas, who had been exercising various forms of feudal dominance over the Manresan townspeople since the twelfth century.3 From 1315, few if any noblemen resided within Manresas city limits. Throughout the fourteenth century, no knights were elected to the office of consul. King Jaume had made Manresa into a bourgeois city. Jaumes political reforms were complemented by equally farreaching fiscal innovations. In 1311, for example, the king granted Manresans a monopoly on intramural wine sales. This new monopoly represented a serious blow to the seigniors in the vicinity of Manresa, who lost their principal market, while the landowning patricians of the city were now in a position to charge a premium on their own vintages. The privilege was especially important to the citys patricians because wine growing was a principal capital investment for them at this time.4 Another royal privilege of 1311 granted Manresans the right to collect taxes from everyone who owned property within the territory of Manresa.5 Also in this year, Jaume added a second fair to the citys calendar, increasing its importance as a regional trade nexus.6 The principal aim of all this reform was, of course, to increase revenue. As part of the royal patrimony, Manresa owed a certain amount of money to the crown each year. Exactly how much this

Dissertation, University of Toronto (2006), 8-10. 3 Pere Catal i Roca, ed., Els castells catalans, 6 vols. (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau, 1967-1990), 5: 658-60. 4 Josep Fernandez Trabal found that wine growing was a principal investment of the Gironese patriciate in the years after 1300. See Fernandez, De mercaders a terratinents, LAven 94 (1986): 42-7, esp. 42-3. 5 Marc Torras, ed., El Llibre Verd de Manresa (Barcelona: Fundaci Noguera, 1996), 88-9. 6 Torras, El Llibre, 70-1, 85-6.

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entailed at any given time has proven a very elusive figure.7 It is known that in 1254, the city had been worth about 450 per year to Jaume IIs grandfather. By 1329, two years after Jaumes death, Manresa was raising over two and a half times the 1254 figure. It is impossible to say, however, whether real royal income from the city increased during this period, since there are as yet no price series for Iberia before 1350.8 One can only point to other European trends, such as Herlihys wheat prices, and suggest that Jaume II had perhaps doubled Manresas real contribution to the Aragonese treasury.9 The main reason for this sudden increase in urban tax revenue was another financial reform carried out under Jaume II, which was the creation of a system of indirect consumption taxes on such commodities as meat, grain, wine, spices, and simple manufactured goods. These were known in Catalonia as imposicions.10 Because the development of an imposicion system happened simultaneously in Barcelona and Manresa, it is probable that it was implemented by royal fiat in other Catalan cities at the same time. The imposicion system can be seen as the culmination of Jaume IIs fiscal policy, even though he did not live to see its full implementation. The new system proved successful, insofar as it enabled the cautious Jaume
7 The few bailiff generals books in the ACA which mention Manresa prior to 1380 give accounts of feudal rents, but no indication of total annual payments to the crown. Presumably, all of Manresas regular revenue from imposicions, less the costs of urban administration, went to the crown. Since these imposicions also went to pay extraordinary taxes, and later, censal debts, in years when these were owed, it appears as though the crowns income from extraordinary taxes was always earned at the expense of ordinary revenue. This in itself is an important distinction which is seldom discussed. 8 The earliest data are from Earl Hamiltons Navarre series. His Aragon series has only fragmentary data prior to 1381, and the Valencia series does not commence until 1413 (Earl Hamilton, Money, Prices and Wages in Valencia, Aragon and Navarre, 1351-1500 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1936): Appendices III-V, 213-60). 9 David Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (New Haven: Yale, 1967), 123, shows that wheat prices ranged from an index figure of 125 in 1251-1275, to 170 in 1301-1325. By 1326-1350, the index had fallen back to 125. 10 Comparable systems had been fully developed in most Italian states by the late thirteenth century. Charles M. de la Roncire, Indirect Taxes or Gabelles at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection, in Nicolai Rubenstein, ed., Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence (Evanston, IL: Faber and Faber, 1968).

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to launch a successful conquest of Sardinia between 1322 and 1326, after a quarter century of planning. The work of Jean Broussolle, who in 1955 published a detailed study of Barcelonas imposicions, is the starting point for understanding the development of the imposicion system. Broussolle discerned that through 1329 Barcelonas tax system was not regularized. In fact, the control of municipal taxes had passed firmly into the control of Barcelonas consellers only in 1283. Between 1283 and 1329, according to Broussolle, the tax system entered into an evolutionary phase, in which the sales of indirect taxes on staples were made only irregularly.11 For example, taxes on meat, wine, grains, and ships were sold in 1328 in order to raise money for the marriage of Alfons IV. However, in 1329 no such taxes were sold.12 In the face of such irregularity, Broussolle believes that during this 1283-1329 period most of the ordinary revenue paid by Barcelona to the crown came from other sources (consistant en dautres impts), by which he presumably meant older feudal dues. Exactly what these dues entailed, and how much revenue they provided, remains to be discovered.13 The work of Manuel Sanchez has now subdivided and nuanced the evolutionary period discerned by Broussolle. Sanchez notes that prior to 1321, extraordinary royal levies were raised from the Catalan cities by means of direct impositions known as tallias. From 1321, however, most Catalan cities began to raise sums for extraordinary taxes by selling imposicions. Late as it may seem, the true development of this type of urban tax system dates only from this year.14 The first known references to imposicions date from only a few years before: they are referenced in 1314 in Barcelona, 1316 in Tortosa.15 By combining the narratives of Broussolle and Sanchez, the years between 1321 and 1329 can be seen as a further experi-

Broussolle, Les impositions municipales de Barcelona de 1328 a 1462, Estudios de Historia Moderna 5 (1955): 1-164, 14. 12 Broussolle, Les impositions municipales, 16. 13 But now on Barcelonas early rents see Pere Orti Gost, Renda i fiscalitat en un ciutat medieval: Barcelona (segles XII-XIV) (Barcelona: Consejo superior de investigaciones scientficas, 2000). 14 Manuel Sanchez, El naixement de la fiscalitat dEstat a Catalunya (Vic: Estudis Universitaris, 1995), 91-2. 15 Marc Torras, Els privilegis del Llibre Verd de Manresa (Manresa: Parcis Edicions Selectes, 1998), 152.

11

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mental period, in which the imposicions were heavily relied upon, but were not yet accepted as annual and permanent. From 1330, however, the imposicions became ensconced as a cornerstone of Catalan urban finance. In that year, a new royal campaign was launched against Genoa, and Barcelonas tax system was reorganized into the form that it would retain until the outbreak of civil war in 1462. The difference between the number and value of imposicions sold in 1328 and in 1330 is striking. Whereas in 1328, only four taxes were sold, in 1330 twenty-four were sold, and the number of taxes would remain close to this level thereafter. Barcelona collected 6,332 in taxes in 1328, but in 1330 it collected 39,892, or over six times the amount collected two years previously. When we consider the portrait of Barcelonese urban finances outlined above, it is interesting to note that the revenue from Manresan imposicions shows a large increase between 1329, when the first figures become available, and 1339, when the next figures are available. The Manresan figures did not increase nearly as much as the Barcelona figures over the same period, but there was an increase of nearly 100 percent when a missing meat tax is added to the total, and of 50 percent when this is left out.16 In 1329, Manresan revenue from imposicions stood close to 1,000, while from 1339 onward it stood closer to 2,000. The probable explanation for this increase is that, in 1330 or shortly thereafter, Manresas taxes were reorganized along the same lines as Barcelonas new system, and it is likely that this reorganization was imposed by the crown. Whether this represents a shift from low to moderate taxes, or from moderate to heavy taxes, especially from the point of view of the cities poor householders, is an open question. From Table 1 it can be seen that between 1339 and 1418, Manresan revenue from regular impositions hovered around 2,000, except during the Castilian war years of the 1360s and 70s, when it surpassed 3,000. Since the Black Death cut the population of Manresa by perhaps 30 to 50 per cent in 1348, it is very curious that revenue from imposicions did not change substantially between 1339 and

16 Because the meat tax was usually the single most valuable tax, it was traditional to assign it to a separate purpose, and it was often recorded in special books that were distinct from the records for the remainder of the taxes. Records of meat taxes are therefore often left out of the accounts found in the Barcelona and Manresa council manuals.

censal

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royal levies had been a part of Catalan fiscality for centuries, a new wave of levies on the royal cities was begun in 1321-24, in preparation for Jaume IIs campaign against Sardinia. This campaign would, in fact, initiate a long-standing conflict with Genoa, which reached a crescendo in the early 1350s. It has been suggested that Jaumes reforms left the Aragonese fiscal system better prepared to deal with the crowns newly aggressive foreign policy. In fact, the financial machine that was marshalled to finance the conquest of Sardinia has been christened a new page in the history of royal and municipal finance by Manuel Snchez Martnez.26 The reorganization of regular taxes was one branch of the royal initiative, and a reorganization of the irregular tax system was another. The new series of extraordinary levies that began during the 1320s was to last with very few breaks until Catalonia became fiscally exhausted in the mid 1370s. Table 4 summarizes the known payments of over 2,000s that were owed by Manresa to the crown, or that were raised by the city as the result of extraordinary demands made by the crown, between the years of 1325 and 1378. The list is not complete, since several subsidies levied after known sessions of the Corts remain unaccounted for, but the known figures provide a sense of the high level and frequency of extraordinary taxes that were being raised from the Catalan cities during the middle decades of the fourteenth century. It can be observed from Table 4 that extraordinary taxation during this half century was so regular that it became, in effect, a further means of ordinary taxation. The only check on the royal will regarding these taxes was that permission be granted by the Corts, and although much has been made of the Corts intransigence, there were few, if any, sessions that did not eventually produce a substantial levy. Another point to be noted is that Manresas portions of
26 Snchez Martnez and his students have done much needed work on Catalan fiscality. See Manuel Snchez Martnez and Pere Orti Gost, eds., Corts, parlaments i fiscalitat a Catalunya: els capitols del donatiu, 1288-1384 (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de Justicia, 1997); Manuel Snchez Martnez, El naixement de la fiscalitat dEstat a Catalunya: Segles XII-XIV (Girona, Universitat de Girona, 1995); Manuel Snchez Martnez, Estudios sobre renta, fiscalidad, y finanzas en la Catalua bajomedieval (Barcelona: Casa Mil i Fontanals, 1993); and Manuel Snchez Martnez, Questie y subsidios en Catalua durante el primer tercio del siglo XIV: el subsidio para la cruzada granadaina (1329-1334), Cuadernos de historia econmica de Catalua 16 (1987), 11-54.

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A censal was a perpetual money annuity, received by an investor in return for his or her investment of a cash sum (usually substantial).34 Rates for both the censal and violari varied in response to the flux of the credit market. The censal was perpetual, meaning that it could be transmitted to an heir at the death of the owner/recipient. The Catalan censal could also be sold on the market, though, it seems, only with the intervention of the issuing authorities, who were usually municipalities.35 Royal municipalities of all sizes, from large towns to hamlets, issued their own censals; the Manresan council manuals suggest that this practice probably became widespread in the early 1360s.36 In Catalonia, the crown ensured that censals could always be redeemed by the issuing municipality, since it was to the kings advantage for his cities to be less, rather than more, in debt.37 The first evidence for Manresan sales of violaris comes from the early 1340s.38 It should be noted that in this regard, the Catalans and the Italians consolidated their systems of loans on

Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1943), 147-62. 34 It should be noted that Spanish censal = French rente and Flemish rent. The word rentier is derived from these terms. The rente developed as early as the mid-13th century in Northern France and Flanders, but, as has been noted, did not appear in Catalonia-Aragon until nearly a century later. The censal-rente is a distinct instrument from that used in Northern Italy, where forced loans or prestanze were used alongside voluntary debt systems. This is because in the case of censals the principal did not legally have to be repaid except at the will of the issuing authority. This made censals all the more attractive to late medieval investors since they could be classified by canon lawyers as non-usurious. On these issues see John Munro, The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution, and James Tracy, On the Dual Origins of Long-Term Urban Debt in Medieval Europe, in Marc Boone, et al., eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries) (Oakville, CT: David Brown, 2004), 13-26. 35 Munro, Medieval Origins, 535. 36 Snchez Martnez, El naixement, 129-34, speaks of the use of censals as a Catalan financial system from the 1360s. Christian Guiller, Girona Medieval, letapa dapogeu (1285-1360) (Girona: Ajuntament de Girona, 1991), 50-1, says that from 1350 there was no year in which censals and violaris were not sold (A partir de 1350, no hi ha cap any sense emissions de censals i violaris). It is likely that the smaller Catalan municipal entities began to sell their first censals at the same time as the larger ones, since all were equally indebted to the crown by the acts of the Corts. 37 Munro, Medieval Origins, 535. 38 For the appearance of the public debt in Manresa, see Torras, Els privilegis, 191-9.

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a similar time scale. The Venetians had developed a secondary market for their loan shares by 1320; the Genoese consolidated their loan shares in 1340, and the Florentines reorganized their loan system into the Monte Comune by 1345.39 That the plague occurred just after these major institutional reforms certainly meant, in Catalonia at least, that inexperience with managing the new system added to the calamity caused by the plague. Snchez has noted the speed with which the crown switched from financing its extraordinary levies through tallias and direct payments to financing these levies through the censal system. Sanchez suggests, however, that the imposicion system of consumption taxes was superseded by the system of public debt. In fact, Sanchez views on this point should be emended or at least reworded, insofar as the imposicion system was not replaced by the censal system. Rather, as we have seen, the imposicion system formed a regular revenue stream that was not tied to outmoded feudal dues. By 1320, this stream was being used to pay extraordinary taxes.40 Later, after the imposicion system had been made regular and perpetual, the Catalan authorities realized that imposicion revenue could be used to pay censal interest. Thus, the imposicion system was never replaced. Rather it supplemented both the older loan method of paying extraordinary taxes, and it underpinned the newer censal system. The main innovation represented by the censal system, then, was that instead of paying the Barcelona bankers more or less directly, the cities now pledged their regular revenue to a number of intermediate parties, who purchased censals from the city for ready cash. In effect, a layer of middlemen was added. These investors paid lump sums to the cities, and the cities forwarded these sums to the bankers. The cities regular revenue now went to pay interest on the censals purchased by the investors, but the cities could also forward far larger lump sums to the Barcelona bankers. In effect, the switch to the debt system, which paid at 15 per cent in the 1340s, had multiplied the cities effective short-term revenue nearly sevenfold.41

Munro, Medieval Origins, 515. Note that the old system of raising tallias (one-time exactions) was still used alongside the imposicion system, throughout the fourteenth century. 41 For interest rates on Catalan violaris and censals, see Fynn-Paul, The Catalan City, 149-50.
40

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The danger of this system for the cities and for Catalonia at large was that a far larger network of creditors was now co-opted into the royal fisc. The pressure on city governments to pay their interest on time was now much higher than it had been during the brief era of imposicions and extraordinary taxes. The effects of unexpectedly difficult wars and unforeseeable catastrophic plagues on this newly emergent system will be detailed in the next section.

Warfare, Plague, Debt, and Taxation in Manresa, 1347-1381 It has been noted that a new age of conflict was initiated by the Catalans with their seizure of Sardinia in 1322-1326. The principal Catalan conflict of the 1340s involved the successful annexation of Mallorca by the new king Pere III (1336-1387). But this was not terribly costly to the Catalan cities, and when the Black Death struck in 1348, it does not appear as though the Manresan treasury was in dire straits. It is therefore difficult to say that outstanding debts played an important role in civic finances during the immediate aftermath of the 1348 plague. In any event, by 1351 Pere III felt strong enough to ally with the Venetians against the Genoese. The following year witnessed the famous showdown in the Bosporus, in which the Venetians, Catalans, and Greeks won a Pyrrhic victory over the Genoese, or, alternately, in which the Genoese won a Pyrrhic victory over the allies.42 The Catalans and Genoese fought another major engagement in 1353, and this time, the Genoese were utterly routed off the coast of Sardinia, ending their effective resistance for a time. In 1354 a third campaign was required in order for the Catalans to restore some semblance of order on Sardinia. This expedition was led by King Pere III himself. The financial effects of this Genoese-Sardinian war on Manresa can be ascertained from Table 4. From 1353 through 1356, unprecedentedly large annual payments were made to the crown by Manresa, and it is likely that these were paid by the sale of censals and/or violaris. Since the war began in 1351-1352, it is likely that the city made payments in those years as well, although due to lingering

42 For the former view, see Thomas Bisson, The Medieval Crown of Aragon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 109; for the latter, see Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 220.

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bureaucratic confusion caused by the Black Death, the town records for those years are disorganized and scanty. It can be seen from Table 4 that the high annual expenses of the Sardinian war led directly, without a break, into the hostilities of the Castilian war, which I have argued was an extension of the Sardinian war and largely instigated by Pere III himself.43 But what might have been originally intended as a mere demonstration of Aragonese power soon turned into a defensive war for survival, as Pedro I The Cruel of Castile (1350-1369) proved himself doggedly willing and able to annex portions of Aragon to his own crown. Despite recent rebellion and civil war in Castile, Pedro quickly showed that Castiles superior resources were more than a match for the Aragonese on land.44 As a result, the Catalans were forced to fight a defensive war, which lasted for over a decade, until the final defeat of Pedro in 1369 by the Aragonese-supported pretender to the throne, Enrique of Trastmara. Even then, hostilities did not cease, since Enrique proved himself unwilling to yield concessions made to Aragon during the war. Perhaps most dangerous of all was the fact that the French White Companies had gained a taste for Iberian campaigning during the war, when they had been enlisted on the side of Aragon. Pere III soon realized that most of his cities were woefully under-fortified, and presented tempting targets in the event of a mutiny. The king therefore ordered a general fortification of Catalonia in 1368. The cities were to pay for their own walls, and the timing was, to say the least, unfortunate. Table 4 shows the long and depressing list of extraordinary levies that were raised by the Manresans during these several decades of crisis. Note that most of the largest payments came during the 1350s; from the early 1360s, after a decade of unrelenting subsidies, each successive levy extracted from the Manresan fisc was like wringing the proverbial blood from a stone. Since a detailed history of

Fynn-Paul, The Catalan City, 41-9. It should be noted that in the 1350s the Crown of Aragon consisted of the semi-autonomous states of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and Majorca. I take the liberty of using Aragonese and Catalans and near synonyms, since about 90 per cent of the population of the Crown of Aragon, including its royal house, was Catalan-speaking, and likewise the vast majority of the confederations wealth was concentrated in Catalan speaking areas. The capital of the confederation, which Pere III attempted to embellish in various ways, was Barcelona.
44

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this period would be beyond the purpose of the present work, it will suffice to focus on two periods, 1362-1363, and 1375-1377, in which the vise of debt and plague squeezed Manresa with especial severity. The year 1362 saw Pedro of Castile break a Vatican-arranged truce to attack the Aragonese frontier city of Calatayud. In response, Pere III had little choice but to enlist the French White Companies, a situation which caused real alarm in Manresa. Barricades were set up at weak points in the city walls, for no one trusted the companies after their infamous exploits in southern France.45 As this drama was unfolding, a prolonged drought threatened to create the worst famine in a generation. In April 1362 Manresa dedicated 60 (1,200s) toward the purchase of grain.46 This had not been done since the great famines of the 1330s. In July 1363, just before the harvest, the Manresan councillors reported a dearth of wine, indicating a poor vendimia in the previous year.47 Weakened by famine, the Catalan populace began to succumb to a fresh wave of plague in the summer of 1362. Together with most of Europe, Catalonia would continue to experience serious outbreaks of plague in fifteen year cycles after 1348, and these cycles did not abate much until the end of the fifteenth century. The new plague lasted through the fall of 1362 and into the winter, adding the threat of sudden death by contagion to the miseries of the Castilian invasion, the menace of the White Companies, oppressive taxes, and the citizens desperate and laborious efforts to encircle themselves with defensible fortifications. In typical fashion, the Manresan consellers laconic record of the 1362 plague outbreak says nothing about its duration or severity. Yet this record is one of the most significant council entries of the fourteenth century. It may be summarized as follows:
Because of the pestilence which recently ravaged the city, and because of the many payments which we must make to the king, this city

45 MC 1362.8.1. Note: MC stands for the Manuales Concilii of the city of Manresa. They are unfoliated but entries are dated in chronological order and they have therefore been referenced by date. The citations relevant to this article are: Arxiu Histric de la Ciutat de Manresa AHCM/AM I-7 (1358.10.281364.3.6); AHCM/AM I-8 (1365.3.18-1373.5.18); AHCM/AM I-9 (1373.6.11375.3.22); and AHCM/AM I-10 (1375.3.25-1381.10.3). 46 Ad opus emendi frumentum. MC 1362.4.30. 47 MC 1363.7.9.

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stands in need of people who practise the mechanical arts; likewise it is our duty to attempt to populate the city by whatever means possible. Therefore we proclaim that all those who are not natural to the city and who wish to stay in it for more than ten days must write their name in the book of the city. These shall be free from all fogatges, questias reyals, and other occasional taxes; likewise they shall be free from all regular civic taxes (imposicions) for a period of ten years.48

The first thing to be gleaned from this entry is that the plague of 1362-1363 hit the city with some severity. Catalan historiography has made much of a reference which calls this plague the mortaldat dels infants, but it is clear that the Manresans also experienced it as a mortaldat dels menestrals (labourers).49 The Manresan councillors sentiment could not be a more fitting illustration of an analysis made by Anthony Bridbury regarding the effects of the first two waves of plague on the populace of England. Bridbury argued that in England the plague of 1348 did not cause a severe labour shortage; rather, it had served only to alleviate the severe overcrowding experienced by most of the country through the first half of the fourteenth century. It was not until the plague of 1362, Bridbury argues, that the country began to experience an acute shortage of labour.50 As far as can be determined from the Manresan evidence, Bridburys assessment also holds true in Catalonia. After the plague of 1362, the town councillors felt it necessary to foster policies that would increase the number of householders in the city. Depopulation was now added to the list of enemies they faced. The year 1362 thus marks a very important psychological turning point in the mentality of Manresas citizens and government. The city had been crowded, and even overpopulated from the vantage point of the lower classes, during the first half of the fourteenth century. Between 1348 and 1362, despite the ravages of the Black Death, the Manresan councillors gave no indication that they felt the citys population to be inadequate. From 1363, however, their attitude changed dramatically. Henceforth they considered their city to be underpopulated.

MC 1363.5.3. On the mortaldat dels infants, see Carme Batlle, Lexpansi baixmedieval [segles XIII-XV], in Pierre Vilar, ed., Histria de Catalunya (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1999), 3: 252. 50 A. R. Bridbury, The Black Death, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 26 (1973): 557-92.
49

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But the councillors own words show that, to their minds, even more important than the labour shortage caused by the plague was the shortage of taxpayers it created. While the citys debt burden continued to grow, the plague of 1362 had wiped out a significant portion of the taxpaying households. As the population continued to shrink, the debt burden remained to be shared amongst fewer survivors. Certainly this phenomenon was having an adverse effect on the Manresan economy. On the same day that the consellers inaugurated their new immigration policy, they recorded that the treasurer had examined his books and determined that the citys regular impositions were no longer sufficient to pay its censal annuities. As a short-term expedient, all of the citys imposicions were sold for the upcoming four months. Meanwhile, a fogatge, or hearth tax, had been declared, presumably at the Corts of Monzn in February 1363, and the city was now forced to sell 21,000s worth of new censals to make a payment on the fogatge.51 As though this were not burden enough, one month earlier the king had required the city to pay for the upkeep of a contingent of 25 clients, or mercenaries, who were probably mounted men-at-arms.52 In fact, these may have been some of the very Frenchmen against whom the Manresans were so desperately fortifying themselves. Eight Manresan men, two from each quarter, were appointed to collect a new tallia for the maintenance of this company. Not surprisingly, on 6 April the consellers reported that the eight men were having some difficulty in collecting the money.53 In an effort to speed up the tax collection, the royal veguer and batlle imposed a deadline upon the tax collectors themselves, after which time they would be personally responsible for paying a penalty of 500 gold morabatins.54 In this difficult situation, the eight members of the committee, all of whom were well-to-do and well connected to city government, claimed that they had not consented to this

51 MC 1363.5.3. For the fogatge at Monzn, see Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Aragn y de Valencia y Principado de Catalua (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1896-1922), 2: 149-50. This is mentioned at the Corts of Barcelona, beginning 10 March 1364. 52 MC 1363.3.26. 53 MC 1363.4.6. 54 The morabat was derived from an old Arabic coin, and as a unit of account it was used in Catalonia throughout the middle ages for assessing judicial fines. For the equivalency in sous (1 morabat = 9s), see MC 1372.5.21.

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penalty and were therefore not bound to it.55 Unfortunately, the entry breaks off at this point and nothing more was written on the matter. It is very interesting to learn that the town patricians claimed to have the right to consent to fines imposed upon them by the bailiff and veguer: This was clearly a challenge to the authority of the royal officials, who were admittedly acting in an extraordinary manner, and it is unfortunate that the results of this challenge cannot be known. The incident highlights important changes taking place in the tone of civic life. Not only were the lower classes becoming restive about sustaining such a high tax burden, but years of high taxation had created a situation in which it was becoming increasingly unpleasant to be a conseller or jurat. Civic officials were now inescapably sandwiched between the ire of their neighbours and the impatience of the powerful agents of the crown. In this dispute may be seen one of the early foreshadowings of the state of affairs described in the royal privilege of 1380, in which the councillors had complained that the citys best men were avoiding public service.56 Further signs of unrest were also evident in 1363. In the summer of that year, the city gave plenum posse to a new treasurer, Bernat de Area, who received authority to hear accounts from whomever he saw fit, in addition to the authority to collect what was due to the city. Bernat was to receive the very high rate of 3 sous per livre, or 15 per cent, of the money that he extracted from the citizens. It is probable that some of this commission was destined to go to the guards who were appointed to help Bernat in his efforts.57 The use of guards to enforce the payment of taxes was a novel step at Manresa, but this tactic would continue to be employed through the early 1370s. The city remained in a state of quasi-revolt through the entire period. After maxing out their regular revenue in 1362-1363, the Manresans could continue to raise additional funds, but only at the cost of introducing novel modes of taxation. But they had no choice, since at this moment Pedro of Castile threatened their very sovereignty, and so they paid up. In Manresa, the 28,000s levy of 1365 was raised by the expedient of a weekly tax. Every Sunday one
55 56 57

MC 1363.4.6. Torras, El Llibre, 269. MC 1363.7.15.

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or more shillings were collected from each head of household according to their income level.58 This weekly tax was collected between 1365 and 1367.59 In 1368, when Pere III ordered Manresa and other cities of Catalonia to construct new fortifications, this order, too, was obeyed, albeit at the cost of six or seven more years of extraordinary expenses.60 In 1375, after nearly thirty years of unrelenting hardship, another famine menaced the city. In addition to other levies, the city voluntarily raised 51,000s over the next three years in order to complete their irrigation works known as the cequia, which they viewed as their primary defence against famine. This was a Herculean effort: in August of 1375, the administrator Pere Nadal had rendered an account for his office of the clavarius of the impositions assigned to pay censals, which showed that the city had paid 3,311 on the debt over the previous year. Only a month before, in July, Manresas jurats had admitted, in inelegant Latin, that they could find no one to purchase more censals from themmutuo invenietur non potest. The citys credit had reached its limit. Tellingly, interest rates on censals were at an all-time high, suggesting that the rest of the principality was in similar straits.61 This is borne out by the narrative sources as well. In a unique passage from the Chronicle of Pere III, the king specifically calls attention to his financial incapacity during the years 1375 and 1376. He notes that Our house of Aragon had had great trouble and harm from King Don Enrique [of Castile], and especially had become impoverished [because of him] ...62

MC 1365.4.19. I have found payment records for the weekly tax between MC 1365.4.1 and MC 1367.8.30; for the daily tax see MC 1368.9.26. 60 Renewed efforts on the Manresan walls (picking up from the panicked efforts of 1362-1363) began in September 1368. The 1368 order to fortify led to the imposition of another new tax, the daily tax about which little is said in the records. MC 1368.9.26. For the fortification of Vic in 1368, see Eduard Junyent, La fortification de Vich en 1368, Ausa 2 (1955-57): 347-56. I suspect from the nearly identical architecture that the walls of Montblanc and parts of Barcelonas walls were also built in the same year, indicating that the order to fortify was probably widespread. 61 MC 1375.7.17 62 Mary and J. N. Hillgarth, trans., Pere III. Chronicle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1980), 2: 590.
59

58

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Nor did the crisis abate with the lessening of invasion fears after 1376. Years of high censal payments combined with demographic decline was taking its toll on Manresas vitality, and on its very viability as a socio-political entity. On 10 January 1377 this trend was analyzed by the councillors of Manresa in no uncertain terms:
Many inhabitants of this city have deserted it, moving their homes elsewhere, on account of which this city is becoming depopulated, and there are not enough people to pay the censals and other burdens by which the city is bound.63

Applications: Genoa, Florence, and Venice This analysis of the Catalan evidence is, fittingly, also applicable to the experience of the Catalans archrival Genoa. In his account of the 1350-1355 Genoese-Catalan-Venetian war, Steven Epstein describes a situation in which the Mediterranean powers paradoxically began a new conflict just after their cities had been devastated by the worst plague in memory. Utilizing vastly reduced navies, the Venetians, Catalans and Genoese fought on, with dire results for Genoa.64 Nor did the Genoese situation improve over the next several decades. By 1380, the Genoese tax on salt had raised its price to twelve times what the state paid for it. By the 1390s, Epstein reports, consumption taxes were at revolutionary levels, and unprecedented levels of coercion were required in order to collect them. In Genoa, as in Catalonia, consumption taxes were primarily used to pay interest on the debt, and the Genoese debt had remained very high due to almost continuous warfare. As in Catalonia,

MC 1377.1.10. ... plures ipsius civitatis habitatores deseruit ipsam civitatem, transferendo eorum domicilia aliundem, propter quod ipsam civitatis inhabitatibilis effici posset et non esset qui solveret censualia et alia onera ad que ipsam tenitur. 64 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 219-21. It should be noted that Epstein follows a long Italianist tradition of describing the 1350-1355 war as Genoas war with Venice, even though Catalonia played an equally important role in the conflict. This is mentioned only because one of the purposes of this paper is to show how thoroughly the Catalans were integrated into the Mediterranean trade system by this time. They were, in effect, a third major Mediterranean naval power, which between 1200 and 1500 gradually increased its maritime influence, largely at the expense of Genoa.

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creditors were so vital to the continuing functioning of the state their goodwill naturally took precedence over common people needing bread, firewood, and salt.65 Of course, Genoa also experienced recurring outbreaks of plague, such as that which occurred in 1385, and population levels did not recover between major visitations.66 Although Liguria is isolated from the rest of Italy, and Tuscan comparisons must be taken with a grain of salt, Herlihy estimated that between 1340 and 1404, Pistoia lost between two thirds and three quarters of its population.67 With the Manresan example at hand, we are now in a position to answer one further, and very important, question about the Genoese situation described above. Why did extravagant consumption taxes and state creditors become such an issue during these decades, and why were unprecedented levels of coercion required in the collection of taxes? Much of the specific mechanism behind these factors, which we now recognize as a classic post-plague urban crisis, must be the fact that the state had contracted a high debt burden, which was impossible to pay off in the short term, at the same time that householders continued to perish in significant and unforeseeable numbers. The remaining householders had no choice but to pay off the debt which had been contracted in the name of a significantly larger populace, years or even decades before. The Manresan example can also be applied to the famous case of the Florentine Ciompi revolt of 1378. As is well known, one of first demands of the rebels was an abolition of the funded debt and a lowering of the gabelles that had paid its interest.68 The Ciompi government of July and August of that year did manage to lower the tax rate in the Florentine contado by one third, and abolish the hated salt tax, at least for a brief time. Likewise, it attempted to suspend all payments on the funded debt for a three month period.

Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 234-6. Note again that in Genoa, Florence, and Venice, debt shares were often assessed as involuntary forced loans, whereas in Catalonia censal holders were almost always voluntary investors. Secondary markets for forced loan shares did open up to some degree in all three Italian republics however. 66 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 243. 67 Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia, 76. 68 Roberto Barducci, Le riforme finanziarie nel tumulto dei Ciompi, in Il tumulto dei Ciompi: Un momento di storia fiorentina ed europea, Acts of the Congress of 1979 (Florence: Olschki, 1981), 100-1.

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Another related reform was the creation of a program for implementing a direct tax, called an estimo. But in the end, the revolutionary government found that it could not function without maintaining interest payments on the debt, and Brucker lays much of the blame for the regimes failure on its vacillating debt policy, which alienated both the governments lower and middle class supporters and the states wealthy creditors.69 Part of why the Florentine situation became so dire by the 1370s might be ascribed to the mechanisms described above. It is possible that through the 1370s, at least, the Florentines themselves were less acutely aware of the continuing effects of population decline on their debt system. This could have occurred both because the nature of a large city is such that it is difficult to judge marginal population decreases, and because Florence, like other metropoles, was a focus of emigration. This would have provided an illusion of continual demographic replenishment, at least for a time.70 In medium-sized cities such as Manresa, however, even slight losses in population would have been more obvious and more keenly felt by civic officials in need of funds. The Venetian debt system, for its part, began to show serious signs of trouble from 1363, when the government ceased to make any pretence of redeeming forced loan shares.71 In 1378, at the same moment that Florence became embroiled in its civil war, Venice became involved in a disastrous war with Genoa, known as the War of Chioggia. It is very notable from the point of view of the present discussion that Venice managed to pay the interest on its state debts regularly between 1262 and 1380, and only at this moment did it succumb to temporary insolvency. Between 1378 and 1381, the Venetians were forced to lend 41 percent of their assessed patrimonies to the state, more than ever before. Many defaulted and had their lands sold at auction. The Venetian debt system, according to Mueller, never recovered from the blow it received during the

Gene Brucker, The Ciompi Revolution, in Rubinstein, Florentine Studies, 338-44. 70 On the issue of emigration to the capital, see Semuel K. Cohn, Jr., Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-1434 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 84. Here Cohn quotes a document of 1402 in which the Florentines admit that their estimo had to be reassessed because war and plague had reduced the population of the mountains in particular. 71 Munro, The Medieval Origins, 515.

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TOLL AND TRADE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND


James Masschaele

In the year 1272, Henry Black, the common clerk of the town of Ipswich, was indicted as a notorious thief. Upon learning of the indictment, Black fled from the town and was never heard from again. There is nothing particularly unusual about the indictment of a public official in the period, nor about Blacks decision to flee rather than face justice, but the erstwhile common clerks behavior upon learning of his indictment has few, if any, parallels. To spite his fellow townsmen, Black somehow managed to gain possession of the towns customary and a number of its foundation charters before his departure from the town. Like Black himself, these guarantors of Ipswichs privileges and freedoms were never to be seen again. Initially, the leaders of the town sought to continue the routines of local government as if though nothing had happened. Eventually, however, they came to view the absence of a formal documentary basis for local government as a problem, and they decided to convene the citizenry to draw up a new statement of the customs by which the town was governed. The document they produced, commonly referred to as the Ipswich Domesday Book, is a fascinating account of the government and economy of a major English port in the later thirteenth century.1 It naturally has much to say about local government and commercial regulation, but what is most surprising about the document is its lengthy account of procedures for collecting tolls. In this account, Ipswichs leaders made a sustained effort to specify the distinctive features of the commodities liable to pay toll and the circumstances of their circulation as trade goods. They began with a description of the extensive array of tolls
Printed in Sir Travis Twiss, ed., The Black Book of the Admiralty, Rolls Series no. 55 (London: Longman, 1873), 2: 1-207. The passages about the towns tolls that are discussed in this paper are found on pp. 184-207. A good summary of the circumstances in which the text came to be written is given in Ninth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, part 1 (London: s.n., 1883), 239-43.
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collected on the towns quay, and then followed up with a series of shorter descriptions of the tolls collected in eight separate markets specializing in cloth, fish, wool, cheese, timber, bread, meat, and animals. Between these various accounts of the items traded and the rates of toll imposed in each market, the compilers of the document entered brief notes summarizing unusual features of the markets: the toll on hemp, for example, appertained to the cloth market, but the toll on hemp seed was paid in the cheese market. Within each account, the authors distinguished not only the different goods that were traded in that market but also their mode of transport and a host of incidental details about how goods might be processed or modified in the course of being sold. Though exceptionally detailed, the account of toll collection in Ipswich represents a common documentary genre of the high and late Middle Ages. Well over 50 lists of tolls collected in English towns and markets prior to 1350 can now be found in print and hundreds more exist in manuscript form. These documents are a heterogeneous bunch, ranging from expansive descriptions like the one found in the Ipswich Domesday Book to simple lists with a small number of commodities and rates. Like the documents Georges Despy described in his survey of medieval toll documents in France and Germany, English lists often appear in ad hoc forms that defy easy generalization.2 Perhaps because of their heterogeneity, economic historians have paid relatively little attention to them, and their study has been left largely in the hands of local historians and antiquarians. But their sheer number suggests that they are of more than local interest and deserving of more careful scrutiny than they have hitherto received. They are, in fact, a treasure trove of information about the conduct of trade in medieval England and they raise an important but curiously neglected issue for medieval commerce, namely the relationship between tolls and the development of trade. This article will examine four issues related to the use of tolls in medieval England. The first section summarizes the main types of toll levied in medieval England and sketches their chronological development. The second section provides some quantitative evidence for the revenues generated by tolls and relates the revenue figures to the rates of toll specified in extant toll lists. The third
Georges Despy, Les Tarifs de Tonlieux, Typologie des sources du moyen ge occidental, 19 (Turnhout: ditions Brepols, 1976), 13-6.
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section looks at the payers of toll and considers how different groups of payers were affected by royal grants of exemption from toll. The fourth and final section offers some thoughts on the overall impact of tolls in the period. An appendix enumerating the many lists of tolls that have appeared in print can be found at the end of the article. Types of Toll To make sense of the great variety in the form and structure of tolls and toll lists, it is helpful to divide them into two principal types, one associated with the collection of local or customary tolls and the other with special tolls collected for a fixed period of time to finance public works projects. The two types had different histories as well as significantly different roles to play in urban finance. Each type merits consideration on its own before any general assessment of the relationship between tolls and trade can be offered. The Ipswich account in the towns Domesday Book is a good example of a document concerned with the collection of local or customary tolls. Such lists encompass several different kinds of toll, the two most important being toll collected on sales in a marketplace or fair and toll imposed on the passage of goods through a particular town or along a particular route. In theory these were two distinctive forms of taxation, but in practice it is often difficult to determine which type is documented in a particular list, and it seems likely that municipal officials did not distinguish sharply between the two. Tolls on passage were sometimes denoted by the Middle English thurghtoll but the Latin word teloneum (with common variants teoloneum and theolonium) could be used to describe just about any toll.3 In more descriptive accounts the circumstances of collection can sometimes be diagnosed from incidental details, but in general extant lists give frustratingly little detail about when and where tolls were assessed. Information of this sort is more likely to be found in court records dealing with disputes over exemptions from toll than in lists of toll rates.4
3 Throughtoll was sometimes levied on roads or bridges that were not associated with a specific town or market but it was far more commonly levied in places that had commercial facilities in which sales tolls were collected. 4 Such disputes are discussed more fully in James Masschaele, Peasants,

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Local tolls existed well before public works tolls came into being and they also predate by a considerable margin the earliest lists that have survived. Examples of both transit tolls and sales tolls can be found in the Anglo-Saxon world and may go back to the late Roman period. For the continent, F. L. Ganshof has shown how Merovingian and then Carolingian kings sought to emulate late Roman practices with respect to toll and toll exemptions.5 Similarly detailed study has not been carried out for Anglo-Saxon England, but there is no question that tolls were levied in the period.6 Domesday Book contains numerous references to toll income and includes a rudimentary list of the tolls collected in Lewes, Sussex.7 An undated eleventh-century list of the local tolls collected at Billingsgate in London points to the same conclusion, as do the formulaic references to toll and team in Anglo-Saxon charters, a formula that goes back to the tenth century, if not earlier.8 Over the course of the twelfth century, the documentary evidence associated with toll collection becomes much richer, particularly in the form of charters granting exemptions from toll. By 1200, nearly 30 towns had acquired a charter granting toll exemptions, and many monasteries had done likewise.9 This body of evidence suggests that local tolls had become widespread by the end of the twelfth century, and also suggests that their development was particularly extensive in the period after 1150, since the vast majority of the exemption charters (25 of 30) date to the second half of the twelfth century. Evidence related to the actual functioning of tolls in the period is,
Merchants, and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997), 129-46. 5 Ganshof, A propos du tonlieu lpoque Carolingienne, in La Citt nellalto Medioevo, Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sullalto Medioevo, 6 (Spoleto, [s.n.], 1959), 485-508. 6 F. E. Harmer, Chipping and Market: A Lexicographical Investigation, in Cyril Fox and Bruce Dickens, eds., The Early Cultures of North-West Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 335-60; P. H. Sawyer, From Roman Britain to Norman England, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), 225-6. 7 H. C. Darby, Domesday England (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), passim; Adolphus Ballard, The Domesday Boroughs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), 73-5. 8 N. S. B. Gras, The Early English Customs System (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1918), 153-5; Middle English Dictionary, electronic version (http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/mec/), s.v. Tol. 9 A. Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1042-1216 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1913), cxxxviii-cxlv.

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unfortunately, relatively meager. Only two lists that can be securely dated to the twelfth century have surfaced to date, one describing tolls collected in Newcastle in the reign of Henry I and the other detailing tolls collected in Cardiff in the second half of the century. Both bear close resemblance to lists from later periods, but they enumerate fewer items of trade and their descriptions of commodities lack the precision and specificity of later examples. In general, the twelfth-century evidence suggests that tolls were going through a phase of significant growth, especially after 1150, but it also suggests that they had yet to reach their mature form. The volume of documentary evidence related to tolls increases dramatically in the thirteenth century. As is often the case, the relationship between the survival of sources and real economic change is difficult to disentangle. The thirteenth century is in general much better documented than the twelfth century and the insistence that longstanding practices and traditions be put in writing is one of its great hallmarks.10 In this regard, the increase in documentation may be due mainly to the nature of our source material rather than to any substantive change in the practice of toll collection. Similarly, the thirteenth century was a period in which local rights and privileges came in for close scrutiny, particularly rights and privileges that bore an association with royal authority.11 The most common context in which lists of local tolls were recorded is, in fact, a royal inquest to establish how tolls were collected in a particular place. Even statements of toll rates and procedures that were not directly developed in response to a formal investigation may owe their existence to an awareness that the king looked more favorably on franchise holders with evidence in writing than on those who relied on longstanding tradition. But it is also likely that there were substantive changes in the role tolls played in urban finance and the economy as a whole. The long thirteenth century was a period characterized by the foundation of a plethora of new markets and towns, each with the right to collect tolls on the transactions they facilitated.12 It was,
10 Michael Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 11 Donald W. Sutherland, Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I, 1278-1294 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). 12 Maurice Beresford, New Towns of the Middle Ages. Town Plantation in England, Wales, and Gascony (New York: Lutterworth Press, 1967); Richard

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moreover, a period in which many of the larger towns acquired greater local control over their markets and tolls through the acquisition of royal charters granting self-government.13 Most of these towns appear to have collected tolls before they acquired formal status as self-governing royal boroughs, but their agreement to pay an annual farm to the king in return for their rights meant that toll revenues came to loom much larger in borough affairs; in their dealings with the king many town leaders made a direct association between their right to collect local tolls and their duty to pay their annual farm. Perhaps most significantly of all, the long thirteenth century was a period of considerable economic growth, involving a dramatic increase in the money supply, significant technological innovation, and vastly increased commercial activity at both regional and international levels.14 It was, consequently, a period in which toll collectors were well rewarded for their work and thus particularly interested in enhancing their rights. The history of public works tolls also points to the thirteenth century as a period of significant growth. Public works tolls constituted a special form of toll granted by the king to a town to allow it to raise money for a local construction project.15 The most common type was murage, collected for the construction, improvement, or maintenance of city walls. Other common types included pavage, collected for the improvement of city streets, and pontage, collected for the improvement of bridges. The earliest grant of this form of toll, to finance the construction of a town wall in Hereford, was made in 1216.16 The Hereford charter provides few specifics about

Britnell, The Commercialization of English Society, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1996); Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets. 13 Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1042-1216; A. Ballard and J. Tait, eds., British Borough Charters, 1216-1307 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1923). 14 For a recent assessment of the periods growth, see John Langdon and James Masschaele, Commercial Activity and Population Growth in Medieval England, Past & Present 190 (Feb., 2006): 35-81. 15 These grants have not been systematically studied in their own right, but good accounts can be found in Hilary L. Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales (London: J. Baker, 1971) and Constance Fraser, The Pattern of Trade in the North-East of England, 1265-1350, Northern History 4 (1969): 44-66. 16 T. D. Hardy, ed., Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in Turri Londinensi Asservati, Record Commission no. 15, 2 vols. (London, Record Commission, 1833-1844),

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how tolls were to be collected, referring only to a collection of customary charges on loads of goods that were brought to the town.17 It is difficult to determine from the wording of the grant whether the king intended to give the citizens of Hereford the right to impose a second set of tolls that mirrored the towns local tolls or simply the right to retain revenue from the local tolls that had formerly flowed into royal coffers. The first grant that specifically instituted new tolls occurred in 1220, when Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth acquired the right to collect tolls to facilitate the construction of their walls.18 By the standards of later grants, the list of tolls established in this joint grant of 1220 is fairly rudimentary, giving rates for loads of unspecified merchandise conveyed by ship, cart, packhorse and backpack, along with rates for seven different types of livestock. What began as a matter of military necessity in the troubled period following the death of King John gradually developed into a routine act of government. Over the course of the next century and a half, English kings made more than 1,000 grants of public works tolls; indeed, one could rightly conclude that much of the infrastructure of English urban life in the Middle Ages, and for some time beyond, owed its existence to the activities of the toll collectors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.19 In the later fourteenth century public works tolls began to fall out of favor, as towns moved towards direct taxation of local inhabitants as a preferable means of generating revenue for public works. Investment at levels that characterized the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was sustained in relatively few towns in the fifteenth century, and it seems as though the overall economic contraction of the period meant that tolls were no longer a cost-effective means of generating revenue.

1: 267b. Early murage grants are discussed in Charles Young, The English Royal Boroughs and Royal Administration 1130-1307 (Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1961), 104. 17 The grant was renewed in 1219, but the renewal sheds little additional light on the original grant. Patent Rolls of the Reign of King Henry III, AD 1216-1225 (London: Mackie, 1901), 224. 18 Patent Rolls of the Reign of King Henry III, AD 1216-1225, 238-9. 19 Alan Ralph Cooper, Obligation and Jurisdiction: Roads and Bridges in Medieval England (c. 700-1300), Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University (1998), 274; Turner, Town Defences, 238-43.

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The period from 1150 to 1350 can fairly be described as the heyday of toll collection in medieval England. Tolls certainly existed well before the expansion of the twelfth century and they continued to play a significant role in urban budgets for many centuries after 1350. Indeed, the system of local tolls fixed in place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persisted, with occasional additions of new trade commodities, into the nineteenth century.20 But their internal development and their impact on trade were especially pronounced in the two centuries before the Black Death, and consequently their development in this period deserves particularly close scrutiny.

Rates and Annual Revenues Both local tolls and public works tolls were capable of generating significant revenues. Already at the time of Domesday Book there are indications that tolls were well worth collecting: the tolls of Dover were said to be worth 22 in 1086, and even the small market town of Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire accounted for market tolls of 7, although it is possible in the latter case that the entire revenue of the market was included.21 Most of the Domesday entries referring to the value of markets and tolls, however, deal with relatively small amounts of money.22 Markets in the small boroughs of Taunton and Frome in Somerset were valued at less than 3, and the borough markets of Okehampton (Devon) and Tewkesbury (Gloucestershire) were valued at less than 1. Even the port of Pevensey, Sussex, which appears to have been thriving in 1086, accounted for toll revenues of only 4. The dearth of information in Domesday Book about market and toll revenues in larger towns makes generalization difficult, but it seems likely that most towns would have envied Dovers toll receipts in 1086. By the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, when we next have a substantial body of quantitative evidence, many towns
Great Britain House of Commons, First Report of the Royal Commission on Market Rights and Tolls. Parliamentary Papers 1888, vol. 53. Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others, vol. 30 (London: s.n., 1889). 21 Darby, Domesday England, 300, 369. 22 Darby, Domesday England, 369-70; Carl Stephenson, Borough and Town, A Study of Urban Origins (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1933), 109.
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were enjoying remarkably healthy incomes from their tolls. Even some relatively modest towns brought in more than 20 per annum from their local tolls. Accounts for Oswestry, Shropshire, for example, record incomes from tolls and market fees of 20 in 1271 and more than 27 in 1276.23 In an inquisition post mortem in 1307 for the town of Chepstow, Monmouthshire, a jury stated that the tolls of the market and fair were worth 20.24 An account of the town of Scarborough in 1316-1317 records toll receipts of 28.25 An account for Grantham, Lincolnshire in 1324-1325 states that the tolls and tronage of the market were farmed for 25, with the tolls and other perquisites of the fair bringing in roughly the same amount.26 Even higher revenues accrued to larger towns. Colchester, for example, leased its tolls for 35 per annum in 1310.27 When asked to report on the revenue that could be raised by leasing the towns tolls, a jury in Berwick in 1303 responded that they could be let at farm for 40 per annum.28 Still higher amounts are recorded in several bailiffs accounts of the late thirteenth century: Northamptons bailiffs accounted for about 44 in one year, while Gloucesters bailiffs reported more than 50 and Lincolns more than 75 in single years.29 Ipswich generated more than 69 by leasing out the revenues from its markets in 1287-1288, a figure that helps to explain why the local Domesday Book, written a few years later, gives such a lavish description of how the town collected its tolls.30 Municipal officials enjoyed similarly high revenues when they collected public works tolls. An investigation into the conduct of toll collectors in Bristol in 1340 found that 516 had been collected in the preceding twenty years, yielding an average yearly intake of
G. C. Baugh, ed., A History of Shropshire, vol. 4: Victoria History of the Counties of England (Oxford: Constable, 1989), 68. 24 M. W. Beresford, New Towns of the Middle Ages (New York: Praeger, 1967), 66. 25 London, The National Archives, E101/506/22. 26 London, The National Archives, SC6/913/23. 27 Court Rolls of the Borough of Colchester, trans. Isaac Herbert Jeayes, 4 vols. (Colchester: [s.n.], 1921), 1: 3. 28 Gras, Early English Customs System, 165. 29 London, The National Archives, SC6/1248/8; London, The National Archives, E101/505/24; Historical Manuscripts Commission Twelfth Report, part 10 (London: s.n., 1891), 420. 30 Nathaniel Bacon, The Annalls of Ipswich, ed. William H. Richardson (Ipswich: S.H. Cowell, 1884), 68.
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approximately 26.31 Shrewsbury collected nearly 30 in murage in the politically troubled year of 1264-1265.32 In Great Yarmouth, murage collectors brought in more than 66 in 1342-1343.33 London decided to lease its murage tolls in the early 1330s and earned 109, 126, and 113 from three annual leases.34 Somewhat surprisingly, Newcastle was able to generate revenues comparable to those in London, raising 120 from its murage grant in 1280.35 Walls and bridges were voracious consumers of capital and Hilary Turner has argued that the sums collected from tolls were often insufficient to fund the projects for which they were earmarked.36 While Turners argument certainly has merit, the sums collected are nonetheless impressive when viewed in their own right. It is worth remembering, for example, that an annual income of 20 was held to be the threshold for knightly status in the period, and that relatively few lords enjoyed annual incomes greater than 100.37 It is also worth remembering that revenues like those itemized above could account for a significant portion of a towns annual farm to the king. Ipswich, with an annual farm set at 40, actually took in more from leasing its market revenues in 1287-1288 than it paid to the king for its privileges.38 Gloucester, too, nearly managed to pay its entire farm from its toll receipts.39 Other towns were not quite as fortunate but could still expect to requite between a third and a half of their annual farm from the sums collected in toll. The very fact that kings and local officials viewed tolls as the best way

Henry Bush, Bristol Town Duties (Bristol: J.M. Gouch, 1828), 90-3. Shrewsbury, Shropshire Record Office, 3365/310. 33 J. C. Tingey, The Grants of Murage to Norwich, Yarmouth, and Lynn, Original Papers Published Under the Direction of the Committee of the Norfolk and Norwich Archaeological Society, 18, part 2 (Norwich: s.n., 1913), 136. 34 R. R. Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved Among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London, 1275-1498, 11 vols. (London: J. E. Francis, 1899-1912), Letter Book E: 273-4. 35 Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1272-1307 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1911), 132. 36 Turner, Town Defences, 48. 37 Christopher Dyer, Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 27-48. 38 Henry L. Cannon, ed., The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Twenty-Sixth Year of the Reign of King Henry the Third (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1918), 191. 39 Cannon, ed., The Great Roll, 252. Gloucesters farm was 60 per annum.
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to pay for essential public facilities is a testament to their ability to generate revenue. The best perspective on the sums generated by toll collection is, however, gained by comparing annual receipts with the rates paid for specific commodities. Most surviving toll lists can facilitate analysis along these lines, since, in addition to enumerating the commodities on which toll was collected, they also stipulate the precise payment that was due for a specific quantity of each good. The lists ordinarily do not record the price of the enumerated goods, but we have sufficient price data from other contemporary sources to establish a relationship between the actual value of the listed goods and the amount of toll each incurred. Using this method, it is possible to calculate the percentage of the likely sales price that was owed as toll, or, in other words, to establish the proportional rate of taxation on trade. Before offering such calculations, though, it is necessary to describe more carefully the nature of the source material. Carefully itemized individual statements of goods and rates characterize lists derived from both major types of tolls and the range of commodities and the units of measurement show considerable overlap. But there are a number of differences between the lists that are worth noting. Local tolls tend to place greater emphasis on the modes of carriage used to transport particular commodities: grain, for example, is often taxed by the cartload or packhorse load in local toll schedules, whereas in public works tolls it is ordinarily taxed by the quarter. In this respect local lists probably reflect more accurately the real circumstances of trade in the period. Similarly, local tolls are more likely to include entries dealing with small quantities of goods; rates applied to goods carried on a mans back are common in lists of local tolls but rare in lists of public works tolls. In this same vein, local toll lists, at least the longer and more detailed lists, are wont to give occasional incidental details about where and how tolls were exacted, whereas lists of public works tolls convey little information beyond the commodities and rates. Overall, lists of public works tolls give a more standardized and formulaic representation of English trade, while local toll lists tend to be more idiosyncratic and reflective of unique or unusual local circumstances. In the case of public works tolls, the printed form of many of the lists gives a misleading impression about their level of specificity. The editors of the Patent Rolls, on which the grants were recorded,

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included in their standard calendars virtually the entire text of the grants made between 1220 and 1232, but then opted to save space in later calendars by omitting the lists of commodities and rates appended to grants made after 1232.40 Antiquarians and local record societies have published some of the later lists but the vast majority is accessible only by consulting the original manuscript sources. This situation is unfortunate, because the earlier lists are much shorter than later lists and often much less precise. The lists of the early thirteenth century often provide statements of rates based on cartloads or boatloads of goods rather than precise quantities; those of the later thirteenth and fourteenth century are much more carefully itemized, typically listing more than 100 separate goods, each with a separate toll rate based on a standard unit of trade, and occasionally with two or more standard units of trade. General rates for a cartload or a boatload of goods still occur sometimes, but they were hemmed in by the extensive lists of specific commodities, and also by the inclusion of specific ad valorem rates assessed on the value of merchandise that was not specifically mentioned in the list. For the purposes of the current analysis, the later lists are obviously better suited for calculating the relationship between commodity prices and toll rates. A summary of the basic information that can be extracted from extant toll lists is provided in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 gives an overview of the rates on common trade goods documented in a selection of local toll lists, while Table 2 furnishes information about rates occurring in lists of public works tolls. The first column of each table records the type of good and the standard unit of measurement with which it appears in the lists. Subsequent columns record the toll demanded for the given standard unit of the good in a number of towns. The towns in the tables were selected partly because they have relatively extensive lists of rates and partly because

40 They did, however, continue to include entries denoting the recipients and general terms of these later grants. Their decision to omit the lists of commodities appears to have been based partly on their sheer volume. Including all of them would have significantly lengthened the published form of the calendars. It may also have been based on the knowledge that the lists often repeated information provided in earlier lists. On the issue of repetition in the lists, see Fraser, Pattern of Trade in the North-East, and Tingey, Grants of murage. This is a subject that would repay more careful investigation.

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they reflect a variety of urban types and chronological periods. The goods in the tables were selected to represent different levels of commercial activity and also to reflect some of the more prominent commodities in circulation in the period. On these grounds, grain should also have been included, but grain tolls often appear in the lists in units of measurement that are not easily comparable, making direct comparison difficult and potentially misleading. In both tables, goods that do not occur in a particular towns list are indicated by the notation n.d. meaning that there is no data for that good. Goods that occur in a list but with an unusual unit of measurement are denoted by the abbreviation n.s. (for non-standard). Several features of the tables call for comment. First of all, it is important to note that the units of measurement in Table 1 do not always correspond with the units in Table 2: herring is usually taxed by the last of 12,000 in local lists but by the thousand in public works lists; hides are typically listed by the dicker of ten in local lists but by the single hide in public works lists; and woad is most often taxed by the ton in local lists but by the quarter in public works lists. In the case of herring and hides, it is relatively easy to convert the rates from one unit of measurement to the other, but the relationship between a ton and a quarter of woad is uncertain. Second, the rates specified in local tolls lists tend to be somewhat higher than the rates in public works lists, a feature that is particularly pronounced in the rates applied to wool and wine. This may well have been an intentional policy on the part of royal administration to make the public works tolls more palatable to the people who had to pay them. Third, the lists show a surprising degree of uniformity in the assessment of rates: a common rate for wool, for example, was 4d. per sack; a common rate for the sale of a horse was 1d.; and a common rate for a ton of wine was 4d. Even when different rates were charged they often bear a simple arithmetical relationship to the standard rate (typically half as much or twice as much as the standard rate). Such uniformity might be expected in the case of the public works tolls, which were centrally defined and organized, but it is more difficult to explain in the case of local tolls. It seems possible that local rates might have been based on some earlier commonality, perhaps a common rate associated with dues paid to the king in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. While there is much to learn by comparing the lists with each other, the primary purpose of assembling the data in Tables 1 and

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2 is to facilitate a comparison between toll rates and the actual value of the goods. This can best be done using the price data assembled by David Farmer and James Thorold Rogers.41 There are, of course, many caveats that need to be offered when making calculations of this nature. Prices tended to rise over the period as a whole, meaning that a standard, consistent toll rate constituted a higher proportion of the average sales price of a given commodity in the early thirteenth century than in the early fourteenth century. Prices of goods also fluctuated significantly from one year to the next depending on weather conditions and the presence or absence of impediments to trade such as war. Finally, the geography of production and trade could also exert an influence on the price structure, in ways that cannot be accounted for with surviving data. Comparing toll rates with average prices is indeed a useful way to assess the influence tolls might have had on trade, but surviving data would have to be far more extensive to allow for exact calculations to be made. But a general sense of the parameters within which tolls were collected is well worth having and can be calculated with some degree of confidence. The primary conclusion yielded by such an exercise is that toll rates were exceptionally low, ordinarily constituting less than one per cent of the average price of a commodity, sometimes much less.42 The average price of wool in Farmers index period of 1330-1347, for example, was 4 12s. 7d. per sack. According to Tables 1 and 2, a common rate for the toll on a sack of wool was 4d. Thus, the toll represents less than four-tenths of one per cent (0.36 per cent) of the average price of wool in the 1330s and 1340s. The 1330s and 1340s constituted a period of unusually low wool prices, and Farmers data shows that for much of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries a toll of 4d. would have comprised well below three-tenths of one per cent of the value of the wool.

David Farmer, Prices and Wages, in H. H. Hallam, ed., The Agrarian History of England and Wales (Cambridge: Clarendon Press, 1988), 2 (1042-1350), 779-817; James Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, 7 vols. in 8 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1866-1902). 42 Similar conclusions are presented in Hubert Hall, A History of the CustomsRevenue in England, 2 vols. (London: Stock, 1885), 1: 73, and Henry Cobb, ed., The Local Port Book of Southampton for 1439-40 (Southampton: The University, 1961), lxv.

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Wool appears to have been treated relatively favorably by toll collectors, but low figures can also be calculated for some of the other goods found in Tables 1 and 2: the common toll of 4d. per ton of wine represented less than four-tenths of one per cent of the average selling price in the period; the toll of one farthing on 1,000 herrings amounted to less than three-tenths of one per cent of the average price of herrings.43 The toll on horses was one of the more onerous dues among the ones summarized in Tables 1 and 2. According to Farmers data, a toll of 1d. constituted just over eighttenths of one per cent of the average price of a general farm horse (an affer) in the 1330s and 1340s and exactly one-half of one per cent of the average price of a carthorse in the same period. Confidence in these calculations can be increased by comparing them with occasional entries in the lists that provide ad valorem rates or other information about the values of commodities occurring in the lists.44 The London murage grant of 1315, for example, stipulates a special toll of 1d. on horses worth 40s. or more, whereas the standard toll on horses in the list is one half-penny. It also stipulates that a toll of 1d. could be charged on all merchandise worth 1 or more not specifically mentioned in the list. Norwichs murage grant similarly mentions special tolls on a few goods with stated values: a whole cloth worth 2 or more owed 1d.; a boat carrying ale, firewood, or turves worth 1 or more owed 1d.; anyone with a trussel of merchandise worth more than 10s. owed one half-penny. The Norwich list also notes that any merchandise worth 5s. or more and not named elsewhere in the list owed a farthing. Other lists suggest that an ad valorem rate of a farthing for every 5s. worth of goods was common; the attraction of using a rate based on the principle of a penny per pound of merchandise is obvious.45 Tolls set according to this rate amount to four-tenths of one per cent of the value of the goods, a figure that is strikingly similar to the ones that can

The decennial average for wine in the 1330s calculated by Rogers (Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices, 1: 641) was 4 12s. 9d.; the decennial average for 1,000 herrings in the same period was 9s. 3d. Rogers calculated wine prices per dozen gallons. I converted his price into a price per tun of 252 gallons. Wholesale prices per tun would, of course, have been lower, meaning that the proportion represented by toll would have been higher. 44 See the Appendix for the sources on which this paragraph is based. 45 E.g. Dublin murage tolls in 1308; Gloucester pavage tolls in 1332; Southampton local tolls in 1329.

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be calculated by comparing standard toll rates with prevailing commodity prices. An important exception to the general rule of low toll rates applied to traders who operated on a small scale. Part of the reason toll rates are so low in surviving lists is that the units of measurement were ordinarily quite large, meaning that the value of the goods on which toll was levied was correspondingly high. A sack of wool, for example, represented the clip of about 260 sheep. It was the common unit used in international trade conducted by wealthy merchants and is the most common unit to appear in surviving toll lists. But for the millions of peasant producers responsible for the bulk of Englands wool production, it represented commercial activity on a scale beyond their normal experience. At the local level, wool was typically traded in units of pounds and stones, and toll represented a higher share of the value of sales transactions. Extant toll lists have less information about the tolls imposed on this level of trade than on the trade conducted by wealthier merchants. Typically, they specify rates for the more humble branches of trade based on how goods were carried into the market rather than on precise units of measurement. But they do occasionally furnish more precise details about the treatment of local trade, enough to signal the likelihood that peasants and small scale traders had to pay higher proportional rates than did the merchants engaged in longerdistance trade. The extensive list in the Ipswich Domesday Book provides particularly good evidence for differential toll rates applied to smaller scale trade. Merchants who shipped a sack of wool from the quay could expect to pay 4d., but if they shipped a last of wool (equal to 12 sacks) they had to pay only 8d. In other words, they could ship twelve times the amount of wool and pay only twice the amount of toll. Those who sold wool in the wool market confronted a sliding scale depending on the mode of transport used: a cartload paid 2d.; a packhorse paid one half-penny and a person carrying a backpack of wool paid one farthing. These rates seem to be on a par with the rate charged per sack, if one accepts that a human was capable of carrying at least 23 pounds in a pack, or that a horse could be saddled with twice that amount. But a fourth rate also applied in the wool market: a farthing would be collected from anyone who sold wool worth 2.5d. This unusually precise rate probably represented the value of a single fleece of low to middling quality, the

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kind of good that a peasant with a cottage and a few acres of land might occasionally bring for sale.46 As a simple ad valorem rate the toll amounts to ten per cent of the value of the wool. But it seems unlikely that many people would have been forced to pay such a steep rate. Since the farthing payment was the same for a single fleece as for an entire backpack, the rate dropped precipitously with each additional fleece sold. Thus, someone selling two fleeces would have paid approximately five per cent of the value of the wool in toll and someone with five fleeces would have paid less than two per cent. To reach the level at which the rate would have approximated that paid by merchants, an individual would have had to be able to sell the wool from a flock of about 15 sheep. Many peasants had flocks of this size and larger, but such peasants were generally among the better off members of a village.47 Regressive rates can also be found in the Ipswich tolls imposed on hides. The standard rate in Ipswich was 4d. for a dicker of ten hides, an unusually high rate by the standards of other towns. But the high rate per dicker melted away with increased volume, so that a merchant who shipped as many as 100 hides (a half-last) paid the same amount as someone who dealt in a single dicker. Conversely, the rate per unit was much higher on small transactions: an individual who sold a single hide had to pay one half-penny. Thus, someone who sold eight hides had to pay as much in toll as someone who carried 100 hides into the town. According to the data collected by Thorold Rogers for the early fourteenth century, a single unprocessed ox hide typically fetched a price of approximately 2s., while raw horse hides were worth about half as much.48 Prices varied significantly from one year to another and even between different sets of accounts in the same year, but the decennial averages calculated by Rogers suggest that a half-penny toll would have amounted to a bit more than two per cent of the value of a single oxhide and a bit more than four per cent of the value of a single horsehide.

46 A single fleece probably weighed a bit less than 1.5 lbs., and according to David Farmers data, would have sold for about 4d. in the 1330s and 1340s. On fleece weights see E. M. Carus-Wilson and O. Coleman, Englands Export Trade 1275-1547 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 13. 47 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 42-54. 48 Rogers, History of Agriculture and Prices, 2: 451.

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The Payers of Toll Comparison between toll rates and commodity values reveals that the rates were extraordinarily low but also suggests that tolls may have affected different social groups in different ways. Any attempt to assess the relationship between tolls and trade clearly needs to take this social variability into account, and the best way to do so is to look at the practices of toll collection. Of particular importance is the issue of who actually paid the rates specified in the lists. Were the principal payers the wealthy merchants who traded goods such as cloth and wine in wholesale quantities over long distances, or were they mainly the humble peasants of a towns rural hinterland who needed to sell a few pounds of wool in order to pay their rent? It has often been suggested that peasants inhabiting the hinterland of towns and prominent rural markets and other smaller scale traders inhabiting the market site were particularly prone to paying tolls, and that their payments accounted for the lions share of the income raised by toll collectors.49 This view is based mainly on indirect evidence derived from sources dealing with exemptions from toll, exemptions that were widespread in the period. Local merchants who were freemen of a town or members of the towns merchant gild, for example, ordinarily traded without tolls in their own town. Merchants from other towns were also sometimes exempted from tolls, if their own town had a royal charter granting exemption. Larger monasteries were also common recipients of royal grants of exemption. Peasants and other petty traders in the town were, on the other hand, seldom endowed with such privileges. A few select groups of peasants were able to establish and enforce toll exemptionsprincipally tenants of royal demesne and, occasionally, the tenants of some ecclesiastical estatesbut the vast majority of peasants and artisans had little choice but to pay the farthings and half-pennies demanded at the gates and in the marketplaces where they conducted their business. While there is little doubt that peasants and artisans were major contributors of tolls, their role as toll payers needs a great deal of
49 Gras, Early English Customs System, 26; K. M. E. Murray, ed., Register of Daniel Rough, Common Clerk of Romney 1353-1380, Kent Records 16 (Ashford: Records Branch [of the Kent Archaeological Society], 1945), xix; Maryanne Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 200-1.

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qualification. For one thing, it is important to keep in mind that the term peasant is extraordinarily broad, ranging from small cottagers who might have only a single fleece to sell in any given year to wealthy virgate-holding tenants who were likely to have dozens of fleeces to sell at one time. For wealthier peasantsthe ones most likely to be implicated in the commercial economythe regressive scale found in some of the toll lists may not have caused much concern, certainly not as much as it would have for poorer peasants and artisans. Anyone in a position to take a full cartload of grain to market or to sell wool in units of stones rather than pounds would have enjoyed a toll rate closer to the one enjoyed by merchants than the one enjoyed by smallholders and artisans. The extent to which merchants managed to escape tolls because of their chartered exemptions also needs careful scrutiny. There is certainly a good deal of evidence to suggest that merchants were adamant about asserting their right to exemption and vigilant about protecting it, but there were limits to the exemptions. Indeed, anyone who reads the individual entries of a surviving toll list would be hard pressed to form the impression that the trade of merchants was not a major concern of the framers of such lists. Many goods occurring in the lists were clearly the commercial preserve of merchants rather than of peasants or artisans: dyestuffs, for example, or metals, or other imported goods. Equally revealing is the presence of so many entries dealing with wholesale quantities of goods: herring assessed by the thousand and almost as commonly by the last of 12,000; hides assessed by the dicker of ten and often by the last of 200; wooden boards (frequently imported from Ireland or the Baltic) assessed in units of 100 and only rarely in smaller amounts. Even farm commodities routinely occur in relatively large units. Rates for ten sheep, for example, are more common than rates for single sheep, and other common units of measurement in the lists include five flitches of pork, 2,000 onions, 100 rabbit skins, and a wey of cheese (336 lbs.). Such large units are particularly characteristic of lists of public works tolls, but local lists also devote a surprising amount of space to quantities that are clearly implicated in trade at a wholesale level. A desire to target foreign merchants explains at least some of this emphasis on imported goods and wholesale quantities. Foreigners accounted for a significant share of English trade throughout the Middle Ages and were particularly prominent in the thirteenth and

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early fourteenth centuries when most of the surviving toll lists were written.50 From the perspective of an English toll collector, they were also ideally suited to pay toll: their status as toll payers was simple and straightforward, they were less likely to have corporate support to fend off demands for toll, and they had the ability to pay. It was not in anyones interest to abuse foreign traders by demanding excessive payments for the right to trade, but vigorous enforcement of dues that were either customary or sanctioned by the king was certainly well worth the effort, and probably accounts for a significant share of the figures for toll income given above. In 1303, however, the toll paying status of foreign merchants underwent drastic revision with the issue of the Carta Mercatoria, an edict designed to protect the interests of foreign merchants in return for their agreement to contribute to a new national customs duty.51 One of the key provisions of the document stipulated that foreigners were henceforth to be exempt from all levies of murage, pontage, and pavage throughout England. Exemption from the payment of local tolls was not included in the grant and appears not to have been claimed subsequently. This abrupt change in status with respect to public works tolls raises a perplexing problem, though. If foreign merchants were the only significant merchant group paying these tolls, one would expect to find a significant change in the nature of the toll lists drawn up after 1303, as well as a precipitous decline in the revenues yielded by public works tolls. Neither of these propositions finds much support in surviving documentation: the emphasis on mercantile exchange is every bit as prominent in later lists as in the earlier ones, and murage receipts remained healthy in the early fourteenth century, although the number of surviving accounts is too small to allow a categorical conclusion on this point. Another possibility worth considering is that English merchants were not quite as successful at evading tolls as the evidence regarding the enforcement of their privileges might suggest. Native merchants could be forced to pay toll in several different ways. First of
50 M. Prestwich, Italian Merchants in Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth-Century England, in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979); T. H. Lloyd, Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages (New York: St. Martins Press, 1982); Joseph P. Huffman, Family, Commerce, and Religion in London and Cologne: Anglo-German Emigrants, c. 1000-c. 1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). 51 Gras, Early English Customs System, 257-64.

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all, royal exemptions were conditional rather than universal and toll collectors were able to ignore the exemption privileges of many of the merchants who passed through their town gates. They were entitled to do so because of a legal doctrine that placed great weight on the date on which an exemption was first granted, a doctrine that is sometimes referred to as priority of seisin or priority of charter.52 Grants of toll exempt status could not be applied retroactively, meaning that they were not valid in towns or markets that had a preexisting right to collect tolls. Thus, the merchants of Ipswich, who acquired their exemption in 1200, could expect to trade free of toll in Kings Lynn, which acquired its formal right to collect tolls when it became a borough in 1204, but not in Norwich, which could trace its collection rights back to its acquisition of its borough farm in 1194.53 According to the data assembled by Adolphus Ballard, dozens of towns acquired toll exemptions so late that their privileges would have been viable in very few of the major towns and rural markets of the kingdom. By the end of King Johns reign in 1216, for example, virtually all of the major towns in the kingdom and several hundred rural markets had established their right to collect toll, but the list of towns that lacked formal exemption privileges at that time includes such places as Coventry, Huntingdon, Leicester, and Worcester, along with many other smaller towns.54 Priority of seisin was, in fact, less straightforward than legal theory might suggest. First of all, rights and privileges could lapse through lack of use. If the first merchants to trade in a particular town did not insist on their rights, then other merchants from that town could not do so, even if their exemption charter predated the other towns right to collect.55 Second, exemptions from toll were almost always conveyed by specific words in a formal charter, but the right to collect tolls was not always specifically mentioned in a royal act. Many of the older and larger towns in the kingdom had prescriptive
Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 111-16. Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxli, cxliii. 54 Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxxxviii-cxlvii; 2: xc-cii. On the degree of commercial development before 1216 see Langdon and Masschaele, Commercial Activity and Population Growth, 42-54. 55 George Woodbine, ed., Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, trans. Samuel Thorne (Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 2: 166-73.
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rights to collect tolls based on usage that went back to the AngloSaxon period. Some, but not all of these towns, also acquired the farm of their boroughs in specific royal acts, and the date on which they acquired the farm typically became the date used to determine priority of seisin vis--vis other towns who enjoyed chartered exemption rights. How priority of seisin would have been determined in places that never acquired a formal charter granting the farm of their boroughincluding some major commercial centers such as Bristolis an open question. Ambiguities in the possession of collection rights might also explain cases in which towns agreed to compromise in toll disputes in which the issue of priority of seisin appears to have been clear-cut. In 1239, for example, the town of Southampton agreed to stop collecting tolls from the merchants of Marlborough, notwithstanding that the charter of our [i.e. the kings] men of Southampton is prior to that of our men of Marlborough.56 The relevant charters for both towns are still extant, and they show that Southampton did indeed have the legal right to demand toll, since it acquired the farm of its borough in 1199 and Marlborough acquired its right of exemption in 1205.57 A second important limitation on the universality of exemption privileges applied in the case of public works tolls. In theory, the principle of priority of seisin should have meant that relatively few English merchants contributed to public works tolls, since the grants of such tolls typically postdated the acquisition of chartered exemptions: the vast majority of English towns had already secured exemption rights by the time kings began to make murage grants. But exemptions that originated as a means to deal with local tolls did not necessarily extend to public works tolls. The limited character of toll exemptions is well illustrated by King Henry IIIs grant of exemption from murage to the inhabitants of Shrewsbury and Kings Lynn in the 1260s as a reward for their support during the Barons

Ballard and Tait, eds., British Borough Charters, 2: 257-8. Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: cxliii, cxliv. In the fourteenth century, Southampton made a similar compromise with the merchants of Salisbury, agreeing to forego its priority of seisin in order to reach agreement about how the two towns would collect toll from each others merchants. P. Studer, ed., The Oak Book of Southampton, 2 vols., Publications of the Southampton Record Society, nos. 10 and 11 (Southampton: Southampton Record Society, 1910-11), 2: 1-17.
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Revolt.58 Both towns had acquired general toll exemptions much earlier, Lynn in 1204 and Shrewsbury in 1227, but it is clear that the general exemptions had not extended to the most common form of public work toll.59 In the case of Kings Lynn, the newly acquired exemption from murage was valid only for five years; even the expansion of toll privileges was kept within strict limits. A similar process of enhancing and extending exemption privileges probably also helps to explain the subtle changes in language one commonly finds in royal confirmations of previously granted borough charters.60 Early urban charters usually specify that the towns privileged members were henceforth to be free from teloneum, the generic Latin word for toll; later confirmations usually stipulate that the exemption covers murage, pavage, pontage (and sometimes other dues like stallage) as well as teloneum. A confirmation in 1348 of a charter originally granted to the town of Huntingdon in 1205, for example, states in the preamble that the burgesses fear that they may be in future impeached touching liberties and customs which they have hitherto used under ... general words and then goes on to enumerate various tolls and dues which were not specifically included in the 1205 charter.61 Uncertainty about the extent of exemption privileges conveyed in general grants is also manifest in an inquest into murage collection in Newcastle in 1281. In the course of the inquest, a jury noted that local merchants, who should have paid murage on their merchandise ... in the same way as foreigners, stopped doing so six months after collection had begun in the town.62 The Newcastle inquest is particularly interesting, because the jurors mentioned in

Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, AD 1258-1266 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1910), 455-6; Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, AD 1266-1272 (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1913), 214. 59 Ballard, ed., British Borough Charters, 1: 188; 2: 255. 60 Calendar of Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1908), 3 (1300-1326), 9, 100, 217. Many more examples could be offered. 61 Calendar of the Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office(London: H.M. Stationery Office 1916), 5 (1341-1417), 94-5. A similarly explicit confirmation was made in the same year for the town of Hedon (Calendar of the Charter Rolls, 5 (1341-1417), 88). 62 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1916), 1: 366.

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passing that local merchants stopped contributing when they learned that merchants in Lincoln and York did not pay murage in their home towns.63 The Newcastle verdict suggests that the issue was still up in the air in the 1280s, long after the inauguration of public works tolls. It also implies that even on a merchants home turf, where privileges were most securely held, exemptions from toll were not necessarily ironclad. The third and final limit to the exemption rights of English merchants worth considering is simply that merchants did not always insist on the letter of the law.64 Fighting for recognition of privileges was usually an arduous affair that risked reprisals and protracted court battles. Towns frequently undertook the task of litigating on behalf of an individual who had been forced to pay toll in contravention of the towns charter, and there is certainly no shortage of examples documenting their commitment to defending their chartered rights. But these manifestations of corporate vigilance and assertiveness in defense of toll exemptions have some curious features. Litigation sometimes recurs between two towns even after a royal court has issued a definitive ruling on their respective toll rights. Litigation also sometimes occurs long after commercial relationships had begun; in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries towns were still engaging in disputes related to priority of seisin and still invoking late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century charters when doing so. One can legitimately wonder if the lingering lack of certainty manifested in these types of litigation might have been caused by the willingness of individual merchants to pay a few pennies for the right to trade rather than to enter into a lengthy dispute by insisting on their formal privileges. A merchant of Norwich made just such a decision in 1286 and was fined for his behavior in his local court. The court entry notes that he paid toll in markets and fairs of his own accord and thus damaged the towns liberties.65 The temptation simply to get on with ones affairs must
63 It is interesting to note that both Lincoln and York were particularly turbulent in the 1280s and 1290s and that much of the turbulence had to do with what the king and the less privileged members of the town were wont to describe as oppressive abuses of their privileged status within their respective towns. 64 E. Lipson, The Economic History of England, 5th ed. (London: Black, 1929), 1: 257. 65 William Hudson, ed., Leet Jurisdiction in the City of Norwich during the

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have been considerable, and giving in to the temptation must likewise have been common enough to obscure what in theory should have been clear and unassailable commercial privileges. Thus, while peasants in hinterland villages and petty urban traders who were neither full citizens nor gild members undoubtedly featured prominently among the payers of toll, they were by no means the only groups affected by the taxation of trade. The only statement that can be made with complete confidence on the matter is that the merchants who dominated gilds and town governments of the period ordinarily did not pay local tolls in their own town. (Had they not been exempt, the revenues cited above would have been significantly higher than they actually were, since local merchants were the most active commercial presence in every towns market.) But when they traded in another town, or even when they traded in their own town while public works tolls were being collected, the situation became murkier. In these situations exemptions were often claimed and often even allowed; they were, however, neither universal nor infallible. Exemptions were an important element of the periods commercial mix, but they were sufficiently circumscribed that merchants, even English merchants, frequently contended with demands for toll payments in the conduct of their business. The payment of toll was, in short, an issue that touched a relatively broad constituency.

The Impact of Tolls on Trade The breadth of this constituency probably goes a good way toward explaining the sensitivity to tolls that can be found in the period. Medieval people were well aware that the level of toll rates could affect trade volumes and general prosperity. The founders of new markets, for example, sometimes encouraged traders to use their facilities by lowering or eliminating the tolls they were entitled to collect, applying an economic rationale that is strikingly similar to the reduced sales taxes offered in urban enterprise zones in many American cities today.66 The effectiveness of such a strategy can be

XIIIth and XIVth Centuries, Selden Society, vol. 5 (London: B. Quaritch, 1892), 29-30. 66 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 68-9.

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seen in a dispute over market rights in Lancashire: the abbot of Furness maintained that his market in Dalton was losing much of its trade because the holder of the market in Ulverston did not require traders to pay toll there, and the court accepted his argument and quashed the upstart market.67 In a similar vein, the towns of Cockermouth and Grimsby presented formal parliamentary petitions pleading for the king to shut down nearby commercial sites where trading occurred without the payment of toll, claiming that their towns were greatly impoverished by the loss of revenue.68 One has to allow for some hyperbole in these petitions, but the behavior they describe and the measures they take to deal with the problem suggest great sensitivity to the practices of toll collection. This sensitivity is harder to account for than might appear at first glance. Indeed, it is somewhat puzzling to contemplate the frequency of surviving toll disputes in light of the fact that toll rates were so low. Nobody likes to pay taxes and perhaps one need go no further than a general anti-tax sentiment to explain the sensitivity to tolls encountered in the period. But the vehemence and perseverance with which toll rights were contested suggests that something more than bellyaching about taxes was going on. The exaction of tolls even tolls set at very low rateswas a serious matter, one that raised important economic issues for the parties involved. The import of these issues can best be studied by disentangling the different interests of collectors and payers. The economic interests of the collectors of tolls are probably the easiest to diagnose. They had a natural desire to maximize their income. This can be viewed as a byproduct of simple greed, although the wealthy merchants who controlled town governments also claimed to be acting in the interests of the community, since the proceeds from tolls were used to underwrite their towns annual farm and to finance the building and repair of its walls, streets and bridges. Whatever the motivation, achieving maximum income from tolls required careful policy decisions. Raising rates was seldom an option because of the general unwillingness to accept modifications to custom, meaning that the central policy decisions revolved around

67 William Farrer and J. Brownbill, eds., The Victoria History of the County of Lancaster, 8 vols. (London: Constable, 1906-1914), 8: 350. 68 John Strachey et al., ed., Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento, Record Commission, 6 vols. (London: s.n., 1783), 1: 197, 412.

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questions of who should be made to pay the customary rates and what sorts of transactions could be treated as subject to payments of toll. Even in these areas, though, toll collectors had to limit the scope of their ambitions. By the middle of the thirteenth century at the latest, commercial venues were so numerous that buyers and sellers were often able to choose where to conduct their business. If traders deemed a towns toll collectors too aggressive or too arbitrary, they would vote with their feet and revenues would suffer as a result: medieval commerce was remarkably adept at relocating in response to relatively small marginal incentives. A loss of trade meant more than a loss of toll income; it could also mean a loss of rental income, a loss of spin-off business, and a dearth of provisions for the inhabitants of the town. Thus while maximizing current revenues was certainly a high priority, those vested with authority over tolls also paid heed to broader concerns about the economic health of their town. In these circumstances, the best toll policy was one that was vigorous but not overly zealous. Finding the right balance could not have been an easy thing to do. For local traders active in retail and small-scale trade, even relatively low rates of toll could have a significant impact on household income. The regressive rates found in many toll schedules suggest that the toll payments of smaller traders constituted a higher proportion of their market income than was true of wealthier merchants. But the real issue for people who sold goods in small amounts was probably the frequency with which they had to pay toll rather than the regressive character of the rate schedule. Those who purchased foodstuffs and other basic necessities were ordinarily exempt, but those who sold simple commodities often had to comply with demands for toll, depending on the item and the scale of the transaction. Many towns sold licenses to butchers, bakers, and other artisans in lieu of collecting tolls on every transactiona policy most familiar from the routine fining of brewers and tapstersbut such licenses were seldom available outside the food trades. Nor were they ordinarily available to the peasants, victualers and petty traders who resided in the towns hinterland. These extramural traders were, however, less dependent on a single market than were the artisans and retailers living inside the walls, and they may have seen their greater choice in marketing venue as preferable to the payment of a standard licensing fee. Wholesale merchants had the luxury of viewing tolls from the perspective of the profitability of their trading ventures rather than

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their immediate effect on household income, but like smaller-scale local traders their primary concern was more the frequency with which tolls had to be paid than the absolute rate imposed in any single place. One might sympathize, for example, with the plight of a wool merchant, whose best sources of supply were in the west and north of England, but whose primary shipping depots were in the east. When carting his goods across the country, he was likely to pass through one or more towns vested with the right to collect murage or pontage, and several others that might endeavor to impose local tolls on the wool. Further tolls were also likely to be due in the port from which the wool was shipped: Southampton, for example, collected toll on all goods that passed through the town on the way to its port and even collected toll twice if the goods were not only brought into the town but sold there as well.69 Merchants sometimes sought detours around towns as a way of reducing the number of tolls they had to pay, but towns took countermeasures by setting up collecting stations at crossroads situated many miles from the town.70 We do not have itemized business records to establish just how often toll was paid by any particular trader, but it is possible to establish how often a merchant would have encountered demands for toll at any given time. In the year 1300, for example, no fewer than 22 English towns were authorized to collect public works tolls, while hundreds of other towns and rural markets had the right to collect local tolls.71 Merchants with good exemption privileges were probably able to avoid most local tolls, but public works tolls were another matter; they were hard to shirk and sufficiently widespread to make a real difference in a merchants bottom line. The great proliferation of tolls that characterized the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is, consequently, a particularly important issue to address when assessing how tolls affected the overall health of

Cobb, ed., Local Port Book of Southampton, xii. Donald Sutherland, ed., The Eyre of Northamptonshire, 3-4 Edward III, A.D. 1329-30, 2 vols., Selden Society vols. 97, 98 (London: Selden Society, 1981-82), 1: 243-44; Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1916), 1: 315-16. 71 The number of public works tolls in effect in 1300 has been calculated from entries in Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, AD 1292-1301 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1895), passim. Dublin, Drogheda, and Clonmel are not included.
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the commercial economy in the period. Since it was the English crown that introduced and expanded the use of public works tolls, one could reasonably conclude that royal policy posed a considerable threat to the viability of commerce in the period. Indeed, one might even see a continuum in royal interference in trade relations over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, one that began with the introduction of public works tolls in the 1210s, continued through the imposition of a national customs system under Edward I, and ultimately led in the fourteenth century to the system of staple ports and bullionism so well described by John Munro.72 But in the case of tolls, at least, the relationship between royal policy and commercial development is more complex than such a trajectory might suggest. For though the Crown was largely responsible for extending the use of tolls, it was also committed to keeping them within reasonable limits. This commitment can be seen in several ways. Public works tolls were, for example, carefully monitored to make sure that the money they produced actually went to the projects they were intended to fund. The policy of limiting their duration to a specified number of years points in the same direction. It is worth noting in this regard that the terminal dates of surviving murage accounts indicate that towns adhered closely to the terms defined in their grants. Many towns received extensions of their terms, but their request for an extension was often accompanied by a scrutiny of what had been done with the earlier grant and sometimes even an assessment of the condition of the walls or streets earmarked for improvement.73 At times, the crown would even consider how a new set of tolls might affect the general level of tolls in a particular town or area. In 1324, Edward II turned down an entreaty from the burgesses of Scarborough to add murage and pavage dues to those they were already collecting for the repair of the towns quay, noting that it would be too great a burden to people to have murage and pontage in the same place where there is quayage.74
72 John Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold. The Struggle for Bullion in AngloBurgundian Trade 1340-1478 (Brussels and Toronto: ditions de l'Universit de Bruxelles 1972). 73 Royal oversight is particularly well documented in the multiple murage grants obtained by Dublin. J. T. Gilbert, ed., Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland A.D. 1171-1320, Rolls Series 53 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1870). 74 Strachey, Rotuli Parliamentorum, 1: 423.

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In a similar vein, the crown made an effort to ensure that toll rates remained at low levels. This is apparent in the care taken to define rates when making grants of public works tolls and also in the policy of setting those rates below the customary local rates charged in towns and markets. It also found more general expression in a broad supervision of toll collection practices throughout the kingdom as a whole. As early as 1201, a lawsuit was filed in the kings court to challenge what the plaintiffs described as a change in toll rates collected in a local market.75 Similar cases can be found throughout the thirteenth century and were common enough to lead King Edward I to include a clause dealing with toll rates in the First Statute of Westminster of 1275.76 In the statute, the king denounced those who collected outrageous toll, contrary to the common custom of the realm, and threatened to terminate the rights of any market-holder who charged rates that were deemed to be too high. Numerous enquiries related to the statute can be found in the Hundred Rolls of 1274 and the quo warranto pleas of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In 1330, for example, a lengthy quo warranto investigation of commercial practices in Derby established that the town required people residing outside the county to pay rates that were twice as high as those paid by inhabitants of the county.77 The towns privileges were suspended as a result and reinstated only after the payment of a heavy fine and a promise to end the practice of collecting excessive rates. Many similar examples of the crowns willingness to regulate methods of toll collection and to intervene on behalf of those who paid toll could be offered.78 The salient point, however, is not simply that Angevin kings sometimes acted to protect the interests of toll payers; it is rather that their commitment to action fostered an economic environment in which people by and large respected the rules of the game. Toll collectors sometimes acted in ways that were arbitrary and capricious, but on the whole their behavior was based
C. T. Flower, ed., Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Richard I and John (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1922), 1: 449-50. 76 Statutes of the Realm (London: G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1810; reprint London: Dawson of Pall Mall,1963), 1: 34 (Statute of Westminster I, c. 31). 77 W. Illingworth and J. Caley, eds., Placita de Quo Warranto, Record Commission (London: G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1818), 160-61. 78 Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets, 109-20, has many examples but is not exhaustive.
75

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on an ingrained acceptance of custom and routine rather than a willful flouting of rules. Even when disputes arose over aggressive toll collection, they usually involved calculated actions undertaken to stretch rather than break conventional boundaries. In other words, the form of both public prosecution and private litigation suggests that people by and large accepted the existence of norms governing the rates that could be charged and the circumstances under which toll could be demanded. In most economies, the regularity and predictability of the costs born in trade matter at least as much as the absolute level of those costs. In the circumstances of medieval commerce, tolls had the potential to undermine peoples ability to make rational cost calculations in the conduct of trade, since they were so widespread and so important to the bodies that collected them. Ultimately they did not play that role, at least not in England. They were prevented from doing so by an effective assertion of public authority. The crown was not capable of ensuring cost certainty for traders under its jurisdiction, but it did manage to establish relatively narrow limits within which uncertainty fluctuated. And in the circumstances of the time, it must be added, that was no mean feat.

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APPENDIX
A Handlist of Medieval English Toll Lists Prior to AD 1350 in Published Sources

A. Lists of Customary Local Tolls


Lewes, 1086 Domesday-Book, seu Liber Censualis Willelmi Primi Regis Angliae, ed. Abraham Farley, 2 vols. (London: s.n., 1783), 1: 26a. N. S. B. Gras, The Early English Customs System (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1918), 153-5. The Percy Chartulary, ed. M. T. Martin, Surtees Society 117 (Durham: Published for the Society by Andrews and Co., 1911), 333-4. British Borough Charters, 1042-1216, ed. A. Ballard (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1913), 177-78. Curia Regis Rolls of the Reigns of Richard I and John, ed. C. T. Flower, 7 vols. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 19231935), 1: 449-50. Gras, Early English Customs System, 155-8. The Anglo-Norman Customal of Exeter, ed. J. W. Schopp and R. C. Easterling (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925), 24. The list is incomplete. British Borough Charters, ed. Ballard, 178.

London, late eleventh cent. Newcastle, 1100-1135

Cardiff, 1147-1183 Yaxley, 1201

Torksey, 1228 Exeter, c. 1240

Okehampton, 1194-1242 Southwark, 1266

Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) preserved in the Public Record Office, 1226-1377, 3 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1916-1937), 1: 103. Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Albus, Liber Custumarum, et Liber Horn, ed. H. T. Riley, Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. 12, 3 vols. in 4 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1859-62), 1: 229-36.

London, 1266

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Rotuli Hundredorum temporibus Henrici III et Edwardi I in Turri Londinensi et in Curia Receptae Scacarii Westmonasterii Asservati, ed. W. Illingworth and J. Caley, Record Commission, 2 vols. (London, 1812-1818), 1: 90. Rotuli Hundredorum, 1: 106. The Ancient Usages of the City of Winchester, ed. J. S. Furley (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1927), 32-42. Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. W. Illingworth and J. Caley, Record Commission (London: Eyre and Strahan, 1818), 302. C. E. Woodruff, A History of the Town and Port of Fordwich (Canterbury: Cross and Jackman, [1895]), 32-5. (Dated on the basis of references to Jews). Dorothy Owen, The Making Of King's Lynn, Records of Social and Economic History, new series 9 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), 99-102. Black Book of the Admiralty with an Appendix, ed. Travis Twiss, Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. 55, 4 vols. (London: Public Record Office, 1871-76), 2 (Appendix, Part 2): 184-207. The Great Red Book of Bristol, ed. E. M. W. Veale, Bristol Record Society Publications, vols. 2, 4, 8, 16, 18 (Bristol: Bristol Corporation, 1931-53), 4: 90-1. Rates applied only to trade with Southampton. The Records of the City of Norwich, ed. William Hudson and John Tingey, 2 vols. (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, 19061910), 2: 199-205. Register of Daniel Rough, ed. K. M. E. Murray, Kent Records 16 (Ashford: Printed for the Records Branch [of the Kent Archaeological Society], 1945), 28-35. William Boys, Collection for an History of Sandwich (Canterbury: By Author, 1792), 435-40.

Hornsea, 1272 Winchester, c. 1275 Huntingdon, 1286

Fordwich, ante 1290

King's Lynn, c. 1290

Ipswich, 1291

Bristol, c. 1300

Norwich, c. 1300

Romney, c. 1300(?)

Sandwich, c. 1300

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Southampton, c. 1300

The Oak Book of Southampton, ed. P. Studer, 2 vols., Publications of the Southampton Record Society nos. 10 and 11 (Southampton: Record Society, 1910-11), 2: 2-17. Gras, Early English Customs System, 164-7. Gras, Early English Customs System, 159-63. Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, ed. Riley, 1: 223-9.

Berwick, 1303 Ipswich, 1303 London, 1272-1307 Manchester, 1320

Mamecestre: Being Chapters From the Early Recorded History ... of Manchester, ed. John Harland, Chetham Society vols. 53, 56, and 58, 3 vols. (Manchester: s.n., 1861-1862), 2: 282-3. Rupert H. Morris, Chester in the Plantagenet and Tudor Reigns (Chester: The Author, n.d.), 554-58. Oak Book of Southampton, ed. Studer, 18-27. Rates applied only to trade with Salisbury. Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. Illingworth and Caley, 160-1.

Chester, 1321

Southampton, 1329 Derby, 1330

Measham, 1330 Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. Illingworth and Caley, 146. Bakewell, 1330 Oundle, 1330 Peterborough, 1330 Ipswich, 1340 Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. Illingworth and Caley, 140. Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. Illingworth and Caley, 553. Placita de Quo Warranto, ed. Illingworth and Caley, 552.

Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery) Preserved in the Public Record Office (London: Public Record Office, 1916), 2: 421.

B. Public Works Tolls


Note: The editors of the patent rolls included lists of tolls granted to finance public works in the volumes covering the years 1216-1225 and 1225-1232. Subsequent volumes calendared the grants of tolls, but did not include the lists of commodities and rates appended to the grants. A number of these

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later lists have, however, been published in other venues. Rather than record each early list separately, I have summarized the material available in the early volumes of the printed calendar, and then furnished individual entries for later lists. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, A.D. 1216-1225 (London: Public Record Office, 1901): Shrewsbury, 1220 (238-9); Waterford, 1224 (433); Shrewsbury, 1224 (445); Stafford, 1224 (459); Northampton, 1224 (499); Scarborough, 1225 (508-9); Lincoln, 1225 (518); Worcester, 1225 (555-6). Great Britain, Public Record Office, Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, A.D. 1225-1232 (London: Public Record Office, 1903): York, 1226 (32); Bridgnorth, 1227 (116); Feria bridge, Yorkshire, 1227 (173-4); Drogheda Bridge, 1227 (182); Hereford, 1228 (228); Worcester, 1229 (253); Hereford, 1230 (343); Hithe, 1232 (477); Gloucester, 1232 (479); Bristol, 1232 (483). London murage, 1279 Calendar of Letter Books Preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London at the Guildhall. Letter-Books A-F, ed. Reginald Sharpe (London: E.J. Francis, 18991904), Letter Book A, 222-3. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, A.D. 1172-1320, ed. J. T. Gilbert, Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages no. 53 (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1870), 189-90. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 191-4. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 194-5. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 218-21.

Dublin murage, 1284

Dublin murage, 1295 Dublin murage, 1297 Dublin pavage, 13021303 Dublin murage, 1308 Dublin murage, 1312 London murage, 1315

Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 270-3. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 308-12. Calendar of Letter Books, ed. Sharpe, Letter Book E, 63-6.

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Peterborough pavage, 1315 Drogheda murage, 1318 Newark pavage, 1328

Peterborough Local Administration, ed. W. T. Mellows, Northampton Record Society 9 (Northampton: s.n., 1939), 233-4. Historic and Municipal Documents of Ireland, ed. Gilbert, 413-17. England from 1000 to 1760, ed. H. E. S. Fisher and A. R. J. Jurica, Documents in English Economic History (London: G. Bell, 1977), 237-8. Henry Bush, Bristol Town Duties (Bristol: J. M.Gutch, 1828), 88-9. Peterborough Local Administration, ed. Mellows, 233-4.

Bristol quayage, 1331 Peterborough pontage, 1334 Gloucester pavage, 1334 Gloucester murage, 1345

Calendar of the Records of the Corporation of Gloucester, ed. W. H. Stevenson (Gloucester: J. Bellows, 1893), 50-2. Calendar of the Records of the Corporation of Gloucester, ed. Stevenson, 54-5.

C. Fair Tolls
St. Ives, 1252 Ellen Wedemeyer Moore, The Fairs of Medieval England. An Introductory Study, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts 72 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 197. A Charter of Edward the Third Confirming and Enlarging the Privileges of St. Giles Fair, Winchester, AD 1349 (Winchester: s.n., 1886), 39-40. Summarized in Moore, Fairs of Medieval England, 197.

Winchester, 1349

EXPENDITURE AND WAR

CALCULATING PROFITS AND LOSSES DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: WHAT REALLY FORCED PHILIP THE GOOD FROM THE WAR?
Kelly DeVries

I first became concerned with war financing when I took Dr. John Munros seminar at the University of Toronto twenty years ago. His lengthy bibliography and the seminar discussion opened my mind to ways of looking at medieval warfare which I have profited from ever since. This was followed by one of my first medieval historical reality checks, when in approaching John with a project concerning a data base of some 4,400 Burgundian gunpowder weapons dating from 1410 to 1477, many listed with costs, and planning to make a comparative study of these costs, the reality of Burgundian monetarism was pointed out to me. The fluctuation of such currency over this period, especially as it was not currency but currencies that these records report, made such a study nearly impossible, I was told. From that conversation, too, I profited, and I am sure that it will come as a relief to John that when, finally, my study of Burgundian gunpowder weapons, co-written by Robert D. Smith of the Royal Armouries, was published in 2005, it also lacked any comparative cost analysis of the gunpowder weapons of the four Valois dukes of Burgundy.1 Nevertheless, I have still remained interested in the financing of warfare, and especially how such affected and effected military policy, strategy, and tactics. This should be a matter of immense importance, yet I am ashamed to admit that military historians have not paid enough attention to economic matters. In my Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology, which comes in at 1045 pages, only three of those pages are devoted to war financing in general with an additional four pages devoted specifically to

1 Robert D. Smith and Kelly DeVries, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363-1477 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005), in which some of the following is discussed and elaborated on.

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financing in the Hundred Years War.2 Perhaps for the earlier Middle Ages this is excusable; there are no extant records that can be used to study the financing of William the Conquerors conquest of England. Indeed, I found that even trying to determine the financing behind the Flemish rebellion of 1302-1305, the project I eventually attempted for Johns course, was nearly impossibleBruges paid for the majority of it, with Ypres and Courtrai in for a chunk, anything more detailed was undetectable.3 But for the later Middle Ages, and especially the Hundred Years War, it seems that we should know more about the military financing. It was fought for a long period of time, over the reign of several kings and magnates; there were several lands involved; extant records are more numerous; and military actions, winners and losers, are more clearly identified, as are the causes of these victories and defeats. Still, this has made little impact on the scholarship. Of the prominent general studies of the war in any language, none, save Christopher Allmands The Hundred Years War, have the slightest discussion on the financing of the conflict, from either the English or French side, let alone from any of the other lands involved: Scotland, Burgundy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and the various Low Countries entities. Allmands book does consider the subject, in eight pages, although he discusses only Taxation and Fiscal Institutions and hides it in the middle of his section on The Institutions of War. Furthermore, most of his examples in this chapter come not from any king ruling during the war, but from the reign of Philip the Fair, and not a single word is devoted to the financing of the fifteenth-century warfare.4 Sometimes, this neglect can become quite
Kelly DeVries, A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 262-5, 398-402; an update, published in 2005, A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology Update 2004 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), adds only six more references (46, 73, 204). 3 Although several new studies of this conflict appeared in 2002, with the seven hundred year anniversary of the battle of Courtrai (see Cumulative Bibliography Update, 232-4), none of these discussed the financing of the rebellion. In this authors opinion, the most complete studies of the 1302-1305 rebellion remain J. F. Verbruggens De slag der guldensporen: Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Vlaanderens vrijheidsoorlog, 1297-1305 (Antwerp: N. V. Standaard Boekhandel, 1952)now translated as The Battle of the Golden Spurs: Courtrai, 11 July 1302, ed. Kelly DeVries, trans. David Richard Ferguson (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2002)and Vlaanderen naar de Guldensporenslag (Bruges: Westvlaamse Gidsenkring, 1991). 4 Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War
2

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absurd. In the last thirteen years two major studies on the first decade of the war have been published, Jonathan Sumptions The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle, and Clifford Rogers War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360, with both determining the cause of Edward IIIs failure at the siege of Tournai as the unwillingness of his Parliament to pay for the sustained siege, despite the town being on the verge of defeat.5 Yet, neither details what forms of financing there were, why such financing was solely in the hands of Parliament, why Edward had not arranged his financing more completely before he left England, why England was paying for the siege alone when Flemish, Brabantese, Hainaulter, and German allied forces were also involved, probably in greater numbers than the English, and, finally, why if his war financing was such a hardship in 1340, it was well in hand by 1341 when Edward was prepared to make yet another assault on the continent.6 (As one might guess from my criticism, my own study of the failure of the siege of Tournai has determined a different cause, the breaking apart of the southern Low Countries and German alliance, with the

c. 1300-c. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-11. Syntheses on the Hundred Years War that exclude any discussion on financing include Joseph Calmette and Eugne Dprez, Histoire du Moyen Age, vol. 7, part 1, La France et lAngleterre en conflit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1937); Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W. B. Wells (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951); Alfred H. Burne, The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955); Alfred H. Burne, The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956); Andr Leguai, La guerre de cent ans (Paris: Editions Fernand Nathan, 1974); Philippe Contamine, La guerre de cent ans, 3rd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977); Desmond Seward, The Hundred Years War: The English in France, 1337-1453 (New York: Atheneum, 1978); Jean Favier, La guerre de cent ans (Paris: Fayard, 1980); Robin Neillands, The Hundred Years War (London: Routledge, 1990); and Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War, 2nd ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 5 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 338-70, and Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2000), 199-216. 6 On the desire to return to combat by the end of 1341 see Michael Prestwich, English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 56 (1983): 102-13.

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defection of the Brabantese).7 I could go on. Suffice it to say, that most scholars who have written about the English side have been interested in the subject of Hundred Year War financing as a big picture, considering the war as a whole, the McFarlanes and Postans, with few considering smaller instances of war financing and their effects on the fighting of the war.8 About France the opposite has been the case: there more studies have appeared considering smaller examples of war financing and their limited effects, either chronological or geographical.9 Only Philippe Contamine has attempted to take a larger look at the cost of the Hundred Years War, and his approaches, as he calls them, so far have been more theoretical than substantive.10 Interestingly, scholars discussing the Hundred Years War from the Burgundian or Low Countries perspective have done a far better job of investigating the profits and losses of the Hundred Years War. Although most of these studies have been focused on smaller situations, there are so many of them that I was recently able to combine several together to present a larger perspective on how the economic costs seem not to have mattered in determining the number of rebellions of the Southern Low Countries towns during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This brings me back to Dr. Munro. None of the studies mentioned above have suggested any determination of military strategy or tactics, except for an article by John Munro, An Economic Aspect of the Collapse of the AngloBurgundian Alliance, 1428-1442, which appeared in the English Historical Review in 1970 and which was extended later in his book,
7 Kelly DeVries, Contemporary Views of Edward III's Failure at the Siege of Tournai, 1340, Nottingham Medieval Studies 39 (1995): 70-105. 8 K. B. McFarlane, War, the Economy and Social Change: England and the Hundred Years War, in England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays (London: Hambledon, 1981), 139-50, and M. M. Postan, The Costs of the Hundred Years War, Past and Present 27 (1964): 34-53. 9 See, among others, Harry A. Miskimin, Money and Power in FifteenthCentury France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and John Bell Henneman, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322-1356 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Captivity and Ransom of John II, 13561370 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1976). 10 Philippe Contamine, La guerre de cent ans en France: une approche conomique, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 47 (1974): 125-49. See also Contamines Guerre, tat et socit la fin du moyen ge: tudes sur les armes des rois de France, 1337-1494 (Paris: Mouton, 1972).

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Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340-1478, published two years later. Now, I will not attempt to summarize Munros article or book, I only wish to say that he suggests that economics had something to do with the break-up of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance in 1435, the agreed upon turning point of the Hundred Years War. I agree with John. But I want to take it a step further, and also look at the issue a bit deeper, meaning that Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy does not simply abandon his English allies in 1435, a process which I see beginning with his failure at the siege of Compigne in 1430, that first creates a negative economic divide between Burgundy and England, but, after his failure at the siege of Calais in 1436, which increases his war financing problems, he also abandons the French, to turn his military focus towards the Low Countries and the economic problems he has created for himself there by his Hundred Year War decisions in 1430-1436. It was Philips abandonment of the English that meant they would never win the war, but that it was his abandonment of the French that meant the war would not be over quickly; instead it would last until 1453.11 First, to the two failed Burgundian sieges and their financing problems. Almost anyone who knows even the most meager history of the Hundred Years War will know that 1430 was not the best year for the English. The previous year a young peasant woman, ironically born and raised in Burgundian territory, appeared saying that she had received a mission from God to free occupied France from its English occupiers. To the Burgundians, Joan of Arc posed little problem. But to the English, she was a military disaster, the like of which they had never seen before nor, one might add, after. Joan of Arc menaced them. Less than a week after she had arrived at Orlans, she had relieved the English siege of that town, an incredibly difficult task considering that they were in control of the fortified bridgehead across the Loire, the Tourelles. A month later, she removed the remaining English forces from their Loire strongholdsat Jargeau, Meung-sur-Loire, and Beaugencyand had won

While this article focuses on the economic woes created by Philips failures in these sieges, I discuss the military situation created in the forthcoming The Effect on the Hundred Years War of Philip the Goods Failures at Compigne (1430) and Calais (1436).

11

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the battle of Patay. Then, shortly after, she led an army to Reims, capturing towns along the way, where Charles the Dauphin was crowned King Charles VII of France.12 All during this time, Joan and, after his coronation, Charles VII, made entreaties for peace towards the Burgundians.13 What Joan of Arc and Charles VII did not offer Philip the Good, however, the English leader in France, John, duke of Bedford, did: money. By the end of 1429, Bedford was desperate for Burgundian assistance. The reverses suffered by the English at the hands of Joan of Arc in that year were more significant than any in the last fifty years. He needed to halt their progress before the English lost any more territory. So, Bedford needed Philip and, when the Burgundian duke demanded payment in return for services, the English leader was forced to ensure that the Burgundians would get it. And, indeed, Philip the Good did: by the end of 1431 he had been paid 150,000, although he was still owed 100,000.14 Obviously, money was a more important incentive to the Burgundian duke than Joan of Arcs or Charles VIIs prospect of peace or French unity. With this settlement, the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was once again in force. A detailed and intricate military plan was agreed on, indicating how those lands currently held were to be apportioned and by whom governed, and what new military targets were to be undertaken.15 The Burgundian army then set out against its first objective, Compigne. Compigne, like several ungarrisoned French towns, had joined with Charles VII after he had been crowned. Yet, despite staying in the town for several days before Joan of Arcs
12 On the military life and leadership of Joan of Arc see Kelly DeVries, Joan of Arc: A Military Leader (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999). 13 One extant letter is preserved in the Archives du Nord in Lille. It is edited in Jules Quicherat, ed., Procs de condamnation et de rhabilitation de Jeanne dArc dite la Pucelle, 5 vols. (Paris: Jules Renouard et Cie., 1841-1849), 5: 1267, and Rgine Pernoud and Marie-Vronique Clin, Joan of Arc: Her Story, trans. and rev. J. D. Adams (New York, 1998), 253-4. I have used the translation found in Pernoud and Clin, Joan of Arc, 67-8. See also DeVries, Joan of Arc, 139. 14 Richard Vaughan, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London: Longmans, 1970), 17. 15 This plan is in the Bibliothque Nationale, MS fr. 1278, fols. 12-14. It is edited in part in Pierre Champion, Guillaume de Flavy: Captaine de Compigne: Contribution lhistoire de Jeanne dArc et ltude de la vie militaire et prive au XVe sicle (Paris: Honor Champion, 1906), no. 30, and translated in part in Vaughan, Philip the Good, 22-4.

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attack on Paris, Charles retreated to his Loire River holdings following her failure to take Paris, abandoning Compigne and the other towns in the region which had joined him.16 Philip the Good may have thought that as Compigne had gone over so easily to Charles, it might just as easily leave him, especially as he had, it seems, so quickly abandoned the town. However, Compigne was not going to abandon the French king. The people of the town received news in March 1430 that Philip was planning to lay siege to Compigne and decided that they would not surrender to him. They chose to remain French even though that meant that they would have to resist attempts to capture their town. The citizens of Compigne began to stockpile supplies and weapons. Such bravery inspired Joan of Arc who felt that she had been held back from military engagements since the beginning of the year. Eventually she joined the townspeople in the defense of their town, arriving there before the Burgundians.17 Philip had amassed a large army and an impressive artillery train.18 At this date, there was perhaps no power with a stronger or more numerous gunpowder weaponry arsenal than the Burgundians, and almost all of it was directed at Compigne. Contemporary chroniclers report the existence of at least five large bombards, two veuglaires, one large and one small, innumerable couloverines, and two engins among the besieging Burgundian army;19 other sources record the transportation of at least 17,000 lbs. of gunpowder with the artillery train.20 Extant artillery comptes for the Burgundian forces
DeVries, Joan of Arc, 153-4. DeVries, Joan of Arc, 166-70. 18 This is discussed more completely in Smith and DeVries, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. 19 Jehan de Waurin, Rcueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, ed. W. and E. L. C. P. Hardy, 5 vols. (London: Her Majestys Stationery Office; rpt. Wiesbaden: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1864-91), 3: 362; Enguerran Monstrelet, Chronique, ed. L. Douet-d'Arcq, 6 vols. (Paris: Mme. J. Renouard, 1857-1862), 4: 418-9; Georges Chastellain, uvres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 8 vols. (Brussels: F. Heussner, 1863-66), 2: 53; and Antonio Morosini, Chronique: Extraits relatifs lhistoire de France, trans. and ed. L. Dorez (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1898-1902), 3: 319-23. See also DeVries, Joan of Arc, 169-70, and Claude Gaier, Lindustrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes principauts belges du XIIIme la fin du XVme sicle (Paris: Socit dEdition Les Belles Lettres, 1973), 111. 20 Philippe Contamine, La guerre de sige au temps de Jeanne d'Arc, Dossiers darchologie 34 (May 1979): 16.
17 16

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have shown that these tallies are far too low. But this show of military technology did not intimidate either Joan of Arc or Guillaume de Flavy, the governor of Compigne and leader of its defense effort. The fortifications of the town were very strong. Additionally, the defenders of Compigne had their own gunpowder weaponry arsenal, and they had prepared their defenses to use it by destroying any superfluous fortifications which might hinder gunfire. These guns would prove very effective, particularly, as reported by an anonymous eyewitness, the great number of small engines, called coulovrines, which were made of bronze and which fired lead balls. He even boasted that these balls were able to penetrate the armor of a man-at-arms.21 This was not going to be a quick siege, but the Burgundian leaders, especially Jean of Luxembourg, felt that they could still achieve a victory, even against such a fortified location and even against Joan of Arc. The actual defeat of Joan was accomplished quite easily. Not accustomed to stand behind walls in a defensive posture, on 23 May 1430, with a small group of soldiers, she decided to ride out of the town and strike into the Burgundian army. What she hoped to accomplish with this misguided tactic, no one has adequately explained, for it was unsuccessful and she was captured.22 Her capture proved to be worth 10,000 livres tournois to Jean of Luxembourg, whose men had captured her, the sum the English paid for her ransom. A little more than a year after she had been captured, on 30 May 1431, Joan of Arc was burned to death as a heretic in the market-place of Rouen.23 However, the capture of Compigne was quite another matter. In fact, it never did occur. Despite the large number of gunpowder weapons which Philip the Good had at the siege, and the constant bombardment against the town, its walls, gates, and inhabitants, the town did not capitulate. All contemporary narrative sources record that the Burgundian guns were very powerful and very destructive. Enguerran Monstrelet describes a siege where the Burgundians built a large bastille or boulevard of earth, a bow-shot from the town, in which they set up their gunpowder weapons. These were aimed

Quoted in Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, 49 n.10. Joan of Arc gave the best account of this at her trial (in Quicherat, Procs de condamnation, 1: 207-8). See also DeVries, Joan of Arc, 176. 23 DeVries, Joan of Arc, 176-82.
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against Compigne which, because of the continuation of large stones which they fired, disrupted and breached the gates, bridge, mills, and boulevard of the town in many places. The mills ceased to mill; and one gunshot even killed Louis de Flavy, the brother of the governor, Guillaume. Mines also were attempted and failed.24 Still, Guillaume de Flavy continued to defend diligently the walls and the boulevard. According to both Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne and Jean de Waurin, the gunpowder weapons of the townspeople seemed to have been as effective as those of the Burgundians, with one cannon mounted on the wall killing ten or twelve besiegers.25 Throughout the summer the siege of Compigne went on. The joy of capturing Joan of Arc was soon forgotten, and the plodding of the constant conflict must have worn on the soldiers. Surprisingly, little fatigue seems to have afflicted the besieged; who seem to have been well provided for, despite being encircled by hostile forces. No contemporary source even mentions hunger being a problem inside the town, thus missing a narrative topos so prevalent in accounts of other Hundred Year War sieges. On the other hand, the besiegers were both fatigued and tormented by their inability to conquer the site. Suddenly, and really without an adequate explanation in any of the original sources, the Burgundians abandoned the siege. In fact they abandoned it so quickly that they left behind their numerous gunpowder artillery pieces which the inhabitants of Compigne quickly captured and brought within the gates. What actually happened is truly one of the biggest mysteries of the Hundred Years War. Monstrelet claims that it was a decision made by Jean of Luxembourg, the Burgundian general at the siege, the count of Hontiton, and many other notables in their company. But, if this was the case, why did they leave with such speed that they abandoned a very large number of large bombards, cannons, veuglaires, serpentines, coulovrines, and other artillery which were left in the hands of the French, their adversaries? Monstrelet ends his account:

Monstrelet, Chronique, 4: 390-91. See also Waurin, Rcueil, 3: 361-3, 3859; Chastellain, uvres, 2: 53, and Morosini, Chronique, 3: 319-23. 25 Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne, in Chroniques relatives l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts franais), ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: M. Hayez, 1873), 176. See also Waurin, Rcueil, 3: 388-9.

24

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This artillery was the duke of Burgundys!26 Jean de Waurin is equally confused and offers the same surprise at the abandoning of a large quantity of large bombards, cannons, veuglaires, serpentines, and other artillery which fell into the hands of the enemy. The author of Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne professes that it was the defensive gunfire which convinced them to retreat.27 Still, this can hardly be the sole or even the primary reason for such a quick withdrawal. Modern authors are equally befuddled at the Burgundian retreat. Richard Vaughan suggests only that the Burgundians were forced to leave;28 Pierre Champion praises the inhabitants of Compigne and especially their governor and military leader, Guillaume de Flavy, whose reputation he was trying to rehabilitate from one who gave up Joan of Arc;29 surprisingly, many do not even record the siege, except for its relationship to the soon-to-be martyred Saint Joan;30 and none mention the Burgundian financing problems that resulted from the defeat. Yet, the failure of the Burgundians to capture Compigne, with its attendant loss of gunpowder artillery, was of enormous importance both to the next phase of the Hundred Years War and, especially, to the relationship between the Burgundians and the English, at whose behest the duke of Burgundy was undertaking the siege. Although Monstrelet reports that Jean of Luxembourg was condemned for his actions by Philip the Good,31 the duke himself felt that blame for the military debacle should be laid firmly at the feet of the English. In a letter written 4 November 1430 by Philip to Henry VI, he clearly makes this known:
Most redoubted lord, I recommend myself to you in all humility. I imagine that you and your councillors remember that it was at your urgent request that I took part in your French war. For my part, I

Monstrelet, Chronique, 4: 418-9. Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne, 176. 28 Vaughan, Philip the Good, 24. 29 Champion, Guillaume de Flavy, 42-58, 162-82. 30 See, for example, Burne, The Agincourt War; Sir Charles W.C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, vol. 2 (London: Methuen, 1924; rpt. London: Greenhill Books, 1998); and Ferdinand Lot, Lart militaire et les armes au moyen-ge en Europe et dans le proche orient (Paris: Payot, 1946). 31 Monstrelet, Chronique, 4: 419.
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have so far accomplished everything that I agreed to and promised in the indenture made between ... the cardinal of England [Henry Beaufort], acting in your name, and myself. It is a fact that, as a result, all my lands both in Burgundy and Picardy have been and are at war and in danger of destruction ... Moreover, it was at your request and command that I undertook the siege of Compigne, though this was contrary to the advice of my council and my own opinion. For it had seemed to us better for me to advance towards Creil and Laon, as appears in the recommendations drawn up on this and sent to Calais by our secretary Master Jehan Milet. It is also true, most redoubted lord, that, according to the agreement drawn up on your part with my people, you ought to have paid me the sum of 19,500 francs of royal money each month for the expenses of my troops before Compigne, as well as the cost of the artillery; while my good cousin the earl of Huntingdon with his company ought to have remained with me before the said town of Compigne ...32 It was under the impression that this would be done on your part, and especially that the said payment would be made without fail, as agreed, that I had my men stationed before Compigne all the time. But, most redoubted lord, these payments have not been kept up by you, for they are in arrears to the tune of two months. The same goes for the artillery, for which I myself paid out over 40,000 saluts... Likewise, my good cousin of Huntingdon has been unable, according to him, for want of payment, to keep his forces in the field any longer ... My redoubted lord, I cannot continue these [military operations] without adequate provision in future from you ... and without payment of what is due to me, both on account of the two months abovementioned, and for the artillery. Thus most redoubted lord, I ask and entreat you most humbly to see that the said sums are paid over at once to my people at Calais who have been waiting there for this purpose for some time ...33

This was the sum agreed to by the duke of Bedford before the siege. This letter is edited in Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry VI, ed. J. Stevenson, 2 vols. in 3 (London: Her Majestys Stationery Office; reprint Wiesbaden: Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1965), 2.1: 156-64. The partial translation I am using comes from Vaughan, Philip the Good, 24-5.
33

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The Anglo-Burgundian relationship, perhaps never an entirely solid one during the reign of Philip the Good, was irreparably damaged at Compigne for a lack of promised financing. By the way, although it appears that some of the promised funds were eventually paid, the costs of the artillery lost to the French, for which Philip asked to be recompensed, never was paid. Let me jump to 1436 and the siege of Calais. There is of course much history in between the failed siege at Compigne and that at Calais, including, most importantly, the Congress of Arras, where Philip the Good led the Burgundians away from the alliance they had had since before the assassination of Philips father, John the Fearless, in 1419. I do not have the time to go into this in depth, except to suggest that it was not so much a Burgundian treason against the French, as Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson and others have suggested, as it was an attempt by the duke to bring the two sides together and their obstinacy which caused his reversal of previous policy.34 In 1436, Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy proved beyond any doubt that the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was at an end when he directed his largest army and artillery train yet assembled to attack Calais. This important coastal town had since 1347 been securely held in the hands of the English. Its symbolism may even have outweighed its strategic significance. Had Philip successfully besieged Calais, following so closely on the heels of their diplomatic defeat at the Congress of Arras, the English would surely have changed their strategic plans for the future of the Hundred Years War. Instead, the siege of Calais was a resounding defeat for the Burgundians. Philip began to formalize his plan in January 1436. Because of logistical problems, whenever a leader needed to gather a large number of gunpowder artillery pieces, as the siege of Calais reI think that Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson (The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955]) does an excellent job of examining the Congress of Arras from the Anglo-French perspectives, with some correcting by the various essayists in Denis Clauzel, Charles GiryDeloison, and Christophe Leduc, ed., Arras et la diplomatie europenne, XVe-XVIe sicles (Arras: Artois Presses Universit, 1999). But neither she nor those in the latter work analyze the Congress from Philips position. Nor, in my view, does Vaughan, Philip the Good, 98-107. I have attempted to do this briefly in my and Bob Smiths The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, and plan to return later to it.
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quired, a longer planning time was necessary. In this case the Burgundians had no central artillery arsenal, and thus had to amass his gunpowder weapons from smaller, local armories. Most of the guns used at the siege of Calais were supplied from the Low Countries, especially from the counties of Flanders, Holland, Picardy, and Artois. There were also four hundred ships, not including additional smaller vessels, stuffed with the most strong ordnance and all other materiel of war that any man had ever heard of, which sailed from the harbors of Sluys, Biervliet, and Rotterdam.35 One convoy from Holland included a large veuglaire with eight removable chambers, two crapadeaux with six chambers, one hundred bronze coulovrines, and bombard gunstones weighing between 180 and 350 livres, not to mention a large number of lances and crossbows.36 Notarial documents at the Archives de la Cte-d'Or record the following numbers and types of Burgundian gunpowder weapons at the siege of Calais:
3 2 3 2 2 Iron Gros Bombards and 3 other Gros Bombards from Holland Iron Bombards from Picardy Bronze Bombards from Burgundy Iron and 1 other Bombard from Abbeville Bronze Bombards, named Pruce and Bergiere, and 1 Iron Bombard from the Saint-Bertin Monastery in Saint-Omer (indicated in other documents to have been brought there as a central site) 1 Bronze Bombard chamber for the Bourgoinge from the Saint-Bertin Monastery 7 Gros Veuglaires taken from naval vessels 4 Iron and 1 other Gros Veuglaires from Saint-Bertin Monastery 2 Iron and 3 other Gros Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 2 Gros Veuglaires from Gravelines 1 Gros Veuglaire from Damp 17 Iron and 13 other Veuglaires from Sluys 23 Veuglaires from Bruges or Sluys 11 Veuglaires from Holland

35 This quote comes from a document written by an English spy (Archives dpartementales du Nord, B10401, fol. 29) with a complete transcription in Vaughan, Philip the Good, 75-80. 36 Monique Somm, L'arme Bourguignonne au sige de Calais de 1436, in Guerre et socit en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe-XVe sicle, ed. P. Contamine et al. (Lille: Centre d'histoire de la rgion du Nord et de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest, Universit Charles de Gaulle Lille III, 1991), 203.

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14 Iron and 9 other Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 6 Iron Veuglaires from naval vessels 1 Veuglaire, named Anvers, and 2 other Veuglaires from Abbeville 2 Iron Veuglaires from Avennes 2 Veuglaires from Bruges 23 Petit Veuglaires (no site mentioned) 2 Petit Veuglaires from Abbeville 4 Veuglaire Chambers from Sluys 23 Cannons or Veuglaires from Sluys 2 Petit Cannons from Abbeville 12 Iron Crapaudeaux (site not mentioned) 5 Iron Crapaudeaux from Gravelines 3 Iron Crapaudeaux from Abbeville 2 Petit Crapaudeaux (site not mentioned) 48 (or 52) Gros Coulovrines 200 Bronze Coulovrines 40 Iron Coulovrines 3 Other Coulovrines 2 Bronze Coulovrines a escappe37

It is also recorded that Burgundian and Low Countries carpenters made carts, wagons, and mantlets for the large- and medium-sized gunpowder weapons; masons carved stone cannonballs; and cannoneers purchased saltpeter and made gunpowder.38 The expense was enormous. The size and presence at Calais of this incredibly large gunpowder artillery train is commented on by all of the chroniclers who discuss the siege. As a whole they are impressed with what the duke of Burgundy was able to deliver to the walls of the English town. Enguerran de Monstrelet describes the large number of ribauds carrying canons and other large engins to the siege.39 Jean de Waurin writes that the Philip the Good had a large number of bombards, cannons, ribaudequins, and large serpentines.40 And Jean
37 See the documents preserved in Joseph Garnier, Lartillerie des ducs de Bourgogne daprs les documents conservs aux archives de la Cte-dOr (Paris: Honor Champion, 1895), 151-63. 38 Somm, L'arme Bourguignonne, 203. 39 Monstrelet, Chronique, 5: 240. See also Oliver van Dixmude, Merkwaerdige gebeurtenissen vooral in Vlaenderen en Brabant van 1377 tot 1443, ed. J. J. Lambin (Ypres: Lambin en Zoon, 1835), 150. 40 Waurin, Rcueil, 4: 160. See also Le livre des trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne, 211, and Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae

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Chartier notes that one of the Burgundian bombards was so large that it required 50 horses to pull it, another 36 horses, and others 26 horses each, not including the large number of other various sized guns which accompanied those larger weapons.41 This artillery force was so large, it seems, that to utilize their numerous gunpowder weapons, the Burgundian army not only placed them at weak spots around the walls, but also constructed their own earth-andwood artillery fortifications, boulevards and artillery towers around Calais and filled them with guns. The result of all of these gunpowder weapons at the siege of Calais, that began in earnest on 9 July 1436, was an intense bombardment of the town. Day and night cannonballs fell on the walls and flew over them to land on the buildings inside. The most cinematic portrayal of this comes from a Middle English poem written at the time of the siege. First, the anonymous author of this poem describes the weapons which the duke had brought to Calais:
With gonnes grete and ordinance, That theyme myght helpe and avance, With many a proude pavis; Gailly paynted and stuffed wele, Ribawdes, armed with Iren and stele, Was neuer better devyse.

Then the cannoneers began to attack the town:


Gonners began to shew thair art, Into the tovn in many apart, Shot many a full grete ston.

But, fortunately, the townspeople were preserved from the terror that these weapons delivered, preserved by God, Mary, and, interestingly, the patron saint of cannoneers, Saint Barbara:
Thanked be god, and marie mylde, They hurt neither man, woman, ne childe.
ducis, in Chroniques relatives l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne (texts latins), ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: M. Hayez, 1876), 62-3. 41 Jean Chartier, Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France, ed. Vallet de Viriville, 3 vols. (Paris: P. Jannet, 1858), 1: 242.

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Houses thogh they did harme; Seynt Barbara! than was the crie, Whan stones in the tovn flye, They cowde noon other charme.42

Yet, these Burgundian gunpowder weapons, despite their power and numbers, were not successful in breaching the walls or causing the towns capitulation. For fifteen days they fired on the town, but without success. This might be credited to the defensive gunpowder weapons which were inside the town which, at least according to the English chronicle, The Brut, were very effective in the defense of the town, with one Calaisien gunshot even piercing Philip the Goods tent.43 However, most contemporary chroniclers give no credit to the towns defensive weapons in relieving the siege. Indeed, they note that neither the offensive nor defensive gunfire was effective. While the Burgundian forces were easily able to conquer smaller nearby fortifications, such as Oye, Marck, and Balinghem, by placing their guns near the walls and battering them down, when it came to the larger and better defended walls of Calais, they were incapable of breaching them, even if, as Monstrelet claims, these gunpowder weapons strongly damaged the walls of the town.44 On the other hand, how effective can a bombardment lasting only fifteen days be? The military history of the fifteenth century showed
42 The version of this poem used is Ralph A. Klinefelter, ed., The Siege of Calais: A New Text, Publications of the Modern Language Association 67 (1952): 888-95. The quotes which appear in the text above are found on pp. 891-3. Three more poems can be found in Rossell Hope Robbins, ed., Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries (New York, 1959), 78-89; they originated in The Brut, or the Chronicles of England, ed. F. W. D. Brie (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trbner and Co., 1906-1908). However, Roger Nicholson, of the Department of English, University of Auckland, New Zealand, who has worked on these poems, assures me that there are at least two more such poems as yet unedited, one in London, Lambeth Palace Library, ms. 6, and a second in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby ms. 102. All were written within a few months of the end of the siege. 43 The Brut, 2: 578. Monstrelet (Chronique, 5: 245) confirms this, adding that while the cannonball did not kill the duke, it did kill a trumpeter and three knights who were with him. See also Olivier van Dixmude, Merkwaerdige, 1545. 44 Monstrelet, Chronique, 5: 243, 245. See also Waurin, Rcueil, 4: 175; The Brut, 2: 577-9; the Liber de virtutibus sui genitoris Philippi Burgundiae ducis, 63; and Vaughan, Philip the Good, 79. The fortifications of the nearby castle of Guines also held out during the siege.

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that, if the inhabitants desired to withstand a siege, strong fortifications generally took a very long time to be defeated, even when faced with the constant bombardment of gunpowder weapons. Indeed, it seems that only when there was no desire to withstand a siege was there a quick capitulation, such as those gained by Henry V in Normandy and Joan of Arc along the coronation route to Rheims. At all other times sieges either failed or dragged out until fatigue or privation on one side or the other brought about victory or defeat.45 Yet, on some occasions, and ever more frequently during the mid-fifteenth century, military leaders simply gave up when their combatants and artillery were unable to bring about a victory either from intimidation at the sight of the large number of gunpowder weapons facing a site or the increased fear of destruction after a few days of gunpowder weaponry bombardment. Such can only be the reason for Charles VIIs unwillingness to pursue the attack of Paris after only one day in 142946 and perhaps may also be the reason why Philip the Good raised his siege of Calais after little more than two weeks in 1436. Richard Vaughan raises other possibilities. He cites the failure of the Burgundian fleet, raised largely among Flemish and Dutch coastal towns, to arrive at Calais at the same time as the army, appearing only after fatigue and discouragement had begun to inflict their toll on the besieging troops. Before they arrived, English ships had sailed in and out of Calais, and there was no evidence of distress among the besieged inhabitants. Once the Burgundian fleet arrived, it did little to change the situation, proving as Edward III had discovered in 1346-1347 when he conquered the town, that it was extremely difficult for a blockade of any size to cut off all relieving maritime traffic to the stricken inhabitants.47 In the meantime, rivalry between two of the larger factions of Flemish troops, the Brugeois and Ghentenaars, had begun to affect the morale of the Burgundian troops. Unwittingly, the Calaisiens
45 I investigate this more in The Walls Come Tumbling Down: The Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder Weapons, in The Hundred Years War, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 46 See DeVries, Joan of Arc, 152-4. 47 Vaughan, Philip the Good, 79. On the problems of Edward IIIs siege in 1346-1347 see Kelly DeVries, Hunger, Flemish Participation and the Flight of Philip VI: Contemporary Accounts of the Siege of Calais, 1346-47, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History n.s. 12 (1991): 129-81.

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played on this rivalry. On 26 July, the day after the Burgundian ships arrival at Calais, they made a sortie from the Boulogne gate, surprising a unit of Brugeois troops, that at the time also included Philip the Good. This defeat was met by jeers and mockery from the Ghentenaars. On 28 July, another group of English inhabitants of the town attacked a wooden artillery tower manned by Ghentenaar troops, again by surprise. It was now the Brugeois soldiers turn to respond with their own derision. The Ghentenaars had reached their breaking point, and as fear and rumors of other attacks spread throughout their camp, they fled during the night. The next morning, the Brugeois joined them. The rest of the Burgundian army soon followed suit.48 The defeat was made even more serious by the abandonment of many of the Burgundian gunpowder weapons to hasten the retreat. The Brut indicates that the Brugeois tried to bury some of their guns in the sand in an effort to keep them from falling into English hands, but most seem simply to have been left behind.49 Whether the Flemings were to be blamed entirely for this military debacle is debatable. Certainly the English felt so, with poems such as The Englishmans Mocking Song Against the Flemings and An English Ballad Against the Flemings becoming so prevalent that they found their way into accounts of The Brut.50 In these there is little doubt that the Flemings were to blame for the defeat:
Remembres now, ye Flemmynges, vpon youre owne shame; When ye laide seege to Caleis, ye wer right still to blame; For more of reputacioun, ben Englisshmen en ye, And comen of more gentill blode, of olde antiquitie; For Flemmynges come of Flemmed men ye shal wel vndirstand, For fflemed men & banshid men enhabit first youre land. (The Englishmans Mocking Song Against the Flemings)51 Vndyr a veyle of fals decepcioun, Record of Flaundrys, whiche falsly dothe malygne.
Vaughan, Philip the Good, 79-80. See also Waurin, Rcueil, 4: 186. The Brut, 2: 581, 583. See also Vaughan, Philip the Good, 80. Jean de Waurin (Rcueil, 4: 188-9) claims that the Flemings did take their best gunpowder weapons with them. 50 The Brut, 2: 582-4, 600-1. 51 The Brut, 2: 583-4.
49 48

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us in one place, and the men of Bruges, Ypres, the Franc of Bruges their followers and some of our nobles in another place ... . Because the spot where we and our people of Ghent were lodged was unsuitable for fighting a pitched battle when the enemy came, we asked them to withdraw with us and the noblemen in our company to a certain place quite near their encampment ... which was said to be the best, most suitable and most advantageous position to await the enemy in battle order, and they agreed to do this ... Nevertheless, on Saturday 28 July late at night, these people of Ghent, considering neither our honour nor their own, regardless of the promises which they had that very day renewed, and at a time when we were expecting the enemy to arrive on the following Monday or Tuesday, came to tell us that they had decided to decamp that night and to withdraw to a place near the town of Gravelines in Flanders, which is three leagues from Calais. There, they would await events, having put the river [Aa] at Gravelines between themselves and the enemy. And at once, without listening to our requests or waiting for our advice, they departed that night, together with the men from the castellany of Ghent, and withdrew to the above-mentioned position near Gravelines. Moreover, not content with this, they persuaded the men of Bruges, Ypres, and the Franc of Bruges, who would willingly have stayed to carry out our wishes, to withdraw likewise. Since the contingent of noblemen we had with us was too small to do battle with the enemy ... we were forced to depart and withdraw to Gravelines with the Flemings, abandoning what we had begun with the utmost chagrin.55

But Philips councillor, Hugh de Lannoy, puts a more realistic spin on problems at Calais. In a letter to the duke written 10 September 1436, he blames the defeat at Calais on problems financing the siege, while at the same time prophesying of future financial problems brought about by the defeat, and placing those problems firmly in the Low Countries:

A translation of this letter is found in Vaughan, Philip the Good, 81-2. The original is edited in Marie-Rose Thielmans, ed., Une lettre missive indite de Philippe le Bon concernant le sige de Calais, Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire de Belgique 115 (1950): 285-96, although she mistakenly has Philip the Good sending the letter to his other brother-in-law, Arthur de Richemont.

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You must have appreciated, during the siege of Calais, what harm was done by the lack of finance, and it is to be feared that the war has only just begun. If you need to raise finance in Brabant, Holland, and other lands of yours, it can only be with the consent and good will of the people, especially when they see that you are at war [with England] and that the Flemings seem likely to revolt against you at any moment. If the truth be told, you have no territory whose populace is not hard pressed financially; nor are your domains, which are mortgaged, sold, or saddled with debts, able to help you. Again, you have seen how agitated your Flemish subjects are; some of them, indeed, are in armed rebellion. Strange and bitter things have been said about yourself, your government, and your leading councillors; and it is very like that, having got as far as talking in this way, they will soon go further than mere talk. Moreover, if you pacify them by kindness and by accepting their demands, other towns, which have similar aspirations, will rebel in the hopes of getting similar treatment. On the other hand, if you punish and repress them, it is to be feared that they will make disastrous alliances with your enemies. If by chance they start pillaging and robbing, it is possible that every wicked person will start plundering the rich. Covetousness exists among the well-off; you can imagine how much worse it is among the populace. In this matter, there is much anxiety. I note that, according to reports, the English are planning to keep a large number of ships at sea in order to effect a commercial blockade of your land of Flanders. This is a grave danger, for such harm would result if that country were deprived for any length of time of its cloth industry and commerce. And you appreciate how much it cost to send a fleet to sea to protect this commerce and resist the enemy. Moreover, if Holland and Zeeland continue their trade with the English, and they will probably want to do this, the Flemings, finding themselves without commerce, without their cloth industry, and involved in war on sea and land, will probably make an alliance with the English, your enemies, which could be very much to your prejudice and dishonor.56

The original of this text is found in Kervyn de Lettenhove, Programme dun gouvernement constitutionnel en Belgique au XVe sicle, Bulletin de lAcadmie Royale de Belgique 2nd ser., 14 (1862): 218-50. I have used the translation found in Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier, The Promised Lands: The Low Countries Under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530, ed. Edward Peters, trans. Elizabeth Fackelman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 84.

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At the siege of Calais then, war financing can also be blamed for the failure, with the Flemish town rivalries perhaps at fault. The economic problems that directly followed the failed siege must also be considered. For one thing, immediately after the Burgundian withdrawal, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, who had succeeded to the leadership of the English troops in France after the death of his brother, John of Bedford, the previous year, and who had arrived to take command at Calais only to see the flight of the besiegers, led his own raid into western Flanders. Taking advantage of the Burgundian confusion, Gloucester burned several villages south of Dunkirk and around Ypres. The English fleet also raided along the Flemish coast as far north as the Zwin estuary and the island of Cadzand before both army and navy returned to Calais.57 This fulfilled in essence the last paragraph of Lannoys letter: the citizens of the southern Low Countries, and the Flemings in particular on this occasion, found themselves in the ironic position of defending their countryside and towns from the very people on whom their livelihood chiefly depended.58 Philip the Good and the Burgundian army would not be coming to their aid, as a number of letters from the ducal court to the Ghentenaars and others in Flanders insisting that the Flemings must defend themselves suggest.59 One would expect to see a similarity throughout Flanders during these troubled times, and, once again, the irony of it all is that these were the people with whom Flanders had been allied for more than two centuries, far longer than they had been in Burgundian control. It would not be long before the first paragraph of Lannoys letter would also be fulfilled: the larger towns of the southern Low Countries would seek their own means to ensure their economic wellbeing. They would rebel. Already by the end of 1436, led by their soldiers returning from Calais, the inhabitants of Bruges began an open rebellion against Philip the Good.60 It was the first of many
Vaughan, Philip the Good, 82-84. Examples of the cost of this defense appears in Kelly De Vries, Provisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense, August 1436, Journal of Medieval Military History 3 (2005): 176-83. 59 See V. Fris, Documents Gantois concernant la leve du sige de Calais en 1436, in Mlanges Paul Frdricq (Brussels: H. Lamertin, 1904), 245-58. 60 The military history of this siege can be found in Smith and DeVries, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy. See also Jan Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand van
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Low Countries rebellions Philip the Good would be forced to face and put down. Although he allowed some generals aligned with him to fight on the side of the French, Philip the Good himself never returned to the Hundred Years War, nor did he allow the Burgundian army to be used en masse in any of Charles VIIs military conquest. Although he frequently drifted into Crusading fantasies and other imaginative and unfulfilled military adventures,61 from this time forward the dukes focus was firmly placed on the southern Low Countries, geographically, and his treasury, financially. Never again would he rely on someone else to pay for an engagement, as he had with the English at Compigne, or risk an enormous amount of expensive weapons on a single military endeavor, such as at Calais.

1436-1438 (Courtrai-Heule: U.G.A., 1997), Vaughan, Philip the Good, 86-92, and Blockmans and Prevenier, The Promised Lands, 98-99. 61 See Kelly DeVries, The Failure of Philip the Good to Fulfill His Crusade Promise of 1454, in The Medieval Crusade, ed. Susan Ridyard (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), 157-70.

THE COST OF MAJESTY: FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL COURT IN PORTUGAL AND ENGLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Susannah C. Humble Ferreira

The changes brought to bear in the royal courts of England and Portugal, at the turn of the sixteenth century, are strikingly similar. The households of both Henry VII (1485-1509) and Manuel I (14951521) underwent a sizeable increase in both human and spatial terms. Despite the constant fluctuation in population, attributable to location of the household and immediate political circumstances, it is evident that during these reigns, more people came to live as dependents of the king than ever before. It is true that household numbers had been on the rise in preceding reigns, and Rosemary Horrox has made a convincing argument that Richard III of England (1483-1485) appointed many of his retainers to positions within the royal household.1 Similarly, records from the reign of the Portuguese king Joo II point to an escalation in the number of residents at court receiving stipends or moradias.2 But the research of Sean Cunningham has shown that Henry VII doubled the number of dependants known as knights of the body as part of a strategy designed to increase his own political security.3 And the surviving records of Manuel Is court indicate a similar trend occurring in Portugal.4 In order to accommodate these growing numbers, both Henry VII and Manuel I undertook a number of important building projects: the former king refurbishing and constructing large palaces along the River Thames, while the latter erected and expanded his
Rosemary Horrox, Richard III: A Study in Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 2 D. Antnio Caetano de Sousa, Provas da histria genealogica da Casa Real portuguesa (Coimbra: Atlntida, 1947), 3: 217-224. 3 Sean Cunningham, The Establishment of the Tudor Regime: Henry VII, Rebellion and the Financial Control of the Aristocracy 1485-1509, Ph.D. Diss., Lancaster University (1995). 4 Caetano de Sousa, Provas da histria genealogica, 3: 440-476.
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domiciles in and around the important towns of Santarm, vora and Lisbon.5 Such rapid expansion, in both England and Portugal, reveals a changing attitude toward the royal household and arguably marks a shift from a medieval household to a Renaissance-style court. No longer was presence at court restricted to essential personnel and a handful of grandes and no longer were household ordinances punctuated by legislation limiting their numbers. In Portugal, new ordinances in 1516 allowed lower ranking servants to maintain wives and families.6 And by the turn of the sixteenth century, the size of the royal households in both kingdoms began to outstrip the proscriptions that had limited their sizes in earlier centuries. From the medieval royal household, obsessed with economy, emerged the renaissance court devoted to appearances of opulence and majesty. Such was the transformation that historian Sir Geoffrey Elton could glibly claim: the Tudor court as a centre of social and political life springs suddenly into existence with the accession of Henry VIII.7 Of course, the royal courts did not, and could not, have materialized from thin air; transformation was attributable to major changes in the financial administration of both the royal households and the kingdoms. Research reflects that by securing a steady and reliable cash-flow into the coffers of the royal household, Henry VII and Manuel I were able to overcome substantial household debt and expand their royal courts. In revisiting the world of late medieval royal finance, a number of historians have cautioned against straightforward readings of exchequer and household accounts. Given the imperfect separation between personal and professional identity, the officers who handled the kings money were individually responsible for sums in their possession. Thus as historian David Grummitt has noted, the oftcited accounts of the treasury of the chamber record only the sums
5 For a comparison of the money spent by Henry VII on palaces as compared to Edward IV, see H. M. Colvin, History of the Kings Works (London: Her Majestys Stationery Office, 1963-1982), 2: 1024 and 4: 223. Also Simon Thurley, The Royal Palaces of Tudor England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 19. Information on Manuel Is expenditure on building works can be found in Anselmo Braamcamp Freire, ed., Cartas de quitao del Rei D. Manuel, Archivo Histrico Portuguez 1-7 (1903-1909). 6 British Library (BL) Add. 20958. 7 Geoffrey Elton, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3: 40.

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of money that passed through the hands of the Treasurer, John Heron and do not reflect a complete picture of the money controlled by the department as a whole.8 This principle of private accountability is evident in the Portuguese quittance letters, or cartas das quitaes that are made known to us through the royal chancery records. These quittances show that a crown official had to account for all money in his possessionsometimes even from beyond the graveand officials and their families were held accountable for sums as if they had been held as a personal loan.9 Thus, in order to understand the operation of household administrative departments, it becomes necessary to consider the personal relationships of administrative officials, many of whom held more than one office. Since the publication of W. C. Richardsons Tudor Chamber Administration in 1952, the attention given to the Treasury of the Chamber, as the kingdoms primary financial department in the reign of Henry VII, has muddied our understanding of court finance.10 While the Treasury of the Chamber was undoubtedly the backbone of the financial machinery throughout much of the reign of Henry VII, it was not the primary financial department at court: that place belonged to the Treasury of the Household. A clue to the veritable relationship between these two departments can be seen in relation to the career of Sir Thomas Lovell. From 1485 until 1492, Lovell served as Treasurer of the Chamber, also occupying the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. But after the death of Sir Richard Croft in 1502, Lovell was given the position of Treasurer of the Household in what was ostensibly a promotion.11 The new office would have been more prestigious inasmuch as it gave Lovell an important position within the itinerant court, thereby offering him greater access to the king. But his new appointment also brought a closer social tie between the treasuries of the chamber and house-

David Grummitt, Henry VII, Chamber Finance and the New Monarchy: Some New Evidence, Historical Research 179 (1999): 229-243. 9 For example, the wife and heirs of Estevo Pestana, mantieiro of the royal household had to account for all the silver and goods that had been in his possession. Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo (AN/TT), Chancelarias de D. Manuel, liv. 29, fol. 118. 10 W. C. Richardson, Tudor Chamber Administration (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952). 11 S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 126.

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hold insofar as the new Treasurer of the Chamber was John Heron, who had previously been serving as Lovells deputy. Presuming that the relationship of the two office-holders reflects the relationship of the two departments, it would appear that the treasury of the chamber was working to facilitate the expenditure of the treasury of the household. The traditional role of the treasury of the household, or counting house as it was sometimes called, was to regulate the expenditure of the royal household. Although the head of this department was nominally the Lord Steward, the official in charge of running all aspects of the household, the two main figures in its operation were the Treasurer, who looked after all monetary assignments to the household and the Controller who kept a counter roll of expenses.12 Because these officers were of high social rank, and were often physically absent from the household, it was the official known as the Cofferer who managed the daily expenses of the major household departments. Extant Cofferers accounts reveal that while the responsibilities of this official changed somewhat over the course of the reign, he continued to disburse money to the purveyors of the major household departments for diet and supplies throughout the reign.13 According to the Black Book, the sergeants of the various departments were also supposed to deposit their tallies with the Cofferer, so that they might be redeemed by the various merchants and suppliers in the localities.14 For this reason, the smooth running of the royal household depended upon a regular supply of coin into the hands of the Cofferer. It was financial constraint that limited the size of the royal household during the late middle ages. Large households placed considerable strain on surrounding areas and, while house-to-house purveyance was a thing of the past, the kings subjects were undoubtedly affected when several hundred hungry mouths descended suddenly upon a village, demanding food and accommodation. If the Cofferer did not have enough cash in hand to redeem tallies, then local merchants and innkeepers would not be repaid. Further

A. R. Myers, The Household of Edward IV The Black Book and the Ordinance , of 1478 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), 144-7. 13 Public Record Office (PRO) E 101 413/5, 7, 8, 12; 414/2, 3, 5, 9, 13; 415/1, 6, 9, 12, 13, 15; 416/1. 14 Myers, Household of Edward IV, 167.

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social unrest resulted if household servants, who received wages in lieu of diet, went unpaid and were forced to obtain food and lodging by whatever means necessarybad credit, violence or theft.15 The poor management of the treasury of the household during the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461), provoked a reaction from Parliament. The treasurys inability to meet household running costs, which by 1449 were estimated at 24,000 per annum, had encouraged the promulgations of an ordinance that attempted to limit its size.16 Although financial recovery was seen during the reign of Edward IV, the Black Book attempted to limit the membership of the royal household, cautioning that the kyng wull haue his goodes dispended but not wasted.17 In 1485, Parliament authorized an increase in the annual subsidy paid to the royal household; seemingly its objective was not to underwrite the costs of expansion or enhancement, but rather to alleviate the burden placed on the kings subjects who had, according to the Commons, been grievously charged with continual taking of their goods and chattels for the expenses of his most honourable household whereof they have not been sufficiently contented nay paid, to their great impoverishing.18 It had long been the expectation that English kings should live of their own, meaning that they should finance their households with the profits of the lands that they had controlled as individuals. By the reign of Henry VI, it was realized that this expectation was unrealistic, and in 1454, as the crown faced civil war, the king was granted a meager allowance of 5,500 to help to defray household expenses.19 Upon his accession in 1461 Edward IV began to channel his private revenues into the treasury of the chamber in order to meet costs and tackle the debt of the royal household.20 But his efforts were designed to get household finance on solid footing rather than to expand his household and Edward IVs initial measure was to reduce household size. Although there is evidence of expansion by the end of his reign, both the Black Book and Ordinance
15 Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 282-3. 16 Myers, Household of Edward IV, 63-75. 17 Myers, Household of Edward IV, 87. 18 J. Strachey et al., eds., Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento (London: s.n., 1767), 6: 299. 19 Wolffe, Henry VI, 301. 20 David Loades, The Tudor Court (London: Batsford, 1986), 74.

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of 1478 were preoccupied with economy.21 And in 1482, when Parliament agreed to raise the annual exchequer assignment to the treasury of the household to 11,000, it still fell short of the household running costs which the Black Book had estimated to be 14,000.22 By the accession of Henry VII to the throne in 1485 it is clear that the crown was in financial trouble again. The expansion of the household undertaken by Richard III was not accompanied by administrative changes that would sustain a larger household over the long term; if such changes had been on the horizon, then this king did not remain on the throne long enough to put them into play. Henry VII had an added disadvantageunlike his Yorkist predecessors, he did not possess enough private property to help him meet the running costs of the government. Thus in 1485, Parliament increased the subsidy from 11,000 to 14,000 and augmented this sum by 2,100 to pay for supplies in the royal wardrobe.23 This increase of more than 5,000 appears to be a tacit acknowledgment of the differences between a kings public and private wealth. As heir to the Duke of York, Edward IV had been able to put his private revenues toward household expenditure and freely channeled these receipts through the Treasury of the Chamber. Richard III was entitled to do the same with the lands he controlled as the Duke of Gloucester. However the bulk of the landed revenues available to Henry VII had been acquired through formal Acts of Attainder in Parliament, and was thus processed through the national treasury of the exchequer. Thus they could only be made available to the king through Parliamentary assignment. By 1485, the income that had traditionally financed the royal household, including revenues from the vast duchies of Cornwall and the Lancaster, was no longer controlled by the king as a private landholder, but formed part of the patrimony of the crown.24 The matter might appear to be academic, but the implicit differences between public and private wealth appeared to have had an effect on the way revenues were controlled. The household assignment

Myers, Household of Edward IV, 12-3. Myers, Household of Edward IV, 230; Rotuli Parliamentorum, 6: 198-202. 23 Rotuli Parliamentorum, 6: 299. 24 A description of the lands comprising the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster is provided by Colvin, History of the Kings Works, 1: 470-6.
22

21

Wes-

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1495.28 The substitution clause of 1489, ensured that despite the fact that the revenues from these lands were actually going through the chamber, the king could collect the equivalent amount of money from other sources of public revenue, such as customs revenues or tunnage and poundage. Thus, although the assignment from the exchequer might have appeared to have been reduced from 1489 onward, in actuality Henry VII was collecting on some of this income twice. Accompanying such double dipping was a change in the way in which various expenses of the royal household were being paid for. A fragment of a document outlining household accounting procedure reveals that before 1493 the wages of most household servants: including sewers, ushers, waiters, messengers, grooms, pages and even servants of the chamber were paid by the Cofferer, from the Treasury of the Household. At this time other honorary servants such as sergeants-at-arms, carvers and cupbearers were paid directly from the exchequer. Only knights and esquires of the body received their wages from the Treasury of the Chamber.29 Yet according to the extant accounts of the Treasurer of the Chamber, John Heron, by the end of the reign it is evident that nearly all servants received their wages from the Treasury of the Chamber.30 Toward the end of the reign, the various accounts belonging to the Treasury of the Household reveal that the bulk of expenditure went towards diets while the Treasury of the Chamber came to underwrite other costs, such as the building expenses and entertainment. The sum of money that the treasury of the household received from the Exchequer does not appear to have increased over the course of the reign; the amount received per annum was consistent with the 13,000 per annum stipulated by Parliament.31 Although this fact seems to suggest that the expenses of the treasury of the household did not increase, the Coffers accounts mask a number

Rotuli Parliamentorum, 6: 433. PRO E 101/416/11. Given his inclusion as one of the members of the household, this document appears to predate the death of Thomas West who died in 1493. See Calendar of Patent Rolls (London: Her Majestys Stationery Office, 1914-1916), 1: 421. 30 BL Add. 21480. 31 PRO E 101/413/4, E101/413/5, E101/413/7, E101/413/12, E101/414/2, E101/414/5, E101/414/9: E101/414/13, E101/415/6, E101/415/9, E101/415/12, E101/416/1.
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Chamber to the Treasury of the Household. Couched in the terminology of an indenture, the terms of this financial arrangement are laid out in a Close Letter of 1499 stating that 1,000 was to be granted to the Cofferer each month and provided that if there are tallies that cannot be met he would receive allowances for the same.34 Thus it appears that 1,000 per month was being used by Cope to redeem tallies brought to him by local merchants and suppliers and that Cope was personally liable for any of this money not accounted for. The fact that Cope continued to receive this assignment until at least 1505 suggests that the Chamber assignment became an enduring arrangement. Thus, in effect the treasury of the household was receiving a total in excess of 25,000 per year after 1499: 13,000 in assignments from the exchequer and 12,000 from the chamber to meet the cost of tallies. The diversity of payments listed in the accounts of the treasury of the chamber gives a false impression that the financial departments in operation during the reign were crude in their administration. However administrative changes undertaken during the reign of Henry VII offered treasury officials greater flexibility and reflect a marked effort to organize finances in such a way as to increase the flow of cash into the hands of the Cofferer. The exchequer of receipt channeled public monies such as customs revenues and tunnage and poundage, whereas the treasury of the chamber received profits from crown lands. And as Grummitt has shown, surplus cash from both departments came to be stored in the crown coffers in the Tower of London. The treasury of the household, once a department that handled the majority of crown expenses, was streamlined into the department that merely financed the diet and supplies of the expanding royal household. And it was the regular and reliable supply of money into this department that not only allowed Henry VII to achieve solvency and quell the complaints of the Commons, but to expand the size of his household. At the turn of the sixteenth century, Portugal presents itself as an interesting comparison to England. Although the kingdom did not suffer the same damaging effects of a long-term dynastic struggle akin to the Wars of the Roses, a devastating war with Castile (14751479) wreaked havoc on royal finances. Moreover, Afonso V (14331481) had granted lands and annuities at an unprecedented rate
34

Calendar of Close Rolls (London: Public Record Office, 1955), 1: 322.

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over the course of his long reign that further impoverished the crown. Although his successor, Joo II (1481-1495) worked hard to place the crown on surer financial footing, his success was limited. Lands confiscated from those nobles implicated in the conspiracies of 1483 and 1484 were soon granted out again and after 1489 the crown lost the valuable revenues from the Duchy of Viseu. Unlike the English crown, the kings of Portugal were to enjoy additional income from the profits of the overseas expansion. But until the turn of the sixteenth century the ability of the crown to fund the royal household from these revenues was limited. While the successive conquests of the North African captaincies might have been lucrative from the perspective of individual nobles, the defense of such places as Ceuta and Tangier drained crown resources. Furthermore, although the development of sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands contributed to metropolitan wealth and trade, immediate profits belonged to the Duchy of Viseu and were exempt from crown taxation. And although the construction of the important trading fort of So Jorge da Mina, begun in 1482, was to play an important role in stimulating tradethe effects were not seen until the end of the reign.35 Until the turn of the sixteenth century, the crown remained plagued by financial shortfall that placed limitations on the size of the royal household. While the Portuguese crown was able to maintain the royal household on a system of credit, its repeated failure to meet costs outraged the Cortes. In the session of 1459, representatives demanded that the king exercise moderation in household expenditure and in 1472-1473 it was explicitly requested that Afonso V reduce the size of the royal household.36 Representative assemblies expressed a willingness to provide for the royal household, but only if the crown exercised restraint. Even as late as 1498, the Cortes entreated the king to keep a moderate household.37 The complaints of these representatives reflected the frustrations of a populace burdened by crown debt and it is evident from the cartas das quitaes that even as late

35 Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, Ensaios II, Sobre histria de Portugal (Lisbon: S da Costa, 1978), 55. 36 Armindo da Sousa, As Cortes medievais portuguesas, 1385-1490 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1990), 363, 384. 37 Joo Jos Alves Dias, ed., Cortes portuguesas: Reinado de D. Manuel, Cortes de 1498 (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Histricos, 2002), 179.

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nues was derived from the customary taxes of the sisa and the dizima. The sisa, which formed nearly three quarters of crown revenues in the fifteenth century, was levied on any merchant activity or sales and was most often paid at trade fairs on wine, cereals, meat, colored cloth and imported textiles. Very few exemptions were granted on the sisa, and nobility and even royalty were obliged to pay this tax.42 The dizima, on the other hand, was levied on all imports by sea and on goods coming through dry ports. Given the volume of trade coming through Portuguese ports in the fifteenth century, the yields from this tax should have been lucrative.43 The stumbling block was that the system of collection and delivery to the central coffers of the Casa dos Contos was inefficient. It is often assumed that social and economic change occurring in Portugal in the early sixteenth century was attributable to the windfall of the Indian Ocean spice trade. While extraordinary riches were indeed dumped in the lap of Manuel I (whose unabashed epithet was the Fortunate), his good luck has masked the concerted efforts put forth by his administration to instigate reform and increase revenues from domestic sources. Like Henry VII, Manuel I inherited a kingdom rife with political faction. Few records are left that can testify to the effect which the conflicts and confiscations had on revenue collection at a local level, but it can be surmised that war in the 1470s and the purges of the nobility that took place in the 1480s brought an added confusion to the networks of crown administration operating in the localities. If the profits of the sisa and the dizima were the main sources of cash feeding the coffers of the household, then interruptions in their collection would have had a direct impact on its operation. The efforts of the Manueline administration to reform local practices of revenue collection in the early years of the reign can therefore be seen as a conscious attempt by the king to increase his ability to finance the royal household.

Exempt from this tax were gold, silver, baked bread, horses and arms. Joo Cordeiro Pereira, Para a histria das Alfndegas em Portugal no incio do sculo XVI (Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1983), 22-6. 43 Once rated as a tenth of the balance of trade, rules and rates changed during successive reigns in the fifteenth century. Amendments to the dizimas were made during the reigns of D. Joo I and D. Afonso V to combat abuse. See Dizimas, in Joel Serro, ed., Dicionrio de histria de Portugal (Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1979), 2: 326.

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Compared to his predecessor Joo II, Manuel I was a much wealthier king, even before his proverbial ships came in. As heir to the Duchy of Viseu, Manuel I was able to draw upon lands and income worth more than twenty-eight million ris.44 While much of this land was granted away in the decades to come, these added revenues gave him an initial cash injection as well as the ability to buy the support of various sections of the political elite at the time when he first took the throne. Similar to the practice of Henry VII, Manuel I authorized commissions to investigate the condition of the administrative machinery. In 1496 the king sent a commission led by his chancellor Dr. Rui Boto, to examine local charters in order to assess obligations of taxation and to perform a local survey establishing the lands held in feudal tenure. These enquiries would have provided information about the effectiveness of local administrative officials as well as up to date information about the rents and taxes owed by towns and independent landholders. Ostensibly they provided the background information that prompted the program of administrative reform enacted later in the reign.45 During the reign, a number of reforms were put into effect, many of which had a perceptible impact on revenue collection. Notable among these reforms were the Ordenaes Manuelinas, first published in 1514 but reissued in 1521. They clearly articulated the duties, obligations and procedures to be followed by crown agents and officials. In addition, the reign witnessed the standardization of weights and measures and also the reissue of town charters. Both of these latter reforms would have had direct repercussions on revenue collection because they controlled prices and established concrete guidelines enabling crown agents to better enforce the payment of the sisa. Also, in 1516 the king and his ministers oversaw the reform of the financial administration of the entire kingdom, known as the fazenda. While the reforms undertaken over the course of the reign might seem to demonstrate an altruistic interest in good government and civil harmony, they undoubtedly reflect, to a significant degree, the self-interest of the crown. It remains that the administrative re-

44 Damio de Gis, Crnica de D. Manuel (Coimbra: University da Coimbra, 1949), 1: 24. 45 Joo Jos Alves Dias, ed. Portugal do Renascimento Crise Dinstica, (Lisbon: Editorial Presena, 1998), 714.

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forms put into effect had a perceived effect on domestic revenue, evidenced by the claims of Vitorino Magalhes Godinho that crown revenues increased by fifty per cent between 1506 and 1518, rising from sixty-six million ris (38,000) to nearly a hundred million ris (54,000).46 It is important to recognize that the reforms of the fazenda were not enacted merely to impose an academic sense of order upon the network of financial administration. Virginia Rau has argued that the Portuguese crown increased the efficiency of revenue connection by separating the departments of collection and audit. Thus under the new system, officials called Contadores were entrusted with the task of collecting rents and chasing down withheld payments, while the officials known as Almoxarifes, who had once performed these duties, were responsible for conducting the audits. But, as Rau notes herself, the Almoxarifes continued to administer and collect the sisa which, as mentioned, remained one of the main sources of crown revenue.47 It appears that rather than legislating a strict division between officials of audit and collection, what the crown was attempting to do was to speed up the process by which money made its way to the central coffers. Taken at the point of sale, the sisa could be assessed, collected and processed much more quickly than annual rents; officials designated as Recebedores, or Receivers, of the sisa could channel the profits to the central administration on a more regular basis. Contadores, who were burdened with the more cumbersome task of rent collection would be given more time to complete their duties. One of the provisions of the fazenda reforms was the regulation of the tax schedule so that both taxpayers and officials could thus anticipate the process of collection and get their accounts in order. Every two years, the Contadores would have been summoned to Lisbon in order to render their accounts to the central authorities, headed by the Vedores da Fazenda. Thus, every other January, Contadores collected money owed to the crown and conveyed the
46 The increase in revenues from the individual almoxarifados can be exemplified by Guarda, where revenues went from 27 (47,500 rs.) in 1496, to 31 (54,700 rs.) in 1504, to 65 (113,000 rs.) in 1510, leveling out between 1516 and 1521 at 245 (430,000 rs.). See Finanas pblicas e estrutura do estado, in Serro, Dicionrio, 3: 32-3. 47 Virginia Rau, A Casa dos Contos (Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras, 1951), 62-7.

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amounts to the Almoxarife. Balances were then to be settled by the middle of February, and the Contadores would then assemble their reports to present to the Vedores da Fazenda and their deputies in the late spring and summer.48 By relieving the Almoxarife from the responsibility of collecting rents and by remitting the revenues from this source separately, the crown greatly increased the efficiency of the system of revenue collection. Apart from reorganizing the financial administration of the kingdom, changes to the system of household finance also increased the ability of the crown to access money in order to pay for the royal household. The changes undertaken at the level of the royal household were aimed at making the financial administration more flexible in order to channel the increased revenues directly into the hands of the Escrivo da Camara. Thus, in 1504, the king appointed a new official, known as the Provedor, to act as a liaison between the national treasury known as the Casa dos Contos and the Escrivo da Camara. Since the household does not appear to have generated any significant source of revenue, and because the process of audit was undertaken by the Vedores da Fazenda, it can be assumed that the primary purpose of this official was to communicate the financial needs of the royal household to the Casa dos Contos and to ensure that the necessary sums of money were brought into the coffers of the household. A decade later, the formal structure of the financial administration was altered in order to reflect the fact that the royal household was now drawing its income freely from the profits of the kingdom. Whereas beforehand the department that had regulated the expenses of the royal household had been termed the Contos do Rei and was separate from the Casa dos Contos, the new department was an amalgamation of the two and was called the Contos da Casa e Reino.49 The impact of this reorganization on the financial footing of the royal household becomes immediately apparent when one examines the way that the issue of lodging was handled. At the turn of the sixteenth century, accommodation for the king and his dependents was managed by local counting houses called aposentadorias, which
48 Rau, Casa dos Contos, Alenquer and Setbal. On On 1 July: contadores of Moncorvo. 49 Rau, Casa dos Contos,

62-7. On 1 May: Contador Mor, Santarm, Leiria, 1 June: vora, Beja, Coimbra, Viseu and Guarda. the Algarve, Porto, Guimares and Trre de 27.

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were supervised by a crown official known as the Aposentador Mor. This official was responsible for ascertaining the numbers of people at court who were entitled to lodging through the royal household, and then worked with the local aposentadorias to requisition the appropriate number of beds. Although the kings subjects were required by law to provide housing for the members of the court when it was in residence in their village or town, the crown was obliged to remunerate both innkeepers and private citizens for the lodging and food provided. The failure of previous kings to meet these payments and the tendency of members of the court to abuse their privileges had roused an endless number of complaints in the Cortes. By 1513, however, the position of Aposentador Mor, which had been filled at least until 1497, seems to have been rendered obsolete and is not mentioned in the Ordenaes Manuelinas.50 Instead, the departments of the aposentadorias of the three citiesSantarm, Lisbon and vorawhere the court was most frequently in residence, came under the direct control of one of the Vedores da Fazenda. At the same time, crown revenue agents came partially under the authority of the aposentadorias.51 What these changes implied is that revenues, such as those derived from the sisa, that were collected in these areas, could be used to directly pay for the debts incurred by the aposentadorias. This shift undoubtedly allowed the aposentadorias of Lisbon, Santarm and vora to rapidly pay off the debts that they had been accruing since 1477.52 For the royal household, the road to financial recovery in the earlier part of the reign lay in its ability to access the increased revenues coming in from the almoxarifados. But it cannot be denied that the great injection of wealth brought into the hands of the Portuguese crown from the profits of the emergent spice trade was to have a major impact on the development of the royal court. In 1506, around the time when the gold trade had reached its peak, this income contributed a sizeable forty million ris or 23,000 to crown revenues and profits from the spice trade were about the sameforty-four million ris or 25,000. Twelve years later, the

AN/TT, Leitura Nova, Estremadura, liv. 2, fol. 128v. AN/TT, Chancelarias D. Manuel, liv. 12, fol. 57; liv. 42, fol. 12v.; Chancelarias D. Joo III, liv. 17, fol. 23. 52 AN/TT, Chancelarias D. Manuel, liv. 7, fol. 44v.
51

50

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amount of revenue generated by the spice trade was close to one hundred million ris or 55,000.53 The vast quantities of cash, spices and other moveable goods that tumbled into the harbour warehouses in the port of Lisbon presented a golden opportunity for the cash-strapped Portuguese royal household. In 1501, the crown established the joint Casa da ndia e Guin in order to manage the profits from both the spice trade and gold trade. If the royal household had once suffered because of a dearth of cash or saleable goods, then the monetary surplus allowed household officials to redeem tallies and pay for necessary provisions from this department. It can be no coincidence that the Casa da ndia e Guin came to be located in the Ribeira Palace complex. Begun in 1505, this opulent edifice on the main commercial square of the River Tagus replaced the castle of So Jorge as the residence of the royal court when it was housed in Lisbon.54 The royal court thus began to siphon off the wealth generated through overseas trade and diverted it in order to finance the royal household. Despite the fact that increased revenues were coming in from domestic sources, money from the Casa da ndia e Guin was more readily usable. If one examines the changes in the money used to pay the stipends or moradias of the kings dependents, the relationship between the court and the Casa da ndia e Guin, (later the Casa da ndia) becomes obvious. In 1498, more than forty per cent of the money being taken to pay the living allowances of the fidalgos resident at court came from the kingdom, either as receipts from the almoxarifados or other revenues associated with regular taxation. About twenty per cent of the income derived from customs subsidies while another twenty per cent came from foreign trade, most of which comprised profits from sugar from Madeira, which had been part of the patrimony of the Duchy of Viseu that Manuel I was able to bring with him to the throne. Just over ten years later, more than half of these revenues derived from overseas sources and the majority came from the pepper trade. Money from the almoxarifados and rents consisted of about only twenty per cent of the money received by the fazenda; the amount being received from customs was about

Finanas pblicas, 3: 33. Damio de Gis, Descrio da Cidade de Lisboa (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1988), 61.
54

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In general, Henry VII increased revenues by ensuring that his receivers were both loyal and efficient and by exercising his prerogative in all cases where he stood to profit. But it was not enough for the king to merely generate incomehe had to make sure that the monetary surplus was channeled directly into the central coffers. At least 13,000 was guaranteed to the king by way of exchequer assignment which was ostensibly to be comprised of customs revenues and other public money coming from landed estates confiscated through acts of attainder. Even when Henry VII began to divert revenues from crown land, both public and private through the Treasury of the Chamber, he continued to collect the full sum of the assignment, substituting other revenues from the sources specified by Parliament. Over the course of the reign, the financial departments of the kingdom were reorganized so that the Treasury of the Household paid only for the diet and supplies of the householdwhich required a steady influx of cash; and, after 1499, in addition to the income received from the exchequer, the Cofferer of the household received an additional 1,000 per month. Developments in the financial administration of Portugal suggest that Manuel I had a similar priority of providing adequate and regular funding for the royal household. The Manueline Reforms of 1516 allowed the Almoxarifes to streamline their process of revenue collection and to rapidly funnel the profits of the sisa into the central coffers. The reform and standardization of urban charters or foros helped to regulate prices and thus normalize taxation. The standardization of weights and measures, achieved during the reign, also helped crown agents in this task. Even before the windfall of the India trade deluged the warehouses of Lisbon, the crown facilitated the financing of the royal household by making alterations in its personnel. The creation of the office of Provedor in 1504 allowed money to be carried freely between the counting house and the royal household and this link was formalized with the formation of the amalgamated department of the Contos da Casa e Reino. The replacement of the Aposentador Mor by one of the Vedores da Fazenda as the official in charge of organizing and paying for accommodation for the royal household epitomised the crowns objective of properly funding the royal household and this move drastically reduced the red-tape involved in paying for lodgings. Finally, the construction of the Ribeira Palace, which jointly housed the kings household and the Casa da

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ndia allowed the court to directly draw upon the revenue and saleable goods coming from India. Reforms affecting the financial administration in both England and Portugal at the turn of the sixteenth century were precipitated by the kings determination to expand the size of the royal household. This development may have been stimulated by a wish to keep up with expanding courts elsewhere in Europe as well as to extend and strengthen their political connections within their kingdoms. Yet in the century that preceded the reigns of Henry VII and Manuel I, the monarchs of England and Portugal had faced great difficulty in paying the diets and wages of a household restricted in numbers previous kings had difficulties achieving solvency, let alone expansion. The ability of the kings to enlarge their households depended on their ability to channel money into the hands of the Treasurers of their household and many of the major reforms undertaken in these reigns were designed to do just this. The changes that rendered crown finance more efficient were not undertaken in a spirit of altruism; nor were legal reforms and the standardization of weights and measures seen in both kingdoms for the benefit of the kings subjects alone and the self interest of the two monarchs is evident in the spoils raked in by their tax collectors.

WARFARE, SHIPPING, AND CROWN PATRONAGE: THE IMPACT OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR ON THE PORT TOWNS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
Maryanne Kowaleski

The debate on the economic costs and social consequences of the Hundred Years War has been part of most economic history syllabi since the 1960s when M. M. Postan published a negative view and K. B. McFarlane a more positive assessment of the impact of the war on the English economy.1 The debate has since developed many strands, from A. R. Bridburys argument that there was nothing special about the Hundred Years War in a society in which war was a constant factor, to conflicting analyses of the impact of rising war taxation.2 Other scholars have focused on the costs and bene1

K. B. McFarlane, War, the Economy, and Social Change: England and the Hundred Years War, Past and Present 22 (1962), 3-13, with discussion on 13-18; reprinted in K. B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays (London: Hambledon Press, 1981), 139-50. M. M. Postan, The Costs of the Hundred Years War, in Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 63-86, first published in Past and Present, no. 27 (1964), 34-53; and see also, M. M. Postan, Some Social Consequences of the Hundred Years War, in Essays on Medieval Agriculture, 49-62, first published in Economic History Review, 1st ser., 12 (1942): 1-12. J. W. Sherborne, The Hundred Years War: The English Navy: Shipping and Manpower, Past and Present 37 (1967), 163-75. See also a review of the debate in Philippe Contamine, Le cot de la Guerre de Cent Ans en Angleterre, Annales: conomies, socits, civilisations 20 (1965): 788-91. 2 A. R. Bridbury, The Hundred Years War: Costs and Profits, in Trade, Government, and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F. J. Fisher, ed. D. C. Coleman and A. H. John (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), 80-95. For discussions of the impact of war taxation, see especially Edward Miller, War, Taxation, and the English Economy in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, in War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin, ed. J. M. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 11-32; G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); J. R. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown, 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement no. 1, Oxford, 1975), J. W. Sherborne, The Cost of English Warfare with France in the Later Fourteenth Century, Bulletin of the

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fitsthrough ransom, plunder, and the award of officesto the aristocratic elite which led the war effort.3 John Munro has made particularly valuable contributions to the debate by pointing out how the disruptive effects of warfare from the 1290s through 1340s contributed to an industrial transformation in the textile trades.4 This essay concentrates on an overlooked but crucial part of the debate by exploring how the Anglo-French conflicts affected the shipping available in British port towns, particularly during the fourteenth century. Although historians have long noted the devastating impact on ports of naval impressments, coastal raids, privateering, and the disruption of maritime trade routes during the Hundred Years War,5 no one has focused exclusively on port towns and few
Institute of Historical Research 50 (1977): 135-50; J. R. Strayer, The Costs and Profits of War: The Anglo-French Conflict of 1294-1303, in The Medieval City, ed. H. A. Miskimin, D. Herlihy, A. L. Udovitch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 269-92; W. M. Ormrod, The Crown and the English Economy, 1290-1348, in Before the Black Death: Studies in the Crisis of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B. M. S. Campbell (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 149-83; W. M. Ormrod, The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1994), 83-101. 3 For example, K. B. McFarlane, The Investment of Sir John Fastolfs Profits of War, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 7 (1957): 91-116; and K. B. McFarlane, A Business Partnership in War and Administration 1421-1445, English Historical Review 78 (1963): 290-316; A. J. Pollard, John Talbot and the War in France 1427-1453 (London: Humanities Press, 1983); Simon Walker, Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: The Subcontracts of Sir John Strother, 1374, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 58 (1985): 100-6. 4 J. H. Munro, Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c. 1290-c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis? in Before the Black Death, 110-48. See also his The New Institutional Economics and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: The Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (2001): 1-47. 5 See, for example, Postan, Costs of the Hundred Years War, 64, 68; C. F. Richmond, War at Sea, in The Hundred Years War, ed. Kenneth Fowler (London: Macmillan, 1971), 96-121; Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 88-9, 122-23; Sherborne, English Navy, Shipping and Manpower; Michael Hughes, The Fourteenth-Century French Raids on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications, 121-43; N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660-1649 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 91-116; Maryanne Kowaleski, Port Towns: England and Wales 1300-1540, in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, ed.

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have discussed shipping, although it represented the chief form of capital investment in port towns. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the value of ships probably outstripped all other forms of industrial investment in England during the middle ages.6 In focusing on shipping and port towns, I want to query the uniformly negative view of the Wars impact on the maritime economy, a view which has been promulgated by historians such as J. W. Sherborne, who has arguedas part of the Past and Present debate between McFarlane and Postanthat coastal areas suffered from shouldering a greater proportion of the costs of war than inland regions.7 What I would like to suggest here, however, is that the picture is not as unrelievedly grim as naval and economic historians have claimed. The entrepreneurial merchants, shipowners, and mariners of English port towns sometimes found ways to profit from the War, particularly in the western ports (those from Hampshire westwards, around Devon, Cornwall, and Wales, and up the coast to Cumbria). The essential contributions of the port towns to the war effort, moreover, made the Crown increasingly open to their interests, more likely to address their petitions, and inclined to reward them with charters and other privileges. When the English kings needed ships to transport troops and supplies, patrol the coast, or engage the enemy at sea, they had three options. One was to call on the Cinque Ports, a confederation of south-eastern port towns which owed 57 manned ships for two weeks of service a year in return for a number of privileges and tax exemptions. But the Cinque Ports were rarely able to fulfill this quota by the fourteenth century because of the silting of their ports and war-time interruptions of the maritime trade on which their

D. M. Palliser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1: 469-70, 473. 6 Maryanne Kowaleski, Shipowners and Shipping in Medieval England, unpublished paper given at the 38th International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, 2003. 7 Sherborne, English Navy, Shipping and Manpower; see also his The Battle of La Rochelle and the War at Sea, 1372-5, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 47 (1969): 17-29. Other historians who have emphasized the negative costs of the Hundred Years War to the maritime sector include: H. J. Hewitt, The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966); and Timothy Runyan, Ships and Mariners in Later Medieval England, Journal of British Studies 16 (1977): 1-17.

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economies relied.8 A second option was for kings to build or purchase ships of their own, although this alternative was rarely pursued because of its enormous cost. In fact, the kings ships never represented more than 4 per cent of the fleets employed in the fourteenth-century naval campaigns.9 These vessels, moreover, were considered the kings personal property and could be sold or given away at any time.10 The third and most commonly used option was to impress mercantile shipping into naval service. Many of these cargo ships were cogs, which had to be specially outfitted with sterncastles and topcastles for war-time service, or with hurdles and gangways if they were to transport horses. To impress these merchant ships for naval duty, royal officials traveled from port town to port town to supervise their arrest, an activity which became much more frequent and onerous for shipowners from the 1290s on.11 Ships could be impressed before their voyage was completed, forced to unload their goods before they reached their final destination, or diverted to another port to pick up goods or troops for a period of weeks or even months at a time.12 Impressed ships could also be captured or destroyed and their crews held to ransom or killed. By the late 1340s the constant impressment of merchant vessels was provoking bitter complaints from port towns, who pointed out the unreasonable burdens that shipowners were expected to bear since they received no compensation for their ships when on naval service and also lost
8

K. M. E. Murray, The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1935), 206-16; May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 243; N. A. M. Rodger, The Naval Service of the Cinque Ports, English Historical Review 110 (1996): 636-51. 9 Rodger, Safeguard, 118. 10 When Henry V died, for example, the superb fleet of some 40 ships that he had assembled was soldon his orderto pay off his debts; see Colin Richmond, The Keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War: 1422-1440, History 49 (1964): 285-7. For a similar sale to settle Edward IIIs debts, see Runyan, Ships and Mariners, 9. 11 Many of the accounts survive, showing their routes and work at each port; see, for example, The National Archives, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO] E101/40/21, 41/33, 53/39. See also Rodger, Safeguard, 118-25. 12 For example: McKisack, Fourteenth Century, 244; Hewitt, Organization, 77; Timothy J. Runyan, The Organization of Royal Fleets in Medieval England, in Essays in Maritime History, ed. Timothy J. Runyan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 44-9.

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out on the commercial freightage they could have earned.13 The dissatisfaction port towns felt about these naval burdens was evident in the slowness with which many met the kings orders for ships, in outright disobedience by shipmasters who either ignored the ship call or left naval service prematurely to take on a commercial cargo, and by the mounting chorus of petitions from port towns and their residents regarding what they viewed as excessive and unfair burdens on their purse.14 From the Crowns point of view, the chief benefit of this reliance on mercantile shipping was its relatively low cost compared to what it would have to spend to build and maintain a permanent navy. Although naval historiansmany with the model of the modern navy foremost in their mindshave for years lamented the inefficiency and slow response time of the medieval naval system, they also acknowledge the Crowns creative financing in transferring the costs of shipping, crews, and victualling to port towns.15 The Crown was even able to shift the costs of purpose-built barges and balingers (oared vessels especially suited to war at sea because of their maneuverability) to port towns by instructing them to build ships for the navy on five different occasions from 1294 to 1401.16 Town revenues
13 Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous [hereafter CIM], vol. III (London: H.M.S.O., 1937), no. 14; Calendar of Close Rolls [hereafter CCR] 1349-54 (London: H.M.S.O., 1906), 550-1; Rotuli Parliamentorum [hereafter Rot. Parl.], 7 vols. (London, 1783-1832), 2: 320, 345, 346; 3: 66; for newly edited texts and translations, see W. M. Ormrod, ed., Parliament of November 1373, Text and Translation, (hereafter Parliament of [ ... ]), The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al. (CD-ROM, Leicester: Scholarly Editions, 2005) [hereafter PROME], item 29; W.M. Ormrod, ed., Parliament of April 1376, PROME, items 133, 136; G. H. Martin, ed., Parliament of April 1379, PROME, item 50. 14 For example: CCR 1343-46, 128-34; Calendar of Patent Rolls [hereafter CPR] 1348-50 (London: H.M.S.O., 1905), 72, 448; Rot. Parl., 2: 307; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of February 1371, PROME, item 32. See also Sherborne, Navy, Shipping and Manpower, 164-66; Hewitt, Organization, 77, 83. 15 Runyan, Ships and Mariners; Rodger, Safeguard, 118-25. See also Hewitt, Organization, 89. 16 In 1294 the Crown ordered 30 towns to provide a total of 20 large galleys or barges. We know that at least eight of these vessels were constructed, at considerable expense to the port towns. The barge provided by Southampton, for instance, cost the town 246, while Londons two barges cost the city over 580 in a five-month period. This experiment was enough of a success, however, that the cash-strapped Edward III increasingly resorted to this practice, ordering six barges in 1354, at least 70 barges and balingers in 1373, another 32 in 1377, and an additional 54 in 1401. See below, n.48; R.

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were nowhere near enough to pay for these new ships, so port towns had to raise the money from their own citizens. In Exeter, for instance, the money came from a special rate assessed on the richer burgesses, along with a smaller sum granted by the king from a tenth. Nonetheless, the barge that Exeter built in 1374-75 cost over 200 at a time when the town revenues were in the neighborhood of only 100-120 a year. And a few years later, in 1377, the town was ordered to provide yet another barge, a cost it only grudgingly met.17 The War also cost the port towns in other ways. Enemy coastal raids became a particular danger during the Hundred Years War, targeting ports from Scarborough to Haverfordwest in Wales.18 To counteract these threats, port towns were forced to spend significant amounts to construct and maintain seaward defenses, such as chains strung along harbor entrances, artillery fortifications, and reinforced stone walls and towers. War-time disruption of overseas trade routes was also costly. The lucrative annual voyage to Bordeaux to fetch wine, for instance, used to bring back some 20,000 tuns of wine a year to England in the first decade of the fourteenth century, but that amount fell to about 10,000 tuns a year by the end of the fourteenth century and even less by the mid-fifteenth century, though Gascony was still in English hands.19 Shipowners also had to absorb the costs of armed convoy ships when they went to Gascony during
J. Whitwell, The Newcastle Galley, A.D.1294, Archaeologia aeliana, 4th series, 2 (1926): 142-96; R. C. Anderson, English Galleys in 1295, Mariners Mirror 14 (1928), 220-41; J. T. Tinniswood, English Galleys, 1272-1377, Mariners Mirror 35 (1949): 276-315; Ian Friel, The Building of the Lyme Galley, 12941296, Proceedings of the Dorset Natural History and Archaeological Society 108 (1986): 41-4; Rodger, Safeguard, 473-5. 17 Devon Record Office [hereafter D.R.O.], Exeter City Archives, Miscellaneous Roll 6, m. 17 [for the special rate] and mm. 17, 17a, 25-28 [for the building and repair accounts of the barge in 1374-75 and 1376-77]. The annual town accounts are in DRO, Exeter City Archives, Receivers Accounts. For barges that Exeter was ordered to build for the king, see also CPR 1354-58, 221; Thomas Rymer, comp., Foedera, conventiones, litterae, et cujuscumque generis acta publica inter reges Angliae ..., ed. Adam Clarke, John Caley, and Frederick Holbrooke (London, Record Commission, 1816-69) 3 vols. in 6 [hereafter Foedera], 3/ii, 998-9; 4: 28; CCR 1399-1402, 238. For the financial difficulties faced by other towns ordered to build similar barges, see above, n.16. 18 Kowaleski, Port Towns, 469, for this and the following. 19 Margery K. James, Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade, ed. E. M. Veale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 10, 39, 41-3, 107-16.

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wartime, and, by the fifteenth century, the costs of wafting: protective convoys for the Yarmouth fishing fleets.20 Piracy and privateering also took their toll during the tumultuous war years, as when 25 English ships returning from Brittany with cargoes of salt were attacked and either captured or burnt by a Spanish fleet.21 The picture painted here reflects the traditional, accepted view of the impact of warfare on late medieval shipping and the port towns economies. I accept this picture too, but I do not believe it tells the whole story. The remainder of the essay, therefore, considers how the kings wars could also promote economic development and political empowerment. Some of these opportunities have been acknowledged by scholars. War profiteering, for example, obviously enriched some merchants and shipowners, particularly those in northern ports such as Newcastle, Hull, and Scarborough which served as supply points during the Scottish wars.22 Other ports prospered when they served as embarkation ports for naval fleets, especially when ships and their crews were forced to wait weeks until favorable winds or sufficient supplies arrived. The capture of Calais increased traffic through Sandwich, while Plymouth benefited from the more frequent expeditions to Brittany and Gascony.23 South20 James, Studies in the Wine Trade, 125-33; Maryanne Kowaleski, The Commercialization of the Sea Fisheries in Medieval England and Wales, International Journal of Maritime History, 15:2 (2003): 196-7. 21 Richmond, Keeping of the Seas; Stephen P. Pistono, Flanders and the Hundred Years War: The Quest for the Trve Marchande, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 49 (1976): 185-97; C. J. Ford, Piracy or Policy: The Crisis in the Channel, 1400-1403, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 29 (1979): 63-77. 22 Rosemary Horrox, The De La Poles of Hull (East Yorkshire Local History Society Series, no. 38, 1983), 9-27; Bryan Waites, The Medieval Ports and Trade of North-East Yorkshire, Mariners Mirror 63 (1977): 138; C. M. Fraser, The Life and Death of John of Denton, Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th series, 37 (1959): 303-25. 23 For this and the following, see M. Oppenheim, Maritime History, in The Victoria History of the County of Kent, ed. W. Page (London: Constable, 1926), 2: 247, 269; H. J. Hewitt, The Black Princes Expedition of 1355-1357 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 25-6, 36-8, 92-3, 148-9; Maryanne Kowaleski, The Port Towns of Fourteenth-Century Devon, in The New Maritime History of Devon, ed. M. Duffy et al. (London: Conway Press, 1992), 1: 63; L. G. Carr Laughton, Maritime History, in The Victoria History of the County of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, ed. W. Page (London: Constable, 1912), 5: 360-8; Barbara Carpenter Turner, Southampton as a Naval Centre, 1414- 1458, in Collected Essays on Southampton, ed. J. B. Morgan and P. Pederdy (Southampton: Southampton County Borough Council, 1961),

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ampton and Portsmouth became major naval bases, homes to extensive shipbuilding enterprises for the royal fleet. The shipbuilding that the king ordered so many ports to undertake also provided employment and training for a body of skilled shipwrights, in addition to channeling business to the merchants and shopkeepers who furnished naval supplies and victuals.24 What has not been fully recognized, however, are some of the other ways that the Hundred Years War altered the profile of port towns on the national stage. The kings growing reliance on shipping to carry out their territorial ambitions, for example, stimulated more recognition and appreciation of the contributions that shipowners, shipmasters, and mariners could make to strategic planning. Indeed, the Crown increasingly went out of its way to consult these shipping experts, going so far as to summon them to the so-called Councils of Shipping and Naval Parliaments in the mid and late fourteenth century. In 1326 the kings admirals were ordered to bring two men from each port who were well informed about shipping to London to advise the king and his Council.25 In 1339 shipmasters and mariners were issued writs to appear in Parliament, and their presence is reflected in agreements during the Parliament of 1340 to provide shipping to combat the French threat, as well as passage of a tax to provide for the safety of the sea.26 And on eight other occasions in the middle decades of the fourteenth centuryin 1336, 1341, 1342, 1344, 1347, 1369, 1374 and 1376as many as forty to fifty ports were ordered to each send one to four experienced mariners or men knowledgeable about shipping to advise the Kings Council at Westminster on nautical matters.27 These specific calls to
39-47. 24 Ian Friel, The Good Ship: Ships, Shipbuilding and Technology in England 1200-1520 (London: British Museum Press, 1995), 39-67; Susan Rose, ed., The Navy of the Lancastrian Kings: Accounts and Inventories of William Soper, Keeper of the Kings Ships, 1422-1427 (Navy Records Society, v. 123, 1982). 25 CCR 1323-27, 566. 26 Rot. Parl., 2: 107, 108; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of January 1340, PROME, items 5, 11, 12; W. M. Ormrod, Edward III: Parliament of January 1340, Introduction, PROME. 27 Report on the Dignity of a Peer of the Realm (London, 1826), 4: Appendix, Part II, 469-70, 526, 527, 539-40; Foedera, 2/ii, 1150; 1193; 3/i, 4, 105-6; 3/ii, 880-1, 1002. See also Nicholas Harris Nicolas, A History of the Royal Navy, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1847), 2: 74, 82-3, 95, 152; and Rodger, Safeguard, 124-5. Their ability to articulate maritime needs also prompted in 1347 the first grant of tonnage and poundage, customs duties levied to help

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include shipping experts in political deliberations at such a high level deserve more attention, not least because of the influence they must have exerted in the flood of parliamentary petitions and decisions concerning shipping and the navy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The growing political clout of the shipping industry is evident in the Crowns more positive responses to shipowners grievances from the mid-fourteenth century on. An allowance for wear and tear on the masts of ships pressed into naval service was made available in 1378, and in 1380 shipowners were finally granted regular compensation for the impressments of their ships.28 Called ton-tight, this compensation was paid at the rate of 3s 4d per ton for each three-month period of service. The allowance fell to 2s per ton when the grant was renewed in 1385, but it rose again in subsequent years and some form of monetary payment to shipowners became a regular feature of most naval impressments from this time forward.29 By at least 1338, moreover, knights and men-at-arms going overseas for wartime service had to pay shipowners to transport their horses, at the rate of 6s 8d per horse.30 Further concespay for the ships involved in the siege of Calais that year. 28 Rot. Parl. 3: 86, 212; Chris Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of January 1380, PROME, item 47; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of October 1385, PROME, item 28. Although 1380 was the first time that ton-tight was made a regular payment, it had been given to shipowners on an ad hoc basis from at least the late thirteenth century. In 1301, for instance, shipowners negotiated for a rate of 7s per ton; British Library, Add. Ms. 7966a, fols. 102-3, 130-31; CCR 1296-1302, 482-83. See also Michael Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 145. 29 For example, ton-tight was back to 3s 4d per ton for every three months of service by the reign of Henry V; PRO, E101/48/15, Rot. Parl., 4: 79, 104; Given- Wilson, ed., Parliament of March 1416, PROME, item 31; GivenWilson, ed., Parliament of October 1416, PROME, item 27. The regularity of ton-tight payments is also evident in the practice, from the late fourteenth century on, of recording the tonnage of each ship impressed for service; in many cases, the shipowner (who would have received the ton-tight payment) is also noted. By the 1480s, shipowners were receiving 1s a ton per month, a sum closer to commercial freightage; see Rodger, Safeguard, 125. 30 Bryce Lyon, The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet in the First Phase of the Hundred Years War (1338-1340), Handelingen der Maatschappij voor geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent, n.s., 51 (1997): 73 n.19; Mary Lyon, Bryce Lyon, Henry S. Lucas, eds., The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell: 12 July to 27 May 1340 (Brussels: Palais des Acadmies, 1983), passim. In 1358, the rate for those joining the Gascon expedition was

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sions included more substantial reimbursement for the war-time loss of impressed ships (although this did not always happen), and explicit instructions reserving a portion of plunder taken at sea to shipowners.31 Starting in 1381 there was also a big push to restrict the transport of English-owned imports and exports to English ships because the increased business, the petitioners stated, would strengthen the merchant fleet on which the king relied for naval service.32 These petitions not only prompted statute legislation, but also increased in scope as they continued into the reign of Henry VII. The shipowners lobby was also probably behind parliamentary legislation forbidding confiscation of a ship when it carried uncustomed merchandise, and exempting ships from being forfeited as deodand when a mariner fell out and drowned.33 Other parliamentary petitions put forward by shipowners included release from responsibility for the misdeeds of their mariners (which could result in the forfeiture of the ship) and continual complaints about the misuse of safe-conducts by foreign shippers; the latter petition prompted the king to sanction a procedure to deal with captured ships.34 Lower down the social ladder, shipmasters also appear as

a noble (6s 8d) for two horses; Foedera, 3/i, 412. 31 Hewitt, Organization, 89, note; Runyan, Ships and Mariners, 11-3; R. G. Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England, English Historical Review 24 (1909): 675-97. 32 For this and the following, see Rot. Parl., 3: 120, 278, 296, 444; 5: 504; 6: 437; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1381, PROME, item 107; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1390, PROME, item 11; idem, Parliament of November 1391, PROME, item 50; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of October 1399, PROME, item 152; R. E. Horrox, ed., Parliament of April 1463, PROME, item 18; Horrox, ed., Parliament of January 1489, PROME, item 39; A. Luders et al., eds., Statutes of the Realm, 11 vols. (London: Record Commission, 1810-28), II, 534-5. 33 The continual stream of petitions to outlaw deodand, which met with some initial success, is particularly noteworthy; see Rot. Parl., 2: 345-6, 372-3; 3: 444, 94, 120; 4: 12, 492; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of April 1376, PROME, item 133; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of January 1377, PROME, item 73; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1380, PROME, item 33; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1381, PROME, item 107; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of October 1399, PROME, item 153; GivenWilson, ed., Parliament of May 1413, PROME, item 35; Anne Curry, ed., Parliament of October 1435, PROME, item, 26. 34 Rot. Parl., 5: 27, 29, 52-3, 55; Curry, ed., Parliament of November 1439, PROME, items 44, 52; Curry, ed., Parliament of January 1442, PROME, items 18, 26.

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petitioners, successfully protesting the delay of wages when pressed into naval service and the seizure of ships for minor customs infractions, although the king would not promise to compensate them for all the ships equipment that might be damaged during naval service.35 Common mariners also reaped benefits, including bonuses (called regards) of 6d per week which was added to their regular pay of 3d per day.36 Port towns also began to receive some relief from the burdensome costs of ship impressments. The Crown, for example, began to group seaports together administratively so that they shared the expense of providing ships and men.37 The costs of strengthening seaward defenses were defrayed by murage grants, while port towns were regularly being released from contributing to land service by the early fourteenth century.38 To compensate for the cost of outfitting and victualling ships for naval service, port towns were also specifically exempted from subsidies and other taxes.39 By the 1370s, towns that had built barges for the navy were allowed confirmation of their franchises free of charge.40 In exchange for particularly meritorious
35 Rot. Parl. 2: 287, 319-20; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of January 1365, PROME, item 26; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of November 1373, PROME, items 28. 29. 36 This bonus was recorded in naval accounts from 1387 through at least 1450; see, for example, PRO, E101/40/36, 41/33, 48/15, 53/12, 53/25, 54/4, m. 2, 54/10. Mariners on trading vessels, in contrast, were paid by the voyage; see Travers Twiss, ed., Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty (London: Rolls Series, no. 55, 1871), 1: 138-42; and Maryanne Kowaleski, Working at Sea: Maritime Recruitment and Remuneration in Medieval England, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., Ricchezza del mare. Richezza dal mare, secc. XIII-XVIII: atti della trentasettima Settimana di studi, 11-15 aprile 2005, Istituto internazionale di storia economica F. Datini, Prato, serie 2, Atti delle Settimane di studi e altri convegni, 37 (Florence: Le Monnier, forthcoming). 37 For example, PRO, C47/22/9135; CCR 1377-81, 33, 51, 182; 1399-1402, 238-40. 38 Hilary L. Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales: An Architectural and Documentary Study AD 900-1500 (London: John Baker, 1970); D. Macpherson et al., Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in domo Capitulari Wesmonasteriensi asservati, 19 Edward I-Henry VIII, 2 vols. (London: Record Commission, 18141819), 1: 211; Rot. Parl., 1: 405; 2:, 172; Ormrod, ed., Parliament of January 1348, PROME, item 59; CPR 1413-16, 57. 39 For example, CPR 1288-96, 497-8; 1296-1302, 26; PRO, C47/2/63/2, 7. See also Rodger, Safeguard, 123. 40 Rot Parl., 3: 17, 42, 44; G. H. Martin, ed., Parliament of October 1377, PROME, item 52; Martin, ed., Parliament of October 1378, PROME, items 38, 39, 52.

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service, some seaports received entirely new privileges. Dartmouth, for example, was granted freedom from tolls throughout the realm in 1337, and a charter of libertiesincluding the right to elect a mayorin 1341 in consideration of the great expense and loss they have suffered by reason of the war and also for providing two large war ships with a double crew for the king.41 In 1390, Dartmouth was given a monopoly on the export of tin for three years because it above other places in the realm has long been and still is strong in shipping, and therewith has wrought great havoc on the kings enemies.42 In 1393, tiny Dartmouth was granted its own coroner and in 1463 the borough was allowed to absorb its suburb, Southtown, to help citizens guard against enemy incursions. Dartmouths neighbor to the south, Plymouth, also benefited from its naval contributions, being named in 1384 as one of the places where passports to depart the realm were available and in 1389 as one of two seaports sanctioned for the departure of pilgrims to Santiago de Compostella.43 Nor did Plymouth hesitate to remind the king of its wartime services to him, as the town did in a successful petition against a corrupt royal customs official in 1396.44 The culmination of Plymouths rewards came in 1439, when it received a charter granting it self-government after a long struggle with the towns manorial lord, Plympton Priory.45 Not so long afterwards, Plymouth was also incorporated, the first town in Devon to do so.

Calendar of Charter Rolls, 6 vols. (London: H.M.S.O., 1903-27), 1327-41, 389; 1341-1417, 3-4, 338-9. 42 See for this and the following: CPR 1388-92, 338; CPR 1461-67, 307; Hugh R. Watkin, ed., Dartmouth (Devonshire Association Parochial Histories of Devonshire, no. 5, 1935), 82, 155. The tin monopoly was annulled in 1391 as inconvenient for merchants; Rot. Parl., 3: 295-6; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1391, PROME, item 48. 43 Statutes of the Realm, 2: 68; Rot. Parl., 3: 120, 275; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1381, item 107; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of January 1390, Appendix, no. 18; Crispin Gill, Plymouth: A New History (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1966), 83-4, 92-7. 44 PRO, E159/172, Hilary recorda, m. 5. 45 For this and the following, see Rot. Parl., 3: 662-3; 5: 9, 18-22, 555-61; Given-Wilson, ed., Parliament of November 1411, PROME, item 40; Curry, ed., Parliament of November 1439, PROME, items 20, 32; Horrox, ed., Parliament of April 1463, PROME, item 48. See also C. E. Welch, Plymouth City Charters 1439-1935: A Catalogue (Plymouth: Plymouth City Council, 1962), 5-16, 37-9; CPR 1461-67, 309-10.

41

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The advantages that accrued to Dartmouth and Plymouth in the fourteenth century were due mostly to their naval contributions, but their ability to meet these obligations arose in large part from deliberate Crown patronage. Shortly before the Hundred Years War began, the Crown had completed a process begun decades earlier to consolidate control over the two fine, deep harbors of Dartmouth Water and Sutton Pool in Plymouth.46 In 1337, the Crown transferred its rights over these two strategic harbors to the newly-created Duchy of Cornwall, which also controlled Fowey Water, which lies at the mouth of the river leading up to the administrative capital of the Duchy, Lostwithiel. Thus the Duchy of Cornwall, led by the Black Prince and closely linked to the Crown, came to control three choice harbors on the southwestern coast. Crown patronage, as well as the location of these harbors on the best shipping lanes to Gascony and Iberia, where English commercial and military interests were expanding at this time, clearly encouraged the use of these ports as embarkation points for troops and supplies, pilgrims, and wine fleets. Other western ports also benefited from royal investment in the navy during the fifteenth century, chief among them Portsmouth, where the Crown spent large sums on seawards fortification, dry docks, and repair facilities, and Southampton, where royal investment in shipbuilding and storehouses is well-known.47 Crown patronage of these western ports was, I argue, a crucial trigger that helped to stimulate their shipping and maritime economies. One reflection of this stimulus was the progressively larger share of shipping these western ports were able to provide. This vitality in the regions shipping sector was evident, first of all, in its contributions to naval impressments, which rose from just under 40 per cent of English ships at the beginning of the War to 54 per cent by the end of the War (Table 1). Indeed, Dartmouth alone provided more ships for the war effort than any other single port in England, a remarkable achievement when we consider that it ranked around

For this and the following, see Gill, Plymouth, 65-7, 72-5; Maryanne Kowaleski, Introduction, The Haveners Accounts of the Earldom and Duchy of Cornwall, 1287-1356 (Devon and Cornwall Record Society, n.s., vol. 44, 2001), 5-11. 47 A. Temple Patterson, Portsmouth: A History (Bradford-on-Avon: Moonraker Press, 1976), 26-30; Laughton, Maritime History, 364-73; Rose, ed., Navy of the Lancastrian King; Carpenter Turner, Southampton as a Naval Centre, 39-47.

46

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88th in total wealth in 1334 and its population in 1377 was only about 1200. The Crowns recognition of the westwards expansion of shipping is also evident in the regional distribution of the orders it placed for the construction of barges and balingers for naval service; in 1294, only 24 per cent of the 21 barges ordered were from the western port towns, but by 1401, fully half of the 54 orders were directed towards these ports.48 There was a similar rise in the western ports visibility on the valuable wine route to Bordeaux, where their share of British shipping rose from around 45 to 73 per cent between the early fourteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. Ships from the western ports were also responsible for almost 70 per cent of the late medieval pilgrim transports to St James of Compostela. And studies by Dorothy Burwash indicate that by the fifteenth century, the western ports were capturing a larger share of overseas trade and competed more successfully against foreign carriers than did vessels of the eastern ports.49 How were the western ports able to increase so substantially their share of the nations shipping? The Crowns constant need for ships, particularly its orders for port towns to construct barges at their own cost for naval service, may well have stimulated shipbuilding in these counties.50 Devons reputation for shipbuilding was certainly well known.51 And the fact that more barges and balingers (oared sailing
Foedera, 4: 28; CCR 1377-81, 32-3, 43-4, 46-7, 51-2, 55, 57, 114, 120, 181-2; CCR 1399-1402, 238-40. See also Rodger, Safeguard, 474, and above, n.16. Note that probably fewer than eight of the 20 ordered in 1294 were built, and probably none of those ordered in 1401 were ever constructed. 49 Dorothy Burwash, English Merchant Shipping 1460-1540 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 145-64. There is some evidence, however, that the shipping and trade of the smaller ports of Norfolk and Suffolk fared better than the larger head ports of eastern England; see Geoffrey V. Scammel, English Merchant Shipping at the End of the Middle Ages: Some East Coast Evidence, Economic History Review, 2nd series, 13 (1961): 327-41; N. J. Williams, The Maritime Trade of the East Anglian Ports 1550-1590 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 50 From the 1350s through 1380s, Exeter, Dartmouth, and Plymouth all funded the building of new barges or the fortifying of old ships in response to the governments needs; see CPR 1350-54, 386; 1354-8, 221; 1377-81, 298; 1385-89, 428; PRO E101/41/2; PRO E101/555/8; M. C. B. Dawes, ed., Register of Edward the Black Prince (London: H.M.S.O., 1931), Part II, 150; Gill, Plymouth, 80; D.R.O., Exeter City Archives, Misc. Roll 6, mm. 17, 25-28 (work on the Exeter barge). 51 PRO E101/555/8; CPR 1350-4, 386; Barbara W. J. Carpenter-Turner, The Building of the Gracedieu, Valentine and Falconer at Southampton,
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vessels whose speed and maneuverability made them particularly desirable during wartime) were active in western ports, especially Dartmouth, also suggests that West Country shipping was sparked in part by Crown needs during the Hundred Years War.52 Indeed, it must be significant that three new types of boatsthe crayer, a small craft with comparatively elaborate sail; spinace, another oared but also decked sailing vessel; and carvels, speedy and highly maneuverable vessels that may have been influenced by the Portuguese caravelwere also found in significantly greater numbers in the western than eastern ports in the late fifteenth century, suggesting a trend of innovation that may originally have been fostered a hundred years earlier.53 Funding for these ships came from a variety of sources, including first and foremost, commercial freightage. During the period of the Hundred Years War, the mercantile shipping capacity of the western ports, particularly those of Dartmouth and Plymouth was clearly growing relative to capacity in eastern ports, as indicated both by the rise of the western ports share of the important carrying trade of Bordeaux wine and by their significantly greater profile in the transport of pilgrims to Compostela (Table 1).54 The passenger trade involved in pilgrim transport was capable of turning a tidy profit since the whole voyage took only three to four weeks and

1416-1420, Mariners Mirror, 40 (1954), 65; Ian Friel, Devon Shipping from the Middle Ages to c. 1600, in A New Maritime History of Devon, 74. For two masts and other gear shipped from Dartmouth to Greenwich in 1396, see PRO E122/40/21; for the names of West Country shipwrights who were fined for refusing to go to Southampton to work on the kings ship, Grace Dieu, see PRO, C47/2/49/14 (7 from Bristol, 11 Cornishmen, and 22 from Devon). There was also considerable shipbuilding in Southampton Water (above, n.44) and Bristol; see J. W. Sherborne, The Port of Bristol in the Middle Ages (Bristol Branch of the Historical Association, Local History Pamphlets, 1965), 17. 52 Burwash, Merchant Shipping, 107-8, 112-5, 190-200; J. W. Sherborne, English Barges and Balingers of the Late Fourteenth Century, Mariners Mirror, 63 (1977): 109-14. 53 Burwash, Merchant Shipping, 120-3, 125-6, 128-31. Crayers usually carried three masts and set a bonnet on both fore and mainsails. Spinaces were oared and decked sailing vessels. Carvels were light, swift ships (with hulls presumably carvel-built), with three masts, a main, a musyn and a fukke, each supplied with a yard. The mizen probably carried a lateen sail. 54 On this point, see also Wendy R. Childs, The Commercial Shipping of South-Western England in the Late 15th Century, Mariners Mirror, 83 (1997): 272-92.

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shipowners could earn about 30 for taking 80 passengers.55 The vigor of the carrying trade in the ports of Devon and Cornwall, which together accounted for almost one-half of all voyages to St James of Compostela from 1390 to 1484 and almost one-half of all wine voyages to England from Bordeaux by the mid fifteenth century is especially notable (Table 1). Also significant as a spur to investment in shipping was the rising prosperity of West Country agriculture and the growth of overseas trade in the region (especially the profitable export of cloth and tin) over the course of the late middle agesin contrast to the depression which hit so many areas of northern, eastern, and southern England.56 Substantial funding may have also come from the spoils of war via privateering and piracy. As C. J. Ford has argued, the Crown increasingly pursued a deliberate policy of licensing shipowners and shipmasters in the early fifteenth century to defend English interests by giving them free reign to attack enemy shipping, a low cost solution to the kings dilemma on how to fund a viable navy. Devon and Cornish men took such a leading role in privateering57 that the Libelle of Englyshe Polycye, a 1436 tract arguing for the economic and political advantages that England could accrue by exercising control of the seas, specifically cited Dartmouth, Plymouth and Fowey men for their effective harassment of foreign shipping in the English Channel.58
55 The only recorded charge is in 1473, for a London ship of 320 tons taking 400 pilgrims for 225 marks (150), indicating a charge of 7s 6d per passenger; see CPR 1476-85, 78. The cost from Plymouth was probably slightly less since the voyage was shorter. For this and the following, see also Childs, Commercial Shipping. 56 Kowaleski, Port Towns of Fourteenth-Century Devon; Kowaleski, Port Towns, 476-87; Maryanne Kowaleski, The Expansion of the South-western Fisheries in Late Medieval England, Economic History Review, 53 (2000): 420-54. 57 E.g., Charles Kingsford, West Country Piracy: The School of English Seamen, in Prejudice and Promise in Fifteenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), 78-106, 177-203; Stephen P. Pistono, Henry IV and the English Privateers, English Historical Review 90 (1975): 322-30; Stephen P. Pistono, Henry IV and John Hawley, Privateer, 1399-1408, Transactions of the Devonshire Association 110 (1979): 145-63; Ford, Piracy or Policy. The point of disagreement usually revolves around the degree of control the government could exercise over lawlessness at sea. Kingsford and others emphasize the Crowns helplessness, while Ford and to some extent, Pistono, view periods of rampant piracy as government policy to weaken the French. 58 George Warner, ed., Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea-

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An early example of the profitable merger of interests in naval service, the carrying trade, privateering, and piracy was William Smale, a Dartmouth merchant/shipowner active from the 1330s. Mayor in 1346, he was also personally involved in naval service, both as a shipowner whose vessels were impressed for service, and in his capacity as lieutenant of Lord Guy de Brien, admiral of the West, on whose behalf he assembled fifteen Devon and Cornish ships (seven from Dartmouth) for the king in 1360. A truce intervened, however, and without the means to pay the crew or the costs of the squadron, they were diverted into piracy and profited from the capture of Flemish cargoes worth over 2000. Smale was also accused of plundering a ship in Dartmouth harbor in 1343, and several years later two of his ships were part of a private squadron of 13 vessels that pirated a Spanish ship, threw its mariners into the sea and absconded with the ship and its rich cargo of wine and other goods.59 An even more notorious example is John Hawley of Dartmouth, who in 1379 was commissioned, with two fellow burgesses, to set out with a fleet of seven vessels against the Kings enemies for a period of one year.60 Although accused of irregularities on many occasions, Hawley prospered as the owner of no fewer than 15 ships, serving as mayor of Dartmouth fourteen times, holding various royal appointments in Devon, and acquiring immense amounts of real estate in the Southwest. Often thought to be the model for Chaucers Shipman, Hawleys activities made him tremendously wealthy; he had no difficulty, for instance, in paying 500 cash up front to farm the customs of tonnage and poundage in the whole country.

power, 1436 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 12. Their effectiveness can also be seen in the petitions of their victims; see Dorothy Gardiner, ed., A Calendar of Early Chancery Proceedings Relating to West Country Shipping 1388-1493 (Devon and Cornwall Record Society, n.s., vol. 21, 1976). 59 CCR 1343-6, 115; CCR 1360-4, 4, 22, 27, 120; CPR 1343-45, 100-1; CPR 1358-61, 584-5; CIM, III, 150-1; Watkin, Dartmouth, 183, 271; D.R.O., Exeter Port Customs Accounts, 1349/50-1360/1; Dawes, ed., Register of the Black Prince, 2: 84, 87, 106, 111-12, 121, 141. 60 For this and the following, see Dorothy A. Gardiner, John Hawley of Dartmouth, Transactions of the Devonshire Association 98 (1966): 173-205, Michael Jones, Roches contre Hawley: la cour anglaise de chevalerie et un cas de piraterie Brest, 1386-1402, Mmoires de la socit dhistoire et de larchologie de Bretagne, 64 (1987): 53-64 ; Pistono, Hawley; PRO, C47/6/4; and the relevant documents in Watkin, ed., Dartmouth.

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By the fifteenth century, the significant profits to be gained from privateering and plunder encouraged the emergence of a more organized and businesslike approach to these activities.61 In 1449, a privateering squadron led by Robert Wennington of Dartmouth captured over 100 ships in the Hanseatic salt fleet.62 Prominent gentry from such West Country families as the Trevelyans, Arundells, Bodrugans, and even the Courtenays (whose head was the earl of Devon) also collected the profits of piracy, as shipowners, investors, and receivers of pirated goods, and under color of their county offices.63 It is surely no coincidence, moreover, that the vessels most often associated with piracy carvels in particular, but also barges and balingers, because of their speed and maneuverabilitywere concentrated in the West Country ports.64 And it was the ports where the shipping trade had developed most precociouslyFowey, Dartmouth, and Poole in particularthat were at the forefront of the privateering and piracy that was so prevalent in the late medieval ports of western England. From Fowey come Cornish privateerpirates such Mark and John Mixtow, whose targets included a Genoese carrack off the coast of Portugal; John brought the ship and its rich cargo back to Fowey, cavalierly putting its crew ashore in Portugal destitute.65 From Poole comes the notorious Henry Pay, whose
Gardiner (West Country Shipping, xvi-xvii) cites evidence on this point; see also J. C. Appleby, Devon Privateering from Early Times to 1688, in A New Maritime History of Devon, 90-2. 62 For an account of the capture, see A. R. Myers, ed., English Historical Documents, vol. IV, 1327-1485 (London: Eyre & Spotiswoode, 1969), 259. 63 Kingsford, West Country Piracy; A. L. Rowse, Tudor Cornwall: Portrait of a Society (London, 1941; reprint Redruth: Dyllansow Truran, 1990), 75-6; A. L. Rowse, The Turbulent Career of Sir Henry Bodrugan, in The Little Land of Cornwall (Gloucester, 1986; reprint, Redruth: Dyllansow Truran, 1992), 178-90; J. A. F. Thomson, The Courtenay Family in the Yorkist Period, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 45 (1972): 233. 64 Burwash, Merchant Shipping, 120-3, 125-6, 128-31. Balingers and barges were associated with ports like Dartmouth from the fourteenth century on; carvels appear in the mid-fifteenth century. See also Rodger, Safeguard, 523, n.56 who cites a M. Litt. study of piracy 1450-1500 that found that 60% of known English pirates were barges or balingers. 65 John Keast, The Storey of Fowey (1950; reprint Redruth: Dyllansow Truran, 1987), 24-33; and Kingsford, West Country Piracy, passim. Others profited from the ransoms they collected, which led to a lively trade in prisoners in several West Country ports; see for example, D.R.O., Exeter Mayors Court Rolls, 1404/5, mm. 23d, 28d; CIM, vol. 7, 313; see also Kowaleski, Port Towns, 491.
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raids on Flanders, Normandy, Brittany, and Castile drew the attention of Spanish chroniclers.66 Although Smale, Hawley, the Mixtows, and Pay as ship captains benefited most from these illegal and semi-legal activities at sea, their crews were also entitled to a share of the profits, an incentive that must have drawn a wide variety of port-town residents into this shady but profitable maritime world.67 Although it would be foolish to deny the very real damage that shipping and port towns suffered during the Hundred Years War, I hope this essay illustrates that it is worth considering the ways that the War stimulated investment in shipbuilding, in town defenses and quayside facilities, and in the training and employment of a whole range of maritime workers, from shipwrights and ropers to mariners and masters. We also need to consider the sheer amount of cash that the war effort siphoned to port towns; between 1368 and 1381, for instance, naval costs accounted for over 246,050, or 23 per cent of the total spending on war.68 Edward IIIs campaign to the Low Countries in 1338 included wage payments of almost 5,000 to 12,263 maritime workers (of whom 11,325 were mariners) in 370 ships, most of which were in service for just under one month.69 In other words, the central government was transferring more money to port towns than it was taking away in the form of taxes. Less quantifiable is the impact of the increasingly favorable distribution of prize money, which reduced the royal share of captured cargoes and ships to virtually nothing by the fifteenth century, when shipowners customarily received one-third, shipmasters one-sixth, and the crews half of the spoils.70 Few accounts survive of the legitimate distribution of these profits, but the proceedings of inquisitions into

H. P. Smith, The History of the Borough and County of the Town of Poole, 2 vols. (Poole: Looker, 1951), 1: 178-82; F. W. Matthews, Henry Pay: The Story of a Noted Poole Worthy, Proceedings of the Dorset Natural History and Archaeological Society 61 (1939): 89-93; Kingsford, West Country Piracy, 82-3. 67 For the variety of occupational backgrounds practiced by the mariners aboard ships of John Hawley accused of piracy, see Kowaleski, Working at Sea. 68 Sherborne, Costs of English Warfare, 149. See also Sherborne, English Navy: Shipping and Manpower. 69 Lyon, Infrastructure, 66-7. 70 D. A. Gardiner, "The History of Belligerent Rights on the High Seas in the Fourteenth Century," Law Quarterly Review 48 (1932): 521-46; Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction; Richmond, Keeping of the Seas, 121; Rodger, Safeguard, 127.

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illegal privateering or piracy suggest very large profits indeed, which given the notoriety of the West Country seamen for these activities, must be considered as a significant source of profit and investment.71 Nor must we forget the bigger picture here, because it was the navigational experience and entrepreneurial spirit formed by the naval, privateering, and piratical activities of late medieval English mariners that provided the school for seamen and training for Britains later voyages of exploration and colonization to the New World.

For examples of illegal profits made by Devon pirates and privateers, see Gardiner, ed., Early Chancery Proceedings.

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LAND AND LABOUR

PEASANT SERVITUDE IN LATER MEDIEVAL PROVENCE: ARCHAISM OR INNOVATION?


John Drendel

Peasant servitude lasted only briefly as a generalized phenomenon in Provence. Monastic sources attest to it widely for perhaps a century after 1050. It fossilized in most areas into symbolic dues after 1200, a victim of economic change and the pressures upon lordship created by the reconstruction of centralized authority in Provence. In the later Middle Ages, as sources become more abundant, we encounter mentions of serfdom, in particular an onerous form of lordship, characterized by tenures burdened with heavy charges and restrictions upon inheritance, localized in a swath of villages astride the highlands of Provence. Monique Zerner suggests that this bondage to land, rather than being a declining artifact of an earlier age represented a revival of peasant servitude.1 This reassessment comes in the context of a renewed interest in serfdom among French historians, who have recently discovered that serfdom survived in areas where they thought it to have been abolished in the course of the thirteenth century.2 Did serfdom indeed rebound in Provence in the later Middle Ages, and if so, what was its relationship to the economic problems of the period? We should first clarify the vocabulary and language of serfdom. Marc Bloch defined servitude as a personal, hereditary, and shameful attachment to a lord embodied in dues, foremost of which were payment of a tallage and obligatory labor works or corves, and restric-

1 Monique Zerner, Le nouveau servage en Provence au XIe-XIIIe sicles: absence ou raret? Mlanges de lcole Franaise de Rome 112 (2000): 911-1007. 2 Monique Bourin, ed., La servitude dans les pays de la Mditerrane Occidentale chrtienne au XIIe sicle et au-del: dclinante ou renouvele? Mlanges de lcole Franaise de Rome 112 (2000); the introduction to this volume by Monique Bourin and Paul Freedman is online at http://lamop.univ-paris1.fr/W3/Intro MEFRM2000.pdf; Nouveaux servages de lEurope mdiane et septentrionale (XIIIe-XVIe sicles), Confrence Gttingen, 6-8 fvrier 2003, reviewed by Julien Demade, Histoire & Socits Rurales 19 (2003): 354-9.

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tions upon personal freedom.3 Among the latter, the most important limited the right to possess property and to marry; by virtue of mainmorte, the lord inherited part or all of the real or movable goods of his serfs, while formariage imposed barriers, usually in the form of onerous fines, against marriage among peasants of different lords. In what follows, I use the terms servitude, serfdom and bondage as synonyms referring to dependent status as Bloch defined it; the term slave refers to human chattels under Roman law, and of dependents designated as servi in the period prior to 1000; freeholders refers to peasants possessed of non-dependent allods, alleutiers in French; the term real servitude or bondage to land describes an onerous and degrading status in later medieval Provence not unlike serfdom, but with an important difference. This form of dependence was created by the land a peasant held, rather than by inheritance of a personal tie; in theory a peasant who renounced his holdings no longer endured the servitudes they imposed. Sources for the study of dependency in Provence are skewed towards the end of the Middle Ages. Unlike the north of Europe, records of seigneurial administration are not numerous in any period.4 The period between 950 and 1120 is documented by the monastic cartularies of the great Provenal abbeys, St. Victor of Marseille, Lrins, St. Pons, Montmajour and the episcopal cartulary of Apt. Most of these sources peter out before the middle of the twelfth century, leaving a hiatus of a century before the enqutes of the Angevin counts, beginning in 1252, and notarial and communal records from the countryside allow us to pick up the thread again in the late thirteenth century.5 The lacunae of documentation between

Marc Bloch, Libert et servitude personelle au Moyen Age, particulirement en France; contribution une tude des classes, in Marc Bloch, Mlanges Historiques (Paris: Sevpen, 1963), 1: 286-91. 4 Georges Duby, Note sur les corves dans les Alpes du sud en 1338, in Pierre Petot, ed., tudes dhistoire du droit priv offertes Pierre Petot (Paris: Librairie Gnrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1959), 141-46. 5 Monique Zerner, Llaboration du grand cartulaire de Saint-Victor de Marseille, in Olivier Guyotjeannin, Laurent Morelle, and Michel Parisse, eds., Les Cartulaires, Actes de la Table Ronde Organise par lcole Nationale des Chartes et le G.D.R. 121 du C.N.R.S., Mmoires et Documents de lcole des Chartes (Paris: cole des Chartes, 1993), 217-46; Robert-Henri Bautier and Janine Sornay, Les sources de lhistoire conomique et sociale du Moyen ge: Provence, Comtat Venaissin, Dauphin, Savoie (Paris: CNRS, 1972-1974).

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1150 and 1250 leave us in the dark concerning the period during which servitude withered, but the records which survived in the period following 1250 describe its remnants and perhaps its sequels. George Dubys influential thesis on the Mconnais explained the manifestations of personal servitude as arising from the disappearance of the Roman notion of liberty and private land which the Carolingians sustained until the tenth century.6 The disappearance of public jurisdiction allowed local lords to treat the bodies and lands of free peasants as no different from those of their slaves. Recent historians of the early feudal period in Provence more or less follow this model, despite the discrepancies between Provence and Burgundy.7 In the eighth century, the social landscape of Provence resembled late antiquity more than the region between the Loire and the Rhine. Servi cultivated the Provenal demesnes which Abbo, rector of the Tarentais, bequeathed in his will of 739 to the Abbey of the Novalesa, without assistance from the families of diverse status which held individual properties, colonicae. These Provenal manors at least did not have the bipartite structure of estates in Northern Francia.8 Less than a century later, in 812/13, the Bishop of Marseilles enumeration of his lands and dependents mentions no freedmen or demesne slaves at all; a roughly equal number of colons and slaves worked on tenures.9 Though some slaves probably worked the lands of the colonicae dominicatus, legal distinctions among peasant were fewer, reflecting a simplified social structure. Beginning in the late tenth century, the economic and social status of these dependents improved. Although Paul-Albert Fvrier believed the impact of the sarrazinades to be wildly exaggerated, Provence did experience considerable domestic warfare and suffered incursions by Islamic raiders in the period 870-972 which may have contributed to breaking the nexus between peasants and land.10
6 Georges Duby, La socit aux XIe et XIIe sicles dans la rgion mconnaise (Paris, 1952; reprint Paris: ditions de lcole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales, 1988), 173-262. 7 Jean-Pierre Poly, La Provence et la socit fodale 879-1166. Contribution ltude des structures dites fodales dans le Midi, Collection tudes (Paris: Bordas, 1976). 8 Patrick J. Geary, Aristocracy in Provence, The Rhne Basin at the Dawn of the Carolingian Age, The Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 88. 9 Poly, La Provence, 92. 10 Paul-Albert Fvrier, Review of Les Sarrasins dans le Haut Moyen-ge

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Mentions of mancipia disappear in the latter half of the tenth century; the distinction between free and unfree after 1040. The language of sources refers to peasants with less pejorative language; they are no longer objects, but rather actors in the social landscape.11 Indeed, in this period a group of peasant freeholders briefly emerged, profiting from the reclamation of wasteland, particularly through contracts of medium vestum which gave peasants the ownership of half the land they cleared after a period of five to seven years.12 An opposing social force, the ascendant warrior class of caballarii, beat down the free peasantry. The decline of comital power led to the privatisation of Church lands in the late ninth century, followed by those of the count in the 1040s.13 The result was a new social division between rusticus and caballarii, termed miles after 1050. For Stephen Weinberger, the changing vocabulary was not wholly unfavorable towards the peasants who found their social role valorized, but the end result was the disappearance of freeholding peasants, and the emergence of a broad servitude. From castles held for the count, or built after 1040 on allodial lands, the miles exploited jurisdictional powers of public authority: justice, hospitality (alberga), military service (cavalcata) and somewhat later the assistance (quista) owed by a vassal to his lord. These were the pretexts for the imposition of arbitrary confiscationsmalos usos and malas consuetudines upon the peasantry, and notably the freeholding peasants. Some rich peasants may have escaped upwards into the ranks of the warrior aristocracy but most fell under its domination.14 The characteristics of this servitude are disputed. Monique Zerner, who has closely studied the cartulary of St. Victor for this period, finds within it scarce evidence of peasant servitude. About 40 twelfthFranais (Histoire et Archologies) (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1965), Bibliothque de lcole des Chartes (1966): 301-3; Stephen Weinberger, La transformation de la socit paysanne en Provence mdivale, Annales: conomies, Socits, Civilisations 45 (1990): 10. 11 Poly, La Provence, 108; Weinberger, La transformation,10-12. 12 Weinberger, La transformation, 12-13; Monique Zerner, Sur la croissance agricole en Provence, in Centre Culturel Dpartemental de lAbbaye de Flaran, ed., La croissance agricole du Haut Moyen ge: Chronologie, modalits, gographie. Flaran (Auch: Centre culturel dpartemental de lAbbaye de Flaran, 1990), 153-67. 13 Poly, La Provence, 92 14 Poly, La Provence, 92, 134; Weinberger, La transformation, 10-12.

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Louis initiated a general movement towards the abolition of serfdom in the thirteenth century, the decline of millenial serfdom resulted from the decay of seigneurial prerogatives. The allodialisation of seigneurial power in a region with a strong tradition of Roman law resulted in a collective possession of lordship shared among heirs equally in each generation. While such coseigneuries were generally managed through a single baile in the thirteenth century and later, the fragmentation of lordship weakened its holders in the face of competition from resurgent comital power.21 The counts of Provence reconquered their ascendancy after the marriage between the count of Barcelona and the heiress of Forqualquier in 1094 brought to Provence a powerful and dynamic Catalan dynasty.22 Raimund Berenger III and his heirs attacked strong lordship by undercutting its social domination. particularly in the highland regions where lords opposed comital power most fiercely. Consular governments, inspired by Italian influence and the renaissance of Roman law, existed in villages of eastern Provence from at least 1064. In the first half of the thirteenth century, Raimund Berenger V used this tradition to weaken highland barons by creating consulates in the towns and villages of highland Provence where they did not exist; in so doing, as we have seen, he abolished serfdom. The Angevin counts of Provence continued this policy in the second half of the thirteenth century by granting safeguard (salvatoria) to serfs who left their lord, a status which brought them under the lordship of the count. Those who did so abandoned the lands and goods they held from their personal lord, which suggests that the peasants relationship to land was already more powerful than personal bondage.23 The fading of servitude parallels the disappearance of traditional peasant census tenure in favor of the Roman law contract of emphyteusis. In the thirteenth century, whenever the sisters of La Celle had the occasion to relet or renew a traditional censive holding, they
21 22

Poly, La Provence, 155-9 Poly, La Provence, 318-58. 23 Jean-Paul Boyer and Alain Venturini, Les consulats ruraux dans le ressort de lvch de Nice (circa 1150-1326), Actes des Journes dHistoire Rgionale, Mouans Sartoux (1984): 361-96; Aubenas, Le servage, 510 n.2; douard Baratier, Enqutes sur les droits et revenus de Charles Ie dAnjou en Provence, 1252 et 1278, avec une tude sur le domaine comtal et les seigneuries de Provence au XIIIe sicle (Paris: Bibliothque Nationale, 1969), 74-5.

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did so using the newer Roman law contract. This evolution was part of the global remodeling and concentration of habitat in Provence, which saw lords divide up seigneurial demesnes constituted during the eleventh century among free peasants and peasants soon to be free. In some instances lords freed their own serfs individually, but more often they accorded franchises to entire villages, even to the point of emulating the counts, and permitting villagers to create permanent institutions of self-governance. Many such acts survive from the thirteenth century. These accords were paid for by converting onerous or shameful services into cash payments.24 The Capetian dynasty of counts which succeeded the Catalans in 1246 launched a series of detailed enqutes in the 1250s, modeled upon Saint Louis administration of Languedoc.25 These surveys, a revived Roman law notariat, and a general renaissance of written records, shed new light upon the status of peasants in the second half of the thirteenth century. These records show, as we noted, that the count tended to dissolve servitude in villages where he was a direct lord. But the counts were not successful in wresting all elements of public authority from the lay and ecclesiastical lords who wielded it. Lords like the viscounts of Marseille limited the counts jurisdiction in the Val of Trets to the east of Aix; the abbot of Lerins held all rights of justice in Cannes and its neighboring coast; the archbishop of Arles held all rights of justice in Salon; the lands of the sisters of La Celle, south of Brignoles, were exempt from the counts jurisdiction as well, save for justice over homicide. Still, in the inquest into comital rights conducted in 1252 and 1278, Edouard Baratier found that the count had recovered comital domain over the lands of lay lords, even in the highland regions north of the Var, where baronial families like the Glandves retained much land and power.26 The servitude which emerges in the records of the later Middle Ages reflects the enduring power of seigneurial jurisdiction in some
24 25

LHermitte-Leclercq, Le monachisme, 87-90; Baratier, Enqutes, 75. Baratier edited the most important enqutes from the thirteenth century, but only a few of the many detailed enqutes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centurys are available in print, Robert-Henri Bautier and Janine Sornay, Les sources de lhistoire conomique et sociale du Moyen ge, 1: 35-53. 26 Baratier, Enqutes, 143, n.2; 178. John Drendel, The Institutions of Village Goverment in Later Medieval Provence and the Origins of the Council of Trets, Historical Reflections/Rflections Historiques 19 (1993): 249-66.

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(although by no means all) of the mountain valleys of highland Provence.27 In 1252, in the upper valleys of the Durance, Verdon, and Var rivers, personal dependents of the count outnumbered free peasants in numerous villages. The enquteurs called these dependents men of the market quest (homines de quista ad mercedem). Zerner argues that these men were not serfs, noting that only in one locality, Aups were they distinguished from free. According to Zerner men of the quista refers to the same comital obligation owed by all the counts subjects. Quista, however, is a term which originated in the eleventh century as one of the malos usos; it continued in the thirteenth century to refer to both seigneurial and comital obligations.28 There is considerable evidence that homines de quista ad mercedem refers to a specific obligation owed by men by virtue of their subordinate status; in 1341, homines de mercedem referred to men in Castellane whose annual tallage was a mark of dependence. Other dependents bore servitude by virtue of their attachment to a specific type of tenure, the casamentum. One can find remnants of mainmorte, corves and seigneurial quistas scattered across highland Provence from Forqualquier to the valleys north of Grasse.29 Baratier described the servitude of homines de quista and casamenti as comparable with the status of serfs in notarial registers from the

Strong communities and a strong count reduced lordship to very little in the upper valley of the Vsubie after 1250, Jean-Paul Boyer, Hommes et communauts du haut pays niois mdival. La Vsubie (XIIIe-XVe sicles), preface by Nol Coulet (Nice: Centre dtudes Mdivales de Nice, 1990), 357-83. 28 Baratier, Enqutes, 129-134; Zerner, Nouveau servage, 1004; Poly, La Provence, 134. The lords of the village of Saint Christol on the plateau of Forqualquier continued to levy quistas in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, quistas which in the case of the Abbey of Saint-Andr were limited by arbitration in 1270 to five cases modeled upon those which circumscribed the quistas of the count. This suggests how broad the quista was beforehand, Danuta Poppe, Saint-Christol lpoque mdivale, Cahiers du Centre dtudes des Socits Mditerranennes 53 (1) (1966): 25-26; the same arbitration conceded to the inhabitants the right to dispose of property by will. In Reillanne, inhabitants paid a seigneurial quista as well, Danuta Poppe, Economie et socit dun bourg provenal au XIVe sicle: Reillanne en Haute Provence, trans. Danuta Poppe, Jan Stodolniak and Lidia Carminati-Nawrocka (Wroclaw: Acadmie Polonaise des Sciences, Institut dHistoire de la Culture Matrielle, 1980), 72; Poppe, Saint-Christol, 25-26. 29 Aubenas, Le servage, 78; Colette Samaran, Note sur la dpendance personnelle en Haute-Provence au XIVe sicle, Annales du Midi 69 (1957): 229-36; Baratier, Enqutes, 102.

27

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early fourteenth century studied by Colette Samaran.30 These acts reveal in much more detail than the comital records the subjection in the region of Grasse of two classes of men: caslani and maleservi. Maleservi possessed a casamentum, a coherent unit comprised of arable land, dwellings and outbuildings, garden, vineyard and pasture held not in emphyteusis but by virtue of an act of homage. The maleservus had no other rights over the casamentum, other than to hold it and bequeath it to a direct heir. If there was more than one direct heir, the holding could not be divided but only held undivided; in the absence of heirs, the lord recovered the casamentum through mainmorte, though in fact it was often relet to close relatives or other members of the village.31 These obligations are very like those owed in this period by peasants in the Alps of Savoy and Dauphin to the north.32 The maleservus owed a heavy dues, up to 4 sesters and 3 quarters of grain after the harvest. Caslani in the village of Caussols had no more freedom to buy and sell their land than maleservi, but elsewhere they appeared to possess land in emphyteusis. Caslani and casamenti alike owed their lord tallage in six customary cases, the obligation to inhabit the village and use the lords oven and mill, the burden of comital taxation, and corves. For casamenti, this form of servitude derived from the status of land and was not personal; the free peasant who acquired a casamentum acquired a personal tie to the lord, and in theory, could release himself from that same bondage by relinquishing his holding.33 It is comparable to the servitude of men known as maleservi in Castellane in 1341, whose goods were subject to mainmorte unless their children held the land undivided. It is also similar to the bondage of peasants described in a comital inquest in the region of Puget-Theniers, where lords inherited the goods of many villagers.34 Although the language differs
Samaran, Note sur la dpendance, 229-36. Samaran, Note sur la dpendance, 230-32. 32 Henri Falque-Vert, Les hommes et la montagne en Dauphin au XIIIe sicle, Collection La Pierre et lcrit (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1997); Nicolas Carrier, La vie montagnarde en Faucigny la fin du Moyen ge. conomie et socit, fin XIIIe-dbut XVIe sicle, Collection Logiques Historiques (Paris: LHarmattan, 2001); Fabrice Mouthon, La famille et la terre: exploitations paysannes au sud du Lman la fin du XIIIe sicle, Revue Historique 307 (2002): 891-937. 33 Samaran, Note sur la dpendance, 232. 34 Aubenas, Le servage, 78. The document from Puget-Theniers will be discussed below.
31 30

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from place to place, and the details as well, the prevalent form of servitude in these highlands appears to have been real, and not personal. The rise of bondage to land underlies the paradox of Zerners final conclusion; personal serfdom had not only disappeared from Provence, it never really had existed, but lords in the mountains used rights over land to capture economic resources from peasants beginning in the late twelfth century, as their jurisdictional rights decayed.35 The distinction is neat, but it overlooks the clear, albeit scanty, evidence of personal servitude based upon jurisdictional rights prior to 1150, and its fossilized remnants later. The apparent rise of bondage to land may be a simple reflection of more abundant sources after 1250. Moreover, as George Duby pointed out long ago, a dependent peasantry in Provence made no sense to lords moving towards salaried agricultural labor in the monetized economy of the early fourteenth century.36 Finally, the idea that lords would use rights over property to limit the freedom of peasants and extract greater rent goes against the grain of an agrarian legal system dominated by Roman Law, and in particular by emphyteutic tenure. Emphyteusis was a flexible contract adaptable to very different relations of power between peasants and lords, but it conferred fundamental rights of possession incompatible with seigneurial restrictions on inheritance and alienation.37
Zerner, Nouveau servage, 1005-7. Duby, Note, 144. 37 The question of the impact of Roman law upon freedom merits a separate discussion. Aubenas argued that the clarity of Roman law laminated a diversity of social statuses into a stark opposition between free and unfree, much as English common law polarized the status of villani in opposition to free men, but Gouron disagrees, pointing out that civil law commentators had little interest in the status of peasants in the twelfth century, and that the broader impact of their interpretation of the law uniformly promoted the Roman law notion of liberty. The consensual essence of Roman law contracts renders the legal system unusable in an unfree society. The rapid, precocious and widespread diffusion of Roman law and the notariat in the Provenal countryside widely promoted emphiteusis tenure and credit, whose close relationship I have explored elsewhere, Roger Aubenas, Inconscience de juristes ou pdantisme malfaisant? Un chapitre dhistoire juridico-sociale, XIe-XVe sicle, Revue dHistoire de Droit 56 (1978): 215-52, cited by Andr Gouron, Libert, servage et glossateurs, Recueil des mmoires et travaux publi par la Socit dHistoire du droit et des institution des anciens pays de droit crit (1980): 41-51, reprinted in La science du droit dans le Midi de la France au Moyen ge (London: Variorum, 1980), XVI-XXVI; John Drendel, Le crdit
36 35

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The economic illogic of bondage to land for both lords and peasants in the fourteenth century emerges most clearly in a source from the later Middle Ages which has not been examined from this perspective, an enqute which the auditors of Provences central accounting office ordered into declining tax revenues in the mountain baillie of Puget-Theniers in the spring of 1343.38 The Chamber of Accounts in Aix ordered local officers to investigate the missing foci or basic taxpaying unit in 25 villages and 4 small towns. In each community the officers empaneled jurors who identified the hearths, named the missing tax payers, described the time and cause of their departure, and their present residence, if known. The investigation documents a dramatic population loss of one-third of the regions population in the space of a dozen years, a drop affecting nearly every village. This source has been interpreted as evidence of a Malthusian crisis in Provence; however, Edouard Baratier declined to invoke overpopulation, speaking rather of serious economic difficulties which neither he nor his student Ilona Jonas explored. The collapse in population is unequalled in any other region of Provence, with the exception of a few villages, also in highland Provence, affected by the introduction of outside flocks onto common pastures.39 The inhabitants of some villages decried poor weather and sterilitas as the fundamental causes of the regions malaise, and indeed sources do mention regional climatic crises and food shortages in

dans les archives notariales en Basse-Provence au dbut du XIVe sicle, in Franois Menant and Odile Redon, eds., Notaires et crdit dans loccident mditerranen mdival, Collection de lcole Franaise de Rome (Rome: cole Franaise de Rome, 2004); Marie Louise Carlin, La pntration du droit romain dans les Actes de la Pratique Provenale (11e-13e sicle), Bibliothque dhistoire du droit et droit romain (Paris: Librairie gnrale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1967); Paul-Louis Malaussena, La vie en Provence orientale aux XIVe et XVe sicles, introd. by Roger Aubenas (Paris: Librairie Gnrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1969). 38 Archives Dpartementales des Bouches-du-Rhne, B354. douard Baratier discovered this source, and his student Ilona Jonas studied it in a fine article which I have relied upon, along with the original document, to write the following passages, douard Baratier, La dmographie provenale du XIIIe au XVIe sicle, avec chiffres de comparaison pour le XVIIIe sicle, Dmographie et Socits (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961), 80, 223-4; Ilona Jonas, Note sur un recours de feux dans la baillie de Puget-Thniers en 1343, Provence Historique 27 (1977): 59-80. 39 Baratier, La dmographie, 80.

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Southern France in 1329-1330, 1331-1332, and 1339-1340.40 Other jurors fingered debt, which harvest failures may well have provoked. Yet no region of Provence outside of Puget-Theniers appears to have suffered social and economic dislocation on this scale as a result of food shortages, climatic incidents, or debt; my own study of a neighboring region suggests that highlands village sustained a relative degree of prosperity through the first four decades of the fourteenth century, a prosperity brought down not by crop failure or overpopulation by rather by a crushing burden of war taxation.41 What is specific to Puget-Theniers, apart from the catastrophic loss of population, was the high population of dependent peasants: 24 per cent of 226 peasants hearths deserted by death escheated to the lord, while only 9.6 per cent were in the hands of heirs, a figure reflecting not the lack of legitimate offspring but rather their emigration. The nature of the tie between lord and peasant is expressed by the term man of (suus homo erat) or the remark that the goods escheated to the lord pro servicio. On a few occasions the term homo de casamento is expressly mentioned, but in any case, the difference between the percentage of homes and properties sold (12 per cent) and recovered by creditors (16 per cent) as opposed to those claimed by the lord is convincing evidence of the servile incapacity of a substantial proportion the households to sell their goods, bequeath them to heirs or use them as collateral for loans.42 The enqute of 1343 is unclear concerning the specific nature of servitude in Puget-Theniers, but eloquent in its description of its economic impact. Whereas elsewhere in Provence, the transition from feudal tenure to emphyteusis gave peasants rights which accelerated the liquidity of land, creating a land market, and above all, a market for credit, in these highland villages, lack of freedom singularly restricted the ability of peasants to mobilize capital. Credit existed the jurors specified many peasants who had lost their goods to creditorsbut without the collateral of land, peasants borrowing would have restricted what few precious movables they could pledge. Indeed it is difficult to understand how the lords themselves might
40 Louis Stouff, Ravitaillement et alimentation en Provence aux XIVe et XVe sicles (Paris: Mouton, 1970), 284; Marie-Joseph Laurnaudie, Les famines en Languedoc au XIVe et XVe sicles, Annales du Midi 64 (1952): 23-35. 41 John Drendel, Jews, Villagers and the Count in Haute Provence: Marginality and Mediation, Provence Historique 49 (1999): 217-31. 42 Jonas, Note sur un recours, 72-4, 80.

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BARGAINING POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: SEVEN CENTURIES OF ITALIAN SHARECROPPING CONTRACTS, 821 TO 1517 A.D.
Francesco L. Galassi I A fundamental division lies at the heart of what has been called the New Institutional Economics (NIE). To stylize a complex debate, on the one hand the functionalist view, put forth for example by North and Thomas or Sugden,1 argues that the multiplicity of stable equilibria leads to the establishment of competing selfreinforcing conventions. Institutional choice and change occur as the most successful conventions, usually defined as the least costly ones, emerge. On the other side, which for want of a better term could be called the QWERTY view after Davids influential article,2 multiple stable equilibria lead to arbitrary or stochastic selection through sensitive dependence on small events (path dependence). Increasing returns, network economies, or sheer uncertainty over the precise outcomes of alternative arrangements then generate rents or quasi rents for a subset of actors, who will find it advantageous to invest resources in protecting and enforcing existing institutions. No guarantee of efficiency or even reversibility exists.3 As always when worldviews differ, proponents of either approach can point to a mismatch between the opposing model and everyday observation. Change undeniably takes place, and it would take a
D. C. North and R. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); R. Sugden, Spontaneous Order, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4) (1989): 85-97; R. Sugden, Convention, Creativity and Conflict, in Y. Varoufakis and D. Young, eds., Conflict in Economics (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 68-90; R. Sugden, Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, Economic Journal 101 (4) (1991): 751-85. 2 P. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 75 (2) (1985): 332-7. 3 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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particularly obdurate mind to deny that historically the broad thrust of institutional change has been towards increasing efficiency and reducing transaction costs, albeit with checks and reversals, at times on a macro scale. At the same time, however, the world is not a Panglossian equilibrium where all is at its best. To detached inspection, the functionalist approach has more than a whiff of teleology or at the very least bears a strong resemblance to the smoothness of an Arrow-Debreu setting, as Knight pointed out.4 The root of this division probably lies in the conceptual difficulty of modeling change in social relations.5 To be more specific, the disagreement does not ultimately hinge on the sources of social change, in that both approaches can deal with randomness or intentionality, determinism and free will, or any mixture of these. The difficulty lies rather in the process of transmission: how does a mutation, however it may have arisen, become a new norm? How does it reproduce? The biological analogy is both troublesome and insightful. Troublesome because it brings back Alchians concept of fitness,6 so that it becomes necessary yet again to separate success from optimality. But the insight into the tension running through the whole body of NIE-inspired literature may well be worth the small price of underscoring that distinction.7 If seen from the perspective of the numerous attempts to apply evolutionary thinking to economics,8 the difficulty may be reduced to what Vromen9 has argued is the real puzzle in that exercise: arriving at a satisfactory specification of the transmission mechanism. In fact, of the three constituent elements of evolutionmutation, selection, and transmissionthis last aspect remains the most troublesome for social science.10 If transmission is unclear selection cannot be understood
4 J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 5 M. S. Archer, Culture and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 6 A. A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 211-22. 7 E. Sober, The Nature of Selection (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). 8 For review see G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). 9 J. J. Vromen, Economic Evolution (London: Routledge, 1995). 10 M. T. Hannan and J. Freeman, Organizing Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

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either, in that the units on which selective pressures act have to be identified before the process of selecting can be mapped. NIE does not have a general answer to this puzzle, so that unsurprisingly the evolutionary analysis of institutions has been focusing on case studies.11 One important proposal in this direction was put forth by Nelson and Winter.12 The unit of selection is, in their framework, the individual routine used in any given economic process, whether consciously put in place or slowly arrived at by random walk or learning by doing. Since routines can be learned, this makes economic evolution Lamarckian (transmission of acquired traits) rather than Darwinian (only genotypes are capable of replication, and change occurs through their differential survival rates). However, if these routines are to be considered the economic equivalent of genes how they replicate is not clear. A gene can be isolated as a unit of information within a biological organism, while a routine is not similarly identifiable. The suggestion that there are units of culture (memes),13 though fascinating is difficult to test and use analytically. The problem can therefore be put in these terms: reconciling the functionalist vs. path-dependence debate involves specifying an agreed (set of) evolutionary mechanism(s). That in turn depends on defining what is being selected. If a basic (set of) unit(s) can be agreed upon, then we could watch economic evolution in action and study the selection process. As a first approximation, then, it should be possible to identify an institution and isolate within it a set of rules whose incidence in the population changes over time, recognizing that to reach meaningful conclusions the time horizon might have to be longer than most studies of institutional change allow. We could then correlate these changes with potential transmission links. To achieve this, we need a well-defined population with a clearly identifiable set of characteristics, in an environment whose broad features are reasonably well known. The population needs to be, first, successful, that is reproduce over long periods of
11 L. J. Alston, T. Eggertsson, and D. C. North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 12 R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1982). 13 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); S. Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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time, and second, changing yet reasonably stable (does not undergo such profound modifications that descendants cease altogether to resemble ancestors). We need, in fact, something akin to Darwins Galpagos finches.14 On a much more modest level, in this paper I propose to look at just one such population.

II In early June 821 A.D., in a village called Baiano, some fifty kilometres south-east of Siena (central Italy), a farmer named Leuprandus leased from the Abbey of San Salvatore a farm with a house [...] vines, woods, streams and pasture, tilled and untilled land for which he agreed to pay the Abbey omnia medietate, half of all [products]. The agreement, the earliest known sharecropping agreement in Italy and one of the earliest surviving farm contracts anywhere, was simplicity itself: in a few lines, beside the land and the house, the Abbey agreed to supply oxen and half the seed while Leuprandus promised to live on the farm.15 Leuprandus was illiterate, yet he probably would have had no trouble recognising as fundamentally the same agreement as his own a contract in use in Tuscany over 1,000 years later.16 Then too, rent consisted of half of all output and the tenant agreed to live on the farm. Variable inputs were supplied in somewhat different proportions, but what had really changed by the late nineteenth century was the sheer number of stipulations that had been added to that basic agreement over time: the later contract consisted of 4 closely printed pages and 26 distinct clauses. Mezzadria (sharecropping) pre-dated Leuprandus and lasted well into the post-1945 years. At its zenith, in the nineteenth century, in central Italy it accounted for over half (in some areas over 2/3) of all farm employment, and was used in every part of country and
14 P. R. Grant, Variation in the Size and Shape of Darwins Finches, Biological Journal of the Linnaean Society 25 (1985): 1-39; J. Weiner, The Beak of the Finch. Evolution in Real Time (London: Vintage Books, 1995). 15 P. S. Leicht, Livellario nomine. Osservazioni ad alcune carte amiatine del sec. IX, Studi Senesi 1 (1906): 275-301; I. Imberciadori, Mezzadria classica toscana (Florence: Vallecchi, 1951), 78. 16 C. M. Mazzini, La Toscana Agricola. Atti della Giunta per la Inchiesta Agraria e sulle condizioni della classe agricola (Rome: Forzani, 1881), 3, Part 1: 463-466.

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throughout the Mediterranean basin.17 As recently as June 1961, exactly 1,140 years after Leuprandus put his cross on that contract, twelve per cent of all farmland in Italy (some 3.2 million hectares) was sharecropped.18 As economic events go, eleven centuries can be considered longterm success. But success of what? What is the link between Leuprandus and the Italian farm census of 1961? Because it is the evolution of a contract that forms the focus of this inquiry, let us be very clear. I will look at changes brought over time to land rental contracts having the following characteristics: first, rent is paid as a share of the product19 and second, the land is already improved and constitutes a farm with a house for the tenant to live in. This excludes emphyteosis or ad meliorandum agreements with share rents. In the remainder of the paper, I will first briefly discuss the adoption and spreading of share contracts in Italy in the late Middle Ages, then will identify three clauses which appear quite early on in the centuries. From June 821 until January 1517 I can then track the geographic spread and frequency of these clauses through a sample of 832 sharecropping contracts, following them through periods of demographic expansion, stagnation and decline. In effect I will treat the early contracts as an initial benchmark against which mutation can be measured. What the inquiry will show is that the spread of mutation to the original benchmark package (that is, the transmission) is linked to the channels of communication. The framework within which these changes can be understood is an agency problem. III Though already used in antiquity,20 share contracts became increasingly common in Italy from the thirteenth century onwards.21
T. J. Byres, Historical Perspectives on Sharecropping, in T. J. Byres, ed., Sharecropping and Sharecroppers (London: Frank Cass., 1983), 1-18. 18 Istituto Centrale di Statistica (ISTAT), Sommario di statistiche storiche 1926-1985 (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1986), 189. 19 For the present purposes, it does not matter whether that share is , though in practice it almost always is. 20 Byres, Historical Perspectives. 21 P. J. Jones, Medieval Agrarian Society in its Prime: Italy, in M. M.
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Recent quantitative studies show that their diffusion can be related to imperfect capital markets and incentive compatibility issues.22 The intensification of farming that resulted from rising population pressure in the late Middle Ages altered relative factor prices and encouraged the creation of exclusive property rights in land. As techniques became more labor intensive the scope for opportunism by laborers increased, as did the cost of careless or dishonest activity. Supervision was difficult for landlords, who increasingly were urban dwellers engaged in trade or manufacturing, and one way to reduce the problem was to introduce strong self-monitoring incentives. After the demographic crisis of the fourteenth century, changing terms of trade altered the crop mix in favor of costly products with high sensitivity to proper care and handling, such as vines, olive and fruit trees. Share contracts responded easily to this new situation by allowing landlords to concentrate costly resources on supervising invested capital while in effect leaving tenants to run the farm on a daily basis. The sharing rule went some way towards solving the monitoring problem, but at a cost. Multiple performance margins and strong exogenous influences meant that room for discretion had to be built into the contract, which in turn gave renewed scope for opportunism. Since not all opportunistic choices would have been known at the time when the early contracts were designed, it is possible to imagine landlords and tenants being engaged over the years in a repeated positive-sum game with learning. The object of the game was to appropriate as much of the joint product as possible while limiting ones own contribution to the competitive minimum. Thus tenants sought to reduce their inputs into the proPostan and H. J. Habakkuk, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), I: 340-430; P. J. Jones, From Manor to Mezzadria, in N. Rubinstein, ed., Florentine Studies (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 193-241. 22 F. L. Galassi, Tuscans and Their Farms: The Economics of Share Tenancy in Fifteenth Century Florence, Rivista di Storia Economica 9 (1992): 77-94; F. L. Galassi, Moral Hazard and Assets Specifically in the Renaissance: The Economics of Sharecropping in 1427 Florence, Advances in Agricultural Economic History 1 (2000): 177-206; S. Pudney, F. L. Galassi, and F. Mealli, A Discrete Random-Effects Panel Data Model of Farm Tenures in Fifteenth Century Florence, Economica 65 (1998): 535-56; D. A. Ackerberg and M. Botticini, The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections? Explorations in Economic History 37 (2000): 241-57.

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duction process, mostly labor, both because labor creates disutility and because of Marshallian disincentives caused by the sharing rule. At the same time, they would seek to draw the largest possible benefit from the capital invested in the farm. Landlords, of course, had the incentive to skimp on capital investment and force tenants to work as much as possible.23 Tenants were constrained by the probability of detection, and possible sanctions, including dismissal, while landlords were constrained by monitoring costs and the tenants shadow reservation wage. Each time the game was played, there was a probability that some player would find a new margin over which to capture some portion of the income streams. If the gambit produced a reward, other players would adopt it, and eventually measures to regulate or prohibit it would wind their way into the contract. Tenants and landlords were very well aware that they were engaged in this game. That is the explanation for the obligation the Abbey of San Salvatore imposed on Leuprandus to reside on the farm (limit his opportunities to undersupply labor) in the 821 contract. Over 400 years later, the game was still going on. On 11 August 1255 a court in Lucca sentenced a sharecropper named Grispi to pay his landlord three pounds in damages for not ploughing and sowing at the appropriate time as he had undertaken to do.24 Two centuries later, L. B. Alberti, one of the architects of the Italian Renaissance as well as a rich landowner, wrote that I would have my farm in a place ... where I could often go, and take my exercise walking around it, and the labourers, seeing me often, would cheat rarely ... and be more diligent at their work.25 In general, Luporini and Parigi have shown that limitations imposed on tenants activities are statically efficient in a multi-tasking framework.26 The point is that the margins where either party could engage in opportunistic behavior were likely not at first fully known to either landlords or tenants. Ways of pruning vines, for instance, so
23 Note that neither incentive exists in contracts where one party acts as full residual claimant. 24 Imberciadori, Mezzadria, 90. 25 L. B. Alberti, Della famiglia (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano, [1468] 1906), 210, my emphasis. 26 A. Luporini and B. Parigi, Multitask Sharecropping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria, Economica 63 (1996): 445-58.

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as to maximize short-term output at the cost of the longevity of the plant, something that benefitted the tenant, probably had to be worked out over time. The thieving sharecropper was a stock character of Renaissance plays and stories, where tenants are often shown teaching one another how to hide grain already mown but not yet threshed, how to extract wine from a sealed barrel without leaving marks, or how to work away from the farm without the landlord finding out.27 In addition, careless handling of tools or livestock could affect the capital value of the landlords investment, but it was difficult to predict ex ante what form damage caused by neglect (a manifestation of opportunism) might take. Like other activities, cheating and monitoring, and especially knowing what to monitor, have a learning curve. If that is correct, then it is reasonable to argue that the early contracts were signed by people who had not yet traveled far on that curve. In other words, in the earlier period of the contracts life there may still have been a great deal of uncertainty about how to make the agreement work to ones advantage. Repeated interaction revealed this over time, and the contract changed as a result. Another way of saying this is that characteristics acquired over time spread through the population. This is the general hypothesis of the paper. Testing it is the next step. A reasonable approach to designing a test is to use the earliest contracts as a benchmark, and to track deviations from their set of clauses over time. But showing that change takes place is not evidence of evolution in the sense used in Section I. What needs to be shown is that there is a line of transmission of these changes, or putting it differently, that changes in the set of clauses are directional and cumulative. There must be, in other words, learning. The next section discusses the design of the test. IV Contracts, even simple ones, are multifaceted mutual commitments operating on several margins simultaneously. The definition
G. Cherubini, LItalia rurale nel Basso Medioevo (Rome: Laterza, 1984), 134-8; C. Bec, Le paysan dans la nouvelle Toscane, in Civilt ed economia agricola in Toscana nei secc. XIII-XV: problemi della vita delle campagne nel tardo medioevo (Pistoia: Centro italiano di studi di storia e darte, 1981), 29-52.
27

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I am employing, viz., share-rent paid for an improved farm and tenants residence obligation, forms the core of mezzadria, the constant linking Leuprandus to the second half of the twentieth century. Any element detailing an obligation incurred by either party in addition to that basic core I will call a clause. This section identifies a group of clauses to be tracked as they spread through the population, then discusses the sample used and presents summary statistics of the contracts under consideration. An econometric test is carried out in section V. Two basic issues need to be addressed to study mezzadria in an evolutionary framework. First, the clauses whose presence is tracked must be clearly identifiable. This means that they have to be reasonably simple clauses, so that there can be no question of one appearing in a modified form that may alter its effect on the contracting parties. At the same time, they cannot be those common catch-all clauses (e.g., the tenant promises to work well) of little practical value. I will call clauses satisfying these criteria nonreducible rules. Secondly, the clauses must not be picked only because they are common in later contracts. That would vitiate the analysis. Rather the choice must be based on a priori considerations: if I am right that sharecropping was a way of introducing incentive compatibility, then the clauses that spread should be those that further constrain opportunistic behaviour. To show that an evolutionary approach can yield insight into institutional changes, the chosen clauses must then be shown to have spread chronologically and/or geographically from their inception point. Because I cannot observe communication flows between actors, I have to rely on geographic or chronological proximity to argue that a solution found in one location spread (that is, increased its frequency in the population). To anticipate one possible objection, the sample contracts are obviously unlikely to include the very first instance of clause c making its appearance, and even if they do I have no way of knowing this. However, all that matters is that c should at some point start to spread in the population, wherever and whenever it first appeared. No priors exist as to when or where c began. It is the process of spreading that I am trying to follow. The non-reducible rules I propose to track are three and are also, in a sense, the obvious ones to follow given the agency framework I am using. Besides committing labor on one side, and on the other land and fixed capital, tenants and landlords had to

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agree on who would supply at least three other significant inputs: seed, tools, and livestock. If the landlord supplied them, tenants had no incentive to care for them. Tales of seed given for sowing but never put in the ground (as in Grispis case), of cattle worked too hard or not properly fed, of tools broken, stolen, or left in the fields, are common complaints for medieval and Renaissance landlords in Tuscany.28 On the other hand, if tenants supplied complementary inputs, they had the incentive to use as much of the farm output as possible to feed their own livestock, and to sow what they wished. No magic formula could protect everybody. Landlords may have preferred to shift the burden of supplying complementary inputs on their tenants, but even aside from the latters ability to incur the cost this was a mixed blessing at best. Animals fattened on the farms output would be sold by the tenant to his sole benefit, or be leased out to work other farms. Sharing inputs was resorted to, but even so the agency problem remained acute for the landlord: one can imagine a tenant reporting that your cow has died. With the advantage of hindsight, one reasonably stable solution was to force tenants to internalize as many of the costs of supplying complementary inputs as possible, while using scarce monitoring resources to ensure that they did not divert income streams from the farm to maintain their own capital beyond a certain point. The last part of this sentence is deliberately vague: finding the right tolerance for such diversions was not easy. At what point is the tenant siphoning rent? How expensive is it to stop him? Perhaps above all, how can you really tell how much is being siphoned? In spite of such metering problems, however, the advantage of passing these costs on to tenants was that the range of necessary monitoring activities shrank. If this reasoning is at least broadly correct, then I expect to find that sharecropping contracts over time increasingly came to include clauses that shifted onto the tenant the responsibility for the provision of complementary inputs, once other factors are taken into account. To be more specific, the supply of working capital was subject to bargaining between tenants and landlords. The outcome of the bargaining was affected by several unobservable variables, but ultimately must have been decided by the land/labor ratio. If
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Cherubini, LItalia, 134-8.

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tenants could not easily find another farm, landlords must have been able to force them to internalize more costs than tenants would have liked. If tenants were scarce, landlords would have to supply a greater proportion of complementary inputs and thereby shoulder the risk of incurring capital losses. Demographic trends will matter to the test of the evolution of mezzadria. The discussion so far has mostly set the stage and presented in general terms what testing is to be carried out. The time has come to focus more closely on the sample. The 832 contracts of the sample, written between 821 and 1517 A.D., have been collected from the notarial chartularies of the State Archives of Florence, Siena, Lucca, Pisa and Arezzo, and published over the past fifty years.29 Given their great age (42 per cent of sample contracts predate 1300), the sample is almost surprisingly large, yet it obviously represents only a minute fraction of all sharecropping contracts signed over these seven centuries. The contracts relate in all cases to first-time agreements (renewal or termination were oral), and have been selected trying to maximize temporal continuity and geographic coverage.30 The number of contracts extant in the archives drops off dramatically during the sixteenth century, something that may indicate that the agreement had achieved a sort of canonical status, so well known that there was little need to reproduce it. This is indirectly confirmed by the strong similarity between the contracts dating from the late 1400s/early 1500s and the standard forms that came to be used in the nineteenth century.31 If so, the contracts of the early centuries constitute the case of an institution in full evolutionary adaptation. The wording of the contracts is reasonably standardized, and becomes more so over time, just as the language tends to shift from Latin to Italian. The notary begins his text with religious formulae followed by date and location, then identifies himself and the contracting parties and describes the purpose and duration of the
29 Imberciadori, Mezzadria; G. Pinto and P. Pirillo, Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. Il contado di Siena, sex. XIII-1348 (Florence: Olschki, 1987); O. Muzzi and M. D. Nenci, Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. Il contado di Firenze, secolo XIII (Florence: Olschki, 1988); G. Piccinni, Il contratto di mezzadria nella Toscana medievale. Il contado di Siena, 1349-1518 (Florence: Olschki, 1992). 30 Pinto and Pirillo, Il contratto, for sampling criteria. 31 Piccinni, Il contratto, 325-80; Mazzini, La Toscana, 463-6.

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contract. There follows a description of the farm and its location, with details of the house or other buildings such as stables, granaries and wine and oil making equipment. There follow the clauses agreed upon by the parties. Almost invariably, the tenants residence obligation is the first mentioned, followed by the details for the provision of seed, livestock and tools of direct interest to this analysis. Other clauses include where the rent had to be paid (on the farm or at the landlords residence), lists of capital maintenance work to be carried out each year, any additional payments owed for keeping fowls or other animals not directly covered by the contract, the prohibition (usually) from seeking work off the farm, and a list of loans, if any, received by the tenant to start work. Fines are set against either party failing to live up to their commitments and at times arbitration procedures are outlined. An inventory of stocks already on the farm is then added, and the contracts end with the list of witnesses and the signatures (or marks) of all present. This is in fact a wealth of information. For all contracts we know where landlords lived and where they signed the agreement with their new tenants. We do not always know exactly where the actual farm was, though we know which political jurisdiction it came under. We know something about the crop mix of the farm and the presence of animals and buildings/improvement works. More importantly, we have over 800 observations of a well-defined institution scattered across the arc of some 700 years in a restricted geographic area where we have reasonably good information about other important historical events, such as demographic trends. Even considering that not all contract specifically list the three clauses I am trying to track (only about 500 do, depending on which clause), this is still a remarkable sample. Above all, I have a clear question I can ask these data: do the non-reducible rules aimed at limiting discretion in an agency context spread chronologically and geographically in such a way as to suggest a learning process? Do these contracts evolve? Or are the changes non-directional? Table 1 reports some summary statistics relating to these clauses. Some comments are in order. First, the periodization. Since very few contracts (hardly a dozen) survive from before 1199, the first column inevitably covers an abnormally long time period. The other peculiarity may appear to be the division at 1347. The late 1340s marked a dramatic crisis all over Europe as the Black Death

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These bare demographic facts fit easily with the trends in the clauses highlighted in the table. In the centuries of demographic expansion, when that is the land/labor ratio was steadily falling, the bargaining between landlords and tenants was being resolved against the latter. Their contribution was rising, whether in the provision of livestock or of seed. There is a hint in these data that at the peak of the demographic boom (early fourteenth century) tenants may have grown increasingly unable to meet the kind of capital commitment required of them: the proportion of tenants supplying all livestock (the most expensive working capital) in the first half of the 1300s is halved relative to the proportion in the previous century. The Malthusian limit was fast approaching. The mid-fourteenth century constitutes a structural break. Thereafter, landlords increasingly had to commit complementary inputs to their farms and renounce gains accumulated since 1200. By the fifteenth century livestock is almost always wholly supplied by landlords (fewer than one in forty or fifty supplied all livestock between 1200 and 1347), and seed is almost always shared (tenants supplied all seed in 50 per cent of contracts from 1200-1347). Evidence of changing relative bargaining power, which is all the table shows, does not per se constitute evidence of evolution in the sense discussed above. An evolutionary adaptation involves transmission, in this case by learning. How can this learning process be modeled? My argument is that, before the sixteenth century when the contract became so well established that it was seldom written down, landlords and tenants were engaged in an ongoing search for the appropriate solution to the agency problems they faced. They knew what they wished to achieve in entering into the agreement, but probably did not actually have a fully formed mental picture of how to go about their goals. The complexity of the tasks that had to be carried out, their contingent nature and the uncertainty inherent in any agreement where time consistency was a significant element and exogenous influences were strong, meant that the parties could hardly devote time and resources to working out in the necessary detail what clauses to impose on one another. Fortunately this was not necessary because they could hire a specialist, the notary, who had experience of contracting practices, had already designed clauses aimed at obtaining the results they
Sociales, 1978).

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sought, and could sell them a reasonably standardized commodity easily adjustable to suit their particular circumstances. The notary sold information, in effect, or to put it differently sold a reduction in uncertainty. In addition, he provided a reference point on current accepted practice, something of considerable value to both tenant and landlord who were thereby spared the trouble of analyzing to the end of their computational abilities each clause of the agreement. The notarys commodity was, that is, also the reassurance to the contracting parties that in using the agreement he designed they could expect that on average they would be no worse off than their reference group. For his part, the notary worked on past practice and current concerns. He can be modeled as storing a set of non-reducible rules for contracts of this sort, a kind of template in which the details of any given pair of landlords and tenants could be entered, with the necessary modifications. Notaries were organized in guilds, like other trades, and it seems logical to see such organizations as information-sharing machines.33 The basic template learned during the notarys studies and apprenticeship would be continuously checked against current practice in conversation and professional contacts with other guild members.34 The template would then be adjusted as practice changed, as new solutions to old problems were devised, or as existing approaches were discarded. The selective pressures were at work in the mind of the notary, where individual non-reducible rules stored as part of the template were checked, assessed, and possibly modified. The process was self reinforcing in the sense that a modification to the template which found favor with the contracting parties would be used again and therefore would have a greater-than-average probability of being discussed within the corporation and consequently of spreading to other notaries and other contracts. If that is at least a reasonable approximation of the process, it follows that modifications to the template were more likely to spread rapidly in the immediate geographic proximity of their inception, only later colonizing more distant populations. The

33 S. R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Pre-industrial Europe, Journal of Economic History 58 (1998): 684-713. 34 For examples see G. Catoni, Il collegio notarile di Siena, in Il notariato nella civilt toscana (Rome: Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato, 1985), 337-65.

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advantage of putting the issue in these terms (chronological and geographic proximity) is that I can derive some reasonably strong predictions and can then use the sample contracts to test them. That is the task of the next section.

V This section specifies and tests a multinomial logit model to detect directionality, and therefore learning, in the changes undergone by sample contracts. First, I will specify the form the model takes, and then discuss the variables used. Let l, s, t indicate livestock, seed, and tools, and L, S, T represent whether each of the complementary input is supplied by the landlords, shared, or by the tenant. I will then use superscript letters { l, s, t} to indicate under what arrangement complementary inputs are supplied, so that for example Ls indicates the seed is supplied by the landlord, while Sl indicates that the livestock is shared. Let P(cij=k) be the probability of clause cj being recorded in contract i. Then, for the supply of inputs by the landlord, L, I can write: P cij = Lk xi = exp(ixi) 1 + exp(ixi) for k = {l,s,t}

where and x represent respectively vectors of coefficients and explanatory variables. Likewise, for shared inputs, S, P cij = Sk xi = 1 1 + exp(ixi)

and for tenant supplied inputs P cij = Tk xi = 0 The technique is sufficiently well known to require little discussion beyond pointing out that the s estimate the impact on P(cij) relative to the normalized probability of observing k supplied by the tenant, which is set to zero. The framework is simple but useful

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in the present context. I can now turn to discussing the actual variables. I said earlier that for evolutionary pressures to have been at work on the contract there has to be evidence of directional modifications. The discussion in IV above allows me to put some flesh on these bones. Specifically, ceteris paribus, the probability of encountering clause c in contract i should rise with time elapsed since c is first encountered in the sample, and fall with the distance from the location where the first instance of c is recorded in the sample. However, the extremely long time period covered by the sample makes it necessary to qualify these priors. It is unrealistic to suggest that notaries referred back several centuries when modifying the template, so it is opportune to relate P(ci=1) to the time elapsed since c was last encountered in the sample. As for distance, I am using both the kilometers from the location where c is last recorded, and from where it is first recorded in the sample. If evolutionary pressures were at work as discussed above, I would expect that the more recent was the use of c, the higher was P(ci=1), and that the farther away were its last and first use, the lower is P(ci=1). There should be, in other words, waves of diffusion. Note that, as there appears to be no reason to believe diffusion should be linear, both time (in years) and distance (in km) have been used in linear and quadratic form. The distance variable poses some conceptual problems. Its role is to capture the geographic spread of a given clause, and to do so accurately to the conditions of the time. It follows that what matters is the distance that the carriers of the template modifications, the notaries, had to travel between one place and the next. This distance is fixed in some ways (Siena and Florence are no farther apart today than they were in 1300), but the time taken traveling it is not. Ignoring improvements in transportation technology, which should not significantly affect this sample, travel conditions change. It may also be questioned whether todays roads are sufficiently close to the roads of the time to allow a modern kilometer count to approximate historical conditions. Both objections are valid, and no real solution to them exists, except to note that the results reported below suggest that the distance variables seem to mirror reasonably well the cost of spreading information. Since the sample is not evenly spread over the 700 years it covers, having very few observations before 1200, and since demo-

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graphic trends obviously had a significant impact on the clauses used in these contracts (Table 1), each regression will include four chronological dummy variables, one for the period before 1200 when population was growing but few contracts remain, one for the period of demographic expansion when numerous contracts have survived (up to 1347), one for the years of crisis (1348-1400), and one for the slow recovery of the fifteenth century. Finally, another dummy will attempt to capture the effects of political jurisdiction: Does it matter whether a contract was signed in Florentine territory, or in Sienese territory? Out of the three sets of clauses in Table 1, only the regressions using the supply of tools as the dependent variable failed all diagnostic tests, and are therefore not reported. This was due to the very small number of contracts where tools are specifically mentioned (in all, about two dozen for the 1200-1350 period and none before or after) which leaves virtually no degrees of freedom. Table 2 reports the estimates (t statistics in round brackets, (), significance levels in square brackets []). On balance the results are almost surprisingly robust for a sample such as this. The only two variables that consistently fail to reach significance are, first, the time squared elapsed since any given clause was last recorded and, second, the political jurisdiction dummy. The former actually worsens the performance of the estimates, and was therefore omitted altogether from Table 2. As for the latter, whether or not a contract was signed in the territory of Florence appears to have had no effect on the probability of particular clauses being included. This is in a way not surprising: in spite of centuries of conflict between Siena and Florence, the two city-states shared a language and a common cultural and legal heritage (Roman law). Information evidently flowed easily across their contested boundaries. Overall, the distance variables perform markedly better than the time elapsed variables (excluding, that is, the period dummies). The linear time variable is significant in only two of four cases, and even then only once at 5 per cent (in the other case, it has the wrong sign, suggesting that as more time passed since the last use of the clause, the lower was the probability of finding it again). On the other hand, the distance variables all have the correct sign (negative) and often are significant at remarkably high levels (1 and 2 per cent). On balance, the variables measuring distance from the

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last recorded use of the clause (linear or squared) perform better than the distance from the location of first use. This is powerful evidence in favor of evolutionary spreading. The mutation introduced in the population was passed on to geographically proximate carriers, in a process that must resemble what I discussed in Part IV above. Interestingly, if all distance variables are omitted from the estimate, and the logit is recalculated with all the time variables and the political jurisdiction dummy, the latter is weakly significant (10 per cent) and negative in all cases. This is not surprising: since the earliest contracts are from Siena, once distance is taken out of the estimates, contracts signed in Florentine territory are less likely to include particular clauses. But it is the distance, not the political jurisdiction, that is driving the parameters. What do the estimates suggest about the nature of this diffusion? The evidence is ambiguous. In some cases, notably the probability that landlords would supply livestock vs. that tenants would, it appears that the diffusion follows a quadratic rather than linear form. In other cases (the probability that seed would be shared vs. that tenants would supply it) the coefficients suggest linearity. In some ways, this latter is intuitively convincing: if modifications to the original template traveled with notaries, provided that traveling times and costs were linear in the distance traveled, linearity in diffusion is to be expected. In this sense, the estimated coefficients for quadratic variables may indicate that beyond a certain point, traveling costs rose so that diffusion was slowed down above a certain distance. In any event, quadratic distance variables, even if strongly significant at times, are rather weak. Their marginal effects tend to be in the order of fractions of percentage points. The time dummies, which try to capture changing demographic trends, tell an interesting story. The worsening of the tenants bargaining power during the centuries of demographic growth is quite visible in the negative coefficients relating the probability that complementary inputs would be supplied by landlords or shared to the period 1200 to 1347. Equally evident on balance is the reversal of the trend after the Black Death: the probability that the supply of seed and livestock would be shared or taken on entirely by the landlord rises after 1347. If the distance variables were insignificant, this kind of result would suggest that mutations had arisen in several distinct locations independently. But it is the significance of

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the distance parameter estimates that underscores that learning was in fact taking place. The story probably goes something like this. The mezzadria contract fulfilled the function of giving labor self-monitoring incentives in conditions where it was costly to solve agency problems through direct supervision. The downside of the sharing rule was that both parties had an incentive to economize on their complementary inputs (= supply inputs only up to the point where their marginal product equaled their opportunity cost times the reciprocal of the rental share). If the technical coefficients of production were not fixed, bargaining between the contracting parties would determine their respective contributions. There was, and this must be stressed, no unique optimizing solution, no well-defined point of tangency among Edgeworthian contract curves, which require that actors be interchangeable and rules continuous.35 There was rather an area of possible outcomes, and over this area Tuscan landlords and tenants bargained to and fro for centuries. A landlord who had to supply tenants with seed in the early fifteenth century may have been, in some abstract sense, worse off than his ancestor who had obtained it from his tenants 150 years earlier, but was still better off than not having tenants at all. But above all what the logit strongly suggests is that there was in fact an evolutionary process at work here. The contingent events of a given time period affected the outcomes of the bargaining processes, but so did access to information about how best to make use of changing circumstances. There is, in other words, reason to believe that the changing relative contributions embodied in these clauses were not arrived at independently at different places and different times. Rather, they spread: distance (and, less clearly, time) matters to relative probabilities estimated by the logit. In periods of stress, that is in periods when one party was willing to give up some ground to gain access to an income stream, the carriers of the template, the notaries, must have communicated with one another (even across political boundaries) to find solutions, i.e., to identify successful mutations that would spread in the population. They communicated with the most proximate colleagues, who in turn spoke to others farther away, who in turn repeated the process. Any given solution spread
35

Knight, Institutions.

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because it reduced uncertainty for increasing number of people who found existing arrangements unsatisfactory. A notary who could satisfy many clients by introducing a good adaptation in the template would have additional clients beating a path to his door, and would be copied by other notaries, thereby ensuring that the successful clause would spread further. It matters little to present purposes that one or the other party lost or gained something as a result of each mutation. In fact, focusing on the clauses themselves makes the game in which landlords and tenants were engaged appear as zero-sum. In reality, however, this was a positive sum game, in that what players were ultimately bargaining for was the final output of land, labor and capital. All that was happening was that the price one or the other player had to pay to have access to this output rose or fell depending on contingent events. And the process by which contingent events affected individuals was an evolutionary one: solutions worked out in one place spread. Diffusion means learning: under certain stimuli, more actors were interested in learning of new solutions.

VI In the end, the exact process of diffusion of contractual clauses in late medieval Tuscan agriculture may in itself be of interest to agrarian historians. But the issue here is whether the historical process is theoretically enlightening for researchers interested in institutional choice and change in general, and it is on that criterion alone that the contribution of this article rests. In that sense the opportunity to follow change over 700 years is useful in that it may help define a research agenda for the analysis of institutional change, an agenda that would seem to consist of three main items. The first is that modeling institutional change requires the identification of the exact unit of selection. The approach taken here is that this is to be found in the simplest non-reducible rules, aggregates of which form institutions. The second is to identify the means by which these non-reducible rules are stored and transmitted. In the current instance this has been identified in the template of the notaries, and it would seem likely that in general members of the legal profession are likely to perform this function for a large number of institutions. Whether they do or not is an

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empirical question which need not detain us here beyond stressing that transmission is not independent of the transmitter. Finally, and as a consequence of the second point, understanding institutional choice and change involves understanding the incentives of the transmitters. In this case, this aspect has been neglected in that the notaries had no obvious interest in siding with one or the other party when drawing up the contract, unless they were themselves landlords. If so, however this does not seem to have affected the shift in contractual clauses against the interests of landowners after the demographic crisis of the fourteenth century. But those who store the information are not necessarily transmission neutral, and the distributional effects of passing the information on have to be modeled in any credible attempt to understand institutional choice and change as a general process.

MARKET INTEGRATION

A TEST CASE FOR REGIONAL MARKET INTEGRATION? THE GRAIN TRADE BETWEEN MALTA AND SICILY IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES
Mark A. Aloisio

Malta is very fortunate for this one reason, namely that Sicily, very fertile in all kinds of grain, lies nearby and is for the inhabitants as good as a granary, where otherwise they would die of hunger.1 I The economy of medieval Europe is increasingly studied in the context of a commercialist or Smithian framework.2 This approach emphasizes the role of trade in promoting a greater division of labor in town and countryside, the expansion of commercial activity, and the progressive integration and greater sophistication of regional market networks. Towns perform a crucial role in these models, whereby urban demand for foodstuffs stimulates specialization and higher levels of productivity in agriculture, as well as more efficient distribution of resources. Yet while few would dispute the increased commercialization and sophistication of the late medieval economy generally, the extent and effect of these changes at a regional or local level is less clear. Legal, institutional or social barriers represented transaction costs that could significantly limit the flow of trade or access to markets. In the fifteenth century, the kingdom of Sicilyof which the Maltese Islands formed partwas a politically
J. Quintin DAutun, Insulae Melitae descriptio (Lyons 1536), ed. with trans. in H. R. Vella, The Earliest Description of Malta (Lyons 1536) (Malta: DeBono Enterprises, 1980), 35. 2 For instance, R. H. Britnell, The Commercialisation of English Society, 10001500, 2nd. ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); J. Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England, 1150-1350 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997). For an exposition of the commercialist approach, J. Hatcher and M. Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages. The History and Theory of Englands Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 121-73.
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unified state with a relatively commercialized economy. It has recently been argued that during the late Middle Ages Sicilys internal markets became progressively more integrated. In the course of this paper I wish to discuss the extent of this economic integration by highlighting some obstacles that disrupted the trade in grain between Sicily and Malta during much of the fifteenth century. II The important role of Sicily in the grain trade of the medieval Mediterranean is well known.3 At one time or another, Sicilian wheat was exported to cities in northern Italy (particularly Florence and Genoa), France and Spain and occasionally even to north Africa.4 Sicilys Norman, Angevin and Aragonese rulers took an active interest in the commercial exploitation of this vital commodity, fully aware of the substantial revenues that its export brought into their coffers. Since the reign of Frederick II, the grain trade was channeled through specially designated ports known as caricatori, most of them located in the western half of the island where much of the
3 M. De Board, Problmes de subsistance dans un tat mdival: le march et les prix des crales au royaume angevin de Sicile (1266-1282), Annales dHistoire conomique et Sociale 10 (1938): 483-501; M. Aymard, Il commercio dei grani nella Sicilia del 500, Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale 72 (1975): 7-40; D. Abulafia, Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento, in La societ mediterranea allepoca del Vespro: XI Congresso della Corona dAragona, Palermo-Trapani-Erice, 25-30 Aprile 1982, vol. 2 (Palermo: Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti, 1983), 5-22, repr. in D. Abulafia, Italy, Sicily and the Mediterranean 1100-1400 (London: Variorum, 1987), essay VII; O. Cancila, Baroni e popolo nella Sicilia del grano (Palermo: Palumbo, 1983); H. Bresc, Un monde mditerranen: conomie et societ en Sicile, 1300-1450, 2 vols. (Rome-Palermo: Bibliothques des coles franaises dAthnes et de Rome, 1986); S. R. Epstein, An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). On the Mediterranean grain trade in the Middle Ages, P. Wolff, Un grand commerce mdival: les crales dans le bassin de la Mditerrane occidentale: Remarques et suggestions, VI Congreso de la Corona de Aragon, Cerdea (Madrid: n.p., 1959), 147-74; M. Tangheroni, Aspetti dei commercio dei cereali nei Paesi della Corona dAragona, I. La Sardegna (Pisa-Cagliari: Pacini, 1981). 4 D. Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); D. Abulafia, Lo stato e la vita economica, in P. Toubert and A. Paravicini, ed., Federico II e il mondo mediterraneo (Palermo: Sellerio, 1994), 165-187; M. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani e lespansione della Corona dAragona nel secolo XV (Naples: LArte Tipografica Napoli, 1972).

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grain was grown.5 Sicily produced at least three types of wheat by the sixteenth century but the hard variety (grano duro) was especially prized for its capacity to resist rot while remaining in storage for several years.6 The islands reputation as a major grain producer was indeed well-founded. In the late thirteenth century annual export levels averaged 20,000 to 30,000 salme and perhaps around 40,000 salme in the following century (1 salma = 2.75 hl).7 Some 122,000 salme were shipped out of Sicilian ports in 1407-1409 but this may have been an exceptional year.8 An average of 50,000 salme was probably typical throughout the 1460s with a maximum of 90,000-100,000 salme in the 1490s.9 Nonetheless, in spite of these impressive figures, estimates put grain exports at less than ten per cent of domestic output, occasionally reaching a maximum share of fifteen per cent.10 It seems therefore that most of the grain produced in Sicily was consumed locally. A system of land and (more importantly) sea transport linked the caricatori of Sciacca, Agrigento and Licata to the two main cities of Palermo, Messina and to smaller centers such as Trapani, Syracuse and Catania. Unlike northern Italy, however, where urban centers frequently obtained jurisdictional authority over the surrounding their contado and its resources, Sicilian cities, with the partial exception of Messina, had little direct control over their hinterland. Stephan Epstein believes that, given their inability to rely on institutional privileges for economic and human resources, Sicilys towns and cities were forced to obtain these resources on a competitive basis.11 However, this state of affairs, as Epstein himself concedes, did not apply in the case of a strategic and relatively scarce commodity such as grain.
5 6

Abulafia, Lo stato, 165-87. Cancila, Baroni, 44. 7 Bresc, Un monde, 127-8. 8 Cancila, Baroni, 16; C. Trasselli, Sullesportazione dei cereali dalla Sicilia negli anni 1402-1407, Annali della Facolt di Economia e Commercio dellUniversit di Palermo 11 (1957): 217-52, repr. in C. Trasselli, Mediterraneo e Sicilia allinizio dellepoca moderna. (Ricerche quattrocentesche) (Cosenza: Pellegrini Editore, 1977), 331-70. 9 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 274. 10 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 275; Cancila, Baroni, 20 reaches similar conclusions. 11 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 133; S. R. Epstein, Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late Medieval Italy, Economic History Review 46 (3) (1993): 453-77.

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In 1392 Martin I of Aragon invaded Sicily in order to restore royal authority and put an end to years of wars and internal political instability.12 The Aragonese monarchy also took steps to revive Sicilys economy and promote inter-regional trade by establishing new fairs, standardizing weights and measurements, and reducing tolls on internal trade.13 Among the latter measures was a decree passed in 1398 which stated that no tratte or trade permits were to be paid on grain exchanged intra regno and hence destined for internal consumption. Indications are, however, that Sicilys domestic grain market remained quite fragmented throughout much of the fifteenth century. In this case at least, the monarchy appears to have been unable or reluctant to consistently enforce institutional reforms favoring more open markets. This is hardly surprising given that, in order to do so, the state often needed to act against powerful and entrenched local or sectional interests including monopoly rights of feudal lords and protectionist measures by individual cities.14 In fifteenth-century Messina, the grain trade was effectively controlled by local municipal officials who not only decided the price at which grain was to be sold in the city but frequently also owned the very estates from where that grain was bought.15 My own research based on the notarial archives of Sciacca, one of the principal outlets for the export of grain in Sicily, suggests that the interests of the local authorities were often in conflict with those who had grain for sale because the latter found it more profitable to sell their stocks to Catalan, Genoese and other foreign merchants. The grain reserves of many cities were frequently low and any interruption in the supply chain could provoke considerable hardships for the inhabitants. For instance, Catanias annual grain requirements in the fifteenth century were in the region of 12,000-15,000 salme while production averaged some 18,000 salme.16

V. DAlessandro, Politica e societ nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo: U. Manfredi, 1963); P. Corrao, Governare un Regno. Potere, societ e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento (Naples: Liguori Editore, 1991). 13 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 96. 14 D. C. North and R. P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 97-100. 15 C. Salvo, Giurati, Feudatari Mercanti. Llite urbana a Messina tra Medio Evo e Et Moderna (Rome: Bibliopolis, 1995), 107-8. 16 A. Petino, Aspetti e momenti di politica granaria a Catania e in Sicilia nel Quattrocento (Catania: Universit di Catania, 1952), 30.

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Moreover, the desire on the part of the state to act in the interests of the urban masses and to implement long-term economic reforms often conflicted with more immediate political and fiscal concerns. An example from Agrigento serves to emphasize this point.17 In 1404, after the towns giurati (municipal officials) had acted to prevent grain exports out of their port, Martin I declared to those officials the monarchys intention to act in the interests of the islands cities first and the merchants second. That assurance notwithstanding, in 1433 the crown had given permission to two feudal lords to establish their own caricatori in the region thereby bypassing that of Agrigento. By then Martin had been succeeded by Alfonso V who intervened directly in the Italian grain markets, selling grain during periods of scarcity and high demand, apparently with great zeal.18 In the 1430s, while engaged in military campaigns against Naples, Alfonso passed a series of measures promoting grain exports at the expense of domestic consumption requirements. The Aragonese king was at that moment desperately in need of funds and provisions, both of which could be obtained by manipulating sales of grain. Thus, in the course of the fifteenth century, as grain exports increased, Sicilys towns, faced with a growing population and rising grain prices, were increasingly forced into a harsh struggle to gain control over food supplies for their citizens.19 Some of the larger cities managed to either assure themselves of preferential access to grain stocks through special arrangements or by closing ports or even by interdicting grain destined for export. Smaller communities, such as the Maltese Islands, often faced even greater difficulties. III The Maltese islands, consisting of Malta, Gozo and Comino, have a combined area of only about 316 square kilometers. The surface is rocky in most places, the soil is shallow and water generally scarce
V. DAlessandro, Paesaggio agrario, regime della terra e societ rurale (secoli XI-XV), in V. DAlessandro, Terra, nobili e borghesi nella Sicilia medievale (Palermo: Sellerio, 1994), 58-60; orig. publ. in R. Romano, ed., Storia della Sicilia, 10 vols. (Naples: Societ editrice Storia di Napoli e della Sicilia, 1980), 3: 411-47. 18 Del Treppo, I mercanti, 357-9 and Chap. 3. 19 Bresc, Un monde, 744-7.
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so that even today agriculture is heavily dependent on winter precipitation. The archipelago was incorporated into the Norman kingdom of Sicily in the late eleventh century and after 1282 became a peripheral outpost of the Crown of Aragon.20 In spite of the harsh physical environment, Malta (the largest of the three islands) managed to support a sizeable population throughout the late middle ages, probably hovering around 10,000 by the early fifteenth century. The only sizeable concentrations of people on Malta were the town of Mdina with its suburb of Rabat in the center and the royal castle at Birgu, which guarded the islands main harbor located in the south-east. Most other inhabitants were dispersed in rural settlements where they cultivated their own fields or worked on the larger private fiefs or royal estates. Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy and the land was worked by a free peasantry, with wheat, cumin and cotton being the principal crops. Cotton, both raw and in spun form, was widely exported and provided a valuable source of income through which Malta was able to pay for the growing necessity to purchase wheat from nearby Sicily.21 Given their geographical proximity, and the fact that they both formed part of the same political order, it was natural for the Maltese to look to Sicily, a mere 60 km away, to supply local needs. Sicilian wheat was of superior quality compared to that grown in Malta and was therefore always in demand. Nonetheless, the need for Malta to import grain was probably not acute prior to the fifteenth century.22 A number of instances are known in the fourteenth century when Malta actually exported grain to Sicily but even then these were probably unusual occurrences. A more accurate picture
A. T. Luttrell, Approaches to Medieval Malta, in A. T. Luttrell, ed., Medieval Malta. Studies on Malta before the Knights (London: The British School at Rome, 1975), 1-70, repr. in A. T. Luttrell, The Making of Christian Malta (Aldershot: Variorum, 2002), remains the best introduction to the islands medieval history. For more recent overviews, C. Dalli, Iz-Zmien Nofsani Malti (Malta: Pubblikazzjonijiet Indipendenza, 2002); B. Blouet, The Story of Malta, rev. ed. (Malta: Progress Press, 2004). 21 H. Bresc, The Secrezia and the Royal Patrimony in Malta: 1240-1450, in Luttrell, Medieval Malta, 132. Maltese cotton is mentioned in Genoa in 1164: Abulafia, The Two Italies, 218. In the fifteenth century it was extensively utilized in Barcelona and also in Genoa and Montpellier. Del Treppo provides several examples of Catalan merchants purchasing cotton in Malta. 22 G. Wettinger, Agriculture in Malta in the Late Middle Ages, in M. Buhagiar, ed., Proceedings of History Week 1981 (Malta: The Malta Historical Society, 1982), 13.
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of Maltas grain requirements is possible for the fifteenth century for which more documentary material has survived.23 In 1435 the Maltese claimed that grain shortages occurred every two to three years and were reducing the island to great poverty.24 The Maltese historian Godfrey Wettinger argues that in this period it became increasingly necessary to supplement local production with regular imports, probably on the order of 1000-2000 salme each year.25 In critical moments the estimated need for grain could be higher still. In 1468, which admittedly may have been an unusually harsh year, the municipal council ordered the purchase of 4,000 salme, while in 1480, faced with the threat of a Turkish invasion, the authorities debated whether they should purchase 2,000, 3,000, or 5,000 salme.26 Given that one salma was equivalent to the yearly consumption for 1-1.5 individuals, these figures represent significant amounts that must have imposed a considerable financial burden on the islands limited resources. A population list from 1480 for the community of Rabat, possibly drawn up in response to the above-mentioned invasion scare, indicated that its population of 317 households necessitated an additional 896 salme of grain.27 Certainly the need to import grain pressed ever more urgently upon the Maltese authorities between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, as the island experienced a demographic upsurge that doubled the population to almost 20,000 by 153028 (at the time of the arrival of the knights
23 The main sources utilized here are the records of the Maltese municipal administration, in G. Wettinger, ed., Acta Iuratorum et Consilii Civitatis et Insulae Maltae (Palermo: Associazione di Studi Malta-Sicilia/Centro di Studi Filologici e Linguistici Siciliani, 1993). 24 S. Giambruno and L. Genuardi, eds., Capitoli inediti delle citt demaniali di Sicilia approvati sino al 1458, 1, Alcamo-Malta (Palermo: Boccone del povero, 1918), 409: ki omni dui oy tri anni pati penuria di victuaglu per ki a quista chitati et insola fa misteri trahiri di Sichilia gran quantitati di frumenti. 25 Wettinger, Agriculture in Malta, 14. 26 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 286, 772. 27 S. Fiorini, Li Buki di Rabatu: The Population of Rabat c. 1480, in T. Cortis, T. Freller, L. Bugeja, ed., Melitensium Amor. Festschrift in honour of Dun Gwann Azzopardi (Malta: Gutenberg Press, 2002), 73-96. 28 G. Wettinger, The Militia List of 1419-20: A New Starting Point for the Study of Maltas Population, Melita Historica 5 (2) (1969): 80-106; S. Fiorini, Malta in 1530, in V. Mallia-Milanes, ed., Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798. Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (Malta: Mireva, 1993), 121-6. Comparable demographic growth patterns have been observed for Sicily in the later fifteenth century: M. Aymard, Une croissance slective: la population sicilienne aux XVIe-XVIIe sicles, Mlanges de la Casa de

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of St John). By then, Malta and Gozo were importing about 9,000 salme of wheat annually.29 As in other towns and cities in Sicily, the task of ensuring that the population were adequately supplied with wheat was the responsibility of the local municipal council or universitas.30 The universitas of Malta was based at Mdina but its jurisdiction in fact extended beyond the limits of that town to include all the villages on the island, where a large section of the population lived. In addition to the procurement of grain, the universitas oversaw the defense of the island, the farming out of indirect taxes (gabelle) on imported and exported goods, and the enforcement of price controls on foodstuffs. The principal officials of the universitas were the captain, who was appointed by the royal authorities, and the jurati, who were chosen locally and served for one year. Studies on the Maltese universitas and other universitates in Sicily have demonstrated that they tended to be dominated by a small group of families, who often viewed public office as an opportunity to promote sectional or private interests.31 From 1402 to 1457, the universitas of Malta was effectively controlled by 68 families, of whom only 42 had members who became jurati. Moreover, that office was in fact monopolized by fourteen families whose members received 101 of 145 municipal appointments.32 The precise extent to which personal interests impinged on the public responsibility of the universitas to provision its citizens with grain is difficult to assess. The language used in the debates that took place during council meetings was often vague and the necessary prosopographical research that can identify relations among different families or groups has not yet been done. However, the proVelasquez (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1968), 4: 303-27. 29 Wettinger, Agriculture in Malta, 14. 30 P. Corrao, Assemblee municipali nella Sicilia tardomedievale: note sul caso maltese, in P. Xuereb, ed., Karissime Gotifride. Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey Wettinger on his Seventieth Birthday (Malta: Malta University Press, 1999), 37-46; Fiorini, Malta in 1530, 111-98. Roughly 16 per cent of debates and deliberations within the town council between 1450 and 1499 concerned matters relating to grain. 31 C. Dalli, Capitoli: The Voice of an Elite, in S. Fiorini, ed., Proceedings of History Week 1992 (Malta: The Malta Historical Society, 1994), 1-18. For similar patterns of behavior within the universitas of Messina, Salvo, Giurati, 95-120. 32 Bresc, Un monde, 727.

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posals put forward by some council members frequently appear to have specifically favored certain individuals at the expense of others. For instance, in March 1474 a number of merchants protested a decision by the universitas that prohibited the sale of grain for eight days with the exception of one merchant who a few days earlier had been allowed to sell a quantity of wheat at the high price of 21 tar per salma.33 In other instances, some jurati attempted to manipulate the selling price of imported grain to favor another merchant who was entrusted with its procurement (and who served periodically as a jurato). If these examples represent a more widespread pattern of behavior among Maltese municipal authorities at the time they would have certainly represented a further disruption to the flow of trade in grain between the two islands. When it became necessary to import wheat to Malta, communal officials often appointed a representative charged with its procurement. They also needed to decide how much grain to buy and at what price, and the price at which it would be sold in Malta.34 The Maltese universitas, like other Sicilian towns, had consuls in various parts of Sicily where its merchants traded, including Licata and Syracuse, and these officials most likely functioned as intermediaries between sellers and buyers. Most grain destined for Malta was apparently shipped from Terranova, Licata and Syracuse, all on Sicilys southern coast. At other times, the Maltese authorities were approached directly by individuals or firms willing to bring grain to the island. In that case, the jurati discussed the offer and, if found acceptable, gave permission for the deal to take place. Contemporary records indicate the involvement of Maltese and Sicilians in this trade but Catalan merchants were especially prominent. This activity confirms a pattern, already delineated by Mario Del Treppo, whereby Catalans supplied cloth and agricultural products to Malta in
33 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 556, 561, 562. As in Sicily, the money of account used in Malta and Gozo was the uncia, tar, grani and denari (1 uncia = 30 tar, 1 tar = 20 grani, 1 grano = 6 denari). The Maltese uncia was equivalent to around one-seventh of that of Sicily in the late fifteenth century. 34 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 219 (1462): council granted Fredericus Calabachi, a fellow jurat, liberam et generalem potestatem administracionem et procuram pro emendo frumentum per universitatem et illud mictendo cum navigiis et si invenerit aliquem qui offeret fornire insolam frumento pro toto anno eciam ad granos duos ultra quod veniret ad expensas universitates quod habeat licenciam concordandi hoc prestito per eum juramento sollempni dum modo quod alii ferentes possent vendere ...

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exchange for Maltese raw and spun cotton.35 As a territory that formed part of the kingdom of Sicily, commercial relations between Malta and Sicily should have been categorized as internal trade, and hence exempted from payment of licences, known as tratte, that were levied on exports of grain fuori regno. In practice things worked rather differently. In fact, one of the most pressing concerns for the Maltese universitas in the early fifteenth century was to obtain from the royal officials a permanent exemption from payment of the tratte and other taxes on trade. This aim appeared to have been realized in 1398, when shortly after the restoration of Aragonese power in Sicily, Martin I exempted from export duties all commerce intra regno involving grain and foodstuffs traded by sea. That privilege was hitherto enjoyed only by the city of Messina but was now extended throughout the demesne which included most universitates, among them that of Malta.36 In 1416 however, the Maltese petitioned Ferdinand I to reconfirm that privilege, alleging that they were being taxed at one-half tratta for each salma.37 It has been argued that Martins decree contributed to the formation of an integrated grain market in Sicily by opening the way for reduced incidences of shortages and more stable prices.38 As the example of Malta demonstrates, however, royal privileges could lose much of their effect if they fell into disuse (as the Maltese claimed) or were not reconfirmed or firmly enforced. It is not known whether Ferdinand acceded to the Maltese request, but any trade privileges granted would have been lost from 1421 to 1428, when Malta and Gozo were pawned to the Aragonese nobleman Gonsalvo Monroy and so were not part of the demesne.39 Alfonso granted another exemption from payment of export licenses on grain and other victuals in 1432, following the reincorporation of the islands into the demesne, yet other requests to reconfirm this privilege recur in 1435 and 1450.40
35

Del Treppo, I mercanti, 166-7, 172, 174-5. The exchange of Catalan cloth and foodstuffs for Maltese grain by a Catalan merchant company in the 1450s and 1460s is difficult to explain: Del Treppo, I mercanti, 176. 36 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 141. 37 Giambruno and Genuardi, Capitoli, 376. 38 Epstein, An Island for Itself, 141-50. 39 G. Wettinger, The Pawning of Malta to Monroy, Melita Historica 7 (3) (1978): 265-83. 40 Giambruno and Genuardi, Capitoli, 390.

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Even when trading privileges were in force, the Maltese continued to experience difficulties procuring grain, either because of the intransigence or corruption of port officials who refused to honor toll exemptions or because towns in Sicily were unwilling to allow sales of grain for fear that they themselves might experience shortages.41 Small towns or isolated communities may have been especially vulnerable because they could not easily make their voice heard, which perhaps explains why the capitoli (petitions) of the universitas of the island of Lipari contained complaints similar to those by the Maltese.42 In 1483, in spite of an order from the viceroy, the authorities in Licata refused to sell wheat to Malta, and in 1507 Maltese who wished to buy grain from Terranova were allegedly being forced to pay bribes to customs officials or risk imprisonment.43 Similar protests were made in 1513 and 1515 against other port authorities.44 Times of scarcity only compounded the usual difficulties. In 1483 the port official of Licata asked the Maltese authorities not to buy all their grain from his city but to extend their search to other ports, particularly during the summer months when the weather was favorable to longer voyages.45 In fact by 1515, Malta appears to have been buying grain from several caricatori including Agrigento, Sciacca, Mazara, Licata, and Heraclea.46 In difficult circumstances the universitas sometimes adopted harsh measures such as requiring those who held stocks of grain to sell it immediately,47 to conduct searches to reveal hoarded supplies,48 or to institute forced loans upon all or some members of the community with which the universi-

Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 517. Giambruno and Genuardi, Capitoli, 366-7, 371. 43 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 927; J. Del Amo Garca, S. Fiorini, and G. Wettinger, ed., Documents of the Maltese Universitas. No. 1. Cathedral Museum, Mdina. Archivum Cathedralis Melitae, Miscellanea 33, 1405-1524. Documentary Sources of Maltese History (Malta: Malta University Press, 2001), 84. 44 Del Amo Garca, Fiorini, and Wettinger, Documents, 96, 101. 45 Del Amo Garca, Fiorini, and Wettinger, Documents, 45. 46 Del Amo Garca, Fiorini, and Wettinger, Documents, 101. 47 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 73 (1456); 215 (1462); 279 (1468). 48 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 125 (1461); 216 (1462). On the cherca, Bresc, Un monde, 745. Some people made their own private arrangements to purchase grain in Sicily. Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 314 (1468): si faza la cherca di quilli ki hannu portatu frumentu et si lannu portatu per usu so si pigla parti per vindiri a lu populu.
42

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tas could purchase grain (inpronti).49 If the situation was deemed to be especially critical, the universitas authorized the seizure of ships carrying grain to other destinations and confiscated their cargo.50 IV In conclusion, I would like to remark on two implications which can be derived from this study. First, it is admittedly notoriously difficult, but nonetheless important, to assess the effect of commercialization on a local level. I suggest that the extent to which urban demand in the late Middle Ages was responsible for opening commodity markets and lowering the costs of trade was in part limited by conflicts of interests within and among individual towns. Even in a relatively commercialized society like late medieval Sicily, towns and urban elites were often more concerned with protecting their particular fiscal and commercial privileges than in reducing the cost of regional trade. As John Hatcher and Mark Bailey have recently noted:
legal controls over trade in the Middle Ages were not intended to secure cheap and ready participation for as many as possible. Rather their object was to extend and protect the control of commercial activity ... for the profit of a few beneficiaries, and this inevitably restricted the scale of any reduction in the transaction costs of marketing for most producers.51

Second, I believe that the evidence presented above confirms the view that economic intervention by the medieval state generally came in spurts and its effect was, at best, unevenly distributed. When stategranted economic privileges were reasonably respected or enforced, they may have indeed contributed to a reduction of institutional constraints on trade and promoted regional specialization and greater market integration. However, the Maltese evidence shows that there were also several instances where, in practice, this did not occur. Maltas alienation from the demesne between 1421 and 1428by no means a unique event among demesnal cities in the
49 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 25 (undated); 197 (1462); 218 (1462) (forced loan of 1000 florins on persuni facultusi). 50 Wettinger, Acta Iuratorum, 547; 548; 549. 51 Hatcher and Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages, 168.

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kingdom of Sicilystands as a reminder that, for the state, the benefits of short term gains might outweigh long-term expectations.

COMMERCIAL CREDIT AND CENTRAL PLACE FUNCTION IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY YPRES


David Nicholas

Of the five great cities of Flanders (Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, Lille, Douai) in the late thirteenth century Ypres was the last to develop urban characteristics, the most precocious in record-keeping, the most industrial, and the most involved in trade at the interregional fairs. Its cloth was the most highly taxed of any Flemish textiles at the fairs of Provins, and the city maintained its own houses for merchant lodging at Provins and Lagny.1 The decline of the textile industry of Ypres in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is well known.2 The extent to which the decline of the Champagne fairs was involved in the general decay of Ypres prosperity, either as cause or effect, must remain an open question.3 Indeed, most questions concerning Ypres must remain open, because the archives of the city, once the richest of Flanders, were destroyed in 1914. Before the war the city archivist, Guillaume Des Marez, published the city accounts from 1267 to 13294 and took extensive notes on the more than seven thousand chirographs, including 5,505 debt recognitions, that were contracted before the chevins of the city from 1 October 1249 to 18 June 1291, when the
1 Elizabeth Chapin, Les villes de foires de Champagne des origins au dbut du XIVe sicle (Paris: Honor Champion, 1937), 96, 109, 115, 118. 2 See particularly Hans Van Werveke, De omvang van de Ieperse lakenproductie in de veertiende eeuw, Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgi, Klasse der Letteren, no. 9 (Antwerp: Standaard, 1947). 3 John Munro has argued persuasively that the eclipse of the Champagne fairs was due to a decline in the production of light woollens that had been the most important element in their prosperity. He links the change also to the rise in transaction costs with the onset of wars in the 1290s. John H. Munro, The New Institutional Economics and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (2001): 1-47, at 14-9. 4 Guillaume Des Marez and E. De Sagher, eds., Comptes de la ville dYpres de 1267 1329, 2 vols. (Brussels: Commission Royale dHistoire, 1909-1913).

egulated Textile Industries by 1382, Castellany of Ypres and Environs

gros tournois

THRESHOLDS FOR MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES AND ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY
Richard W. Unger

England, Flanders, Brabant, and Holland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while showing signs of economic growth and a remarkable ability to adjust to changing demographic, environmental and political circumstances, did not indicate a reliance on long distance trade or even intra-European trade that would be typical of the following two centuries. More stable political conditions allowing a revival in overland trade to Germany and Italy along with expansion of shipping were the foundation for subsequent growth in industrial production and in commerce.1 But for much of the two centuries before 1500 it appears that the participation of the towns around the southern North Sea in exchange, in extending the scope of their trade, and in integrating their markets with those of other towns changed little and perhaps even declined. Southeastern England, which largely meant London, and Flanders were the most urbanized parts of northern Europe. With the exception of Paris, virtually all sizeable fifteenth-century cities north of Italy could be found in the region. Towns were net consumers of people: Death rates were higher than birth rates. Even more dramatically they were net consumers of food. Urban dwellers kept animals and had gardens. Some food production within town walls was to be a common feature of European cities into the nineteenth century. But for the principal source of nutrition of pre-modern
See among other works by John H. A. Munro, The New Institutional Economics and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: The Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88 (1) (2001): 20-8. His emphasis is on the fall in transaction costs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the rise of fairs in the Low Countries. See also John H. A. Munro, English Backwardness and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th Centuries, in Peter Stabel, Bruno Blond, and Anke Greve, eds., International Trade in the Low Countries (14th-16th Centuries) Merchants, Organisation, Infrastructure (Leuven: Garant, 2000), 105-67.
1

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people in northern Europe, bread, people in cities had to import the raw material. Cities were sumps for food grains, sucking wheat and rye, barley and oats, from the countryside. Towns were a force for promoting and generating trade and exchange. The size of towns around the southern North Sea and their need for food grains would suggest a need for trade, a force for creating conditions conducive to an economy based on shipping and commerce. It appears that, surprisingly, that was not the case in the fifteenth century. Despite the high degree of urbanization, trade in food grains was limited. The towns of southeastern England and the Low Countries did not rely extensively on grain shipped to them from afar and, in fact, not even grain shipped from relatively nearby. The principal urban markets in northern Europe in the later Middle Ages showed low degrees of market integration with those at any considerable distance away. The towns could function and prosper on the basis of nearby supplies. Few towns reached or surpassed a threshold which forced them to seek food grains from distant points. That seeming anomaly is, however, consistent with theoretical expectations and with the constraints placed on them by the availability of land and by the prevailing technologies of agriculture. Within the Low Countries, and especially the southern Low Countries, in the fifteenth century there was a high and increasing degree of market integration. The process gained momentum in that most densely populated region of northern Europe in the following century giving something of an impression of the inevitability of the process, especially in what was a clearly defined and relatively small region. Scholars examining the grain markets of the region through a variety of statistical teststhat is Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide2and the growth of the largest city in sixteenth century Europethat is Herman Van der Weeamong others, found evidence for the emergence in the fifteenth century of an integrated market or markets in Flanders and Brabant. According to Van der Wee urban markets in Brabant were moving toward integration already well before 1500, a process he said which became

2 Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix craliers en Brabant et en Flandre au XVe sicle (Brussels: ditions de l'Universit de Bruxelles, 1975), 270-5.

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more pronounced over time.3 Both he and Tits-Dieuaide were convinced that a closely related and connected regional market for, at the very least, the southern Low Countries had emerged by 1500. Data from towns in the Netherlands outside of Flanders and Brabant suggest that the process of integration was advanced by then but less so in places like Douai and Utrecht than in Antwerp, Brussels, and Louvain. A standard test for market integration is whether prices tended to converge and to move together.4 Though price movements in the various markets were not always of the same magnitude at exactly the same time, the charting of prices leaves a strong impression of the convergence of prices of the principal food grains, wheat and rye. This suggests slow movement toward integration and within limits.5 In the sixteenth century the same regions became even more integrated among themselves but only then with markets elsewhere in northern Europe. For the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it appears that integration was local and at most regional. Despite the long term outcome, despite the eventual integration of markets throughout northwestern Europe, the final economic result was not inevitable. The grander pattern, called globalization by later writers, may be common in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries but by no means was that the only possible outcome in the fifteenth. Then more common it appears was the development of integration in relatively small regions which were themselves in turn connected commercially through new periodic regional fairs that emerged in the period.6 Levels of transactions costs, warfare, and government regulations worked to prevent exchange. Cumula3 Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 1: 23-4, 31. 4 See Appendix 1. 5 For a summary of the discussion about Low Countries market integration and further statistical confirmation of a level of regional market integration see Richard W. Unger, Feeding Low Countries Towns: The Grain Trade in the Fifteenth Century, Revue Belge de Philolgie et d'Histoire 77 (2) (1999): 32958; Richard W. Unger, Maritime Transport and the Integration of Low Countries Grain Markets in the Late Middle Ages, in Piet Van Cruyningen and Erik Thoen, eds., Town and Countryside from the late Middle Ages to the 19th Centuries: Supply and Demand of Food (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, forthcoming). 6 Stephan R. Epstein, Regional Fairs, Institutional Innovation, and Economic Growth in Late Medieval Europe, Economic History Review 47 (3) (1994): 459-482.

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tive improvements in agricultural production, including diversification and intensification, worked to make small parts of the region self-sufficient. At the same time swings in production thanks to changing natural conditions and improvements in transportation had the opposite effect. On balance and in the long term it is true that the forces for integration prevailed. At many points in the fifteenth century and for many parts of the region, however, the level of integration with other urban markets was scant. Many of the towns of the region only infrequently searched outside of the lands nearby for sources of food grains. Measures of market integration indicate the limited degree of reliance on distant markets and the limited scope of integration in the region. Data on potential food grain production indicate why towns could and did get by in many if not most years on what local farmers grew in the fields around the towns. If prices moved up and down together, to be expected of two markets that are integrated, then price series from the two markets for the same good should be highly correlated. Where levels of correlation were high that indicates that when a food grain was in short supply consumers turned to sources of the good in other markets. In the fifteenth century in England and the Low Countries correlations of prices of different food grains in the same market were even higher than correlations of prices between markets. That indicates that when a good grain was in short supply consumers turned to other grains in the same market. To test the degree to which consumers moved not to distant sources for the same food grain but shifted to different grains in their own market prevailing prices were compared inside single markets. Comparisons were made using the currency prevailing in that market, thus avoiding problems created by the changing values of currencies. Corrections were made for differences in and changes in the units of measure, that is either by weight or volume depending on the practice of the individual market. There was a hierarchy of food grains in late medieval markets. Consumers preferred wheat almost invariably. Wheat prices were higher per unit volume always. Because of the higher price wheat was better able to cover transport costs and so was more likely to be exchanged across markets. The demand for wheat was more susceptible to changes in the income of consumers. The wealthy bought wheaten bread and the not so wealthy bought it when they

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could afford it. A fall in the price of wheat drew more consumers into the market for the good. If wheat was, relatively, a luxury good then oats was at the other end of the spectrum. It was not just the lexicographer Dr. Samuel Johnson who thought oats were intended for horses.7 In the Middle Ages the grain was used as animal feed but was also used for bread, porridge and, in the Low Countries especially, it was used extensively in brewing.8 So people did eat oats but it came at the bottom of the list among choices. It was an inferior good in that presumably a fall in price would have led to no increase in consumption as people used the income released by the lower cost of oats to buy something else, such as wheat or more likely rye, the next grain up the ladder of preference from oats. Rye was like oats and for both consumption was price inelastic, that is if prices changed consumption levels changed little. Those grains were so necessary to the diet of the poor that people simply had to buy them even when prices are up sharply. Barley was not in the same class as wheat which was alone at the top of the grain hierarchy but barley was probably ahead of rye because of its use in quality beer. That seems to have been especially true in England in the later Middle Ages. If farmers and merchants and shippers preferred to trade wheat over other grains then wheat prices should have been more highly correlated with prices in other markets. The market for wheat should have been larger, more integrated and integrated earlier than those for inferior grains like rye or oats. The expectation is that the price of a traded grain would have had a high correlation with prices in other markets and much less of a correlation with prices of other grains in the same market. If no grains were traded then prices would have been determined solely by local conditions. If neither wheat nor oats nor barley nor rye was exchanged under such conditions of autarky the price movement of all grains would have been much the same, the only variation being small and

Oats. A grain which in England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports the people. (Samuel Johnson, A dictionary of the English language: in which the words are deduced from their originals, and illustrated in their different significations by examples from the best writers: to which are prefixed a history of the language and an English grammar (London: W. Strahan for J. and P. Knapton etc., 1755), II). 8 See Richard W. Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland 900-1900. Economy, Technology and the State (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 116-20.

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caused by differences in the characteristics of demand for the different food grains. To put it another way if grains were traded there should have been high correlation among the prices for the same grains in different markets and if grains were not traded then there should be high correlations for different grains in each local market. Using price series starting in the late fourteenth century and running down to 1600, that is well into the era of greater market integration in the sixteenth century, if there is one thing that leaps out from an examination of the correlation of grain prices within markets it is the consistently highindeed staggeringly highlevels of correlation. For sites with surviving lengthy price series for the four principal food grains, that is Antwerp, Leiden, and southern England the coefficients of correlation are almost always above 0.800 (Table 1).9 What is more the relationship between oats and wheat, where the lowest level of correlation would be expected given the position of the two grains at either end of the hierarchy of food grains, is among the highest and not the lowest. The somewhat lower levels of correlation of barley and oats prices with rye prices in Leiden could easily be a result of the relatively smaller sample size. It is almost as if any two grains were complementary goods, like left and right shoes, but of course food grains were not complements. For Utrecht there is only surviving data for three grains, barley, oats and wheat, but correlation of prices was still high, much higher than the norm for prices for the same grain among different markets (Table 2). The relationship between oats and wheat shows the lowest level of correlation but the difference between it and other levels is small. For some markets there are only two surviving price series (Table 3). The results still prove to be similar no matter the grains, no matter the sample size and no matter the location. Going futher afield, Gdansk, the great export centre for Polish grain and in the sixteenth century and beyond a major supplier of food grains to the Low Countries, showed little difference between the performance of rye and wheat prices. The Paris case, also beyond the region around the southern North Sea, offers few observations. As well some extremely high wheat prices in the closing years of the Hundred Years War strongly affect reThe rye and oats prices from Antwerp are compared to wheat prices from nearby Lier.
9

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one market are compared to levels in other markets, such as Antwerp (Lier) and Leiden (0.471) or south England with Antwerp (Lier) (0.600). With the same grain price correlations between markets are still low compared to the price correlations between grains in a single market. Oats prices in Antwerp and Leiden were weakly correlated (0.427) as were wheat prices between Bruges and Brussels (0.451). For a comparison of barley and rye prices the results are similar (Table 6). Correlations within Leiden and Antwerp between the two grains were high while comparisons between markets show lower levels of correlation, for example between Antwerp and Louvain (0.460) and Utrecht and Leiden (0.498). For the same grain the correlations between markets are also low. Between Brussels and Amsterdam the correlation of rye prices is actually negative (-.004), admittedly for minute samples. Even with markets close to each other the correlations of the figures for barley and rye are strikingly low, another indication that markets were moderately independent and did not rely on common sources of supply. Price movements for different grains in the late Middle Ages and the sixteenth century were highly correlated within markets. The data would seem to indicate much more exchange of food grains within markets than among markets. The levels of correlation within markets are staggering, especially when compared with levels of correlation among markets. Despite some deviations the statement would seem to be true of all grains in all places and at all times and not just in the Low Countries and southeast England but in northwestern Europe in general. Even the sample size does not seem to affect the result. There is the possibility that to some degree the common internal price movements were generated by government price fixing or at least price regulation. Though towns in the Low Countries and especially in the northern Low Countries were less dirigiste than their German counterparts in the sixteenth century the legislation which first appeared in the fifteenth century may have had some bite which would help explain internally consistent prices (Table 7). The correlations in prices for the four principal food grains in Strasbourg are simply too high to be explained by autarky. The hand of the civic government can be seen in the complete consistency of price movement over the years up to 1600. If that is the case then government legislation worked against market integration, kept the mechanism of prices from working to draw supplies from areas of surplus. The towns may already have

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of farmers in feeding towns had limits, however, and so the effectiveness set restrictions, even if somewhat flexible, on the size of those settlements. In dealing with questions of sources of food big cities have been the most popular sites for investigation and not just because the material is easier to muster. For medieval England the study of the maximum size of towns has meant the study of London. The capital did reach an impressive 80,000 souls by around 1300 but cities of that size and larger in northern Europe were more a product of the sixteenth century when political centres like Paris, London, and Amsterdam went through dramatic expansion. Ultimately it was food and fuel supplies that both theoretically and practically constrained the population of towns. To measure the restrictions created by the need to feed urban populations perhaps the simplest way is to return to the world of that early nineteenth-century Pomeranian rye farmer, Johan von Thnen, and to his followers, the German geographer Walter Christaller and the professor who refused a post under National Socialism, August Lsch, to return to that school of German scholars who dealt in what they called the economics of location. They began purely theoretically and then made attempts to adjust their theories to conform more closely to the reality they knew. To make life simple they began by assuming a world that is a flat undifferentiated plainand in this case two spellings of plane are correct which is the kind of thing that brings relief to students and anxiety to the writers of spell checkers for computer programs. There are additional limiting assumptions, such as that no firm makes abnormal profits and that society maximizes the degree to which firms agglomerate, or in other words minimizes the number of sites of any economic activity. Both transport and production costs, are uniform, demand is infinitely elastic at a given price, and there is a single market centre. With those assumptions then production would logically be distributed evenly and equally across the plain so then central places, sites which provide services to the population, would appear at equal intervals. It turns out that the distribution of those centres of population will be theoretically arranged regularly in a pattern of equilateral hexagons.12
J. H. von Thnen, Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalkonomie, 2nd ed. (Rostock: G. B. Leopold, 1842-1850); August Lsch,
12

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Von Thnen wanted to know the maximum rent a landlord could get from farmland. That would depend he realized on the profits that farmers could generate. So if farmers were trying to maximize their incomes that led him to the question of why farmers picked the specific crops they chose to raise at different locations. Consumers paid for the cost of producing a crop and also for transport costs so at a certain distance away from a consumption centre it was no longer economic to grow one crop but became profitable to grow another. The critical factors for the choice of a crop were then production costs per unit of land and transport costs. Von Thnen envisaged, theoretically, a series of circles around a point of consumption and within each zone described by those circles farmers producing one crop or type of crop. Christaller, starting with the same set of assumptions, examined the geometry asking what would be the optimum shape of the zones of production. There is no doubt that the circle was the most efficient choice but a series of circles around each centre of consumption would not fill up the entire plain. The collection of polygons that would fulfill that necessary function of blanketing the plain are the triangle, square and hexagon. Since the hexagon is the closest to the circle in shape, intuitively and also mathematically it is the best choice to describe regions of production for maximizing efficiency of supply. The hexagon turns out to be four-fifths as efficient as a circle for the purpose. In a sense Christaller was trying to make more general the specific case that von Thnen had described. Lsch went further in trying to loosen the rather strict assumptions of the essential theory. Von Thnen himself tried to relax the obviously inaccurate assumption that the world is a flat undifferentiated plain. He did consider what happened if for example a river ran through the plain, thus creating a range of lower transport costs.13 In general just as waterways lower transport costs hills increase them. The plain is finite in extent and at some point reaches what is a much more undifferentiated surface, that is the sea. By accepting variations in geography and so a lack of uniformity in production but, more important, in transport costs the neat
The Economics of Location, trans. Wolfgang F. Stolper (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 109-20. 13 Alan G. Wilson, Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2000), 51-4, 81-2, 123-5, 135-8.

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pattern of hexagons becomes skewed. By accepting that geography could be different the theorists also accepted that production costs could vary because of soil type and weather conditions.14 The smaller the area under consideration, however, the more likely the pattern of supply would conform to the theoretically anticipated pattern of regular hexagons. In the second half of the twentieth century, armed with more sophisticated mathematics and computers to do iterative calculations at high speed, theorists have added a dynamism to the static models of Lsch and his predecessors. The resulting spatial interaction modelling can with some ease consider the reciprocal relationships of multiple centres of consumption, the flows between them, and allow for variations in geography. The resulting models are more complex with von Thnens world of rings reduced to a special highly restricted case. They are highly flexible, and able to accommodate a wide variety of variables and so better able to deal with known circumstances. The geometrical patterns around multiple centres are varied and show a great potential variety in land use (Figure 1). Yet in dealing with a single centre and even incorporating an interaction-location paradigm, though the geometrical form takes on more of an elliptical shape the further away from the centre (Figure 2), still the shape, at least in the first zone closest to the centre, is similar to the regular hexagon which satisfied Christaller.15 According to Wilson,
... Christallers system is too rigid to have any chance of representing reality ... However, it should be emphasised that the theory is an outstanding creation, offering great insightsrather in the manner of many economic concepts and theories which are accepted on such a basis without ever having a chance of representing reality in any detailed respect.16

While the criticism of location theory as it emerged in the first half of the twentieth century is certainly well established and acknowlOn differences in agricultural output depending on differences in weather patterns see Christian Pfister, Climate and Economy in Eighteenth Century Switzerland, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 10 (1978): 719-23. 15 Wilson, Complex Spatial Systems, 81-4, 93. 16 Wilson, Complex Spatial Systems, 146.
14

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Figure 1

Von Thnen Rings with an Interaction Model


(Alan G. Wilson, Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2000), 83)

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Figure 2 A Von Thnen System with Multiple Market Centres


(Alan G. Wilson, Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2000), 83)

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edged as sound, and while the addition of dynamical locational analysis shows how exceptional were the cases described by earlier theorists, the expectations which had their origins in the work of von Thnen can still serve as both a guide to patterns of production and land use, and also as a basis for an understanding of the historical relationship between the agrarian countryside and the sites farmers supplied with food. Each person who lives in the central place requires the labour of people producing food within the hexagon around the consumption centre, that is around the central place. The surplus created by the farmer will determine the land area required to support each resident of the central place. That in turn means that the amount of land it took to feed a town depended on how much land it took to feed a person. For the late Middle Ages, using figures generated by Christopher Dyer from the end of the thirteenth century, with gross yields of around 1,000 litres per hectare for many food grains and after deductions for seed, feed for animals, food for the farmers family, and for tithes, the net figure for marketable grain was between 160 and 220 litres per hectare. Another estimate for the early fourteenth century by James Galloway and Margaret Murphy puts the average marketable surplus at 360 litres per hectare for wheat. There was wide variation of course but something like 300 litres net per hectare for wheat and oats and 400 litres net for barley seem reasonable for late medieval England.17 If per caput annual consumption of food grains was about 600 litres, an estimate which is not unreasonable and reflects neither a poor nor a prosperous standard of living, then it took around two hectares of farmland, more or less, to support a town dweller. That assumes that the entire rural population was involved solely in production of food for market. That was of course not true and became less true in the late fourteenth and fifteenth century with expansion in rural industry. If for every farmer in the countryside there was one dependent person who consumed rather
17 Christopher Dyer, Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages Social Change in England c. 1200-1520 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1113; James A. Galloway, Londons Grain Supply: Changes in Production, Distribution and Consumption during the Fourteenth Century, Franco-British Studies 20 (1995): 27; James A. Galloway and Margaret Murphy, Feeding the City: Medieval London and its Agrarian Hinterland, The London Journal 16 (1) (1991): 11.

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than produced food then the land area needed to feed one urban dweller was around four hectares, and that estimate probably is a high one. As to fuel, though in some parts of England coal was known and used in the late Middle Ages, for the overwhelming majority of the population heat came from firewood. Around 1300 coal cost four times as much in London as it did in Durham so even though coal had higher calorific valuemore than double that of woodother than for industrial uses, firewood was the logical source of home heat.18 Von Thnen expected that forested areas near cities would be retained and managed to produce heating supplies and that certainly did happen in southeast England, in regions near London. Attempts to estimate the land area needed to supply people in towns with fuel are even more plagued by problems than the attempts to estimate the land area needed to supply food grains. Firewood consumption varied with the climate. Firewood production varied with the character of the land and the level of organization and management in exploiting the land.19 One authority offers a figure for Sweden and Finland of eight kilograms of firewood per person per day as the consumption norm, including industrial uses, but in northern France, Germany, the Netherlands, and England the estimate is about four kilograms per day. Four kilograms per day translates into about 1.5 tonnes annually and assuming a level of the average productivity of forests of between 0.75 and 1.5 tonnes per annum it would have taken from 0.5 to 1.0 hectares of managed woodland to produce that much firewood and so meet the needs of the average inhabitant of a town.20 Presumably the demand for firewood per caput was on the rise in late medieval England because of the spread of the use of the chimney. Production figures reported by Galloway, Keene, and Murphy from the woodlands supplying late medieval London suggest output of 2.25 tonnes per hectare, an estimate that is generous. They also esti18 James A. Galloway, Derek Keene, and Margaret Murphy, Fuelling the City Production and Distribution of Firewood and Fuel in Londons Region, 1290-1400, Economic History Review 49 (3) (1996): 447-72, at 448. 19 On the management of English forests in general and over the long term see Oliver Rackham, The History of the Countryside (London: Dent, 1986). 20 Paolo Malanima, The Energy Basis for Early Modern Growth, 16501820, in Maarten Prak, ed., Early Modern Capitalism Economic and Social change in Europe, 1400-1800 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 53, 61.

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mated per caput wood consumption for the fourteenth century at 0.8 tonnes. At that pace and at the high rate of production they use it took an area of at least 0.35 hectares to supply each Londoner, but that figure errs to the low side. At that level it took about 28,000 hectares in 1300 to meet the needs of the population of 80,000 and only 18,000 hectares in 1400 when the population was considerably reduced. The estimate of 0.35 hectares per Londoner seems low in general but especially because a contemporary in 1700 put the land area required to supply each town dweller with firewood at 0.5 hectares, and that in an era when coal already was making a considerable contribution to the thermal energy needs of the capital.21 So despite the extensive and directed work of Galloway, Keene, and Murphy an estimate of 0.5 hectares as a per caput land requirement for firewood supplies is preferred. People in the countryside would have required firewood as well. The ratios employed for net grain production can and should be applied to estimating rates of firewood output by country dwellers for themselves and city dwellers. Assuming 16 rural people for each urbanite, that is two farm families of four each producing grain for the town dweller and two farm families producing grain for dependents in the countryside, then to supply them would have taken eight hectares of woodland at 0.5 hectares as the land requirement just to supply the 16. It would have taken an additional 0.5 hectares then to meet the needs of a single town dweller. An estimate of something on the order of eight hectares needed to supply enough wood for people in the countryside as well as a single person in town is probably not wide of the mark. Many factors make the figures suspect and the task of lending precision to the estimates for land requirements to sustain townspeople is far from complete. The results may be wide of the mark, and presumably over time more research will sharpen accuracy, still the errors in estimation do serve to some degree to counteract each other. The goal is to produce a general rather than highly specific sense of land use and land requirements to supply town dwellers and so gain some sense of the threshold area required to sustain

Rolf Peter Sieferle, The Subterranean Forest Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolution, trans. Michael Osmann (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2001). Original German edition published as Der unterirdische Wald (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1982), 55, 66, 91-2. Galloway, Keene, and Murphy, Fuelling, 455-6.

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a late medieval town. No matter the efforts at estimation it appears that Englands largest urban centre in the late Middle Ages, London, had its fuel needs easily met by producers in the region, and there was still a surplus for export.22 That along with other indications of regular and consistent access to adequate heating fuel in the Low Countries and England suggests that most of the time most towns did not have trouble with their energy requirements. If it took four hectares of land in total to produce the food needed for a town dweller and eight hectares in total to produce the firewood, for a notional town of 1,000 peopleassuming that none of the people in the town did anything to produce any food or fuel for themselvesthe total rural area required was 12,000 hectares. If a distribution of production of food grains and firewood for the town of 1,000 conformed to a pattern of regular hexagonsa limiting assumption though as indicated theoretically a reasonable first approximationthen the distance from one side of the hexagon to the other would have been about 12 kilometres. The shortest distance to any of the six sides of the notional hexagon from the centre would have been under six kilometres.23 It was a distance a farmer could walk in an hour with little difficulty. For a town of 10,000 the distance along the any of the six sides of the regular hexagon would have been about 21.5 kilometres. For a city the size of Ghent or Bruges, that is around 40,000, the length of the walk to the outer extremity of the idealized supply zone would have been just short of 43 kilometres, an easy trip in a day on foot. For London at its maximum late medieval population around 1300 of 80,000, and the largest town in the region outside of Paris, the theoretical distance was just short of 61 kilometres. Because of the geometry that distance was not eighty times the distance for a

Galloway, Keene, and Murphy, Fuelling, 457. The formula for the area of a regular hexagon is A = 3/2 W2 where W is the smallest width of the hexagon, the length of a straight line from one side to the side directly opposite. If A = 12,000 or 120,000,000 square metres since 1 hectare = 10,000 square meters then 240,000,000/ 3 = W2 or W = 138,564,064 or W = 11,771 metres or just under 12 kilometres as the width of the regular hexagon. The shortest distance from the centre to any one of the sides would thus have been less than 6 kilometres. The area, A, is also equal to 3 3/2 L2, where L is the length of a side of the regular hexagon. 46,189,376 so L= 6,796 metres If A= 120,000,000 square metres then L = or almost 6.8 kilometres.
23

22

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town of 1,000 but only something more than five times the distance. A careful examination of sources of food for London, the second largest and possibly at some times the largest city in the region, indicates that virtually all the food needed, and so excluding fuel, came from 100,000 hectares, an area in total about twice the size of the small county of Middlesex. It may be that because of the nature of surviving documents research has missed some sources Londoners used for food, for example nearby on the Continent, but whether that is true or not the fact remains that food for the largest city in England came almost entirely from the southeast of England.24 In around 1500, farmers in the coastal Low Countries could supply something on the order of twice as much grain as was needed to feed the existing urban population.25 Even if the estimates to arrive at that conclusion are somewhat suspect and even if the final result is off by as much as 100% still the weight of the evidence strongly supports the impression that for most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries most grain to feed towns came from close by and so did not have to brought from far afield, that is except in unusual years. Such calculations depend on all the land within the notional polygon being productive and able to supply either food or fuel. But even assuming that only half the land was productive for a town of 10,000 that would have increased the length of the side of the hexagon only to a bit more than 30 kilometres or a distance of a little more than 26 kilometres from the centre to the outer edge of the hexagon, again something that could have easily been covered in half a day by a farmer on foot and with some time to spare. There are many problems with the estimates. There are many exceptions which can and should be raised to the calculations. There are certainly errors. But there is no way to diminish the impression that the land area required to supply a late medieval English town was small by almost any measure. The hexagon did not have to be largein terms of distance that could be travelled even with the limited equipment and methods availableto meet the needs of the town in either the idealized world of the German location theorists or in the practical world of late medieval townsfolk. That being the case the maximum population of the town was
24 25

Galloway and Murphy, Feeding, 11. Unger, Feeding Low Coutries Towns, 329-58 at 330-2.

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determined by the limits on the size of the hexagon and the optimal population was suggested by the size of the hexagon. The population threshold, the size of the town which would force reliance on distant supplies of food and fuel was very high because so much of what was needed by urban folk could be raised within a short distance from the town. The area needed to supply a town depended on transport costs. It was not just the presence of food and fuel that mattered but the ability to deliver it to the town at a price which made it worthwhile for countryfolk to produce the goods and to transport them to a central place. Falling transport costs would have made it even easier to supply towns. Estimates of the land needed to produce food and fuel for towns are filled with problems but those pale in comparison to the difficulties with estimates of transport costs. Odd data appear with singular observations never offering more than a glimpse at what it cost to move goods. For example, carrying firewood overland to London in the fourteenth century doubled prices over a distance of some sixteen kilometres but it still paid to bring firewood from as far away as twenty kilometres and even further if shipment was by water.26 To move grain from the Baltic to the Low Countries in the fifteenth century was said to double the price so moving wheat over the few kilometres from producers to urban consumers, even if overland, probably did not present an economic barrier to town size. If the costs of transport went down it certainly made it easier to reach further afield for sources of food and fuel but since the area required to supply towns was as small as it was circumstances rarely required exploiting any gains that might be reaped from falling shipping costs. Two factors seem to have been at work in the late Middle Ages which directly affected the ability of the countryside to get supplies to towns at prices that could sustain the settlements. First, it appears, and appears is the right word, that over short distance by water transport costs went down in the period. If falling transport costs can make a valuable contribution to integrating markets and if in the fourteenth and fifteenth century the most obvious development in commerce was the emergence of regional grain markets

26 Galloway, Keene, and Murphy, Fuelling, 457-8; Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, ed. by E. F. Sderlund, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955 [revised ed.]), for example 2: 80-9

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then perhaps it was not design improvements in the largest long distance traders that had the greatest impact on the organization of markets and town size but rather changes in smaller ships, vessels used in coastal and river transport.27 River boats are rarely a topic worthy of the time of historians or archeologists. There is little that is grand about them and little reason to examine them when found or to preserve records of them. Yet rivers, even some rather small and insignificant ones, had a central role in inland transport in the late Middle Ages. Getting grain or wood to urban markets very often depended on proximity to a creek or rivulet which ultimately gave access to a major stream. The development of new and more efficient types of coastal and small sailing ships lowered costs. The presence of many river boats and the widespread use of river transport, documented by Jim Masschaele and John Langdon,28 only worked to make moving goods easier and so expand the potential area to supply towns. Second, actions of governments had an effect on the area that might supply urban needs. The failure to maintain order, the established practice of public authorities fighting wars or not stopping people from fighting each other, certainly hurt urbanization. The amount of violence in late medieval northern Europe was limited, sporadic and so the long term effects on optimal town size were less than the new practice of public authorities: regulating commerce. Fears of forestalling and regrating, that is of seeking monopolistic advantages, had generated legislation in English towns already in the thirteenth century. The extent of controls over food supply and the marketing of food in towns expanded in the fifteenth century and became the model for monarchical governments in the sixteenth century.29 Those kings and queens in northern Europe followed patterns of legislation and regulation pioneered by urban governments in Italy. There town populations used political power to gain economic advantage, or at the very least to assure their necessary supplies. Italian towns, especially in Tuscany but to a lesser extent in Lombardy, set up rules and systems of taxation
Unger, Maritime Transport. John Langdon, Inland Water Transport in Medieval England, Journal of Historical Geography 19 (1) (1993): 1-11; James Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England, 1150-1350 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997). 29 Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism (London: Allen & Unwin, [1935]).
28 27

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which worked against subject towns and rural areas. Their actions led to relatively large urban centres and inefficiencies that slowed recovery from the mid fourteenth century economic and demographic shock of the Black Death.30 In kingdoms with powerful monarchies, even in the absence of powerful monarchs, such urban legislation was virtually impossible. Richard Britnell has shown that in England nothing like the Italian pattern of legislative control existed and, as a result, nothing like the size of Italian towns was achieved, despite the fact that population densities overall were much the same.31 In the absence of powerful civic governments able to influence market forces and enjoying stable or falling transportation costs English towns in the late Middle Ages had greater flexibility in seeking their sources of food and fuel. In the Low Countries towns found themselves less able than their Italian counterparts to control the flow of goods from the countryside thanks to the power of counts and dukes and to the consolidation of the authority of the Dukes of Burgundy through much of the fifteenth century. There is probably no exact answer to the question of what the optimal size was for a town in late medieval northern Europe. Certainly no final answer is produced by the calculations. At least there is every indication that the answer to the question is probably something like not very big and certainly well short of the maximum. In England around 1300 most towns were of medium and smaller size, that is they had populations in the 2,000 to 10,000 range. Only four towns had populations between 10,000 and 80,000 and only one was over 80,000.32 The single giant, London, was an anomaly in England. It had the kind of political power and pull that typified powerful Italian towns. It had access through a river network and through coastal trading to a highly productive agricultural region. It also had relatively easy access to foodstuffs and other goods from not-far-distant productive regions overseas. There is good reason to believe that improvements in transport technology did allow for the optimal size of towns to grow in the late
30 Stephan R. Epstein, Town and Country: Economy and Institutions in Late Medieval Italy, Economic History Review 46 (3) (1993): 456-69. 31 Richard Britnell, The Towns of England and Northern Italy in the Early Fourteenth Century, Economic History Review 44 (1) (1991): 24-30. 32 Britnell, The Towns, 22. The four were Norwich, York, Winchester, and Bristol.

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Middle Ages. That did mean that even though local suppliers could meet needs there might well have been distant suppliers who had the ability to supplant them because the competitors some distance away enjoyed lower production costs. The regular pattern of hexagons was more likely to be disrupted by flows of goods with a different and varied pattern of supply emerging (See the example in figure 2). Even if grain and firewood came from further away that did not mean that lands nearby could not meet urban needs. The region that supplied the town might have an elongated shape with tentacles reaching some distance away but the total area remained more or less the same size, soil productivity and intensity of effort being the factors that led to some variation. By the same token, if most markets got the overwhelming majority of their food almost all of the time from farmers within a very few kilometres of the towns then it does not appear that it was trade and market integration which yielded or pressed for specialization in agricultural production. That would have to wait for larger populations, larger towns and greater concentration of economic activity, all of which became more prevalent in the region in the sixteenth century. Towns could and did thrive in most years under most conditions without having to search far afield for essential supplies. Price data deployed to examine market integration conforms to the expectations of location theory and data for production and consumption of essential goods in the late Middle Ages. Towns relied on suppliers nearby. The threshold, the point at which towns had to look some distance away for supplies, was high. The price data combined with the theoretical framework laid down by von Thnen and his disciples and data on grain production per hectare confirms that intuitive expectation. There was a threshold of size for settlements that set limits to how large the village or town or city could grow before it needed to look beyond the local area for essential supplies to sustain the population. What is perhaps not intuitive is how high that threshold was and how infrequently, even in the densely populated Low Countries and southeastern England, that threshold was breached. Over time the ability to draw on distant supplies might well have and probably did become easier. The constraints on urban growth were most likely reduced but for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it does not appear that towns chose to or needed to look to distant sources for basic goods, that

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is with a few exceptions. It seems that transportation costs did not act as a constraint on town size, either the optimal or the maximum size. It is another case it appears where people in the late Middle Ages did not, contrary to the opinion of the last generation of economic historians, test the technical and economic limits of the world in which they lived.

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APPENDIX I Measuring Market Integration: On the Theory of the Single Price, Sources, Correlations and Variations
If markets are integrated the same price should prevail in them, any difference being attributed to the cost of transporting the good between the two markets. The theory of the single price is the basis for measuring market integration. By implication integrated markets should see increases and decreases in prices to the same degree. As prices rise in one traders should move goods from others in order to reap profits, thus lowering prices in the original market to a level consistent with that in all the others. The drive for gain among merchants is the force for price equalization and so for the distribution of benefits and burdens from changes in supply to all people within the scope of the integrated markets. The extent of trade will depend on those traders being informed about prices in the different markets, the cost of transporting goods between and among markets, and the supply of goods available locally to each market. Gauging the integration of European markets from the thirteenth through the sixteenth and even into the eighteenth century depends on the theory of the single price. If two markets are integrated the same price should prevail in both with any difference attributable to differences in transport costs.33 As markets became more integrated the prices in different places tend more and more to move up and down together. The theory is simple enough and what is more a mass of published price data exists both from antiquarians and from the International Commission of Price History whose efforts began in the 1930s.34 In order to make comparisons among cities and to make comparisons over time all prices are standardized to the amount of silver needed to buy a litre of grain. There are serious problems with any such conversions. The advantages, however, in the end outweigh the difficulties. For measures for grain volume towns were generally very strict about regulating the unit of transactions. The goal was to decrease fraud and so increase confidence in the market among both buyers and sellers. The units remained the same over long periods of time.35 In some instances the measure was not of

Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1928), 270-3. 34 Robert Allen and Richard W. Unger, Allen-Unger Database, European Commodity Prices 1260-1914, http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_ grain.htm, reports many series of grain price data for the period 1250-1914. 35 For example, Monique Mestayer, Prix du bl et de lavoine de 1329 1793, Revue du Nord 45 (178) (1963): 163-4.

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volume but of weight which makes conversion necessary. That is done assuming a specific gravity of late medieval grains of 0.8. The silver content of coins changed much more frequently than measures of weight or volume. Official changes at the mint typically do not reflect accurately the amount of silver in all the coins that exchanged in the market place. Old issues circulated frequently as did a variety of coins from other jurisdictions, new and old. There are other problems associated with the use of silver equivalents36 but the error introduced is more than tolerable in order to get the possibility of making comparisons. When dealing with the prices of grains in just one market tests for correlation often involve only the use of the prevailing currency, thus avoiding monetary problems, and correction is made only for differences in and changes in the units of measure To test for integration comparisons are made to see if price changes moved together, that is were the movements correlated, in two or more markets. Such tests can be made for long periods or the time period can be broken down to compare different segments of time. That was an approach taken by Wilhelm Abel, looking at price averages, and by his student, Walter Achilles, examining correlations.37 They did find differences over time and a long term trend toward integration. The gaps between prices in different markets should, in theory, have moved inexorably closer and closer together, the difference reduced by improving transport costs and the movement of goods among markets. Results, however, have not uniformly suggested that inexorable advance.38 Of course it could be that the serious data problems which plague the study of prices may be the cause for the mixed results, but inconsistent market integration remains a more plausible explanation. It may be that the internationalization of markets is what theory predicts and what historians presume existed but in fact the pattern of market development was more complex.

Herman Van der Wee, The Growth, 115-122. Wilhelm Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorinduustriellen Deutschland (Gttingen: Vendenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1972), 38-9, 47; Wilhelm Abel, Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, trans. Olive Ordish (London: Methuen and Company, Limited, 1980), 107-9; Walter Achilles, Getreidepreise und Getreide- handelsbeziehungen europischer Rume im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, PhD Dissertation, University of Gttingen (1957), 5-10, 33-4, 83-7, 114. 38 Richard W. Unger, Maritime Transport and the Integration of Low Countries Grain Markets in the Late Middle Ages, in Piet Van Cruyningen and Erik Thoen, eds., Town and Countryside from the late Middle Ages to the 19th Centuries: Supply and Demand of Food (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, forthcoming).
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APPENDIX 2 Sources for Price Data


Amsterdam, Leiden and Utrecht: N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946-1964). Antwerp and Lier: Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). Brussels and Louvain: Marie-Jeanne Tits-Dieuaide, La Formation des Prix Craliers en Brabant et en Flandre au XVe sicle (Brussels: ditions de l'Universit de Bruxelles, 1975). Bruges: Charles Verlinden and E. Scholliers, et al., Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 4 vols. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1959-1973), 2: 33-59. Douai: Monique Mestayer, Prix du bl et de l'avoine de 1329 1793, Revue du Nord 45, (178) (1963): 168-170. Southern England: James E. Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England From the Year after the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793), Compiled Entirely from Original and Contemporaneous Records (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882). Strasbourg: A. C. Hanauer, tudes conomiques sur l'Alsace ancienne et moderne, 2 vols. (Paris: A. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel, 1876-1878).

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I The long-term stability in gold prices, which characterised European specie markets during the mid-fourteenth century (1325-1375), rested upon the existence of a delicately balanced bi-metallic equilibrium within and between a series of autonomous specie markets. Each maintained the level and composition of its precious metal stock from independent, indigenous supply sources of silver and gold. The first of these, north of the Alps, possessed plentiful supplies of gold emanating from Hungarian mines.3 When this was exchanged against silver initially produced in England (Bere Ferrers, Devon) and Bohemia (Kutn Hora) during the years 1290-1345 and subsequently in Saxony (Freiberg-in-Meissen),4 a stable metallic ratio of 1:10-11.4 was established.5 Further south, two similar autonomous markets existed on the basis of an efficient inter-continental exchange network, facilitating the exchange of African gold for silver from Europe and Asia Minor. Driving directly northward from the Niger Bend across the deserts of the central Sahara, caravans carried gold each year to the refining and minting centres of al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, providing the base for an abundant local circulation of . heavy single and double dinars. Further east, caravans travelling via either Wargla or Ghadames brought similar supplies to Egypt, for minting into those miscellaneous gold pieces that found currency in the lands of the Circassian Sultanate, the regions of the Muslim East, the Hijaz and the Yemen (Map 1).6 Two distinct zonesin the Mahgrib and Egyptthus emerged, each with cheap and plentiful supplies of gold, which were juxtapositioned against equivalent areas

Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, 2, 935. Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, 1, 927-34. 5 Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 1, 3b, 950-70. 6 Shihab al-Dn Abu l-Abbas Ahmad b. Yahya b. Fadl Allah al-Adaw . . . al-Umar, Masalik al-absar f mamalik al-amsar, trans. and annot. Maurice . . Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 2 vols. (Paris: Bibliothque des Gographes Arabes, 1927), 2, Bk. 10: 54; Shams al-Dn Abu Abd Allah Muhammad al-Lawat al . Tanj a.k.a Ibn Batttuta, Rihla or Tuhfat al-nuzzar f gharaib al-amsar wa ajaib . .. . . . .. . al-asfar, ed. and trans. C. Defrmery and B. R. Sanguinetti, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1853-1858; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Uni versity, 1994), 4: 376-82; Zakarya ibn Muhammad al-Qazwn, Ajaib al . makhluqat wa gharaib al-mawjudat, in Yusuf Kamal, ed., Monumenta cartographica Africae et Aegypti, 5 vols. in 16 books (Cairo-Leiden, 1926-1951), 1046.
4

Cartography: Ian Blanchard

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of abundant silver, thereby encouraging an active interchange of the two metals. In the west the profitability of this exchange was such that for half a century trade in goods was subordinated to trade in specie. From 1325-1375 gold doblas (double dinars) regularly passed north bring forth a countervailing supply of European silver southward. In response to these flows a distinctive market structure evolved in the westernTyrrhenianbasin of the Mediterranean, characterised by a long-term stability in gold prices and an anticyclonic distribution of the two metals between the continental littorals. Although relatively scarcer as one moved northward, gold was abundant to customers within a unitary market in which the African product reigned supreme. Nor was the situation significantly different within the eastern zone. Gold arriving in Egypt from alBilad al-Sudan was distributed after minting in a similar market struc ture receiving small amounts of European silver and larger quantities from the mines of the Isaurian Taurus.7 Within the area spanned by European commercial networks there were thus three distinct and autonomous specie markets. Each of these had a similarly balanced stock of precious metals conforming to a common bi-metallic standard (1:9.4-10.9), and thus, whilst retaining their autonomous character, the markets were united into a homogeneous and unitary system. Unlike in the period 1135-1175, however, in 1336-1375 African gold no longer enjoyed a complete hegemony in the supply of this metal to specie markets within the area spanned by European commercial activity. Yet the existence of an efficient inter-continental trade network, facilitating the exchange of African gold for European or Middle Eastern silver supplies, still ensured bi-metallic exchange stability within and between at least two of the three autonomous specie markets. The unitary European system existed, moreover, on terms of bi-metallic parity with another one of similar character, which encompassed the lands bordering the Indian Ocean (Map 2).8 This Asiatic specie distribution system was also divided into a series of autonomous elements which, existing in conditions of bi-metallic
7 Ibn Batttuta, Tuhfat al-nuzzar, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, Travels in Asia and .. . . .. Africa (London: Hakluyt Society, Second Series, CXVII, 1929), 61-2 436-7. C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071-1330 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1968), 160-1. 8 Blanchard, Mining, Metallurgy and Minting, 3: Chap. 7, 3a-1, 1275-89.

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equilibrium, were conjoined within a unitary system. Here Chinese gold held pride of place, being distributed by Muslim and Chinese merchants through a commercial system that extended from the source of supply to Ormuz on the Persian Gulf and drew a countervailing flow of silver through three distinct points of access. In the west it was Iranian silver, from the Elburz (Reshteh-ye Alborz) mountains (Rayy and Damghan), traded through Ormuz, which laid the foundations of a bi-metallic system. Further to the east silver, drawn from the once mighty workings of the Pamir and Hindu Kush, passing through Cambay and Chittagong, played a similar role in the markets of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Autonomous yet united by a common bi-metallic standard these markets thus formed a single system, which co-existed with its European counterpart, bringing conditions of specie price stability and bi-metallic uniformity to a world trading network, divided by religion and politics, but united in its monetary mechanisms.

II From about 1375, however, the first signs of disintegration began to appear in this monolithic edifice. Gold prices began to rise on European markets but not universally (Figures 1-3). Some regions remained able to acquire adequate supplies whilst others suffered acute shortages as the once universal market split into atomistic elements. The primary cause of these changes, as far as northern European specie markets were concerned, was rooted in the vicissitudes of indigenous gold production. Until the introduction of Afro-Asiatic techniques of separating gold from auriferous quartz by mercury amalgamation in the 1440s, this was largely confined to small-scale placer workings of European gold bearing gravel. Such placers, during the balmy days of overpopulation and low wages in the early fourteenth century, were thronged with workmen who sustained an annual output of about four tonnes of the yellow metal.9 From about the 1380s, however, a combination of labour shortages and resource

9 M. Malowist, Problems of the Growth of the National Economy of Central-Eastern Europe in the Late Middle Ages, Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974): 345.

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depletion caused production to fall to below three tonnes a year, causing producers to cast around for new sources of gold. In the event they lighted upon the exploitation of copper and lead ores containing auriferous silver. Deposits of the former were found in Hungary to the north of Bansk Bystrica (Neusohl) but, because of their low metallic content, their exploitation was dependent on a new technologythe Saigerprozessand a favourable conjuncture of primary metal (copper and silver) prices. Slovak gold production, accordingly, became tied to the fortunes of the silver industry and was most pronounced in the boom conditionsin 1391-1399, 1412-1418 and 1435-1439 affecting that sector. Thus during the 1390s the deposits of argentiferous copper of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Polish lead fields attracted the attention of two Nrnberg corporationsthe Kammerer-Seiler and Flextorfer-Zennerand the Genoese house of Gallici, and until the end of the decade the pickings were rich. Falling copper and silver prices from 1399-1412, however, posed difficulties from which the first German house emerged victorious, thanks to its collaboration with the Venetian and Florentine agents of the Medici.10 From 1412 therefore, secure in the purchase of Polish lead and with control over Hungarian copper supplies, the Italians and Nrnbergers now profited from the boom years 14121418. The Spleiss-Saigerhtten and Hammerwerke established at Neusohl produced some 2,000-2,500 zentners of refined copper and some 8,000-10,000 zentners of unrefined black copper, which was exported to Venice together with an indeterminate amount (perhaps 2,500 zentners) sent to Nrnberg. Nor was their contribution to specie markets unimportant. The 900-1,000 tonnes of copper yielded some fifteen tonnes of silver and 140 kg of gold. Hungarian production from auriferous silver thus played a not insignificant role

W. von Stromer, Nrnberger Unternehmer im Karpatenraum. Ein oberdeutsches Buntmetall-Oligopol 1396-1412, Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej 16 (4) (1968): 641-62; as well as von Stromer, Oberdeutsche Hochfinanz, 1350-1450 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1970), 119-25, 143-8, 448-95; and von Stromer, Das Zusammenspiel oberdeutscher und Florentiner Geldleute bei der Finanzierung von Knig Ruprechts Italienfeldzug, 1401/2, in Hermann Kellenbenz, ed., ffentliche Finanzen und privates Kapital im spten Mittelalter und in der ersten Hlfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Bericht ber die 3. Arbeitstagung der Gesellschaft fr Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Mannheim (Forschungen z. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgeschichte 16) (Stuttgart, 1971), 50-86.

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in European gold supply during the crisis years of the early fifteenth century. As silver prices rose ever upwards, moreover, its contribution became ever greater, attaining at the beginning of the next boom in the early 1430s an annual output of about 400 kg.11 Yet whilst it made a contribution to the long-term stabilisation of European gold stocks it was an erratic one due to the primary role of silver and copper prices in determining production levels in plant using the new technology. Such was not the case, however, with the other major source of European auriferous silverthe argenta indorata found in the lead ores of Novo Brdo, Serbia. Here the much higher gold content of the silver, amounting to as much as a sixth, made it, at prevailing relative prices, the primary object of exploitation. Production thus moved counter-cyclically to that of Slovakia. Established during the crisis of 1280-1320 the workings were neglected until the gold boom of 1418-1435 when production rose to 6.1 tonnes of silver and 108 kg of gold. With the fall in gold prices after 1435, however, production fell from even this diminutive level, amounting to no more than sixty per cent of its former size in the early 1450s. Table 1 European Gold Production, 1325-1450 (metric tonnes)
Date Date 1325-1375 1375-1400 1400-1425 1425-1450 Placer-lode gold (Hungary) 4.0 2.9 3.5 3.7 Auriferous silver (Slovakia & Serbia) 0.04 0.04 0.36 Gold quartz (Rhineland) 2.0 Totala (a) Total 4.00 2.94 3.54 6.06

Note: (a) Augmented until the late fourteenth century by African gold imports of about 2.0-2.5 tonnes annually.

11 Und anfnglich bey Knig Mattys auch Vladislai Zeiten ist keine Spleyss-Saygerhtten noch Hammer in Neusohl gewesen, sondern man hat den schwarzen Kupfer alsso aus den Land gefhret und andersowo gespleissen, geseigert und geschmit, quoted from the Memorial of the Fuggers Factor at Neusohl, printed in Peter Ratko, Dokumenty k banckemu povstaniu na Slovensku, 1525-1526 (Bratislava: Vydavatemstvo Slovenskej Akadmie Vied, 1957), 457. On the production of copper see Jozef Vlachovic, Slovensk med v 16. a 17. storoc (Bratislava: Vydavatemstvo Slovenskej Akadmie Vied, 1964), 23.

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Together, therefore, the Slovak and Serbian producers exploiting copper and lead ores containing auriferous silver made a small but growing contribution to European gold supply. During the critical years 1375-1425, however, their contribution was slight and as Hungarian placer production declined, so gold prices rose.12 Yet the decline in indigenous supplies was sufficient only to explain some one third of the price increase during the years 1375-1425. Other factors were at work, which were of far greater significance.

III Of primary importance amongst these non-indigenous influences was a fundamental restructuring in the patterns of trans-Saharan trade. As early as the 1390s basic structural changes may already be discerned in the transport network used by merchants. Caravans increasingly avoided the direct routes across the arid dune zones, where nomadic attacks13 and increasing difficulties in securing adequate water supplies rendered the transients life precarious. They turned instead to the aqueous gravel at the foot of the Ahaggar and the Adrar des Iforas (Map 2). A major restructuring of the transSaharan trade routes was underway. During the next half- ce