Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and Metaphysics

A Tract Book Essay

By

Anthony J. Fejfar, J.D., Esq., Coif

© Copyright 2007 by Anthony J. Fejfar

In the Gadamer-Habermas debate, Habermas argues that there is no way to avoid

the hermenutic circle, and thus that Gadamer’s Hermeneutic position is logically circular

and invalid. I, on the other hand, argue that Gadamer’s Hermeneutics are valid because

they are based upon metaphysics.

Gadamer asserts that Hermeneutics, that is, philosophy of meaning, is based upon

the idea that there are certain “forestructures of knowing” which guide hermeneutic

interpretation. Obviously, if these forestructures are just ideas, then it would appear that

hermeneutics are circular in nature and thus invalid. I would argue that just as Plato

argued for the idea of the World of the Forms, so too, hermeneutics is guided by what I

would call Hermeneutic Forms. I argue that Gadamer’s position is Platonist and is thus

grounded in Metaphysics. Since the forestructures of knowing are in fact transcendent

Immutable Platonic Forms, in the World of the Forms, better interpretations are possible.

Additionally, using Lonerganian epistemology it is possible to argue that intuitive

judgment and reflection are cognitive functions which transcend mere analytic

understanding or hermeneutic interpretation. The argument is that intuition enables us to

transcend hermeneutic understanding and helps to to find a better interpretation.