COVERSTORY

How Failure Breeds Success

BY JENA MCGREGOR
EVER HEARD OF CHOGLIT? HOW ABOUT OK SODA OR SURGE? Long after " New Coke" became nearly synonymous with innovation failure, these products joined Coca-Cola Co.'s graveyard of beverage busts. Choglit, in case you blinked and missed it, was a chocolateflavored milk drink test-marketed with Nestl in 2002. OK Soda, unveiled in 1994, tried to capture Generation X with edgy marketing. The "OK Manifesto," parts of which were printed on cans in an attempt at hipster irony, asked : "What's the point of OK Soda?" It turned out customers wondered the same thing. And while Surge did well initially, tliis me-too Mountain Dew later did anything but. Sales hcgan drying up afterfiveyears. Given that history, failure hardly seems like a subject Chairman and CEO E. Neville Isdell would want to trot out infrontof investors. But Isdell did just that, deliberately airing the topic at Coke's annual meeting in April. "You will see some failures," he told the crowd. "As we take more risks, this is something we must accept as part of the regeneration process." Warning Coke investors that the company might experience some ftops is a little like warning Atlantans they might experience afternoon thunderstorms in July. But Isdell thinks it's vital. He wants Coke to take bigger risks, and to do that, he knows he needs to convince employees and shareholders that he will
42 I BusinessWeek I July 10. 2006

Everyone fears failure. But breakthroughs depend on it The best companies enibrace their mistakes and iearn from them.

tolerate the failures that vidll inevitably result. That's the only way to change Coke's traditionallyrisk-averseculture. And given the importance of this goal, there's no podium too big for sending the signal. "Using [the annual meeting] occasion elevates the statement to another order of importance," Isdell said in an interview with BusinessWeek.

CLOSETO BLASPHEMY
WHILE FEW CEOS are as candid about the potential for failure as Isdell, many are wrestling vnth the same problem, trying to get their organizations to cozy up to the risk-taking that innovation requires. A warning: It's not going to be an easy shift. Alter years of cost-cutting initiatives and grovting job insecurity, most employees don't exactly feel like putting themselves on the line. Add to that the heightened expectations by management on individual performance, and it's easy to see why so many opt to play it safe. Indeed, for a generation of managers weaned on therigorsof Six Sigma error-elimination programs, embracing failuregasp!is close to blasphemy. Stefan H. Thonike, a professor at Harvard Business School and author o Experimentation Matters, says that when he talks to business groups, '^I try to be

COVERSTORY
way that accounts for these opposing pressures. At IBM Reprovocative and say: 'Failure is not abad thing.' I always have search, engineers are evaluated on both one- and three-year time lots of people staring at me, [thinking] 'Have you lost your frames. The one-year term determines the bonus, while the mind?' That's O.K. It gets their attention. [Failure] is so importhree-year petiod decides rank and salary. The longer frame can tant to the experimental process." help neutralize a year of setbacks. "A three-year evaluation cycle That it is. Crucial, in fact. After all, thaf s why true, breaksends an important message to our researchers, demonstrating through innovationan imperative in today's globally comour commitment to investing in the early, risky stages of innovapetitive world, in which product cycles are shorter than ever tion," says Armando Garcia, ^ is so extraordinarily hard. It requires well-honed organizations vice-president for technical built for efficiency and speed to do what feels unnatural: Exstrategy and worldwide opplore. Experiment. Foul up, sometimes. Then repeat. erations at IBM Research. Granted, not all failures are praiseworthy. Someflopsare just that: bad ideas. The eVilla, Sony Corp.'s $500 " Internet appliance." The Pontiac Aztek, General Motors Corp.'s ugly duckling "crossover" SUV. For good measure, well throw in our own industry's spectacularly useless flop: the CueCat A marketer's dream, the device, which was launched in 2000 (when else?), scanned bar codes from magazine and newspaper ads, directing readers to Web sites so they wouldn't have to go to the trouble to type in the URL. Ford Xerox But intelligent failHua Burger, Edsel, Mode/A Copier uresthose that happen 1962 (the "Ox Box"), 1949 1957 early and inexpensively Founder Ray Kroc tested Known as the Titanic of tlie The first manually operated I and that contribute new this cheese-topped grilled industry, this overhyped, xerographic printer, the 9 N O insights about your cuspineapple on a bun for - J Need inspiration? Model A was slow, messy, oversized, and overpriced tomersshould be more ; !& car had abysmal sales. than just tolerable. They Many companies and hard to use. Businesses Customers even scoffed at Chicagoans who avoided eating meat on Fridays, were unconvinced and should be encouraged. have founa But customers abstained. the stodgy name. After just largely stuck with carbon "Figuring out how to The company learned over 2,800 of the 1960 W i^ success in the paper. But 10 years later, master this process of meatless didn't have to models were churned out, Xerox launched the fully failing fast and failing ashes of their mean wacky, and the next the Edsel was history. automated Model 914, cheap and fumbling tomemorable year a franchise owner Chastened, Ford did its transforming modern ward success is probably came up with a tastier research and tuned into misses: office work, the most important alternative for customers'call for stylish thing companies have to hamburger-free Fridays; atfordability, launching the get good at," says Scott theRiet-O-Fish, nowa legendary Ford Mustang Anthony, the managing McDonald's classic. in 1964. director at consulting firm Innosight. "Getting good" at failure, however, doesn't mean creating anarchy out of organization. It means leadersnot just on a podium at the annual meeting, but in the trenches, every daywho create an environment safe for taking risks and who share stories of their own mistakes, it means bringing in outsiders unattached to a project's past. It means carving out In addition to making sure performance evaluations take a time to reflect on failure, not just success. long-term view, managers should also think about celebrating smart failures. (Those who repeat their mistakes, of course, should hardly be rewarded.) Thomas D. Kuczmarski, a Chicago new-product development consultant, even proposes "failure : PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, it means designing ways to i measure performance that balance accountability vith the free- parties" as a way of recognizing that it's part of the creative process. "What most companies do is put a wall around a fail' dom to make mistakes. People may fear failure, but they fear the ure as if ifs radioactive," says Kuczmarski. I consequences of it even more. "The performance culture realIntuit Inc., based in Mountain View, Calif., recently celebrati ly is in deep conflict with the learning culture," says Paul J. H. ed an adventurous marketing campaign that failed. The comI Schoemaker, CEO of consulting firm Decision Strategies Interpany had never targeted young tax filers before, and in early national Inc. " It's an unusual executive who can balance these." 2005 it tried to reach them through an ill-fated attempt to com\ Some oi^anizations have tried to measure performance in a

Famous

FAILURE PARTIES

"Most companies...puta wall around a fail

44 ! BusinessWeek I July 10, 2006

bine tax-filing drudgery with hip-hop style. Through a Web site called RockYourRefund.com, Intuit offered young people dis[ counts to travel site Expdia Inc. and retailer Best Buy Co. and the ability to deposit tax refunds directly into prepaid Visa cards issued by hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons. But even hip-hop stars can't make 1040s cool enough to get young adults excited about taxes. "We did very few returns" through the site, says Rick Jensen, vice-president for product management at Intuifs consumer tax group. "It was almost a rounding error." Through a postmortem process, the team that developed the campaign documented its insights, such as the

now finding fans among large companies. Eggers hopes future conferences -will feature even more presentations on failures. She also plans to distribute "narrative storytelling booklets" about failed projects so people can "feel the pain." Unlike Intuit, most companies don't spend enough time and resources looking backward, says Chris TVimble, a professor at the TYick School of Business at Dartmouth College and co-author of 0 Rksjr Strategic Innovators. That's a mistake. "How do you leam if you don't examine the past?" asks Trimble. General Electric Co. is trying to do just that. The company, which is well-known for sharing best practices across its many

Sony
Betamax, 1975
Sony kept tight controls over the license for its video recording technology while its rival, JVC, shared its VHS format. Now, Sony faces another format war, pitting its Blu-ray nextgeneration DVD against Toshiba's HD-DVD. This time, Sony has assembled a powerful cadre of backers. Will it win? The first commercial personal computer featuring a graphical user interface (GUI), Lisa didn't sell because it was sluggish and expensive. But Lisa's GUI helped to inspire Apple's famously userfriendly product line, from the crisp Macintosh interface of the iMac to the sleek and simple iPod.

Coca-Cola
New Coke, 1985 Coca-Cola rolled out a wellresearched, taste-tested new formula to energize its lethargic brand. Buta firestorm of consumer protest led to New Coke's demise after 79 days, when the original was brought back with great fanfare. Today, New Coke is a celebrated chapter in Coke lore.

Pfizer
Sidenafl, 1991 First tested on humans in 1991, Sildenafil didn't prove effective for ifs initial indication: angina, or chest pain. After patients reported erections as a side effect, Pfizer began testing the compound for erectile dysfunction. In 1998, Viagra became the first drug to treat the condition, and the blockbuster has been a household name ever since.

Kellogg's
Breakfast Mates. 1998 This cereal-and-milk combo product was lost on consumers who found the non refrigerated milk unappetizing. The inconvenient convenience food was not nearly as appealing as the real thing (above). More mindful of its harried customers' needs, Kellogg has expanded its line of handy breakfast bars.

fact that Gen Yers don't visit destination Web sites that feel too much like advertising. Then, on a stage at the Dolce Hayes Mansion in San Jose, Calif., last October in front of some 200 Intuit marketers, the team received an award from Intuit Chairman Scott Cook. "Ifs only a failure if we fail to get the learning," says Cook. In addition to postmortems, Intuit has begun plucking insights from its flops through sessions that focus on failure. Jana Eggers, who heads up Intuit's Innovation Lab, held the first such "When Learning Hurts" session recently. There, she recounted the story of QuickBase, a software application that failed for its initial market, small business customers, but is

units, has recently begun formally discussing failures, too. Last September the company set up a two-hour conference call for managers of eight "imagination breakthroughs" that didn't live up to expectations and were being shelved, or "retired," in GE'S parlance. ("Imagination breakthroughs"IBsare new businesses or products that have potential sales of $100 million within three to five years.) Such discussions can be nerve-racking, especially in companies where failure has traditionally been met with tough consequences. That was the case at GE, which is now three years into the effort spearheaded by Chairman and CEO Jefifrey R. Immelt to make innovation the new mantra at the $150 billion be-

as if it's radioactive," says one consultant

Julv 10. 2006 I BusinessWeek I 45

COVER STORY Helen Greiner

-Co-founder and chairman Robot

hen we first started working with the military in the early 1990s, lied the design of an amphibious mine-clearing robot, called Ariel. It walked in the suri and acted like a crab. It was a "12degree of freedom" walking robot, meaning there are 12 motors to drive 12 joints. At the time, it was the most advanced walking robot in the world. We built technologies that we knew from the labs. Buf there was a very strong missing component of the user's needs. It couldn't walk far enough, it couldn't carry the payload it would need to carry, and it was too complex. When we demonstrated Ariel, the reaction was: "iRobot is doing some really innovative and futuristic stuff, but it doesn't solve a current need." It started the perception of our company along a line

My favorite mistake..M
I wouldn't choose now: We do innovation for innovation's sake. Now I believe the perception of iRobot is we build practical and affordable robots that help people. After Ariel, I was invited to an Army Rangers demonstration and brought another prototype to solicit input from soldiers. That input led to the design of our PackBot-we've delivered 500 of them so fara bomb-disposal robot that has been credited with saving the lives of dozens of soldiers. Innovation in our field can lead us in the wrong direction to the most exotic creation. 1 learned to talk to users and get input before designing. Don't think that you are going to design something that has all of the bells and whistles, then reduce the costs sometime later.

hemoth. "I had some offline conversations with some of the IB leaders reassuring them that this was not a call where they were going to get their pink slips," says Patia McGrath, a GE marketing director who helped put together the call. "The notion of taking big swings, and that it's O.K. to miss the swing, is something that's quite new with Jeff." Some companies have gone even further, taking a compre-

hensive look at all their previous failures. That was the case at Corning Inc., which found itself teetering on the brink of bankruptcy after the once red-hot market for its optical fiber collapsed during the telecom bust. Following that debacle, then-Coming GEO James R. Houghton asked Joseph A. Miller Jr., executive vice-^president and chief technology officer, to produce an in-depth review of the company's 150-year

history of innovation, documenting both failures and successes. One of the failed products Coming investigated was the DNA microarray, or chip, which the company began developing in 1998. Genomics research was heating up at the time, with Dr. J. Craig Venter launching Celera Genomics that year. Coming, which makes laboratory sciences equipment, saw an opportunity. Its DNA chip was designed to print all 28,000 human genes onto a set of slides that could be used by researchers. By 2000, Coming had invested $100 milHon in the project and announced a partnership with Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

mark that you couldn't get out unless you buffed it with sandpaper. It was a classic case o ust not asking the right questions up front. This one was my mistake. 1 let the need for speed overwhelm doing enough up-front market research and testing. It was a $20 million mistake. We caught it after about three months. Customers would complain, At first, you go

"WE WERE LATE"

BUT WHILE CORNING was trying to

launch the chip, another company, Afymetrix Inc., commercialized one. "They had the dominant design on microchips, and they were the first out," says Peter F. Volanakis, now Coming's chief operating officer. "We were late." Quality problems plagued -Chairman and CEO the project, and customers had not General Electric been brought in early. With Corning in a freefall financially, the DNA chip was ni992,1 was running all the killed in 2001. commercial operations for the plastics Still, the experience ojened Coming business at GE. We had a product up to a whole new market. "We had discalled Nuvel, which was a sheet You're never allowed in GE to make the covered the marketplace of drug discovproduct that would go over wood to fry same mistake twice. You're allowed to make ery," says Miller. By combining its introto create the poor man's Corian countertop. the mistake once. If you try something and it duction to the drug research market Turns out the thing just didn't work. Any time fails but you went about if the fight way and with another failed business, photonics, you dropped a coin on it, if would leave a you learned irom it, that's not a bad thing. which manipulates data using light waves, it created Epic, a revolutionary technoiogy for drug testing that it will launch this fall. By using could reach $ 100 million to $300 million a year, and more than light waves instead offluorescentdyes. Epic promises to accel$500 million annually long-term. erate dramatically the process of testing potential drugs and As Coming learned Tom the DNA chip and with Epic, getimprove its accuracy. ting potential users in before a project goes too far helps to One key difference? This time, 18 pharmaceutical companies prove the market for it. But outside perspectives can also help have tested Epic before the launch. By 2010 to 2012, Jeff" neutralize emotions and biases about failing product lines, says Mooney, who led Epic's development, projects that Epic sales Duke University Fuqua School of Business professor William

Jeffrey R. Immelt

through this denial phase: "You don't understand" the product and stuff like that. It made me leam about listening better. I'm more disciplined on the up-front stuff now than I was then. I wanted to do something big and exciting, and I wanted to do it now rather than waif a year. I fessed up: stepped into it, made up for the financial hit we had to take on it [by exceeding sales targets on other products], and made good to the customers, I think that t got better at understanding the need for research and more thought up front, so you don't have to redo things.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS.

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micfosystems

COVERSTORY
Boulding. In research published in the April issue ofie Journal of Marketing, Boulding and his colleagues contradict the common notion that teams cling to a project because they want to save face or salvage the "sunk costs." Rather, the problem Is with the objectivity o the people involved. "Even if you're not on the hook in terms offinancialembarrassment or psychological embarrassment," says Boulding, "you did form beliefs, and that causes you to warp new feedback." That's why W.L. Gore & Associates Inc. in Newark, Del., makers of the waterproof fabric Gore-Tex, recognizes outsiderspeople within Gore but not on the product development teamwho make the call on projects that need to be pulled. When Brad Jones led Gore's Industrial Products Div., which makes sealants and filtration systems, he handed out "Sharp Shooter" trophies to these outside managers when a project was effectively killed. These marksmen, so to speak, fi^ed from the trappings of familiarity, can identiiy potential snags that the team may have overlooked. "We're eusive in our thanks for that contribution," says Jones. "We ask them to write up what they learned from it, and how we could have made the decision [to kill the project] faster."

FAILING FORWARD
More Mistakes: In an expanded slide show, more leaders share stories about their failures and what they learned from t h e m Learning on the Front Lines: How the U.S. Army's after-action review process can help corporations learn from their mistakes The Story Behind the Story: For a podcast interview with Management Editor Jena McGregor by Executive Editor John A. Byrne, go to businessweek.ccmearch/podcasting.htm J 1 J

http:/Aww.busr)e5sweek.comA3rtras

FIND YOUR OWN FLAWS

THE MINDSET THAT Gore looks for in these outsidersthe ability to home in on uncertaintiesrequires employees to reframe their thinking. Most people naturally seek positive outcomes and set about trying to prove that an experiment works. But designers, inventors, and scientists, all models for com-

panies struggling to be more creative, take the opposite tack. They try to prove themselves wrong. That focus on potential flaws makes failure, and the lessons that come with it, happen earlier. Amy Edmondson, a professor at Harvard Business School wdio has studied how oiganizations leam from failure, says managers would do well to think more like scientists. "Failure provides more learning' in a stricdy logical or technical sense" than success, she says. "Ifs a principle of the scientific method that you can only disconfirm, never confirm, a hypothesis." Failure's capacity to teach is exactly why venture capitalists often look for managers to run startups whose resumes include experience with a flop. Gordon McCallum, CEO for Richard Branson's Virgin Management Ltd., can point to managers within Virgin who might have been overlooked by other companies because of failures in their careers. He's also quick to

PLAYBOOK: BEST-PRACTICE IDEAS

A Formula for Failure

it's innovation's great paradox: Success-that is, true breakthroughs-usuaily comes through failure. How to help your team get comfortable with taking risks and learning from their mistakes. Formalize Forums For Failure
To keep failures and the valuable lessons they offer from getting swept under the rug. carve out time for reflection. GE has recently begun sharing lessons Irom failures by bringing together managers whose "Imagination Breakthrough" efforts are put on the sheli.

Share Personal Stories

If employees hear leaders discussing their own failures. they'll feel more comfortable talking about their own. But it s not just the CEO's job-front-line leaders are eyen more important. says Harvard Business School professor Amy Edmondson. "That person needs to be inviting, curious, and the first to say: 'I made a mistake.'"

Prove Yourseif Wrong, Not Right

The tendency for development teams is to look for supporting, rather than countervailing, evidence. "You have to reframe what you're seeking in the early days," says Innosight's Scott Anthony. "You're not really seeking proof that you have the right answer. It's more about testing to prove yourself wrong."

Move Goalposts
ii'ovation requires flexibility in meeting goals, since early predictions are often little more than educated guesses. Intuit's Scott Cook even suggests that teams developing new products ignore forecasts in the early days. "For every one of our failures, we had spreadsheets that looked awesome," he says.

Bring in Outsiders
Outsiders can help neutralize the emotions and biases that prop up a op. Customers can be the most valuable. After its DNA chip failed, Corning brought pharma companies in early to test its new dmg-discovery technology. Epic.

Celebrate Smart Failures

Managers should design performance-management systems that reward risk-taking and foster a long-term view. But they should also celebrate failures that teach something new, energizing people to try again and offering them closure.

48

BusinessWeek I July 10, 2006

COVERSTORY
note that eiTors on the job, as long as they aren't repeated, are not only supported, but valued. One example: Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.'s J2000 seats, a $67 million investment made in 2000 to create new sleeper seats that reclined at an angle for the airline's "upper-class" seats. Although sleeper seats had long existed in first class, airlines had not yet adopted them for business class. Virgin was the first to announce it would be offering "a bed in business," says Joe Feny, Virgin's head of design, who led the design of the J2000 seats. Within a year, however. Virgin's idea was oneupped by its chief competitor, British Airways PLC, which rolled out a truly flat bed. While customers were initially enthusiastic about the J2000, some complained about sliding and di.scomfort. In the end, says McCallum, it "was wildly unsuccessful. Everybody acknowledged that it was not as good a product as our principal competitors'." jarees Ferry: "We were an alsoran, which didn't really sit well with us." But Ferry didn't get the ax. In fact. Virgin entrusted him to take on another extraordinary risk, committing a huge $127 million to an overhaul of the airline's upper-class seats years before tlie traditional product life cycle would have ended. And the company stuck by its investment even after September 11. The new version, launched in 2003, has been a solid success. Called the "upper-class suite," Ferry's makeover made a design leap beyond merely being flat. Flight attendants flip over the back and seat cushions to make the bed, al-

E. Neville Isdell
-Chairman and CEO Coca-Cola

was [Cuke's] division president for Central Europe between "85 and '88. We were doing a restructuring to get 116 bottlers to exchange their equity for ownership in a single bottler in Germany. We took the plan to Atlanta and presented it to the key people we were responsible to and got the support that we needed. We went back and went on a road show around Germany for three days. We

reckoned we would get [support] from around 70% of the bottlers, and about 30% would reiect us, but that would be enough to get critical mass, End of Day Three, we were celebrating because we had a maior bottier, who we thought would not agree, say, "It makes sense." Then a call came in from the international president-at about U o'clock at nightsaying: "Stop. You're going to take this offer completely off the table." What I had underestimated was the degree to which there were multiple constituencies that needed to be covered in order to ensure that the back-door, old relationships that some ot the bottlers had

builf up could not stop us. Phone calls came in to headquarters from bottlers around the world, asking: "What does this mean for me?" I had not thought that through well enough. I like telling that story because I failed, and the lesson I learned is you have to look outside the narrow view you have of where the areas of influence exist. Be sure that you have them all covered, Now I think in a different way about where obiections might come from. If you're going to create change, you're going to have people who you're not going to convince. You can neutralize some of them, but I had not done that,

50 I BusinessWeek I July 10. 2006

COVERSTORY
lowing for different foam consistencies for sitting and sleeping. While Ferry hoped the new seats would eventually improve Virgin's business-class market share by 1%, they've already exceeded that goal. team decided to replace a popular but hardly healthy mix of Doritos chips called Munchie Mix. "It's the ultimate junk food," says Brinker. The junk food fans revolted. "The tribe had spoken, and these guys wanted Munchie Mix," Brinker says. "People wrote really spirited letters, saying: This is the only reason I flew JetBlue!'" Brinker realized he would have to reverse course, but he didn't want his team to think change wasn't encouraged. So he decided to make fun of himself to keep the reaction lighthearted. On the company's intranet, Brinker started up a "Save the Munchie Mix" campaign that read: "Some pinhead in marketing decided to get rid of the Munchie Mix!" He invited employees to write in poems and stories about why the snack should return to JetBlue. The point? By keeping things fun, he hoped employees wouldn't hesitate to make their own creative decisions. "If we don't have people willing to risk something, then we'll really end up like our competitors." And that, of course, would be a failure indeed. -With William C. Synionds in Boston, Dean Foust in Atlanta, and Diane Brady and Moira Herbst in New York

TREMORS AND THRILLS

A COMPANY'S REACTION in the face of intelligent failures, whether it's Virgin reinvesting in a pricey design revamp or Intuit giving an award to its marketing team, can send tremors or thrills through a culture. If top executives are accepting, people will embrace risk. But if managers react harshly, people will retreat from it. That's something Eric Brinker, JetBlue Airways Corp.'s director of brand management and customer experience, wants to make sure doesn't happen. Last year, JetBlue, which tries to limit its in-flight snack mix to keep costs low and reduce complexity, began hearing that some of its customers wanted a healthier choice. Brinker and his

Pete Carroll
-Head Footbail Coach, University of Southern Caifornia

hen I left my job as defensive coordinator of the San Francisco 49ers, I had two opportunities, at the St. Louis Rams and the New England Patriots. The Rams had had problems, and expectations would be low. On the other hand, the Patriots had iust come off losing the Super Bowl. What's more, [former head coach] Bill Parcells had iust left the team. I went to the harder situation. My mistake was not to evaluate the impact of the guy I was following-one of the most heralded coaches in the NFL, a guy with great charisma and great stature. The challenge of itall the pressure of trying to maintain the program-blinded me to how difficult it would be. Even going 27>21 over three years. I still couldn't keep up with expectations, and I lost my job because we didn't win enough, I thought I could handle anything, thought I could follow Bill Parcells. I felt like, Yeah, this'll be good., .111 win them over. My instincts-to a faultare always to go to the high-pressure opportunity. I didn't really assess the situation dearly enough, I've learned to really weigh things and not be so driven by my gut. Sometimes it gets us in trouble, that feeling that you can handle anything. You have to dig deeply and not iust be emotionally driven into a situation. Great competitors sometimes fail prey to their own drive to see what they can endure.

52 I BusinessWeek I July 10, 2006

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