The foundations of

Bultmann's work
Michael Waldstein
What is needed for a constructive sifting of
Bultmann' s legacy is a more positive and
more critical assessment of the
Enlightenment .... What is needed is a
renewed philosophy and theology of nature.
Rudolf Bultmann is without doubt the most infuential New
Testament scholar of this century. In the first half of the century
his influence made itself felt primarily in Protestant exegesis,
but since then it has become increasingly important in Catholic
scholarship as well.I In 1976, the year Bultmann died, Karl
Neufeld, S.J. wrote:
In scientific exegesis and theology Bultmann' s work is alive-perhaps
more intensely than ever. His contributions are present as founda-
tions, for the most part invisible ones, in most wor1<s which dominate
New Testament exegesis and theology today.
2
1
For an extensive discussion of Bultmann's impact on Catholic theology,
primarily in Germany, see Klaus Hollmann, Existenz und Glaube: Entwicklung
und Ergebnis der Bultmann-Diskussion in der katholischen Theologie (Paderborn:
Bonifacius, 1972); early Catholic reactions to Bultmann are collected in
Kerygma und Mythos (Vol. 5; ed. Hans W. Bartsch; Hamburg: Reich, 1955); see
also Rudolf Bultmann in Catholic Thought (ed. Thomas F. O'Meara, O.P.; New
York: Herder and Herder, 1968); for a summary of the more recent situation
see Hermann Haring, "Ungeliebter Kronzeuge-Zur Bultmannrezeption in
der katholischen Theologie," in Rudolf Bultmanns Werk und Wirkung (ed. B.
Jaspert; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984) pp. 379-395.
2
Karl H. Neufeld, "Theologie durch Kritik: Zum Tod Rudolf Bultmanns,"
StZ (1976) p. 773. Translations of works cited in German are my own.
Communio 2 (Summer, 1987). 1987 by Communio: International Catholzc Review
116 Michael Waldstein
Bultmann's contribution to the study of the New
Testament lies primarily in his historical-critical work, e.g. his
pioneering work in Gospel criticism (form criticism) and his
history of religions work (the New Testament in the context of
hellenistic syncretism).3 It would be a mistake, however, to see
him only as a great historical critical scholar. He is remarkable
for the comprehensiveness and unity of his work. Philosophi-
cal reflection, historical research, exegesis, and a new theolog-
ical synthesis-he brings them all together into a unified vision.
A full clarification of Bultmann's legacy would
have to consider all these aspects in their interrelation. The
purpose of this article is more limited. It attempts to make a
partial contribution toward such a clarification by analyzing
some of the basic philosophical and theological principles
which govern the whole of Bultmann' s work.
4
A. The enigma of Bultmann
Bultmann became generally famous through his
project of "demythologizing" the New Testament.
The world picture of the New Testament is a mythical world
picture. . . . The presentation of the salvation occurrence, which
constitutes the real content of the New Testment proclamation,
corresponds to this mythical world picture. The proclamation talks in
mythological language: the last days are at hand; "when the time had
fully come" God sent his Son. The Son, a preexistent divine being,
appears on earth as a man (Gal. 4:4; Phil. 2:6 ff.; 2 Cor. 8:9; John 1:14,
etc.); his death on the cross, which he suffers like a sinner (2 Cor. 5:21;
Rom. 8:3) makes atonement for the sins of men (Rom. 3:23-26; 4:25;
8:3; 2 Cor. 5:14,19; John 1:29; 1 John 2:2, etc.). His resurrection is the
beginning of the cosmic catastrophy through which the death
3
Cf. Helmut Koester, "Early Christianity from the Perspective of the
History of Religions: Rudolf Bultmann's Contribution," in Bultmann, Retro-
spect and Prospect: The Centenary Symposium at Wellesley (ed. E. Hobbs;
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) pp. 59-74.
4
My analysis is primarily based on the recently published notes of
Bultmann's course on the nature and foundations of theology, taught four
times from 1928 to 1936: Theologische Enzyklopddie (ed. Eberhard Jiingel and
Klaus Muller; Tiibingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1984). I am also relying on the
excellent monograph by Roger Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing:
Philosophy and Historiography in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (Leiden: Brill,
1974). For a clear survey of Bultmann's theology, see Walter Schmithals, An
Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (London: SCM, 1968).
Foundations of Bultmann's work 117
brought into the world by Adam is annihilated (1 Cor. 15:21-22; Rom.
5:12 ff.) ... All of this is mythological talk, and the individual motifs
may be easily traced to the contemporary mythology of Jewish
apocalypticism and of the Gnostic myth of redemption. Insofar as it is
mythological talk it is not credible to men and women today because
for them the mythical world picture is a thing of the past. . . .
Experience and control of the world have developed to sucfi an extent
through science and technology that no one can or does seriously
maintain the New Testament ~ o r l d picture.
5
This text gives the impression that Bultmann is simply an
Englightenment rationalist, an opponent and destoyer of Chris-
tian faith. In support of this impression one can point to his
roots in Nineteenth Century liberal theology and its rationalist
historiography.
Liberal theology owed its distinctive character chiefly to the primacy
of historical interest , and in that field it made its greatest contributions.
These contributions were not limited to the clarification of the
historical picture. They were especially important for the develop-
ment of tfie critical sense, that is, for freedom and veracity. We wfio
have come from a background of liberal theology could never have
become theologians nor remained such had we not encountered in
that liberal theology the earnest search for radical truth. We felt in the
work of orthodox university theology of all shades an urge toward
compromise within which our intellectual and spiritual life would
necessarily be broken. We can never forget our gratitude to G. Kruger
for that often cited article of his on "unchurcfily theology." For he
saw the task of theology to be to imperil souls, to lead men into
doubt, to shatter all naive credulity. Here, we felt, was the atmo-
sphere of truth in which alone we could breathe.6
5
Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology: The Problem of
Demythologizing the New Testament Proclamation" (1941), in New Testament
and Mythology and other Basic Writings, transl. by Schubert M. Ogden (Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1984) pp. 1-43; here pp. 2-4.
6
Rudolf Bultmann, "Liberal Theology and the Latest Theological Move-
ment," in Faith and Understanding (Vol. 1; New York: Harper and Row, 1969)
pp. 28-52; here pp. 29-30. The collapse of orthodoxy can be observed already
in Bultmann's letters as a young student of theology. "The closer I get to my
final exam, the greater are my doubts about our Church, whose servant I will
become. The old orthodoxy had a fine, firm structure, and was easily able to
satisfy those in need of faith. The structure has collapsed and there is nothing
new to take its place" (August, 1904). "My main annoyance is currently
dogmatics. We really do need a reform! What nonsense is taught about
'Revelation,' 'Trinity,' 'Miracles,' 'Divine Attributes'-it is frightening! And
everything is done out of love for tradition. I have sadly had ample
opportunity to observe in my own home, how people can cling to their
118 Michael Waldstein
Yet, at the same time, Bultmann is also a radical
opponent of this enlightened "atmosphere of truth." In sharp
reaction against liberal theology he joined Barth and Gogarten
in the movement of dialectic theology.? Like Barth and Go-
garten, he i5 a deeply believing theologian and preacher of the
Word of God. He understands demythologizing as the consis-
tent and reflected formulation of authentic Christian faith.
Radical demythologizing is the parallel to the Pauline-Lutheran
doctrine of justification through fa1th alone without the works of the
law. Or, rather, it is the consistent application of this doctrine to the field of
knowledge. Like the doctrine of justification, it destroys every false
security and every false demand for security. It makes no difference
whether this security is based upon good action or well substantiated
knowledge ... They alone find security who let all security go, who-
to speak with Luther-are ready to enter into inner darkness.
8
Here lies the enigma of Bultmann. His work seems
to be built on two contradictory foundations: aggressive ratio-
nalism and deep Christian faith. In the attempt to unravel this
enigma I will present first Bultmann' s dialectical doctrine of
knowledge and then the outlines of his theology of the Word of
God.
B. A dialectical doctrine of knowledge
1. Reason and power
In the year before he died Bultmann explained his
understanding of hell to an American physician:
The existential meaning of hell is not that of an image of a physical
place below the world full of torments. Instead, it is the recognition of
the power of evil, indeed, the evil of the poisoned and poisoning
atmosphere which humankind has created for itself when we began
inherited customs and how much unhappiness results from this" (June 1905).
Antje Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann's Papers," in Bultmann, Retrospect and
Prospect, pp. 3-12; here pp. 6 and 8.
7
Bultmann, "Liberal Theology and the Latest Theological Movement,"
spells out this reaction; cf. The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, ed. by James
Robinson (Richmond: John Knox, 1968).
8
Rudolf Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing" (1952), New
Testament and Mythology, pp. 95-123; here p. 122; translation slightly altered;
emphasis added.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 119
to assume that we could create security through scientific knowledge
and the ability to dominate the earth. With this attitude, the world
does become hell. Such confusion leads to the battle of all against all.
Here are the roots of our doubts, our questioning the meaning of life.
9
This judgment on scientific knowledge and its power over
nature stands at the very foundations of Bultmann's thought.
" ... genuine historical existence can be buried under and ...
it is especially buried under today by the aftereffects of the
Enlightenment that so dominate our modern thinking."w It is
in opposition to the Enlightenment and its ideal of science and
power that Bultmann develops the foundations of his
thought.
11
Before turning to these foundations, I turn therefore
to the particular line of Enlightenment thought which he
appears to have in mind.
Francis Bacon compares the learning of the Greeks
to the "boyhood" of knowledge: "it can talk, but it cannot
generate, for it is fruitful in controversies, but barren of
works."
12
In opposition to the Greek insistence on contempla-
tion (theoria), Bacon proposes that the true end of knowledge is
"the benefit and use of life."
13
Thus he claims, " ... I am
laboring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but
9
Antje Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann's Papers," pp. 11-12.
10
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), p. 25.
11
In analyzing Bultmann's thinking as a reaction to the Enlightenment and
its ideal of science and power, I am developing suggestions made by Hans
Jonas in "Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism," in The Gnostic Religion:
The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianty, 2nd ed. (Boston:
Beacon, 1963), pp. 320-340. Jonas wrote his dissertation on Gnosticism in the
1920s under the joint direction of Bultmann and Heidegger. He played a
seminal role in the development of Bultmann's thinking, especially in the
development of the concept of "demythologizing." It is fascinating to follow
his intellectual voyage from the existentialism of Bultmann and Heidegger to
a critique of this heritage and the development of an alternative more in
harmony with traditional Jewish faith in creation. One of the foci of this
alternative is a renewed philosophy of nature which retrieves contributions of
Goethe and, behind him, of the natural philosophy of antiquity. The
biographical aspect of this voyage is itself highly dramatic. As a prominent
Jewish intellectual, Jonas had to leave Germany in 1933 (his mother died in
Auschwitz). He returned to Germany as an infantry-man of the allied forces.
It was during the war that he conceived the central ideas of his philosophy of
nature.
12
Francis Bacon, "The Great Instauration," in The New Organon and Related
Writings (New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1960), p. 8.
13
1bid., p. 15.
120 Michael Waldstein
of human utility and power."
14
In his "New Organon" (placed
against the old Organon, Aristotle's writings in Logic) he
expresses this point in the famous words, "Human knowledge
and human power meet in one; . . . nature to be commanded
must be obeyed."
15
Similarly, Descartes writes in the "Dis-
course on Method":
... it is possible to reach knowledge that will be of much utility in this
life; and . . . instead of the speculative philosophy which is now
taught in the schools we can find a practical one, by which, knowing
the nature and behavior of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all
the other bodies which surround us ... we can employ these entities
for all the purposes for which they are suited, and so make ourselves
masters and possessors of nature.1
6
The connection between knowledge and power is a
pervasive influence at the very foundations of Descartes's
philosophy of nature. It is the basic reason why he eliminates
from nature most of the aspects that cannot be grasped by
mathematics, that powerful instrument of the mind which is
most suited to mechanical control.
In Kant power takes a further step. It determines
not only the outer inventory of nature, as in Descartes, but the
inner structure of knowledge as well. According to Kant we
produce the objects of our knowledge. Sensation is stimulated
by a "thing in itself" which exists apart from the mind, but of
which we can know nothing except that it exists and produces
an amorphous mass of sensation. The mind immediately forms
and orders this amorphous mass according to categories that lie
in it ahead of time. The result of this ordering activity is what
we call the outside world of nature. Just as technological power
imposes an external order on nature, so the mind, in construct-
ing the world of nature, imposes an external order on amor-
phous sensation.
The Kantian description of knowledge in terms of a
structure of power is extremely important for Bultmann. When
he speaks of science and reason, he speaks, with certain
important modifications, of this Kantian power-reason.
14
Ibid., p. 16.
15
Bacon, "The New Organon," ibid., p. 39.
16
Rene Descartes, "Discourse on Method," in Discourse on Method and
Meditations (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 45. Cf. also Rules for the
Direction of the Mind (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 63.
Foundations of Bultmann' s work 121
2. The Neo-Kantians and Heidegger
In Marburg Bultmann came in contact with a group
of Neo-Kantian professors who were to have a lasting influence
on him: Wilhelm Herrmann, Hermann Cohen, and Paul Na-
torpY Hermann, who was perhaps Bultmann's most impor-
tant teacher, writes:
Since its beginning, science has sought order in the world. In Kant,
science reached the insight that it itse1f creates this order ... Whether
the world functions according to law has ceased to be a question for
science after Kant. For only those things which are bound into unity
with all others, or determined by law, are demonstrably real. They
form the world conceived or presented [vorgestellt] by science. That
reality follows laws is not the result of scientific research, but its
presupposition. In this [presupposition] we have the eternally fixed
point through which alone there are demonstrably real things.
18
The Marburg Neo-Kantians followed Kant's basic
premise, the reduction of reality to a construction of the mind.
However, they took two significant steps beyond Kant. The
first step was to eliminate Kant's "thing in itself," that remnant
of the old "realist" metaphysics. Hermann Cohen writes:
Here is the fundamental weakness of Kant: that thinking has its
beginning in something outside of itself. We begin with thinking
itself. Thought does not need to have origins outside of itself.
1
9
In this first step the Marburg Neo-Kantians radicalized Kant's
rationalism. The entire world is built up according to the
rational patterns of the mind, and there are no mysterious
outside forces that give rise to our ideas. To know is to
construct objects, to objectify, according to a principle of law,
and the primary pattern of law is mathematics.zo
In sharp contrast to this rationalism one finds in
the Marburg Neo-Kantians also a deeply felt religious thinking
17
See Johnson, The Origins of Demytholgizing, pp. 38-86.
18
Wilhelm Herrmann, "Unsere Kantfeier," in Gesammelte Aufsiitze (Tii-
b i n ~ e n : Mohr/Siebeck, 1923), pp. 26-32; here p. 26.
1
Hermann Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (Berlin: .Bruno Cassirer,
1902), p. 11. Quoted from Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, p. 44.
20
See Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, pp. 49-50. The concept of
"objectification" is central in Bultmann's thought. It stands at the very roots
of the operation of demythologizing as an operation of de-objectification.
122 Michael Waldstein
aimed at retrieving the spontaneous and non-rational element
in the life of the individual. Paul Natorp writes:
The claims of individuality remain unsatisfied in relation to the
abstract and impersonal laws of reason; after all, we are individuals,
feeling men, not merely rational creatures who are subjects of
knowledge and will. We are heirs of Goethe as well as of Kant.
21
There is thus a clear and sharp dualism in Marburg
Neo-Kantianism: on the one side stands the world of reason,
dominated by the model of mathematics and natural science,
on the other side stands the sphere of the individual, the
sphere of passionate and nebulous sensations, of religious
intuitions and experiences.
22
This dualism is extremely impor-
tant for Bultmann. He accepts it as the framework of his own
dialectical view. One can grasp this framework in an early
essay in which he distinguishes culture, i.e., the world of
reason, from religion.
Culture is the methodical unfolding of human reason in its three
areas, the theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic. Essential for it is
the activity of the human spirit. This spirit is what builds the three
worlds of culture: science, law and morality, and art. ... (R)eligion is
not present in objective formations, as culture, but in being realized,
i.e. in that which happens to the individual. The coming to be and the
life of the individua1 are its meaning.2
3
This text was written in 1920, three years before
Bultmann met Heidegger. It already contains the essential
foundation of his program of demythologizing. Still, it was
Heidegger who gave to Bultmann the existentialist conceptual
instruments for fully formulating this program.
24
21
Paul Natorp, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanitaet (Leipzig: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1894), p. 59. Quoted from Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, p.
66.
22
See Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, pp. 65-66.
23
Rudolf Bultmann, "Religion und Kultur," in Anflinge der dialektischen
Theologie, vol. 2, ed. by Jiirgen Moltmann (Munich: Kaiser, 1963), pp. 11-29;
here pp. 17 and 19.
24
In a letter written in 1923, shortly afer Heidegger's arrival in Marburg,
Bultmann writes, "(In my seminar) I treat the position of the justified in the
world. This seminar is especially instructive because our new philosopher,
Heidegger, a student of Husserl, participates in it. He comes from Catholi-
cism, but he is totally a Protestant. This he showed convincingly when, the
Foundations of Bultmann' s work 123
Martin Heidegger's existentialist analysis of human existence
seems to be only a profane philosophical presentation of the New
Testament view of who we are: beings existing historically in care for
ourselves on the basis of anxiety, ever in the moment of decision
between the past and the future, whether we will lose ourselves in
the world of what is available and of the "one," or whether we will
attain our authenticity by surrendering all securities and being
unreservedly free for the future.
25

3. Authentic truth
According to the existentialist understanding
which Bultmann adopted from Heidegger, being human in the
authentic sense does not mean being an object in the natural
world. It means being a historical possibility which continually
realizes itself through decision. Bultmann is quite radical in
formulating this principle:
... only in it [i.e., the free deed] and nowhere else do we really exist
in the authentic sense since [decision] is nothing else than our
existence itself.
2
6
Bultmann' s doctrine of knowledge is based on this
existentialist principle: he sees authentic knowledge and truth
exclusively in terms of decision. The following texts provide a
good summary:
The original intention of knowledge is evidently guided by concrete
occasions, by a purpose on account of which one wants to know, by
the concern [Sorge] which moves life.
27
other day, he spoke in a debate after a lecture by Hermelink on Luther and
the Middle Ages . . . I also noticed with interest that Heidegger is familiar
with contemporary theology. He is especially an admirer of Herrmann and
knows Gogarten and Barth." Antje Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann's Papers,"
pp. 9-10.
The relation between Bultmann and Heidegger is very complex, involving
common background and mutual influence. As an early student of both,
Hans Jonas was particularly important in this interaction. Cf. Johnson, The
Origins of Demythologizing, pp. 169-256; Hans Jonas, "A Philosopher Remem-
bers Bultmann," in Bultmann, Retrospect and Prospect, pp. 13-16.
25
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), p. 23.
26
Rudolf Bultmann, "Welchen Sinn hates, von Gott zu reden," in Glauben
und Verstehen, vol. 1 (Tiibingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1933), p. 35.
27
Bultmann, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, pp. 35-36.
124 Michael Waldstein
The original meaning of the question, What is truth?, as the question
of the challenge [Anspruch] of the moment, is the question, What
should I do?, on the presupposition that at every moment I am at
stake, that through my deed [become something. The whole truth, my
truth is in question. I want to understand myself.
28
One can unfold the doctrine of these texts in four
successive steps, building from the foundation.
(a) Authentic truth is inseparable from existential
self-understanding. It is a challenge in the light of which I
understand myself in the concrete moment and realize my
existence in decision. Anything which is not such a challenge is
not authentically and really true.
(b) Since authentic truth is an aspect of my exis-
tential self-understanding, I do not stand vis-a-vis an "object"
when I encounter it. I do not think about something, but I stand
in a challenge. Authentic truth is thus prior to the subject-
object distinction. It is non-objective (and also non-subjective).
(c) Since truth is inseparable from my self-
understanding, the truth is completely and radically concrete. It
is that which challenges me. And everything which falls outside
this completely concrete challenge is not really truth.
(d) Truth is, therefore, radically temporal or histor-
ical. It is not a general validity, but the challenge of the
moment, valid only for that moment.
If human existence is temporal-historical, concerned in every concrete
moment with itself and ... grasping at every moment a concrete
possibility of itself,-if, I say, the Being of human existence [das Sein
Cies Daseins] is thus Being-able-to-be inasmuch as every Now is essen-
tially new and receives its meaning only now, now through decision,
and thus not from a timeless meaning of the world, then the question
of truth has meaning only as the question of the one truth of the
moment, my moment.
2
9
4. Inauthentic truth as objectification
Bultmann argues that other modes of truth, such
as "objective" and "universally valid" truth derive from au-
thentic truth by a certain corruption. Following the four points
listed above, one can summarize this derivation as follows:
28
Ibid., p. 49
29
Ibid., p. 50. Heideggerian terminology is palpable in this text.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 125
(a) In the very nature of knowledge there is a ten-
dency to break away from authentic truth, because knowledge
can remember or "preserve" the encounter of the moment. In
this "preservation" of the moment, truth is no longer seen as a
challenge to my existence. It is no longer an aspect of my self-
understanding. I take a point of view outside the challenge.
The possibility of distancing itself from life lies from the outset in
knowledge, because knowledge lifts the being it encounters into the
sphere of the objective and thus preserves it and still"knows" it, even
when the real [aktuelle] relation to the being is no longer present.3
(b) It is this detachment from the challenge which
gives rise to the subject-object distinction. I no longer stand in
the challenge, but I think about something. And so I stand
vis-a-vis an object. Inauthentic truth is thus the same as
objectification.
(c) Objectification, in turn, is the basis for universal
truth, truth which is no longer applicable to me alone, but to a
variety of objects.
(d) Objectification is also the basis for positing
"timeless" truths, truths which are not valid only now, but
always.
5. Nature as an artifact of inauthentic knowledge
When knowledge is cut off from the existential
situation of the moment, its object increasingly becomes the
great causal system of the world of nature, to be known by
universal laws. This system then proceeds to devour our
authentic historical existence.
It is important to note carefully that, according to
Bultmann, this scientific world is a human artifact. There is not
a real "natural world" ready to be "discovered" by natural
science. Nature, as science sees it, is rather a product of
science. It is the product of a way of looking in which we are cut
off from our genuine life which lies only in the moment of
decision and self-understanding. The world of science is, as it
were, a frozen objectification of the only truth which is really
truth, that of the moment. When the mind forces the truth of
30
Ibid., p. 44.
126 Michael Waldstein
the moment to hold still, when it thus lifts that truth into
objectivity, the world of science comes to be.
In my historical [geschichtlich] reality I do not encounter nature as an
objective reality which follows certain laws, but as the fullness of
f
ossibilities for my action and suffering, for my decisions. Only when
disregard my existence do I see nature as an object, and inasmuch
as I then place myself into a certain relation to it, I see myself as a
natural ooject among others, standing with them in causal connec-
tions governed by law. 31
This dialectic between authentic and inauthentic
truth brings us back to the dualism of the Neo-Kantians, the
basic framework of Bultmann's thinking. However, the Neo-
Kantians, in accordance with their positive assessment of the
Enlightenment, saw "objectified" reality as something positive
next to the non-objectified life of the self (cf. Natorp's state-
ment quoted above, "We are heirs of Goethe as well as of
Kant"). Bultmann, on the other hand, sees "objectified" reality
in profoundly and radically negative terms as a falling away
from authentic existence.32
C. A theology of the Word of God
1. Simultaneously just and sinner
(a) Science and sin: Although science is a corruption,
it is not a matter of some wrong choice.
33
As people of the
twentieth century we inescapably live in the scientific world.
Although we cannot avoid living in this world, we
sin by doing so. We commit, in fact, the basic sin, the sin of
self-assertion, the sin of evading the challenge of the moment
in order to find an ultimate security in something "objective"
and "permanent" or even "eternal."
... sin together with death goes back to the flesh (Rom. 8:13; Gal. 6:8,
etc.). But what is meant by flesh [sarx]? It is not what is corporeal or
sensual, but the whole sphere of what is visible, available, disposable,
and measurable, and as such the sphere of what is transient. This
sphere becomes a power over us insofar as we make it the foundation
of our lives by living "according to it," that is, by succumbing to the
31
Ibid., p. 107.
32
See Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, p. 251.
33
See Bultmann, "Wahrheit und Gewissheit," in Theologische Enzyklopiidie,
pp. 183-205; here pp. 197-198.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 127
temptation to live out of what is visible and disposable instead of out
of what is invisible and nondisposable-regardless of whether we
give ourselves to the alluring possibilities of such a life imprudently
and with desire or whether we lead our lives reflectedly and with
calculation, on the basis of our own accomplishments, "the works of
the law."
34
This, then, is how Bultmann connects science and
sin: The inauthentic way of thinking which defines science and
which constitutes the world of nature, the world of the flesh, is
an expression of the self-assertion of human power. Thus to
live in the natural world is to live in sin; it is the attempt to gain
life through "works of the law. "3s
(b) Bultmann and Luther: It is instructive to compare
Bultmann and Luther at this point. For Luther the central
question is, "How may I find a gracious God?" In his answer he
rejects anything that lies in our power. What he struggles
against is the Catholic who has devised a mechanism for
securing salvation in "works of the law." For Bultmann the
central question is, "How may I gain my authentic historical
existence?" In his answer he too rejects anything that lies in our
power. What he struggles against is the Enlightenment power-
reason which has devised for itself a mechanism for securing
life in science.
Luther is concerned with moral guilt, while Bult-
mann is concerned with the loss of authentic historical exist-
ence. Yet they agree in their rejection of human works and in
the sharp dialectic according to which sin and true life are
intertwined: simul justus et peccator, at the same time just and
sinner. According to Luther, we remain sinners, even when the
justice of Christ is imputed to us; acccording to Bultmann, we
continue to live in the scientific world of nature, even when we
are called by God into authentic decision.
36
2. God as the challenge of the moment
(a) God and the challenge: Once this dialectic between
sin and authentic existence is grasped, one can see the place for
God in Bultmann. The dialectic has two sharply distinct sides:
34
Rudolf Bultrnann, "New Testament and Mythology," p. 16.
35
See Johnson, The Origins of Demythologizing, p. 194.
36
See Ibid., pp. 198-200.
128 Michael Waldstein
one side is the realm of non-objectified existential challenge;
the other side is the world of objectified truth, the world of
escape from the challenge, the world of substantial sin. Given
these two sides, it is clear that God is located on the first side,
that of existential challenge .
. . . what is the question of God, if not the question of truth? Precisely
when the question of truth is posed as the question of the moment,
can it be anything else than the question of God, who, if he is thought
at all, is meant as the power which rules the now, as the challenge
[Anspruch] which makes itself heard in the now?
37
(b) No being behind the challenge: In order to under-
stand Bultmann it is decisive to resist the temptation of a
traditional interpretation. His notion of God must be under-
stood on the basis of his Traditional Christianity
ascribes objective existence to God. But for Bultmann, God is
not an objectively existing being which, among other things,
challenges me in the moment. No! God is the challenge of the
moment and nothing besides. No being stands behind this
challenge, for that being would be part of the world, something
objectified, something which is not felt as a challenge, some-
thing, therefore, which is contrary to the deepest nature of God
as absolute Lord. God does not exist "objectively." God is not
"generally" valid. God is the challenge in which I stand,
concrete and temporal, valid only for me in my moment.
God is thus unknowable for science. And this unknowability does not
mean that the object "God" is too great, too vast, too incomprehen-
sible; it does not mean that our knowledge is not "adequate." No idle talk
about God's unknowability! God is not a complete or partial X, so that
our lack of knowledge of him would have the character of a lack of
knowledge of hidden things, of some hinterland or over-world. In this
case, knowledge of God would be thought of as in principle knowl-
edge of the world, and the insufficiency of our knowleage of the
world would be confused with that of our knowledge of God.
38
The knowledge of God is the knowledge of the challenge of the moment.
His call becomes heard as the challenge of the moment to us. God is
invisible to the objectifying vision of scientific research.
39
37
Bultmann, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, , p. 50.
38
lbid., p. 51.
39
1bid., p. 57.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 129
3. Scripture alone
(a) God in Scripture: To define God as the challenge
of the moment is not to say that the voice of the moment is
automatically God. God is not simply the voice of conscience,
but a concrete authoritative word spoken from the outside into
the moment .
. . . one can speak of God only as the how of our existence [das Wie
unserer Existenz], i.e., as the one whom I encounter always anew in
the moment. But my moment, in order for me to hear God in it, must
be determined by a fact [Tatsache], something factual [ein Faktisches].
This happens when I encounter revelation as something spoken in
the moment, or rather to the moment. From the standpoint of
philosophical analysis, this is an accidental historical fact [zufiilliges
geschichtliches Faktum]. 4o
It is possible to identify the accidental historical fact
which is God. God, as the word spoken to me in the moment,
is the revelation of Scripture .
. . . all proclamation points to Scripture, not as to its accidentally first
stage, out as to that of which it speaks, namely, revelation. This first
proclamation, and nothing else, is revelation .... Thus Scripture is
the authority, the only authority for theology.
41
(b) Jesus as the scriptural Word of God: The definition
of God as the historical word of Scripture spoken into my
moment must be further specified. Jesus Christ is this Word of
God.
. . . we come from a history of love inasmuch as in Christ the divine
forgiveness has become reality for us, reality in the proclamation of
the Church, and reality in the faith which receives this proclamation
... God's revelation as a historical [geschichtlich] event is thus Jesus Christ
as the word of God. This word was instituted in the contingent historical
[historisch] event Jesus of Nazareth and it is alive in the tradition of the
Church. The fact of Jesus Christ does not take on importance as a fact
which is visible outside of the proclamation, but onfy as a fact which
we encounter in the proclamation, as a fact made present by the
proclamation. Jesus Cnrist is the Word.42
40
Ibid., p. 63.
41
Ibid., p. 169
42
1bid., p. 95.
130 Michael Waldstein
Bultmann makes two fundamental assertions in
this text. On the one hand he asserts that Jesus is the unique
Word of God. On the other hand he excludes any "objective"
truth from this assertion. Jesus is significant for faith, not as a
person with certain objective characteristics, divine or other-
wise, but as the preached Jesus. The traditional doctrine that he
is objectively divine is contrary to the faith because it falsely
locates divinity in the world of objectivity, the world of
substantial sin. God has no room in this world. He cannot enter
it. God is only the concrete challenge addressed to me when
the Scriptural message of Jesus is preached to me.
(c) Two senses of "historical": This definition of God
as the Scriptural proclamation with Jesus as its historical
content can be made more distinct by distinguishing two
senses of "historical." In one way something can be historical
(historisch) as an objectified thing of the past, subject to scien-
tific historical criticism. In another way something can be
historical (geschichtlich) as an address which challenges me in
my moment .
. . . we can look at the history of the past in an objectifying way or else
as personal address, insofar as in it the possibilities of human
self-understanding become perceptible and summon us to responsi-
ble choice. The relation of these two modes of self-understanding
must be characterized as "dialectical," insofar as the one is never
given without the other. 43
On the basis of this distinction one must say that
the historical (historisch) Jesus is not, and never was, the Word
of God, while the historical (geschichtlich) Jesus is. The preached
Jesus, or, as Bultmann says more often, the Christ of the
kerygma (proclamation), is the Word of God, while the Jesus of
objectifying historical critical studies is part of the scientific
world of sin and definitely, as such, not the Word of God.44
43
Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing" (1961), New Testament
and Mythology, pp. 153-163; here p. 158.
44
Still, the historical [historisch] Jesus is necessary as part of the dialectic
between authentic and inauthentic truth: "This living Word of God is not
invented by the human spirit and by human sagacity; it rises up in history. Its
origin is an historical event, by which the speaking of this Word, the
preaching, is rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus
Christ. We may say that this assertion is paradoxical. For what God has done
in Jesus is not an historical fact which is capable of historical proof. The
Foundations of Bultmann's work 131
(d) The absoluteness of Christianity: If one fails to
interpret Bultmann in the light of his basic dialectic, one might
think that his rejection of traditional Christian dogmatics would
lead him to relativize Christianity. This is not the case. As it
happens, the word of God is present only in Scripture and it is
inseparable from Jesus. Christian theology is thus the only
theology.
Theology, i.e., speaking of revelation and of faith, exists only as
Christian theology. All other supposed theology is only talk about
humanity since God is accessiole only in his revelation through
Christ. However deeply such talk may grasp human reality, it still
does not reach the reality of God.
4
5
4. Demgthologizing
(a) The liberal elimination of myth: The dialectic which
stands at the foundation of Bultmann' s thought emerges as an
exegetical method in the program of demythologizing. Inau-
thentic truth is the first factor in this method. New Testament
myths (e.g., the Incarnation of the Son of God, his atoning
death and his bodily Resurrection) can be maintained no longer
because, on the level of objectifying thinking, they are contra-
dicted by modern science.
Demythologizing in this sense was already prac-
ticed by Bultmann' s great opponents, the liberal theologians of
the Nineteenth Century. Liberal theology failed, however,
because it eliminated the center of the New Testament procla-
mation.
For the epoch of the older "liberal" theology, it is characteristic that
mythological representations are simply eliminated as time condi-
tioned and inessential while the great basic religious and moral ideas
are explained to be essential. ... The kerygma is here reduced to
certain basic religious and moral ideas, to an idealistic ethic that is
religiously motivated. But the truth of the matter is that the kerygma
is eliminated as kerygma, that is, as the message of God's decisive act
in Christ .... The New Testament talks about an event through which
God has brought about our salvation. It does not proclaim Jesus
objectifying historian as such cannot see that an historical person (Jesus of
Nazareth) is the eternal Logos, the Word." Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and
Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 79-80.
45
Bultmann, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, p. 159.
132 Michael Waldstein
primarily as the teacher who has indeed said things of decisive
importance and whom we therefore continue to revere, but whose
person is in principle indifferent to anyone who has understood his
teaching. Rather, it proclaims precisely Jesus' person as the decisive
event of salvation. 46
(b) The existential interpretation of myth: Enlighten-
ment rationalism is a common ground between Bultmann and
liberal theology. For Bultmann, however, such rationalism is
only one side of the basic dialectic of human knowledge. The
failure of liberal theology stems from its failure to grasp the
existential pole of the dialectic. In opposition to liberal theol-
ogy, which simply discards myths, Bultmann argues, there-
fore, that "the task today ... is to interpret New Testament
mythology" in order to preserve the central New Testament
proclamation of God's saving act in Jesus.
47
In this interpreta-
tion, the New Testament myths must be taken, not in their
"objective" content, but in their function as challenge to
human existence.
Existential interpretation is not an arbitrary opera-
tion but it corresponds, Bultmann argues, to the very nature of
myth. There is a certain tension between the true intention or
point of myth and its "objective" content.
Myth intends to talk about a reality which lies beyond the reality that
can be objectified, observed and controlled, and which is of decisive
significance for human existence. It is the reality that means for us
sa1vation or damnation, grace or wrath, and that demands of us
respect and obedience. 48
In other words, myth intends to express a certain
ultimate existential self-understanding. It aims at authentic
truth, at the non-objectified challenge of the moment. But
contrary to this intention it expresses this challenge in objective
terms.
Mythological thinking ... naively objectifies what is thus beyond the
world as though it were something within the world. Against its real
intention it represents the transcendent as distant in space and as
only quantitatively superior to human power. By contrast, demythol-
46
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), pp. 12-13.
47
Ibid., p. 12.
48
Bultmann, "On the problem of Demythologizing" (1961), p. 160.
Foundations of Bultmann' s work 133
ogizing seeks to bring out myth's real intention to talk about our own
authentic reality as human beings.
4
9
Bultmann thus defines myth within the framework
of his dialectic between authentic and inauthentic truth as a
phenomenon which, of itself, cries for existential interpreta-
tion. Myths are truer to themselves in existential interpretation
than they are in their own "objective" understanding.
Therefore, the motive for criticizing myth, that is, its objectifying
representations, is present in myth itself, insofar as its real intention
to talk about a transcendent power to which both we and the world
are subject is hampered and obscured by the objectifying character of
its assertions.
50
5. An example of demythologizing in John:
In the text just quoted, Bultmann argues for the
legitimacy of the project of demythologizing on the basis of his
dialectical doctrine of knowledge. In other parts of his work he
attempts to buttress his case by arguing on the historical
grounds that the New Testament itself demythologizes in
certain cases. Let me outline an example of this argument,
taken from Bultmann's history of religions work on John. This
example is instructive, because it shows how various aspects of
Bultmann' s work (philosophical principles, historical studies,
exegesis and theological synthesis) interrelate.
(a) The enigma of John: In an early essay on "The
Importance of the Newly Edited Mandean and Manichean
Texts for Understanding the Gospel of John" (1925), Bultmann
delves into the "basic point" of the Gospel of John by locating
John on a history of religions background.
51
He begins by
arguing on the basis of the text of the Gospel itself that John's
basic point lies in the idea that Jesus is the revealer sent from
the Father.
What is his [John's] central view, his basic conception? Without doubt it
must lie in the assertion which is repeated again and again that Jesus
49
1bid., p. 161.
50
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mytyhology" (1941), p. 10.
51
"Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandiiischen und manichiiischen
Quellen fiir das Verstiindnis des Johannesevangeliums," reprinted in Exe-
getica, ed. by E. Dinkier (Tiibingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1967), pp. 55-104; here p. 55.
134 Michael Waldstein
is the one sent from the Father (e.g. 17:3,23,25) who brings revelation
through words and works. sz
However, John is not interested in the revelation of
anthropological, or cosmological, or theological mysteries. And
thus, if one asks what Jesus reveals, no satisfactory content can
be found. Jesus does not even primarily reveal his own person,
for John does not give an image of his religious and moral
personality. Although John describes Jesus as a divine being, 5
3
one cannot say that even this divinity is the true object of
revelation.
All the miraculous and divine which appears in Jesus' life is obviously
a mere means to an end. Granted, Jesus' humantiy "is merely a
transr,arent medium for letting the divine light shine through on
earth '-if only one could say what it is that shines through. Funda-
mentally, the transparent medium is not really the humamty, but the
divinity of the Johannine Jesus. For the divine which becomes visible
in him is apparently not the true object of revelation.
54
(b) John's history of religions background: The great
puzzle of this "revelation of the revealer" can only be resolved
by seeing how John adopted the Gnostic redeemer myth.
55
Bultmann follows Reitzenstein' s reconstruction of this myth: A
divine being, the Primal Man, falls at the beginning of time
from the heavenly world of light into matter. Only part of him
escapes; the rest is overpowered by matter and breaks up into
particles of light (human souls). So trapped are these souls that
they have forgotten their origin. In the fullness of time the
Primal Man descends again into the world of matter and
reveals himself to his lost fragments, to human souls. By
revealing himself, he thus reveals the identity and destiny of
souls and thereby saves them. His self-revelation is the saving
event.
John adopted this myth and applied it to Jesus.
Bultmann supports this claim by giving an extensive list of
precise parallels between John and Gnostic sources, above all
52
Ibid., p. 57.
53
"True, Jesus is largely the divine man [theios aner], omniscient and in
possession of miraculous power. He is more, he is 'a divine being which
floats across the earth as a stranger' [Wrede]." Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid.
55
Cf. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
Foundations of Bultmann' s work 135
Mandean texts.
56
These texts, Bultmann admits, are later than
the Gospel of John. The myth they contain, however, precedes
the Gospel. One of the most important arguments for this
conclusion, the argument, in fact, which decides the issue, is
this: many elements of the Gnostic myth are present in John,
but the central ideal which makes the myth work (the identity
of the redeemer with the redeemed souls) is absent. The
elements present in John have their natural place in the
complete myth, where alone they function properly. There-
fore, John's version must be secondary, dependent upon the
integral myth as a later transformation.
57
(c) John demythologizes the Gnostic myth: Why does
John transform the redeemer myth? The reason lies in the
"fundamental character" of his Gospel: Jesus is the revealer. As
Bultmann notes, the Gnostic redeemer does not need to reveal
any doctrine, except himself, because his fate is parallel to that
of the soul and thus salvific when revealed. Also in John, Jesus
does not reveal any doctrine: he simply is the revealer.
However, the great puzzle of the Gospel is increased
by this similarity because the crucial element in the myth, the
redeemer/redeemed identity, is absent in John. After stating
this point, Bultmann concludes his article as follows:
The author is only interested in the that of revelation, not in the what.
If faith is no longer content with myths as the objects of revelation
and if no dogma suffices, rational knowledge or psychological expe-
riences tend to take their place. But the author is equally far from both
of these. One possibility still remains, however, that of taking the
concept of revelation in a radical sense, i.e., without describing its
content either by speculative propositions or psychic states, because
both would pull down revelation into the human sphere. One cannot
say of God Fzow he is, only that he is. The divine is nothing which is
in any way given and describable. And thus the Gospel of John
speaks of God, not, of course, by the via negationis of the mystics (all
mystical divine attributes are lacking), but in the only way in which
one can speak of God, through the depiction of the jolting [Erschiit-
terung] of all that is human through the revelation ... Revelation can
only be depicted as the annihilation of all that is human, as the
rejection of all human questions, as the refusal of all human answers,
as that which puts the human person into question.
58
56
lbid., pp. 59-97.
57
See Ibid., pp. 97-99.
58
lbid., pp. 103-104.
136 Michael Waldstein
This text, published three years after Bultmann
came in contact with Heidegger, still uses the language of
dialectical theology rather than existentialism. Still, the pro-
gram of demythologizing is already complete in its essential
outlines as dictated by a dialectical doctrine of knowledge. The
two poles of the dialectic are clearly spelled out: on the one
hand there is God, wholly un-worldly, non-objective, content-
less, a jolt which calls us into question; on the other hand there
is the world of objective "content," of myth, of dogma, of
rational knowledge and psychological experiences. It is on the
basis of this dialectic that Bultmann interprets John. By muti-
lating the Gnostic myth, John indicates that God's revelation in
Jesus lies only on the first side of this dialectic. In other words,
he radically de-objectifies or demythologizes revelation.
D. Summary: liberation from hell
To set the stage for some critical reflections let me
attempt to summarize the core of Bultmann's intentions. On
one level of his thinking, Bultmann works from the platform of
a radical Enlightenment rationalism. To modern enlightened
consciousness, New Testament myths are no longer accept-
able. Is the Christian faith, then, irretrievably lost? Demythol-
ogizing solves this dilemma with brilliant simplicity. It grants
rationalist science complete sway in the sphere of objectivity
and simply brackets this whole sphere by inserting it into a
Lutheran dialectic. Science is unanswerable, but the final word
still belongs to faith.
On a more basic level, however, Bultmann's plat-
form is one of radical opposition to the Enlightenment. He
attempts to preserve authentic human existence against the
destruction of this existence by science and its power. Let me
return to his explanation of hell:
. . . the evil of the poisoned and poisoning atmosphere which
humankind has created for itself when we began to assume that we
could create security through scientific knowledge and the ability to
dominate the earth. With this attitude, the world does become hell.
59
If one reads this statement against the background
of Bultmann' s dialectical doctrine of truth, one realizes its full
59
Antje Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann' s Papers," pp. 11-12.
-
Foundations of Bultmann's work 137
import. Bultmann is not concerned with a mere cultural critique
of the Enlightenment and with mere cultural remedies, such as
ecological awareness or a return to a simpler life in harmony
with nature. He analyzes the predicament of science and power
as an inescapable predicament. Hell is built into the very
structure of human existence because human existence inevi-
tably slips into inauthentic truth. The Enlightenment repre-
sents merely a particularly clear expression of this ontological
predicament.
Still, even on this anti-Enlightenment platform,
Bultmann accepts a particular line of Enlightenment thought.
Here lies the solution to the enigma mentioned at the begin-
ning of this article. In his resistance against the Enlightenment
he, first of all, accepts a radical form of Enlightenment thought
and, secondly, builds this thought as the negative pole into a
dialectical doctrine of knowledge. He accepts Bacon's identifi-
cation of science and power; he accepts the Cartesian reduction
of nature to a mathematical machine without finality; and he
accepts the Kantian importing of a structure of power into the
very nature of "objectifying" knowledge. Human existence
and its quest for meaning cannot but sense such a world as
entirely foreign and threatening.
. . . a change in the vision of nature, that is, of the cosmic
environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation
which has given rise to modern existentialism and to its nihilistic
implications .... the essence of existentialism is a certain dualism, an
estrangement between man and the world, with the loss of the idea
of a kindred cosmos-in short, an anthropological acosmism ...
60
Jonas points out that Gnosticism and existentialism
are strikingly similar in this respect. Like existentialism, Gnos-
ticism sees the human self as trapped in the hellish prison of
the "objective" visible world. But, if anything, the estrange-
ment felt by existentialism is more radical.
There is no overlooking one cardinal difference between the gnostic
and the existentialist dualism: Gnostic man is thrown into an antag-
onistic, anti-divine, and therfore anti-human nature, modern man
into an indifferent one. Only the latter case represents the absolute
vacuum, the really bottomless pit. In the gnostic conception the
60
Jonas, "Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism," p. 325.
138 Michael Waldstein
hostile, the demonic, is still anthropomorphic, familiar even in its
foreignness, and the contrast itself gives direction to existence ... Not
even this antagonistic quality is granted to the indifferent nature of
modern science, and from that nature no direction at all can be
elicited. This makes modern nihilism infinitely more radical and more
desperate than gnostic nihilism ever could be for all its panic terror of
the world. 6I
Once one understands that, according to Bult-
mann, this alienation is an inescapable ontological predica-
ment, one will understand the full meaning of his theology of
the Word of God. The Word of God redeems us by calling us
radically out of this world. Gnostic theology also advocated a
radical departure from this evil world into the sphere of light.
The similarity, however, is only partial. Contrary to the Gnostic
dream of escape into an "objective" sphere of light Bultmann
holds that we must continue living in this world, fully engaged
in its operation, even relishing its "atmosphere of truth," but at
the same time free from it.
[Faith] is radical submission to God, which expects everything from
God and nothing from ourselves; and it is the release thereby given
from everything in the world that can be disposed of, and hence the
attitude of being free from the world, of freedom. This freedom from
the world is, in principle, not asceticism, but rather a distance from
the world for which all participation in things worldly takes place in
the attitude of "as if not" (1 Cor. 7:29-31). 62
E. Critical reflections
1. The need for a theology of creation
It is at this central point of Bultmann' s intentions,
at the point of "liberation from hell," that critical reflection
about his work can fruitfully begin. One of the most central
criticisms to be brought against his vision is that it lacks a
theology of creation. It lacks the assent to the fundamental
goodness of the world e.s God's creature. In his essay "The
Meaning of the Christian Faith in Creation" (1936), Bultmann
61
1bid., pp. 338-339.
62
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" (1941), p. 18 " ... let those
who have the modern world view live as though they had none." Bultmann,
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 85.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 139
interprets this faith as applying only to the sphere of authentic
truth, at the exlusion of the sphere of objectivity. In our
authentic existence, we are determined by God, but the world
of nature is not objectively caused by God.
This kind of faith in creation is not a theory about some past
occurrence such as might be depicted in mythological tales or
cosmological speculation and natural scientific research; rather, it is
faith in man's present determination by God.
63
Bultmann' s basic ontology does not permit any
other position. He must deny the objective content of faith in
creation, because the objective world is the result of an inau-
thentic mode of human knowledge. Far from being caused by
God it arises as a self-enclosed objectification from human
sin.
64
2. The need to speak of God objectively
Closely related to the issue of creation is the issue
of the
11
objective" existence of God. If the world, in its
objectivity, is God's creature, then its objective truth must in
some way be a positive reflection of God and one must speak
of God objectively.
In fact, Bultmann cannot escape from
11
objective"
statements about God. When he claims that God is the chal-
63
Rudolf Bultmann, "The Meaning of the Christian Faith in Creation," in
Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. by Schubert
O ~ e n (New York: Meridian, 1960), pp. 206-225; here p. 220.
Jonas is quite right to question the scientific aspects of Bultmann's view
of a self-enclosed cosmos:" ... the question is permitted whether Bultmann,
totally conceding the modern axiom of immanence, has not given more to
modern science than is its due. This seems to be the case, for instance, when
he writes, 'Modern science at any rate does not believe that the course of
nature can be breached by supernatural forces' and he means to say that it
believes that this cannot occur. But on such a 'can' and 'cannot' science does
not pronounce .... Bultmann is, of course, right that subjectively this very
faith, i.e., the science-inspired idea of a natural law that brooks no exception,
is the dominant faith of 'modern man' including the theologian (less, perhaps,
lately the scientist himself) .... Bultmann shared with Kant an exaggerated
conception of the tightness and rigidity of worldly causality." Hans Jonas, "Is
Faith Still Possible Today? Memories of Rudolf Bultmann and Reflections on
Philosophical Aspects of his Work," Harvard Theological Review 75 (1982), pp.
1-23; here pp. 9-10, 14.
140 Michael Waldstein
lenge of the moment he is formulating a general definition, one
which holds for every moment. But if this is the nature of God
in general and at all times, God is apparently not just the
unique challenge of the moment.
Bultmann is quite aware of this dilemma. He
attempts to escape it by saying that theology, when it speaks of
God, must necessarily objectify; it must necessarily pull God
down into the world of sin, while God is really the challenge of
the moment beyond all theological talk. At the conclusion of his
lecture "What does it mean to speak of God," he writes,
Even this lecture is a speaking about God and, as such, if God exists
it is sin, and if God does not exist, it is meaningless. Whether it has
any meaning and whether it is justified-no one of us can judge.
65
Bultmann thus squeezes God to a point of com-
plete disappearance between sin and meaninglessness in his
attempt to keep theology untainted by any objective truth.
Heinrich Schlier, a student of Bultmann who later became a
Catholic, correctly diagnoses the nihilist implications of this
attempt:
The Word of the Spirit never takes on form, never becomes concrete;
it never becomes outward and objective, but is merely "picked up" at
times in a sort of existential faith, a faith, however, which by no
means truly exists because it vanishes as soon as it aprears. Here
everything remains uncertain, including the certitude o our uncer-
tainty in the prescence of the Self-revealing God.
66
As a defense against objective truth, however,
even such radical nihilism is unsuccessful. For Bultmann claims
that the general definition of God as the challenge of the
moment is objectively true; it attains the real God. He does not
sufficiently reflect about this fatal invasion of objective truth
into the sphere of God.
3. The positive role of theoretical knowledge
(a) The inescapability of objective truth: Bultmann' s
unsuccessful attempt to keep theology untainted by objective
65
Rudolf Bultmann, "What Does it Mean to Speak of God," Faith and
Understanding I, p. 65.
66
Heinrich Schlier, "A Brief Apologia," in We are Now Catholics, ed. by Karl
Hardt (Westminster: Newman, 1959), pp. 187-215; here p. 205.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 141
truth points to a self-contradiction at the very foundations of
his existentialist doctrine of knowledge. He claims that authen-
tic truth is concrete (valid only for me) and radically temporal
(valid only for the moment in which I now stand). But when he
claims, as he does, that this doctrine is true, he claims to have
laid hold of a truth which is neither concrete (it holds for all
human beings) nor temporal (it is valid for all times). Yet he can
hardly disqualify this truth by saying, "The general doctrine of
truth is admittedly far from the moment; it is an objectification
in which contact with the moment has been lost." For he claims
to have grasped truth (i.e., the challenge of the moment) as it is,
which means that contact has in fact not been lost.
There is a further self-contradiction, closely related
to the one just mentioned. Bultmann claims that authentic
truth is inseparable from self-understanding. In this claim,
however, he does not attempt to understand himself; he at-
tempts to understand the authentic situation of knowledge
which is found in all human beings. He wants to know what
that situation is, truly, in itself. And thus his interest is
primarily theoretical or contemplative. By his own practice he
refutes thus his existentialist theory and shows that the desire
of knowledge for its own sake is the first and authentic desire
in relation to truth. He shows that the question of truth is not
primarily the question of existential self-understanding, but the
question of contemplating (theoria) that which is.
With a certain violence Bultmann attempts to press
"objective" truth into a radically negative position, dialectically
opposed to existential truth. Wounded and chased out by the
front door, however, objective truth re-enters by the back door,
still intact. Bultmann' s dialectical doctrine of knowledge re-
mains thus an unsuccessful attempt. By its failure it confirms
exactly what it attempts to deny: the positive place of objective
truth.
(b) Contemplation: Bultmann' s failure to notice the
re-entry of objective truth is not accidental, but deeply rooted
in his ontology. He understands God as radically future-
oriented. True, God is only in the present, because he is the
challenge of the moment. But he exhausts himself in the role of
calling me out of my sinful past into my open future. The
present, as such, is an empty turning-point from past to future.
I cannot repose in the present as the presence of God.
This emptying of the present stems from Butt-
mann's negative assessment of "objective" being. Objective
142 Michael Waldstein
being is what is merely "factual," what is merely and indiffer-
ently extant; it is nature as the product of objectifying thinking,
stripped to mute thinghood.
This existentialist depreciation of the concept of nature obviously
reflects its spiritual denudation at the hands of physical science, and
it has something in common with the gnostic contempt for nature. No
philosophy has ever been less concerned about nature than Existen-
tialism, for which it has no dignity left ... To look at what is there,
at nature as it is in itself, at Bemg, the ancients called by the name of
contemplation, theoria. But the point here is that, if contemplation is
left witn only the irrelevantly extant, then it loses the noble status it
once had-as does the repose in the present to which it holds the
beholder by the presence of its objects. Theoria had that dignity
because ... it beheld eternal objects in the forms of things, a
transcendence of immutable being shining through the transparency
of becoming ... Thus it is eternity, not time, that grants a present and
gives it a status of its own in tli.e flux of time; and it is the loss of
eternity which accounts for the loss of a genuine present.
67
Jonas points to two reasons for the negative assess-
ment of objective truth and contemplation in existentialism: the
spiritual denudation of nature and the denial of the eternal
creative source of being. We are thus brought back to the
fundamental criticism that Bultmann's thought lacks a theology
of creation.
4. Is demythologizing a hermeneutical procedure?
As a critique of Bultmann' s dialectical doctrine of
knowledge, the above lines of argument call into question the
very foundations of demythologizing. If objective truth is not a
corruption, dialectically opposed to existential self-under-
standing, then it cannot be assumed that all objective or
mythical statements about the divine are defective attempts to
express an existential self-understanding.
Even if the dialectical doctrine of knowledge were
correct, however, there are some problems with the legitimacy
of demythologizing. Bultmann conceives of demythologizing
as an interpretive or hermeneutical procedure.
By "demythologizing" I understand a hermeneutical procedure that
inquires about the reality referred to by mythologicaf statements or
67
Jonas, "Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism," pp. 337-338.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 143
texts. This presupposes that myth indeed talks about a reality, but in
an inadequate way.6s
The phrase "in an inadequate way" raises the
following difficulty: To preach the word of God as something
located in the non-objective sphere of existential challenge
requires great conceptual clarity, a clarity which became pos-
sible only after the development of Bultmann's dialectical
doctrine of knowledge. The ancient Christians did not have this
clarity. And so they inevitably and continuously confused the
Word of God with something objective. Bultmann acknowl-
edges their confusion when he notes that the false objectivity of
New Testament myths must be eliminated.
Demythologizing seeks to bring out the reaL intention of myth,
namely, its intention to talk about human existence as grounded in
and limited by a transcendent, unworldly power, which is not visible
to objectifying thinking. Thus, negatively, demythologizing is criti-
cism of the mythical world-picture insofar as it conceals the real
intention of myth. Positively, demythologizing is existentialist inter-
pretation, in that it seeks to make clear the intention of myth to talk
about human existence.69
The problem lies in the negative aspect, that of
de-objectification. If ancient Christian texts are mired in objec-
tification, then Bultmann gives them too much credit when he
interprets them as really proclaiming the non-objective Word of
God. He is engaged in over-benign apologetics and not in
critical exegesis. He miraculously converts mud into dear
water. In other words, demythologizing is not a hermeneutical
procedure, but the expression of a disagreement with the text. In
its de-objectifying aspect, it replaces the text's theology with an
opposed theology.
Bultmann protests emphatically, "Scripture is the
authority, the only authority for theology."
70
In fact, however,
a dialectical doctrine of knowledge determines what can, and
what cannot, be Word of God.
5. Does John demythologize?
This line of criticism can be pushed one step
further. How do we know that the real intention of myth is to
68
Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing" (1961), p. 155.
69
Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing" (1952), p. 99.
70
Bultmann, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, p. 169.
144 Michael Waldstein
express an existential self-understanding? Bultmann cannot
simply point to his dialectical doctrine of knowledge, for that
would be begging the question. His only resort is the historical
argument that the New Testament itself demythologizes. Let
me briefly return to his argument on the "basic point" of John.
Colpe and Schenke have shown that the Gnostic
redeemer myth in the form postulated by Bultmann is probably
a post-Christian Manichean development.
71
This does not
deprive Bultmann' s reconstruction of John's history of religions
background of all value. In fact, it is still stimulating the
scholarly discussion.
72
For the purposes of the demythologiz-
ing debate, however, the conclusions of Colpe and Schenke
show that John cannot be interpreted as cutting critical holes
into the Gnostic redeemer myth.
There is a more basic point: Suppose Bultmann is
completely correct in his reconstruction. This would not yet
prove his main point, namely, that John de-objectifies revela-
tion. John could simply have chosen some mythical elements
which suited him to state that Jesus, objectively speaking, was
the Son of God made flesh. Bultmann does not even consider
this obvious possibility. He reads his own theology all too
quickly into the historical data.
F. Conclusion
The enigma with which I began this article is that
Bultmann is both a deeply believing Christian. and a radical
rationalist critic of the New Testament. Precisely this apparent
contradiction constitutes the systematic unity of his work
which is rooted in his dialectical doctrine of knowledge. By
demonizing the Enlightenment and turning it into his most
implacable enemy, he thought he could make it, paradoxically,
comfortable to live with.
71
Carsten Colpe, Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht, 1961); Hans Martin Schenke, Der Gott "Mensch" in der Gnosis
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962).
72
Helmut Koester, for example, writes, "Further work with the documents
from Nag Hammadi will most likely confirm Bultmann's hypothesis of the
existence of a pre-Christian Jewish Gnosticism. Thus, his most controversial
hypothesis about the history of religions background of the New Testament
will be confirmed." "Early Christianity from the Perspective of the History of
Religions: Bultmann's Contribution," in Bultmann, Retrospect and Prospect, pp.
59-74; here p. 72.
Foundations of Bultmann's work 145
I have never felt uncomfortable in my critical radicalism. As a matter
of fact, I am quite comfortable in it. But I often have the impression
that my conservative colleagues in New Testament studies feel quite
uncomfortable, because I always see them engaged in salvaging
operations. I calmly let things burn, because I see tbat what is burning
is merely the imaginations and pictures produced by life of Jesus
research and that this is "Christ according to the flesh." This "Christ
according to the flesh," however, is of no concern to us.
73
But if even flesh in its objectivity is God's creature,
and if the Word of God became flesh, then Bultmann's comfort
is too easy. The more difficult road must be pursued. What is
needed for a constructive sifting of Bultmann' s legacy is thus a
more positive and more critical assessment of the Enlighten-
ment which avoids both Bultmann's demonizing and uncritical
acceptance of it. What is needed is a renewed philosophy and
theology of nature which sees nature as God's creation and as
the vessel of God's expression. Here lies the great contribution
of Hans Jonas to the discussion with Bultmann:
... the deeply religious Bultmann ... rested his whole life on the
New Testament as the revelation, but he was unable to make room for
it in theory, because he felt compelled to concede more to the
"scientific world-view" than science itself demands. Here is where I
wish to come to his aid with the means of philosophy ... More than
once I saw him in my mind raise his eyebrows skeptically, shake his
head doubtfully, and I almost hear him say now: But my friend, aren't
you speculating here? Aren't you speaking of God in the objective
mode ... Yes, 1 would reply, so be it, and would try to explain that
at some point even here one must, for the sake of thought and of
faith, dare to become objective ...
74
D
73
Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, vol. 1, p. 101.
74
Jonas, "Is Faith Still Possible?" pp. 21-22. There is a remarkable conver-
gence between Hans Jonas and Hans Urs von Balthasar in some of these
issues. Like Jonas, von Balthasar attempts to develop a renewed theology of
revelation with the help of a renewed philosophy and theology of nature. Cf.
his The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (3 vols.; San Francisco:
Ignatius, 1982-1986).