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Baltimore Police Department Independent Review Board Follow Up Response Police Involved Shooting of January 9,

Baltimore Police Department

Independent Review Board Follow Up Response

Police Involved Shooting of January 9, 2011

Final March 1, 2012

CONTENTS

Introduction

1

Club / Bar Scene in the Central District

1

1.1 Response

2

1.2 Response

3

1.3 Response

3

Plainclothes Officers

5

2.1 Response

5

2.2 Response

5

Use of Deadly Force

6

3.1 Response

6

3.2 Response

7

3.3 Response

7

Incident Management

8

4.1 Response

8

4.2 Response

9

4.3 Response

9

Criminal and Internal Investigations

11

5.1 Response………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

11

5.2 Response

12

5.3 Response

13

5.4 Response

13

5.5 Response

13

5.6 Response

13

5.7 Response

15

Police Legitimacy, Trust, and Interactions with Citizens

16

6.1

Response

16

6.2

Response

17

Conclusion

18

Appendix A: Executive Summary

A

Appendix B: Standard Operating Procedure for Response to Crowd Control Incidents

B

Appendix C: General Order J-5 “Uniformed Policing Standards”

C

Appendix D: General Order G-10 “Police Involved Shooting Incidents”

D

Appendix E: Standard Operating Procedure for Homicide Section

E

Appendix F: Standard Operating Procedure for Internal Investigation Division

F

Appendix G: Standard Operating Procedures for Education & Training Section

G

Appendix H: Standard Operating Procedure for Public Affairs Section

H

Appendix I: 2012 In-Service Training Curriculum

I

Appendix J: 2012 In-Service Training Curriculum: Select Lounge Shooting Lessons Learned

J

Appendix K: Command & Control Training: Casey Haskins

K

Appendix L: Crime Scene Photo Log Form

L

INTRODUCTION

The tragic police-involved shooting at the Select Lounge on January 9, 2011 represents a historical

and challenging point in the history of the Baltimore Police Department (BPD or Department).

circumstances of this event have challenged the Department to critically examine its internal structure and find the necessary solutions to prevent a reoccurrence of this incident. In February 2011, Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and Police Commissioner Frederick Bealefeld appointed an Independent Review Board (IRB) and charged the Board with examining the policies, procedures, and actions of the Department.

The

The IRB submitted their findings and recommendations to the BPD at the beginning of November 2011. The BPD had ninety (90) days to respond to these findings and implement the recommendations. There were six (6) major areas of concern, twenty (20) findings, and thirty- three (33) recommendations. Each recommendation was tailored to one of the six areas of identified concern: the club/bar scene in the Central District; plainclothes officers; use of deadly force; incident management; criminal and internal investigations; and police legitimacy, trust, and interaction with citizens.

In addition to implementing the recommendations of the IRB, the BPD has used the tragedy at the Select Lounge as a catalyst for a major cultural change that emphasizes professionalism within the Department. After a nationwide applicant search, the BPD hired both a new Director for the Education & Training Facility and a new Chief for the Internal Affairs Division. Each brings a tremendous level of experience and credibility and has been tasked with the responsibility of implementing many of the IRB’s recommendations. Additionally, in a further step to improve the internal policy structure, the BPD established a CALEA Unit to oversee Written Directives. This Unit is charged with updating and implementing internal policies and procedures in accordance with the Commission of Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).

The following report represents the BPD’s comprehensive response to the recommendations of the IRB. There is significant overlap with some of the recommendations, and therefore many of the newly implemented policies and practices will encompass a larger area of concern. For further clarification, please refer to the executive summary in Appendix A.

ISSUE AREA: Club / Bar Scene in the Central District

1.1 Baltimore Police Department (BPD) does not adequately engage in problem-solving for the club/bar issues in its jurisdiction.

1.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD implement problem-solving methods to better understand and address the recurring crime and disorder at problem places (bars, clubs, or other relevant locations).

1.1.2: The IRB recommends that BPD and the City of Baltimore take actions necessary to ensure that it is aware of potential problem areas before events occur.

Response:

In recognition of the challenging public safety issues associated with the large scale night clubs in the Central District, the BPD implemented a comprehensive training program for all patrol midnight shifts. In the spring of 2011, the Central District midnight shift was taken off-line and participated in a six (6) week Diamond Standard Program (DST). During these six weeks, the shift received extensive training on night club problem solving, crowd control, and incident management. Over the span of this training, the officers participated in real time, live exercises on busy Friday and Saturday nights in the Central District. Upon completion of the Central District Midnight Shift, the remaining 8 district midnight shifts also began rotating through a four week cycle of the same training program. As part of their training, these shifts participated in real time field work within the Central District. The rotation of midnight shifts through this comprehensive training cycle will conclude in April 2012.

In addition to this aggressive training timeline the Chief of Patrol, based on a recommended framework on incident management by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, has established a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Response to Crowd Control Incidents. The SOP provides members of the BPD with a framework for response to an unanticipated, spontaneous crowd control incident. The SOP details how to assess a crowd control incident, establish priorities, and create an incident action plan. Specific procedures are iterated, along with unit responsibilities and after-action reporting.

The SOP outlines a general procedure to response to crowd control incidents. Before the actual incident, supervisors should direct patrol officers to gather intelligence in reference to potential crowd size and characteristics. Once crowd assessment has been completed, operational priorities should be examined, such as any immediate threats to the general public, dispersal of the crowd, crime scene preservation and collection of evidence, and the restoration of order. The first member to arrive on the scene of a crowd control incident becomes the Incident Commander (IC) until he/she is relieved by another member of higher rank. The Incident Commander determines what resources are needed and prepares a basic incident action plan based on the assessment of the situation and incident priorities. In order to prevent individual officers and supervisors from initiating random, uncoordinated actions in which no strategic purposes are served, the IC must always provide a plan of action to unite and direct all response efforts during the incident. After the request for enforcement has been made, responding personnel will report to a staging area where they are briefed on the incident action plan and assigned deployment duties. Once the incident has been resolved, the IC directs personnel to respond back to the staging area, notifies Senior Command that the situation has been resolved, and begins the collection of after-action reporting.

The entire SOP for Response to Crowd Control Incidents can be found in Appendix B.

1.2 BPD does not have formal oversight of outside promoters for clubs/bars in the city.

1.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD seek to implement a permitting program for club promoters.

Response:

The BPD is currently in the process of proposing legislation to establish licensing and enforcement procedures for large “entertainment venues” and “promoters.” The Baltimore City Legislative Reference Section is presently drafting this proposal for presentation to the Mayor and City Council. The Chief of Patrol’s Office will be working with city agencies to ensure that BPD is functioning in a proactive manner with respect to larger entertainment venues and promoted events. The BPD is encouraging participation from the Health Department, Housing, the Fire Department, and partnership will also be sought with the Liquor Board. Representatives from these agencies will work with the Chief of Patrol’s Office on licensing issues, occupancy/zoning, permits, application processing, security plans, enforcement, and administrative follow through as it pertains to “entertainment” venues. All venues that wish to have entertainment will also need to obtain a Live Entertainment license. It is proposed that with larger scale events of 150 or more people or those with 100 or more persons under 21, venues will be required to provide two weeks advance notification to the BPD to ensure that proper security measures are in place. This is also designed to ensure that patrol resources are allocated and schedules adjusted as necessary. A detailed security plan and liability insurance coverage for the venue is also included in the proposal. It is recommended that violations be referred to the Environmental Control Board for administrative hearings.

The BPD is also in the process of implementing a new tracking mechanism for club related incidents. Previously generated reports did not allow the BPD to correctly determine whether incidents were directly related to club activity. The new database provides club locations, along with the owner’s contact information and capacity limitations and creates an improved mechanism for the tracking of calls and incidents that occur at the club address. It also allows for the tracking of specific promoters. Additionally, the BPD’s Vice Unit is monitoring social media websites to better track club events in the city and disseminate relevant intelligence to patrol and operations.

1.3 Current Baltimore City crowd control training that is provided in the police academy and during in-service training does not prepare officers for intervention in club/bar disorder.

1.3.1: The IRB recommends that BPD training reflect operational realities (i.e., club and bar response) and that officers, first-line supervisors, and commanders follow protocol and training when responding to club scenes.

1.3.2 The IRB recommends that a formal evaluation of the “Diamond Standard Training Program” be

conducted with respect to the crowd control situations that frequently occur in the Central District.

1.3.3

The IRB recommends that BPD conduct regular deployment and tactical exercises for both in-

service officers and new recruits in the academy.

1.3.4 The IRB recommends that BPD also engage in training to prevent recurring problems at clubs

and bars.

Response:

In addition to the training program described above (see Response 1.1), the BPD’s Education and Training Section, after an internal evaluation of the Diamond Standard Training Program, initiated a training curriculum on crowd control for both entry- level and current police officers in the spring of 2011. This program includes classroom lecture and practical exercises, conducted on both small and large group scales. The training also focuses on critical problem solving for supervisors based on the specific crowd dynamics. To further expand upon this foundation the Department has incorporated crowd control training into the 2012 In-Service Training Program. During 2012 In- Service Training, patrol squads and shifts will attend training together and participate as a team in crowd control management.

In addition to a standard level of crowd control training for all members of the Department, the BPD has also instituted an in-depth and more specialized training curriculum for the Special Operations Section (SOS). The SOS has been identified internally as the primary response unit for disorderly crowds, demonstrations and protest groups. Starting in fall of 2011, the SOS began regularly participating in live crowd control exercises with a concentrated focus on problem solving and critical decision making. In January 2012, the SOS implemented the tenets of this specialized training during operational deployment for the Occupy Baltimore Movement.

Also incorporated in the 2012 In-Service Training Program is an instructional course on the “Lessons Learned from the Select Lounge Incident.” This training program will facilitate a discussion on the overlapping events and conditions that culminated in the tragedy at the Select Lounge. Specific focus will be placed on understanding and implementing the recommendations of the IRB. Over the course of the year, the entire BPD Command Staff will rotate through the facilitation of this program.

Additionally, in February of 2012 the entire Command Staff within the Department participated in an Incident Management Training Program. The focus of this program was critical decision making at the command level during highly stressful, critical incidents. Command members participated in an assortment of practical field exercises that reinforced the application of a strategic plan for mitigating critical incidents.

The entire In-Service Curriculum can be found in Appendix I, while a summary of the lessons learned from the Select Lounge shooting is detailed in Appendix J.

ISSUE AREA: Plainclothes Officers

2.1 Current BPD policy regarding plainclothes policing is not specific in describing when such attire is necessary for a police purpose. (see response on page 5)

2.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD carefully evaluate and rewrite policy permitting plainclothes

officers to respond to non-life-threatening situations, in light of the danger and risks associated with plainclothes policing.

2.1.2 The IRB recommends that BPD develop a policy that comprehensively addresses the roles and

responsibilities of officers who are operating in plainclothes.

2.1.3 The IRB recommends that BPD weigh the need for plainclothes officers with the dangers and lack

of flexibility for other assignments and response to calls for assistance, and make adjustments as necessary.

2.2 The majority of witnesses-civilian and police-did not recognize Officer Torbit as a police officer.

2.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD policy require that officers in plainclothes verbally announce that

they are police when taking enforcement action.

2.2.2 The IRB recommends that when BPD officers respond to any incident that may require

enforcement action, all plainclothes officers wear outermost garments that clearly identify them as police officer on front and back (i.e., yellow raid jackets or ballistic outer vests that say “POLICE” in high-visibility letters).

2.2.3 The IRB recommends that BPD badge(s) be firmly affixed to the officer’s outermost garment.

Response:

Immediately after the Select Lounge Incident, the Police Commissioner ordered all officers assigned to the Patrol Division, including the District Operations Sections, to wear the uniform.

Subsequently, the Violent Crime Impact Section was ordered to wear the Departmentally issued tactical vest covers with the words “POLICE” clearly printed on the front and back as the outer most

garment.

Policing Standards,” on the requirements of working while not in a uniform. of this new policy are as follows:

The BPD has since established a formal policy, within General Order J5 “Uniformed

The relevant dictates

Research shows that officers not working in uniform have a greater potential to find themselves in dangerous confrontations because of the lack of identification.

Sworn members assigned to the Patrol Division will wear the Departmental uniform and are not authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity.

The Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) will determine which units in CID are authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity.

Any member authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity when engaged in proactive enforcement actions such as arrests, neighborhood patrols, and car stop/field identification

initiatives must wear the tactical vest cover with the words “POLICE” clearly printed on the front and back as the outer most garment. The member’s Departmental Badge must be affixed to this tactical vest cover. This specific requirement meets CALEA standard 41.3.6.

Any member authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity will be required to attend a mandatory training developed by the Commanding Officer of the Violent Crime Impact Section.

Non-uniformed officers will not engage in crowd control.

Non-uniformed officers will not take enforcement action within a crowd unless there is potential for imminent death or serious injury.

The policy also stipulates that when arriving on the scene of a tactical situation, all officers regardless of assignment or status are required to report to an assigned staging area for a briefing

and deployment by the incident commander.

non-uniformed capacity becomes involved in a circumstance requiring immediate enforcement action, they are required to broadcast through police communications their location along with their physical and clothing description.

Additionally, in the event that an officer working in a

It should be noted that during the Select Lounge Incident, Officer Torbit was working in a non- uniformed capacity assigned to a Central District Operations Unit. Under this new policy structure, all district operations units are assigned to exclusively work in uniform and all non-uniformed officers are restricted from responding to crowd control type incidents.

This entire policy can be found in Appendix C.

ISSUE AREA: Use of deadly force

3.1 Officer Torbit’s tactics and safety were compromised when he took law enforcement action without backup. This action (while he was wearing plainclothes) contributed to the life-threatening situation where he used lethal force to stop the assault.

3.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD policy dictate that officers do not take enforcement action in crowds without backup, especially when dressed in plainclothes.

Response:

As previously noted (see Response 2.1, 2.2), General Order J5 “Uniformed Policing Standards” now restricts officers working in a non-uniformed capacity from engaging in crowd control. Additionally, officers not in uniform are directed not to take any enforcement action in a crowd unless there is the potential of imminent death or serious injury. In these limited circumstances, non-uniformed officers are required to notify, via police radio, the Communications Section their location and provide their physical and clothing description.

The policy also provides specific guidelines for encounters between uniformed and non-uniformed officers. If a non-uniformed officer is challenged by other members of law enforcement, they are

directed to immediately identify themselves as a police officer, giving their name, assignment and sequence number. They will obey all orders to disarm themselves and assume non-threatening positions.

This General Order will be taught in entry-level training, in-service training, sergeant’s school, and lieutenant’s school during 2012. Additionally, all officers authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity will be required to attend a training session provided by the Commanding Officer of the Violent Crime Impact Section. This training will focus on application of the policies defined under General Order J5 and provide scenario based exercises to reinforce the responsibilities of working in a non-uniformed capacity.

The entire order can be found in Appendix C.

3.2 Officer Torbit’s use of deadly force was within policy (with important qualifications).

3.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD evaluate training for use of deadly force in civilian crowd

situations and that BPD place stronger emphasis on prevention and tactics to minimize the incidences

where deadly force might be needed.

3.2.2 The IRB recommends that both academy and in-service training emphasize the circumstances

that may lead to the use of deadly force, focusing not only on the analysis of BPD's own data, but also

on other police departments’ successful approaches to lethal force training.

3.3 The four uniformed officers' use of deadly force was within policy (with important qualifications).

3.3.1 The IRB recommends that BPD enhance its training on firearms and use of lethal force to

emphasize assessing situations, making informed judgments, and finding alternatives to lethal force

other than reflexive shooting.

Response:

The BPD has enhanced its entire training structure to re-emphasize cognitive decision making in potential lethal force situations. Recruits and senior officers are taught to evaluate potential threats, make judgments, and find potential alternatives to deadly force, each of which are important components within the new training structure.

In aftermath of the Select Lounge Incident, the BPD invested in a state-of-the-art electronic judgmental shooting system, called the TI Shooting Simulator. This system provides a realistic interactive encounter where officers must quickly make critical decisions within intense and stressful scenarios. These scenarios can be modified by the staff controller, dependent upon how the officers work through each situation. Each instructional period includes a one-on-one

discussion with emphasis given to proper decision making under stressful conditions. Within each

scenario, there is emphasis placed on use of force continuum.

In 2012, all officers within the

Department along with all recruits in the Police Academy will participate in exercises on the TI Shooting Simulator.

Additionally, both in In-Service and recruit training, all officers will participate in a firearms training curriculum that focuses on Excited Delirium, Police on Police Friendly Fire, and Live Fire Cognitive Shooting. These programs will be facilitated through practical exercises by the Department’s Firearms Training Staff.

In the concentrated effort to reinforce cognitive judgment training in the field, the BPD has also established a Mobile Training Unit. On a daily basis, this Mobile Training Unit responds to specific patrol districts and works with patrol officers in practical exercises. To create the most realistic environment possible, these practical exercises are conducted within role playing scenarios, in real

street locations, using “simunition” weapons.

evaluating potential threats and applying judgment in stressful situations. The Department believes that the continual reinforcement by the Mobile Training Unit within these practical field exercises is an essential component to improve cognitive judgment in critical incidents.

Within this training environment, officers practice

Additionally, the Department has instituted a new policy in General Order G10 that requires all officers involved in shooting incidents to participate in an after-action training program. The purpose of the after-action training program is to evaluate the circumstances of the incident from a training perspective and assess an officer’s readiness to return to work. The program is designed to reinforce confidence in cognitive decision making after a stressful incident.

The curriculum for this training can be found in Appendix I and lesson plans are available upon request.

ISSUE AREA: Incident Management

4.1 The call for any free units to respond to the scene created a mass, decentralized response, making it difficult to organize the officers into squads for assignments and to expedite dispersal of the agitated crowd.

4.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD develop, test, and implement a strategic plan for incident response in club/bar situations. Strategic and tactical incident response plans should be based on rigorous analysis and lessons learned from prior incidents.

Response:

In January 2012, the BPD contracted with Casey P. Haskins, an experienced leader with expertise in the areas of strategy and planning, decision making processes, leadership development, managing risk, and sharing information. Haskins provided all BPD Command members with enhanced command and control training, which focused on core command and control principles, resource deployment, incident assessment, effective decision making, communication, and after action review.

Command members participated in a five day, forty (40) hour training program that used a combination of seminar, classroom exercises, and field exercises. Command members were required to solve problems of increasing difficulty, reflect on their decisions, and adjust future behaviors as necessary. Emphasis was placed on encouraging participants to recalibrate their basic intuitions and to think thoroughly through each problem that is presented. In addition to learning basic command and control techniques, commanders were trained in how to teach their subordinates the concepts as well. Commanders were trained to identify potential critical flash points, and participated in “summarizing the situation” drills. They also were advised on the commander’s activities and planning during command and control situations, as well as allowing for flexibility in the event. Commanders were also trained on communicating orders, tracking resources, delegating responsibility, and how to handle multiple priorities.

Upon conclusion of the training, each command member will have the knowledge and ability to:

Explain the practical requirements and tradeoffs associated with controlling forces during stressful, ambiguous situations

Make sense of confusing situations and identify appropriate police actions

Control forces effectively in both preplanned and unexpected incidents

Lead after-action reviews that promote the organization’s learning

Identify opportunities to incorporate training into ongoing operations

In conjunction with the command and control training, the Chief of Patrol has implemented a SOP that addresses crowd disorder and appropriate response. The SOP dictates certain aspects of the situation, such as the role of the on-scene supervisor, the activation of a staging area, the identification of a command post, any additional resources needed, and the creation of an incident action plan.

Please refer to Appendix K for Casey P. Haskins’ resume and a summary of the Command and Control Training. Please refer to Appendix B for the entire Crowd Control SOP.

4.2 Less than half of the responding BPD officers reported to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which made tracking and managing the officers more difficult, despite General Orders requiring units to identify themselves as they responded to the scene. (see response on page 10)

4.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD enforce the existing CAD system policy for command and control

and officer safety.

4.3 The breakdown of response to the Select Lounge incident was, in large part, the result of failure to establish incident command, as trained by BPD. (see response on page 10)

4.3.1 The IRB recommends that BPD update standard operating procedures for incident management

and incorporate the International Association of Chiefs of Police model policies for incident management.

4.3.2

The IRB recommends that BPD develop established protocols for club closures and other similar

events, as well as have the incident commander assign roles and responsibilities to the responding officers.

4.3.3 The IRB recommends that BPD conduct additional incident management training and practice

incident command and scenario based exercises, as well as review and revise existing training policies and procedures.

Response:

The Commanding Officer of the Communications Section, in conjunction with the Chief of Patrol, have implemented procedures to remind officers to call 10-23 “on the scene” upon arrival to calls for service. Dispatchers now routinely instruct officers of their responsibilities to call 10-23. Dispatchers have been reminded to complete the 10-23 field in CAD as soon as possible. The Commanding Officer of the Communication Section is regularly auditing the CAD system to ensure compliance with this directive.

To expand upon the management of on-scene arrivals, the BPD has drafted a SOP in response to

crowd control incidents. The SOP provides a framework in which sworn members design an Incident Action Plan tailored to crowd control incidents, including club closures and similar events. The SOP is centralized around Command and Control principles, based upon the International Association of Chiefs of Police model policy for incident management. Additionally, the SOP outlines how commanders can delegate subordinates to assess crowds using surveillance and intelligence gathering techniques. Based on information gathered, commanders will make command and control decisions utilizing the SOP. The plan outlines measures for the maintenance of an orderly response, clearly defined command structure, a command post with incident commander present, as well as the development of an incident action plan. If a crowd becomes complex and outside resources are requested, members will respond to the designated staging

area.

deployment. Incident priorities are predicated on protection of life, officer safety, incident

stabilization, maintenance of public order and crime scene preservation. In an effort to maintain

effective communications, commanders will request a designated channel.

eliminates radio interference that is common on the primary channels during large scale operations. The plan clearly defines the commander’s roles and responsibilities, as well as command and control principles for mitigating incidents involving spontaneously large numbers of people.

Upon arrival, members will be provided with an incident summary and clear direction before

This procedure

The entire SOP can be found in Appendix B.

ISSUE AREA: Criminal and Internal Investigations

5.1 The inability to conduct accurate ballistics analysis on the shots fired made it impossible for the firearms examiner to determine who fired the shots that struck Officer Torbit and Sean Gamble.

5.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD conduct further research into the costs and benefits of the Glock weapons and consider using alternate weapons or some modification to the barrels to ensure accountability in the future.

Response:

Bullets fired from conventional Glock pistols are problematic to forensically identify. Polygonal/hexagonal barrel rifling utilizing the “hammer forging” method does not normally impart individual characteristics enabling the forensic identification of fired bullets. Glock has been working on solutions to this issue, and offer the optional “EBIS” Enhanced Bullet Identification System barrel which is restricted to law enforcement use only. According to published literature 1 this option creates a barrel “signature” by creating gross lines down the length of the barrel on the lands of the rifling. These gross lines vary in width, depth, and spatial relationship, similar to a barcode. Small imperfections in the depths of these gross lines also appear to have an impact on the appearance of the land engravings on the fired bullets. Durability testing has been conducted by various groups (including Miami Dade County) testing the reproducibility of the signature markings after enduring the firing of many (250-10,000) rounds of ammunition. Results showed that the gross lines endured, but that finer lines faded. This disparity reduces the chances of identifying GLOCK bullets by a sufficient correspondence of individual characteristics when more temporally removed; however, the manufacturing method lends itself to imparting class characteristics in temporally adjacent bullets which can aid in differentiating one Glock bullet from another in a “limited universe” situation.

The articles indicate that in a “limited universe” situation, where a number of Glocks of the same caliber are involved in the same shooting incident, the EBIS barrel option would be beneficial in the elimination but not necessarily the identification of the guns involved. In other words, it would be more likely that the guns that did not fire the suspect bullet could be eliminated. There may or may not be sufficient individual markings on the suspect bullet to determine if it was fired by a specific gun to the exclusion to all others.

1 Carolyn E. Martinez, Corpus Christi Police Department Forensic Services Laboratory, Corpus Christi, Texas, GLOCK’s Signature Barrel – Durability of the EBIS Markings, AFTE Journal--Volume 41 Number 4--Fall

2009

Thomas G. Fadul Jr., Ph.D., Laboratory Manager, Miami-Dade Police Department, An Empirical Study to Evaluate the Repeatability and Uniqueness of Striations/Impressions Imparted on Consecutively Manufactured Glock EBIS Gun Barrels, AFTE Journal--Volume 43 Number 1--Winter 2011

At this time, the cost conversion for the BPD to GLOCKS with an EBIS barrel option is financially prohibitive. The Department will re-examine the possibility of switching to this type of GLOCK in the future as additional funds become available.

5.2 BPD did not establish a photo log of the crime scene.

5.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD closely examine its practices regarding crime scene processing

and follow best practices.

Response:

Mobile Unit crime scene practices have been recently updated. A new technical manual was published in June 2011 that formalized the training requirements and procedures used. This latest version expands Mobile Unit’s documentation process, instituting new requirements, including the creation of notes in the field for submission with the final report.

A new form and procedure has been outlined regarding photo log creation, and is currently undergoing review prior to addition into the technical manual. The form would be completed by the Crime Laboratory Technician, using a photo contact page as reference during record creation. The current implementation plan indicates that we expect to add the procedure to the technical manual in the next update, currently scheduled for April 2012. A proposed switch to digital photography may require further procedure adjustment and a first meeting was held toward this switch with the State’s Attorney’s Office on November 18, 2011. Implementation issues were discussed, including the database software needed to insure authentication and verification. Further meetings will be held to map out a coherent strategy that will ensure a smooth implementation plan in the future. In addition to photo log documentation, the BPD has tested two different types of crime scene reconstruction software, one of which was determined to be preferred, and the Crime Laboratory Section is also researching a new panoramic camera solution.

The new crime scene photo log form can be found in Appendix L.

5.3 BPD's reporting process for a police-involved shooting incident is confusing, making it difficult to determine whether officers followed proper procedures. (see response on page

13)

5.3.1

The IRB recommends that BPD’s current reporting policy regarding the use of force in police-

involved shootings be re-examined and updated to call for Use of Force Reports from both the officers involved and from their first-in-line supervisors—in every case.

5.4 BPD did not regularly conduct analysis of the use of force at the time of the incident, resulting in a continued lack of understanding about police-related shootings. (see response on page 13)

5.4.1 The IRB recommends that BPD establish regular and proactive systems to examine and update

information and analyze patterns in police use of force.

5.5 BPD’s current practice of deferring an internal investigation until after the homicide investigation and the State’s Attorney's ruling in officer-involved shooting incidents unnecessarily delays the Department’s ability to fulfill its responsibility to determine compliance with policy or any policy shortcomings. (see response on page 13)

5.5.1 The IRB recommends that BPD conduct the criminal and internal investigations in parallel for

officer involved shooting situations.

5.5.2: The IRB recommends that the Internal Investigation Division (IID) interview the BPD officers who used lethal force during the January 9, 2011 incident and conduct a systematic investigation into all the actions at the scene leading up to the use of lethal force to determine compliance with existing policies.

5.6 BPD investigators did not interview the officers who used lethal force; instead, the officers involved in the incident prepared brief, formal memos summarizing their roles in the incident and did not provide specific details regarding their decisions to use lethal force.

5.6.1 The IRB recommends that if the BPD Homicide investigator is prohibited from interviewing the

officers because of the assertion of constitutional protections, IID should interview the officers within 48 hours and compel their response under authority of Garrity v. New Jersey (1967).

Response:

As recommended by the IRB to ensure that specific details of this event were captured, the involved officers gave prepared statements to the Homicide Detectives in February and March 2011. Those statements were reviewed by detectives from Internal Investigation Division and were compared with witness statements and interviews to investigate and evaluate the involved officers’ actions. Based on the handling of this incident, the BPD has established new procedures governing the investigation of police officer involved shooting incidents.

The BPD’s response to findings 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 details a clear, concise message of how a member is to provide a report on the incident he or she was involved in. General Order G10 “Police Involved Shooting Incidents” was recently redeveloped to reflect a more efficient way of reporting situations involving uses of force with a firearm. This order applies to incidents involving the death or injury of an officer or the death or injury to a citizen by police gunfire, as well as the intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer. Any use of force must be reasonable and must be properly documented.

Officers are required to immediately notify the Communications Section and their Command when a firearm is intentionally discharged or if the officer is a victim of an assault that involves the discharge of a firearm. These notifications must be made regardless of member’s duty status or the location where the discharge occurred. The member must ensure adequate medical resources are requested for any injured person, remain on the scene until a permanent rank supervisor arrives, and immediately notify the proper law enforcement agency if the discharge occurs off duty.

A team with representatives from different units of the Department will be made available 24/7 to respond to any officer involved shooting incidents. The Police Involved Shooting Team (POIS Team) consists of the Homicide Section Supervisor, to conduct the criminal investigation; the Internal Investigations Division Supervisor, to determine compliance with departmental rules and regulations; the Education and Training Section Firearms Supervisor to examine any and all training issues surrounding the incident and to implement training needs for the involved officers; and the Crime Laboratory Section technician to process all evidence and ensure timely results of any and all examinations; and a representative from the Public Affairs Section to ensure the timely and accurate dissemination of facts to the public. These criminal and administrative investigations are conducted during a parallel period of time. Each section of the team is required to compose a SOP that outlines individual responsibilities.

For future police involved shooting incidents, the Commanding Officer of the Homicide Section will solicit a voluntary statement from the involved officers as soon as practical, based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, the Chief, Internal Investigation Division, and the Division Chief of Homicide from the State’s Attorney’s Office will confer prior to compelling a statement from the involved officers in accordance with the Law Enforcement Officers Bill Of Rights (LEOBR). As a general guideline this compelled statement should occur within 30 days of the incident, if a voluntary statement is not provided by the officer. In observance of the statutory protections afforded to officers, Homicide detectives may not observe or have access to the compelled statements given to the Internal Investigation Division; however the Internal Investigation Division detectives may observe or have access to the voluntary statements given to the Homicide Section. All statements, whether voluntary or compelled, shall be tape recorded and/or videotaped. Once the investigations have concluded, the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division will submit a comprehensive Criminal Investigation Summary Report to the Police Commissioner. The submission of this report will take place within forty-five (45) days of the incident.

Upon completion of the investigations, the BPD has also created additional mechanisms for the evaluation of the incidents. Regular data tracking and analysis is set to take place through the creation of a database, which includes incident information and logistics; the involved officers, witnesses, and suspects; investigator information; associated cases; and location history. The logistics of the initial incident will be captured, but after the After Action Review Board convenes (see Response 5.7), additional information will be added regarding the important components of the case. The BPD’s Planning & Research Section will be responsible for compiling statistics on police involved shootings. The number of police involved shootings will be tracked by year to produce historical analysis, in addition to breaking out the shootings by category. The number of shots fired, both by the officer and citizen, will also be analyzed. Additionally, the types of incidents leading up to the shootings will be tracked. This information will be disseminated through the department and used in a proactive manner to aid in the prevention of any unjustified use of force incidents.

The revised General Order can be found in Appendix D. The Homicide Division’s SOP can be found in Appendix E, the Internal Investigations Division’s SOP can be found in Appendix F, the Education

and Training Section’s SOP can be found in Appendix G, and the Public Affairs Section’s SOP can be found in Appendix H. The Crime Laboratory’s SOP from the technical manual is available upon request.

5.7 BPD’s policies and procedures provide for a Firearms Discharging and Assault Review Board; however, the Department has not convened the Review Board in several years.

5.7.1 The IRB recommends that BPD activate a Lethal Force Review Board to conduct a systematic

review of any police-involved shooting, using both the Homicide and IID investigations.

5.7.2 The IRB recommends that BPD initiate an after-action review, incident reconstruction, and

analysis for all lethal force incidents.

Response:

The BPD recognizes the necessity of conducting a systematic review of police-involved shootings incidents and has detailed the organization of the After Action Review Board in General Order G10 “Police Involved Shooting Incidents.” Since November 1, 2011 the After Action Review Board has convened two times to review police involved shootings. The After Action Review Board consists of representation from the Office of the Police Commissioner, the Operations and Administrative Bureaus, Chief of Patrol, Criminal Investigations Division, Legal Affairs, Education and Training, Planning and Research, and the involved member’s Commanding Officer.

The After Action Review Board convenes as the result of any police involved shooting resulting in injury or death within thirty (30) days of the incident. Commanding Officers from the Homicide Section, Education and Training Section, and Internal Investigations Division all brief the Board members on details regarding the incident. Backgrounds and previous assignments for the investigators are presented to the group before moving into the details of the case. The 911 call is played for the Board and a synopsis of the incident is presented, including the criminal history of the suspect. Photographs of the scene and a timeline of events are reconstructed to determine whether any actions were in violation of policy. In addition to the reconstruction of the incident, the backgrounds of the involved officer(s) and witnessing officer(s) are detailed, as well as any statements they have provided. Internal Investigations detectives provide an internal history of the involved officer and detail any previous areas of concern. Education and Training Section representatives also analyze the training and the use of the firearm by the officer.

Collectively the Board examines the use of police tactics and the precipitating events that led to the use of force, and evaluates revision of training and/or practice. The analysis by the Board of the two (2) incidents has proven very beneficial to the Department. Each member has provided recommendations with regard to improving police policy and training, which ultimately helps the BPD better serve the citizens of Baltimore.

The composition and purpose of the review board is detailed in Appendix D.

ISSUE AREA: Police Legitimacy, Trust, and Interactions with Citizens

6.1 Some officers at the scene spoke to victims and witnesses rudely, in a matter unbefitting professional policing.

6.1.1 The IRB recommends that BPD consider incorporating into its academy, into its in-service curriculum, and into the Commissioner’s general memos to the force, specific training and reminders about communication and interpersonal skills, procedural justice, and community trust.

Response:

The BPD consistently strives to hold members to the highest level of professional integrity. Much of this is judged through the BPD’s interaction with citizens and the community’s perception of police. To create an increased trust in police among citizens, community engagement is being stressed at roll calls, In-Service training, and during the Comstat process.

In 2012, additional emphasis is being placed on entry- level recruits’ ability to communicate with the public. Classroom instruction and role playing are supplemented by street assignments. During these street assignments the recruits are specifically directed to engage the public in polite and

respectful conversation. In addition, a ninety (90) minute session on lessons learned from the Select Lounge shooting is being incorporated into training on the academy side. Part of the class discussion focuses on understanding of the power of words and tone when dealing with a

potentially unruly crowd. professionalism.

Each of the trainings places emphasis on police legitimacy and

Interpersonal Communications training will be also provided to all patrol sergeants in 2012. Highlights from the two-day course include: Verbal Communication; Non-Verbal Communication; Cultural Awarness and Community Engagement. Lessons will involve classroom discussions with community memebers and victim advocacy groups as well as in-field practical exercises. This “Train-the-Trainer” course will result in the sergeants providing training to patrol officers in their specific units. This methodology reinforces the sergeant’s role as a trainer of his subordinates. In the CID training school, investigators will also receive training on how to effectively communicate with citizens through presentation by actual victims of crime.

In addition to incorporating these elements into training, other units are emphasizing the importance of professional policing. The new Chief of IID, Grayling Williams, has already engaged the community since beginning his new role. Chief Williams will be attending community meetings to communicate his thoughts on police misconduct and police corruption. Chief Williams has also contacted each member of City Council to assure them of his commitment to honesty and professionalism in the BPD, as well as his availability to attend meetings. He also plans is attending recruit and in-service training to speak on the importance of maintaining integrity as a police officer in the BPD.

Emphasis on community engagement is also taking place in the Administrative Bureau. A Victims Assistance Unit has been created to specifically follow up with victims of robberies and burglaries. The BPD is also in the planning phase of developing a Citizens Police Academy. Within the Citizens

Police Academy, community members will experience and interact with several aspects of the BPD,

from administrative to operational functions.

houses for community members and has experienced positive feedback from neighborhood

associations and representatives attending these events.

Finally, the BPD continues to host regular open

The In-Service curriculum can be found in Appendix I, while the detailed ninety minute training presentation can be found in Appendix J.

6.2 Significant delays in an IID investigation can have a direct effect on community perceptions and can ultimately undermine community trust in the Baltimore Police Department.

6.2.1 The IRB recommends that BPD review its procedures for public communications in officer- involved shooting investigations.

Response:

The BPD strives to communicate with citizens as quickly as possible with regard to officer-involved shootings. Prior to any public release regarding officer-involved shootings, all information must be verified by division commanders and forwarded to the Office of the Police Commissioner.

The Public Affairs Section has created a SOP with regard to the dissemination of information

regarding police involved shootings. In reference to the release of information, the Director of the Public Affairs Section is the only employee of the BPD, other than the Police Commissioner, authorized to speak with or release information to any media outlet. The Director of Public Affairs, or assigned designee, will respond to the scene of a police-involved shooting incident and ensure

that any information is verified as factual.

statement of facts related to the incident will be given. The number of officer(s) and victim(s) involved will be communicated, as well as their age, gender, rank, and unit of assignment. Forty- eight (48) hours after the police-involved shooting, the BPD will then release the identity of the officer involved, as well as additional details on the incident, if applicable. In cases of fatal police- involved shootings, the identities of the victim(s) are made available after next of kin notifications.

Once a media staging area has been assembled, a brief

As referenced in the General Order G10 “Police Involved Shooting Incidents,” the Homicide Division and Internal Investigations Division will launch concurrent investigations into the incident and the After Action Review Board examines further details of the incident. Upon completion of the criminal and internal investigations, the Homicide Section’s case file pertaining to the incident shall be made available to the general public and news media in accordance with the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA).

The entire Public Affairs Office SOP can be found in Appendix H.

CONCLUSION

The Baltimore Police Department has achieved incredible advancement in the reduction of crime, reducing both homicides and non-fatal shooting to thirty (30) year lows. However, despite this significant success, the lessons of the Select Lounge are a powerful reminder that the Department must remain committed to improving both professionalism and community confidence.

It has been over one (1) year since the tragic death of Officer William Torbit. During this past year the Department has been dedicated to establishing new policies and better practices to help prevent the occurrence of a future tragedy. With the assistance of the IRB, the Department has redefined the investigation process for police involved shooting, created a new structure for managing crowds and implemented an aggressive training curriculum that emphasizes decision making, incident management and communication.

The Department remains dedicated to maintaining the highest levels of integrity and dedication. The IRB's recommendations have been fully implemented by the Department with great confidence that they will build a foundation for organizational growth and enhanced public trust.

APPENDIX A

Executive Summary

A

Executive summary

In the early morning hours of January 9, 2011, Baltimore City police responded to Select Lounge, located at the corner of Franklin and North Paca Streets in the Central Police District, for crowd control and dispersal operations due to disorderly conduct and numerous fights at the location. Upon arrival, on-scene officers’ initial request for additional units was ended shortly thereafter by a 10-32(sufficient units on scene).

However, soon after the “10-32,” the Central District Duty Commander who was on the scene radioed for any free units to respond and assist in closing the club. Over 30 officers responded and began their attempts to control and disperse the crowd. With so many officers responding from a number of different units, managing the incident became difficult, especially after the Central District Commander failed to coordinate and assign units to specific tactical duties or to quickly establish an incident command structure. The lack of overall incident management of an agitated crowd placed the responding officers at risk and contributed to an increasingly chaotic situation.

This risk escalated as officers in plainclothes began responding to the scene without a crowd-control strategy in place and without the establishment of an incident command center to direct and control the increasingly complex police operation. Officer William Torbit was on duty in plainclothes that night and responded to the scene minutes after the District Commander’s call was placed for all available units. Officer Torbit began to assist in dispersing the crowd in the parking lot and, in the process, intervened in an altercation in the lot. This altercation led to a fight between Officer Torbit and several of the club patrons, with a number of individuals punching and pushing him to the ground. Apparently unable to get up and finding himself assaulted and stomped by 6-8 individuals, Officer Torbit drew his gun and fired to stop the attack against him. Four uniformed officers rushed into the area of the fight and, not recognizing Officer Torbit, fired at him. After 6 seconds and 42

rounds discharged, the shooting ended, and the uniformed officers quickly realized they had shot a plainclothes police officer. In addition, one of the individuals assaulting Officer Torbit—Sean Gamble—was also shot and killed (likely by Torbit, himself), and four other persons (including a uniformed officer) were wounded. All of the rounds fired were by Officer Torbit and four uniformed officers.

The City of Baltimore Mayor’s Office and the Police Commissioner tasked the Independent Review Board (IRB) with examining this police-involved shooting. The Mayor’s Office and the Police Commissioner also asked the IRB to review crowd-control techniques, use of lethal force, deployment of incident command, and the homicide investigation. Appendix A provides a copy of the charge letter with a complete list of tasks for the IRB to complete. CNA was contracted to support the IRB in this process, though the IRB members, themselves, served without compensation.

Methodology

The IRB met seven times between March and September 2011 to deliberate on the incident of January 9, 2011. Because the IRB was charged with reviewing all of the materials available to them from the incident, as well as department policies and practices, CNA assisted the IRB by compiling this material. CNA provided research, analytic, writing, and editing support; scheduled and recorded the contents of meetings; and provided other support when needed.

Summary of findings

The IRB has made 20 findings and 33 recommendations, which are summarized in the table below.

Table 1. Summary of findings and recommendations

Issue Areas

 

Findings

 

Recommendations

1. Club/bar scene

1.1

Baltimore Police Department

1.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

in the Central

(BPD) does not adequately engage in problem-solving for the club/bar issues in its jurisdiction.

implement problem-solving methods to better understand and address the recurring crime and disorder at problem places (bars, clubs, or other relevant locations).

1.1.2: The IRB recommends that BPD and the City of Baltimore take actions necessary to ensure that it is aware of potential problem areas before events occur.

District

 

1.2 BPD does not have formal oversight of outside promoters for clubs/bars in the city.

1.2.1: The IRB recommends that BPD seek to implement a permitting program for club promoters.

1.3

Current Baltimore City crowd-

1.3.1: The IRB recommends that BPD training reflect operational realities (i.e., club and bar response) and that officers, first-line supervisors, and commanders follow protocol and training when responding to club scenes.

control training that is provided in the police academy and during in- service training does not prepare officers for intervention in club/bar disorder.

1.3.2

The IRB recommends that a

formal evaluation of the “Diamond Standard” program be conducted with respect to the crowd control situations that frequently occur in the Central District.

1.3.3

The IRB recommends that BPD

conduct regular deployment and tactical exercises for both in-service officers and new recruits in the academy.

1.3.4

The IRB recommends that BPD

also engage in training to prevent recurring problems at clubs and bars.

Issue Areas

 

Findings

 

Recommendations

2. Plainclothes

2.1

Current BPD policy regarding

2.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

officers

plainclothes policing is not specific in describing when such attire is necessary for a police purpose.

carefully evaluate and rewrite policy permitting plainclothes officers to respond to non-life-threatening situations, in light of the danger and risks associated with plainclothes policing.

2.1.2

The IRB recommends that BPD

develop a policy that comprehensively addresses the roles and responsibilities of officers who are operating in plainclothes.

2.1.3

The IRB recommends that BPD

weigh the need for plainclothes officers with the dangers and lack of

flexibility for other assignments and response to calls for assistance, and make adjustments as necessary.

2.2

The majority of witnesses—

2.2.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

civilian and police—did not recognize Officer Torbit as a police officer.

policy require that officers in plainclothes verbally announce that they are police when taking enforcement action.

2.2.2

The IRB recommends that when

BPD officers respond to any incident that may require enforcement action, all plainclothes officers wear outermost garments that clearly identify them as police officers on front and back (i.e., yellow raid jackets or ballistic outer vests that say "POLICE" in high-visibility letters).

2.2.3

The IRB recommends that BPD

badges be firmly affixed to the officer’s outermost garment.

3. Use of deadly

3.1

Officer Torbit’s tactics and safety

3.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

force

were compromised when he took law enforcement action without backup. This action (while he was wearing plainclothes) contributed to the life-threatening situation where he used lethal force to stop the assault.

policy dictate that officers do not take enforcement action in crowds without backup, especially when dressed in plainclothes.

Issue Areas

 

Findings

 

Recommendations

 

Officer Torbit’s use of deadly force was within policy (with important qualifications).

3.2

3.2.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

evaluate training for use of deadly force in civilian crowd situations and that BPD place stronger emphasis on prevention and tactics to minimize the incidences where deadly force might be needed.

 

3.2.2

The IRB recommends that both

academy and in-service training emphasize the circumstances that may lead to the use of deadly force, focusing not only on the analysis of BPD's own data, but also on other police departments’ successful approaches to lethal force training.

3.3

The four uniformed officers' use of

3.3.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

deadly force was within policy (with important qualifications).

enhance its training on firearms and use of lethal force to emphasize assessing situations, making informed judgments, and finding alternatives to lethal force other than reflexive shooting.

4. Incident

4.1

The call for any free units to

4.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

management

respond to the scene created a mass, decentralized response, making it difficult to organize the officers into squads for assignments and to expedite dispersal of the agitated crowd.

develop, test, and implement a strategic plan for incident response in club/bar situations. Strategic and tactical incident response plans should be based on rigorous analysis and lessons learned from prior incidents.

4.2

Less than half of the responding

4.2.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

BPD officers reported to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which made tracking and managing the officers more difficult, despite General Orders requiring units to identify themselves as they responded to the scene.

enforce the existing CAD system policy for command and control and officer safety.

Issue Areas

 

Findings

 

Recommendations

 

4.3

The breakdown of response to the

4.3.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

Select Lounge incident was, in large part, the result of failure to establish incident command, as trained by BPD.

update standard operating procedures for incident management and incorporate the International Association of Chiefs of Police model policies for incident management.

4.3.2

The IRB recommends that BPD

develop established protocols for club closures and other similar events, as well as have the incident commander assign roles and responsibilities to the responding officers.

4.3.3

The IRB recommends that BPD

conduct additional incident management training and practice incident command and scenario- based exercises, as well as review and revise existing training policies and procedures.

5. Criminal and

5.1

The inability to conduct accurate

5.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

internal

 

conduct further research into the costs and benefits of the Glock weapons and consider using alternate weapons or some modification to the barrels to ensure accountability in the future.

investigations

ballistics analysis on the shots fired made it impossible for the firearms

examiner to determine who fired the shots that struck Officer Torbit and Sean Gamble.

5.2

BPD did not establi sh a photo log

5.2.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

of the crime scene.

closely examine its practices regarding crime scene processing and follow best practices.

5.3

BPD's reporting process for a

5.3.1

The IRB recommends that BPD’s

police-involved shooting incident is confusing, making it difficult to determine whether officers followed proper procedures.

current reporting policy regarding the use of force in police-involved shootings be re-examined and updated to call for Use of Force Reports from both the officers involved and from their first-in-line supervisors—in every case.

5.4

BPD did not regularly conduct

5.4.1 The IRB recommends that BPD establish regular and proactive systems to examine and update information and analyze patterns in police use of force.

analysis of the use of force at the time of the incident, resulting in a continued lack of understanding about police-related shootings.

Issue Areas

 

Findings

 

Recommendations

 

5.5

BPD’s current practice of

5.5.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

deferring an internal investigation until after the homicide investigation and the State’s Attorney's ruling in officer-involved shooting incidents unnecessarily delays the Department’s ability to fulfill its responsibility to determine compliance with policy or any policy shortcomings.

conduct the criminal and internal investigations in parallel for officer- involved shooting situations.

5.5.2: The IRB recommends that the Internal Investigation Division (IID) interview the BPD officers who used lethal force during the January 9 th incident and conduct a systematic investigation into all the actions at the scene leading up to the use of lethal force to determine compliance with existing policies.

5.6

BPD investigators did not

5.6.1

The IRB recommends that if the

interview the officers who used lethal force; instead, the officers involved in the incident prepared brief, formal memos summarizing their roles in the incident and did not provide specific details regarding their decisions to use lethal force.

BPD Homicide investigator is prohibited from interviewing the officers because of the assertion of constitutional protections, IID should interview the officers within 48 hours and compel their response under authority of Garrity v. New Jersey

 

(1967).

5.7

BPD’s policies and procedures

5.7.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

provide for a Firearms Discharging and Assault Review Board; however, the Department has not convened the Review Board in several years.

activate a Lethal Force Review Board to conduct a systematic review of any police-involved shooting, using both the Homicide and IID investigations.

5.7.2

The IRB recommends that BPD

initiate an after-action review, inci- dent reconstruction, and analysis for all lethal force incidents.

6.Police legitimacy,

6.1

Some officers at the scene spoke

6.1.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

trust, and

to victims and witnesses rudely, in a matter unbefitting professional

policing.

consider incorporating into its academy, into its in-service curriculum, and into the Commissioner’s general memos to the force, specific training and reminders about communication and interpersonal skills, procedural justice, and community trust.

interactions with

citizens

 

6.2

Significant delays in an IID

6.2.1

The IRB recommends that BPD

investigation can have a direct effect on community perceptions and can ultimately undermine community trust in the Baltimore Police Department.

review its procedures for public communications in officer-involved

shooting investigations.

APPENDIX B

Standard Operating Procedure for Response to Crowd Control Incidents

B

Standard Operating Procedure For: Respon se to Crowd Control Incidents 1 March 201 2 INTRODUCTION

Standard

Operating Procedure

For: Respon se to Crowd Control Incidents 1 March 201 2

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for a ll members of the Baltimore Police Departmen t when responding to an unanticipated, spontaneous cro wd control incident within the City of Baltimore.

The contents of this Standard O perating Procedure (SOP) are intended to prov ide a framework around

which any member acting as a n Incident Commander during a crowd control implement an Incident Action Pl an.

incident can create and

However, at no time does the g uidance provided by this document supersed e or replace the policies and procedures of the Baltimo re Police Department as defined in any appli cable General Order or Police Commissioner’s Memora ndum.

POLICY

Proactive Crowd Assessment

Although certain crowd control i ncidents may occur with no warning, many ven ues throughout the City are known as popular destinati ons and can be monitored by Officers on pa trol. Supervisors should direct their subordinates to ga ther intelligence at these venues through o ne-on-one contact with security and/or management pe rsonnel. Items of critical value are:

Is the crowd size larger t han can be handled by available sector Patrol O fficers?

Can the crowd dynamic

be characterized as disruptive, hostile, or comb ative?

Have there been any in cidents of assault, property damage, etc., or i s there a likelihood that they will occur?

Is there any indication th at members of opposing groups are present?

Will direct police interve ntion be necessary to disperse the crowd, re store order, and protect property?

Incident Commander (IC)

Every crowd control incident will require the identification of an Incident Comm ander (IC) who will have absolute authority at the scene of the incident. The first officer on the scene w ill become the initial IC, and he/she will continue in that r ole until relieved by another member of higher rank.

As higher-ranking members as ssume the duties of IC they will ensure tha t an official transfer of command is broadcast by poli ce radio. In order to prevent individual officer s and supervisors from initiating random, uncoordinated actions in which no strategic purposes are ser ved, the IC must always provide a plan of action to unite and direct all response efforts during the incide nt.

Incident Priorities

When resolving a crowd control incident, the following operational priorities should be examined:

1. Protection and preservation of life.

2. Immediate threats to the safety of the general public and responding Officers.

3. Incident stabilization / isolation (with the recording of actions taken).

4. Dispersal of the crowd, restoration of order.

5. Crime scene preservation and collection of evidence.

6. Restoration of unrestricted access to public services, transportation, infrastructure, etc.

Incident Action Plan

The Incident Action Plan is based on the Incident Priorities listed above and contains general objectives that reflect the Incident Commander’s strategy for controlling/dispersing the crowd. It may be basic in nature, can be passed down to subordinates by way of direct verbal instructions, and includes the establishment of a Staging Area.

Incident Commanders can and should revise their Incident Action Plans based on status reports from subordinate supervisors. Any element of an existing Incident Action Plan that proves ineffective in serving the Incident Commander’s strategic goals should be altered or discarded as necessary.

Staging Area

A location under the direct control of a permanent rank supervisor which serves as an assembly area for additional personnel and resources. It must have adequate space for police, fire, and utility vehicles, as well as areas in which specialized units such as SWAT may prepare for deployment.

PROCEDURES

Member

1. If you are present in the location of the crowd control incident prior to the arrival of a Supervisor:

1.1. By police radio:

1.1.1. Notify your District’s Police Dispatcher that a crowd control situation is developing; give whatever information you believe will be most descriptive of both the situation AND the location in which it is occurring.

1.1.2.

Request that a Supervisor respond to your location.

1.2. Do not take any direct police action unless you observe a threat that presents an imminent risk of serious physical injury or death.

1.3. Continue to monitor the crowd until a Supervisor and back-up units arrive.

1.4. If operating in a Non-Uniformed capacity:

1.4.1. Non-Uniformed officers will not engage in crowd control.

1.4.2. Non-Uniformed officers will not take enforcement action unless they observe a threat that presents an imminent risk of serious physical injury or death.

1.5. Upon the arrival of a Supervisor, relay any pertinent information.

1.5.1. At this time the Supervisor should announce by police radio that he/she is on the scene and assuming the duties of Incident Commander.

2. If you are not present in the location of the crowd control incident, DO NOT respond to the area unless directly ordered to do so.

2.1. If you are ordered to respond to the area, report ONLY to the location (or Supervisor) to which you have been directed.

2.2. If you are ordered to respond to a Staging Area, report directly to the Supervisor in charge of the Staging Area.

Incident Commander (IC)

1. Assess the situation and determine what resources/personnel will be needed.

1.1. Give clear direction by police radio as to where those back-up units will respond, or to whom they will report.

2. Ensure that a Permanent Rank Supervisor is performing the duties of Shift Commander for the current patrol shift.

3. Consider whether any need exists to activate the following:

3.1. A separate, dedicated radio channel.

3.2. A Command Post.

3.3. A Traffic Perimeter.

3.4. A Staging Area.

4. Make every reasonable effort to determine if any other on- or off-duty law enforcement or first responder personnel are present at the scene.

5. Determine if there is a need for outside expertise such as a Fire Marshall, VICE, or a Liquor Board Inspector.

6. If you believe that on-scene personnel will be sufficient to execute any necessary crowd control/dispersal actions:

6.1. Prepare a basic Incident Action Plan based upon the Incident Priorities.

6.2. Brief subordinate Supervisors on your overall plan and assign specific task(s) to each Supervisor.

6.3. Ensure each Supervisor clearly identifies him-/herself to the Officers for whom he/she is responsible.

7.

If you DO NOT believe that on-scene personnel will be sufficient to execute a crowd control/dispersal plan:

7.1. Request that a supervisor of the next higher rank respond to your location (lieutenant relieves sergeant, major relieves lieutenant, etc.).

7.2. Direct available resources to a continuation of efforts to isolate and stabilize the situation.

NOTE: Any response to a crowd control incident of extreme size or complexity shall be governed by General Order T-7, “National Incident Management System.”

8. If you determine that the incident has been resolved, demobilize all resources by:

8.1. Directing all personnel (except those who are injured or transporting/processing prisoners) to report back to the original Staging Area.

8.2. Gaining exact accountability for all personnel deployed during crowd control incident.

8.3. Notifying appropriate members of Senior Command Staff that the situation has been resolved and that District operations are returning to a normal status.

8.4. Deactivating the dedicated radio channel.

8.5. Organizing the collection of required after-action reporting.

Staging Area Supervisor

1. Immediately upon direction from the Incident Commander, respond to the designated Staging Area.

2. Assess its suitability in terms of size, sufficient space for vehicles, etc.

3. Advise all other responding units by police radio of a safe route by which they may reach the Staging Area.

4. Take charge of the following duties:

4.1. Maintain a written Staging Area Log of arriving units that includes their names, call numbers, time arrived, time deployed, and time released/demobilized.

NOTE: This will be crucial in accounting for all personnel prior to demobilization at the completion of the crowd control incident.

4.2. Give a direct order to arriving units that they are to remain in the Staging Area until specifically authorized, at your direction, to depart.

4.3. Ensure vehicles with priority tasks (i.e., ambulances and tow trucks) are parked in locations that will allow them to rapidly deploy from the Staging Area.

4.4. If necessary, assign another member to assist you in these duties.

5. Group Officers and Supervisors into teams at the direction of the Incident Commander.

6.

Deploy units/teams from the Staging Area at the direction of the Incident Commander.

6.1. When units/teams are deployed from the Staging Area, update the Staging Area Log to reflect their time of departure and assignment.

7. Assist the Incident Commander with final accountability during the demobilization process.

District Commander

1. Ensure that all appropriate after-action reporting is collected by the final Incident Commander.

2. Arrange an after-action review of the crowd control incident.

2.1. Determine what units or personnel should attend this review.

Special Operations Section

Units from the Special Operations Section will be utilized as follows:

SWAT - SWAT personnel will not perform basic crowd control tasks.

SWAT elements will respond to the Staging Area and, upon direction from the Incident Commander, deploy in support of the main crowd control effort. They will perform specialized actions such as directed arrests or downed-Officer rescues from within the crowd. SWAT will also prepare to assess and confront potential deadly force threats.

EVU - EVU will respond to the Staging Area and supply specialized equipment as required.

Mounted Unit - The Mounted Unit will report to the Staging Area and, at the direction of the Incident Commander, engage in primary crowd control measures.

Canine (K9) Unit - Canine units will respond to and remain at the Staging Area in order to provide security for personnel and equipment at that location. Canine handlers will not engage in crowd control and they will not take enforcement action within a crowd unless they observe a threat that presents an imminent risk of serious physical injury or death.

Aviation Unit (Fox) - The Aviation Unit will provide airborne surveillance at the direction of the Incident Commander and, upon request, utilize their ability to downlink video imagery of the incident to ground units.

Marine Unit - The Marine Unit will perform their regular mission of monitoring waterways unless directed to perform other activities by the Incident Commander.

After-Action Reporting and Analysis

At the conclusion of any activation of this SOP, a thorough accounting of actions taken and resources expended must be made in order to: (1) Document departmental activities for the purposes of prosecution and/or other legal action; (2) Provide the framework for an overall cost estimate; and (3) Allow for a post-incident debriefing and an analysis of the police response, emphasizing both lessons learned and the refinement of existing training paradigms.

After-Action Reporting will include, at a minimum:

1. Departmental

logs,

Employee’s Incident Reports (EIRs), use of force packages, administrative reports detailing damage to departmental property, equipment, vehicles, etc.

Documentation:

Copies

of

property/evidence

receipts,

crime

scene

2. Arrest/Booking

Information:

Copies

of

offense

reports,

statements

of

probable

cause,

statements of charges, witness information and statements, etc.

3. Staging Area Manager’s Log: Names and unit numbers of all responding Officers, paramedics and fire department personnel, City tow truck drivers, etc. This log should include time arrived, time deployed, and time released/demobilized for all personnel.

4. Command Post Log: This will be the notes and entries made by the Incident Commander’s recording assistant (“scribe”). It should include times and outcomes of notifications to City and Departmental leadership; requests for specialized units and/or subject matter experts (Fire Marshall, Liquor Board, VICE, etc.); and any official findings from the specialized units and experts.

APPENDIX C

General Order J-5 “Uniformed Policing Standards”

General Order J-5 Subject UNIFORMED POLICING STANDARDS Distribution “A” Date Published 1 March 2012 Page

General Order J-5

Subject

UNIFORMED POLICING STANDARDS

Distribution

“A”

Date Published

1 March 2012

Page

Page 1 of 4

By Order of the Police Commissioner

BACKGROUND

Research on crime prevention and reduction clearly demonstrates that the presence of a uniformed

officer has a positive impact on a community’s sense of security and dramatically reduces fear of crime.

A police officer wearing a uniform, badge, and nameplate visibly demonstrates the officer’s official

authority and clearly identifies the individual as an agent of the state. It is important to note that there is no empirical evidence that the deployment of non-uniformed police officers leads to greater crime prevention, or more effective policing.

A police officer not in uniform and lacking immediate identification poses a potential risk, jeopardizes

safety, and can infringe upon an officer’s ability to carry out enforcement duties.

Research shows that officers not working in uniform have a greater potential to find themselves in dangerous confrontations because of their lack of identification.

Members working in the unique and highly specialized capacity such as a non-uniformed or undercover officer should be properly trained and made aware of the inherent dangers and responsibilities while working in this duty status.

POLICY

It is the policy of the Baltimore Police Department that any member who is authorized to work in any non-uniformed capacity must, at all times, bear in mind the potential life-threatening nature of attempting to take police action while not in uniform.

All members working in a non-uniformed assignment are solely responsible for ensuring that they are readily identifiable prior to taking police action.

All members authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity must attend an annual training session provided by the Commanding Officer of the Violent Crime Impact Section on the risks and responsibilities of working out of uniform.

Patrol Division

Sworn members in full duty status assigned/detailed to the Patrol Division are not authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity. They will wear a departmental uniform as defined by the Chief of Patrol.

Exception: District Commanders, in consultation with the Chief of Patrol, may authorize District Drug Enforcement Units to work in a non-uniformed capacity during limited investigative initiatives, such as surveillance operations or meetings with informants.

G.O. J-5

UNIFORMED POLICING STANDARDS

Page 2 of 4

Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

The Chief, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), will determine which units within CID are authorized to work in a non-uniformed capacity. When members of these authorized units engage in proactive enforcement actions such as arrests, neighborhood patrols and car stop/field identification initiatives, they must wear as their outermost garment their ballistic vest in an authorized tactical vest carrier that has the word “POLICE” displayed on the front and back panels. The members’ Departmental Badge must be affixed to their tactical vest carrier. CALEA 41.3.6

Police Commissioner’s Office/Administrative Bureau

Sworn full-duty members assigned/detailed to units within the Administrative Bureau or the Police Commissioner’s Office will wear a departmental uniform.

Exception: The Police Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, Administrative Bureau, have the discretion, on a unit-by-unit basis, to authorize sworn full-duty members to work in a non-uniformed capacity.

GENERAL INFORMATION

In order to minimize potential hazards, all officers authorized to work in a non-uniformed assignment must immediately identify themselves as a police officer and provide appropriate police identification when challenged by another police officer. Officers not in uniform are responsible for identifying themselves while engaging in enforcement activities.

1.

proactive

enforcement actions such as arrests, neighborhood patrols and car stop/field identification initiatives are required to wear:

Sworn

Members

working

in

a

non-uniformed

capacity

and

engaged

in

1.1. Ballistic vest, in an authorized tactical vest carrier with the word “POLICE” displayed on the front and back panels, as the outermost garment. CALEA 41.3.6

1.2. Departmental Badge affixed to the tactical vest carrier.

2. Sworn Members working in “Court Attire” are generally primary investigators who respond to investigate crimes after they have occurred and conduct follow up investigations. Officers working in this capacity are not concealing their identity as police officers. These members shall prominently display their identification during the normal course of their duties. Officers/Detectives working in court attire are required to wear: CALEA Standard 22.2.5

2.1. Departmental Badge affixed to their outermost garment.

2.2. Departmental Identification Card attached to their outermost garment. CALEA 22.2.7

3. Sworn Members working in an undercover capacity are generally conducting investigations that require them to conceal their professional identity.

3.1. Commanding Officers with a minimum rank of Deputy Major assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division have the authority to put members into an undercover capacity.

G.O. J-5

UNIFORMED POLICING STANDARDS

Page 3 of 4

3.3. The undercover member should avoid becoming involved in proactive enforcement actions. If an exigent situation arises that requires an undercover officer to take proactive enforcement action, he/she should immediately identify him-/herself as a police officer and follow all requirements of this Order.

REQUIRED ACTION

Member

1. It is the non-uniformed officer’s responsibility, whenever engaged in proactive enforcement, to make his/her identity as a police officer clear to both members of the general public and to other members of law enforcement.

1.1.

Officers will be conscious of their appearance, keeping in mind that officers do not always recognize each other.

1.2.

Non-uniformed officers will not engage in crowd control.

1.3.

Non-uniformed officers will not take enforcement action within a crowd unless there is potential for imminent death or serious injury.

1.3.1.

If enforcement action is required due to the potential for imminent death or serious injury, non-uniformed officers will advise the Communications Section that they are not in uniform and will then provide their physical and clothing description.

1.4.

When reporting to any tactical or crisis situation, all officers will report to the assigned staging area or incident commander for a briefing so as to minimize the chances for misidentification.

1.5.

Due to the possibility that non-uniformed or undercover officers may not be recognized by other officers, they shall obey all orders given to them by other officers—including orders to disarm themselves, raise their hands in the air, or assume other non- threatening positions.

1.6.

When non-uniformed officers are challenged by other members of law enforcement, they should immediately identify themselves as a POLICE OFFICER, giving their name, assignment and sequence number. Confronted officers will verbally advise that they are armed and the location of their weapon.

1.6.1. In the event that the non-uniformed officer has an exposed weapon, he/she will not make any movements unless instructed to do so by the confronting officer.

1.6.2. If the non-uniformed officer does not have an exposed weapon, he/she will immediately straighten his/her arms over the head, then cross both arms at the wrists with the palms forward and the fingers spread.

1.6.3. As soon as practical, notify your Commanding Officer of the incident.

Supervisor

G.O. J-5

UNIFORMED POLICING STANDARDS

Page 4 of 4

2. Supervisors of non-uniformed investigative activities will, when practical, notify the patrol shift commanders in the effected district. This action will ensure that uniformed and non-uniformed personnel are made aware of the confrontational possibilities so as to minimize hazards.

3. Supervisors of non-uniformed investigative activities will notify the Communications Section of the non-uniformed operation, the location of the operation, and each unit’s assigned radio call number.

4. Ensure all non-uniformed officers are aware of and comply with the procedures set out in this Order.

Patrol Shift Commander

1. Patrol Shift Commanders will be aware of all locations in their districts at which non-uniformed proactive enforcement operations are occurring.

2. Inform uniformed officers of non-uniformed operations. CALEA Standard 42.2.24

3. Provide assistance to the non-uniformed operations, as requested by the supervisor of the non- uniformed activity.

Commander, Violent Crime Impact Section

1. Conduct an annual training session for all members who are authorized to work in a non- uniformed capacity.

Director, Education and Training Section

1. Assist the Commander, Violent Crime Impact Section, in conducting training for all members assigned to work in a non-uniformed capacity.

2. Upon request, provide a list of all members who have received this training.

Director, Communications Section

1. Establish a policy whereby the Police Dispatcher makes audible notification by police radio whenever he/she becomes aware that a non-uniformed officer is at a location to which other members are responding for a disturbance or other call for service. Include all information known about the non-uniformed member(s), including a clothing description, physical description and call number.

RECISION

Remove and destroy/recycle Police Commissioner’s Memorandum 22-83, “Officer Identification,” dated 16 May 1983.

COMMUNICATION OF POLICY

Supervisors shall be responsible for communication of the contents of this Order to their subordinates. This Order is effective on the date listed herein and is to be read at all roll calls for five consecutive days and posted on Departmental Bulletin Boards.

APPENDIX D

General Order G-10 “Police Involved Shooting Incidents”

D

General Order G-10 Subject POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS Distribution Date Published Page “A” 1 March 2012

General Order G-10

Subject

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Distribution

Date Published

Page

“A”

1 March 2012

1 of 7

By Order of the Police Commissioner

POLICY

It is the policy of the Baltimore Police Department to thoroughly investigate and accurately document all of the facts surrounding incidents in which an officer discharges a firearm or is the victim of an assault that involves the discharge of a firearm.

SCOPE

This General Order applies to the following types of incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

NOTE:

For procedures governing the shooting of a vicious animal, see General Order C-2, “Rules and Regulations,” Rule 3, Firearms, Section 1.

For procedures governing the negligent handling of a firearm that results in a discharge of the firearm with no injury, see General Order C-6, “Command Discipline.”

GENERAL

1. Each member on the scene of a police-involved shooting situation will be held strictly accountable for adhering to departmental regulations governing the use of firearms. Those regulations include General Order C-2, “Rules and Regulations,” and the Training Bulletin entitled “Use of Deadly Force.”

2. Members must be aware that gunfire in close proximity could initiate a “startle response” that causes the member to unintentionally discharge his/her firearm. Therefore, members are reminded that they must keep their trigger finger off of the trigger and at “touch point” until they are prepared to justifiably discharge the weapon.

3. Members are reminded that in accordance with departmental policy the application of deadly force must cease when the attacker is incapacitated. Incapacitation is defined as the point at which an attacker is no longer capable of injuring the officer or others.

POLICE OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING TEAM (POIS Team)

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 2 of 7

1.1. Supervisor, Homicide Section, to conduct the criminal investigation.

1.2. Supervisor, Internal Investigation Division, to conduct the internal investigation and assess compliance with departmental rules and regulations.

1.3. Supervisor, Firearms Training Unit, to examine any and all training issues surrounding the incident and to implement training needs for the involved officers.

1.4. Technician, Mobile Crime Laboratory Unit, to process the crime scene(s) in accordance with procedures contained in the Crime Laboratory Section’s technical manual.

1.5. Spokesperson, Public Affairs Section, to ensure an accurate and timely flow of information to the public.

2. Each component of the POIS Team is required to maintain a Standard Operating Procedure which defines its particular role and responsibilities.

3. The Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, will ensure that POIS Teams are available to respond twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week.

4. The POIS Teams shall conduct parallel criminal and administrative investigations.

The Commanding Officer, Homicide Section, will solicit a voluntary statement from the involved officer(s) as soon as practical based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. CALEA 1.3.6

The Chief, Internal Investigation Division, will confer with the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, and the Chief Prosecutor, State’s Attorney’s Homicide Division, prior to compelling a statement from the involved officers in accordance with the Law Enforcement Officers Bill Of Rights (LEOBR). As a general guideline, this compelled statement will be taken within thirty (30) days of the incident.

All

videotaped.

statements,

whether

voluntary

or

compelled,

shall

be

tape

recorded

and/or

Detectives from the Internal Investigation Division may observe and have access to the voluntary statements given to the Homicide Section.

Detectives from the Internal Investigation Division may conduct follow-up interviews with involved officers in order to address policy-related issues that may not have been detailed in the interview conducted by the Homicide Section.

Detectives from the Homicide Section may not observe or have access to the compelled statements given to the Internal Investigation Division.

The Shift Commander, Homicide Section, and the Supervisor, Internal Investigation Division, will coordinate the use-of-force entry into Blue Team.

REQUIRED ACTION

Member

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 3 of 7

1. Any time you intentionally discharge your firearm or you are a victim of an assault that involves the discharge of a firearm, immediately notify the Communications Section and your Command. These notifications must be made regardless of your duty status or the location at which the discharge occurred.

2. Ensure adequate medical resources are requested for any injured person. CALEA 1.3.5

3. If the discharge occurs off-duty, you must also immediately notify the proper law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction of occurrence.

4. Remain on the scene until a permanent rank supervisor arrives, unless exigent circumstances arise.

Mobile Unit Supervisor, Crime Laboratory Section

1. Process the crime scene and all evidence in accordance with the procedures contained in the Crime Laboratory Section’s technical manual.

Shift Commander, Communications Section

1. Make prompt notifications to Police Command Staff.

2. Activate the POIS Team.

3. Activate the Critical Incident Stress Team.

Lieutenant/Sergeant-in-Charge, District of Occurrence

1. A permanent rank supervisor must respond to, secure and maintain the integrity of the scene and all witnesses.

2. Ensure that a crime scene log is established.

3. Request adequate medical resources for any injured person.

4. Confirm that the POIS Team has been activated.

5. Confirm with the Shift Commander, Communications Section, that all required notifications have been made to Police Command Staff.

6. Separate all involved member(s).

7. Do not recover, inspect or secure any involved member’s firearm unless directed to do so by the Shift Commander, Homicide Section.

8. Assist the Shift Commander, Homicide Section, and the POIS Team as requested.

Lieutenant/Sergeant-in-Charge, Member’s Assignment

1. Immediately respond to the scene.

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 4 of 7

3. If the discharge occurred outside of the City of Baltimore, confer with your Commanding Officer to determine whether or not you should respond.

3.1. Out-of-jurisdiction/out-of-district incidents require that you act strictly as an observer for your Command.

4. Ensure that any officer who has been ordered to do so submits to appropriate drug screening and/or alcohol testing.

NOTE:

The Shift Commander, Homicide Section, has complete command over the discharging scene and the investigation.

If reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a member who has discharged a firearm acted under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, the Shift Commander, Homicide Section, will order the member to submit to the appropriate drug screening and/or alcohol testing.

Shift Commander, Homicide Section

1. Respond to the scene.

2. Direct the overall investigation of a Police-Involved Shooting.

3. Complete the “Preliminary Police-Involved Firearms Discharge Report” (Form 177).

4. Make a determination as to when an involved member’s firearm will be recovered, and the location at which the firearm will be recovered.

Sergeant, Firearms Training Unit

1. Respond to the scene.

2. Conduct the After Action Training Program with the involved member(s).

Commanding Officer, Involved Member’s District/Section

1. Before restoring any involved member to full-duty status, and prior to the reissuance of any departmental equipment, ensure that the involved member:

1.1. Has successfully completed a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation at the Public Safety Infirmary (PSI).

1.2. Has attended the mandated After Action Training Program conducted by the Firearms Training Unit.

1.3. Has been cleared for reinstatement by the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, the Chief, Internal Investigation Division, and the Director, Education and Training Section.

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 5 of 7

Division Chief, Involved Member

1. Consult with the involved member’s Commanding Officer concerning the member’s duty status in accordance with General Order C-4, “Suspension Procedures.”

2. Authorize the After Action Training for the incident with the involved member after consultation with the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, the Chief, Internal Investigation Division, and the Chief Legal Counsel, Legal Affairs Section.

Chief, Criminal Investigation Division

1. In conjunction with the Chief, Internal Investigation Division, ensure that all initial reporting is forwarded via Official Channels to the Police Commissioner.

2. Submit a comprehensive Criminal Investigation Summary Report via Official Channels to the Police Commissioner within forty-five (45) days of the incident.

Director, Public Affairs Section

1. Based upon information received from the investigative units, prepare press releases for the Police Commissioner’s approval.

2. Release a statement to the media summarizing the facts surrounding the incident, including:

2.1. The number of officer(s) involved, as well as their age, gender, rank and unit of assignment.

2.2. The number of victim(s) involved, as well as their age and gender.

3. The identity of the officer(s) involved in a police-involved shooting incident will only be released to the general public and media outlets after forty-eight (48) hours have elapsed from the time the incident occurred.

4. Upon completion of the police-involved shooting investigation the Homicide Section’s case file shall be made available to the general public and news media in accordance with the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA).

Chief, Internal Investigation Division

1. In conjunction with the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, ensure that all initial reporting is forwarded via Official Channels to the Police Commissioner.

2. Submit a comprehensive Internal Investigation Summary Report to the Police Commissioner within forty-five (45) days of the incident.

3. Maintain files for all police-involved shooting incidents and related data.

Chief Legal Counsel, Legal Affairs Section

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 6 of 7

Deputy Police Commissioner, Administrative Bureau

1. Review the reporting of the incident relative to firearms training, equipment matters, policies and practices as prescribed in this Order. CALEA 1.3.6

Director, Planning and Research Section

1. Collect, maintain and analyze all reporting and documentation pertaining to police-involved shooting incidents and assaults by firearms. CALEA 1.3.13

POLICE INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS - AFTER ACTION REVIEW BOARD

1. Duties and Responsibilities:

1.1. An After Action Review Board will examine all incidents in which there is an injury to or death of an officer due to gunfire, and/or there is an injury to or death of a civilian due to police gunfire. The Deputy Police Commissioner, Administrative Bureau, will convene this Board within thirty (30) days of the incident. CALEA 1.3.7

1.2. The Board will review all incidents as they pertain to equipment, training and policy matters, including an examination of the police tactics and precipitating events that led to the use of force, and evaluation of/revision(s) to training and/or practices.

1.3. The Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, the Chief, Internal Investigation Division, and the Director, Education and Training Section, will prepare and present their findings to the Board.

2. After Action Review Board membership:

2.1. Police Commissioner.

2.2. Deputy Police Commissioner, Operations Bureau.

2.3. Chief, Criminal Investigation Division.

2.4. Chief Legal Counsel, Legal Affairs Section.

2.5. Chief, Patrol Division, or his/her designee.

2.6. Chief, Internal Investigation Division.

2.7. Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

2.8. Commanding Officer, involved member’s Command.

2.9. Director, Education and Training Section.

2.10. Director, Planning and Research Section.

G.O. G-10

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENTS

Page 7 of 7

RECISION

Remove from files and destroy/recycle General Order G-10, “Police Involved Firearms Discharges:

Supervisory Response and Reporting,” dated 31 May 1999, and all amendments.

COMMUNICATION OF POLICY

Supervisors shall be responsible for communication of this directive to their subordinates and to ensure compliance. This directive is effective on the date of publication, is to be read at all roll calls for five (5) consecutive days, and is to be posted on Departmental Bulletin Boards.

APPENDIX E

Standard Operating Procedure for Homicide Section

E

Standard Operating Procedure For: Homicide Section Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March 2012

Standard Operating Procedure

For: Homicide Section Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

1 March 2012

Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March 2012 INTRODUCTION This document is intended for all

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for all members assigned to the Homicide Section, Criminal Investigation Division. It will be utilized whenever the Homicide Section is notified of a police-involved shooting incident.

The contents of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are intended to provide a framework around which investigators from the Homicide Section can perform their duties during the course of an investigation of a police-involved shooting incident. However, at no time does the guidance provided by this document supersede or replace the policies and procedures of the Baltimore Police Department as defined in any applicable General Order or Police Commissioner’s Memorandum.

SCOPE

Consistent with General Order G-10, “Police-Involved Shooting Incidents,” this SOP applies to the following types of incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

DEFINITION

Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team - An investigative team tasked with responding to the scene of police-involved shooting incidents. It is comprised of members from the Internal Investigation Division, the Homicide Section, the Crime Lab Section, the Public Affairs Section, and the Firearms Training Unit. Its purpose is to oversee the initial stages of the investigation of a police-involved shooting incident.

For the purposes of this SOP, the Homicide Section’s component of a POIS Team will include:

1. Detective Lieutenant.

2. The current “Up Squad,” consisting of one Detective Sergeant and two Detectives.

3. Any other personnel as may be designated by the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

PROCEDURES

Shift Commander/Sergeant-in-Charge (SIC), Homicide Section

1.

This SOP applies to any member who may be serving as the Shift Commander, Homicide Section, at the time notification is received that a police-involved shooting incident has occurred.

NOTE: In the event that a Sergeant-in-Charge (SIC) is serving as the Shift Commander, Homicide Section, when notification is received of a police-involved shooting incident, he/she will continue to execute the duties of Shift Commander until properly relieved by a permanent rank Detective Lieutenant, or by the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

2. When notified that a police-involved shooting incident has occurred:

2.1. Respond directly to the scene and assume control of the criminal investigation, unless/until properly relieved by a higher-ranking member of the Homicide Section.

2.1.1. If any person has been struck by gunfire, or is believed to have been struck by gunfire, and an SIC is serving as Shift Commander, Homicide Section, request that the Duty Lieutenant respond and assume responsibility for the criminal investigation.

2.1.2. If no person has been struck by gunfire, or there is no reason to believe that any person has been struck by gunfire, assume control of the investigation and make proper notifications to the Duty Lieutenant (if necessary), as well as the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

3. Establish and maintain a command post to facilitate proper control and coordination of investigative activity.

4. Ensure that adequate manpower and resources are available in order to conduct a thorough and expeditious investigation.

5. Establish and maintain communication with members of Police Command Staff; coordinate field assignments as appropriate.

6. Assist the Director, Public Affairs Section, or his/her designee, in gathering appropriate information for release to the general public/news media.

7. Contact the Chief Prosecutor, Homicide Division of the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, for a legal review of the incident.

7.1. After sufficient consultation with the Chief Prosecutor, determine an appropriate course of action governing additional investigative efforts.

8. Review all investigative documents.

9. In cases where a person has been struck by gunfire, it shall be the responsibility of the Homicide Section to file any and all charges related to the incident.

10. In cases where no person has been struck by gunfire:

10.1. The Homicide Section is charged only with conducting an investigation of the shooting incident itself.

10.2. The involved officer’s parent command (or agency) will be responsible for filing/pursuing any criminal charges that are beyond the scope of the shooting investigation.

11.

The Detective Lieutenant assigned to the POIS Team will ensure that the 24-Hour and Final Office reports are completed as outlined in General Order G-10, “Police Involved Shooting Incidents.”

11.1. The Shift Commander, Homicide Section, and the Supervisor, Internal Investigation Division, will coordinate the use-of-force entry into Blue Team.

12. Prepare a detailed briefing report for presentation to the Police Commissioner.

12.1. This presentation will be created utilizing Microsoft PowerPoint.

12.2. The presentation will be made to the Police Commissioner within thirty (30) days of the police-involved shooting incident.

12.3. Information to be included in the presentation will be:

12.3.1. Coordinated between members of the POIS Team and any investigating detective(s) from the Homicide Section.

12.3.2. Approved by BOTH the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section, and the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, prior to presentation to the Police Commissioner.

13. Ensure that the Final Office Report is completed within forty-five (45) days of the police-involved shooting incident and is submitted to the Police Commissioner via Official Channels.

14. If a “Declination Letter” is received from the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City:

14.1. Notify the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

14.2. Ensure that the Declination Letter is placed into and retained in the appropriate case file.

Reporting Guidelines

Reporting guidelines are as follows:

1. Preliminary Office Report – a detailed report of all pertinent known facts of the incident.

Due

within twenty-four (24) hours of the initial incident. This report is to be disseminated via Official Channels to:

1.1. Office of the Police Commissioner.

1.2. Deputy Commissioner, Operations Bureau.

1.3. Deputy Commissioner, Administrative Bureau.

1.4. Chief, Criminal Investigation Division.

1.5. Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

1.6. Chief, Patrol Division.

1.7. Chief, Internal Investigation Division.

1.8. District Commander, Police District of occurrence.

1.9.

Commanding Officer of the involved officer(s).

1.10. Director, Education and Training Section.

1.11. Director, Public Affairs Section.

1.12. Chief Prosecutor, Homicide Division of the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City.

2. Final Office Report – a follow-up to the Preliminary Office Report. May contain additional witness information, evidence, test results, etc. It is due forty-five (45) days after the incident. This report is to be disseminated, on a “need-to-know” basis, via Official Channels to:

2.1. Office of the Police Commissioner.

2.2. Chief, Criminal Investigation Division.

2.3. Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

2.4. Any other person(s) as may be designated by the Police Commissioner.

2.5. Chief Prosecutor, Homicide Division of the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City.

3. All reports will be addressed to the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division.

Inspection of Weapons

1. Any officer involved in a police-involved shooting incident shall:

1.1. Retain possession of his/her holstered firearm; and

1.2. Be transported to the Homicide Section by a Permanent Rank Supervisor.

NOTE: If exigent circumstances exist (e.g., the officer’s mental state, or his/her ability to carry a firearm, is in question), an officer’s weapon may be collected at the scene of the police-involved shooting incident if it is in the best interest of public safety.

2. Upon arrival at the Homicide Section, the Permanent Rank Supervisor will oversee/conduct an inspection of the involved officer’s weapon as follows:

2.1. A Technician, Mobile Crime Laboratory (CLT), shall photograph the officer and his/her weapon prior to the inspection.

2.2. Using an authorized weapons clearing box, the Permanent Rank Supervisor shall render the weapon safe and unloaded.

NOTE: The CLT will witness this procedure.

3. The officer’s ammunition will be accounted for as follows:

3.1. If a revolver:

3.1.1.

Counting the total number of live cartridges remaining in the cylinder; and

3.1.2. Any reloading devices (speedloader, speedstrip, etc.).

3.2. If a semiautomatic pistol:

3.2.1. Counting the total number of live cartridges remaining in both the chamber and the magazine that was ejected from the weapon’s magazine well; and

3.2.2. In any additional magazines recovered from the officer’s primary and secondary pouch (or off-duty/plainclothes pouch).

4. During this inspection the CLT shall follow the procedures contained in the Crime Laboratory Section’s technical manual related to recovering and processing an officer’s weapon.

5. The Permanent Rank Supervisor shall report the findings of this inspection to the POIS Team members, as well as document them in any supplemental reporting.

Interviewing Law Enforcement Officers

1. Members of the POIS Team shall solicit a voluntary statement from the involved officer and any witnessing officers as soon as is practical (based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident).

2. All statements, regardless of the officer’s level of involvement in the incident, shall be taken at the Homicide Section and audio and/or video recorded.

3. All officers involved in a police-involved shooting incident shall be granted all applicable rights under the law (i.e., Miranda).

4. The involved officer may consult with counsel prior to providing a statement. However, members of the Homicide Section shall not solicit counsel for the officer.

5. The officer may have counsel present during the interview process.

6. Detectives from the Internal Investigation Division may observe the interview via the observation room, but they shall not be in the interview room during the interview process.

7. The Internal Investigation Division will have access to the voluntary statements given to the Homicide Section.

Storage and Record Keeping

1. Secured storage and accountability shall be the responsibility of the Administrative Unit, Homicide Section.

2. The files shall be stored in a secure, locked location.

3. The only persons with access to these records shall be:

3.1. The Commanding Officer, Homicide Section; or

3.2. His/her designee.

Confidential Communications

1. Information gathered during the investigation shall remain confidential.

2. Only the following personnel may have access:

2.1. The Police Commissioner.

2.2. Deputy Commissioner, Operations Bureau.

2.3. Deputy Commissioner, Administrative Bureau.

2.4. Chief, Criminal Investigation Division

2.5. Chief, Internal Investigation Division.

2.6. Commanding Officer, Homicide Section.

2.7. Members of the POIS Team.

APPENDIX F

Standard Operating Procedure for Internal Investigation Division

F

Standard Operating Procedure For: Internal Investigation Division Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March

Standard Operating Procedure

For: Internal Investigation Division Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

1 March 2012

Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March 2012 INTRODUCTION This document is intended for all

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for all members assigned to the Internal Investigation Division (IID). It will be utilized whenever IID is notified of a police-involved shooting incident involving a sworn member of the Baltimore Police Department.

The contents of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are intended to provide a framework around which investigators from IID can perform their duties during the course of an investigation of a police- involved shooting incident. However, at no time does the guidance provided by this document supersede or replace the policies and procedures of the Baltimore Police Department as defined in any applicable General Order or Police Commissioner’s Memorandum.

SCOPE

Consistent with General Order G-10, “Police-Involved Shooting Incidents,” this SOP applies to the following types of incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

DEFINITION

Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team - An investigative team tasked with responding to the scene of police-involved shooting incidents. It is comprised of members from the Internal Investigation Division, the Homicide Section, the Crime Lab Section, the Public Affairs Section, and the Firearms Training Unit. Its purpose is to oversee the initial stages of the investigation of a police-involved shooting incident.

PROCEDURES

Sergeant or Lieutenant Assigned to On-Call POIS Team

1. When informed that a police-involved shooting incident has occurred, immediately notify the Chief, IID, or his/her designee.

2. Respond to the scene of the police-involved shooting incident and coordinate your investigative efforts with other members of the POIS Team.

3. Conduct a complete and thorough investigation of the police-involved shooting incident.

3.1.

The focus of your investigation will be an evaluation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident for compliance with established departmental policy and procedure.

3.2. In concert with the members of the POIS Team from the Homicide Section, collect copies of:

3.2.1. All available departmental reporting.

3.2.2. Witness statements.

3.2.3. Photographs taken of the scene, involved officer(s), suspect(s), etc.

3.2.4. Any video footage from any source.

3.2.5. Any other materials deemed relevant to your investigation.

4. Generate a case number within IAPRO for your investigation.

4.1. Ensure that all related documents, photographs, and other investigative materials are linked to this case number.

5. Coordinate the use-of-force entry into Blue Team with the Shift Commander, Homicide Section.

6. Compose a statement of the preliminary facts and circumstances generated by your investigation to be submitted in the “IID Duty Packet for the Police Commissioner.”

7. Ensure that interviews are conducted with, and statements are taken from:

7.1. All officers involved in the incident.

7.2. All officers that witnessed the incident.

NOTE: Interviews of this type will be conducted in compliance with the section of this SOP entitled “Interviewing Law Enforcement Officers.”

8. If an involved member exercises his/her right under the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights (LEOBR) to delay his/her statement for ten (10) days:

8.1. Document this decision in the appropriate report.

8.2. Do not compel the member to provide a statement.

8.3. Refer the matter to the Chief, IID, in accordance with the procedures for obtaining a compelled statement.

9. If your investigation determines that member(s) other than the officer involved in the police- involved shooting incident violated departmental policy or procedures:

9.1. Take whatever action is appropriate at the time this determination is made.

9.2. Make immediate and appropriate documentation of the violation(s).

10. Provide supervisory guidance to subordinate detectives during the investigation of a police- involved shooting incident.

11.

Review all reporting and investigative materials submitted by detectives under your immediate supervision.

12. Review any statement of an investigation’s preliminary facts and circumstances that has been submitted by a detective prior to its inclusion in the “IID Duty Packet for the Police Commissioner.”

Interviewing Law Enforcement Officers

1. Members of the POIS Team shall solicit a voluntary statement from the involved officer and any witnessing officers as soon as is practical (based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident).

2. All statements, regardless of the officer’s level of involvement in the incident, shall be taken at the Homicide Section and audio and/or video recorded.

3. All officers involved in a police-involved shooting incident shall be granted all applicable rights under the law (i.e., Miranda).

4. The involved officer may consult with counsel prior to providing a statement. However, no investigating detective may solicit counsel for the officer.

5. The officer may have counsel present during the interview process.

6. Detectives from the Internal Investigation Division may observe the interview via the observation room, but they shall not be in the interview room during the interview process.

7. The Internal Investigation Division will have access to the voluntary statements given to the Homicide Section.

Chief, Internal Investigation Division

1. Coordinate any decision to compel an officer that has been involved in a police-involved shooting incident to provide a statement to IID with:

1.1. The Chief, Criminal Investigation Division.

1.2. The Chief Prosecutor, Homicide Division of the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City.

2. Whenever necessary, and as a general rule, statements from involved officer(s) will be “compelled” within thirty (30) days of the police-involved shooting incident.

3. Once the IID receives official notification from the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City that an officer involved in a police-involved shooting incident will not face criminal prosecution:

3.1. Direct the appropriate IID personnel to review the completed investigation in order to determine if the involved officer’s actions were in compliance with established departmental policy and procedure.

3.2. Ensure this review is documented in the investigative summary.

APPENDIX G

Standard Operating Procedures for the Education & Training Section

G

Standard Operating Procedure For: Firearms Training Unit Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March

Standard Operating Procedure

For: Firearms Training Unit Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

1 March 2012

Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March 2012 INTRODUCTION This document is intended for Permanent

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for Permanent Rank Supervisors assigned to the Firearms Training Unit, Education and Training Section, who respond to Police Involved Shooting Incidents as a member of the Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team.

The contents of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are intended to provide a framework around which a sergeant from the Firearms Training Unit can perform his/her duties during the course of an investigation of a police-involved shooting incident. However, at no time does the guidance provided by this document supersede or replace the policies and procedures of the Baltimore Police Department as defined in any applicable General Order or Police Commissioner’s Memorandum.

SCOPE

Consistent with General Order G-10, “Police-Involved Shooting Incidents,” this SOP applies to the following types of incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

DEFINITION

Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team - An investigative team tasked with responding to the scene of police-involved shooting incidents. It is comprised of members from the Internal Investigation Division, the Homicide Section, the Crime Lab Section, the Public Affairs Section, and the Firearms Training Unit. Its purpose is to oversee the initial stages of the investigation of a police-involved shooting incident.

PURPOSE OF THE ON-CALL SERGEANT

The On-Call Sergeant will respond to the scene of any incident outlined above and shall:

1. Observe the physical characteristics of the scene.

2. Gather the facts related to the incident and the Use-of-Force that occurred.

3. Evaluate those facts in light of training and equipment.

4. Prepare an Administrative Report (Form 95) for the Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team limited to issues concerning training and equipment.

5.

Review his/her findings with the Range Commander, Firearms Training Unit, and the Director, Education and Training Section.

REPORTING FORMAT

The On-Call Sergeant’s initial on-scene observations will be reported on the Firearms Training Unit’s “On-Scene Police-Involved Shooting Form.”

PROCEDURES

1. While in an “On-Call” status, remain prepared to respond on short notice.

2. When informed that a police-involved shooting incident has occurred, immediately notify the Range Commander, or his/her designee.

3. Upon arrival at the scene, report to the incident commander, the primary investigator, and other members of the POIS Team.

4. Provide POIS team members and the primary investigator with any subject matter expertise that may be required.

5. Complete any required documentation.

6. During the sergeant’s next regular tour of duty, create a case folder which contains:

6.1

Handgun and shotgun In-Service qualification scores for any member(s) involved in the incident.

6.2

Issued handgun information for any member(s) involved in the incident:

6.2.1. Serial number.

6.2.2. Date of issue.

6.2.3. A written notation that you have confirmed via the Armory Unit’s inventory database that any involved member(s) was in possession of either his/her issued duty handgun or approved off-duty handgun.

6.3.

Recorded off-duty handgun serial number, if applicable, for any member(s) involved in the incident.

6.4.

The completed “On-Scene Police-Involved Shooting Form.”

7. Fax copies of items 5.1 through 5.4 to the Homicide Section and the Internal Investigation Division.

8. Brief the Range Commander of the facts and circumstances related to the police involved shooting incident as they apply to training and equipment issues.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING BULLETIN 1 March 2012 THE FIREARMS TRAINING UNIT’S “AFTER-ACTION TRAINING

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING BULLETIN

1 March 2012

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING BULLETIN 1 March 2012 THE FIREARMS TRAINING UNIT’S “AFTER-ACTION TRAINING

THE FIREARMS TRAINING UNIT’S “AFTER-ACTION TRAINING PROGRAM”

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for all members assigned to the Firearms Training Unit who will conduct the After-Action Training Program for any member who has been involved in a police-related shooting incident.

SCOPE

Consistent with General Order G-10, “Police-Involved Shooting Incidents,” this Training Bulletin describes the post-incident training that will be given to every member who has been involved in one of the following types of police-related shooting incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The After-Action Training Program is a two-part instructional and evaluation session that is intended to determine an officer’s readiness to return to his/her full-duty assignment as a sworn member of the BPD.

Every member that has been involved in a police-related shooting incident must attend the After-Action Training Program. Participation in the After-Action Training Program is not limited to the officer who actually fired his/her weapon in a police-related shooting incident. It may also include other officers who were present during the shooting incident.

COMPONENTS OF THE AFTER-ACTION TRAINING PROGRAM

The After-Action Training Program is a four-hour block of instruction divided into two separate components:

Ti Training

The Ti Training simulator is an electronic, interactive device that provides visual and audible feedback based on the participating member’s decisions as he/she interacts with the program. A variety of computerized scenarios are available, each with its own expected use-of-force outcome. The department’s use-of-force continuum will apply, requiring responses from the member that may include:

1.

Verbal commands given in an effort to gain a suspect’s compliance.

2. The use of a less-lethal option, such as an Electronic Control Device or pepper spray.

3. An application of deadly force.

The purpose of this component is to evaluate the member’s decision-making skills as they apply to interacting with civilians in situations where a use of force may - or may not - be required.

Live-Fire

Each member will shoot two courses of live fire. A total of ninety-two (92) rounds will be fired.

1. Slow Fire Fundamentals Course - A total of fifty (50) rounds will be fired from the 15- and 25-yard lines. The intent is for the officer to demonstrate an ability to safely handle and fire his/her handgun.

2. Combat Shooting Course - A total of forty-two (42) rounds will be fired from the 3- and 7- yard lines. The intent is to present the officer with simulated close-quarters shooting engagements and for the instructor to verify that the officer can safely handle and fire his/her handgun.

TRAINING PROCEDURES

Permanent Rank Supervisor, Firearms Training Unit

1. Ensure that any member reporting to the Gunpowder Range Facility for the After-Action Training Program has:

1.1. Successfully completed a Fitness-for-Duty Evaluation at the Public Safety Infirmary (PSI); and

1.2. Been officially cleared to return to full-duty status.

2. Conduct a verbal debriefing with the participating officer at the completion of each Ti Training scenario.

3. Upon completion of both components of the After-Action Training Program, coordinate with the Range Commander, Firearms Training Unit, to discuss and document the participating member’s performance.

Range Commander, Firearms Training Unit

1. Forward an Administrative Report to the Director, Education and Training Section, via Official Channels, documenting:

1.1. Your evaluation of the participating member’s performance.

1.2. Whether or not the member’s performance falls within acceptable standards.

APPENDIX H

Standard Operating Procedure for Public Affairs Section

H

Standard Operating Procedure For: Public Affairs Section Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March

Standard Operating Procedure

For: Public Affairs Section Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

1 March 2012

Response to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident 1 March 2012 INTRODUCTION This document is intended for all

INTRODUCTION

This document is intended for all members assigned to the Public Affairs Section. It will be utilized whenever the Public Affairs Section is notified of a police-involved shooting incident involving a sworn member of the Baltimore Police Department.

The contents of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are intended to provide a framework upon which members of the Public Affairs Section can base the execution of their duties on behalf of the Police Commissioner. However, at no time does the guidance provided by this document supersede or replace the policies and procedures of the Baltimore Police Department as defined in any applicable General Order or Police Commissioner’s Memorandum.

SCOPE

Consistent with General Order G-10, “Police-Involved Shooting Incidents,” this SOP applies to the following types of incidents:

1. Death of or injury to an officer due to gunfire;

2. Death of or injury to a civilian due to police gunfire; and

3. Intentional discharging of a firearm at an officer or by an officer.

DEFINITION

Police Officer Involved Shooting (POIS) Team - An investigative team tasked with responding to the scene of police-involved shooting incidents. It is comprised of members from the Internal Investigation Division, the Homicide Section, the Crime Lab Section, the Public Affairs Section, and the Firearms Training Unit. Its purpose is to oversee the initial stages of the investigation of a police-involved shooting incident.

AUTHORIZED RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Communication with the General Public and News Media

The Director, Public Affairs Section, or his/her designee, serves as the chief spokesperson for:

1. The Baltimore Police Department.

2. The Police Commissioner, or his/her designee.

3. Members of the Senior Command Staff (Colonel through Deputy Commissioner).

Information Pertaining to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

The Director, Public Affairs Section, is the only employee of the Baltimore Police Department, other than the Police Commissioner (or his/her designee) authorized to speak with, or release information to, any media outlet concerning a police-involved shooting incident.

The identity of the officer(s) involved in a police-involved shooting incident will only be released to the general public and the news media after forty-eight (48) hours have elapsed from the time at which the police-involved shooting incident occurred. Members of the Public Affairs Section will ensure that the officer(s) involved in the incident are given appropriate notice PRIOR TO this release of identifying information to the general public and news media.

Case Files Pertaining to a Police-Involved Shooting Incident

Whenever the Commanding Officer, Homicide Section, determines that an investigation of a police- involved shooting incident has been completed, the Homicide Section’s case file pertaining to that incident shall be made available to the general public/news media in accordance with the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA).

PROCEDURES

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENT - NO INJURIES TO POLICE PERSONNEL

Detective

1. Respond to the scene of the police-involved shooting incident.

2. If necessary, ensure your arrival/presence is noted in the crime scene log.

3. Collect any pertinent information from the crime scene.

4. Ensure this information is verified as factual through the appropriate member of Police Command Staff (District Commander, Commanding Officer, etc.).

5. Forward this verified information directly to the Director, Public Affairs Section, or his/her designee.

NOTE: DO NOT release to any person any information that has not been properly verified and previously forwarded to the Police Commissioner.

6. Identify an appropriate media staging area.

6.1. Ensure that this staging area is not in such close proximity to the scene that it will interfere with on-going investigative efforts.

Director, Public Affairs Section

1. Respond to the scene of the police-involved shooting incident.

2. Ensure that any information that has been gathered about the incident is verified as factual through the Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, or his/her designee.

3.

When members of the media have assembled in the designated media staging area, give a brief statement summarizing:

3.1. Basic facts related to the incident.

3.2. The number of officer(s) involved, as well as their age, gender, rank, and unit of assignment.

3.3. The number of victim(s) involved, as well as their age and gender.

NOTE: In the event that any civilian victim involved in the shooting has been mortally wounded or has succumbed to his/her injuries, no identification of that victim will be given until his/her next of kin have been notified.

POLICE-INVOLVED SHOOTING INCIDENT - POLICE PERSONNEL INJURED OR KILLED

Detective

1. Respond to the scene of the police-involved shooting incident.

2. If necessary, ensure your arrival/presence is noted in the crime scene log.

3. Collect any pertinent information from the crime scene.

4. Ensure this information is verified as factual through the appropriate member of Police Command Staff (District Commander, Commanding Officer, etc.).

5. Forward this verified information directly to the Director, Public Affairs Section, or his/her designee.

6. Remain in communication with the Director, Public Affairs Section.

NOTE: Information relevant to this category of police-involved shooting incident will ONLY be released by the Police Commissioner or his/her designee.

Director, Public Affairs Section

1. Respond to the designated hospital and assist the Police Commissioner as necessary.

2. Identify a suitable media staging area in close proximity to the hospital.

3. Assist the Police Commissioner or his/her designee in gathering and releasing to the media preliminary information concerning the police-involved shooting incident.

APPENDIX I

2012 In-Service Training Curriculum

2012 In-Service Training Curriculum

Underlined course titles correspond directly with a finding from the Independent Review Board.

Day 1

 

0730

– 0800

Roll Call

0800

– 0930

Select Lounge Shooting: Lessons Learned

 

Finding of the Independent Review Board

 

0930

– 1030

Operational Priorities

1030

- 1130

Juvenile Delinquency

1230

– 1300

Identity Fraud

1300

– 1330

Intelligence Basics

1330

– 1600

Law Update

Day 2

 

0730

– 0800

Roll Call

0800

– 0900

Rape / Sexual Assault Investigations

0900

– 1000

PCA

1000

– 1100

Domestic Violence Investigations

1100

– 1200

Bloodborne Pathogens

1300

– 1400

Conditioning Wellness

1400

– 1600

Defense Tactics

Day 3

 

0730

– 0800

Roll Call

0800

– 1600

Crowd Control Training

Day 4

 

0730

– 0800

Roll Call

0800

– 0930

Red Handle Firearms Exercises

0930

– 1030

Shooting Simulator

1030

– 1200

Police on Police Friendly Fire

 

Excited Delirium

 

1300

– 1430

Officer Tactics: Use of Force

 

Simulation Exercises

 

1430

– 1600

Live Fire Cognitive Decision Making

Day 5

 

0730

– 0800

Roll Call

0800

– 0930

Use of Force

0930

– 1230

Firearms Qualifications

1330

– 1430

Firearms Qualifications

1430

– 1600

Officer Survival Tactics

APPENDIX J

In-Service Training Curriculum: Select Lounge Shooting Lessons Learned

J

Select Lounge Shooting January 9, 2011 Independent Review Board Lessons Learned

Select Lounge Shooting January 9, 2011

Independent Review Board Lessons Learned

Officer William Torbit

Officer William Torbit

Background Information

• January 9, 2011: Saturday Night / Early Sunday Morning

• Incident begins at approximately 0115 hours

• Location: “Select Lounge” 415 N. Paca Street

•

Temperature: 21 Degrees

Timeline of Events

00:00 hrs to 01:00 hrs

Post Officers identify that Club Select has a large Crowd. Arrest is made for Disorderly Conduct after a patron has an altercation with Security.

01:13 hrs to 01:16 hrs

Post Officers request for additional units. As units arrive on the scene.

01:17 hrs

Units inside the Lounge decide to shut the club down and request more units to assist.

01:21 hrs

• Officer Torbit is on the scene.

• Large crowds forming in parking lot.

Large line waiting for valet service.Torbit is on the scene. • Large crowds forming in parking lot. Small-scale fights and disputes

Small-scale fights and disputes occurring in parking lot.hrs • Officer Torbit is on the scene. • Large crowds forming in parking lot. Large

01:30:00 hrs

• Officer Torbit diffuses a fight in the parking lot.

•

Words are exchanged between Officer Torbit and Sean Gamble.

• Officer Torbit walks away.

01:30:44 hrs

Officer Torbit is punched from behind, falls to the ground and is surrounded by crowd.

01:30:44 to 01:30:55 hrs

• Officer Torbit is on the ground, being attacked by the crowd.

•

Officer Torbit fires 8 shots, striking Sean Gamble.

01:30:55 to 01:31:01 hrs

Four uniformed officers fire a total of 34 shots.

All shots are fired within a total of 6 seconds.

• Both Officer Torbit and Sean Gamble die on the scene.

•

Four additional people, including another officer, are wounded.

What Could We Have Done Differently?

Independent Review Board

Established February 22, 2011

Appointed to conduct a comprehensive review of the incident; andIndependent Review Board • Established February 22, 2011 Make recommendations on policy and training.

Make recommendations on policy and training.Review Board • Established February 22, 2011 Appointed to conduct a comprehensive review of the incident;

Independent Review Board

James Stewart: Served as a White House Fellow and Law Enforcement Advisor to the US Attorney General. President Appointed Director of National Institute of Justice.

•

Darrel Stephens: Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs

Association.

Chief

of

Police:

Largo

Florida,

New

Port

News,

St.

Petersburg and Charlotte. Instructor at Johns Hopkins.

 
•

Hubert

Williams:

President

of

the

Police

Foundation.

Founding

President

of

the

National

Organization

of

Black

Law

Enforcement

Executives.

•

Stephen Sachs: Maryland Attorney General 1979 -1987.

 
•

Cynthia Lum: Deputy Director of Criminology at George Mason University. Former Baltimore Police Officer.

Findings

• Incident Management

• Crowd Control: Bars / Nightclubs

• Plainclothes Policing

• Firearms Training: Use of Force

Thank you for all your dedication and commitment

Please Remember to Stay Safe

Thank you for all your dedication and commitment Please Remember to Stay Safe

APPENDIX K

Command & Control Training: Casey Haskins

K

Casey P. Haskins

13A Wilson Road, West Point, NY 10996 casey.haskins@gmail.com (706) 587-2993

Expertise:

Strategy and planningdeveloped new planning methods that work better with the laws of complex systems, and with the way people really think and decide

Decision-making processesredesigned the way various organizations make decisions, consistently achieving better results and fewer errors

Developing leaderstaught; wove together training, work assignments and feedback; and adjusted the environment to produce highly capable and ethical leaders

Changing organizational culturesdeveloped practical techniques to increase innovation, agility, and accountability, and to build higher-performing teams

Assessing performancecreated innovative ways to measure the things that matter a lot, and then used those measurements to drive decisions

Managing riskfocused on deeper causes of risks, reducing dangerous accidents more than tenfold; reduced the risk of organizational collapse even while accelerating change

Sharing informationimproved coordination and trust within large organizations, while reducing meetings, email volume, and last-minute crises

Experience: 29 years as a US Army officer, retiring in 2011 as a colonel. Recent assignments include:

Director of Military Instruction at the US Military Academy (2008-2011), West Point, New York. In charge of all

military training for the US Military Academy’s 4500 cadets and for teaching them tactical decision making. Revolutionized both field and classroom instruction, gaining widespread notice throughout the Army in the process, and attracting attention in academia and the popular press.

Commander of the 198 th Infantry Brigade (2006-2008), Fort Benning, Georgia. Oversaw basic training and

advanced training for all the enlisted infantrymen in the Army, leading a brigade with 800 leaders and 6500 soldiers. Created entirely new methods for training and assessment, now being emulated in the US and abroad.

Director of Combined Arms and Tactics at the Infantry School (2005-2006), Fort Benning, Georgia. Invented

“Outcomes-Based Training and Education”, a completely different and more successful way to organize and run training and education; dramatically improved how the Army teaches tactical planning to captains.

Chief Strategic Planner (2004-2005), Baghdad, Iraq. Over 18 months, led the shift from kinetic operations to a focus on stability and protecting the population. Planned support for elections and government reorganizations, and planned the elimination of insurgent strongholds, including Fallujah. Designed and then implemented the “transition teams”: embedded teams of advisors that lived and worked with Iraqi (and now Afghan) units—a key component of US strategy.

Strategist and Peacemaker (2002-2003), Sarajevo, Bosnia. Operating from the US embassy, led the international

community’s planning to reshape Bosnia’s military, police, and intelligence forces. Drafted the Bosnian Law on Defense to fundamentally reorganize the factions’ armies, then shepherded that law through adoption in three parliaments.

Speaker, Writer, and Teacher. Widely sought-after speaker and author, on a wide variety of topics (including all those listed in the “expertise” section), to public, governmental, and professional audiences, including NASA, the Chautauqua Institution, the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychologists, the London School of Economics business faculty, the Columbus State University School of Education, and military audiences. Taught at under-graduate and graduate levels, and to professional organizations and executives; recipient of several teaching awards.

Education:

Bachelor of Science, US Military Academy, West Point, 1982

Masters of Military Arts and Sciences, US Army CGSC, 1996

Visiting Defense Fellow, Queen’s University, Ontario 2003-2004

Earlier Experience:

Battalion Commander (2000-2002)

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Commanded a Basic Training battalion consisting of five companies, each 240-strong. Transformed civilians into soldiers. Completely changed the organizational culture, focusing on developing and empowering junior leaders and ensuring everyone understood why they had to do things. Short-term payoff included better training and a dramatic increase in morale and retention. Long-term payoff evident in testimonials from Iraq and Afghanistan citing better performance in combat.

Operations Officer for an Internal Consulting Team (1998-2000)

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Coordinated and organized activities for a team consisting of 19 officers and 22 contractors. Responsible for supporting training of commanding generals and their headquarters around the world. Consultant projects included assisting the Supreme Allied Commander during the Kosovo air war, and helping to develop a series of experiments as part of the Army’s transformation and modernization. Guest speaker at a number of “change management” and transformation conferences.

Operations Officer (1996-1998)

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Operations officer, first for an infantry battalion (650 soldiers), and then for a brigade (~4000 soldiers). Responsible for operations, plans, and training. Key accomplishments included creating a very robust leader development program in the battalion; success at one of the most complex training exercises ever at the National Training Center; and organizing and successfully executing a large- scale, 7-month-long field experiment in which the brigade, working with over 90 corporations, employed, integrated, and provided feedback on over twenty-five new weapons and digital systems.

Student, Command and General Staff College (1995-1996)

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Operations officer and chief planner for the only group of students in over 30 years to “win” the battle in a large simulation during the course’s final, two-week long exercise. While attending the course, earned a master’s degree, with a thesis examining the strategic implications of transnational terrorist and criminal groups.

Special Operations Plans Officer, Europe (1993-1995)

Frankfurt, then Heidelberg, Germany

Responsible for integrating Special Operations Forces into V Corps’s activities. Served as a liaison between conventional and Special Operations and as a “translator” between the two, including serving as the corps’s lead planner for unconventional and counterinsurgency operations. Separately, conducted missions in Bosnia and Rwanda during conflicts.

Ranger Company Commander (1992-1993)

Fort Benning, Georgia

Commanded a 220-person Ranger company. Responsible for every aspect of their training, care, and discipline. Planned and executed training and participated in no-notice exercises testing combat readiness. Conducted training throughout the US, as well as Central and South America, Europe, and Asia.

Assistant Operations Officer (1990-1992)

Fort Benning, Georgia

Coordinated all deployments, training plans, and resources for 3rd Ranger Battalion. Served in the field as the operations officer in the alternate command post. Rewrote various standard operating procedures; coordinated with many agencies and units and then rewrote Fort Benning’s range regulation to enable the battalion to conduct multiple live-fire exercises simultaneously.

Infantry Company Commander (1988-1989)

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Commanded a 110-soldier mechanized infantry company. Responsible for every aspect of training, care, and discipline. Planned and executed an aggressive training program that resulted in our company being selected from the 16 in the brigade to be the “infiltration company”, receiving the most difficult missions, with the least information, and the least time to prepare. Achieved superior results despite missing 10 of 12 squad leaders, by training and empowering very junior soldiers to fill the positions.

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Brigade Training Officer and Brigade Plans Officer (1986-1988)

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Responsible for coordinating all the training plans and resources for 24 diverse units. Coached over 25 inexperienced officers through the process of developing sensible training plans, and served as the leader of the brigade commander’s assessment team. Then served as the chief tactical planner for a different brigade that spent over 50% of its time conducting tactical training, at home station and at the National Training Center in California. Known for being able to brief solid plans after only a brief conversation with the brigade commander, with no time to write anything down.

Battalion Logistics Officer (1984-1985)

West Berlin, Germany

Planned and oversaw all logistical support for a 700-man infantry battalion, in garrison, during deployments, and during tactical training in the field. Provided staff supervision to over 300 soldiers. Responsible for all supplies, transportation, maintenance, food, water, and medical support.

Reconnaissance Platoon Leader (1983-1984)

West Berlin, Germany

Led the battalion’s 28-soldier reconnaissance platoon with the mission of operating in small teams behind enemy lines. Developed and led all training, in Berlin and at training centers in West Germany. Created partnerships with the Berlin Police and with British and French infantry battalions. Served as an exchange officer for nearly six months in a British battalion.

Rifle Platoon Leader (1983)

West Berlin, Germany

Led a 35-soldier platoon with the primary mission of defending in Berlin against a Soviet attack. Responsible for training, care, and discipline of the platoon. Known for innovative tactics, including two training exercises in which the platoon succeeded at supposedly impossible missions.

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Baltimore Police Department (BPD) Command and Control Training

Prepared by Casey Haskins, November 13, 2011

Concept:

General. A five-day course on “command and control” of police forces. The course will focus on effective control of unexpected operations that are filled with ambiguity and stress, and that have the potential to spin rapidly out of control. The “students” (participants) will be the BPD’s senior commanders and deputy commanders (majors and deputy majors). I will be the lead instructor, assisted by two others. Each iteration of the course should have 10-15 participants. The small student-teacher ratio is necessary to ensure enough individual attention for each participant.

Methodology. A combination of seminar, classroom exercises, and field exercises. The schedule will be structured, but relatively loosely. The intent is to remain flexible, taking advantage of opportunities and not advancing until we are comfortable that the participants are ready. We will not measure success by what we teach, but only by what they learn.

The approach will be to require participants to solve problems of increasing difficulty, and then to help them reflect on their solutions and adjust their behavior for the next time. While the training will make reference to the federal, interagency “Incident Command System” (ICS), we will not attempt to teach them either ICS, or any other standard operating procedure—or, indeed, any other type of approved solution. We will, in fact, not focus on checklists or procedures at all. Instead, we will help participants learn to understand command and control problems and to solve them, combining intuitive and deliberate thinking. Along the way, we will thoroughly ground them in a few basic techniques useful in a wide variety of situations. In other words, we want to help the participants recalibrate their instincts and intuition, we want to make them comfortable thinking through each problem and avoiding common pitfalls (including those their intuition can lead them into), and we want to equip them with some basic tools that will help them think through and solve this type of problem.

Other aims. We will accomplish two more things. First, we plan to equip the participants not only with the ability to command and control police forces, but more broadly, to train their subordinates to do so as well. This means we will devote a portion of the course to discussions about learning and about training and teaching, and we will provide the participants with some techniques to help them become better

trainers. Second, at the specific request of the Police Commissioner, we will also try to identify likely “next steps”, should the BPD choose to continue in this direction.

Outcomes: At the conclusion of training, each participant will be able to:

Explain the practical requirements and tradeoffs associated with controlling forces during stressful, ambiguous situations

Make sense of confusing situations and identify appropriate police actions

Control forces effectively in both preplanned and unexpected incidents

Lead after-action reviews that promote the organization’s learning

Identify opportunities to incorporate training into ongoing operations

Training events:

Understanding

Identifying danger points

Identifying critical points

“Summarize” the situation drills

Making Decisions

Commander location

Commander activities

Deliberate planning

CRM (crew resource management) and questioning assumptions

Building in flexibility

Communicating

Orders

Reporting

Tracking

Visualization

Receiving forces and tracking departing forces

Operations tracking

Dealing with multiple things at once

Command post drills

Delegating and unity of command

Using reserves

Training

How we learn—feeling our way to solutions, then thinking our way through adjustments

How we teach

AARs

Tentative Schedule:

Course Layout

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Opening discussion / expectations

Scenario

Shift change

Summarize drills

Discuss training

plans

Teamwork exercises

Decision making and social pressures

Observe operations

Training discussion

Unit SOPs

Receiving new

Discussion