Review: Surely You Are Joking, Monsieur Latour!

Author(s): Olga Amsterdamska Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 495-504 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/689826 . Accessed: 15/05/2011 02:39
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BOOK REVIEW

SurelyYouAre Joking, MonsieurLatour!

Science in Action, by Bruno Latour. Milton Keynes: Open University Press: 1987, 274 pp. $25.00. Also available in paper from Harvard University Press, $12.95.
In reviewing his book, if I were to adopt Bruno Latour's ideas about science, I would certainly ignore its contents and avoid interpreting it. Instead, I would have to consider what he does in order to "weaken [his] enemies, paralyse those [he] cannot weaken, help [his] allies if they are attacked, ensure safe communications with those who supply [him] with indisputable instruments, oblige [his] enemies to fight one another" (p. 37). To write a science in action review of Science in Action would mean that instead of asking what this book teaches us about science, about the production of scientific knowledge, or about the organization of the scientific community, I would have to examine how this book is being used by others. I would have to assume that until it is read, it does not even exist and that the issue of whether it is correct or not depends entirely on how it is read. Reviewing Latour's book in his own terms would mean that I would never ask whether his questions are pertinent or his problems well posed; instead, I would have to consider whose spokesperson he is, whose "obligatory translation passage" he has become, and how many allies he has already enrolled. But, although the responsibility to review this book is worrisome, I will not try to examine the strength, length, or composition of his network but will focus instead on his arguments, his problems, and his solutions. In doing so, I will assume that Latour himself is trying to understand what science is and how it works rather than trying to win a war or to control and dominate others. Moreover, I will try to interpret Science in Action as accurately as I can, even though its author gives me his permission to make it say whatever I want and assures me that "all deformations are fair" (p. 40). Science in Action is ostensibly written as a guide for nonscientists. In an attempt to demystify science, Latour employs a naive, lay observer who encounters scientific texts, follows scientists to their laboratories and into the field, and accompanies them in their attempts to secure the support of others. In the Cartesian tradition of fundamental doubt, the bewildered layman becomes a rhetorical anthropologist whose questioning, undistorted by received views and prejudices, will allow us, the readers, to grasp the underlying principles of science.
Science, Technology,& HumanValues,Vol. 15 No. 4, Fall 1990 495-504 ? 1990 Sage Publications,Inc. 495

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Historyhas taughtus, of course, thatno one has ever succeededin creatinga truly is naive "naiveoutsider,"and Latour's"dissenter" no exception. Even thoughhe has had to "abandonknowledge about knowledge"(p. 7), he certainlyhas not forgotten whatwarandpolitics are all about;and equippedwith this Machiavellianview of the world aroundhim, he attemptsto interpretscience in the only terms he knows. So, or where others see reasonedargumentsor evidence or interpretation experiments, Latour'soutsidersees only attemptsto dominate,strategiesforwinningbattles,means of attack,trialsof strength,and otherforms of violence. Moreover,in his attemptsto representscience, he is also quite willing to employ some very peculiarmeans and argumentsin orderto try to enroll us in his vision of science. The travelsof the "naiveoutsider" "science begin when, in his effortto understand in the making,"he attemptsto follow some controversies.Selectingbits of arguments, the outsider notices that as people disagree with one another,they surroundthe statementsthey make with eitherpositive or negativemodalitiesand thatwhen they This allows him to define facts as those statements agree, these modalitiesdisappear. that are strippedof all modalities, that is, those "devoid of any trace of ownership, construction,time and place" (p. 23). Since in any debate-scientific or not-statements made by others are either surroundedwith modalities or not, the outsider concludes, "A sentencemay be made more of a fact or more of an artefactdepending on how it is insertedinto other sentences"(p. 25). Latour'sfirst principleis a direct consequenceof this observation;it states, "The fate of facts and machinesis in later users'hands;theirqualitiesarethusa consequence,not a cause, of a collective action" to (p. 259). Since this appears be one of themost directproofsof social constructivism, let us examine it more closely. The argumentaboutfacts has the following structure: 1. A fact is a statementthatis devoid of any modalities. 2. When a statementis collectively treatedas a fact, it is strippedof modalities. 3. Treatinga statementas a fact causes it to be a fact. This is an impeccableargument long as we remember as 's Latour initial definitionof a fact. When we do rememberthis initial definition,the conclusion states only that deleting modalitiesfrom a statementcauses it to be a nonmodalizedstatement.The problem is that in the book, the definition of a fact and the interestingconclusion Latouris able to draw from it are separatedby examples of various scientific and political debates about hormones,MX weapons, and fuel cells, and by discussions about the constructionof machines.Trying to disentangleLatour'sbyzantinenumberedsentencesfromthreedifferentcontroversies,andencouragedalongby Latour's passing referencesto the truthvalues of statementsthatare being either believed or disbelieved, most of us, I suspect, by the time we encounter Latour's ingenious conclusion, no longer consider a fact to be any unmodalizedstatement,but instead define a factcommonsensicallyas a statementthatis believed to be trueof the world. And, while I am quite willing to agree with Latourthat the removal of modalities causes the removalof modalities,I am much less eagerto accede to his claim thatthe

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removalof modalities-even a collective removalof modalities-is a cause and not a consequenceof either a statement'sbeing trueof the world or of anybody's belief thata statementis trueof the world. I would not like to exclude the possibility that one of these days Latourwill be able to convince me that nothing is either fact or of fiction but talkingmakes it so, but for the moment I am afraidhis demonstration the extraordinary powers of languageleaves much to be desired. There are two reasons why I have tried to reconstructLatour'sargumentabout facts in such detail. First,the principlethat"the fate of facts is in laterusers' hands" is so fundamentalto Latour's study that the entire book could be considered its used in this case is used by Latour elaboration; second, the methodof argumentation the repeatedlythroughout book. The most fundamentalassumptionunderlyingLatour'sfirst principleis that we areunableto make any distinctionsbetween thingsand theirrepresentations: Things are what we collectively representthem to be, nothing more and nothing less. Accordingly,a true statementis a statementwe express as true, natureis what we collectively representas nature,a fact is what we collectively express as a factual proposition.No otherconditionsneed to be met.' These statementsserve as undeclared premisesfor manyof Latour'smost provocative propositions.It is from such premisesthatLatourmanagesto derivestatements thatappearrevolutionary innovativebecauseof ourlinguistichabitof distinguishand ing between things and ideas about things but that,on closer inspection,turnout to be merely tautologies.In fact, Latouris so adeptat this procedurethathe quite often succeeds in derivingtwo tautologiesfromthe same premisein a way thatmakesthem appearcontradictory. Many examples of this are easy to track down because they are uttered by a two-faced Janusrepresenting old "ready-made the science" and the young "science in the making." For example, the two mouths of Janus make the following two which Latourpresentsas contradictory: old Janussays, "Whenthings The statements, aretruethey hold,"while the young Januscounterswith, "Whenthingshold they start becoming true"(p. 12). Latourmaintainsthat"thingshold" when controversiesare closed and people no longer question the facts. But, if things are true when people statethey aretrue,andthings hold when people no longerquestionthem, thenthe old Janusis simply statingthat"whenpeople state thatsomethingis true,they no longer question it,"while the young Janusbravelycontradictshim by declaringthat"when people no longer questionsomething,they startbelieving it to be true."The appearance of a contradiction between the two statements, ourimpressionthatthe young and Janus is saying something rathernew and daring, both stem from the fact that we are generallydo not thinkthattruestatements simply andexclusively those statements we state as being true(or those we do not argueabout). The last example of this reasoning that I will discuss here-though many more can be found-is containedin Latour'sdiscussion of relativismand realism.First,as a careful readingof his thirdrule of method makes clear, Latourassumes that there is no differencebetween Natureandtherepresentation Nature.The principlestates, of "Since the settlementof a controversyis the cause of Nature'srepresentation, the not

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consequence, we can never use the outcome-Nature-to explain how and why a controversyhas been settled"(p. 99, italics added;also note the subtleshift herefrom to representation the thing itself, Nature).Latourrepeatedlyuses the termsNatures of voice or Nature (pp. 94-100), as if naturewere "somethingout there,independent Janus.Theold face ourrepresentations." Finally,he presentsus with the double-faced asserts conventionally that "Natureis the cause that allowed controversies to be settled,"while the young face makes the more radicalclaim that"Naturewill be the consequenceof the settlement"(p. 99). But if natureis what we collectivelyrepresent of natureto be, then, of course, it is the case that"a sharedrepresentation Natureis the cause that allowed controversiesto be settled,"and that"a sharedrepresentation of nature will be the consequence of the settlement of a controversy (about that Not between these two staterepresentation)." only is there nothing contradictory ments, but all they manage to say is thatthe egg is the cause of the chicken, and the chicken is the cause of the egg. The causal terminologyin this old riddleis no more let peculiarthan Latour'suse of causal terminology.Parenthetically, me remarkthat in a recentpublication reflexivity,Latourrejectsall causalexplanationsandasserts on for that"the belief in causes and effect is always, in some sense, the admiration a chain of commandor the hatredof a mob looking for someone to stone."2 I gather from the same article that being self-contradictory something to be admired,but is still I would like to ask whetherthe omnipresenceof a causal vocabularyin Science in Action is a sign of Latour's admirationfor chains of command, or is it only a reflectionof his desire to stone someone? Latour'smode of argumentsucceeds only because he shifts deftly back and forth to from the language of representation the language of "reality." This shifting also allows him to make statementsthatare not concealed tautologiesbut thatmake-as far as I can see-precious little sense. For example, Latourargues that by making decisions to proceedwith the buildingof a machineon the basis of certainarguments, we not only make it more likely thatthe machinewill be built, but we also make the argumentswe used "more right."The problemwith Latour'sformulationis that it makes it impossible for anyone ever to proceed on wrong premises.If you manage to convince others that we should be building fuel cells because they are more efficient, then by thatvery act you have not only increasedthe chances thatfuel cells will be built and thattheirefficiency will eventuallybe tested, but you have also by some mysteriouspower made the statement,"fuel cells are more efficient,""more right." Now there is obviously a sense in which we often test propositions by examiningwhetheror not theirconsequenceshold. But it is by no meansthe case that every action based on a given premise increases the correctnessof this premise. Testingthe validity of a statementis not a matterof discoveringwhetherpeople have adopted this statementas the basis for their behavior.For example, when, on the assumptionthattramsare fasterthanbuses, 1 decide thatgoing home on a tramwill be fasterthantakinga bus, I do not believe even for a momentthatby making such a decision I have mademy initial assumptionmore likely to have been right;andI do not see why, when scientists decide to build a particularkind of computeron the assumptionthat such a computercould be faster, more efficient, or cheaper,they

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necessarilymake these assumptions"more right,"even if, at the end of their work, theyhave managedto redefinewhat they considerto be efficient,fast, or inexpensive. (Letme addthatthis is a very pernicioussortof logic, for it allows us to say thatwhen the South Africangovernment'sbelief thatBlacks are inferiorserves as the basis for the policy of apartheid, this very fact it somehow becomes "moreright").Acting by on the basis of certainassumptionsdoes not necessarily influenceour evaluationof these assumptions as either true or false, even if the action thus performed is successful. Incidentally,it should be clear that this problemhas nothing to do with how farwe arewilling to go in relativizingto particular groupsor culturesthevalidity of statementsor methods. It does, however, have a lot to do with our usual ways of using such words as right, correct, or true, and with our general ideas, however the changingandculturallyspecific they may be, abouttestingor ascertaining validity of statements. DecipheringLatour'slogical and verbalpyrotechnicsmight be fun,because he is But indeedan adeptrhetorician. ratherthancontinuingto follow this maze, I would innovativepropositions, like to turnto one of his genuinely and not just apparently and to ask what kind of understandingof science we attain when we adopt his suggestion to, as he puts it, "considersymmetricallythe efforts to enroll humanand resources" 258). Latourentreatsus to considerscience andtechnology non-human (p. as a heterogeneousnetwork and to abandon all distinctionsbetween humans and between nature,culture,and society; between science and technology; nonhumans; between what used to be called the knowing subject and the various objects of scientific inquiry; between science as a body of knowledge and science as the collective practiceof a group;and,of course,betweenscience andits context.Briefly summarized,Latour'snetworktheoryof science and technology treatsresearchas a kind of war whose only objective is domination.Winningthe "proofrace"consists of establishingnetworksconsisting of a large numberof allies whose behaviorone can controlso as to "makedissent impossible"(p. 103). Networksemergewhen both "humanandnon-humanresources"areenrolledand the scientistbecomes an "obligatory translationpassage"for a heterogeneousgroup of allies. The more allies one has managed to enroll, and the strongerthe links one has establishedamong them, the more difficultit becomes for othersto challenge one's domination. resourcesso as to make them Latourarguesthat in orderto enroll "non-human" partof a network,scientists generatenew objects in theirlaboratories,submit them become theirspokesperand to "trialsof strength," by winning these confrontations and allies"one has to maketheminterested to control sons. Similarly,to enroll"human their behavior. These people one has enrolled may be industrialistswho commit resources for a particularproject, governmentofficials who fund research,social groupswho are convinced to act on the basis of scientists'findings or inventions,or scientists' colleagues who use a claim or machine for purposesof furtherresearch; but these differencesare irrelevant Latouras long as all these actors-human and to nonhuman-are caught in the network,makingit longer and stronger.In fact, Latour to of argues thatit is unimportant examine either the characteristics the nodes of the network or the nature of the alliances; "the only question that really matters,"

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according to Latour,is "is this new association weaker or stronger than that one" (p. 127). It is not easy to reconcileLatour'srealismwith his constructivism. essentially The realistidea thatscientists are engaged in a kind of war with natural objects, in which they can either succeed or fail in the trial of strengthwith a particularobject of research,is not easily compatiblewith his constructivistand relativistnotion thatthe fate of claims (or objects or machines) is in the hands of later users. But even if it were possible to reconcile these two notions by formulatingsome moderateversion of constructivism to (which I am prettysurewouldbe unacceptable Latour),what- if bothpeople distinctions,treating anything-do we gain by denying all the traditional andthe objectsof researchas "actors," replacingall conceivablerelationsamong and people and things by the single concept of enrollment? Let us look at some of Latour'sown examples.Whydid WatsonandCricksucceed where Pauling failed? Because Watson and Crick created a stronger network by enrollingmore people who were unableto breakthe links between DNA andWatson and Crick. Pauling'sstrategyfor enrollingothersobviously failed when Watsonand Crickdiscoveredthatdespitehis reputation his powerfulfriends,theycouldbreak and the links between the three strands of his DNA model with a bit of "freshmen Latourcannoteven addressthequestionof whythe linksbetweenWatson chemistry." and Crickand theirDNA model resistedall attemptsto sever them,while "freshman chemistry"was strongerthana Nobel Prize winner,because we are not supposedto be interestedin the natureof alliances but only in theirstrengthand because, in any case, these alliances have no intrinsicqualitiesat all. Why did Rontgenmanageto establishtheexistenceof X rayswhile Blondlotfailed to establish the existence of N rays? Because Rontgenbuilt a strong and lengthy networkand nobody was able to sever the links between him and his rays. On the other hand, Blondlot's networkwas destroyedby RobertWood when he, as Latour Blondlotto the N-rays."Obviously,since putsit, "severedthe solid links thatattached Wood was able to sever these links, they must not have been very strong;but the questionof what made them weak is out of order. Why did Koch fail to develop a vaccine against tuberculosis while Pasteur succeeded in developing a vaccine against anthrax? Well, we know about Pasteur's skill in shapingand enrolling allies-microbes, farmers,hygienists, even doctorsand it is clearthatKoch simply did notsucceed in his enrollment driveor,in thewords of Latour,"couldnot deliver on his ostensible promise"(p. 111). I think these examples make it ratherclear that with the networkmodel and the concept of enrollmentwe can easily accountfor anything,no matterwhat happens. Pauling'smodelmighthavebeen accepted;Rontgenshownto be a fraud,andBlondlot a great physicist; Koch might have been hailed as the inventorof the treatmentfor tuberculosis,and Pasteurmight havebeen totallyforgotten;but Latour'sexplanatory frameworkwould need no adjustmentat all. But perhaps this is unfair.After all, Latour'snetworkmodel sharesits foolproof character with a numberof othersocial theories,and if thatwere its only flaw, perhapsit could still be of service in describing and interpreting science.

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In what way, however, does the networkmodel throw any light on the natureof the processes by which Pasteur,Rontgen, and Watson and Crick succeeded, while Koch, Blondlot and Paulingfailed? We know thatPasteur,Rontgen,andWatsonand Crickmanagedto createstrong networksby linking togethera numberof heterogeneous allies. Even if we were able to list all these allies, we could not-if we follow Latour-know how any one of them contributedto the success or failure of the of scientist.Since we arenot to inquireinto the character the relationships among the elements of a network,we have no means of knowing which allies count and what made the links forged by these scientists strong;the only sign of theirstrengthis that they have not been severed. In other words, since Latour'sidea of a heterogeneous of networkmakes it impossible to inquireinto the characteristics differentkinds of alliance alliances,all thathe is finally able to say aboutthe strengthof any particular is that it is strongonly when it cannotbe severed, and thatit cannotbe severed only if it is strong. Latourcould probablyderive from this yet anotherpseudoparadox, arguingwith the voice of one Janusthat the strengthof an alliance is a consequence of enrollmentand with the voice of the other thatenrollmentis a consequenceof the strengthof an alliance. Yet this does not make his account of networks any more of representations enlighteningthanhis earlieraccountsof how facts areconstructed, natureestablished,and machinesmade to work. But what does it mean to enroll a microbeor an electron,let alone to be enrolled by one? In what way is enrolling the microbe the same as enrolling a group of interestedfarmersor enrolling someone to finance a given projectequivalentto the enrollmentof a groupof colleagues?Does each actantcontributeto success or failure in the same way? Do scientists enroll electrons for the same reasons they enroll industrialists?Is the recruitmentof a police force or an army equivalent to the enrollmentof a groupof otherscientists?Does enrollmentreallymeanthe same thing in all these cases? It seems to me thatthe goals, the means,andthe resultsof enrolling such differentkinds of "allies" are hardly comparable,and that the eliminationof differencesamongthemleads only to confusion. It would be absurdto use arguments research. to tryto convince a microbeto give a scientistsome extrafundingfor further Making the laboratoryan "obligatory translationpassage" for a farmer will not impresson a microbeits obligationto behave as the scientist desires.Even if we were to go along with Latour'sidea that the exercise of control over things and people is how this the only goal of scientist research,we would still be unable to understand authorityis achieved and used, without making distinctions among the kinds of control to which the differentcategories of actorsand actantscan be subjected,and among the variousmeansby which dominationcan be exercised over differentkinds of actorsand actants. Latour'sinsistencethatwinning is the only thing thatmattersin science has some very perniciousimplications,especially when combinedwith his attemptto obliterate all distinctionsbetween the variousmeans and methodsthatcan be used to exercise control over people and objects. To put it bluntly, Latour'sepistemology insists on the idea thatmightmakesright,while his sociology eliminatesall distinctionsbetween the variousmeans thatcan be used to achieve controlover things or people. Latour's

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of notionof examiningonly the strengthand not the character alliancesmeans thatit no longer matterswhetherthe scientist's victory is assuredby the use of arguments orby success in eliminatingopponentsphysically,whetherenrollmenttakesplace by experimentsthatconvince othersor by fraud,whetherallies areconvinced performing course of action is of benefit or whetherthey are being intimidated thata particular orsimply bought. Using Latour'slogic and his vocabulary,it appearsnot only that Lysenkowas a great scientist but also that the methods he used to assure his victory over Soviet are genetics and agriculture a superbexample of sound scientific strategy.After all, Lysenkomanagedto builda long andstrongnetworkby enlistingStalin,who "arrayed and drilled its troops" (p. 56) from the Narodnyi KomissariatVnutrennikhDel (NKVD), and the network thus constructed clearly made all "dissentimpossible" (p. 103). Lysenko knew exactly how to "intimidateor to force most people out" (p. 44), how to "forcethem into accepting a claim as a fact"(p. 62), how to ensure thatany "dissident[is] driven into isolation"(p. 62), and "how to be 2000 against one" (p. 50). Latour'sterminologyfits Lysenko's activities betterthan those of any otherscientist I can think of. And the fact that he accomplishedhis goal of control anddominationby making sure thathis opponentswere sent off to die in the Gulag, by literally "displacing"the peasants against their will, and by winning trials of strengthwith grain thanksto fake data, would not-if we were to accept Latour's model-make his achievementany less scientific.3 Lysenko'sstatus as a scientist can be fully appreciatedonly if it is comparedto thatof a failure, such as Galileo. Galileo, as Latourpoints out, deluded himself by thinkingthatscience can be weak and that"a thousandDemosthenesand a thousand Aristotleswould be left in the lurchby any averageman who happenedto hit on the truthfor himself"(p. 32). As a resultof his lack of appreciation power, strength, for allies, tactics, enlistment-not to mention his compatriot Machiavelli-Galileo showed himself to be a poor scientistby failing to enroll the church.We know what this failurecost him:house arrestandisolation.But as Latourremindsus, "anisolated personbuilds only dreams,claims and feelings, not facts"(p. 41). Latour's indifference to the means and methods of enrollment and control, combined with his constantvocabularyof war and his assurancethatthe "similarity not between the proof raceand the armsrace is not a metaphor" 172), undermines (p. only science or technology but also our own traditionsof discourse tout court. We may well be unable to provide an unequivocal demarcationbetween science and or nonscience, to formulatean ahistoricaldefinition of rationality, to ensure a firm foundationfor knowledge;but it does not follow fromthis thatall methodsof gaining assent or reachingconsensus are equivalent.Do we reallywant to believe thatthere is no differencebetween the power of arms,of dictatorsand policemen, and of what we in our culturallyspecific way call rationalargument? Are we preparedto agree with the conclusion thatit mattersnot at all what we say andhow we justify what we aresaying as long as we makeothersbelieve us andmanageto enrollthem,no matter by what means and for what purpose?And if winning is the only thing thatmatters, if being right is nothingelse thanbeing strong, if the means by which variousgoals

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areaccomplishedare a matterof indifference,then should we not ask ourselveswhat we are afterand what methodswe are preparedto use? Latouris perfectly aware of these consequences of his position for our own enterprise.In the work on reflexivity I mentioned earlier,he asks, "If the work of explaining something is that of empire-building,should we explain something?Do we really want to participatein network-building?. . . Do we lust for power and recognition?Do we want to imitatethe ethos and styles of science?" His answerto these questionsis a "qualifiedno." But to rejectpower and empirebuildingit is also necessaryto rejectthe ideal of explanation.Accordingly,Latourassertsthat"theideal thanaiming at explanations of explanation... is not a desirablegoal" and thatrather we shouldstriveto be "tellingstories"(p. 164). Apartfromthe fact thatin thismanner we can prettymuch abandonall responsibilityfor whatwe aresaying, I wonderwhat stories we could be telling one anotherif we were seriously sort of nonexplanatory tryingto avoid the chargeof networkbuilding?Are there any stories so "innocent" that they could not be regardedas stratagemsin a struggle for power and control? First,such powerless stories would have to be inconsistentand incoherent,since to make them either consistent or coherentwould mean that we are trying to make it Second, impossiblefor othersto "severthe links between the elementsof a network." we would have to make sure our storiescould not possibly be acceptableas accurate or true, since both truthand accuracymight increasethe dangerof our inadvertent enrollmentof some well-meaningreaders.Third,our stories would have to be about nothing at all, for if they were about people or things or ideas, we would become spokespersonsfor other actorsand again find ourselves building a network.Fourth, we would have to abandonall attemptsto reachan audience,since an audiencemight come to like ourstoriesandfinditself enrolled.Fifth,we would have to stopdiscussing are ourstorieswith othersor disagreeingwith otherpeople's stories,since arguments only a means of increasingour own control and domination.Somehow, the ideal of a social science whose only goal is to tell inconsistent,false, and incoherentstories about nothing in particulardoes not strike me as very appealing or sufficiently ambitious. Olga Amsterdamska Universityof Amsterdam

Notes
1. This identificationof things and representations goes far beyond any consensus theory of truth, for it eliminates from considerationshared belief and shared reasons for holding beliefs. A statementis not a fact when people (collectively) believe it and formulate particular reasons for believing it, but when they state it as a fact, removingthe modalities.For Tarski's "thestatement'snow is white' is trueif snow is white," Latourwould substitutesomethinglike "thestatement'snow is white' is trueif we say 'snow is white'." Even Latourhimself, however, is unableto remainconsistentlywithin this semiological universe,and in his own languagehe makesconstantreferencesto the distinctionbetween thingsand theirrepresentations, exploiting it for his own argumentative purposes.

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2. Latour(1988). 3. Lysenko's case is a favorite example cited in antirelativistarguments,but I am not referringto this case here in orderto argueagainstepistemologicalrelativism.My point is not thatthereare some absoluteand historicallyunchangingcriteriaaccordingto which Lysenko's version of genetics can be judged inadequate thatthe methodsto which Lysenkoresortedin but orderto ensurehis victory are generally not consideredto be either acceptableor usual means of settling scientific controversiesor achieving consensus in science. Latour'srefusal to make distinctionsbetween various kinds of enrollmenteliminates the possibility of seeing some of these means of settling controversies or reaching consensus as either typical of scientific discourseor,alternatively, withinits conventions.And the impressionthatit makes unacceptable no differencehow consensus is achieved is supportedstylisticallyby the constantrecourseto a warlike vocabularythat, indeed, fits cases such as that of Lysenkomuch betterthan it fits the more typical instancesof scientific controversy.

Reference
B. An In Latour, 1988. The politics of explanation: alternative. Knowledgeand reflexivity, edited by S. Woolgar,162. London:Sage.