CASES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1. Eliseo F. Soriano v. Ma Consoliza P. Laguardia, April 29, 2009 2. Rodolfo Navarro v.

Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, February 10, 2010 3. City Engineer of Baguio v. Rolando Baniqued, November 26, 2008 4. Distileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. v. Advertising Board of the Philippines, November 28, 2008 5. Gov. Orlando Fua v. The Commission on Audit, December 4, 2009 6. Municipality of Pateros v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, June 16, 2009 7. Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 scra 366 proprietary or governmental functions of GOCC 8. Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. 373 scra 316 filing of administrative rules and regulations with UP Law Center; requirement of publication 9. Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 356 scra 174 10.Simon Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 scra 117 CASES FOR LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 11. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, December 18, 2008 Ministerial function 12. Ferdinand Topacio v. Assoc. Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Ong, December 18, 2008- Quo Warranto 13. The Office of the Ombudsman v. Ramon Galicia, October 10, 2008 Jurisdiction 14. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, December 23, 2008 Statutory Liability under the Civil Code 15. Office of the Court Administrator v. Emma Annie Arafiles, July 14, 2008- Habitual Tardiness 16. Ruben Galero v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, July 21, 2008 Simple Neglect of Duty 17. Manicam Bascasar v. Civil Service Commission, January 20, 2009 Good Faith as Defense 18. Rash C. Roque v. Court of Appeals, July 23, 2008 Simple Neglect of Duty 19. Office of the Ombudsman v. Ricardo Evangelista, March 13, 2009 Preventive Suspension 20. Office of the Ombudsman v. Marian and Maricar Torres, January 29, 2008 - Condonation 21. Department of Education v. Godofredo G. Cuanan, December 16, 2008 Appeal by the disciplinary authority 22. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rolando L. Magno, November 27, 2008 Appeal 23. In Re: Judge Antonio Alano, June 27, 2008 Retirement Benefits CASES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Brother Eli vs. Laguardia Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan): Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!] Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB. HELD: The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)

Rodolfo Navarro v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional? Suggested Answer: February 10, 2010 Ruling No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010) The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions. April 12, 2011 Ruling Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID. The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities

which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. Fua, Jr. vs. COA FACTS:

ISSUE:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President GMA for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus. Petitioner wrote a letter to the President reiterating said request. On said letter, the President then wrote a marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION. The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL), Province of Siquijor, and thereafter, she issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, respectively. In AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, Ms. Jaugan questioned the legality of the payment of said bonuses, citing Section 4.1 of Budget Circular No. 2003-7 limiting the grant of Extra Christmas Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section 325 (a) of the Local Government Code imposing a 55% limitation on Personal Services expenditures. AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, COA Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Regional Cluster Director. From said denial, petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO-Local). However, the COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Directors Notice of Disallowance. Aggrieved by the foregoing Decision of the COA-LAO-Local, petitioner filed a Petition forCertiorari, under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:

Yes. By immediately filing the present petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. Rule VI, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states that: The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper. The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit, would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on petitioners letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required approval. It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce evidence to prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. Thus, since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission Proper under the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a writ of certiorari, because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him.

Petitioner having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by the COA-LAO-Local has become final and executory. Consequently, the Decision of the COA-LAO-Local can no longer be altered or modified. Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him. When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION vs THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT FACTS : Philsa is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount ofP5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin andP6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and CedricP. Leyson. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. They were again allegedly forced by their foreign employer to sign a third contract which increased their workhours from 48hours to60hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to thePhilippines. Upon their arrival in thePhilippines, private respondents demanded from petitionerPhilsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before thePOEA against petitionerPhilsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. On t he aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the

employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, thePOEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 ordering respondentPHILSA to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan. In a decision dated July 26, 1989 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. The awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution datedOctober 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply withthe Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of thePOEA on private respondents' money claims, thePOEA issued a separateOrder dated August 29, 1988 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In thisOrder, thePOEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. Under thePOEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of thePOEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 31, 1988Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in anOrder dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailedOrder.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the petitioner can beheld liable for illegal exaction asPOEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication. 2. Whether or not the public respondenthas acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion inholding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries for the supreme court itselfhas already absolved petitioner from this charge. HELD 1. No. The administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering thatPOEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authorityholders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling inT aadavs. T uvera. In the case ofPhil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namelyPhilippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement inT aadavs. T uvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions. 2. Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by thePOEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of thePOEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separateOrder." The fact that petitionerhas been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. ThePOEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.

Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity(CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile TelephoneSystem/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on22 January 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interestedapplicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their

respective applications before theCommission on or before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any applicationfiled after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of anynotice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantels original application, Bayantel filed anurgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in theManila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to allaffected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. Butbefore Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Orderdated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate ProvisionalAuthorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of allavailable frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that thecase may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archivedwithout prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomesavailable. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing theavailability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTCgranted BayanTels motion to revive the latters application and set the case for hearings onFebruary 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was orderedarchived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shallbecome available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application;arguing that Bayantels motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8years ago, and thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in saidapplication are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for theproposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order reviving theapplication of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct,install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized toinstall, operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals grantedthe writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC ordersdated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantels AmendedApplication without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC,the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion forreconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for PartialReconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null andvoid. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC and Bayantelfiled their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In thepresent petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied theRevised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on 3February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own initiative; accordingly,a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before theCommission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuchas the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation,the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in theapproval of Bayantels application. Held:The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of theNTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority toBayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center onFebruary 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act thatgives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellatecourts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, andto other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is acondition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. TheRules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of thePublic Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within thescope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera.Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is toenforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The onlyexceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-calledletters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelinesto be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of generalcirculation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that saidRules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Inthe absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And

petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al". ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH? HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580. CASES FOR LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, December 18, 2008 Ministerial function Facts: On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: (1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code (PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12) International Law Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. Issues: a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. Held: Regional Trial Courts Order to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay. On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay. In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste. Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances. Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay. Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals. Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment. Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing. The Court of Appeals Sustained the RTCs Decision The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates. The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay. So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila

Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. By a Decision of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. FERDINAND TOPACIO vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY ONG and OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL Gr. No. 179895 December 18, 2008 Facts: Ong filed a petititon for correction of an entry in his certificate of birth before the RTC in compliance with the SC decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita on July 3, 2007 enjoining him from accepting appointment to the position of Associate Justice of Supreme Court until have shown through adversarial proceedings that he is a natural born citizen. In the present case, Petitioner Topacio filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prevent Ong from exercising powers, duties and responsibilities as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. On September 5, Topacio filed a letter-complaint praying that the Solicitor General to bring in a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Sandiganbayan member. Petitioner invoked par. 1, Sec. 7, Art. VIII of the Constitution and the decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ongs birth certificate and bar records evidenced his Chinese citizenship. Petitioner avers that Ong should immediately vacate his post bearing out his status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General informed the petitioner that it cannot act favorably on the latters request for filing the quo warranto suit until the resolution of the RTC case is decided by final judgment. In his answer, Ong contends that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, he voluntarily refused to accept the appointment in the Supreme Court and said decision does not annul his appointment but merely enjoined him from accepting the post, there being no definite pronouncement that he is not a natural born citizen. Ong then filed his manifestation and motion to dismiss before the RTC alleging that he was already recognized as a natural born citizen by a court decision. He attached the said decision in his birth certificate. Ong further claims that the present petition is devoid of merit, or at the very least, it must await the final disposition of the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue. Meanwhile, the solicitor general alleges that the present petition is defectively verified. Issues: 1) WON the SolGen committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the filing of quo warranto suit 2) WON the initiation by the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to challenge the title to public office of Justice Ong Held: 1) No. There was no grave abuse of discretion in deferring an action on the filing of a quo warranto suit until after the RTC case has been decided with finality. Rule 66 provides that an action for usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of Republic of the Philippines against a public officer who does or suffers an act which by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office. The Solgen when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action. However, the Solgen may suspend or struck down the institution of action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the suit at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. The Solgen noticed the folly of re-litigation on the issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case. The Solgen merely advised the petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case. 2) No. SC declared that the proper petition is a quo warranto proceeding, not petition for certiorari and prohibition for the former action seeks to declare null and void. Petitioner claims that Ongs appointment as an Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan is being unconstitutional. The petition professes to be for certiorari and prohibition but it shows a quo warranto aspect of the petition.

As a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title of a public office may be contested directly by no less a quo warranto suit. It cannot be invoked collaterally even by mandamus or motion to annul the order. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the title to a contested public office. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held or exercised the public office and may be commenced by the Solicitor General as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. There must be a clear right to the contested office. There was no sufficient proof of a clear franchise to the Office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. The petitioner conceded to that he was neither entitled to the contested office which warrants the termination of the suit. It is the same with rightful authority of a judge in the full exercise of his public function which can not be questioned by merely private suitor or by any other except in the form especially provided by law. To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to courts causing inculpable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machine. The Court declares that Ong may either be a dejure officer who is deemed legally appointed and whose term of office has not expired or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights among which is his title to said office may not be contested except directly by a quo warranto. Ombudsman vs Galicia Facts : Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his 201 file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers' Professional Board Examination (TPBE). Yamsuan, then principal, proceeded to verify the authenticity of the said TOR. Yamsuan was surprised to receive a reply from the College Registrar of CCPC stating that they had no record of the said TOR. Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman. Issue: As between the Ombudsman and DepEd Schools Superintendent, who has the jurisdiction to investigate nonfeasance and mal-feasance by public school teachers? Ruling: The court held that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. However, in the case at bar, Galicia is estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and arguments in his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid. Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp. FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article

32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. Hence this appeal. ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. Rash Roque vs. Court of Appeals July 23, 2008

FACTS: The petitioner is charged of grave misconduct for violating the procedure for the procurement of supplies, and for approving the Disbursement Vouchers without the certification from the Accountant. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOTTHE PETITIONER IS GUILTY FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT HELD: YES. The authority of the Head of Office to approve the Disbursement Voucher is dependent on the certifications of the Budget Officer, the Accountant and the Treasurer on the principle that it would be improbable for the Head of Office to check all the details and conduct physical inspection and verification of all papers considering the voluminous paperwork attendant to his office. Without the certification, the Head of Office is duty-bound to inspect the voluminous records to verify the contents of the documents needing his approval. It needs emphasis that the approval of the Disbursement Voucher means the release of public funds, as in this case, for payment of the supplies to the supplier. In the instant case, Roque approved the Disbursement Vouchers despite the lack of the Accountants certification. He failed to perform his duty of ascertaining whether it is proper for him to approve the Disbursement Vouchers before he approves the same. This is not a mere oversight which the Commission may easily disregard. His act constitutes Grave Misconduct which warrants his dismissal from the service. As regards petitioners acts of disobeying and/or countermanding the lawful orders of his superiors, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that such acts can be classified as gross insubordination punishable with suspension for six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct for manifest intent to disregard established rules in the procurement of supplies. Under Sec. 22, Rule IV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense and penalized with dismissal for the first offense. The penalty of dismissal carries

with it forfeiture of retirement benefits excluding leave credits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. Despite dismissal from the service, petitioner, as a government employee, is entitled to the leave credits that he has earned during the period of his employment. Ombudsman vs. Maricar and Marian Torres January 29, 2008

FACTS: The case arose from an administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by then Barangay Chairman Romancito L. Santos of Concepcion, Malabon, against Edilberto Torres (Edilberto), Maricar D. Torres (Maricar), and Marian D. Torres (Marian), then Municipal Councilor, Legislative Staff Assistant, and Messenger, respectively, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malabon. Maricar and Marian are daughters of Edilberto. The following facts are borne out by the records: (1) Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant in the Office of then Councilor of Malabon, Edilberto Torres, on February 16, 1995; (2) Marian was appointed as Messenger in the same office on May 24, 1996; (3) at the time of Maricars appointment to and employment in her position (1995-1997), she was a full-time regular college student at UST; (4) at the time of Marians appointment and employment as messenger in her fathers office (1996-2000), she was a full-time regular dentistry-proper student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar University; (5) during the employment of respondents in government service, they submitted DTRs indicating that they religiously reported for work from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. during work days; (6) by reason thereof, respondents collected their full salaries during the entire time of their employment in their respective positions; and, (7) these all occurred with the full knowledge and consent of their father. The charge against Edilberto was dismissed, having become moot and academic in view of his re-election on May 14, 2001 in accordance with the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. However, Maricar was elected as the Sangguniang Bayan of Malabon. ISSUE: is condonation applicable to Maricar? HELD:NO. Aguinaldo v. Santos that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." As regards the applicability of Aguinaldo, our pronouncement therein is clear that condonation of an administrative offense takes place only when the public official is re-elected despite the pendency of an administrative case against him. In the case of Maricar, prior to her election as Councilor of now Malabon City, she held an appointive, not an elective, position, i.e., Legislative Staff Assistant, appointed by her very own father, then Councilor Edilberto Torres. Ombudsman vs. Richardo Evangelista March 13, 2009

FACTS: Priscilla Villanueva, the Co-Chair of the Local School Board of Aguilar, accused the respondent of having misappropriated the Special Education Fund (SEF). The complainant alleged that the three respondents had used the SEF to purchase speech kit tapes and textbooks without the approval of the Local School Board. The Ombudsman placed respondents under preventive suspension in accordance with Section 24, R.A. No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 during the pendency of the case until termination, but not to exceed the total period of four (4) months, without pay.The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of the Ombudsman. They claimed that they had been denied due process since they were never furnished with a copy of Villanuevas complaint. They also alleged that the unsubstantiated allegations of Villanueva do not constitute sufficient evidence to suspend them. Lastly, they averred that the order had been hastily issued. ISSUE: Is the Ombudsman correct to place the respondent under preventive suspension? HELD: YES. As early as 1995, the Supreme Court ruled in Lastimosa v. Vasquez and Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, that neither prior notice nor a hearing is required for the issuance of a preventive suspension order. The well-settled doctrine is solidly anchored on the explicit text of the governing law which is Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The provision defines the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend government officials and employees. It reads: SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the

charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. Section 24 does not require that notice of the charges against the accused must precede an order meting out preventive suspension. While a preventive suspension order may stem from a complaint, the Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint prior to ordering preventive suspension. The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The Supreme Court also holds that there was no undue haste on the Ombudsmans part in issuing the preventive suspension order. The fact that the Ombudsman signed the order prior to her Deputy Ombudsmans recommendation does not affect its validity. A review of Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 reveals that the recommendation of the Deputy Ombudsman is not a condition sine qua non for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order. A preventive suspension is not a penalty and such an order when issued by the Ombudsman is accorded the highest deference unless the order violates Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. Ombudsman V Magno Issue: May the ombudsman appeal its reversal decision to the higher courts? Held: NO. the reason for disallowing the disciplining authority from appealing the reversal of its decision, is for precluding said disciplining authority from intervening in the appeal of its decision. However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,36 the Court further warned that: The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasijudicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its Officer-in-Charge and Undersecretary, RAMON C. BACANI, vs. GODOFREDO G. CUANAN FACTS: Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their respective minor daughters, Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III in Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints for Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. However, he was exonerated from the charge of sexual harassment in the CSC Resolution dated on January 20, 2003. Petition for Review/Reconsideration with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan. Again, another Supplemental Petition for Review/Reconsideration was filed reiterating the prayer for reversal of the resolution. Still, no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan. Cuanan was reinstated and directed to return to duty. But, in the new CSC Resolution dated on October 22, 2004, it was found out that Cuanan is guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul Resolution, alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that the petition for review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in violation of procedural due process. The CA rendered a Decision granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution. The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under Rule 43 were available remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted, since the act complained of was patently illegal; that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed by the DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not duly notified of the petition for review/reconsideration, nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon, much less, given a copy of the said petition; that the DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition for review/reconsideration. ISSUES: (1) whether or not the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan. (2)whether or not the right of due process of Cuanan was violated HELD: (1)YES.In a long line of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, and reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution No. 021600 allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee, thus: Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. - x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which, as the appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest. (2)YES. Moreover, while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. The relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations: that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. Furthermore, Section 43.A. of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission, shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission. Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a party to the case. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to consider the averments therein.(Emphasis supplied) Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the attention or consideration of the CSC. A.M. No. 10654-Ret. June 27, 2008

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF THE FOUR (4) YEARS LENGTH OF SERVICE AS A SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER OF THE PETITIONER TO COMPLETE THE TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR PURPOSES OF RECEIVING HIS MONTHLY LIFETIME PENSION AFTER FIVE (5) YEARS, JUDGE ANTONIO S. ALANO (Ret.),

FACTS: Judge Alano served as Sangguniang Bayan member of Isabela, Basilan from January 10, 1976 up to January 31, 1980, or for a period of 4 years and 21 days. He was also elected as Provincial Board member of the same province from February 1, 1980 up to April 20, 1986, or for a period of 6 years, 2 months, and 19 days. On January 1, 1990, he was appointed as presiding judge and he served as such up to April 4, 2001, or for a period of 11 years, 3 months, and 3 days. Thus, he has rendered a total of 21 years, 6 months, and 13 days of government service. ISSUE: Can the length of service of Judge Antonio S. Alano as a former Sangguniang Bayan member be credited in his favor in order to complete the 20 years of government service requirement for the purpose of availing the monthly lifetime pension under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9101? HELD: YES Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, provides: Section 1. When a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, a judge of the Court of First Instance, Industrial Relations, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or a city or municipal judge who has rendered at least twenty years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And when a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, a judge of Court of First Instance, Industrial Relations, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or a city or municipal judge has attained the age of sixty years and has rendered at least twenty years service in the Government, the last five of which shall have been continuously rendered in the judiciary, he shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was then receiving. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the foregoing that the 20 years service requirement for a retiree who has reached the age of 70 must be rendered in the judiciary or in any branch of the government. There is no distinction whether it was rendered in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch. On the other hand, for a retiree who has reached the age of 60, it is required that the last 5 years of his 20 years of government service be continuously rendered in the judiciary. It is axiomatic that retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. This Court is not insensitive to the plight of retired judges who, because of deteriorating health brought about by old age, need financial assistance and support in the twilight years of their life when they can no longer work with much vigor to earn a living. They deserve the full measure of the nations gratitude for giving the best years of their life in the service of the government and the people.