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SAUL A. KRIPKE Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language An Elementary Exposition Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts Copyright © 1982 by Saul A. Kripke All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kripke, Saul A., 1940 Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Includes bibliographical references and index. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. 1. Title B3376.Ws64K74 19281-20070 ‘AACR ISBN 0-674-95401-7 (paper) Contents Preface 1 Introductory 2 The Wittgensteinian Paradox 3. The Solution and the ‘Private Language’ Argument Postscript Wittgenstein and Other Minds Index: 35 ng 147 ‘To my parents Preface ‘The main part ofthis work has been delivered at various places, as lectures, series of lectures, or seminars. It constitutes, a8 1 say, ‘an clementary exposition’ of what I take to be the thread of Wittgenstein’s later work on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics, including my interpretation of the ‘private language argument’, which on my view is principally to be explicated in terms of the problem of ‘following a rule’. A postscript presents another problem. ‘Wittgenstein saw in the conception of private language, which leads to a discussion of some aspects of his views on the problem of other minds. Since I stress the strong connection in Witrgenstein’s later philosophy between the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mathematics, I had hoped to add a second postscript on the philosophy of mathematics. Time has not permitted this, so for the moment the basic remarks on philosophy of mathematics in the main text must suffice. ‘The present work is hardly a commentary on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, nor even on Philosophical Investigations ‘Many well known and significant topics ~ for example, the idea of ‘family resemblances’, the concept of ‘certainty’ ~ are hardly mentioned. More important, in the philosophy of mind itself, a wealth of material, such as Wietgenstein’s views, fon intention, memory, dreaming, and the like, are barely eral

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