CASE: MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT . February 23, 1909.

Ponente: Willard, J FACTS: Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error. Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. Then, that the lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904 ) An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of registration was dismissed
- Given that - Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired - No prescription against the Spanish Crown - Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good

Respondents argues:

- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris) - Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser - Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws - Plaintiff argues: - Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon

ISSUE: Whether Or Not Carino owns the land. HELD: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years. - Here, plaintiffs father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree.- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main. Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present. The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain. The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

CASE: YAP V. GRAJEDA March 28, 1983 PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr. Facts: Private respondent Jose Ricos father, Maximo Rico sold for and in behalf of his minor children Lot no. 339 and a portion of Lot no. 327 to petitioner Donato Yap, who was then a Chinese national. Subsequently, petitioner Yap registered the instrument of sale, cancelled the original certificate of title and issued a new one in his favor. After 15 years from the execution of the deed of absolute sale, petitioner Yap became a Filipino through naturalization. Then, petitioner ceded the majority portion of Lot No. 327 to his son, who was also a Filipino by virtue of petitioners naturalization and his wifes Filipino citizenship. Afterwards, private respondent and his aunt sold the remaining portion of Lot no. 327 to petitioner Yap who had his rights thereon duly registered under Act 496. However, the CFI declared the sale of the lots to petitioner Yap null and void on the ground that the sale was contrary to Section 5, Art. 18 of the 1935 Constitution that No private agripcultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. ISSUE: WHETHER OF NOT THE TRANSFER OF THE PRIVATE LAND TO PETITIONER YAP VALID. HELD: YES. The mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution which was an expression of public to conserve lands for the Filipinos is no longer applicable to the case. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. o The respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property.

CASE: CARLOS N. FRANCISCO vs. PARSONS HARDWARE CO., INC April 10, 1939 PONENTE: MORAN, J. FACTS: On July 26, 1929, a homestead patent was issued to one Alfredo Hernandez for lot No. 615. Thereafter, he became an execution debtor to the appellee herein, Carlos N. Francisco, for a sum of money, in a civil case of the justice of the peace court of Mandaluyong, Rizal; and also to the appellant herein, Parson Hardware Co., Inc., for a mortgage credit, in another civil case No. 44346 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Then, the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija, at the instance of the Francisco, levied upon the homestead in question; and, a like levy was effected upon the same homestead in favor of the Parson. By virtue of these two levies, the property was sold in public auction twice. The lower court in resolving the conflicting claims decided that Francisco had better title over Parson. Thus, this appeal. Issue: whether or not the executions of levy by Francisco and Parson were valid. HELD: NO. It appears that the executions of levy by both Francisco and Parson against the homestead in question were by reason and in satisfaction of debts contracted by Alfredo Hernandez prior to the expiration of the period of five years from the date the patent was issued in his favor. The case, then, for both claimants herein falls squarely within the prohibition of section 116 of Act No. 2874, and as such, the executions levied by both of them in satisfaction of their claims are null and void. (Beach vs. Pacific Commercial Co. and sheriff of Nueva Ecija, 49 Phil., 365.). Thus, the Judgment is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the executions levied by both appellant and appellee and the other transactions taken in furtherance thereof, as annotated in the homestead certificate of title, be cancelled, without costs.

CASE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS February 15, 1990 PONENTE: MEDIALDEA, J.: FACTS: This case stems from the two applications for original registration of two different parcels of land situated in barrio of Umnas, Municipal of Vintar, Province of Ilocos Norte. o The first case was an application for original registration of a parcel of land filed by private respondents Jose Arquillo, et. al. o The second case was also an application for original registration of a parcel of land filed by Salvador Arquillo and Cosme Daguio. These two applications were heard jointly. The Directors of Lands opposed the applications alleging that neither of the applicants nor their predecessors in interest possess sufficient title to said partcels of land

CASE: US V. TAMBUNTING PONENTE: Street, J.

January 18, 1921

FACTS: Respondent Manuel Tambunting and his wife became the occupants of the upper floor of a house situated in Manila. In the house, the Manila Gas Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors. When the occupants who requested for the installation vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the gas pipe, removed the meter, thus cutting off the gas supply from the said premises. Then one day, while Tambunting was away, an inspector of the gas company discovered that the gas was being used for cooking in quarters of the respondent, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company. Tambunting admitted that he was using the gas without the knowledge and consent of the company for 2-3 months but denied making the connection where the meter used to be installed. Later, the gas company sued Tambunting for stealing a quantity of gas belonging to the Manila Gas Corporation. The lower court convicted Tambunting of the offense charged. ISSUE: 1. Whether the taking of gas may constitute larceny (theft or robberry) though it has never been the subject of adjudication in court. 2. whether the quantity of gas appropriated in the two months, during which the accused admitted having used the same, has been established with sufficient certainty to enable the court to fix an appropriate penalty. HELD: YES. Gas has character of personal property, thus, it may be subject of theft or robbery. o There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place. Likewise water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires are subjects of larceny. 2. The trial court was justified in fixing the value of the gas at P2 per month, which is the minimum charge for gas made by the gas company, however small the amount consumed. i. There was evidence before the court showing that the general average of the monthly bills paid by consumers throughout the city for the use of gas in a kitchen equipped like that used by the accused is from P18 to 20, while the average minimum is about P8 per month. We think that the facts above stated are competent evidence; and the conclusion is inevitable that the accused is at least liable to the extent of the minimum charge of P2 per month.