Sei sulla pagina 1di 6
oo Jeanne Davis -- HAK looked these over on London trip but did not mark fthem. I assume they should be treated as other MEMCONs which HAK does not specifically approve. aqMor 84713 Action | June 21, 1971 SUBJECT: Memorandum of Your Conversation with Ambassador Keating ‘The attached is for your approval and for your files only. + Approve, ele Z SECRET/NODIS_ Other SECRET/NopIS June 4, 1971 SECRET /NODIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS; Kenneth Keating, Us Ambassador to India Henry A, Kissinger, Assistant to the President Harold H. Saunders, NSC Stat Ww Date and Place; 4:00 ppm. Thursday, June 3, 1971, in Dr. Kissinger's office After an exchange of pleasantries, Dr. Kissinger to “tell me what you kn: Dz. Kissinger said he thought it would be useful to {iews on what has happened in South Asis to ‘move on the Paks." we can to help solve the President has felt that we See what he can work o explain the President!s + He has felt that it is # We certainly will use our in current humanitarian problems. © should give President ut. As the President sees it, Pakistanis emotionally nOW, we would not gain anythi what ability we may have to influence the situation, Our judgment, Dr, Kissinger continued, is that East Pal frgniually become independent. This, heffelt, is the Ambassadors judgment too. The problem is "how t9 bell the cat." The President has chosen to do it gradually. kistan will in all honesty,’ Dr, Kissinger pointed out, feeling for President Yahya, One cannot it is a fact of life, the President has a special make policy on that basis,. but Dr. Kissinger said that one of the President! India be discouraged from military action, the flavor of the President's feelings, he re we had received reports th: 8 main concerns is that Just to give the Ambassador called that ten days ago when considering military action omic assistance if India fe extreme terms." The ‘ficult situation, and our themselves," moved. "But we don' Pakistanis are alrea, Policy is to " 't have to think in thos dy up against a very di Give the facts time to assert SECRET/NODIS SECRET/NODIS | | | SECRET/NopIs -2- SECRET/NODIS Dz. Kissinger interjected that the President's viewswas to hold up on the sue-time exception [military package for Pakistan] and to give those {ance which would suggest limiting it to non-lethal items. But even that, he felt, would cause criticism of the President. He said he éelt wery strongly about military aid," He said he wanted very much to "sea the President succeed." He had ‘defended the Président's Vietnam Policy up and down India." He just fhought "that to take on this additions) burden is an unnecessary burden Just out of loyalty to a friend, Having said that, he felt that on the insrite it is wrong to resume military. Seereetoe ae lone anlhoikilingteraiest a East Pakistan. Dacca is The Dascly quiet, although only half the norma inhabitants are there, The Pakistani army is now qaucentrating on the Hindu population. At first the refugees crossing into Indis wera in the same proportion of Hindu and Muslim as in the whole East Pakistani population, Now, 90% are Hindus, . As for economic aid, the Ambassador continued, no one can complain about continuing PL-480 food into the cyclone area, although there is a problem in getting the ships unloaded. “As for other aid, the press had SECRET/NODIS / SEGRET/NODIS_

Potrebbero piacerti anche