EXTREME FIRE

PHENOMENA
•A level of fire behavior characteristics that
ordinarily precludes method of direct fire attack
• Extremely dynamic
• 1985-1994 47 firefighters died due to rapid fire
progress
• 1990-2000 37 firefighters died due to rapid fire
progress
• 2000-2009 37 firefighters died due to rapid fire
progress
1

WHAT INFLUENCES
EXTREME FIRE
Heat Release Rate (HRR)

Fuel Air
Characteristics & Ventilation
Availability Profile

Characteristics &
Configuration

Compartment

Ventilation or Fuel Controlled

2

EXTREME FIRE
PHENOMENON:
OBSERVABLE INDICATORS
• High velocity smoke discharging through openings
• Sudden change in the color of smoke.
Specifically darkening
• Sudden change in heat conditions.
• Heat that drives you to the floor.
• Sudden lowering of the smoke layer
•A repeated raising and lowering cycle of the
smoke layer.
3
 EXTREME FIRE
PHENOMENON:
OBSERVABLE INDICATORS
• High-pressure pulsing of the smoke
• Heavily stained or cracked window glass
• Flames“licking” through the smoke and
detaching from the main body of fire

• Doors forced open by rushing air

• The feeling or sound of air rushing into the fire
• Thereversal of smoke, causing it to head back
into an opening
4

TYPES OF EXTREME
FIRE PHENOMENA

Flashover

Backdraft

Smoke Explosion

FLASHOVER

• The sudden
transformation from
the developing stage
to a fully developed
fire that is sustained
• Mybe controlled by
fuel or ventilation
• Entiredevelopment
of the contents may
not occur
6
 FLASHOVER WARNINGS

• Turbulent smoke
• Rollover

• Vent Point Ignition

• Dense/zero visibility
smoke

FUEL CONTROLLED
FLASHOVER
Adequate
Fuel

Adequate Sufficient
Air HRR

Additional
Fuel
8

FUEL CONTROLLED
FLASHOVER

Flashover

Ignition Growth Fully Developed Decay

9
 VENTILATION
CONTROLLED
Adequate
Fuel

Insufficient Increased
Air Ventilaton

Sufficient
HRR
10

VENTILATION CONTROLLED
FLASHOVER

Ventilation

Flashover

Ignition Growth Decay Fully Developed Decay

11

ELIMINATING
FLASHOVER

• Recognize the signs

• Do not over extend
your PPE
• Ventilate

• Penciling

12
 CASE STUDY #2

March 30, 2010

17622 Lincoln Ave Fire; Homewood, IL
1 Firefighter Killed, 1 Firefighter Critically
Injured

13

THE CASE
• On March, 30 2010, units were dispatched for a chair
on fire in a residence with reports of victims trapped
• FF/PM Brian Carey & FF/PM Kara Kopas assisted in the
advancement of a 2 1/2” attack line and began a
primary search
• Shortly after entry, conditions deteriorated and a
flashover occurred
• FF/PM Kopas suffered 2nd and 3rd degree burns to
her lower back, buttocks, and right wrist.
• FF/PM Carey died from carbon monoxide poisoning and
inhalation of smoke and soot.
• A 84 year old male civilian occupant also perished in
the fire.
14

THE BUILDING

15
 16

THE FIRE

17

DISPATCH
INFORMATION
Unit Staffing

Engine 534 Lieutenant, Firefighter, Engineer

Ambulance 564 2 Firefighter Paramedics

Truck 1220 Lieutenant, 2 Firefighters, Engineer

Engine 1340 Lieutenant, 3 Firefighters, Engineer

Truck 1145 Lieutenant, 2 Firefighters, Engineer

Squad 440 Lieutenant, 3 Firefighters

Chief Chief
18
CONDITIONS UPON
ARRIVAL

(%)*+,!-.'/0/10/
19
One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic Dies and a Part-time Fire
Fighter/Paramedic is Injured When Caught in a Residential Structure
Flashover – Illinois !

!
20
Diagram 1. Initial placement of apparatus and scene conditions.
!

!
"#$%!&'!

FIREFIGHTING
OPERATIONS

21
 (%)*+,!-.'/&/0&/
22
One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic Dies and a Part-time Fire
Fighter/Paramedic is Injured When Caught in a Residential Structure
Flashover – Illinois !

23
Photo 3. Looking toward the A/B corner, the victim, FF1, and injured fire fighter/paramedic are
operating the 2 ! inch hoseline inside the structure, and FF2 and FF3 are searching the house.
Crews are preparing to ventilate the roof. Large volume of fire and smoke noted at rear of
home, C-side. Thick, black smoke can be scene billowing out the front door, A-side. A-side
picture windows are covered in soot.
(Photo courtesy of Warren Skalski.)!

!
"#$%!&'!

24
/Paramedic is Injured
One Career When Caught
Fire Fighter/Paramedic in a Residential
Dies and a Part-time Fire
Fighter/Paramedic is Injured When Caught in a Residential Structure
Structure
ver – Illinois
Flashover – Illinois ! !

!
Diagram 4. Fire fighters recall the smoke being very thick and black while operating within the house. In the
diagram, the smoke around the fire fighters was made transparent to convey their location. FF2 and FF3 are not ! 25
included within this diagram.
!
hoto 4. Volume of fire noted at C-side that IC would have seen during his size-up.
!
(Photo courtesy of John Ratko.)

!
"#$%!&'!

(%)*+,!-./0&01&0
!
26
reer Fire
Looking Fighter/Paramedic
toward the A/B corner, a fireDies and
fighter a Part-time
on B-side Fireis preparing to vent
of the house
Paramedic
tchen window. is Injured
Fire fighters When Caught
are preparing in a Residential
to protect Structure
D-side exposures and ventilate.
ver – Illinois Crews are still operating inside and on the roof. !
(Photo courtesy of Warren Skalski.)!
!

27window.
Looking toward the A/B corner, the fire fighter has vented the B-side kitchen
he horizontal flow of thick, black smoke from window. This is characteristic of being
 operating inside and on the roof2!!
(Photo courtesy of Warren Skalski.)

7. Looking toward the A/B corner, thick, black smoke continues to push out28 the B-side
hat was vented. The volume of smoke venting from the front door has increased, so has
-side. FF1 can be seen in front doorway. Crews are still operating inside and on the roof.
(Photo courtesy of Warren Skalski.)!
!

(%)*+,!-./010210 29
One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic Dies and a Part-time Fire
Fighter/Paramedic is Injured When Caught in a Residential Structure
Flashover – Illinois !

!
Diagram 5. Conditions within structure preceding the flashover. Windows vented on B-, C-, and D-side 30
 !

THE EVENT

!
. C-side kitchen window is venting. Unknown if this window failed or was31
manually
vented.
(Photo courtesy of John Ratko.)
!
!

(%)*+,!-./0&01&0
!
32
eer Firetoward
Looking Fighter/Paramedic Dies and
the A/D corner, flashover a Part-time
has occurred Fire
and fire can be seen blowing
Paramedic is Injured When
out the D-side Caught
window that in
wasavented.
Residential Structure
er – Illinois (Photo courtesy of Warren Skalski.)!
!
!

!
33
Looking toward the A-side front door, the flashover has just occurred. FF1 is pulling
n the 2!-inch hoseline and FF2 and FF3 are attempting to pull the injured fire
 TIME-LINE
• 2057 - Units dispatched for the structure fire
• 2101 - Initial units arrive on scene
• 2102 - Search crew made entry
• 2104 - Attack crew made entry & Horizontal
ventilation preformed
• 2107 - Rollover was encountered and conditions
worsened
• 2108 - Fully developed transition occurred while
search crew exited structure
• 2109 - FF Kopas was removed
• 2113- FF Carey was removed
34

LESSONS LEARNED
• Was this fire fuel or ventilation
controlled?
• What were the signs of a possible extreme
fire event upon arrival?
• What signs did firefighters encounter inside
the structure?
• What could have been done to mitigate the
flashover?

35

BACKDRAFT
•A deflagration
(explosion) or rapid
combustion of hot
pyrolysis and
flammable products
of combustion upon
mixing with air
• Mustbe ventilation
controlled
• Oxygen levels are
very low, flaming
combustion is limited
36
 BACKDRAFT WARNINGS

• Tightlysealed or
insulated building
• Smoke stained windows
• Yellowish, grey smoke
• Little to no visible
flame
• SUCKING AND
PUFFING ARE A LATE
SIGN
37

BACKDRAFT
Excess High
Fuel Temperature

Inadequate
Air
Increased
Ventilation
Above
UEL/UFL
38

BACKDRAFT

Ventilation

Backdraft

Ignition Growth Decay Fully Developed Decay

39
 BACKDRAFT
VS
VENTILATION CONTROLLED
FLASHOVER

• Increased ventilation is the initiating factor

in both

• Difference is in the speed and level of the

HRR

• Backdraft is an explosion; Flashover is not

• Flashover transitions to a sustained fire;

Backdraft may not

40

BACKDRAFT
VS
VENTILATION CONTROLLED
FLASHOVER
Backdraft

Ventilation

Flashover

Ignition Growth Decay Fully Developed Decay 41

ELIMINATING
BACKDRAFT
• Recognize the signs

• Ventilate prior to
entry
• Vertical Ventilation

• Horizontal
Ventilation
• Position at the
corners
42
 CASE STUDY #3

February 11, 1998

106th and Western Ave Fire; Chicago, IL
2 Firefighters Killed

43

THE CASE
• On February 11, 1998, two firefighters were killed at a
tire-service center in an apparent backdraft
• FF/PM Anthony Lockhart & FF/PM Patrick J. King, along
with 8 to 10 other firefighters entered the front door
of the showroom and observed only a light haze.
• As they entered the service area, thick, black smoke
was encountered in the ceiling space. No visible fire
was reported.
• Although there were signs of a smoldering fire, the
origin of the fire could not be found.
• Within minutes of entering the service area firefighters
were caught in a backdraft situation
• FF Lockhart & FF King died from smoke asphyxiation.
44

THE BUILDING

45
 46

THE FIRE

47

48
 DISPATCH
INFORMATION
Unit Staffing

Engine 92 Lieutenant, Engineer, 2 Firefighters

Engine 120 Lieutenant, Engineer, 3 Firefighters

Truck 24 Lieutenant, 4 Firefighters

Truck 45 Lieutenant, 4 Firefighters

Battalion 21 Battalion Chief

49

CONDITIONS UPON
ARRIVAL

50

FIREFIGHTING
OPERATIONS

51
52

53

54
 55

TIME-LINE
• 2224 - Fire department received a call from a
civilian stating there was a fire in a commercial
tire service center
• 2228 - Engine 102 was the first unit on the
scene. None of the companies reported seeing
smoke
• 2230 - Store owner arrived on scene to open the
front door
• 2245 - Hot gases that accumulated in the 20 foot
high ceiling ignited, causing a backdraft situation.
The pressure wave knocked all the firefighters
down to the ground, trapping 2 of them.
56

LESSONS LEARNED
• Didthe firefighters have any clues to a
backdraft upon arrival?
• Whatcharacteristic of this building
contributed to the lack of smoke upon arrival?
• Onceinside, what signs did the crews
encounter?
• Whatsign did the Ladder Company at the rear
of the structure?
• What actions could have been taken to
mitigated this backdraft?
57
 CASE STUDY #4

March 28, 1994

The 62 Watts St Fire, New York, NY
3 Firefighters Killed

58

THE CASE
• On March 28, 1994 the FDNY lost 3
firefighters their lives in an apparent
backdraft
• Unitsresponded for reports of heavy sparks
and smoke coming from the chimney of a 3
story apartment building
• When firefighters forced the apartment door
on the first floor a rush of fire traveled up
the stairwell
• Firefighter
James Young, Firefighter
Christopher Seidenburg, and Captain John
Drennan died of burns
59

THE BUILDING

60
 61

 

 

 

 


62

THE FIRE

63

 

 

 

 


64

DISPATCH
INFORMATION

65

CONDITIONS UPON
ARRIVAL

66
 67

FIREFIGHTING
OPERATIONS

68

69
 70

LESSONS LEARNED
• Whatconditions were present upon arrival that
may have been an indication of conditions inside
the apartment?
• What do you think of the observations the
interior crew made after forcing the door to the
apartment?
• Whatbuilding characteristics contributed to the
backdraft condition?
• Whatactions could have been taken to mitigate
the backdraft and limit fire spread to the first
floor apartment?
71

SMOKE EXPLOSION

•A deflagration (explosion) or rapid

combustion a mixture of air and cold smoke
when it finds an ignition source
• Must be ventilation controlled
• Generallyoccur due to incomplete
combustion
• Requires a mixture of fuel (smoke) and air
within the flammable range

72
 THE SUTHERLAND
EXPERIMENT
• Conducted March
1999 at the
University of
Canterbury, New
Zealand by BJ
Southerland
• Aimedto better
understand smoke
explosions
off

73
Figure 3.1 - Isometric View of the Compartment
I

The compartment is elevated approximately 800 mm off the ground by a base constructed of
50 mm angle-steel as used in the compartment frame (refer Figure 3.1). The base sits on
wheels, allowing the compartment to be moved. Four leveling feet are attached to the base,
allowing the compartment to be leveled.

THE SUTHERLAND The compartment has a 1215 mm square door with a horizontal swing. To achieve a tight seal

EXPERIMENT when the compartment door is closed, 30 mm Kaowool rope was glued around the edge

doorframe. This compresses when the door is closed. RTV Silicon Rubber was used to fasten
of the

the rope to the compartment and although it melts at 2OO”C, only a small portion of the RTV
is exposed to the high temperatures. Its strength is regained when cooled. Four clamps, one
wielded to each corner of the doorframe, allow the door to be securely shut.

• Stage I - Fire Started - Door

Due to the possibility Closed
of an explosion in the compartment, a pressure relief panel is located in
the floor of the compartment. In case of a large explosion, the pressure relief panel will open,

• Stage 2 - Door Closed - Smoldering Period

• Stage 3 - Smoldering - Smoke Explosion
• Stage 4 - Smoke Explosion

74

SMOKE EXPLOSION
Contained Low
Smoke Temperature
Layer

Adequate
Oxygen
Igniton
Source
Within
Flammable
Range 75
 SMOKE EXPLOSION
WARNINGS
• Occurduring a
smoldering fire

• Thepresence of
white/grey smoke
• Sudden increase in
density and
thickness

• Firegases trapped in
void spaces
76

77

78
 79

HOW VIOLENT IS A
SMOKE EXPLOSION?
• How much fuel
mixture is available?
• How confined is the
smoke mixture within
a structure?
• How close is the
mixture to its
stoichiometric
mixture?
80

SMOKE EXPLOSION
VS
BACKDRAFT

Conditions For
Backdraft
600ºC
1112ºF
Conditions For
Smoke Explosion

LEL UEL

81
 ELIMINATING SMOKE
EXPLOSION
• Recognize the signs

• Ventilate prior to
entry
• Vertical Ventilation

• Horizontal
Ventilation
• Position at the
corners
82

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

• November 8, 1974 - Chatham Dockyards

• February 17, 2001 - Illinois
• February 22, 2008 - Durango, CA

83

CASE STUDY #5

February 22, 2008

Durango, CA
9 Firefighters Injured

84
 THE CASE
• On February 22, 2008, 9 firefighters were
injured in an explosion at a restaurant fire
•A crew entered the restaurant with
moderate smoke showing toward the rear of
the structure with on flames showing
• At1427 the restaurant and 2 adjoining
structures exploded
•5 firefighters were temporarily trapped
•4 others suffered injuries from flying
debris
85

THE BUILDING

86

87
Nine Fire Fighters from a Combination Department Injured in an Explosion at a Restaurant Fire – Colorado

Diagram 2. Depicts front view showing construction of the fire structure in relation to the
88
exposures, such as, the large shared common attic space and common wood framed
wall of the fire structure and exposure D1. The attic and void space account
for approximately 108 inches empty space in exposure D2.
(Courtesy of the Fire Department)

Page 23

THE FIRE

89

DISPATCH
INFORMATION
Unit Staffing
Engine 1 Chief, Captain, Engineer, Firefighter
Engine 2 Captain, Engineer, 2 Firefighters
Engine 9 Lieutenant
Ladder 1 Captain, Mechanic, Firefighter

Ladder 2 Firefighter
BC 1 Battalion Chief
Medic 1 Paramedic, Firefighter
POV 5 Firefighters
90
 CONDITIONS UPON
ARRIVAL

91

FIREFIGHTING
OPERATIONS

2008 Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

Investigation Report # F2008-03 92
Nine Fire Fighters from a Combination Department Injured in an Explosion at a Restaurant Fire – Colorado

93
Diagram 1. Approximate locations of key apparatus and hoseline placement.
 2008 Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
Investigation Report # F2008-03
94
Nine Fire Fighters from a Combination Department Injured in an Explosion at a Restaurant Fire – Colorado

Photo 1. The fire structure’s front was brick with large plate glass
windows and a parapet wall covered with a wooden façade.
(NIOSH photo)

Page 19

95
Photo 2. This picture shows the restaurant (fire structure) on the right and the involved adjacent
retail store on the left (exposure D1) (see Diagram 1). The building had been remodeled several
times which included dividing the building in half via a wood stud wall (in middle of photo),
lowering the ceiling in both halves yet sharing a common attic space.
(NIOSH photo)

TIME-LINE
• 1340 - Dispatched reported fire coming
Page 20
through the roof of a restaurant
• 1348 - First Engine on the scene starting
offensive operations
• 1415 - The fire self vented and 5 minutes
later crews observed the windows vibrating
• 1427 - The fire building, along with 2
exposure buildings exploded injuring 9
firefighters
96
 LESSONS LEARNED

• Did
the firefighters have any clues to a
smoke explosion upon arrival?
• Whatwas the first observable sign of an
impending event?
• Whatbuilding characteristics contributed
to the explosion?
• Whatactions could have mitigated this
smoke explosion?
97

CASE STUDY #6

April 18, 2005

Evanston, WY
2 Firefighters Killed & 1 Injured

98

THE CASE
• OnApril 18, 2005 2 firefighters were killed
and 1 seriously injured after a smoke
explosion
• With
reports of children trapped, crews
made an aggressive push to the second floor
• Withinminutes, an explosion occurred
trapping the victims on the second floor
• LtRobert Henderson & FF Jacob Cook were
killed
• FF Abe Wheeler was severely burned
99
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DISPATCH
INFORMATION
Unit Staffing
3DJH
Engine 1 Captain/Engineer, Firefighter; Lieutenant

Engine 2 Engineer, 3 Firefighters

Ladder 1 Lieutenant/Engineer; 2 Firefighters

POV 1 Lieutenant/IC

POV 2 Lieutenant

POV 3 Lieutenant
105
 CONDITIONS UPON
ARRIVAL

106

FIREFIGHTING
OPERATIONS

107

LESSONS LEARNED

• Whatbuilding construction characteristics

contributed to the explosion?
• Whatconditions upon arrival showed a
possible smoke explosion?
• What actions could have been taken to
mitigate the explosion?

108
 WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED?
• Fire Tetrahedron

• Life Cycle of a Fire

• Smoke Color,
Volume, Density, &
Velocity

• Flashover

• Backdraft

• Smoke Explosion
109

A SPECIAL THANKS...

• Captain Mark • Firefighter Chris

Wagner Brennan
• Captain Greg • Firefighter Mike
Blaskey Drain
• Chief Brian Plyer • My Family
• Firefighter Jeremy
Hoffman

110

REFERENCES
• IFSTA Essentials IV

• Jones & Bartlett Fundamentals of Firefighting

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (1998, May). Death
in the Line of Duty Report F1998-05. Retrieved November 10, 2010 from http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face9805.pdf

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2010, May). Death
in the Line of Duty Report F2010-10. Retrieved November 10, 2010 from http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face1010.pdf

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2009) Death in the
Line of Duty Report F2008-02. Retrieved November 16, 2010 from http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200803.pdf

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2006) Death in the
Line of Duty Report F2005-13. Retrieved November 16, 2010 from http://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200513.pdf

• Bukowski, R. and Richard, W. (1996, November). Modeling a Backdraft Incident: The

62 Watts Street (NY) Fire

111
 REFERENCES
• Fahy, R. (2010, June) U.S. Fire Service Fatalities in Structure Fires 1977-2009.
Retrieved on November 11, 2010 from NFPA website: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/
files//PDF/OS.FatalitiesInstructures.pdf

• Fahy, R. (2002, July) U.S. Fire Service Fatalities in Structure Fires 1977-2000.
Retrieved on November 11, 2010 from NFPA website: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/
files/PDF/fffstructure.pdf

• Hartin, E. (2005), Extreme Fire Behavior - Backdraft. Retrieved November 9, 2010

from www.firehouse.com

• Hartin, E. (2005), Extreme Fire Behavior - Flashover. Retrieved November 9, 2010

from www.firehouse.com

• Hartin, E. (2005), Extreme Fire Behavior - Smoke Explosion. Retrieved November 9,

2010 from www.firehouse.com

• Hartin, E. (2005), Smoke Burns. Retrieved November 9, 2010 from

www.firehouse.com

• Hartin, E. (2005),Extreme Fire Behavior: Understanding the Hazard. Retrieved

November 9, 2010 from www.cftb-us.com

112

REFERENCES

• Gorbett, G. (2007, June), The Current Knowledge & Training

Regarding Backdraft, Flashover, and Other Rapid Fire Progression
Phenomena. Retrieved on November 16, 2010 from http://
www.kennedy-fire.com/PDFs/backdraft.pdf

• Mittendorf, John. (2008). Reading Smoke: Part 1-9. Retrieved March

3, 2010 from http://www.firenuggets.com

• Sutherland, B. (1999, March), Smoke Explosions. Retrieved on

November 16, 2010 from www.firetactics.com/Smoke,
%20Sutherland.pdf

113