A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Youlty of ?rincetan
University in Candidscy for the Degree
of Doctor af Philosophy
‘Recomended for Acceptance by the
stays 1960Abstract:
‘This paper introduces the concopt of a non-cooperative gaxo and
develops methods for the mathenatical analysis of such games. the
ganee considered are nmporson gumes represented by means of pure stra=
togies and payoff functions defined for the combinations of jure
stratesiess
‘The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative canes is
unrelated to the uathematical doseriztion by means of pure strategies
and peyeoff functions of a game. Rather, it depends on the possibility
or impossibility of coalitions, commnication, ani cide-paymontss
‘The concepta of an equilitriim point, a solution, a strong solution,
fa sub-solution, and valuas ere introduced by natheuntical definitions.
and in later sections the interpretation af those concepts in non-cooper=
ative gamee is discussed.
The min mathematical result is the proof of the existence in any
kane of at least one equilibrium poimte Other results concern the geo~
4 mrtrioat structure of the set of equilthriun pointe of « guns with « son
f lution, the geometry of sub-solutions, and the existence of « symetrical
equilibrim point in a symmetrical game
As on illustration of the possibilities for application «, treatasnt
: of « sinple three-man poker model 1s includede
S + 26 50 ~ Bocterel Dees ota