! Key Judgments czron oceopex 2002 xIE) Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction ‘We judge that Iraq hax continued its weapous of maxs destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical sud biological weapons as welt as missiles with ranges In excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably ‘will havea nuclear weapon during this decade, (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.) ‘We jadge that we are seeing only portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous deala] and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly dewoustrato the ‘extensive efforts undertaken by lraq to deny information, We lack specific infesmation on many key aspeots of Iraq's WMD programs. ‘Since iuspections ened in 1998, Iraq has maintained {ts chemical weapons effort, energized its missile pregram, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad js reconstituting Its muclear weapons program. + Iraq's growing ability to cel it ilicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to flaance WMD programs; annus} carnings hi cash and goods have more than quadrupled, frem $$80 million {in 1998 to about $3 bition this year. : : + aq has larpely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilites darasged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemicel and biological infrastructure uuder the cover of civilian production. © Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 kam with its ballistic missiles and is working ‘with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allaw fora more fecal means to deliver ‘biological and, lesa likely, chemical warfare agents. - Autbough we ascee that Seddam does not yer have nuclear weapons or sufficient material 10° {een ie ucer progr abqeibe tie that UNSCOM inspects departed Lo 1998, ‘How quickly Iraq will obtain its first en ae = nclear wexpon depands on when it acquires . Boghstad woquires sufficient fseilo material from abroad it could make a weapon within several months to a year. a‘+, Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon uxt) 2007 to 2008, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facties to produce highly enriched uranium and chailonges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise. Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal Intesest in and Iraq's agetessive attermpts to obtsin high-strength alumtaum tubes for centrifuge rators—as well es Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools—provide compelling evidence thet Saddam is reconsdnning a cranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s auclear weapons program. (DOB agrees that reconstitution of the nuctear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.) — Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its eatre of weapons persomnel as wel as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway. = All agencies agree that about 25,000 centifuges based an tubes of the size Iraq is tying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons’ worth of highly ‘sariched cranium per year. ‘Ina mach tess likely rconsrje, Roghdad could make enough fissile material for aruclear ‘weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has alt the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale urenfum : ‘We asseas that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclomrin), ‘and VX; its capability probsbly is more limited now Gan it was at the time of the Gulf was, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved. ‘* Anamay of clandestine reporting revenls that Baghdad has procured covertly the types zad Cuantfies of chenscale aad equipment eucient wo allow inked CW agent aodueton ‘Ridden withio Iraq's legitimate chemécal industry, Although we have litle ppeific infomation 6a knq's CW Saddam nroebly Kas ocked at lost 300 melo wes QM) and psphiy de outs NET of CW age mech of jt added in che Just year. . ‘The Iragis bave experivace in mamuficturing CW bombs, utillery rockets, end projectiles. ‘We ascess that that they passess CW bulk fills for SREM watheads, inclading for w limited ‘number of covertly ctared Scud, possibly a few with extended eanges, Wejndge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization ~of fraq’s offensive ‘BW program are active and cere activ and thar mort ements ate larger and more advanced then they * We judge iraq has some lethel znd incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly See nad ae Bes nehaing ania, fr dclivery by producing and Some, missiles, eral= Chances are even that emalipox fo part of Iraq's offensive BW programy. Baghdad probobly has developed genetically cngineered BW agents. ‘+ Baghdad has established a lorge-svate, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability. = Baghdad hos mobile facilities for producing becteriol and toxin BW agents; theao ‘dies om erate deteodow and re bighle saat, ‘Within three to sie months* these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total hatirag produced jn the years prior to the Gulf war. Iraq maintains a small missile force and seversl development programs, indeding for a VAY probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent. ‘* Gaps in Iragi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up toa ‘few dozen Seud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 10 900 kam. Iraq is deploying its new al-Samond and Ababjl-100 SRBMs, which are capable of Dying beyond the UN-sathorized 150-kmn range limit; Iraq has tested an ol-Samoud variant beyond 150 km—~perhaps as fas 2s 300 lon. '» Baghdad’s UAVs could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close t0, or irto, the United States, the USHomeland. ~ Aalragi UAV procurement network attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an ascociated topographis database that would be able to support targeting of the United States, according to analysis of special inteltigence. - Tee Dyce, niles , Soren on Recenalcno, US Ai Foe, daca ogree is developing UAVs primarily intnded ta be delivery platforms for chemical end biological werface (CBW) agent, The small etn of aq’ nsw UAV. Stoney suggets a prima role of reconsisemc,etbugh CBW delivery isan inherent + Traqis developing medium-range ballistic missile cepabilities, largely through wesc i ling sei is lung slr ag mre powed in Hts current ‘We have low confidence in ovr ability to assess when Se@dam would use WMD. * Seddem could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against US forces, Gens, end allies in the region in an attempt to disrapt US war preparati dering the polita wil of e Carian on salad * (Corrected per Errata sheet issued in October 2002]