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Policy History
Spring 2010
One of the most contentious debates among historians of the 20th century is centered on
the immediate post-WWII years and the origins of the Cold War. The historiography of the
1945-1953 period developed and evolved alongside the traditional exceptionalist interpretations
of American endeavors, notably during the 1950s; changing domestic situations and attitudes,
best mated with the 1960s; and, for lack of a better word, an enlightenment and appreciate for
larger issues at play during the 1970s and 1980s. Of these three periods came three schools of
school implicated the Soviet Union as the aggressor at the start of the Cold War and wrote in
defense of American exceptionalism and policies. The revisionists, however, were more critical
of American motives noting a long history of economic imperialist-like policies especially since
the 1890s. Post-revisionists, tended to accept parts of both of the former theses, but also
considered macro issues such as transnational movements when seeking a consensus over the
origins of the Cold War. These three schools remain in the 21st century at odds with each other.
Debates among the different schools, however, are what keep history as a discipline interesting
and credible. As we move further into this century, one has to wonder what new approaches and
analyses will be investigated over the Cold War years. For our purposes, however, this essay will
survey how and why scholarship over the origins of the Cold War evolved the way it did. One
maintains that the largest reason for the three schools’ separation, evidence, and conclusions has
1
The Orthodox scholars were the pioneers in the history accounts of the early Cold War
years. The large unifying theme of most memoirs, monographs, and articles of this school
during the 1950s and throughout the 1960s was of Soviet aggression as a central cause for the
Cold War. Because of Soviet perceived motives, the United States worked in reactionary manner
implementing policies in response to Soviet expansion. In a way this school not only placed the
Soviet Union as the primary aggressor at the onset of the Cold War, but also suggested that
America was left with no choice but to become the deemed champion of anti-Soviet, anti-
Communist forces. One reason such a theme was popular was because of limited resources to
counter assertions made in many policymakers’ memoirs. Another reason such a thesis and
consensus was the domestic climate under McCarthyism. Americans were pushed to believe
their system was exceptional and in the right. The Cold War consensus among the public
essentially gave policymakers infinite, unquestioned authority and allowed for the rise of such
extreme nationalist movements such as McCarthyism. To speak or write negatively about the
United States was taboo and likely to invite the offender to a session of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities (HUAC). The public sincerely believed that the United States had won
a good war and that spreading American ideals throughout the world was our moral obligation. 1
It is not this essay’s purpose to ridicule nor downplay the importance of first hand
accounts. Nonetheless, it does seem necessary to point out the possible over extolling and
apologetic nature of memoirs written immediately after incidents. Because there was insufficient
data to support or contradict retellings inside policymaker memoirs, many assertions and
1See J. Samuel Walker, “Historians and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus,” in Gerald K.
Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review
(Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1981) for a very thorough survey of the field as of early 1981.
2
narratives were held completely factual. Arguably, there can be many portions of memoirs that
are indeed factual in nature, but the reader must be careful to check later as documents are
released to support everything. Because documentation was not readily available in the 1950s,
memoirs of former diplomats and policymakers composed much of the early literature on the
Harry S. Truman published the first volume of his Memoirs in 1955. His memoir was in
response to much of the ridicule received during his early administration. From the onset of the
narrative, Truman tried to show how desperate times were when Franklin Roosevelt died.
Truman also touched briefly on what he deemed the resurgence of Congressional opposition and
power in the year after the conclusion of WWII. Throughout his narrative, Truman asserted how
he had to overcome personal challenges to fill the chair left by FDR. What Truman was
attempting to show to the public in his memoirs, was a story of triumphant growth in office and
explain how difficult decisions were thrust on him over night. Of course, having followed such a
popular president, Truman was not considered on par with FDR, even inadequate. So his
memoirs both served the historical community and his own political agenda. This does not deter
from its importance, if anything it became customary for presidents to publish their own
memoirs after their administration. These first hand accounts serve many purposes, and tend to
be read more than historical monographs as well. At the time, mid 1950s, however, this was
what was available to the public, and those curious about events surely were shocked to see how
much the president had to endure early in his administration. Public documents were not yet
3
released in bulk, and these memoirs served as part of the first wave of scholarship in the
orthodox school.2
Written by author “X” in 1946 and published at length as the “long telegram,” in Foreign
Affairs in 1947 was George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Though not published
as a monograph, this article, more than anything before it influenced anti-Soviet apprehensions.
Written from his first hand experience with the Soviet Union as a diplomat since its revolution,
Kennan sought to write on diplomacy from the outside in hopes of influencing future decisions.
The American public at the time, again, wanted to believe in their leaders and from the long
telegram came part of the Cold War consensus. Kennan asserted that the rising conflict with the
Soviet Union gave the United States an opportunity to become the global hegemon and lead the
free world. Nationalist trends that followed fed off such sentiments and historical scholarship
also alluded to and built off of Kennan’s strong assertions. A few years later, Kennan published
his own Memoirs in 1967 that narrated his time from 1925 to 1950. He furthered attempted to
show how influential he was during his years in Washington, but by the time of its publishing,
such first accounts were not as popular as they were two decades prior. However, his tone also
changed in his memoirs to a more realistic portrayal the world at the end of WWII. Of greatest
interest to readers in 1967 was his admission that the United States was technically incapable of
“conceiving and promulgating and long-term consistent policy toward areas remote from its own
territory.” The Middle East and Southeast Asia were hot topics by 1967 in the public, and
Kennan was suggesting that the country was incapable of sustaining policies for the benefit of
2Harry S. Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Volume I Year of Decisions 1945,
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955); Harry S. Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman:
Volume II Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-53, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956).
4
societies outside of its sphere of influence.3 What we see from these memoirs by Truman and
Kennan is how influential they were to the historical field. Whether everything within was
precise and accurate is debatable from future document releases, but largely, the orthodox school
began with memoirs from policymakers and only later did professional historians join in.
Historians such as Herbert Feis and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. continued the focus early
memoirs in the 1950s and 1960s. To these historians, much like the policymakers before them,
the Soviet Union was the culprit behind the outbreak of the Cold War. Feis was convinced that
during WWII the Soviets already began their expansionist trends and were seeking to incite
world-wide revolutions. For this reason, more than any other, the American response and
retaliation before 1953 was warranted. Schelesinger, Jr. went so far as to assert that the Cold
War was the “brave and essential response of free men to a communist aggression.” The Cold
War Consensus was exacerbated and expanded as historians joined the band wagon for anti-
Soviet attitudes. So why then did the consensus break apart so quickly? Was it because of the
These questions in themselves helped spark a reinvestigation of the origins of the Cold War. In
essence, if the Government was willing to align itself with zealots in HUAC, then what else
could Washington be hiding. This was the root of curiosity that created the revisionist school of
scholarship.4
3X. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, No. 4 (July, 1947), 566-582; George
Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1967).
4See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold
War,” Foreign Affairs 46, No. 1 (October, 1967), 22-52.
5
For the most part, historians and political scientists throughout the McCarthy years and
early 1960s saw no reason to challenge what seemed to be a consensus in scholarship over the
Cold War’s origins. However, in 1959, William Appleman Williams published The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy. To Williams, the United States was an economic, “open door,” imperial
entity pushing for world markets. The Cold War was part of the expansion of capitalist motives
and necessities to maintain American economic prominence. Williams was alone initially in his
conclusions, and criticized heavily. Placing the blame for the outbreak of the Cold War on the
shoulders of the United States was unpatriotic, even treasonous at the time. Slowly, throughout
the tumultuous Vietnam War years, other scholars began to reevaluate their former beliefs. Of
great interest to the revisionist was the Atomic Bomb decision, capitalist economic expansion,
and the assertions that the Soviet Union was no legitimate threat to the United States even in
1945. They blamed Truman heavily for abandoning FDR’s relationship with Stalin and the
conciliatory policies towards the Soviet Union at large. Containment policies pushed for the
wars in Korea and Vietnam, which became quagmires in the eyes of the American public (and
politicians for that matter). Revisionists published amid the early years of government
disillusionment in the United States. Lloyd Gardner in Architects of Illusion (1970) went so far
as to contend that the United States was, in 1945, the largest and strongest power in the world
and should have shown more compassion in policies to the Soviet Union who had lost heavily in
WWII.5
5William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: WW Norton
and Co, 1959); Lloyd Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign
Policy, 1941-49, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
6
The debate over whether presidential power and policies were carried over between FDR
and Truman was also a heavy point of contention for revisionists. Gar Alperovitz in 1965
published Atomic Diplomacy, and from the onset challenged the accepted view of Harry Truman
sharing the same policies as FDR. He believed the Truman launched his own foreign policy
initiative, perhaps at the request and pressure from his advisors, that aimed to reduce Soviet
influence in Europe and Asia. As the title suggests, the atomic bomb was also the focus of a
heated debate among historians at the time, and frankly, persists well into the 21st century. He
was among the first scholars to suggest the bombs dropped on Japan were not meant entirely, if
even at all, to end the war sooner. Rather, they were to intimidate the Soviet Union by revealing
our new scientific marvel. In retrospect, this was a valid point at the time. His reasoning
included citations and estimations of the intelligence community who were as shocked as the
American public when the Soviets detonated their first bomb in 1949 years ahead of
expectations.6
Walter LaFeber in America, Russia, and the Cold War, concurred with much of
Alperovitz in 1967. He believed the quick decay of relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union was because of decades of hostilities from Washington towards the Bolshevik
regime. He also advanced Williams’ thesis that America sought a global economic system
mirroring our own. All along, LaFeber believed, the United States sought to overexert the Soviet
economy and force its demise. What was new with LaFeber’s work was the admission that
postwar foreign policies had followed a similar trend from Truman to LBJ: containment at all
6 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and
the American Confrontation with Soviet Power, (New York: Random House, 1965).
7
cost.7 The revisionist school slowly gained more credence as the disillusionment of the
government continued through the latter 1960s. Historians, like average citizens, were forced to
rethink and reexamine held conceptions of what their government was involved in.
Once both schools developed and expanded by the 1970s, the debates expanded into each
school, especially in the revisionist camp. Michael Leigh published the prominent article in
1974 asking whether there was any consensus among revisionists. While maintaining difference
within the school itself, Leigh concluded that their conclusions were largely similar and not as
different as the orthodox scholars. So the majority of the scholarly debate remained between
revisionists and orthodox traditionalists. The questions and assertions surrounded who (the US
or the USSR) deserved the blame for being more aggressive in the post-WWII years, was
American foreign policy driven by idealism as spoken of during Wilson and FDR’s speeches, or
part of a capitalist expansion, and whether Stalin legitimately sought to expand or was just
Gabriel Kolko, in his 1968 monograph, The Politics of War, asserted that the main
characteristic of the United States followed its aims to expand and promote a global capitalist
system and that policymakers were subservient to big business interests. However, the orthodox
school rebuked such beliefs. They countered famously in 1982 with Thomas Hammond’s
Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War, by looking at the Soviet system and concluded
communism was infallible and would inevitably decline because of lacking competition.
7Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1967).
8
Furthermore, they maintained for communism to survive it would have to expand aggressively
In the debate over motives of policymakers, traditionalist believed foreign policy was
geared toward securing international cooperation (as demonstrated in the Korean War and the
United Nations success). In doing so, the new international system could maintain and promote
the welfare of member states in the UN. However, revisionists maintained this was all
superficial idealism attempting to mask the supremacy of capitalist expansion again following
Williams’ thesis from 1959. The thesis on American exceptionalism and idealistic-promotions
faltered heavily during the Vietnam years and fell apart largely in the aftermath of the Watergate
exposing. The third school of post-revisionism would branch off here and tend to agree with the
revisionists.9
Stalin was also a center for large debate. The lack of Soviet archives only exacerbated
discourse. Revisionists served as the apologists for Stalin and the Soviet Union, for they saw
Stalin as a leader pushed into difficult decision making. Lloyd Gardner and Kolko both asserted
that Stalin tended to accept capitalist encroachment, even with the Marshall Plan. Furthermore,
revisionists saw the Eastern Europe occupation as a reaction to American economic and
militaristic aggression. However, orthodox historians were quick to point out how Stalin was not
a conservative, or even moderate leader. They saw the formation of the East European bloc as a
8 Gabiel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945,
(New York: Random House, 1968); Thomas T. Hammond, “Introduction: the Great Debate over
the Origins of the Cold War,” in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold
War, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), 1-9.
9Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), 65-70.
9
land defense system from future invasions, and even this was a mere excuse for Stalin to exercise
Postrevisionism began to show up in journals and publishing presses in the mid 1970s.
Scholars of this school tend to pick portions of the orthodox and revisionist school and defend
identify areas of blame on both the United States and the Soviet Union. They were critical of
American economic expansion and interventions in the third world, yet defend American policies
in Europe. John Lewis Gaddis summed it up in his 1983 article in Diplomatic History by stating
that the goal of the postrevisionist school is to reach “a third stage, beyond orthodoxy and
revisionism, in the historiography of the period.” Essentially, Gaddis, one of the prominent Cold
War historians, sought to create new perspectives and levels of analysis throughout the Cold War
era, including its origins. Gaddis himself asserted that domestic economic interest were not a
driving force in American foreign policy, yet concedes there might have been some discussions
over a fear of another postwar depression. Without full access to Soviet archives in the 1980s,
Gaddis also criticized revisionists who believes Stalin was eager to work in cooperative efforts
with the United States. Gaddis went so far as to say the “primary cause of the Cold War was
Stalin’s ill-defined ambition, his determination to seek security in such a way as to leave little or
none for other actors in the international arena.” Other postrevisionists defended American
initiatives by showing how many other states were concerned with Soviet directives in the post-
WWII era. Revisionists sought to expose the Cold War consensus as a manipulation of the
10Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: the World and the United States
Foreign Policy 1945-1954, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 619, 710-717; J.L. Richardson,
“Cold War Revisionism, A Critique,” World Politics 24, No. 4, (July, 1972), 587-589.
10
people by Washington, but postrevisionists had issue with this simplification as well.
Postrevisionists, including Gaddis, believed public opinion against the Soviet Union was
founded long before the post-WWII era and that the public and members of Congress sought a
Anthropology, each discipline can be found in many post revisionist publications. The benefits
include more comprehensive illustrations of the minds of policymakers, the public and the
Soviets; new insight into policy analysis formerly overlooked or understudied in the historical
community; and the integration of different types of history into one school, at least when
approaching the origins of the Cold War. Post revisionists accept international trends such as
globalization and the global market system as viable reasons for what is perceived as a capitalist
economic empire by revisionists. Transnational cultural movements and civil and human rights
iniatives and movements were also investigated thoroughly for the first time in the latter 1970s.
The revisionists writing in the mid 1960s, as well as the 1970s and forward postrevisionists had
resources unavailable to the older orthodox historians. The Foreign Relations of the United
States volumes first appeared in the mid 1960s for example. Presidential Library and millions of
formerly classified documents invited the younger generations of historians. This is not to say
that all historians, even in the same school came to the same interpretive conclusions. Post
11 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972); Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Gaddis, We
Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Gaddis, “The
Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 7, No.
3 (Summer, 1983), 171-181.
11
revisionist Melvyn Leffler asserted the beginning years of conflict after WWII were largely in
response to American policies, not Soviet; he saw the Soviets like the revisionists did as
defensive actors who eventually had enough. Bottom up and new top down approaches revealed
insight into policymaking in the post-WWII era formerly unexplored. Agencies were assigned
blame, possibly even more so than revisionists had done in the wake of Watergate. Localized
historical analysis seemed to be blending with international relations as a field, and cultural or
societal movements behind the Iron Curtain revealed that social historians and sociologists had
so much to identify and write about. The post revisionist rise in the 1970s and 1980s was a fresh
The corporatist model of early Cold War history developed because of the
multidisciplinary scholarship. Historians like Michael Hogan and Robert Pollard believed they
public and private agencies, supranational organizations. They asserted these collaborative
ventures influenced the American foreign policy initiatives in the first years of the Cold War. At
the center of this assertion was the Marshall Plan. Such postrevisionists believed this was a way
for big business to move more into military assistance programs and oil policies. Of course one
of the first direct intervention by the corporatist bloc was Iran in 1953, so scholarship was not
solely focused on the Marshall Plan but the ramifications and possibilities created by it. The
corporatist bloc also saw the internationalization, or globalization, movement bridging the gap
between American foreign policy and those of her allies. In doing so, historians among many
12
nation states could compare conclusions and see more complete analyses of the effects of
What is left to analyze over the Origins of the Cold War for historians? All along, the
three major schools relied on first hand accounts and memoirs, some US archives, and a few
western archives and interviews. By 1991, however, the Soviet Union was on its last leg and
Gorbachev was pushing a new policy of openness towards US and other Western scholars.
Though no consensus ever came to full fruition in the decades before the 1990s, the debate in
journals seemed to calm down during the 1980s. By 1991 and the fall of the Soviet Union, and
the subsequent opening of documents in mass, historians revived the controversy over the origins
of the Cold War. Former Soviet researchers also joined discussions in the United States
following the USSR’s collapse. Additionally, the Cold War International History Project was
established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1991. The National
Security Archives at George Washington University began pushing for expedited declassification
and digitizing of documents including those from the former Soviet Union as well. The general
mood of historians was that definitive conclusions could finally be drawn with evidence on both
13Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security
State, 1945-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Hogan, The Marshall Plan:
America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Robert A. Pollard, “The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman
and Economic Containment, 1945-1950,” in Michael Lacey, ed., The Truman Presidency,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 205-235.
14See Odd Arne Westad, Vladislav Zubok, “Symposium. Soviet Archives: Revelations and Cold
War Historiography,” Diplomatic History 21, No. 2 (Spring, 1997); Norman M. Naimark, “Cold
War Studies and New Archival Materials on Stalin,” Russian Review 61, No. 1 (January, 2002),
1-15.
13
Largely, but not completely, recent scholarship has been able to take advantage of the
newer documents and archives. Indeed the newest generation of historians are connected to
unprecedented amounts of raw data. Since the turn of the century, two final works for this
essay’s purposes were published that further the aims of Gaddis in the 1980s when he sought to
add new depth of research and analysis to an already expanded postrevisionist school. Wilson
Miscamble’s From Roosevelt to Truman, and Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko’s The
Atomic Bomb both illustrate how far the field has come since Kennan’s 1947 “large telegram.”
Miscamble does not solely seek to be an apologist for Truman, but also to show how Truman did
not immediately dissolve FDR’s efforts at collaborative relations with Stalin and the Soviet
Union. Miscamble revealed how Secretary of State James Byrnes and Truman worked together
from 1945 to 1947 in an attempt to continue FDR’s policies. However, he also revealed how
with so much happening in these short years, no president nor secretary of state could have
calmed everything with even some mystical force. The international hegemony of America,
began with Truman’s implementation of policies after 1947 Miscamble believed. In truth, such
an assertion is likely to revive even more debate over one of the fundamental questions of
Truman’s foreign policy experience (or lack thereof) prior to his administration.15
Another larger question that has survived since the early years of the orthodox writings, is
the atomic bomb and its effects. Craig and Radchenko add most to Cold War origins scholarship
by implementing new archival evidence in support of an already vastly accepted thesis that the
atomic bomb drops on Japan spurred the bipolar conflict unnecessarily. What is a twist from this
revisionist thesis, is the admission that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were
15William Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34-75, 218-241.
14
adequately prepared for the Cold War standoff. Additionally, they expand on the postrevisionist
thesis that neither superpower exercised to their fullest any attempt to avoid confrontation. They
liken it to two bullies with their own psychological insecurities fighting for domain over a
playground. War was all either country knew at the time, but neither wanted to invest in another
direct conflict, so their problems were not resolved until one ran out of money.16
The origins of the Cold War remain a heated debate well into the 21st century. The three
major schools are without synthesis other than a few major distinctions between ideologies. The
largest changes in historical writing on the origins of the Cold War were the disillusionment era
and subsequent retrenchment from government trust and the end of the Cold War consensus, the
opening of archives since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the digitization of world records. It
also stands to reason that the appearance of the postrevisionist school coincided with the
changing domestic situation of the 1970s and 80s where Americans moved to expand their
horizons in scholarship and bridge the gap between sister disciplines of history. That there is no
solid consensus yet is a testament to the study of history. We are working, as a field, more like
sciences in maintaining individual assertions and theses only until a newer reexamination can
disprove or at least raise issues with our conceptions. The next generation of Cold War
historians will likely continue the move towards smaller issues and try to place them in the
context of the already established macro issues that define the three major schools of thought on
the Cold War origins. What is still lacking, if one must find something, is more partnered and
collaborative work among foreign historians and American scholars. The language barrier,
16Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
15
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Gardner, Lloyd. Architect of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-49.
Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought.
_____. Between War and Peace: the Potsdam Conference. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1960.
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_____. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
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18