Laurel vs. Garcia

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G.R.No.92013
TodayisWednesday,June29,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.92013July25,1990
SALVADORH.LAUREL,petitioner,
vs.
RAMONGARCIA,asheadoftheAssetPrivatizationTrust,RAULMANGLAPUS,asSecretaryofForeign
Affairs,andCATALINOMACARAIG,asExecutiveSecretary,respondents.
G.R.No.92047July25,1990
DIONISIOS.OJEDA,petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVESECRETARYMACARAIG,JR.,ASSETSPRIVATIZATIONTRUSTCHAIRMANRAMONT.
GARCIA,AMBASSADORRAMONDELROSARIO,etal.,asmembersofthePRINCIPALANDBIDDING
COMMITTEESONTHEUTILIZATION/DISPOSITIONPETITIONOFPHILIPPINEGOVERNMENTPROPERTIES
INJAPAN,respondents.
ArturoM.Tolentinoforpetitionerin92013.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:
Thesearetwopetitionsforprohibitionseekingtoenjoinrespondents,theirrepresentativesandagents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5
ChomeMinatokuTokyo,JapanscheduledonFebruary21,1990.Wegrantedtheprayerforatemporary
restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes
for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decisiontopushthroughwiththesaleoftheRoppongipropertyinspireofstrongpublicoppositionand
toexplaintheproceedingswhicheffectivelypreventtheparticipationofFilipinocitizensandentitiesin
thebiddingprocess.
TheoralargumentsinG.R.No.92013,Laurelv.Garcia,etal.wereheardbytheCourtonMarch13,1990.
AfterG.R.No.92047,Ojedav.SecretaryMacaraig,etal.wasfiled,therespondentswererequiredtofilea
comment by the Court's resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on
March27,1990whenthememorandaofthepartiesintheLaurelcaseweredeliberatedupon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a motion for an
extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an
extensionofanotherthirty(30)dayswhichwegrantedonMay8,1990,athirdmotionforextensionof
time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5,
1990butcallingtheattentionoftherespondentstothelengthoftimethepetitionshavebeenpending.
Afterthecommentwasfiled,thepetitionerinG.R.No.92047askedforthirty(30)daystofileareply.We
notedhismotionandresolvedtodecidethetwo(2)cases.
I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots
being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 1124 Nampeidaimachi, Shibuyaku, Tokyo which has an area of
approximately2,489.96squaremeters,andisatpresentthesiteofthePhilippineEmbassyChancery
(2)TheKobeCommercialPropertyat63Naniwacho,Kobe,withanareaofaround764.72squaremeters
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andcategorizedasacommerciallotnowbeingusedasawarehouseandparkinglotfortheconsulate
staffand
(3)TheKobeResidentialPropertyat19802Obanoyamacho,Shinohara,Nadaku,Kobe,aresidentiallot
whichisnowvacant.
ThepropertiesandthecapitalgoodsandservicesprocuredfromtheJapanesegovernmentfornational
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
propertyandtheirsufferingduringWorldWarII.
TheReparationsAgreementprovidesthatreparationsvaluedat$550millionwouldbepayableintwenty
(20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and
Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law,
prescribesthenationalpolicyonprocurementandutilizationofreparationsanddevelopmentloans.The
procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector and those for private parties in
projects as the then National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector
shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipinoowned
entitiesinnationaldevelopmentprojects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule
and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June
27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy" (Annex MD to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
Roppongipropertyhasremainedundevelopedsincethattime.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm Kajima
Corporation which shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai
and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction
wouldbetheleasetotheforeigncorporationofone(1)ofthebuildingstobeconstructedinRoppongi
and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the
Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be
occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See
Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease
period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is
pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo
andKobe,JapanthroughAdministrativeOrderNo.3,followedbyAdministrativeOrdersNumbered3A,
B,CandD.
OnJuly25,1987,thePresidentissuedExecutiveOrderNo.296entitlingnonFilipinocitizensorentities
to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four
propertiesinJapanincludingtheRoppongiwerespecificallymentionedinthefirst"Whereas"clause.
Amidstoppositionbyvarioussectors,theExecutivebranchofthegovernmenthasbeenpushing,with
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property
has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure
sinceonlyonebidderqualified.Thesecondone,afterpostponements,hasnotyetmaterialized.Thelast
scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were
changedsuchthatthe$225millionfloorpricebecamemerelyasuggestedfloorprice.
TheCourtfindsthateachofthehereinpetitionsraisesdistinctissues.ThepetitionerinG.R.No.92013
objectstothealienationoftheRoppongipropertytoanyonewhilethepetitionerinG.R.No.92047adds
asaprincipalobjectiontheallegedunjustifiedbiasofthePhilippinegovernmentinfavorofsellingthe
propertytononFilipinocitizensandentities.Thesepetitionshavebeenconsolidatedandareresolved
atthesametimefortheobjectiveisthesametostopthesaleoftheRoppongiproperty.
ThepetitionerinG.R.No.92013raisesthefollowingissues:
(1)CantheRoppongipropertyandothersofitskindbealienatedbythePhilippineGovernment?and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongiproperty?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to
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alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the
property available for sale to nonFilipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding
procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in
JapanforbeingdiscriminatoryagainstFilipinocitizensandFilipinoownedentitiesbydenyingthemthe
righttobeinformedaboutthebiddingrequirements.
II
InG.R.No.92013,petitionerLaurelassertsthattheRoppongipropertyandtherelatedlotswereacquired
as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the
Philippine government. VicePresident Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of
publicdominion,andnotofprivateownershipunderArticle420oftheCivilCode(Seeinfra).
ThepetitionersubmitsthattheRoppongipropertycomesunder"propertyintendedforpublicservice"in
paragraph2oftheaboveprovision.Hestatesthatbeingoneofpublicdominion,noownershipbyany
onecanattachtoit,notevenbytheState.TheRoppongiandrelatedpropertieswereacquiredfor"sites
for chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other improvements" (Second Year
ReparationsSchedule).Thepetitionerstatesthattheycontinuetobeintendedforanecessaryservice.
TheyareheldbytheStateinanticipationofanopportuneuse.(Citing3Manresa6566).Hence,itcannot
beappropriated,isoutsidethecommerceofman,ortoputitinmoresimpleterms,itcannotbealienated
norbethesubjectmatterofcontracts(CitingMunicipalityofCavitev.Rojas,30Phil.20[1915]).Noting
the nonuse of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains
propertyofpublicdominionsolongasthegovernmenthasnotuseditforotherpurposesnoradopted
anymeasureconstitutingaremovalofitsoriginalpurposeoruse.
Therespondents,fortheirpart,refutethepetitioner'scontentionbysayingthatthesubjectpropertyis
notgovernedbyourCivilCodebutbythelawsofJapanwherethepropertyislocated.Theyrelyupon
theruleoflexsituswhich is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer
anddevolutionofthetitletoaproperty.TheyalsoinvokeOpinionNo.21,Seriesof1988,datedJanuary
27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of
PhilippinelawregardingapropertysituatedinJapan.
TherespondentsaddthatevenassumingforthesakeofargumentthattheCivilCodeisapplicable,the
Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial
propertybecauseithasnotbeenusedforpublicserviceorfordiplomaticpurposesforoverthirteen(13)
yearsnow(CitingArticle422,CivilCode)andbecausetheintentionbytheExecutiveDepartmentandthe
Congresstoconvertittoprivateusehasbeenmanifestedbyovertacts,suchas,amongothers:(1)the
transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the
possibilityofalienatingthefourgovernmentpropertiesinJapan(3)theissuanceofExecutiveOrderNo.
296(4)theenactmentbytheCongressofRep.ActNo.6657[theComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw]
onJune10,1988whichcontainsaprovisionstatingthatfundsmaybetakenfromthesaleofPhilippine
propertiesinforeigncountries(5)theholdingofthepublicbiddingoftheRoppongipropertybutwhich
failed (6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date thus an
acknowledgmentbytheSenateofthegovernment'sintentiontoremovetheRoppongipropertyfromthe
publicservicepurposeand(7)theresolutionofthisCourtdismissingthepetitioninOjeda v. Bidding
Committee,etal.,G.R.No.87478whichsoughttoenjointhesecondbiddingoftheRoppongiproperty
scheduledonMarch30,1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
ExecutiveOrderNo.296.HehadearlierfiledapetitioninG.R.No.87478whichtheCourtdismissedon
August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to
conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also
allegedlyviolates:
(1)ThereservationoftheownershipandacquisitionofalienablelandsofthepublicdomaintoFilipino
citizens.(Sections2and3,ArticleXII,ConstitutionSections22and23ofCommonwealthAct141).
itc a s l
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
nationaleconomyandpatrimony(Section10,ArticleVI,Constitution)
(3)TheprotectiongiventoFilipinoenterprisesagainstunfaircompetitionandtradepractices
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section 7,
ArticleIII,Constitution)
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(5) The prohibition against the sale to nonFilipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino
citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of
Rep.ActNo.1789)and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest(Section28,ArticleIII,Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive
orderisamisapplicationofpublicfundsHestatesthatsincethedetailsofthebiddingfortheRoppongi
property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled
bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements
and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities
ownedbythemdidnothavethechancetocomplywithPurchaseOfferRequirementsontheRoppongi.
Worse,theRoppongishallbesoldforaminimumpriceof$225millionfromwhichpricecapitalgainstax
underJapaneselawofabout50to70%ofthefloorpricewouldstillbededucted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site and the
three related properties were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the
government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the
ReparationsAgreementtohousethePhilippineEmbassy.
ThenatureoftheRoppongilotaspropertyforpublicserviceisexpresslyspelledout.Itisdictatedby
thetermsoftheReparationsAgreementandthecorrespondingcontractofprocurementwhichbindboth
thePhilippinegovernmentandtheJapanesegovernment.
Therecanbenodoubtthatitisofpublicdominionunlessitisconvincinglyshownthatthepropertyhas
becomepatrimonial.This,therespondentshavefailedtodo.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated.Itsownershipisaspecialcollectiveownershipforgeneraluseandenjoyment,anapplication
tothesatisfactionofcollectiveneeds,andresidesinthesocialgroup.Thepurposeisnottoservethe
Stateasajuridicalperson,butthecitizensitisintendedforthecommonandpublicwelfareandcannot
be the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 6669 cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the
CivilCodeofthePhilippines,1963Edition,Vol.II,p.26).
TheapplicableprovisionsoftheCivilCodeare:
ART.419.Propertyiseitherofpublicdominionorofprivateownership.
ART.420.Thefollowingthingsarepropertyofpublicdominion
(1)Thoseintendedforpublicuse,suchasroads,canals,rivers,torrents,portsandbridges
constructedbytheState,banksshoresroadsteads,andothersofsimilarcharacter
(2)ThosewhichbelongtotheState,withoutbeingforpublicuse,andareintendedforsome
publicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth.
ART.421.AllotherpropertyoftheState,whichisnotofthecharacterstatedinthepreceding
article,ispatrimonialproperty.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
propertybelongingtotheStateandintendedforsomepublicservice.
Hastheintentionofthegovernmentregardingtheuseofthepropertybeenchangedbecausethelothas
beenIdleforsomeyears?Hasitbecomepatrimonial?
ThefactthattheRoppongisitehasnotbeenusedforalongtimeforactualEmbassyservicedoesnot
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawnfrompublicuse(CebuOxygenandAcetyleneCo.v.Bercilles,66SCRA481[1975]).Aproperty
continuestobepartofthepublicdomain,notavailableforprivateappropriationorownershipuntilthere
isaformaldeclarationonthepartofthegovernmenttowithdrawitfrombeingsuch(Ignaciov.Director
ofLands,108Phil.335[1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a
changeofintention.Weemphasize,however,thatanabandonmentoftheintentiontousetheRoppongi
propertyforpublicserviceandtomakeitpatrimonialpropertyunderArticle422oftheCivilCodemust
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be definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the nonuse alone specially if the nonuse was
attributablenottothegovernment'sowndeliberateandindubitablewillbuttoalackoffinancialsupport
to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).
Abandonmentmustbeacertainandpositiveactbasedoncorrectlegalpremises.
AmeretransferofthePhilippineEmbassytoNampeidaiin1976isnotrelinquishmentoftheRoppongi
property'soriginalpurpose.EventhefailurebythegovernmenttorepairthebuildinginRoppongiisnot
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japanweremerelydirectivesforinvestigationbutdidnotinanywaysignifyaclearintentiontodispose
oftheproperties.
ExecutiveOrderNo.296,thoughitstitledeclaresan"authoritytosell",doesnothaveaprovisioninits
textexpresslyauthorizingthesaleofthefourpropertiesprocuredfromJapanforthegovernmentsector.
Theexecutiveorderdoesnotdeclarethatthepropertieslosttheirpubliccharacter.Itmerelyintendsto
make the properties availableto foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other
disposition.ItmerelyeliminatestherestrictionunderRep.ActNo.1789thatreparationsgoodsmaybe
sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipinoowned entities. The text of
ExecutiveOrderNo.296provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, the abovementioned properties can be made available for sale,
leaseoranyothermannerofdispositiontononFilipinocitizensortoentitiesownedbynon
Filipinocitizens.
ExecutiveOrderNo.296isbasedonthewrongpremiseorassumptionthattheRoppongiandthethree
otherpropertieswereearlierconvertedintoalienablerealproperties.Asearlierstated,Rep.ActNo.1789
differentiates the procurements for the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12,
Rep.ActNo.1789).OnlytheprivatesectorpropertiescanbesoldtoenduserswhomustbeFilipinosor
entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive Order No.
296.
Section63(c)ofRep.ActNo.6657(theCARPLaw)whichprovidesasoneofthesourcesoffundsforits
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign
countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion
whenitmentionsPhilippinepropertiesabroad.Section63(c)referstopropertieswhicharealienableand
not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
fundingtoaugment(asandwhenneeded)theAgrarianReformFundcreatedunderExecutiveOrderNo.
299.Obviouslyanypropertyoutsideofthecommerceofmancannotbetappedasasourceoffunds.
TherespondentstrytogetaroundthepublicdominioncharacteroftheRoppongipropertybyinsisting
thatJapaneselawandnotourCivilCodeshouldapply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the ones to insist
thatinthesaleofextremelyvaluablegovernmentproperty,JapaneselawandnotPhilippinelawshould
prevail.TheJapaneselawitscoverageandeffects,whenenacted,andexceptionstoitsprovisionis
notpresentedtotheCourtItissimplyassertedthatthelexlocireisitaeorJapaneselawshouldapply
withoutstatingwhatthatlawprovides.ItisaedonfaiththatJapaneselawwouldallowthesale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined(SeeSalonga,PrivateInternationalLaw,1981ed.,pp.377383)and(2)Aforeignlawonland
ownershipanditsconveyanceisassertedtoconflictwithadomesticlawonthesamematters.Hence,
theneedtodeterminewhichlawshouldapply.
Intheinstantcase,noneoftheaboveelementsexists.
Theissuesarenotconcernedwithvalidityofownershiportitle.Thereisnoquestionthattheproperty
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governedbyPhilippineLaw.Theruleoflexsitusdoesnotapply.
TheassertionthattheopinionoftheSecretaryofJusticeshedslightontherelevanceofthelex situs
rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
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reparationsnortheexistenceinwhatbodyoftheauthoritytosellthem.Indiscussingwhoarecapable
ofacquiringthelots,theSecretarymerelyexplainsthatitistheforeignlawwhichshoulddeterminewho
can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboringwhetherornotthisopinioniscorrect.WhyshouldwediscusswhocanacquiretheRoppongi
lotwhenthereisnoshowingthatitcanbesold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned
on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not
have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress
hadalreadyconvenedformorethanayear.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion,thereisanotherobstacletoitssalebytherespondents.
Thereisnolawauthorizingitsconveyance.
Section79(f)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1917provides
Section79(f)ConveyancesandcontractstowhichtheGovernmentisaparty.Incasesin
which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other
instrumentconveyingthetitletorealestateortoanyotherpropertythevalueofwhichisin
excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare
thenecessarypaperswhich,togetherwiththeproperrecommendations, shall be submitted
to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or
contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
GovernmentofthePhilippinesunlesstheGovernmentofthePhilippinesunlesstheauthority
thereforbeexpresslyvestedbylawinanotherofficer.(Emphasissupplied)
TherequirementhasbeenretainedinSection48,BookIoftheAdministrativeCodeof1987(Executive
OrderNo.292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Governmentisauthorizedbylawtobeconveyed,thedeedofconveyanceshallbeexecuted
inbehalfofthegovernmentbythefollowing:
(1)ForpropertybelongingtoandtitledinthenameoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,bythe
President,unlesstheauthoritythereforisexpresslyvestedbylawinanotherofficer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any
politicalsubdivisionorofanycorporateagencyorinstrumentality,bytheexecutiveheadof
theagencyorinstrumentality.(Emphasissupplied)
ItisnotforthePresidenttoconveyvaluablerealpropertyofthegovernmentonhisorherownsolewill.
AnysuchconveyancemustbeauthorizedandapprovedbyalawenactedbytheCongress.Itrequires
executiveandlegislativeconcurrence.
ResolutionNo.55oftheSenatedatedJune8,1989,askingforthedefermentofthesaleoftheRoppongi
property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere
resolution it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In
fact,theSenateCommitteeonForeignRelationsisconductinghearingsonSenateResolutionNo.734
which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a factfinding investigation of the
circumstancesbehindthedecisiontosellthePhilippinegovernmentpropertiesinJapan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.296.Contrarytorespondents'assertion,wedidnotupholdthe
authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of
the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither
necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately
questionsistheuseoftheproceedsofthedispositionoftheRoppongiproperty."Inemphasizingthat
"the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be
questioned"inviewofSection63(c)ofRep.ActNo.6657,theCourtdidnotacknowledgethefactthat
the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the
Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re
classified to be patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for
nationaleconomicdevelopmentprojectsincludingtheCARP.
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Moreover,thesalein1989didnotmaterialize.Thepetitionsbeforeusquestiontheproposed1990sale
oftheRoppongiproperty.Weareresolvingtheissuesraisedinthesepetitions,nottheissuesraisedin
1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from public
domaintomakeitalienableandaneedforlegislativeauthoritytoallowthesaleoftheproperty,wesee
nocompellingreasontotackletheconstitutionalissuesraisedbypetitionerOjeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly
raisedinappropriatecasesandtheirresolutionisnecessaryforthedeterminationofthecase(Peoplev.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presentedbytherecordifthecasecanbedisposedofonsomeothergroundsuchastheapplicationof
a statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad
Commissionv.PullmanCo.,312U.S.496[1941]).
ThepetitionerinG.R.No.92013stateswhytheRoppongipropertyshouldnotbesold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino
people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the
Japanesemilitaryoccupation,forthesufferingofwidowsandorphanswholosttheirloved
onesandkindred,forthehomesandotherpropertieslostbycountlessFilipinosduringthe
war.TheTokyopropertiesareamonumenttothebraveryandsacrificeoftheFilipinopeople
inthefaceofaninvaderlikethemonumentsofRizal,Quezon,andotherFilipinoheroes,we
donotexpecteconomicorfinancialbenefitsfromthem.Butwhowouldthinkofsellingthese
monuments?FilipinohonorandnationaldignitydictatethatwekeepourpropertiesinJapan
as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we should become
paupersweshouldnotthinkofsellingthem.Foritwouldbeasifwesoldthelivesandblood
andtearsofourcountrymen.(RolloG.R.No.92013,p.147)
ThepetitionerinG.R.No.92047alsostates:
Roppongiisnoordinaryproperty.ItisonecededbytheJapanesegovernmentinatonement
for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical
dislocationandeconomicdevastationthewholeFilipinopeopleenduredinWorldWarII.
Itisforwhatitstandsfor,andforwhatitcouldneverbringbacktolife,thatitssignificance
todayremainsundimmed,inspireofthelapseof45yearssincethewarended,inspireofthe
passageof32yearssincethepropertypassedontothePhilippinegovernment.
Roppongiisareminderthatcannotshouldnotbedissipated...(Rollo92047,p.9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetchedbyrealpropertyinTokyobutmoresobecauseofitssymbolicvaluetoallFilipinosveterans
andciviliansalike.WhetherornottheRoppongiandrelatedpropertieswilleventuallybesoldisapolicy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties'
importanceandvalue,thelawsonconversionanddispositionofpropertyofpublicdominionmustbe
faithfullyfollowed.
WHEREFORE,INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionsareGRANTED.Awritofprohibitionisissued
enjoiningtherespondentsfromproceedingwiththesaleoftheRoppongipropertyinTokyo,Japan.The
February20,1990TemporaryRestrainingOrderismadePERMANENT.
SOORDERED.
MelencioHerrera,Paras,Bidin,GrioAquinoandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
SeparateOpinions
CRUZ,J.,concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the following
observationsonlyforemphasis.
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ItisclearthattherespondentshavefailedtoshowthePresident'slegalauthoritytoselltheRoppongi
property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor General was at best
ambiguous,althoughImustaddinfairnessthatthiswasnothisfault.Thefactisthatthereisnosuch
authority.Legalexpertisealonecannotconjurethatstatutorypermissionoutofthinair.
Exec.OrderNo.296,whichreadslikesomuchlegislative,doubletalk,doesnotcontainsuchauthority.
NeitherdoesRep.ActNo.6657,whichsimplyallowstheproceedsofthesaleofourpropertiesabroadto
beusedforthecomprehensiveagrarianreformprogram.SenateRes.No.55wasamererequestforthe
defermentofthescheduledsaleoftileRoppongiproperty,possiblytostopthetransactionaltogether
and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the said property may be authorized only by Congress
throughadulyenactedstatute,andthereisnosuchlaw.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men, where
everypublicofficial,fromthelowesttothehighest,canactonlybyvirtueofavalidauthorization.Iam
happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled against her, the President of the
Philippineshassubmittedtothisprinciplewithbecominggrace.
PADILLA,J.,concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few observations
whichcouldhelpinfurtherclarifyingtheissues.
UnderourtripartitesystemofgovernmentordainedbytheConstitution,itisCongressthatlaysdownor
determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies determined by Congress are
embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress the approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is
Congressthatisthepolicydeterminingbranchofgovernment.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws enacted by
Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing such laws, are in
accordancewiththeConstitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the reparations
agreementbetweenthePhilippineandJapanesegovernments.Undersuchagreement,thispropertywas
acquired by the Philippine government for a specific purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the
Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, Roppongi is a property of public dominion and
intendedforpublicservice,squarelyfallingwithinthatclassofpropertyunderArt.420oftheCivilCode,
whichprovides:
Art.420.Thefollowingthingsarepropertyofpublicdominion:
(1)...
publicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth.(339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the property is first
transformedintoprivatepropertyofthestateotherwiseknownaspatrimonialpropertyofthestate.1 The
transformationofpublicdominionpropertytostatepatrimonialpropertyinvolves,tomymind,apolicydecision. It
isapolicydecisionbecausethetreatmentofthepropertyvariesaccordingtoitsclassification.Consequently,itis
Congress which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state
patrimonialproperty.Congresshasmadenosuchdecisionordeclaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state patrimonial
property)mustbeapprovedbyCongress,forthisagainisamatterofpolicy(i.e.tokeepordisposeof
theproperty).Sec.48,Book1oftheAdministrativeCodeof1987provides:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines,bythePresident,unlesstheauthoritythereforisexpresslyvestedby
lawinanotherofficer.
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(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
nameofanypoliticalsubdivisionorofanycorporateagencyorinstrumentality,
bytheexecutiveheadoftheagencyorinstrumentality.(Emphasissupplied)
ButtherecordisbareofanycongressionaldecisionorapprovaltosellRoppongi.Therecordislikewise
bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi thru public bidding or
otherwise.
Itistherefore,clearthatthePresidentcannotsellororderthesaleofRoppongithrupublicbiddingor
otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion
propertytoastatepatrimonialproperty,and,second,authorizingthePresidenttosellthesame.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary restraining
orderearlierissuedbythisCourt.
SARMIENTO,J.,concurring:
Thecentralquestion,asIseeit,iswhetherornotthesocalled"Roppongiproperty'haslostitsnature
aspropertyofpublicdominion,andhence,hasbecomepatrimonialpropertyoftheState.Iunderstand
thatthepartiesareagreedthatitwaspropertyintendedfor"publicservice"withinthecontemplationof
paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and accordingly, land of State dominion, and beyond
humancommerce.Theloneissueis,inthelightofsuperveningdevelopments,thatisnonuserthereof
by the National Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last thirteen years the issuance of
Executive Order No. 296 making it available for sale to any interested buyer the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the program's
financing,StateassetssoldtheapprovalbythePresidentoftherecommendationoftheinvestigating
committee formed to study the property's utilization and the issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the
Philippine Senate requesting for the deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the
publicdominion,andifitisnot,howitlostthatcharacter.
Whenlandofthepublicdominionceasestobeone,orwhenthechangetakesplace,isaquestionour
courtshavedebatedearly.Ina1906decision,1itwasheldthatpropertyofthepublicdominion,apublicplaza
inthisinstance,becomespatrimonialuponusethereofforpurposesotherthanaplaza.Inalatercase, 2thisruling
was reiterated. Likewise, it has been held that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion
upon its donation to the town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three
cases, the character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to which it is
dedicated.4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the Government,
throughtheexecutivedepartmentortheLegislative,totheeffectthattheland...isnolongerneeded
for [public] service for public use or for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of the public
[dominion], not available for private expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled that a political
subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and
thereafter,todisposeofit.6
Inholdingthatthereis"aneedforalaworformaldeclarationtowithdrawtheRoppongipropertyfrom
publicdomaintomakeitalienableandalandforlegislativeauthoritytoallowthesaleoftheproperty" 7
themajoritylaysstresstothefactthat:(1)Anaffirmativeactexecutiveorlegislativeisnecessarytoreclassify
property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the
uncertainties brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of propertywhether public or patrimonial is
predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous nonuse of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic purposes", has
turneditintoStatepatrimonialproperty.
IfeelthatthisviewcorrespondstoexistingpronouncementsofthisCourt,amongotherthings,that:(1)
Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary 8 (2) With
respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the public dominion unless and until reclassified by the
Executive Branch of the Government 9 and (3) All natural resources, under the Constitution, and subject to
exceptionalcases,belongtotheState.10
IamelatedthattheCourthasbanishedpreviousuncertainties.
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FELICIANO,J.,dissenting
Withregret,IfindmyselfunabletosharetheconclusionsreachedbyMr.JusticeHugoE.Gutierrez,Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306 Roppongi, 5
Chome, Minatoku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be
characterizedaspropertyofpublicdominion,withinthemeaningofArticle420(2)oftheCivilCode:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
somepublicservice.
Itmightnotbeamisshowever,tonotethattheappropriatenessoftryingtobringwithintheconfinesof
the simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for public use
property"intendedforsomepublicservice"andpropertyintended"forthedevelopmentofthenational
wealth") all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines whether found within the territorial
boundariesoftheRepublicorlocatedwithintheterritoryofanothersovereignState,isnotselfevident.
Thefirstitemoftheclassificationpropertyintendedforpublicusecanscarcelybeproperlyappliedto
propertybelongingtotheRepublicbutfoundwithintheterritoryofanotherState.Thethirditemofthe
classificationpropertyintendedforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealthisillustrated,inArticle339of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a
sovereignStatearerarely,ifever,foundwithintheterritorialbaseofanothersovereignState.Thetaskof
examining in detail the applicability of the classification set out in Article 420 of our Civil Code to
property that the Philippines happens to own outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to
academicians.
Forpresentpurposes,too,Iagreethatthereisnoquestionofconflictoflawsthatis,atthepresenttime,
beforethisCourt.TheissuesbeforeusrelateessentiallytoauthoritytoselltheRoppongiproperty so
farasPhilippinelawisconcerned.
Themajorityopinionraisestwo(2)issues:(a)whetherornottheRoppongipropertyhasbeenconverted
intopatrimonialpropertyorpropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheStateand(b)assuminganaffirmative
answerto(a),whetherornotthereislegalauthoritytodisposeoftheRoppongiproperty.
I
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some public
service,intopropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheRepublic,itshouldbenotedthattheCivilCodedoes
notaddressthequestionofwhohasauthoritytoeffectsuchconversion.NeitherdoestheCivilCodeset
outorrefertoanyprocedureforsuchconversion.
Ourcaselaw,however,containssomefairlyexplicitpronouncementsonthispoint,asJusticeSarmiento
has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]),
petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed part of the public domain, the trial court
shouldhavedeclaredthesamenolongernecessaryforpublicuseorpublicpurposesandwhichwould,
therefore, have become disposable and available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor,
speakingfortheCourt,said:
Article4oftheLawofWatersof1866providesthatwhenaportionoftheshoreisnolonger
washedbythewatersoftheseaandisnotnecessaryforpurposesofpublicutility,orforthe
establishmentofspecialindustries,orforcoastguardservice,thegovernmentshalldeclare
it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment
thereof.Webelievethatonlytheexecutiveandpossiblythelegislativedepartmentshavethe
authorityandthepowertomakethedeclaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not
necessaryforpurposesofpublicutility,orfortheestablishmentofspecialindustries,orfor
coastguard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in
questionformspartofthepublicdomain.(Natividadv.DirectorofLands,supra.)
Thereasonforthispronouncement,accordingtothisTribunalinthecaseofVicenteJoveny
Monteverdev.DirectorofLands,93Phil.,134(citedinVelayo'sDigest,Vol.1,p.52).
...isundoubtedlythatthecourtsareneitherprimarilycalledupon,norindeedinapositionto
determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of
theLawofWaters.Consequently,untilaformal declaration on the part of the Government,
throughtheexecutivedepartmentortheLegislature,totheeffectthatthelandinquestionis
no longer needed for coastguard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continuetobepartofthepublicdomainnotavailableforprivateappropriationorownership.
(108Phil.at338339emphasissupplied)
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Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may convert
propertyoftheStateofpublicdominionintopatrimonialpropertyoftheState.Noparticularformulaor
procedure of conversion is specified either in statute law or in case law. Article 422 of the Civil Code
simply states that: "Property of public dominion, whennolongerintendedfor public use or for public
service,shallformpartofthepatrimonialpropertyoftheState".Irespectfullysubmit,therefore,thatthe
onlyrequirementwhichislegitimatelyimposableisthattheintenttoconvertmustbereasonablyclear
from a consideration of the acts or acts of the Executive Department or of the Legislative Department
whicharesaidtohaveeffectedsuchconversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion belonging to
municipalcorporations,i.e.,localgovernmentalunits,intopatrimonialpropertyofsuchentities.InCebu
Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council of Cebu by resolution declared a
certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned road, "the same not being included in the city
developmentplan".Subsequently,byanotherresolution,theCityCouncilofCebuauthorizedtheacting
CityMayortosellthelandthroughpublicbidding.Althoughtherewasnoformalandexplicitdeclaration
ofconversionofpropertyforpublicuseintopatrimonialproperty,theSupremeCourtsaid:
xxxxxxxxx
(2)Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of
title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonialpropertywhichcanbetheobjectofanordinarycontract.
Article422oftheCivilCodeexpresslyprovidesthat"Propertyofpublicdominion,whenno
longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
propertyoftheState."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and
unequivocalterms,statesthat"Propertythuswithdrawnfrompublicservitudemaybeused
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfullyusedorconveyed."
Accordingly,thewithdrawalofthepropertyinquestionfrompublicuseanditssubsequent
sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in
question.(66SCRAat484emphasissupplied)
Thus,againaspointedoutbySarmientoJ., in his separate opinion, in the case of property owned by
municipal corporations simple nonuse or the actual dedication of public property to some use other
than "public use" or some "public service", was sufficient legally to convert such property into
patrimonialproperty(MunicipalityofOasv.Roa,7Phil.20[1906]MunicipalityofHinungananv.Director
of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913] Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334
(1968).
Iwouldalsoaddthatsuchwasthecasenotonlyinrespectof'propertyofmunicipalcorporationsbut
alsoinrespectofpropertyoftheStateitself.ManresaincommentingonArticle341ofthe1889Spanish
CivilCodewhichhasbeencarriedoververbatimintoourCivilCodebyArticle422thereof,wrote:
Ladificultadmayorentodoestoestriba,naturalmente,enfijarelmomentoenquelosbienes
dedominiopublicodejandeserlo.SilaAdministracionolaautoridadcompetentelegislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se
trata naturalmente la dificultad queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de
partida cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede
ocurrir que no haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin embargo,
cesardehechoeldestinopublicodelosbienesahorabien,enestecaso,yparalosefectos
juridicosqueresultandeentrarlacosaenelcomerciodeloshombres,'seentederaquese
haverificadolaconversiondelosbienespatrimoniales?
ElcitadotratadistaRicciopina,respectodelantiguoCodigoitaliano,porlaafirmativa,ypor
nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende
tanto de una declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las mismas, y cuanda el uso
publicoceseconrespectodedeterminadosbienes,cesatambiensusituacioneneldominio
publico.Siunafortalezaenruinaseabandonaynoserepara,siuntrozodelaviapublicase
abandonatambienporconstituirotronuevoanmejorescondiciones....ambosbienescesan
deestarCodigo,yleyesespecialesmasomemosadministrativas.(3Manresa,Comentarios
alCodigoCivilEspanol,p.128[7aed.1952)(Emphasissupplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government purported,
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expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property of the Republic.
Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that cumulative effect of the executive acts
here involved was to convert property originally intended for and devoted to public service into
patrimonial property of the State, that is, property susceptible of disposition to and appropration by
privatepersons.Theseexecutiveacts,in their totality if not each individual act, make crystal clear the
intentoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoeffectsuchconversion.Theseexecutiveactsinclude:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a Committee to study the
disposition/utilizationoftheGovernment'spropertyinJapan,TheCommitteewascomposedofofficials
of the Executive Department: the Executive Secretary the Philippine Ambassador to Japan and
representativesoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandtheAssetPrivatizationTrust.On19September
1988, the Committee recommended to the President the sale of one of the lots (the lot specifically in
Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, the President approved the recommendation of
theCommittee.
On14December1988,thePhilippineGovernmentbydiplomaticnoteinformedtheJapaneseMinistryof
Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The Japanese
Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no objection to such
dispositionbytheRepublic.Subsequently,thePresidentandtheCommitteeinformedtheleadersofthe
House of Representatives and of the Senate of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the
Roppongiproperty.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming that the
majorityopinionisrightinsayingthatExecutiveOrderNo.296isinsufficienttoauthorizethesaleofthe
Roppongiproperty,itisheresubmittedwithrespectthatExecutiveOrderNo.296ismorethansufficient
to indicate an intention to convert the property previously devoted to public service into patrimonial
propertythatiscapableofbeingsoldorotherwisedisposedof
(c)NonuseoftheRoppongilotforfourteen(14)yearsfordiplomaticorforanyotherpublicpurposes.
Assuming(butonlyarguendo)thatnonusedoesnot,byitself,automaticallyconvertthepropertyinto
patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that prolonged nonuse, conjoined with the other factors here
listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial property of the State.
Actually, as already pointed out, case law involving property of municipal corporations is to the effect
that simple nonuse or the actual dedication of public property to some use other than public use or
public service, was sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial property of the local
governmental entity concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa reached the same conclusion in
respectofconversionofpropertyofthepublicdomainoftheStateintopropertyoftheprivatedomainof
theState.
Themajorityopinionstatesthat"abandonmentcannotbeinferredfromthenonusealoneespeciallyif
thenonusewasattributablenottotheGovernment'sowndeliberateandindubitablewillbuttolackof
financial support to repair and improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13). With respect, it may be
stressed that there is no abandonment involved here, certainly no abandonment of property or of
propertyrights.Whatisinvolvedisthechargeoftheclassificationofthepropertyfrompropertyofthe
publicdomainintopropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheState.Moreover,ifforfourteen(14)years,the
Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever funds were necessary to maintain the property in
Roppongiinaconditionsuitablefordiplomaticrepresentationpurposes,suchcircumstancemay,with
equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character of the
property.
(d)On30March1989,apublicbiddingwasinfactheldbytheExecutiveDepartmentforthesaleofthe
lotinRoppongi.Thecircumstancethatthisbiddingwasnotsuccessfulcertainlydoesnotargueagainst
anintenttoconvertthepropertyinvolvedintopropertythatisdisposablebybidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a whole, show at
least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the Legislative
Department)toconvertthepropertyinvolvedintopatrimonialpropertythatissusceptibleofbeingsold.
II
Havingreachedanaffirmativeanswerinrespectofthefirstissue,itisnecessarytoaddressthesecond
issueofwhetherornotthereexistslegalauthorityforthesaleordispositionoftheRoppongiproperty.
ThemajorityopinionreferstoSection79(f)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1917whichreadsas
follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in
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which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other
excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare
thenecessarypaperswhich,togetherwiththeproperrecommendations,shallbesubmitted
to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or
contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in
anotherofficer.(Emphasissupplied)
Themajorityopinionthengoesontostatethat:"[T]herequirementhasbeenretainedinSection4,Book
IoftheAdministrativeCodeof1987(ExecutiveOrderNo.292)"whichreads:
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any
Twopointsneedtobemadeinthisconnection.Firstly,therequirementofobtainingspecificapprovalof
CongresswhenthepriceoftherealpropertybeingdisposedofisinexcessofOneHundredThousand
Pesos(P100,000.00)undertheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1917,hasbeendeletedfromSection48of
the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present Administrative Code refers to is
authorization by law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not purport to be itself a source of legal
authorityforconveyanceofrealpropertyoftheGovernment.ForSection48merelyspecifiestheofficial
authorizedtoexecuteandsignonbehalfoftheGovernmentthedeedofconveyanceincaseofsucha
conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for disposition of real
propertyoftheprivatedomainoftheGovernment,hasbeengrantedbyCongressbothintheformof(a)
a general, standing authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the Government and (b)
specific legislation authorizing the disposition of particular pieces of the Government's patrimonial
property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the Philippines is
provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
ResourcestoSellorLeaseLandofthePrivateDomainoftheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands(now
RepublicofthePhilippines)",enactedon9March1922.Thefulltextofthisstatuteisasfollows:
BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesinLegislature
assembledandbytheauthorityofthesame:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of the
EnvironmentandNaturalResources)isherebyauthorizedtosellorleaselandoftheprivate
domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to such persons,
corporations or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twentyeight
hundred and seventyfour, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the
PublicLandAct,entitledtoapplyforthepurchaseorleaseoragriculturalpublicland.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is
agricultural,bemadeinthemannerandsubjecttothelimitationsprescribedinchaptersfive
andsix,respectively,ofsaidPublicLandAct,andifitbeclassifieddifferently,inconformity
withtheprovisionsofchapternineofsaidAct:Provided,however,Thatthelandnecessary
forthepublicserviceshallbeexemptfromtheprovisionsofthisAct.
SECTION3.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval.
Approved,March9,1922.(Emphasissupplied)
LestitbeassumedthatActNo.3038refersonlytoagriculturallandsoftheprivatedomainoftheState,it
mustbenotedthatChapter9oftheoldPublicLandAct(ActNo.2874)isnowChapter9ofthepresent
PublicLandAct(CommonwealthActNo.141,asamended)andthatbothstatutesreferto:"anytractof
land of the public domain which being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for
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residential purposes or for commercial or industrial purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis
supplied). In other words, the statute covers the sale or lease or residential, commercial or industrial
landoftheprivatedomainoftheState.
itc a s l
ImplementingregulationshavebeenissuedforthecarryingoutoftheprovisionsofActNo.3038.On21
December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Lands
Administrative Orders Nos. 76 and 77 which were entitled, respectively: "Supplementary Regulations
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" and
"Supplementary Regulations Governing the Lease of Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the
Philippines"(textin51O.G.2829[1955]).
ItisperhapswelltoaddthatActNo.3038,althoughnowsixtyeight(68)yearsold,isstillineffectand
hasnotbeenrepealed.1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the State is
illustratedbycertainearlierstatutes.ThefirstofthesewasActNo.1120,enactedon26April1904,which
provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic
Church,tobonafidesettlersandoccupantsthereofortootherpersons.InJacintov.DirectorofLands
(49Phil.853[1926]),thesefriarlandswereheldtobeprivateandpatrimonialpropertiesoftheState.Act
No.2360,enactedon28February1914,authorizedthesaleoftheSanLazaroEstatelocatedintheCity
of Manila, which had also been purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic Church. In
January1916,ActNo.2555amendedActNo.2360byincludingthereinalllandsandbuildingsownedby
the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by private persons, and which were
alsoacquiredbythePhilippineGovernment.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only one statute
authorizingthePresidenttodisposeofaspecificpieceofproperty.ThisstatuteisRepublicActNo.905,
enactedon20June1953,whichauthorizedthe
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government to the
National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of professionals
withacademicstanding,forthenominalpriceofP1.00.ItappearsrelevanttonotethatRepublicActNo.
905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property involved it provided for reversion of
the property to the National Government in case the National Press Club stopped using it for its
headquarters.WhatRepublicActNo.905authorizedwasreallyadonation,andnotasale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative authorization for
dispositionoftheRoppongipropertywhich,inmyview,hasbeenconvertedintopatrimonialpropertyof
theRepublic.2
Tosome,thesubmissionthatActNo.3038appliesnotonlytolandsoftheprivatedomainoftheState
located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the Philippines, may appear
strangeorunusual.Irespectfullysubmitthatsuchpositionisnotanymoreunusualorstrangethanthe
assumptionthatArticle420oftheCivilCodeappliesnotonlytopropertyoftheRepubliclocatedwithin
PhilippineterritorybutalsotopropertyfoundoutsidetheboundariesoftheRepublic.
ItremainstonotethatunderthewellsettleddoctrinethatheadsofExecutiveDepartmentsarealteregos
ofthePresident(Villenav.SecretaryoftheInterior,67Phil.451[1939]),andinviewoftheconstitutional
power of control exercised by the President over department heads (Article VII, Section 17,1987
Constitution),thePresidentherselfmaycarryoutthefunctionordutythatisspecificallylodgedinthe
SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(Aranetav.Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328
[1957]).Attheveryleast,thePresidentretainsthepowertoapproveordisapprovetheexerciseofthat
functionordutywhendonebytheSecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to the austere
questionofexistenceoflegalpowerorauthority.Theyhavenothingtodowithmuchdebatedquestions
ofwisdomorproprietyorrelativedesirabilityeitheroftheproposeddispositionitselforoftheproposed
utilizationoftheanticipatedproceedsofthepropertyinvolved.TheselattertypesofconsiderationsHe
within the sphere of responsibility of the political departments of government the Executive and the
Legislativeauthorities.
Foralltheforegoing,IvotetodismissthePetitionsforProhibitioninbothG.R.Nos.92013and92047.
Fernan,C.J.,Narvasa,Gancayco,CortesandMedialdea,JJ.,concurring.
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SeparateOpinions
CRUZ,J.,concurring:
IconcurcompletelywiththeexcellentponenciaofMr.JusticeGutierrezandwilladdthefollowing
observationsonlyforemphasis.
ItisclearthattherespondentshavefailedtoshowthePresident'slegalauthoritytoselltheRoppongi
property.Whenaskedtodosoatthehearingonthesepetitions,theSolicitorGeneralwasatbest
ambiguous,althoughImustaddinfairnessthatthiswasnothisfault.Thefactisthatthereisnosuch
authority.Legalexpertisealonecannotconjurethatstatutorypermissionoutofthinair.
Exec.OrderNo.296,whichreadslikesomuchlegislative,doubletalk,doesnotcontainsuchauthority.
NeitherdoesRep.ActNo.6657,whichsimplyallowstheproceedsofthesaleofourpropertiesabroadto
beusedforthecomprehensiveagrarianreformprogram.SenateRes.No.55wasamererequestforthe
defermentofthescheduledsaleoftileRoppongiproperty,possiblytostopthetransactionaltogether
andillanycaseitisnotalaw.ThesaleofthesaidpropertymaybeauthorizedonlybyCongress
throughadulyenactedstatute,andthereisnosuchlaw.
Onceagain,wehaveaffirmedtheprinciplethatoursisagovernmentoflawsandnotofmen,where
everypublicofficial,fromthelowesttothehighest,canactonlybyvirtueofavalidauthorization.Iam
happytonotethatintheseveralcaseswherethisCourthasruledagainsther,thePresidentofthe
Philippineshassubmittedtothisprinciplewithbecominggrace.
PADILLA,J.,concurring:
IconcurinthedecisionpennedbyMr.JusticeGutierrez,Jr.,Ionlywishtomakeafewobservations
whichcouldhelpinfurtherclarifyingtheissues.
UnderourtripartitesystemofgovernmentordainedbytheConstitution,itisCongressthatlaysdownor
determinespolicies.ThePresidentexecutessuchpolicies.ThepoliciesdeterminedbyCongressare
embodiedinlegislativeenactmentsthathavetobeapprovedbythePresidenttobecomelaw.The
President,ofcourse,recommendstoCongresstheapprovalofpoliciesbut,inthefinalanalysis,itis
Congressthatisthepolicydeterminingbranchofgovernment.
Thejudiciaryinterpretsthelawsand,inappropriatecases,determineswhetherthelawsenactedby
CongressandapprovedbythePresident,andpresidentialactsimplementingsuchlaws,arein
accordancewiththeConstitution.
TheRoppongipropertywasacquiredbythePhilippinegovernmentpursuanttothereparations
agreementbetweenthePhilippineandJapanesegovernments.Undersuchagreement,thispropertywas
acquiredbythePhilippinegovernmentforaspecificpurpose,namely,toserveasthesiteofthe
PhilippineEmbassyinTokyo,Japan.Consequently,Roppongiisapropertyofpublicdominionand
intendedforpublicservice,squarelyfallingwithinthatclassofpropertyunderArt.420oftheCivilCode,
whichprovides:
Art.420.Thefollowingthingsarepropertyofpublicdominion:
(1)...
publicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth.(339a)
Publicdominionpropertyintendedforpublicservicecannotbealienatedunlessthepropertyisfirst
transformedintoprivatepropertyofthestateotherwiseknownaspatrimonialpropertyofthestate.1The
transformationofpublicdominionpropertytostatepatrimonialpropertyinvolves,tomymind,apolicydecision.It
isapolicydecisionbecausethetreatmentofthepropertyvariesaccordingtoitsclassification.Consequently,itis
CongresswhichcandecideanddeclaretheconversionofRoppongifromapublicdominionpropertytoastate
patrimonialproperty.Congresshasmadenosuchdecisionordeclaration.
Moreover,thesaleofpublicproperty(onceconvertedfrompublicdominiontostatepatrimonial
property)mustbeapprovedbyCongress,forthisagainisamatterofpolicy(i.e.tokeepordisposeof
theproperty).Sec.48,Book1oftheAdministrativeCodeof1987provides:
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SEC.48.OfficialAuthorizedtoConveyRealProperty.Wheneverrealpropertyofthe
(1)ForpropertybelongingtoandtitledinthenameoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines,bythePresident,unlesstheauthoritythereforisexpresslyvestedby
lawinanotherofficer.
(2)ForpropertybelongingtotheRepublicofthePhilippinesbuttitledinthe
nameofanypoliticalsubdivisionorofanycorporateagencyorinstrumentality,
bytheexecutiveheadoftheagencyorinstrumentality.(Emphasissupplied)
ButtherecordisbareofanycongressionaldecisionorapprovaltosellRoppongi.Therecordislikewise
bareofanycongressionalauthorityextendedtothePresidenttosellRoppongithrupublicbiddingor
otherwise.
Itistherefore,clearthatthePresidentcannotsellororderthesaleofRoppongithrupublicbiddingor
otherwisewithoutapriorcongressionalapproval,first,convertingRoppongifromapublicdominion
propertytoastatepatrimonialproperty,and,second,authorizingthePresidenttosellthesame.
ACCORDINGLY,myvoteistoGRANTthepetitionandtomakePERMANENTthetemporaryrestraining
orderearlierissuedbythisCourt.
SARMIENTO,J.,concurring:
Thecentralquestion,asIseeit,iswhetherornotthesocalled"Roppongiproperty'haslostitsnature
aspropertyofpublicdominion,andhence,hasbecomepatrimonialpropertyoftheState.Iunderstand
thatthepartiesareagreedthatitwaspropertyintendedfor"publicservice"withinthecontemplationof
paragraph(2),ofArticle430,oftheCivilCode,andaccordingly,landofStatedominion,andbeyond
humancommerce.Theloneissueis,inthelightofsuperveningdevelopments,thatisnonuserthereof
bytheNationalGovernment(fordiplomaticpurposes)forthelastthirteenyearstheissuanceof
ExecutiveOrderNo.296makingitavailableforsaletoanyinterestedbuyerthepromulgationof
RepublicActNo.6657,theComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw,makingavailablefortheprogram's
financing,StateassetssoldtheapprovalbythePresidentoftherecommendationoftheinvestigating
committeeformedtostudytheproperty'sutilizationandtheissuanceofResolutionNo.55ofthe
PhilippineSenaterequestingforthedefermentofitsdispositionit,"Roppongi",isstillpropertyofthe
publicdominion,andifitisnot,howitlostthatcharacter.
Whenlandofthepublicdominionceasestobeone,orwhenthechangetakesplace,isaquestionour
courtshavedebatedearly.Ina1906decision,1itwasheldthatpropertyofthepublicdominion,apublicplaza
inthisinstance,becomespatrimonialuponusethereofforpurposesotherthanaplaza.Inalatercase,2thisruling
wasreiterated.Likewise,ithasbeenheldthatland,originallyprivateproperty,hasbecomeofpublicdominion
uponitsdonationtothetownanditsconversionanduseasapublicplaza.3Itisnotablethatunderthesethree
cases,thecharacteroftheproperty,andanychangeoccurringtherein,dependsontheactualusetowhichitis
dedicated.4
Muchlater,however,theCourtheldthat"untilaformaldeclarationonthepartoftheGovernment,
throughtheexecutivedepartmentortheLegislative,totheeffectthattheland...isnolongerneeded
for[public]serviceforpublicuseorforspecialindustries,[it]continue[s]tobepartofthepublic
[dominion],notavailableforprivateexpropriationorownership."5Soalso,itwasruledthatapolitical
subdivision(theCityofCebuinthiscase)alonemaydeclare(underitscharter)acityroadabandonedand
thereafter,todisposeofit.6
Inholdingthatthereis"aneedforalaworformaldeclarationtowithdrawtheRoppongipropertyfrom
publicdomaintomakeitalienableandalandforlegislativeauthoritytoallowthesaleoftheproperty"7
themajoritylaysstresstothefactthat:(1)Anaffirmativeactexecutiveorlegislativeisnecessarytoreclassify
propertyofthepublicdominion,and(2)alegislativedecreeisrequiredtomakeitalienable.Italsoclearsthe
uncertaintiesbroughtaboutbyearlierinterpretationsthatthenatureofpropertywhetherpublicorpatrimonialis
predicatedonthemanneritisactuallyused,ornotused,andinthesamebreath,repudiatestheGovernment's
positionthatthecontinuousnonuseof"Roppongi",amongotherarguments,for"diplomaticpurposes",has
turneditintoStatepatrimonialproperty.
IfeelthatthisviewcorrespondstoexistingpronouncementsofthisCourt,amongotherthings,that:(1)
PropertyispresumedtobeStatepropertyintheabsenceofanyshowingtothecontrary8(2)With
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respecttoforestlands,thesamecontinuetobelandsofthepublicdominionunlessanduntilreclassifiedbythe
ExecutiveBranchoftheGovernment9and(3)Allnaturalresources,undertheConstitution,andsubjectto
exceptionalcases,belongtotheState.10
IamelatedthattheCourthasbanishedpreviousuncertainties.
FELICIANO,J.,dissenting
Withregret,IfindmyselfunabletosharetheconclusionsreachedbyMr.JusticeHugoE.Gutierrez,Jr.
Forpurposesofthisseparateopinion,Iassumethatthepieceoflandlocatedin306Roppongi,5
Chome,MinatokuTokyo,Japan(hereinafterreferredtoasthe"Roppongiproperty")maybe
characterizedaspropertyofpublicdominion,withinthemeaningofArticle420(2)oftheCivilCode:
[Property]whichbelong[s]totheState,withoutbeingforpublicuse,andareintendedfor
somepublicservice.
Itmightnotbeamisshowever,tonotethattheappropriatenessoftryingtobringwithintheconfinesof
thesimplethreefoldclassificationfoundinArticle420oftheCivilCode("propertyforpublicuse
property"intendedforsomepublicservice"andpropertyintended"forthedevelopmentofthenational
wealth")allpropertyownedbytheRepublicofthePhilippineswhetherfoundwithintheterritorial
boundariesoftheRepublicorlocatedwithintheterritoryofanothersovereignState,isnotselfevident.
Thefirstitemoftheclassificationpropertyintendedforpublicusecanscarcelybeproperlyappliedto
propertybelongingtotheRepublicbutfoundwithintheterritoryofanotherState.Thethirditemofthe
classificationpropertyintendedforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealthisillustrated,inArticle339of
theSpanishCivilCodeof1889,byminesormineralproperties.Again,minerallandsownedbya
sovereignStatearerarely,ifever,foundwithintheterritorialbaseofanothersovereignState.Thetaskof
examiningindetailtheapplicabilityoftheclassificationsetoutinArticle420ofourCivilCodeto
propertythatthePhilippineshappenstoownoutsideitsownboundariesmust,however,beleftto
academicians.
Forpresentpurposes,too,Iagreethatthereisnoquestionofconflictoflawsthatis,atthepresenttime,
beforethisCourt.TheissuesbeforeusrelateessentiallytoauthoritytoselltheRoppongipropertyso
farasPhilippinelawisconcerned.
Themajorityopinionraisestwo(2)issues:(a)whetherornottheRoppongipropertyhasbeenconverted
intopatrimonialpropertyorpropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheStateand(b)assuminganaffirmative
answerto(a),whetherornotthereislegalauthoritytodisposeoftheRoppongiproperty.
I
Addressingthefirstissueofconversionofpropertyofpublicdominionintendedforsomepublic
service,intopropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheRepublic,itshouldbenotedthattheCivilCodedoes
notaddressthequestionofwhohasauthoritytoeffectsuchconversion.NeitherdoestheCivilCodeset
outorrefertoanyprocedureforsuchconversion.
Ourcaselaw,however,containssomefairlyexplicitpronouncementsonthispoint,asJusticeSarmiento
haspointedoutinhisconcurringopinion.InIgnaciov.DirectorofLands(108Phils.335[1960]),
petitionerIgnacioarguedthatifthelandinquestionformedpartofthepublicdomain,thetrialcourt
shouldhavedeclaredthesamenolongernecessaryforpublicuseorpublicpurposesandwhichwould,
therefore,havebecomedisposableandavailableforprivateownership.Mr.JusticeMontemayor,
speakingfortheCourt,said:
Article4oftheLawofWatersof1866providesthatwhenaportionoftheshoreisnolonger
washedbythewatersoftheseaandisnotnecessaryforpurposesofpublicutility,orforthe
establishmentofspecialindustries,orforcoastguardservice,thegovernmentshalldeclare
ittobethepropertyoftheownersoftheestatesadjacenttheretoandasanincrement
thereof.Webelievethatonlytheexecutiveandpossiblythelegislativedepartmentshavethe
authorityandthepowertomakethedeclarationthatanylandsogainedbythesea,isnot
necessaryforpurposesofpublicutility,orfortheestablishmentofspecialindustries,orfor
coastguardservice.Ifnosuchdeclarationhasbeenmadebysaiddepartments,thelotin
questionformspartofthepublicdomain.(Natividadv.DirectorofLands,supra.)
Thereasonforthispronouncement,accordingtothisTribunalinthecaseofVicenteJoveny
Monteverdev.DirectorofLands,93Phil.,134(citedinVelayo'sDigest,Vol.1,p.52).
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...isundoubtedlythatthecourtsareneitherprimarilycalledupon,norindeedinapositionto
determinewhetheranypubliclandaretobeusedforthepurposesspecifiedinArticle4of
theLawofWaters.Consequently,untilaformaldeclarationonthepartoftheGovernment,
throughtheexecutivedepartmentortheLegislature,totheeffectthatthelandinquestionis
nolongerneededforcoastguardservice,forpublicuseorforspecialindustries,they
continuetobepartofthepublicdomainnotavailableforprivateappropriationorownership.
(108Phil.at338339emphasissupplied)
Thus,underIgnacio,eithertheExecutiveDepartmentortheLegislativeDepartmentmayconvert
propertyoftheStateofpublicdominionintopatrimonialpropertyoftheState.Noparticularformulaor
procedureofconversionisspecifiedeitherinstatutelaworincaselaw.Article422oftheCivilCode
simplystatesthat:"Propertyofpublicdominion,whennolongerintendedforpublicuseorforpublic
service,shallformpartofthepatrimonialpropertyoftheState".Irespectfullysubmit,therefore,thatthe
onlyrequirementwhichislegitimatelyimposableisthattheintenttoconvertmustbereasonablyclear
fromaconsiderationoftheactsoractsoftheExecutiveDepartmentoroftheLegislativeDepartment
whicharesaidtohaveeffectedsuchconversion.
Thesamelegalsituationexistsinrespectofconversionofpropertyofpublicdominionbelongingto
municipalcorporations,i.e.,localgovernmentalunits,intopatrimonialpropertyofsuchentities.InCebu
OxygenAcetylenev.Bercilles(66SCRA481[1975]),theCityCouncilofCebubyresolutiondeclareda
certainportionofanexistingstreetasanabandonedroad,"thesamenotbeingincludedinthecity
developmentplan".Subsequently,byanotherresolution,theCityCouncilofCebuauthorizedtheacting
CityMayortosellthelandthroughpublicbidding.Althoughtherewasnoformalandexplicitdeclaration
ofconversionofpropertyforpublicuseintopatrimonialproperty,theSupremeCourtsaid:
xxxxxxxxx
(2)Sincethatportionofthecitystreetsubjectofpetitioner'sapplicationforregistrationof
titlewaswithdrawnfrompublicuse,itfollowsthatsuchwithdrawnportionbecomes
patrimonialpropertywhichcanbetheobjectofanordinarycontract.
Article422oftheCivilCodeexpresslyprovidesthat"Propertyofpublicdominion,whenno
longerintendedforpublicuseofforpublicservice,shallformpartofthepatrimonial
propertyoftheState."
Besides,theRevisedCharteroftheCityofCebuheretoforequoted,inveryclearand
unequivocalterms,statesthat"Propertythuswithdrawnfrompublicservitudemaybeused
orconveyedforanypurposeforwhichotherrealpropertybelongingtotheCitymaybe
lawfullyusedorconveyed."
Accordingly,thewithdrawalofthepropertyinquestionfrompublicuseanditssubsequent
saletothepetitionerisvalid.Hence,thepetitionerhasaregistrabletitleoverthelotin
question.(66SCRAat484emphasissupplied)
Thus,againaspointedoutbySarmientoJ.,inhisseparateopinion,inthecaseofpropertyownedby
municipalcorporationssimplenonuseortheactualdedicationofpublicpropertytosomeuseother
than"publicuse"orsome"publicservice",wassufficientlegallytoconvertsuchpropertyinto
patrimonialproperty(MunicipalityofOasv.Roa,7Phil.20[1906]MunicipalityofHinungananv.Director
ofLands24Phil.124[1913]ProvinceofZamboangadelNortev.CityofZamboanga,22SCRA1334
(1968).
Iwouldalsoaddthatsuchwasthecasenotonlyinrespectof'propertyofmunicipalcorporationsbut
alsoinrespectofpropertyoftheStateitself.ManresaincommentingonArticle341ofthe1889Spanish
CivilCodewhichhasbeencarriedoververbatimintoourCivilCodebyArticle422thereof,wrote:
Ladificultadmayorentodoestoestriba,naturalmente,enfijarelmomentoenquelosbienes
dedominiopublicodejandeserlo.SilaAdministracionolaautoridadcompetentelegislative
realizanqunactoenvirtuddelcualcesaeldestinoousopublicodelosbienesdequese
tratanaturalmenteladificultadquedadesdeelprimermomentoresuelta.Hayunpuntode
partidaciertoparainiciarlasrelacionesjuridicasaquepudierahaberlugarPeropuede
ocurrirquenohayataldeclaracionexpresa,legislativaoradministrativa,y,sinembargo,
cesardehechoeldestinopublicodelosbienesahorabien,enestecaso,yparalosefectos
juridicosqueresultandeentrarlacosaenelcomerciodeloshombres,'seentederaquese
haverificadolaconversiondelosbienespatrimoniales?
ElcitadotratadistaRicciopina,respectodelantiguoCodigoitaliano,porlaafirmativa,ypor
nuestrapartecreemosquetaldebeserlasoluciion.Eldestinodelascosasnodepende
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tantodeunadeclaracionexpresacomodelusopublicodelasmismas,ycuandaeluso
publicoceseconrespectodedeterminadosbienes,cesatambiensusituacioneneldominio
publico.Siunafortalezaenruinaseabandonaynoserepara,siuntrozodelaviapublicase
abandonatambienporconstituirotronuevoanmejorescondiciones....ambosbienescesan
deestarCodigo,yleyesespecialesmasomemosadministrativas.(3Manresa,Comentarios
alCodigoCivilEspanol,p.128[7aed.1952)(Emphasissupplied)
ThemajorityopinionsaysthatnoneoftheexecutiveactspointedtobytheGovernmentpurported,
expresslyordefinitely,toconverttheRoppongipropertyintopatrimonialpropertyoftheRepublic.
Assumingthattobethecase,itisrespectfullysubmittedthatcumulativeeffectoftheexecutiveacts
hereinvolvedwastoconvertpropertyoriginallyintendedforanddevotedtopublicserviceinto
patrimonialpropertyoftheState,thatis,propertysusceptibleofdispositiontoandapproprationby
privatepersons.Theseexecutiveacts,intheirtotalityifnoteachindividualact,makecrystalclearthe
intentoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoeffectsuchconversion.Theseexecutiveactsinclude:
(a)AdministrativeOrderNo.3dated11August1985,whichcreatedaCommitteetostudythe
disposition/utilizationoftheGovernment'spropertyinJapan,TheCommitteewascomposedofofficials
oftheExecutiveDepartment:theExecutiveSecretarythePhilippineAmbassadortoJapanand
representativesoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandtheAssetPrivatizationTrust.On19September
1988,theCommitteerecommendedtothePresidentthesaleofoneofthelots(thelotspecificallyin
Roppongi)throughpublicbidding.On4October1988,thePresidentapprovedtherecommendationof
theCommittee.
On14December1988,thePhilippineGovernmentbydiplomaticnoteinformedtheJapaneseMinistryof
ForeignAffairsoftheRepublic'sintentiontodisposeofthepropertyinRoppongi.TheJapanese
GovernmentthroughitsMinistryofForeignAffairsrepliedthatitinterposednoobjectiontosuch
dispositionbytheRepublic.Subsequently,thePresidentandtheCommitteeinformedtheleadersofthe
HouseofRepresentativesandoftheSenateofthePhilippinesoftheproposeddispositionofthe
Roppongiproperty.
(b)ExecutiveOrderNo.296,whichwasissuedbythePresidenton25July1987.Assumingthatthe
majorityopinionisrightinsayingthatExecutiveOrderNo.296isinsufficienttoauthorizethesaleofthe
Roppongiproperty,itisheresubmittedwithrespectthatExecutiveOrderNo.296ismorethansufficient
toindicateanintentiontoconvertthepropertypreviouslydevotedtopublicserviceintopatrimonial
propertythatiscapableofbeingsoldorotherwisedisposedof
(c)NonuseoftheRoppongilotforfourteen(14)yearsfordiplomaticorforanyotherpublicpurposes.
Assuming(butonlyarguendo)thatnonusedoesnot,byitself,automaticallyconvertthepropertyinto
patrimonialproperty.Irespectfullyurgethatprolongednonuse,conjoinedwiththeotherfactorshere
listed,waslegallyeffectivetoconvertthelotinRoppongiintopatrimonialpropertyoftheState.
Actually,asalreadypointedout,caselawinvolvingpropertyofmunicipalcorporationsistotheeffect
thatsimplenonuseortheactualdedicationofpublicpropertytosomeuseotherthanpublicuseor
publicservice,wassufficienttoconvertsuchpropertyintopatrimonialpropertyofthelocal
governmentalentityconcerned.Alsoaspointedoutabove,Manresareachedthesameconclusionin
respectofconversionofpropertyofthepublicdomainoftheStateintopropertyoftheprivatedomainof
theState.
Themajorityopinionstatesthat"abandonmentcannotbeinferredfromthenonusealoneespeciallyif
thenonusewasattributablenottotheGovernment'sowndeliberateandindubitablewillbuttolackof
financialsupporttorepairandimprovetheproperty"(MajorityOpinion,p.13).Withrespect,itmaybe
stressedthatthereisnoabandonmentinvolvedhere,certainlynoabandonmentofpropertyorof
propertyrights.Whatisinvolvedisthechargeoftheclassificationofthepropertyfrompropertyofthe
publicdomainintopropertyoftheprivatedomainoftheState.Moreover,ifforfourteen(14)years,the
Governmentdidnotseefittoappropriatewhateverfundswerenecessarytomaintainthepropertyin
Roppongiinaconditionsuitablefordiplomaticrepresentationpurposes,suchcircumstancemay,with
equallogic,beconstruedasamanifestationofthecrystalizingintenttochangethecharacterofthe
property.
(d)On30March1989,apublicbiddingwasinfactheldbytheExecutiveDepartmentforthesaleofthe
lotinRoppongi.Thecircumstancethatthisbiddingwasnotsuccessfulcertainlydoesnotargueagainst
anintenttoconvertthepropertyinvolvedintopropertythatisdisposablebybidding.
Theabovesetofeventsandcircumstancesmakesnosenseatallifitdoesnot,asawhole,showat
leasttheintentonthepartoftheExecutiveDepartment(withtheknowledgeoftheLegislative
Department)toconvertthepropertyinvolvedintopatrimonialpropertythatissusceptibleofbeingsold.
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Havingreachedanaffirmativeanswerinrespectofthefirstissue,itisnecessarytoaddressthesecond
issueofwhetherornotthereexistslegalauthorityforthesaleordispositionoftheRoppongiproperty.
ThemajorityopinionreferstoSection79(f)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1917whichreadsas
follows:
SEC.79(f).ConveyancesandcontractstowhichtheGovernmentisaparty.Incasesin
whichtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesisapartytoanydeedorother
excessofonehundredthousandpesos,therespectiveDepartmentSecretaryshallprepare
thenecessarypaperswhich,togetherwiththeproperrecommendations,shallbesubmitted
totheCongressofthePhilippinesforapprovalbythesame.Suchdeed,instrument,or
contractshallbeexecutedandsignedbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonbehalfofthe
GovernmentofthePhilippinesunlesstheauthoritythereforbeexpresslyvestedbylawin
anotherofficer.(Emphasissupplied)
Themajorityopinionthengoesontostatethat:"[T]herequirementhasbeenretainedinSection4,Book
IoftheAdministrativeCodeof1987(ExecutiveOrderNo.292)"whichreads:
SEC.48.OfficialAuthorizedtoConveyRealProperty.Wheneverrealpropertyofthe
(2)ForpropertybelongingtotheRepublicofthePhilippinesbuttitledinthenameofany
Twopointsneedtobemadeinthisconnection.Firstly,therequirementofobtainingspecificapprovalof
CongresswhenthepriceoftherealpropertybeingdisposedofisinexcessofOneHundredThousand
Pesos(P100,000.00)undertheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1917,hasbeendeletedfromSection48of
the1987AdministrativeCode.WhatSection48ofthepresentAdministrativeCodereferstois
authorizationbylawfortheconveyance.Section48doesnotpurporttobeitselfasourceoflegal
authorityforconveyanceofrealpropertyoftheGovernment.ForSection48merelyspecifiestheofficial
authorizedtoexecuteandsignonbehalfoftheGovernmentthedeedofconveyanceincaseofsucha
conveyance.
Secondly,examinationofourstatutebooksshowsthatauthorizationbylawfordispositionofreal
propertyoftheprivatedomainoftheGovernment,hasbeengrantedbyCongressbothintheformof(a)
ageneral,standingauthorizationfordispositionofpatrimonialpropertyoftheGovernmentand(b)
specificlegislationauthorizingthedispositionofparticularpiecesoftheGovernment'spatrimonial
property.
StandinglegislativeauthorityforthedispositionoflandoftheprivatedomainofthePhilippinesis
providedbyActNo.3038,entitled"AnActAuthorizingtheSecretaryofAgricultureandNatural
ResourcestoSellorLeaseLandofthePrivateDomainoftheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands(now
RepublicofthePhilippines)",enactedon9March1922.Thefulltextofthisstatuteisasfollows:
BeitenactedbytheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesofthePhilippinesinLegislature
assembledandbytheauthorityofthesame:
SECTION1.TheSecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResources(nowSecretaryofthe
EnvironmentandNaturalResources)isherebyauthorizedtosellorleaselandoftheprivate
domainoftheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,oranypartthereof,tosuchpersons,
corporationsorassociationsasare,undertheprovisionsofActNumberedTwentyeight
hundredandseventyfour,(nowCommonwealthActNo.141,asamended)knownasthe
PublicLandAct,entitledtoapplyforthepurchaseorleaseoragriculturalpublicland.
SECTION2.Thesaleofthelandreferredtointheprecedingsectionshall,ifsuchlandis
agricultural,bemadeinthemannerandsubjecttothelimitationsprescribedinchaptersfive
andsix,respectively,ofsaidPublicLandAct,andifitbeclassifieddifferently,inconformity
withtheprovisionsofchapternineofsaidAct:Provided,however,Thatthelandnecessary
forthepublicserviceshallbeexemptfromtheprovisionsofthisAct.
SECTION3.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval.
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Approved,March9,1922.(Emphasissupplied)
LestitbeassumedthatActNo.3038refersonlytoagriculturallandsoftheprivatedomainoftheState,it
mustbenotedthatChapter9oftheoldPublicLandAct(ActNo.2874)isnowChapter9ofthepresent
PublicLandAct(CommonwealthActNo.141,asamended)andthatbothstatutesreferto:"anytractof
landofthepublicdomainwhichbeingneithertimbernormineralland,isintendedtobeusedfor
residentialpurposesorforcommercialorindustrialpurposesotherthanagricultural"(Emphasis
supplied).Inotherwords,thestatutecoversthesaleorleaseorresidential,commercialorindustrial
landoftheprivatedomainoftheState.
ImplementingregulationshavebeenissuedforthecarryingoutoftheprovisionsofActNo.3038.On21
December1954,thethenSecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResourcespromulgatedLands
AdministrativeOrdersNos.76and77whichwereentitled,respectively:"SupplementaryRegulations
GoverningtheSaleoftheLandsofthePrivateDomainoftheRepublicofthePhilippines"and
"SupplementaryRegulationsGoverningtheLeaseofLandsofPrivateDomainoftheRepublicofthe
Philippines"(textin51O.G.2829[1955]).
ItisperhapswelltoaddthatActNo.3038,althoughnowsixtyeight(68)yearsold,isstillineffectand
hasnotbeenrepealed.1
SpecificlegislativeauthorizationfordispositionofparticularpatrimonialpropertiesoftheStateis
illustratedbycertainearlierstatutes.ThefirstofthesewasActNo.1120,enactedon26April1904,which
providedforthedispositionofthefriarlands,purchasedbytheGovernmentfromtheRomanCatholic
Church,tobonafidesettlersandoccupantsthereofortootherpersons.InJacintov.DirectorofLands
(49Phil.853[1926]),thesefriarlandswereheldtobeprivateandpatrimonialpropertiesoftheState.Act
No.2360,enactedon28February1914,authorizedthesaleoftheSanLazaroEstatelocatedintheCity
ofManila,whichhadalsobeenpurchasedbytheGovernmentfromtheRomanCatholicChurch.In
January1916,ActNo.2555amendedActNo.2360byincludingthereinalllandsandbuildingsownedby
theHospitalandtheFoundationofSanLazarotheretoforleasedbyprivatepersons,andwhichwere
alsoacquiredbythePhilippineGovernment.
Aftertheenactmentin1922ofActNo.3038,thereappears,tomyknowledge,tobeonlyonestatute
authorizingthePresidenttodisposeofaspecificpieceofproperty.ThisstatuteisRepublicActNo.905,
enactedon20June1953,whichauthorizedthe
PresidenttosellanIdentifiedparceloflandoftheprivatedomainoftheNationalGovernmenttothe
NationalPressClubofthePhilippines,andtootherrecognizednationalassociationsofprofessionals
withacademicstanding,forthenominalpriceofP1.00.ItappearsrelevanttonotethatRepublicActNo.
905wasnotanoutrightdispositioninperpetuityofthepropertyinvolveditprovidedforreversionof
thepropertytotheNationalGovernmentincasetheNationalPressClubstoppedusingitforits
headquarters.WhatRepublicActNo.905authorizedwasreallyadonation,andnotasale.
ThebasicsubmissionheremadeisthatActNo.3038providesstandinglegislativeauthorizationfor
dispositionoftheRoppongipropertywhich,inmyview,hasbeenconvertedintopatrimonialpropertyof
theRepublic.2
Tosome,thesubmissionthatActNo.3038appliesnotonlytolandsoftheprivatedomainoftheState
locatedinthePhilippinesbutalsotopatrimonialpropertyfoundoutsidethePhilippines,mayappear
strangeorunusual.Irespectfullysubmitthatsuchpositionisnotanymoreunusualorstrangethanthe
assumptionthatArticle420oftheCivilCodeappliesnotonlytopropertyoftheRepubliclocatedwithin
PhilippineterritorybutalsotopropertyfoundoutsidetheboundariesoftheRepublic.
ItremainstonotethatunderthewellsettleddoctrinethatheadsofExecutiveDepartmentsarealteregos
ofthePresident(Villenav.SecretaryoftheInterior,67Phil.451[1939]),andinviewoftheconstitutional
powerofcontrolexercisedbythePresidentoverdepartmentheads(ArticleVII,Section17,1987
Constitution),thePresidentherselfmaycarryoutthefunctionordutythatisspecificallylodgedinthe
SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(Aranetav.Gatmaitan101Phil.328
[1957]).Attheveryleast,thePresidentretainsthepowertoapproveordisapprovetheexerciseofthat
functionordutywhendonebytheSecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources.
Itishardlynecessarytoaddthattheforegoinganalysesandsubmissionsrelateonlytotheaustere
questionofexistenceoflegalpowerorauthority.Theyhavenothingtodowithmuchdebatedquestions
ofwisdomorproprietyorrelativedesirabilityeitheroftheproposeddispositionitselforoftheproposed
utilizationoftheanticipatedproceedsofthepropertyinvolved.TheselattertypesofconsiderationsHe
withinthesphereofresponsibilityofthepoliticaldepartmentsofgovernmenttheExecutiveandthe
Legislativeauthorities.
21/22
6/29/2016
G.R.No.92013
Foralltheforegoing,IvotetodismissthePetitionsforProhibitioninbothG.R.Nos.92013and92047.
Fernan,C.J.,Narvasa,Gancayco,CortesandMedialdea,JJ.,concurring.
Footnotes
Padilla,J.
1Art.422oftheCivilCodeprovides:
"Propertyofpublicdominion,whennolongerintendedforpublicuseorpublicservice,shall
formpartofthepatrimonialpropertyoftheState.(341a)
Sarmiento,J.
1MunicipalityofOasv.Roa,7Phil.20(1906).
2MunicipalityofHinunanganv.DirectorofLands,24Phil.124(11913).Thepropertyinvolved
herewasafortress.
3Hartyv.MunicipalityofVictoria,13Phil.152(1909).
4SeealsoIITOLENTINO,CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINES39(1972ed.),citing3ManresaIII.
SeealsoProvinceofZamboangadelNortev.CityofZamboanga,No.L24440,March28,
1968,22SCRA1334.
5Ignaciov.DirectorofLands,108Phil.335,339(1960).
6CebuOxygen&AcetyleneCo.,Inc.vs.Bercilles,No.L40474,August29,1975,66SCRA
481.
7G.R.Nos.92013&92047,21.
8Salasv.Jarencio,No.L29788,August30,1972,46SCRA734Rabucov.Villegas,No.
L24916,February28,1974,55SCRA658.
9SeeLiangaBayLoggingCo.,Inc.v.LopezEnage,No.L30637,July16,1987,152SCRA80.
10CONST.,art.XII,sec.2.
Feliciano,J.
1WeareorallyadvisedbytheOfficeoftheDirectorofLandsthatActNo.3038isverymuch
ineffectandthattheBureauofLandscontinuestodatetoactunderit.Seealso,inthis
connection,Sections2and4ofRepublicActNo.477,enacted9June1950andaslast
amendedbyB.P.Blg233.Thisstatutegovernmentthedispositionoflandsofthepublic
domainandoftheprivatedomainoftheState,includinglandspreviouslyvestedinthe
UnitedStatesAlienPropertyCustodianandtransferredtotheRepublicofthePhilippines.
2SinceActNo.3038establishedcertainqualificationsforapplicantsforpurchaseorleaseof
landofprivatedomainofthegovernment,itisrelevanttonotethatExecutiveOrderNo.296,
promulgatedatatimewhenthePresidentwasstillexercisinglegislativeauthority,provides
asfollows:
"Sec.1.TheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.1789,asamended,andofotherlaws,tothe
contrarynotwithstanding,theabovementionedpropertiescanbemadeavailableforsale,
leaseoranyothermannerofdispositiontononFilipinocitizens."(Emphasissupplied)
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
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