CH 6 The Assault Begins On The Mavi Marmara

CHAPTER 6
CONTENTS
6.0
THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA.................................................................. 235
6.1
PHASE ONE: THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING FROM THE SEA (THE DECOY) ............................237
6.2
THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE ...............................................................................................................252
6.3
PHASE TWO: THE MAIN ASSAULT ...............................................................................................................255
6.4
6.5
6.3.1
The Black Hawk helicopters arrive .........................................................................................255
6.3.2
Stun grenades ....................................................................................................................................257
6.3.3
Firing from the helicopters .........................................................................................................258
6.3.4
The first commandos land on the Navigation Deck .........................................................266
THE BATTLE IN WHICH THREE SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED......................................................271

6.4.1
Soldier 1 ................................................................................................................................................271
6.4.2
Soldier 3 (also known as Captain R) .....................................................................................280
6.4.3
Soldier 4 (radio operator)............................................................................................................289
6.4.4
The captured soldiers equipment ...........................................................................................294
6.4.5
The battle for the Navigation Deck ..........................................................................................296
6.4.6
Ali Yunusolus film of the battle on the Navigation Deck ...........................................298
6.4.7
The Schalit factor..............................................................................................................................305
6.4.8
Allegations of mistreatment of the soldiers in captivity ...............................................307
6.4.9
Comparison of the soldiers testimonies with available photographs ...................310
FIRING FROM RIBS ...............................................................................................................................................318
Chapter 6 references .........................................................................................................................................................320
Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6
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6.0
THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA
During the night before the attack Israeli boats had been appearing out of the darkness and then
disappearing back into the night, spreading fear among some passengers. 441 Accounts vary on the
number of Israeli vessels following the Flotilla. Blent Yildirim has said there were 40 assault boats (i.e.
RIBs and other fast patrol boats), two submarines, and five naval vessels (although the Israelis say there
were four). He said there were ten helicopters (although aircraft would probably be more correct since
there were also planes involved in the operation). 442
The first hostile act against the Mavi Marmara was effectively thwarted by the captain.
Fig. 6.1 A Saar class 5 corvette closes in on the starboard side of the Mavi Marmara on in the early hours of 31 May.
[David Segarra 31:11]
Early on the morning of the attack, a few hours before the attack, an Israeli corvette (the largest type of surface
vessel in the Israeli Navy) came up on the starboard side of the Mavi Marmara and tried to force it towards the
Israeli coast. The Mavi Marmara moved starboard instead, forcing the corvette to move away. 443
Fig.6.2 Less than six minutes before the

start of the attack ships defenders at the
stern of the Upper Deck are watching
Israeli boats. (Note the firehose on the
deck.) 444
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Fig. 6.3 Three RIBs and the Zaharon command boat are positioning ready for the start of the attack. (Photographed
from the missile ship INS Nitzachon.)
[REUTERS/Uriel Sinai/Pool]
Fig. 6.4 One of the two Saar 5-class corvettes involved in the attack was also close by.
[AFP/Pool/Uriel Sinai]
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6.1
PHASE ONE: THE ATTEMPTED BOARDING FROM THE SEA (THE DECOY)
Marcello Faraggi observed the attack on the Mavi Marmara from the Eleftheri Mesogeios.
commented
445
He
It seemed like something in a movie but it was real. Real as in war.

The attack began during the Fajr, the pre-dawn prayers. All the lights on the ship were on and the men
lined up for prayer at the stern of the Boat Deck would have been clearly visible from the open sea. The
moment appears to have been deliberately chosen by the Israeli commanders.
Fig. 6.5 IDF infrared footage

filmed from the air (perhaps
from a Beechcraft plane)
showing the start of the
attack. A Morena Rigid
Inflatable Boat (RIB) rapidly
approaches the Mavi
Marmara on the port side. 446
Fig.6.6 A fire hose is spraying

at a RIB approached the stern
of the ship before the
commandos commenced
firing with riot guns. (This
footage is believed to have
been filmed from the Zaharon
fast attack boat.) 447
RIBs came along both sides of
the ship simultaneously.
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Fig. 6.7 Image shot from Challenger I.

The commandos move close to the port side of the ship while strong lights are trained on them and the fire hose
at the stern of the Upper Deck continues to douse the RIB. At this stage no water jet can be seen from the fire
hose on the Boat Deck. It is not clear whether commandos have begun firing their pepper ball guns.
[Kate Geraghty ]
Fig. 6.8 The start of the attack, timed by Kevin Neish.
[CoR @ 36.01]
The commandos made no attempt to issue any warning before opening fire. The riot guns were fired
randomly at open areas of the ship and stun grenades and tear gas was used indiscriminately.
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[In this context the Palmer Committee Report observed:

Following the principle of precaution, warnings must be given to the vessel prior to any attack.
The attack itself must be carried out in line with the basic rules of naval warfare, including the
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and the principles of precaution and
proportionality. This means that civilians may not be targeted, unless they take active part in
hostilities. 448]
The start time of attack as calculated by Kevin Neish was corroborated by the Eiland Committees
narrative. (Zero four-twenty-eight: beginning of the Marmara takeover.449) Eilands video narrative
shows two Zodiacs simultaneously attacking either side of the ship. 450 While it is not possible to confirm
this from the video footage that has been released by the IDF, the CoR footage shows passengers at the
stern seeing Israeli boats on both sides of the ship [@ 32:00].
Eleven seconds later (at 36:12 on the CoR footage, and timed by Kevin Neish at 04:28:42) the first stun
grenade is heard, apparently exploding on one of the decks. This is immediately followed by a womans
scream.
Fig. 6.9 At least three of the commandos are firing riot guns (arrowed) at the
starboard side of the ship while an attempt is made to secure the boarding ladder
using a hook. The principal light source at this moment is from an Israeli stun
grenade which has just exploded on the ship.
[CoR @ 36:20]
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Fig. 6.10 During the initial phase of the attack (still timed at 04:28 by Eiland) a commando aims a firearm at the
passengers on the stern of the Upper Deck. This weapon does not have the paintball magazine on top and has a
thicker barrel. This suggests the commando is already firing rubber bullets, live rounds or tear gas canisters.
[Eiland @ 09:20]
Fig. 6.11 (Footage probably filmed from the

Zaharon class command boat.)
[Eiland @ 09:25]
The ships defenders pushed off the
boarding ladder and sprayed the RIB with a
fire hose.
Hook for boarding ladder
Fig. 6.12 The same incident filmed from the RIB.
[IDF]
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Figs. 6.13 & 6.14 A clearer view of one of the scaling ladders (used during the assault of the Eleftheri Mesogeios)
[Marcello Faraggi]
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Fig. 6.15
[IHH CCTV]
451
Passengers in the open working area at the stern of the Upper Deck, mounting a defence against the Israeli assault
using a fire hose and various rods and stakes that have been picked up around the ship. The electric lead appears to
go to the film lighting apparatus which was used to illuminate the RIBs and dazzle their occupants.
Some testimonies state that a chainsaw was used to cut the scaling ladder used by the commandos. 452 The Eiland
video similarly claims that electric disc saws were used for this purpose. (There were no chainsaws on the ship
although angle grinders from the ships workshop were used to cut railings.) It seems unlikely that the hooks were
cut as no grinder appears in any of the photos. Passengers can be seen deflecting the hook for the scaling ladder
(see Fig. 5.24 below). A chainsaw would not be able to cut the solid metal hook and an angle grinder would be too
slow and cumbersome.
Fig. 6.16 The same area filmed

from a RIB.
Shortly after the RIBs draw
alongside an unidentified object is
thrown from the Upper Deck over
the starboard side. 453 [This
appears to be an unexploded IDF
grenade. Activists had been issued
with asbestos gloves in order to be
able to deal with these devices.454]
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Fig. 6.17 A second object is

thrown over the side. 455 The
trajectory (starting well inside
the deck) suggests that it is an
Israeli weapon being thrown
into the sea rather than an
object thrown at the RIB off the
starboard side.
Fig.6.18 A passenger with a long pole attempts to prod the RIB but it is too far below the deck and is out of reach.
(Pole marked in red.) 456
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After their failure to board the commandos in the RIBs withdraw some distance from the ship, out of
range, where they wait their opportunity while continuing their indiscriminate fire with riot guns.
Fig. 6.19 Projectiles from the

riot guns were bouncing
against the side of the ship
(see shooting star type effect
highlighted within the blue
box). This suggests that
commandos were using solid
nylon projectiles, which are
sold under the name Glass
Breaking.
[CoR @ 37:07]
Fig. 6.20 Passengers continued to bombard the Zodiac with objects including bottles (circled). [CoR @37:21]
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A short sequence of film taken from the Bridge Deck (probably journalistic footage seized by soldiers)
was released by the IDF two days after the raid. 457 The film, which had probably been carefully selected
and edited to support the Israeli narrative is reinterpreted here. It shows the commandos in a RIB
alongside the ship attempting to put a hook onto the ship in order to secure a light scaling ladder. They
are prevented from doing this by passengers who train two fire hoses on the RIB, repel the hook with
poles and a chain and throw various items of debris onto the attackers boat. The fire hoses seem to
have been effective in subduing the commandos activities.
There are two bright flashes in the clip, one of which the Israeli editors have labelled as a stun grenade
and circled where this has come from the ship. However this could only have originated from the
Israelis and have been thrown back at them from off the ship. Towards the end of the clip one
commando is seen to raise his pepperspray gun and prepare to fire at the passengers.
Fig. 6.21 One of the first RIBs is alongside the ship, port side aft. A box of plates (ringed) is thrown onto it from
the ship.
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Fig. 6.22 The IDF video circles a stun grenade which has been thrown from the Upper Deck. It is not
clear if this deliberately targetted the RIB or if it was being cleared from the deck after having been
thrown there by the commandos (see Figs. 6.16/7 above).
Fig. 6.23 The grenade explodes and the flash fills the screen.
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Fig.6.24 The aftermath of the explosion
Water jet from second hose

(probably on Boat Deck)
Hook for scaling ladder
Water jet from fire hose
Chain used
in attempt
to catch
scaling hook
Poles trying to
deflect scaling hook.
Fig.6.25 A commando is trying to attach the scaling ladder. Passengers on the open area at the stern of the
Upper Deck are directing camera lighting on the RIB, spraying the attackers with a fire hose and deflecting
the scaling ladder with two metal poles. A passenger on the Boat Deck above them is trying to flick a chain
around the scaling hook. A second hose is employed from the right of the picture, also apparently from the
Boat Deck.
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Scaling hook
Passenger on Boat Deck attempts to

wrap chain around scaling hook.
Pole used to deflect hook
Fig. 6.26 Passengers prevent the installation of the boarding hook
Fig. 6.27 This appears to be a second stun grenade but this time the flash is much less intense because it seems to
be coming from inside on the Upper Deck, suggesting that the commandos had thrown it on board. (The Israeli
editors ignored this explosion.)
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Fig. 6.28 A soldier takes aim at the Mavi Marmara with his pepperball spray gun. The shadow of the gun can be
clearly seen.
Fig. 6.29 A passenger on the Boat Deck prepares to throw a stool at the RIB.
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Fig. 6.30 The start of the attack filmed from the Eleftheri Mesogeios by Marcello Faraggi. Two RIBs can be seen
(ringed), one on the starboard side and one astern. The open area astern on the Upper Deck is filled with smoke
from grenades. Challenger I is astern, but to port of the Mavi Marmara and about to try to outrun the attackers. The
first helicopter has not yet arrived so the time is shortly before 04:30.
[The Raid @ 25:52]
Fig. 6.31 Israeli infrared footage of the same period viewed from the port side of the two vessels.
458
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Fig. 6.32 Having been urged by the captain of the Mavi Marmara to avoid capture and tell the story, Challenger I
accelerates past the Mavi Marmara on the port side.
[The Raid @ 25:54]
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6.2
THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE
Fig. 6.33 Vessel tracker showing the courses taken by MV Mavi Marmara (blue) and MV Defne Y (green). The last
position shown for MV Eleftheri Mesogeios (red) would be for around 03:50 local time.
The entire Flotilla had been travelling at 7 knots (the maximum speed possible by MV Eleftheri
Mesogeios) on a course of 185 at 04:27:52 local time (recorded on the chart as 1:27:52 UTC) i.e.
immediately before the start of the attack. Once the commandos started their attack from the RIBs both
vessels whose courses are shown here, veered towards the west, scattered and accelerated to their
maximum speeds.
Fig. 6.34 Enlargement of the chart at the moment of

attack.
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Fig. 6.35 The two ships turned very quickly and by 04:53:51 the Mavi Marmara had attained 12.5 knots heading
approximately WSW (i.e. away from Gaza and towards Tobruk in Libya). By the same time Defne Y had only
managed to accelerate to 7.9 knots.
The feint attack by the RIBs had caused the ships to turn away from Gaza and head in other directions at
top speed. Israel had suffered some wet, and perhaps some lightly injured commandos. But the attempt
to breach the blockade had, at least temporarily, been abandoned, and the IDF had achieved its
professed objective. Why then did the Israeli leadership decide to press ahead with the attack from the
helicopters which began with gunfire and resulted in deaths and injuries? The whole exercise of seizing,
abducting and abusing more than 700 civilians while seizing six vessels and their cargoes was highly
contentious legally. In retrospect it also appears to have been either utterly pointless, unless it was
intended as a vicious warning to future attempts at breaking the siege.
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Regrettably, none of the official inquiries chose to consider this question.
Fig. 6.36 According to the Eiland Report, commandos took control of the bridge of the Mavi Marmara at 05:04 local
time when they shut down both engines. At approximately that time vesseltracker shows that the ship had reached
13.8 knots and was heading due west.
Fig. 6.37 By 05:51:58 the Mavi Marmara was dead in the water and was
facing north. MV Defne Y was almost stationary at 06:17:37.
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6.3
6.3.1
PHASE TWO: THE MAIN ASSAULT

The Black Hawk helicopters arrive
Fig. 6.38 The first Black Hawk hovers above the Navigation Deck at around 04:30, partially illuminated by a spotlight
from the ship. The Sfendoni is now between the Mavi Marmara and the cameraman.
[The Raid @ 26:19]
In a TV interview for BBC Panorama, Gen Eiland claimed the helicopter attack was a reaction to the
defence of the ship:
Gen Eiland
The resistance was huge, much above expectations. Someone had to say well,
the right conditions do not exist, lets do something else. Lets take plan B.
Jane Corbin:
So they brought the helicopters in []
Gen Eiland:
Exactly.459
Although General Eilands comment that the defence was much greater than expectations is credible,
the helicopter narrative constructed by general and interviewer is fraudulent. The helicopters arrived
less than two minutes after the attack started from the RIBs, yet Black Hawk helicopters are too large to
land on any Israeli Navy ship and would have flown to the attack from Israel, around 70 miles away.
(They are six metres longer than the Eurocopter which can just be stabled on the rear deck of the Saar
class 5 corvettes. 460 461) This flight would have taken about 20 minutes once the soldiers had embarked.
So their departure took place well before the start of the attack and their arrival two minutes after,
must have been intentional.
This suggests the RIBs were merely a decoy to gain an element of surprise for the main assault. Nobody
on the ship had anticipated the airbourne boarding. Nevertheless the ruse failed because there were
already passengers (including two photographers) waiting on the Navigation Deck to defend the
communications antennae, although many were located at the front of the deck above the bridge.
Three Black Hawk helicopters were used to land a total of 41 soldiers (15, 12 and 14 respectively). 462
According to Israeli journalist Alon Ben David, the second Black Hawk arrived around 04:35. 463 Kevin
Neishs timing of the CoR footage shows that the third Black Hawk arrived around 04:46. According to
Blent Yildirim (who was on the Bridge Deck and well placed to see) soldiers were shooting from one
helicopter while a second was unloading commandos onto the ship. 464
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Fig. 6.39 Blent Yildirim

on the Bridge Deck as
the first helicopter
arrives over the
Navigation Deck. Mr
Yildirilm is probably
pleased that the
boarding from the RIBs
has been repelled but
as yet unaware that
commandos are about
to fast rope onto the
ship. Stood next ot him
is Nicci Enchmarch,
whose hair is being
blown around by the
helicopter downdraft.
[Photo: efik Din]
Fig. 6.40 Snapshot from the Eiland video showing aerial infrared footage of the moment when the first Black Hawk
helicopter arrived above the Navigation Deck. The parapet of the deck has been marked here by the red line and the
X indicates approximately the point above which the helicopter hovered to let the commandos descend. The time on
the film (top right corner) has been partially obscured but it appears to confirm the time given by Eiland on the left
of the picture. 465 It is assumed that the IDF (which would have used state of the art technology) has much better
quality copies of this film which have not been released to the public.
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6.3.2
Stun grenades
Israeli sources all admit that stun grenades were then thrown onto the deck, but they cannot agree on
how many. The Eiland video says a number. 466 An ITIC report based on soldiers testimonies admits a
stun grenade was thrown. Yet in an appendix the same report quotes the platoon commanders
testimony saying that two grenades were ordered by the fleet commander, while another testimony
describes throwing stun grenades (i.e. plural). 467 The Turkel Commission also received contradictory
answers ranging from one, two and a number. (Testament from soldier no. 4 tells how soldier no. 5
threw a number of grenades, while soldier 5 admitted to only throwing one.) Unfazed by the
discrepancies Turkel settled for two from one side and a third from the other side of the helicopter. 468
Israeli security services generally use the Mini-Bang grenade with a metal casing, which weighs 424g.
469
According to the platoon commander, the helicopter was hovering 25 metres above the deck 470
when the grenades were thrown: a dangerous act against a civilian ship without any prior warning.
At least one passenger, Osman alik, was injured by these grenades.
[]I saw that one bomb after another was being thrown at the ship from the helicopter. One of
those bombs hit my left leg and I was injured. They were throwing bombs onto nearly every deck.
After they had thrown the bombs they started to lower soldiers onto the ship. 471
(Mr alik was also shot in the other leg and was reported to have been seriously wounded. 472)
Fig. 6.41 Aerial footage from the Eiland video showing a stun grenade thrown from the
first Black Hawk helicopter exploding on the Navigation Deck. This film is almost
concurrent with the image in Fig 6.41 but was filmed from the opposite side of the ship,
indicating that there were at least two aircraft filming.
[@ 09:58]
On the poor quality footage released showing the stun grenade exploding at 04:30, the explosion is very
clear and unmistakeable. The IDF had filmed this whole attack from several angles, so there seems little
doubt that their photo interpreters, using the best quality footage available, would have known
precisely how many stun grenades were thrown from the helicopter. The variable testimonies reinforce
Mr aliks assertion that the soldiers threw more grenades than the IDF has admitted to.
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6.3.3
Firing from the helicopters
Israeli sources deny that there was any gunfire from any of the helicopters, and insist that no one was
shot until after the commandos were attacked on the Navigation Deck.
Fig. 6.42 The Turkel Commissions complete denial that the IDF fired any rounds from any helicopter, with its
sources listed as the Commander of the Commando Unit and the pilots of the three helicopters which ferried the
commandos to the ship. [Highlighting added]
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Fig. 6.43 ITICs denial of shooting from the helicopters. [Highlighting added, but emboldened type in original]
473
Photographic evidence gives the lie to these denials. Two photographs taken by journalist Mahir Tanin
show a helicopter arriving over the Navigation Deck. Although the details inside the aircraft are obscure
a laser sight beam can be seen in both pictures. No gun flashes can be seen in the photos but it is
inconceivable that the soldiers were ranging their weapons at the ship but never fired them. Coupled
with the autopsy evidence that victims on the uppermost deck of the ship were shot from above and
witness testimonies (discussed below), the evidence is overwhelming. In contrast, Turkels suggestion
that high angle of trajectory wounds resulted from victims being shot while they were bending over (see
Fig. 6.43) appears far-fetched, if not ludicrously so.
Fig. 6.44 Blackhawk helicopter arriving over the Mavi Marmara. The aircraft has not yet taken up position over
the Navigation Deck and yet a soldier is already training his laser sight onto that deck.
[Manir Tanin 474 ]
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Fig. 6.45 A second shot of the same helicopter filmed from the same position on the Bridge Deck starboard side,
located to the stern of the bridge. Parts of three letters can be seen from the name Mavi Marmara which appears on
the parapet of the Navigation Deck. (The inset photograph shows the location of the lettering.) The aircraft has still
not arrived in position to offload commandos and no fast ropes have yet been dropped. It is reasonable to conclude
from this that firing took place from the helicopter before any commando landed on the deck. The laser sight is
ringed.
[Manir Tanin 475 ]
Three helicopters offloaded commandos onto the ship and it is possible to deduce that the helicopter in
Manir Tanins photographs is the first one:
Fig. 6.46 Underside of the helicopter

which appears in the Cultures of
Resistance footage (filmed from the
Bridge Deck port side). Kevin Neish has
deduced by cross referencing his own
still photos that this is the third
helicopter.
[CoR @ 40:32]
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Fig. 6.47 Underbelly of the

helicopter in Manir Tanins
photographs. The image has
been upended for the purposes
of comparison. The item which
has been ringed does not
appear on the third helicopter
meaning that this is either the
first or second helicopter to
arrive.
Fig.
Figs. 6.48 & 6.49 (left) Port

side of a helicopter which
does not have a projecting
part as seen on the third
helicopter (above). It also
does not have the
distinctive shape which
appears in Mr Tanins
photos. So the three sets
of photos are of three
different aircraft.
The photograph above shows ropes descending from both sides of the helicopter, and in the video it is
taken from soldiers are descending on both ropes (see section 7.1 below). Section 6.3.4 below describes
how passengers tied up one rope of the first helicopter and prevented the soldiers from using it. So the
picture above is not of the first helicopter and as it is not the third it has to be the second aircraft.
By the same process of elimination the helicopter photographed by Mr Tanin has to be the first
helicopter. These photographs show that commandos were aiming (and therefore presumably firing) at
the Navigation Deck before they landed. That is to say the commandos instigated the violence on that
deck by shooting at the passengers first, and that the passengers violence was, at least in part, a
response to this shooting.
There is also corroborating evidence for this deduction.
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Figs. 6.50 Photograph taken from the Mavi

Marmara of the third Black Hawk helicopter
prior to the commandos descent (the fast
ropes have not yet been dropped). A soldier is
pointing what appears to be a gun barrel out
of the open port side doorway (ringed and
arrowed).
Fig. 6.51 [CIHAN
476
Fig. 6.52 Muhittin Gili

stands on the Mavi
Marmara at the point at
which he says he was shot
by live fire from a
helicopter while praying.
The top of the lifeboat
derrick at the right of the
picture and the bend in the
parapet identify the
location as the Navigation
Deck starboard side. 477
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Photographs of the injured Mr Gili can be seen in Chapter 7. He was hit by a single bullet which entered
his right thigh and exited lower down the leg. This indicates a live round fired from above, which on the
Navigation Deck could only be from an aircraft, i.e. a helicopter.
Two journalists, efik Din and Espen Goffeng have said that rubber bullets were fired first from the
helicopter, but that this only switched to live fire after the first commandos were attacked and disabled.
Both these reporters were on the Bridge Deck and were not able to witness the moment when
passengers were shot on the deck above them. Both reporters also made recorded errors about
contemporaneous events.
Mr Din claimed to have no respirator when the helicopters arrived, yet video evidence shows him
reporting to the TV camera with a respirator attached to his waist. i In captions to the photographs in his
book on the raid he stated that the Sikorsky (Black Hawk) helicopters came from the Israeli surface
ships, yet as already discussed above, this helicopter is too big to land on Israeli naval ships. Similarly Mr
Din claimed that passengers tried to throw one of the soldiers overboard from the Bridge Deck, yet he
should have been aware that the deck below is some three to six metres wider so that it would not have
been possible to throw a person into the sea at that point. (This author also disputes the intentions of
the passengers to commit such a crime.) ii
Mr Goffeng is shown in the Cultures of Resistance footage (@ 39:11) explaining to the cameraman that
he thought the blood on the wall next to a vertical ladder was some paintball-looking substance. In
reality some of the first casualties had come down the ladder, including Muhittin Gili and Mehmet Ali
Zeybek who had been shot nine times and had stumbled down the ladder. Blood was not only on the
wall and dripping down the ladder, but it had been smeared on a nearby locker.
Both of these testimonies are therefore suspect.
Conversely, Captain Mamoud Tural had a clear view of the attack from the bridge and he is certain that
there was firing from the helicopter before any commando descended, although he did not know if live
rounds or rubber bullets were used. 478
Some of the survivors who were on the Navigation Deck also testified that there had been shooting of
live fire before the boarding. Ahmet Aydan Bekar said in his official testimony that various grenades
(including tear gas and smoke bombs) were thrown, and that this was followed by live fire before any
soldier descended from the helicopter. Cihat Gkdemir said that the helicopter hovered above the deck
for about a minute and then soldiers inside opened fire on passengers on the decks. Only after this
fusillade were the ropes dropped down for the commandos to descend. Erdin Tekir also testified that
soldiers shot at him from the helicopters, wounding him in the hip. Osman Kur was also wounded on
the Navigation Deck. He said that there was firing from the helicopters as the commandos descended,
and that he was shot multiple times in his abdominal area by this fire.
In a BBC commissioned translation of Chapter 3 of his book KANLI MAV MARMARA (obtained by the author) in
the section Helikopterlerle ikarma yapildi (Landing via helicopters) Mr Din is quoted as writing I didnt have any
equipment such as a bulletproof vest, respirator or any other protection apart from the life jacket. This is
contradicted here in Fig 5.21.
ii
The BBC also commissioned a translation of all 25 photographic captions in Mr Dins book.
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Fig. 6.53 (above) The earliest footage released by the IDF. The time by the digital clock in
the right hand corner is 04:31:44 and the first helicopter is in position. Israeli sources say
the aircraft arrived at ship at 04:30. 479
Fig. 6.54 (below) 04:31:56 the fast rope is dropped onto the deck. 480 This suggests there
was nearly two minutes between the arrival of the helicopter and the first attempt by
commandos to board. During that time there was firing from the helicopter onto the deck.
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Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Elshayyal said in his witness testimony

[From the Bridge Deck] you could almost see the soldiers pointing their guns down through some
sort of hole or compartment at the bottom side of the helicopter, firing almost indiscriminately
without even looking where they were firing and those bullets were definitely live bullets. 481
Fig. 6.55 Hatchways (ringed) on underbelly of helicopter hovering over the Navigation Deck
[efik Din
482]
Dror Filer is an ex-IDF paratrooper who was travelling on the Eleftheri Mesogeios which was on a course
parallel with the Mavi Marmara. On 6 November 2013 he told the court at Istanbul
Our boat was between 300 and 500 meters from the Mavi Marmara. I could see that people on
the Mavi Marmara using their lights to search the water to see if the boats coming. I could see the
helicopters, two helicopters, above the Mavi Marmara. I could hear shots. And I would like to
emphasize that I know the difference between live ammunition and other ammunition. I had been
a soldier myself and it was live ammunition. And these shots was fired before any Israeli soldier
was on the boat. [Court records]
[The research agency Forensic Architecture, based at Goldsmiths, University of London has published an
online report entitled Nakba Day Killings which illustrates the difference in sound made by live bullets
and rubber-coated bullets. 483
The Israeli narrative which denies the initial shooting and claims that the passengers started the
violence is not only a fabrication. It is also a conspiracy allegedly involving (from the Turkel
Commissions references) at least the commander of the commando unit, the three helicopter pilots
and a number of the soldiers. This conspiracy has also been aided and abetted by the wilfully nave
Israeli commission of inquiry.
| 265
6.3.4
The first commandos land on the Navigation Deck
The commandos descended from the helicopter by fast roping. This technique was developed for rapid
deployment and involves sliding down a thick diameter braided rope using heavy duty gloves. No
harnesses are used. 484
Fig. 6.56 Footage showing Royal Australian Navy

(RAN) personnel fast roping. Note the thickness of
the gloves and the rope.
Fig. 6.57 The same film shows the technique for

landing which involves keeping the hands at about
head height and bending the knees. 485 Passengers
on the Mavi Marmara disrupted the first commandos
by initially preventing them from landing correctly.
Only a few Israeli units are trained to use the technique, but the IDF had previously deployed it during
the capture of other ships where there was an operational need for it. 486
| 266
Fig. 6.58 The attack on the Navigation Deck was unforeseen by the defenders of the ship who were taken by
surprise. 487 Although there were passengers allocated there to defend and to film, they were initially standing above
the bridge (and can be discerned in this enlargement by their red lifejackets to the left of the spotlight). When the
commandos dropped their ropes to descend onto the deck the defenders ran back to confront them.
[The Raid @ 26:19]
Fig. 6.59 Edited infrared footage released by the IDF shows volunteers on the Navigation Deck running from the area
above the bridge to the central area of the deck where the first commandos are landing.
Fig. 6.60 Some of the primitive weapons which remained on

the deck when the ship was released from Israeli custody.
[IHH]
| 267
The commandos boarding operation began to go wrong when passengers tied the first rope to the
communications tower rendering it unusable. When the commandos dropped their second rope two
passengers were pulling it to the communications tower as the first commando descended.
Fig. 6.61 Portion of a snapshot from IDF infrared aerial

footage.
Time 04:31:50. The first commando is descending on the
second fast rope (in the yellow circle) while Fahri Yaldiz and
elebi Bozan (in the red rectangle) are pulling the standing
end that was thrown onto the deck. Ayhan Altunta, who was
in charge of internal organization, told them not to tie the
second rope because he feared it could unbalance the ship.
488
Fig. 6.62 The same incident filmed from an

Israeli boat on the starboard side. The turkish
volunteers are running to tie the rope, while
one of them looks back to watche the
descending commando at the same time.
[IDF]
Fig. 6.63 Starboard side Viewed from the Eleftheri Mesogeios . The rope has been tied to the satellite transmitter
and can no longer be used for fast roping.
[The Raid @ 26:41]
| 268
First rope tied to tower and unusable.
Fig. 6.64 Footage filmed from a boat on the starboard side shows the first rope tied up and inoperable while the
second rope is nearly horizontal and dangerous to use. The first commando [Soldier 1] is more than two metres
above the deck and no longer in control of his descent. The commandos were only able to use this rope because it
was not tied. Time 04:31:51.
[IDF]
If the passengers had continued to tie up the second rope, further boarding at this stage would have
been impossible. With one soldier in captivity, the subsequent Israeli reaction may have been extreme
(see section 6.4.5 below).
Fig. 6.65 The deflection of the rope left

Soldier 1 hanging with his arms in the air
and his head back. In this position he was
unprepared for the physical assault which
followed.
[IDF infrared footage]
| 269
The unusable fast rope was later jettisoned by the helicopter and fell over the side of the parapet on the
port side.
Figs. 6.66 Fast rope (arrowed) discarded by the first helicopter hanging down onto
the Bridge Deck. This was later retrieved by the commandos and thrown down on
the Navigation Deck on top the body of Fahri Yaldiz. 489 [CoR @ 39:13 & 41:57]
Fig. 6.67 A vast amount of debris is blown about in the air by the down draught from
the helicopter. Abdullah Camiolu, travelling behind the Mavi Marmara on the Defne Y
reported seeing sleeping bags and life jackets on the surface of the water and feared
that the Mavi Marmara had been sunk. 490
[The Raid @ 27:06]
| 270
6.4
THE BATTLE IN WHICH THREE SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED
[The numbering of the captive soldiers follows that used by Israels Turkel Commission.]
6.4.1
Soldier 1
IDF infrared video shows the first soldier to land on the ship was promptly overpowered and captured by the ships
defenders. (The soldier appears in dark clothing in the photos here.)
Fig. 6.68 Montage of the six seconds during which Soldier 1 landed on the Navigation Deck and was pushed over
the parapet onto the deck below.
[efik Din & IDF 491]
| 271
Figs. 6.69 6.72 Soldier 1 is pushed over the parapet on the

port side and falls on the deck among about ten passengers
standing there who disarm him and take him prisoner. 492
Fig. 6.73 (below) Time 04:31:57. As soldier 1 is

pushed over the parapet of the deck Soldier 2
descends onto the Navigation Deck.
[IDF]
| 272
Fig. 6.74 Scene on the Bridge Deck where

the photographer appears to have stood
on a locker (out of the way of the fighting)
to take this photograph. Soldier 1 has lost
his helmet but still has his pack on. He is
being struck on the arm with a stanchion.
The fast rope from the helicopter hangs
immediately to the right of Soldier 1s
head.
[Photo: efik Din]
Fig. 6.75 In the background of the

previous photograph Blent Yildirim and
another passenger have wrestled Captain R
onto the deck. This soldiers helmet can be
seen here.
| 273
Fig. 6.76 Soldier 1s account to the Turkel Commission of his treatment once he was taken inside the ship. It is
quoted here verbatim with emphasis added to the section which compares to the photographs reproduced here,
which are all that have been found in the public domain.
| 274
Time: 04:36:17
Fig. 6.77 Soldier 1 at the top of the stairwell on the
Bridge Deck. It is 4 minutes 26 seconds since he
landed on the ship. In that time he has been
overpowered, stripped of his weapons and military
equipment and brought inside. At this stage he is
injured, frightened, crying and probably in a state of
shock and feeling very vulnerable.
[Photo: Kevin Neish]
Time 04:36:25
Fig. 6.78 Soldier 1 is guided downstairs from the
Bridge Deck by Murat Akinan, while Mr Akinan
remonstrates with a photographer taking pictures of
the injured man. [Photo: Kevin Neish]
[Mr Akinan had been entrusted with the care of the
soldiers by IHH president, Blent Yildirim. During his
interrogation in Israeli custody he was asked why the
soldier was hit despite his efforts, to which he
explained that he could not stop everybody. The
interrogator admitted that photographs showed that
he had acted with goodwill towards the soldier in his
care. 493 ]
Fig. 6.79 Three passengers struggle with Soldier 1 as

he resists being taken down the stairs to the Boat
Deck. The vigourous activity appears to have
incrreased the bleeding from the wound on his
forehead. (There is no evidence from these photos
here that he has been hit on the head again at this
stage.)
[efik Din]
| 275
Time: 4:36:38
Fig. 6.80 Soldier 1 is put in an arm lock to force him
downstairs to the Upper Deck. There are no clubs to
be seen and it is not apparent that anyone is
attacking him at this stage.
Figs. 6.81 & 6.82 [Photos: efik Din]
| 276
The three soldiers were all attended by Dr. Hasan Huseyin Uysal, a Turkish eye specialist.
[Once the Israeli forces had taken control of the ship Dr Uysal was treated like the rest of the passengers:
he was handcuffed tightly and made to kneel on the deck for three hours. 494]
Fig. 6.83 Dr Uysal gives first aid to Soldier 1 in the

female quarters on the Main Deck while Mr Akinan
rests his hand on the soldiers left shoulder. The
soldier looks with fear and hostility towards the
cameraman.
[Photo: efik Din]
Fig. 6.84 Dr Uysal:
None of the soldiers had any fatal wounds that

would cause organ loss or defects. There were
scratches on their faces, but since facial skin is
sensitive and very likely to bleed in any trauma,
there was blood on their faces which I cleaned
carefully to see what kind of injuries they had. In
the end, they happened to be only scratches. 495
[Photo: efik Din]
Fig. 6.85
With my broken English I tried to tell them that I

was a doctor and there was no need to be afraid
and that nobody was going to hurt them. They
relaxed after a while and watched us running
around, jumping from one patient to another in
tears, faced with our friends bathed in blood. I also
asked our assistants to keep an eye on them so
that they would not be threatened.
[] We asked photographers not to film in the
medical centre and I have no idea how and when

that picture was taken. 496
[Photo: efik Din]
| 277
Figs. 6.86 6.89 A confused and poor quality short video sequence 497 498 of the same incident was transmitted from
the ship shortly before its capture and broadcast by Al Jazeera and Press TV. This shows a passenger with gas mask
and wooden stave attempting to prevent filming while Dr Uysal supported by Mr Akinan gave first aid to Soldier 1 on
the Main Deck.499
| 278
There is no visible threat to the soldier at this stage. This location on the Main Deck had originally been
allocated for the exclusive use as a womens lounge and was now considered the best place to take the
soldiers for their safety.
In Section 135 on pages 161/2 of their report (Part 1) the Turkel Commission wrote
In a 34-second video taken by one of the flotilla participants, soldier no. 1 is seen inside the ship
below deck, bleeding from his head and groaning in pain, while he is being guarded by an IHH
activist wearing a life jacket and a gas mask and holding a large wooden club.
This writer has not seen more than 17 seconds of this video, although some versions have repeated
sections, which may account for the length seen by Turkel. The video is very confused and jumpy
because the camera is trying to outmanouver the passenger standing guard and trying to prevent the
filming. It is important to note that this guard is not trying to prevent filming of abuse of the captive, but
is actually trying to prevent abuse by the filmmaker of the captives privacy.
As it is also clear that the images in the video do not fit Turkels interpretation, some explanatory
comments are in order.
1.
2.
3.
4.
As can be seen from the caption on the contemporary footage broadcast, the dead and wounded
were rapidly accumulating and the doctors had far more serious cases to attend to. Despite this,
the Flotilla organizers had prioritized the welfare of the soldiers.
Regardless of what other evidence Turkel may have seen, this video shows that the soldier was not,
as Turkel claims, guarded by an IHH activist wearing a life jacket and a gas mask and holding a
large wooden club. The activist is as described but was in fact engaged totally in trying to prevent
the photographer(s) from filming this humanitarian event.
Mr Dins still photographs of this same event (which he somehow managed to capture without
interference) show that the blood on the soldiers face is not fresh and the bleeding appears to
have stopped.
It is not clear if Turkel did in fact see a video with sound (this writer has not done so) or if the
description of the soldier groaning in pain was artistic licence.
| 279
6.4.2
Soldier 3 (also known as Captain R)
Fig. 6.90 Aerial footage shows Captain R was pushed

over the parapet of the Navigation Deck on the port side
at 04:32:09, 12 seconds after Soldier 1. He was attacked
by about four passengers (the two persons showing
darkly at the top are standing on the deck below, i.e. the
Bridge Deck).
Captain R:
They came at me with knives, and tried to stab me. I kept getting hit on my head, on my whole
body. They caught me by the arms and legs to throw me to the deck below. I fought back
wildly and caught hold of the side. They beat my hands with clubs and I fell. 500
Figs. 6.91 & 6.92 Captain R holds onto the parapet port side. In order to dislodge him, the
passenger in white on the Navigation Deck beats his fingers while a passenger on the Bridge
Deck pulls his legs, forcing him to let go and fall among a group of around ten passengers.
[IDF 501]
Ken OKeefe
[Just as I got to the Bridge Deck] one of the commandos fell from the upper deck, just a metre
and a half from me, in front of my eyes. []The first thing I saw was the 9 mm pistol he was
carrying, and I immediately tried to take it. The soldier was conscious but pretty much in shock,
and it was easy to deal with him.
| 280
Osama Qashoo was on the Bridge Deck:

I was filming and then suddenly something fell on top of my head and that was (later on I
realised) it was a soldier. [Captain R] He was looking at me and then he grabbed his Uzi and he
started shooting. I could see the vibration of the Uzi.
Fig. 6.93 Captain R, the second soldier pushed off the Navigation Deck, is pushed against the parapet on the port
side of the Bridge Deck as at least three passengers grapple with him. There have been claims that the intention
was to push him over the parapet but it is more likely that the melee fell aginst the parapet while passengers
struggle to overpower the soldier. The hand in the bottom right corner is pulling his vest, not pushing him.
Another passenger is filming. The cuff and tripod camera identify him as the same cameraman who Murat Akinan
later remonstrated with (see Fig. 6.78).
Fig. 6.94 Captain R has been brought inside on the

Bridge Deck and attempts are made to calm and
reassure him (note the body language of the finger
shown to his face and the hand upon his left knee).
His weapons have probably been thrown overboard
outside and his protective ammunition vest will shortly
be removed and disposed of. This appears to hold two
magazines for a Mini Uzi sub-machine gun (holding 20,
25 or 32 bullets each 502) and two magazines for a
Glock semi-automatic pistol (holding 17 or 19 bullets
each 503) which are visible below his left hand. Other
soldiers carried automatic rifles instead.
Captain R admitted to a reporter that he fired one
round from his sub-machine gun before he was
overpowered, 504 but said two bullets to the Turkel
Commission. 505
| 281
Figs. 6.95 & 6.96 (below)
SOLDIER 3 (CAPTAIN R)S TESTIMONY TO THE TURKEL COMMISSION

Of particular interest here is the claim that he has lost a lot of blood and that part of
his intestines were protruding. No sign of this injury can be seen in these photographs,
even in Fig. 6.100, and Israeli sources have not produced any photographic evidence to
support this claim, despite there having been cameras available at the scene.
| 282
| 283
Time: 04:38:30
Fig.6.97 It was at this point that Kevin Neish saw an enraged
passenger hit this soldier. The activists in charge of the captive
soldier pulled the assailant away while scolding him severely
and then quickly took their charge downstairs out of the way
and to the doctor. 506
[Both photos:
Kevin Neish]
Time 04:39:03
Fig. 6.98 Captain R is taken down the port side stairs coming
onto the landing above the Boat Deck. He does not appear to be
under restraint or attack at this stage.
Time: 04:39:47
Fig. 6.99 A doctor (left of picture) attends to
Soldier 3 on the landing above the Boat Deck.
| 284
Time: 04:40:26
Fig. 6.100 Captain R, obviously frightened, on the stair landing between the Bridge and Boat decks. The
pistol holster on his left leg has now been removed. There is fresh blood on his left hand and a blood stain
shows on his underpants in the appendix region.
The knife in the bottom right hand corner of the picture (ringed) appears to have been used to cut off his
ammunition vest. It is entirely free of blood and held loosely in a pen grip in a non-threatening way by
someone not directly next to or facing the injured captive. It is not the reason for the soldiers fear since
he is looking in the opposite direction. There are at least five people around the injured man, stood
apart from him and only one is seen to be holding him, although another may be holding his right foot.
Fig. 6.101 A close up of the previous photo shows the commandos fear.
| 285
Fig. 6.102 After removal of his balaclava, now with fresh blood on his nose and still shocked and frightened
(as shown by the wide eyes), Soldier 3 seems unaware of the arm over his right shoulder and the hand
touching his right arm. His captors all seem intent on reassuring him rather than attacking him. A
photographer (possibly the person previously admonished by Murat Akinan on the Bridge Deck) is filming
with a cam corder.
[Soldiers 3 and 4 were terrified and were struggling violently to get free from their captors as they were
brought inside the ship.507 This may account for the fresh blood on the nose here.]
[Photo: efik Din]
Fig. 6.103 Captain R (identified by his epaulette) sits on the stairs above the Boat Deck, with his eyes
wide with fear. His guardians seem to be waiting (possibly for the return of the medic) while trying to
keep him calm.
[Photo: efik Din]
| 286
Ken OKeefe:
I looked into the eyes of all three of these boys and I can tell you they had the fear of God in
them. They looked at us as if we were them, and I have no doubt they did not believe there was
any way they would survive that day. They looked like frightened children in the face of an
abusive father.508
Fig. 6.104 A still from a few

seconds of video broadcast
by CIHAN again showing
Captain R sat at the foot of
the stairs on the Boat Deck
lobby. The scene is calm
and without violence and
the body language of the
attackers suggests that
they are trying to reassure
their captive. 509
Fig. 6.105 Soldier 3 lies on the floor of the Boat Deck while another doctor attends to him.
| 287
Time: 04:44:07.
Fig. 6.106 Attention is being given to Soldier 3s wound to the abdomen. The white short-sleeved shirt, grey IHH
waistcoat and jeans correspond with the doctor who attended to soldier 1 thus identifying him as Dr Uysal, who
stated that he attended to all three soldiers.
Dr Uysal:
[Captain R] suffered a cut in his stomach that reached his stomach membrane but not the organ
itself. It was nothing fatal. As a doctor, I wouldnt want to guess the nature of this injury but it
could have been caused by either landing on a sharp pole from the helicopter or a blow from a
pipe with a sharp edge. I couldnt tell.
In either case, it was not fatal but it had to be stitched. However, since we did not ever expect
such a confrontation, we had not brought any stitching equipment on board. All we had was
simple medical material to dress simple wounds, or drops to ease burning in case tear gas was
used. If I had stitching material with me, although I am an eye doctor, I would have treated the
boy properly in accordance with my general medical knowledge. I couldnt. 510
Fig. 6.107 Captain R was given a

piece of gauze to put on the cut
and taken down to the women-only
lounge at the rear of the Main
Deck. An injury on his right hand
can be seen where he was knocked
off the parapet of the Navigation
Deck. Although fairly calm his eyes
still look frightened.511
| 288
6.4.3
Soldier 4 (radio operator)
Part of the testimonies of the three captured soldiers were also reproduced by ITIC. The testimony by
Soldier 4 (referred to as Soldier C by ITIC) has been reproduced here as it is more detailed that the
testimony reproduced by Turkel.
Fig. 6.108 First part of the testimony published by ITIC.
Commentary on this testimony:

1. Israel has not released any film which shows the incident described in paragraph 30.
2. Figs. 6.111 & 6.112 show that this soldier was pushed over the parapet by two passengers (not
three or four), although a third does ineffectively try to help push just at the moment the soldier
is about to fall off the parapet.
3. There appear to be about four men on the Boat Deck, but the lifeboat obscures sight of the area
immediately below the falling soldier where others may be in wait.
| 289
Fig. 6.109 Concluding part of the ITIC commentary by soldier 4
512
Commentary continued:
4. The author has never seen any photographic evidence to support the claim that axes were used
as weapons on the ship. Nobody on the ship has ever admitted that axes were either issued or
used. The Mavi Marmara is equipped with a number of fire axes which were displayed for Israeli
publicity purposes, but none of them showed any sign of blood or any other indication of having
been used in a fight.
5. This soldier has a pistol holster on his right leg (Figs. C, D & E) indicating that he was armed with
a semi-automatic pistol. It is reasonable to assume that he was also carrying an automatic rifle
or machine pistol (Ken OKeefe has testified that the soldier had a rifle) plus a knife. These
weapons were all taken from him and disposed of (the vast majority were thrown into the sea)
which of necessity required some degree of violence. However there is no evidence from the
available photographs of any gratuitous violence following his captivity.
6. Below decks five passengers handling the soldier can be distinguished. None of them wears a
gas mask and one is not wearing a life jacket.
7. Following removal of the soldiers balaclava the top of the soldiers head can be seen clearly.
There is no evidence of any open skull wound. It is obviously possible that this could have been
inflicted later, but the photographic evidence suggests that he would not have been assaulted in
this way, and no member of the passengers or crew have admitting seeing any such assault.
8. The question of firing from the helicopters is considered in detail in section 6.3.3 above.
| 290
Fig 6.110 Time 4:32:56 Soldier 4 is

pushed head first over the parapet of
the Navigation Deck starboard side. 513
[IDF]
Fig. 6.111 Moments later his leg drops

and the soldier rolls forward falling feet
first onto the Bridge Deck below.
Ken OKeefe
This soldier had an assault rifle and was fully conscious. It was a lot harder to cope with him than
with the first soldier. I and another Turk tried to take his firearm, but the strap was tied behind
his back and he lay on his back and fought us. I saw that he was trying to reach the trigger,
so we both made sure not to be opposite the barrel. He held the weapon so tightly that I had to
pry his fingers loose from it. In the end we managed to get the rifle away from him and the Turk
who was with me took it. [The weapon was thrown into the sea.] Another two people arrived
from midship and took this soldier inside, too. 514
| 291
Time: 04:39:10
Time: 04:39:21
Figs. 6.112 1 6.113 After his pack was removed, Soldier 4 is carried downstairs, port side between Bridge and Boat
Decks. This soldier can be recognised by the keffiyah which has been tied to him. The blood on the handrail is from a
wounded passenger who was carried down previously. [Photos: Kevin Neish]
Time: 04:39:40
Fig. 6.114 (At this moment
Soldier 3 was still on the same
level on the opposite side.) In the
photo Soldier 4s protective vest
and ammunition pouches are
being removed using a knife to
cut the straps. (There is no
indication of intent to use the
knife on the soldier.) Because of
the previous attack by a
passenger this soldier was taken
downstairs quickly and his
equipment vest was taken off
while he was being carried.
| 292
Figs. 6.115 & 6.116 Soldier 4, identified by the keffiyah

tied to his right wrist, has been stripped of his balaclava
and ammunition vest. The photographs were taken on the
Boat Deck (which has been identified by the pattern of the
blood stains on the wall which appear in earlier
photographs). Note the passengers hand which is
gripping his right shoulder in the first photograph.
Fig. 6.117 Soldier 4 sits in a foetal

position with his arm over his face. The
passenger in front of him appears to
trying to get him to stand up.
In these photographs there are no
visible signs of bleeding or injuries.
Israeli sources later reported that this
soldier had a fractured skull and
internal bleeding.515
[Photos: efik Din]
| 293
6.4.4
The captured soldiers equipment
Fig. 6.118 (above) A commandos

helmet is requisitioned by one of the
passengers (and appears to be on
back-to-front). (Note Dr Hani Suleiman,
who was later shot in both legs, coming
in through the door.)
Fig. 6.119 (left) Soldier 4s radio pack is

checked out by another passenger.
Photos: [Kevin Neish]
| 294
Passengers have consistently said they threw the weapons overboard which they had seized from the
soldiers. Photographic evidence shows that several objects (thought to be weaponry) were thrown
overboard, and because only very short sequences of film have been released by the IDF it is highly
likely that other unfilmed weapons were also thrown away.
Fig. 6.120 Time 04:32:02. The third soldier, Captain R, descends as something from one of the soldiers is thrown
overboard.
[IDF]
Fig. 6.121 Another commando (possibly Soldier 5) descends. An object, about the size of a Mini-Uzi machine pistol,
has been thrown over the starboard side.
[IDF]
| 295
Figs. 6.122 1 6.123 Two more objects thrown over either side of the ship by passengers trying to overpower and
disarm the soldiers. (This is just before Soldier 4 was thrown over the starboard parapet.) The time is about
04:33.
[IDF]
6.4.5
The battle for the Navigation Deck
After Soldier 4 was pushed off the deck there is a cut of unknown duration in the IDF footage filmed
from the boats so that after this time it is no longer possible to identify the soldiers or calculate the
time.
Fig. 6.124 The soldiers with their

firearms begin to overpower the
passengers.
One soldier has just disabled two of
his assailants by shooting them in
the face with his pepper ball gun.
Another soldier appears to have
drawn a Glock pistol.
[IDF]
Fig. 6.125 Another object is thrown

over the port side. Passengers are
still attacking the soldiers with rods,
chairs and other items.
[IDF]
| 296
Fig. 6.126 Two more objects go over

the port side.
[IDF]
Fig. 6.127 A flash from a stun

grenade illuminates the deck.
[IDF]
Figs. 6.128 & 6.129 The passenger indicated suddenly falls down. Within the space of nine frames his head has
fell to just above the parapet, and within a further six frames the head is below the parapet. The full fifteen
frames amounts to just over half a second. No further information is available, although IHH sources indicate
that Fahri Yaldiz may have died very close to this spot. (See also Fig. 6.143 below.)
| 297
Pepper ball guns
Glock pistol
Fig. 6.130 A group of soldiers has formed near the parapet on the starboard side and
is firing into the centre of the deck.
[IDF]
Mehmet Al Zeybek
There was gunfre comng to us from the helcopter above on one sde, whle a group of three of
four solders on board were frng at us from another. 516
6.4.6
Ali Yunusolus film of the battle on the Navigation Deck
A unique 20-second video sequence (filmed by Ali Yunusolu on the Navigation Deck while commandos
were still descending from the first helicopter) was broadcast via satellite transmission and thus
survived the Israeli censor. It shows the bitter hand-to-hand fighting that ensued in that brief period
before Israeli firepower won the battle on that deck which enabled the commandos to go on to take
control of the bridge.
(The film was made in poor light using a simple camera to record a scene of violent action, hence the
quality is poor. The best quality version of the footage has been cleaned-up and released by the IDF
517
but suffers from having been annotated, cut and deited with repeat sections inserted in order to give
a distorted account of the events portrayed. The full footage shows violence from both sides.)
Fig. 6.131 The footage starts as Ali follows a group of

passengers who had been stadning guard aabove the
bridge as they race towards the stern of the deck to
confront the commandos as they land. [CIHAN version]
| 298
Fig. 6.132 A passenger swings what appear to be a metal bar and is about to hit the dark figure of a soldier.
[IDF version]
Fig. 6.133 (left) The passenger strikes the soldier twice.
Fig.6.134 (right) Another passenger follows carrying a chair as a

weapon.
[IDF]
| 299
Fig. 6.135 Another soldier descends (this is

the same moment shown in Fig. 6.121 and
is possibly soldier 5).
[IDF]
Fig. 6.136 Passengers had pulled the rope as the soldier descended causing him to stumble on landing (blue box). A
passenger and a soldier are fighting on the deck (yellow). Another passenger appears to have fallen injured up
against the parapet on the port side.
[CIHAN]
| 300
Fig. 6.137 A passenger lies on the centre of the deck left foreground. IHH sources believe the Ibrahim Bilgen was
shot and killed about here very early on in the raid. 518
[CIHAN]
Fig. 6.138 A second view of the passenger lying on the centre of the deck.
[CIHAN]
| 301
Fig. 6.139 Moment of impact when a passenger hits a soldier with a metal bar. [IDF]
Fig. 6.140 The soldier, who is carrying a semi-automatic rifle in his hand, is chased and hit again with a metal rod.
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Fig. 6.141 having tried to go through a locked door the soldier turns and is stabbed by a second passenger.
[There are two points to note here. 1) Ken OKeefe said that at the pre-raid meetings to discuss the
defence of the ships it was said that the use of knives was prohibited. 2) By this stage passengers on this
deck had already seen some of their fellows shot by live fire, and as has already been mentioned this
commando had an semi-automatic firearm in his hands.]
Fig. 6.142 A passenger has gone down injured. This is the location where a passenger, possibly Fahri Yaldiz fell in
footage filmed from a boat (see Figs. 6.128 & 6.129).
[CIHAN]
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Fig. 6.143 The injured passenger on the starboard side has turned round and is holding onto the parapet. [CIHAN]
Fig. 6.144 A soldier goes over and kicks the injured

passenger twice. [Press TV 519 ]
Fig. 6.145 The commandos are now

starting to form up on the starboard
side as can be seen in Fig. 6.131.
[Press TV @ 22:49]
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6.4.7
The Schalit factor
Gilad Schalit was a corporal in the Armour Corps of the IDF, deployed as the gunner in a tank near the
Kerem Shalom crossing to the Gaza Strip on 25 June 2006. In the early hours of the morning the tank was
attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade fired by Palestinian militants who had tunnelled out of the Strip.
Largely as a result of irregular actions by the tank crew which contravened operational orders, two of
them were killed. Corporal Schalit was lightly wounded and taken captive after abandoning his M16 rifle
and leaving the tank. He offered no resistance to capture and was taken to Gaza.
Cpl Schalits captors demanded the release of 1300 Palestinians in Israeli jails in return for his freedom.
The demand was refused by the Israeli government and the soldier remained in captivity in Gaza. He was
refused visits from members of the ICRC since this would have betrayed his location through the
network of informants that the Israeli security services run in the Gaza Strip. (One method of
recruitment used is the threat to refuse entry into Israel patients whose condition cannot be treated in
Gaza.) Gilad Schalit was never tortured, and apart from minor mistreatment during the first week was
treated reasonably well although he lost weight during confinement, in a large part due to having to eat
the same poor diet available to most Gazans. 520 521 522
Fig. 6.146 Gilad

Schalit in captivity
in Gaza. 523
Fig. 6.147 In response the Israeli Air Force

attacked Gazas only power station with rockets
on 28 June 2006. All the plants six transformers
were destroyed. The disruption to electricity
supplies badly affected Gazas medical services,
water supply, sewage system and many small
businesses.
[REUTERS 524]
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(The human rights NGO BTselem claimed that Israel could have reduced the supply of electricity from
the primary provider of electricity to the Gaza Strip, the Israel Electric Corporation, but the company had
objected to this threat to its commercial interests. 525)
The following day Israel abducted sixty-four senior Palestinian officials, including twenty members of
parliament. During the next six months Israel also killed at least 400 Gazans, of whom eighty-eight were
children while six Israeli soldiers and four civilians were killed in the same period. Despite this reign of
terror the whereabouts of Gazas prisoner-of-war was never discovered and on 11 November 2006 a
ceasefire was declared. 526
The Israeli state has an unwritten contract with its people: whether dead or alive, everything will be
done to bring home a soldier missing in action. On 18 October 2011 Gilad Schalit was returned to Israel
as part of an Egyptian-brokered deal in which Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners. 527
Fig. 6.148 Sgt Gilad Schalit arrives back in Israel on 18 October 2011. (He was promoted
while held as a prisoner-of-war.) [Reuters/Handout 528]
In 1986 the IDF introduced a rule requiring combat soldiers to prioritise the release of any soldier taken
captive. This objective should be pursued even at the risk of death of the captive. Since the Schalit case
the rule has since been publically and forcibly expressed. No Israeli soldier is to be taken prisoner by
armed militants, even if this should mean death or injury to that soldier. 529
On the day of the Flotilla raid Gilad Schalit was still missing somewhere in the confines of the Gaza Strip.
Despite nearly four years of searching by Israels security services his location was unknown and public
pressure was mounting both in Israel and the diaspora. Suddenly within the space of ten minutes the IDF
had seen three more soldiers, all members of an elite force, taken prisoner on a ship trying to reach
Gaza. The shock caused by this unexpected turn of events must have been profound. It was about this
time (between 04:35 and 04:40) that the sustained use of live fire began and a flood of serious injuries
arrived below decks, while commandos roamed the Navigation Deck committing war crimes against
unprotected casualties. The man who was ultimately responsible for those acts was Vice Admiral
Marom, who was in the Zaharon fast-attack boat seen in photographs as it circled the Mavi Marmara.
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6.4.8
Allegations of mistreatment of the soldiers in captivity
ITIC report
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a report in January 2011 which
contained individual testimonies from each of the three soldiers who had been captured on the Mavi
Marmara. 530 These documents appear to be English translations from the same originals used by the
Turkel Committee in their analysis and commentary of the raid (and quoted in their report). The two
texts present consistent narratives, but textual differences suggest that two different translations have
been made into English from the same original Hebrew text. Nearly one third of the paragraphs start or
end with an ellipsis, indicating some degree of editing of the original at some stage. The ITIC version of
the testimonies has been used in this analysis. The narrative alleges severe mistreatment of the soldiers
throughout their period of captivity on the ship.
Corroboration for some of the allegations can be found in a book by Turkish journalist efik Din 531 who
sailed on the Flotilla reporting for the Turkish newspaper Habertrk. Mr Dins book also contains
photographs taken during the raid which he managed to conceal from the Israelis. However, as will be
shown here below, analysis of the photographic evidence shows that it is not consistent with his
testimony.
Kevin Neishs testimony

One further account of an attack on one of the soldiers has been provided by Kevin Neish who was also
able to conceal a number of images he took of the three soldiers during their captivity. In a personal
account of his experiences on the Flotilla Mr Neish wrote
At 4:37 I returned to the 5th deck [Bridge Deck] lobby. There I photographed the second
captured commando [Captain R/Soldier 3] as he was carried through the port side 5th deck door
onto the floor of the lobby. He was terrified, screaming, eyes as big as saucers and yammering
incoherently. He was being held by his arms and legs while aid workers removed his ammo vest.
At this point a large enraged passenger reached over the aid workers and tried to hit the
commando. Some of the aid workers who were holding the commando immediately pushed the
passenger away and held him against a wall, chiding him loudly. At 4:38 the aid workers quickly
hauled the commando down the stairway to the landing, safely away from the threatening
passenger. 532
There is no photographic evidence to corroborate Mr Neishs testimony, but more importantly there is
no evidence to contradict his statement which relates to a single isolated incident. This testimony is
therefore accepted here as correct.
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efik Dins account

The account of the raid given in Mr Dins book 533 contains serious inaccuracies, suggesting that its
author is not a credible witness.
The book recounts Mr Dins experiences on the Flotilla. It is written in Turkish, but the captions to some
of the photographs have been translated into English by ITIC. 534 (Several of the photographs have been
reproduced here.)
One photograph (reproduced previously above and repeated here as Fig. 6.150) carries the caption
Several volunteers intervened and prevented other angry volunteers from throwing the soldier
into the sea.
Fig. 6.149
This photograph was shot from the deck below. Since Mr Din has admitted that he was on the Bridge
Deck at that stage, the incident illustrated must have occurred on the Navigation Deck. (The picture
actually shows Soldier 1 shortly before he was pushed over the parapet of that deck and dropped onto
the Bridge Deck.) As can be seen elsewhere on the IDF infrared footage, the passengers on the
Navigation Deck were all fighting to the same end, i.e. to get Soldier 1 off that deck. The IDF film shows
that there was no intervention by other passengers at this point. Furthermore having been on the Bridge
Deck Mr Din ought to know that it juts out beyond the Navigation Deck making it impossible to throw
anyone into the sea from that deck. This allegation is also false.
Fig. 6.150 The location of the action recorded in photograph Fig. 6.152.
There are similar discrepencies between another photograph of Soldier 1 (Fig. 6.152) and the caption
given to it in Mr Dins book.
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Fig. 6.151
Is this hand pushing the soldier or
pulling him back?
According to ITIC, that caption reads

The weapons of the soldiers who were taken to the lower deck were thrown into the sea. There
was also an attempt to throw one of the soldiers into the sea.
The prow of the lifeboat visible in the left of that photograph identifies the location of the cameraman as
being on the port side of the Bridge Deck, i.e. the same location as the previous photograph discussed
above. This second photograph also features Soldier 1 and illustrates what befell him after he got to his
feet following his fall onto the Bridge Deck. Again, having stood at that location, Mr Din ought to be
aware that the Boat Deck (i.e. the deck immediately below the deck seen here) juts out beyond the
Bridge Deck making it virtually impossible to throw someone into the sea from the location in the
photograph. It is also unclear what the passengers are trying to do to the soldier at that moment in time.
The soldier is indeed leaning over the parapet, but this was during the middle of a fight, and incidentally
this soldiers own testimony states that he considered jumping into the sea to escape (see Appendix 3,
paragraph 8). Furthermore it is unclear from the photograph whether passengers are actually pushing or
pulling the soldier. The simple fact is that the evidence in the photograph does not support Mr Dins
confident claim.
Figs. 6.152 & 6.153 Two photographs by efik Din which he claims show Soldier 4 being beaten. (The blood stains
on the wall identify the location as on the Boat Deck.) 535
Having been found out making misleading statements on two occasions, it is impossible to accept Mr
Dins assertions at face value concerning his photographs of Soldier 4 on the Boat Deck. On this
occasion, according to ITIC, Mr Dins translated captions say
As doctors attempted to treat the kidnapped soldiers in the corridors, they also attempted to
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keep the passengers from further beating them.

And
It was difficult to get the kidnapped soldiers out of the hands of the man with the club. He
ignored the requests of the volunteers who wanted to protect the soldier, and kept beating him
In reality none of the three photographs show anyone being beaten or anybody beating anything
(despite the fact that one of the passengers is harmlessly holding a solid wooden stave). The blood on
the wall was there before the soldier arrived, and there is no blood or scars or bruises to be seen on the
soldier despite his claims of receiving repeated beatings 536 and a fractured skull. 537 In fact in two of the
photographs it seems quite clear that are trying, gently, to get the soldier to stand up (probably in order
to take him downstairs to the womens lounge).
6.4.9
Comparison of the soldiers testimonies with available photographs
The full availble text to three testimonies has been reproduced in Appendix 3.
1. Soldier 1
This soldier claimed that he had been beaten with clubs, iron bars and fists over the whole of
his body, but particularly on his head and face (paragraph 5).
After falling on the Boat Deck passengers choked me, drove their fingers into my eyes and
tried to gouge them out, pulled my arms and legs one way and then another, and beat me
with clubs and iron bars, especially my head (paragraph 6).
He claimed he was hit on the head with an iron bar, while his face was covered with blood
with the wounds to my head (paragraph 9).
After being taken below decks, They continued beating me, mostly around the head with
clubs and everyone who passed me joined the beating. He said his head had a very deep cut
which he later described as an open skull wound (which ITIC claimed later needed 14
stitches, and that his skull was fractured) (paragraph 10).
Soldier 1 also said that In the hospital they found I had skull fractures, two cranial
haemorrhages, a deep cut on my head and many superficial wounds on my face. I also had a
haemorrhage in one eye and my left arm was broken (paragraph 17).
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Fig. 6.154
Curiously however there are no photographs to back up the allegations of repetitive beatings. After the
soldier was overpowered on the Boat Deck the only photographs available show that he was forcibly
taken downstairs (i.e. he was forcibly taken to the safest place for him on the ship) and was then taken to
a remote corner and given medical attention. It is fair to ask what film did the IDF seize that shows the
treatment of Soldier 1. Where for example is the footage filmed by the passenger with the Sony video
camera who can be seen in two of the stills by efik Din? The most likely answer is that the IDF stole the
film but have chosen to withhold this evidence which ought to cast light on the validity of the allegations
of persistent violence against the soldiers.
Even efik Din is unable to provide photographic evidence of any beating once the soldier had been
taken captive, although this did not stop him making a further unsubstantiated allegation. Thus ITIC
reproduced his photograph of Soldier 1 with a contradictory caption.
Fig. 6.155 According to ITIC, an English translation of Mr Dins

caption reads After the three well-armed soldiers landed on the ship,
they were beaten and taken to the ships interior. Whereas that
photograph (left) shows the soldier having his arm twisted to force
him downstairs to safety. There is no evidence here to suggest that
Mr Dins allegation of beating is true and honest. Arm twisting does
not amount to beating and there is no sign of the iron bars
mentioned so frequently in the soldiers testimony.
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2. Soldier 3
Captain R claimed As I was sliding down the rope I saw that they were throwing things
at us. They hit me with iron bars and stones. When I reached the roof I felt a hard blow
on my neck from behind, and I saw I was surrounded by about fifteen or twenty men,
some of them holding clubs and some of them holding knives, axes. (Paragraph 19)
They were holding axes, knives, iron bars and clubs and running toward me (paragraph
20).
As soon as they reached me they snatched my gun and hit me as hard as they could with
the bars and clubs. I was sitting with my back to the hull with my knees bent and
protecting my face with my hands. All the people surrounding me were hitting me as
hard as they could, especially my head. [] They were hitting me all over, but mostly, as I
said, my head (paragraph 21).
After about two minutes when they were beating me and I was trying to defend myself
a number of men grabbed my arms and legs and picked me up, and I realized they were
going to throw me overboard into the water. I resisted and struggled as hard as I could
but it didn't do any good. I have to say that even then they continued hitting me hard in
the stomach. I fought back as hard as I could until they got me over the hull. I hung onto
it with both hands and was hanging from it. The people above me kept hitting my hands
and the other group on the lower deck dragged me down by my legs. (Paragraph 22)
On the Boat Deck he said One of them jumped on me and I felt a sharp pain in my lower
abdomen. I put my hand out and felt a knife and knew I had been stabbed. Instinctively I
pulled the knife out. I have to make it clear that even then, they were still beating me,
even with clubs. (Paragraph 23)
They dragged me down a ladder [stairs], two men, one above and one below [] I saw
that there was massive bleeding and I could see my intestines spilling out of my stomach.
[] I also saw I had a deep cut on my left arm and it was also bleeding a lot, and I could
feel blood running from my nose into my mouth. (Paragraph 25)
While they were dragging me down the ladder [stairs]I saw soldier 4 lying on the
bottom deck with men acting crazy all around him, they kept beating him without
stopping. (Paragraph 26)
I remember two men wearing bandannas made out of green Hamas flags who were
really eager to kill us. They tried to strangle me and soldier 4, and you could see the hate
burning in their eyes. They told us in English that they were going to kill us. Apparently
what kept them from doing it was that there were people who wouldn't let them and
pushed them away. (Paragraph 27)
In the womens lounge on the Main Deck I found soldier 1 there, his whole face was
bloody. [] They tied my hands and feet with rope. There was a man next to me who
held a wooden stick in one hand and my hand in the other. He beat me with the stick and
with his hand signalled that every time I moved he would hit me hard Everything began
to be blurry, I guess from loss of blood (paragraph 28).
While there is much here that cannot be either substantiated or corrected by reference to photographs,
a considerable amount of this testimony that can be disproven.
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Captain R is also inconsistent insofar as he says in paragraph 21 that his gun was snatched from him but
fails to mention that he fired the weapon (which is not a trivial detail to overlook). While in hospital he
had told Matthew Chance that he had shot one bullet from the gun (see section 11.3 below).
The IDF photographs show that Captain R was actually tackled by about four people and not the 15 to 20
men that he would have us believe. The photos correspond with his account that he was attacked and
pushed over the parapet, and when he hung on to the parapet his hand was hit with a bar to force him
to let go while his legs were pulled from below. But his claim of being on the top deck and beaten for
about two minutes is greatly exaggerated. He was actually on that deck for less than a tenth of that time
and the primary objective of the defenders there was to get him off it and out of the way and not to
continue inflicting punishment on him. It may have seemed an eternity to him while he was being
beaten up, but he would have had ample opportunity afterwards to consider the facts before testifying.
Since he admits to firing his Mini-Uzi machine pistol on the Navigation Deck it is probable that this was
taken from him on that deck. Although Ken OKeefe has testified that Captain R was disarmed on the
Bridge Deck he does not specify what the weapon was, so it is possible that this soldier had also
attempted to use his Glock pistol and that this was also taken from him. (Ken OKeefe did not mention
the gun being fired on the Bridge Deck, which is hardly a detail he would have overlooked.) Certainly
Captain R can be seen holding onto the parapet with both hands so he was not holding the Mini-Uzi as
he fell between decks.
It is possible that he may have been stabbed, as he said, or as Dr Uysal surmised he may have fallen on
something sharp or struck with a pipe with a sharp edge. Blurred footage on the Navigation Deck
suggests that another soldier was stabbed on that deck, but generally there is little evidence that knives
were used or even carried, and according to Ken OKeefes testimony (see section 4.1 above) passengers
defending the ship were explicitly told not to use knives. As we have already seen Captain Rs testimony
is unreliable (and further evidence here will endorse this statement) so his claim cannot be accepted
without reliable corroboration.
If he was not stabbed then obviously the claim that he pulled the knife out of his stomach is also
incorrect. There is no particular reason to believe this since the concomitant claim that I could see my
intestines spilling out of my stomach is disproved by the photographs. (Dr Uysal had also specifically
said that the cut had reached the stomach membrane but not the organ itself.
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Fig. 6.156
Similarly I had a deep cut on my left arm and it was also bleeding a lot seems to refer to bleeding from
his hand near the bottom of the little finger from which a thin trickle of blood had flowed part way along
the lower arm. (It can be seen in a number of the photos in section 4.6.2.) This bleeding would have
been exacerbated by the soldier struggling with his captors. Although messy and perhaps painful, in the
context of injuries on the Mavi Marmara this haemorrhaging was a trivial matter.
The bleeding from the right side of the bridge of his nose seems to have started inside the ship and
apparently was superficial since there was no scar to be seen on that side of the nose when Captain R
was filmed by SVT1 six months later.
[svt1 30:05]
Figs. 6.157 & 6.158 Captain Rs nose on 31 May and in December 2010.
The statement by Captain R They tied my hands and feet with rope is unequivocal. However the
photograph of him lying on a couch in the lounge on the Main Deck shows without any doubt that his
hands were totally unrestrained. Although his feet cannot be seen there would be little point in tying
them with rope when his hands were free to untie them. Although the photograph does not show
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whether there was in fact a man next to me who held a wooden stick in one hand and my hand in the
other [who] beat me with the stick and with his hand signalled that every time I moved he would hit me
hard , there would seem to be no reason to accept the word of someone that has proved to be a serial
liar. Certainly the statement Everything began to be blurry, I guess from loss of bloodsuggests
paranoia and exaggeration given the small amount of blood that this casualty can be seen to have shed.
In total ten photographs have been found which show Captain R in captivity inside the ship and these
have all been inserted in this report. The author is unaware of the existence of any other photographs of
this captive other than material which the IDF has most likely withheld. None of the available evidence
shows him being subjected to violence (although he has somehow acquired a small gash on his nose
while in captivity). On the contrary he had two doctors attend to him (as shown in the images) and the
body language of the passengers around him is at all times firm yet placatory and never aggressive.
3. Soldier 4
When I reached the deck I saw a terrorist with an iron crowbar waiting to hit me over
the head, but when he tried to I shoved him away and four more terrorists jumped me
straightaway. One of them wrapped a chain around my neck to choke me while I was
trying to fight them off(paragraph 30)
This soldier said he was thrown onto the Bridge Deck where about twenty men with
clubs, axes and other weapons were waiting for me and he was taken into the ship. I
saw knives and they cut all my equipment away and they kept beating me all the time.
(Paragraph 31)
They put me in a room and kept beating me. The room was full of blue couches and
they put me on one of them. There were two men, one of them kept hitting me all the
time I was tied to the couch and they also held me down while he hit me. There was
another guy there, he tried to calm him down, but it didn't do any good. (Paragraph 31)
I was taken to the hospital unconscious and breathing with a respirator. My skull was
fractured and bleeding internally. They sent me straight to the operating room. They
fixed my skull, they put the pieces back in place, I had an open skull wound and I was
lucky my brain was not damaged. (Paragraph 35)
The first thing of note in this account is the routine use of the word terrorist (in paragraphs 30 and 31;
the term was also used by Soldier 1 in paragraphs 11 and 12.). This term is discussed in detail in section
14, where the point is made that the definition from the relevant UN panel on terrorism has confined
these actions to violence against civilians and non-combatants. Any soldier on active duty is in neither
of these categories and therefore the Soldiers language might properly be considered ignorant and
partisan in this regard. Given the level of serious violence inflicted on civilians (including noncombatants) on the Flotilla by trained, well-armed commandos, the language used here might also be
described as gratuitously offensive.
After Soldier 4 was overpowered only six photographs of his subsequent treatment are known to have
been publicly released (three each by Kevin Neish and efik Din). None of these show actual physical
violence or threats to the soldier and there are no marks or blood stains on him in the photographs. One
of Mr Neishs photos shows this soldiers equipment being cut off with what looks like a kitchen knife,
but none of his pictures shows anyone holding any form of club or other weapon which might have been
| 315
used to beat the soldier (who claimed that they kept beating me all the time at this point). Similarly
none of Mr Dins three photographs shows any of the passengers in a position in which they might
reasonably be construed as either beating or being intent on beating the captive. A tentative conclusion
from these photographs is that there was no mistreatment at this stage and the soldiers allegation of
being beaten (apparently repeatedly) at the time his equipment was removed is erroneous, perhaps
deliberately so.
No comments can be offered regarding the allegations that this soldier was repeatedly beaten by two
passengers after being taken to the womens lounge on the Main Deck, other than the fact that there
appears to be some doubt about the accuracy of his previous testimony. Did a man who was repeatedly
beaten elsewhere forget about a period of lull when he was not mistreated, or has a man who was
honourably treated chosen to put on record a series of lies about his time in captivity, as his colleague
Captain R can be shown to have done?
Finally with respect to the unproven allegations of repetitive beatings, it is worth recalling , as several
passengers have pointed out, that if the Flotilla passengers had really wanted to harm the captives they
had ample opportunity to inflict serious injury on them or even kill them after taking control of the three
commandos firearms. That the guns were safely disposed of (by throwing them in the sea in all but one
case) and the captives taken for medical attention, is beyond doubt, yet scarcely mentioned in the three
testimonies. This omission casts serious doubt on the integrity of the three witnesses and their motives
for giving testimony that can be shown at least in part to be misleading and false.
Axes and stones
All three soldiers have claimed that axes were wielded by their attackers (i.e. Soldier 1 in paragragh 4,
Soldier 3 in paragraphs 19 and 20, and Soldier 4 in paragraph 31). There are several fire stations on the
ship which contain axes and these were rifled at Ashdod and all the axes were put on display as weapons
used against the soldiers. Significantly none of the axes has blood or other incriminating marks or stains
upon them. None of the film from the ship has ever shown a passenger wielding or even holding or even
being in the vicinity of an axe. None of the injuries seen exhibit wounds that might be attributed to axes.
None of the passengers has ever testified to seeing axes used on the ship in any capacity. It is the
contention of this writer that this is a malicious allegation without any foundation.
Soldier 3 also claimed (in paragraph 19) that he had been hit with stones. This is rejected here as simply
not credible. There is no use on a ship for stones, they were not part of the cargo of the Mavi Marmara,
they are not a typical item of baggage, it is unlikely that they would have been allowed on the ship if
detected at customs, no one else has ever mentioned stones in their narrative, and frankly the claim
seems ridiculous and far-fetched.
The context in which the soldiers were given treatment
As described later in chapter 8, the medical team was ill-equipped unprepared for the for the number of
casualties and the severity of the wounds that they had to deal with. At the same time that they were
having to treat the soldiers a number of casualties with wevere gunshot wounds were already being
brought in for treatment.
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Fig. 6.159 Some of the photographs of the Soldier 4 show him against a wall smeared with bloodstains (e.g. Figs.
6.116 & 6.117). It seems more likely that those same blood stains come from the casualty seen here on the stretcher
(with a profusely bleeding arm against the wall) and not from soldier 4.
[Kevin Neish]
Fig. 6.160 (left) At around the time the soldiers were brought down from the Bridge Deck this man and at least two
others had also been brought in for medical attention. (The first soldier was brought inside around 04:36. This man
came in on the stretcher around 04:37.) He had been hit by two rubber-coated bullets in the chest, and apparently
by live fire in the left arm.
Figs. 6.161 & 6.162 (right) some of the injured passengers were arguably showing more visible signs of pain than
the soldiers.
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6.5
FIRING FROM RIBS
After his release from Israeli custody Al Jazeera reporter Jamal Elshayyal told the Free Gaza Movement
There was also fire coming from the sea as well. Most of the fire initially from the sea was tear
gas canisters and sound grenades. But then it became live fire. 538
This evidence was not accepted by the UNHRC Commission who wrote in their report
despite some claims that live ammunition was also fired from the zodiac boats, the Mission is
not satisfied that this was the case. 539
Nevertheless the claim was confirmed by an Israeli source quoted by the Palmer Report. (Unfortunately
the actual footage referred to does not appear to be in the public domain.) The incident referred to
would be the shooting of Uur Sleyman Sylemez (although he did not in fact die from his injuries until
nearly three years after the publication of the Palmer Report).
Fig. 6.163 Footnote of Palmer Report referring to footage showing live fire from an Israeli RIB.
Some DHA footage supports this, although it is not possible to identify the nature of the ammunition.
Fig. 6.164 An Israeli RIB can be seen off the port side of the Mavi Marmara (within the yellow
rectangle) and a flash can be seen in the video (located by the blue circle) which corresponds to
the sound of gunfire from the speedboat simultaneously heard in the video. 540 [DHA]
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Fig. 6.165 Activists defend the ship at the stern of the Upper Deck. It is thought that Uur Sleyman
Sylemez (inset) is operating the fire hose in the main picture. Mr Sylemez was shot on this deck.
[Kate Geraghty]
| 319
Chapter 6 references
441
IHH; Gaza Flotilla Factsheet; p 129.
442
Filistin Videolar, 2011; IRAN MAVI MARMARA BELGESEL; https://vimeo.com/23942278, @ 18:25
443
Mamoud Tural interview with author, Istanbul, 31 May 2014.
444
Cdr23d1, 12 June 2010; FAKE VIDEOS OF ISRAEL ABOUT THE FREEDOM FLOTILLA ATTACK EXPOSED (MUST
SEE!!!) 07:11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WW2R4Iw5afc
445
Reporters Without Borders, 9 June 2010; As Turkish Photographer is Buried, Other Journalists Aboard Flotilla
Speak Out. http://en.rsf.org/israel-as-turkish-photographer-is-buried-09-06-2010,37701.html (Accessed 2
February 2014)
446
MiddleEastMonitor, BBC Panorama - What happened on the Flotilla to Gaza 1 of 2,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4594E-9PnEg @ 14.27
447
Op. cit. @ 08:40
448
Sir Geoffrey Palmer et al, July 2011, Report of the Secretary-Generals Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010
flotilla Incident, para. 47, pp. 92/3.
449
idfnadesk, Timeline of the Mavi Marmara Incident (English, High Quality Version),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z31GesVrBjc @ 08:31
450
Op. cit. @ 08.34.
451

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4594E-9PnEg @ 14:47
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Op. cit. @ 09:12
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dUNNajEjfk 00:50
| 320
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Gili: Saldr baladnda namaz klyorduk. Tam burda helikopter ateiyle bacamdan vuruldum. [The text
translates as Veterens Muhittin Gili MM: We were praying when the attack began. I was shot in the leg by
helicopter fire right here.]
478
Mamoud Tural in interview with the author, Istanbul, 31 May 2014.
479
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLrX7fznVgI
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Elshayyal. http://www.freegaza.org/en/testimonies-from-israeli-jail/1221-in-their-own-words-survivortestimonies-from-flotilla-31-may-2010.html (Accessed 2 October 2013)
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http://beitunia.forensic-architecture.org/sound-analysis/cnn-footage/
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FmCuFogjAPg @ 00:44
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Blent Yildirim interview with author at Istanbul 27 May 2014, translated by Rabia Yurt.
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Ayhan Altunta, Testimony at 7th High Criminal Court of Istanbul, File No. 2012/264 Basis; 21 February 2013.
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490
Abdullah Camiolu, Testimony at 7th High Criminal Court of Istanbul, File No. 2012/264 Basis; 21 February
2013.
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Robert Mackey and Sebnem Arsu, 9 June 2010; Turkish Doctor Describes Treating Israeli Commandos During
Raid; The New York Times. http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/turkish-doctor-describes-treatingisraeli-commandos-duringraid/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2#more-65643
494
Ibid.
495
Ibid.
496
Ibid.
497
Al Jazeera News Network, undated; Turkish Aid Organization I.H.H. Shelters IDF Commando with Medical Aid
| 322
498
David Segarra, The Raid. @ 38:57 to 39:19.
499
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BBC Panorama, Death in the Med.
501
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http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/small_arms/uzi/Uzi-Mini.html (Accessed 5 May 2014)
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CNN, 2 June 2010; Israel Commando on Flotilla Raid.

http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2010/06/02/chance.israel.army.witnes.cnn
505
Turkel Committee Report Part 1, pp. 152-3.
506
Kevin Neish, pers. comm. 22 February 2011
507
Kevin Neish, pers. comm. 4 March 2011
508
Ken OKeefe, Defenders of the Mavi Marmara; in Moustafa Bayoumi (ed.), 2010; Midnight on the Mavi
Marmara; OR Books, New York, p38.
509
PressTV Documentaries, 11 October 2014; Mavi Marmara;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOugBCuQbAE @ 20:25.
510
511
Photo retrieved from http://play.tojsiab.com/NEk0Z2FNdnNTYk0z @ 00:20
512
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 23 January 2011; Detailed testimony from IDF
carried out by IHH operatives and their accomplices against Israeli forces aboard the Mavi Marmara;
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_19076_2.pdf
513
idfnadesk, 3 June 2010 ; Weaponry Overview and Footage of Marmara Passengers Preparing Weaponry.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16sANhzjcC0 01:56
514
Noam Sheizaf, 24 September 2010; Rough passage; Haaretz.

http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/rough-passage-1.315481 (Accessed 5 May 2014)
515
See Appendix 3 paragraph 36.
516
Zahide Tuba Kor, 2011; WITNESSES of the FREEDOM FLOTILLA; HHKTAP, Istanbul, p160.
517
Israels foreign affairs Min., 15 June 2010; Overview of Israel Navy Interception of the Gaza Flotilla 31May10; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vCIR2N7V6c @ 03:55 et seq.
518
Abdullah Ceylan, undated; ssiz msalarin Destani Mavi Marmara; Tahlil yayinlari, Istanbul, p292.
| 323
519
Press TV DOC, Mavi Marmara; http://presstvdoc.com/Default/Detail/9707 @ 22:47.
520
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2014)
521
Ben Caspit, 28 March 2013; Gilad Schalits capture: In his own words; Jerusalem Post.
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522
Ben Caspit, 30 March 2013; Gilad Schalits capture: In his own words, part II; Jerusalem Post
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in Captivity; http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.695238 (Video @ 09:06) (Accessed 1 March 2016).
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Agency; Common Dreams. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0629-07.htm
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Anschel Pfeffer, 18 October 2011; IDF warns soldiers of kidnappings ahead of Gilad Shalit release; Haaretz.
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530
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carried out by IHH operatives and their accomplices against Israeli forces aboard the Mavi Marmara.
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531
M. efk Dn, 2010; KANLI MAV MARMARA; Kalkedon, Istanbul
532
Kevin Neish, 25 May 2012; Mavi Marmara Attack; http://www.kevinneish.ca/ (Accessed 10 May 2014)
533
M. efk Dn, 2010; KANLI MAV MARMARA; Kalkedon, Istanbul.
534
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 15 September 2010; Preparations made by IHH
for confrontation with the IDF and the violence exercised by that organizations operatives as photographed
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535
Op. cit. p 9.
536
Appendix 3, paragraphs 31 and 32
537
Op. cit. paragraph 36
538
Ibid.
| 324
539
Human Rights Council fact-finding mission report, 27 September 2010; A/HRC/15/21 Table Deaths of
Flotilla Participants, para. 112, p 25.
540
Justicentric, Israel Navy Massacres Freedom Flotilla Passengers in International Waters.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MB-Mk4bFz-U Sequence begins 0:05 and flash can be seen at 0:10.
| 325

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CHAPTER 6

THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA.................................................................. 235

THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE ...............................................................................................................252

PHASE TWO: THE MAIN ASSAULT ...............................................................................................................255

The Black Hawk helicopters arrive .........................................................................................255

Stun grenades ....................................................................................................................................257

Firing from the helicopters .........................................................................................................258

The first commandos land on the Navigation Deck .........................................................266

THE BATTLE IN WHICH THREE SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED......................................................271

Soldier 3 (also known as Captain R) .....................................................................................280

Soldier 4 (radio operator)............................................................................................................289

The captured soldiers equipment ...........................................................................................294

The battle for the Navigation Deck ..........................................................................................296

Ali Yunusolus film of the battle on the Navigation Deck ...........................................298

The Schalit factor..............................................................................................................................305

Allegations of mistreatment of the soldiers in captivity ...............................................307

Comparison of the soldiers testimonies with available photographs ...................310

FIRING FROM RIBS ...............................................................................................................................................318

Chapter 6 references .........................................................................................................................................................320

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

THE START OF THE ASSAULT ON THE MAVI MARMARA

Fig.6.2 Less than six minutes before the

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

It seemed like something in a movie but it was real. Real as in war.

Fig. 6.5 IDF infrared footage

Fig.6.6 A fire hose is spraying

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig. 6.7 Image shot from Challenger I.

Fig. 6.8 The start of the attack, timed by Kevin Neish.

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

[In this context the Palmer Committee Report observed:

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig. 6.11 (Footage probably filmed from the

Hook for boarding ladder

Fig. 6.12 The same incident filmed from the RIB.

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig. 6.16 The same area filmed

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig. 6.17 A second object is

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig. 6.19 Projectiles from the

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Fig.6.24 The aftermath of the explosion

Water jet from second hose

Water jet from fire hose

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Passenger on Boat Deck attempts to

Pole used to deflect hook

Fig. 6.26 Passengers prevent the installation of the boarding hook

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

THE FLOTILLA CHANGES COURSE

Fig. 6.34 Enlargement of the chart at the moment of

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6

Regrettably, none of the official inquiries chose to consider this question.

Lightbown: An Illustrated Narrative of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla Raid Chapter 6