G.R. No.

559 March 14, 1903

MANUEL BARRIOS Y BARREDO,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARIA PASCUALA
DOLOR, ET AL., defendants-appellees
Facts:
-plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery
from the defendants, heirs of the late Don
Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar
estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to
have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco
-stipulation is made for a contract of partnership
for the operation of the said estate
-Doa Maria Pascuala Dolor raised an
incidental issue : instrument referred to be ruled
out of evidence on the ground that it had not
been recorded in the registry of property,
-and that it be returned to the plaintiff without
leaving in the record any transcript or copy
thereof or extract therefrom, resting this
contention upon article 389 of the Mortgage
Law.
-motion was granted by the judge.
PLAINTIFF appeals
-the question has been raised in this incidental
issue whether the defendants, as heirs of Don
Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be
regarded as third persons for the purposes of
the Mortgage Law
-Mortgaged Law itself, in article 27, gives the
definition of a third person, which is, "he who
has not taken part in the act or contract
recorded."
-parties to a contract are not third persons;
consequently, Demonteverde was not a third
person with respect to the contract entered into
by him and evidenced by the instrument in
question. He not being such a third person,
neither can his heirs be so regarded, nor should
they be so regarded with respect to the same
contract, because they are only the judicial
continuation of his personality, they having
been subrogated, by virtue of the right of
succession, to all his rights and obligations, in
accordance with provisions of article 661 of the
Civil Code
-defendants, therefore, are not third persons
with respect to the contract entered into by their
decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the
instrument of February 3, 1883, and they

therefore can not avail themselves of the

prohibition contained in article 389 of the
Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the
admission of this instrument as evidence in the
case
-This prohibition was established solely and
exclusively in favor of those who, within the
meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it
otherwise, the position of the defendants would
be superior to that of the person whom they
derived their rights, because he, not being a
third person, could not set up such an exception.
This would certainly be most illogical from a
legal point of view, in view of the fact that the
heir is, as above stated, a mere continuation of
the civil personality of his decedent.
-defendants not being third persons, it becomes
unnecessary to decide whether the instrument
referred to is or is not subject to inscription in
accordance with article 2 of the Mortgage Law,
because, at all events, and however this may be,
the mere failure to record the instrument in the
registry of property can not be a bar to its
admission as evidence in this case,
RULING:
-Consequently we reverse and annul the order
of the court below, overruling the motion made
on behalf of Doa Maria Pascuala Dolor,
without special condemnation as to the costs of
either instance
G.R. No. L-4777 November 11, 1908
SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek
Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and Insurance Co.,
Ltd., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SILVINA CHIOTAYSAN, defendant-FRANCISCA JOSE,
intervener-appellant.
Facts:
-Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her
lifetime a certain tract of land, which was duly
inscribed in her name in the land registry of the
city of Manila
-1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the
intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000
pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her
title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as
security for the loan, but no entry touching the
transaction was noted in the land registry.
-died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and

thereafter
LOWER COURT:
-Silvina Chio-Taysan, the defendant in this
action, instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action, known, under the system
of civil procedure in existence prior to the
adoption of the present code, as an "action for
the declaration of heirship
-the following order declaring her to be the
only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero,
deceased, was issued
-March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the
city of Manila by virtue of this order entered the
following inscription in the land registry
whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made
to appear as the owner
-On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina
Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from
the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of
which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed
liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question
as security for the repayment of the loan.
-Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan
instituted special proceedings under the
provisions of the present Code of Civil
Procedure, for the administration of the estate
of Avelina Caballero, deceased
-he was, in accordance with his petition,
appointed administrator; and thereupon,
submitted as such administrator, an inventory of
the property of the estate, in which was
included the land in question;
-on the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca
Jose, the intervener in this action, submitted her
claim to the commissioner appointed in these
proceedings, for the sum of 1,000 pesos,
Mexican currency, loaned the deceased, as
above set out, on the 28th day of March, 1904,
-which claim was duly approved on the 31st of
August, 1906.
-On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff
in this action filed its complaint against the
defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, praying for
judgment for the amount loaned her as above
set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon
the land.
-defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, filed her
answer, admitting the facts alleged in the
complaint and declining to interpose any
objection to the prayer of the complaint;
-but on the 30th of October, 1907, Francisca

Jose was permitted to intervene and file her

separate "complaint in intervention" wherein
she set out the facts touching the loan made by
her to Avelina Caballero, deceased, and prayed
that the court declare the mortgage executed by
Silvina Chio-Taysan rescinded and of no effect;
and further that it annul the inscription in the
land registry of the title of Silvina Chio-Taysan
to the land in question; and declare this land
subject to her claim against the estate of Avelina
Caballero, deceased.
TRIAL COURT RULING:
-trial court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against both the defendant and the
intervener in conformity with the prayer of the
complaint, and the intervener brings that
judgment before this court for review upon her
bill of exceptions duly signed and certified.
SC OPINION:
-We do not think that the judgment of the trial
court can be sustained in so far as it wholly
denies relief to the intervener, Francisca Jose.
-The trial judge denied the relief prayed for by
the intervener, on the ground that her
intervention in this action was for the purpose
of the written title deeds on the land, and that,
since she admitted that she had admitted her
claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero,
deceased, to the committee appointed in the
administration proceedings, she must be taken
to have abandoned, whatever lien she may have
held as security therefor, in accordance with the
provisions of section 708 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
-The prayer of her complaint in intervention,
however, is merely for the rescission and
annulment of the mortgage contract between the
loan company and the defendant and of the
inscription in the land registry of the title of the
defendant, and a declaration that as a creditor of
the estate she has a superior right to that of the
plaintiff company in the proceeds of any sale of
the land in question.
-She does not seek to enforce her claim and
recover her debt in this proceeding, but merely
to prevent the plaintiff from securing a
judgment in this action which would take out of
the estate property which she believes to be
subject to her claim set up in the administration
proceedings.

-If her contentions are well founded, and if the

estate of the deceased is subject to the payment
of the debts of the deceased in such form that
the heirs of the deceased could not alienate this
land free of the claims of the creditors of the
deceased against the land, for the payment of
their claims against the deceased, the intervener
is clearly entitled to at least so much of the
relief she seeks in this action as will have the
effect of preventing the sale of this land under
the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings, free of
the claims of creditors of the deceased, because,
if the plaintiffs in this action were permitted to
foreclosure their mortgage and to recover their
debt from the sale of the land in question, it
might well be that there would not be sufficient
property in the estate to pay the amount of the
claim of the intervener against the estate.
-Had the transactions above set out in taken
place under the system of law in force in these
Islands immediately prior to the 1st day of
October, 1901, when the new Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect, there would be no
difficulty in determining the respective rights of
the various parties to this action.
-Article 657 of the Civil Code provides that The
rights to the succession of another are
transmitted from the moment of his death
-and article 661 provides that Heirs succeed the
deceased by the mere fact of his death, in all
rights and obligations
-The property of the deceased, both real and
personal, became the property of the heir by the
mere fact of death of his prodecessor in interest,
and he could deal with it in precisely the same
way in which the deceased could have dealt
with it, subject only to the limitations which by
law or by contract were imposed upon the
deceased himself.
-He could alienate or mortgage it with the same
freedom as could the deceased in his lifetime;
the unsecured debts and other personal
obligations of the deceased becoming the
unsecured debts and personal obligations of the
heir for which he was held personally
responsible in precisely the same manner as the
deceased, save only, as has been said before,
where he availed himself of the privilege of
taking the estate "with the benefit of an
inventory," in which case the extent of his
liability was limited to the value of the estate
which came into his hands,

-Spanish procedural law provided an action

known as an action for the declaration of
heirship (declaracion de herederos) whereby
one claiming the status of heir could have his
right thereto judicially declared
-But both the substantive and procedural law
touching rights of succession and their
enforcement, which were in force in these
Islands when the new Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect, have, to a greater
or less degree, been repealed or modified by
its enactment;
SC OPINION:
-we are of opinion that, under the provisions of
the new code, the heir is not a such personally
responsible for the debts of the deceased, in
whole or in part; and on the other hand, the
property of the deceased comes to him charged
with the debts of the deceased, so that he can
not alienate or charge it free of such debts, until
and unless they are extinguished either by
payment, prescription, or satisfaction in one or
other of the modes recognized by law.
-NEW CODE OF CIV PRO: It substantially
repeals in toto the proceedings prescribed under
the old law for the administration of estates of
deceased persons, and substitutes therefor a
system similar to that generally adopted in the
United States;
-An examination more especially of sections
597, 644, 695, 727, 729, 731, 733, and 749 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, read together with
the remaining provisions for the administration
of the estates of deceased persons, clearly
indicates that the provisions of articles 660 and
661 of the Civil Code have been abrogated.
-These provisions of the new code clearly
demonstrate that the terms heredero and
legatario, as defined in the Civil Code (art.
660), are not synonymous with the words "heir"
and "legatee," as used in the new code;
-the word "heir" in the new code being
technically and applicable only to a relative
taking property of an intestate by virtue of the
laws of descent, devisee and legatee being
reserved for all persons whether relatives or not,
taking respectively real or personal property by
virtue of a will
-while heredero in the Civil Code was
applicable not only to one who would be called
an "heir," under the provisions of the new code,

but also to one, whether relative or not, who

took what might be called "a residuary estate
under a will"
-new code having provided a remedy whereby
the property of the deceased may always be
subjected to the payment of his debts in
whatever hands it may be found, the right of a
creditor to a lien upon the property of the
deceased, for the payment of the debts of the
deceased, created by the mere fact of his death,
may be said to be recognized and created by the
provisions of the new code.
COURT RULING:
-it is evident that her death created a lien upon
her property in favor of the intervener Francisca
Jose, for the payment of the debt contracted by
her during her lifetime, and that this lien ought
to have and has priority to any lien created upon
this property by the heir of the deceased; that
the judicial declaration of heirship in favor of
Silvina Chio-Taysan, could not and did not
furnish a basis for an entry in the land registry
of the name of Silvina Chio-Taysan as the
absolute owner of the property of Avelina
Caballero; that such entry, improperly made,
could not and did not prejudice the lien of the
intervener, Francisca Jose, for the debt due her
by the deceased (Mortgage Law, art. 33); and
that the mortgage of the property of the
deceased by her heir, Silvina Chio-Taysan, was
subject to the prior lien of the intervener,
Francisca Jose, for the payment of her debt.
-the other relief prayed for by her may properly
be denied, since a provision subjecting the land
in question to the payment of her claim against
the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, fully
and sufficiently protects her rights in the
premises, and her rights having been secured,
she has no proper interest in the rescission of
the mortgage contract between plaintiff and
defendant, or the cancellation of the inscription
of the defendant's title as heir in the land
registry.
-RULING:
The judgment of the trial court should,
therefore, be modified in accordance with the
foregoing principles, and the record will be
returned to the trial court where judgment will
be entered modifying the judgment, by
providing that the proceeds of the sale of the
land under the foreclosure proceedings will be

deposited with the clerk of the court, where it

will be retained until the amount of the debt due
the intervener and unpaid in the course of the
administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero
shall have been ascertained, whereupon the said
funds shall be applied: first, to extinguish the
unpaid residue, if any, of the claim of the
intervener; second, to pay the debt due the
plaintiff in this action; and finally, the residue, if
any, to be paid to the estate of the deceased; the
intervener to have her costs in this action in
both instances.
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO
LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
-case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken
by the defendants Conchita McLachlin,
Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael
Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros
-DISPOSITIVE PORTION: court renders
judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco
Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of
the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal
purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the
prayer in the first cause of action that the said
Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to
share in the properties left by the deceased
Eusebio Quitco.
-As to the second cause of action, the said
defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff
Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only
the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from
the filing of this complaint until fully paid
ISSUES:
-In support of their appeal, the appellants assign
the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court
That the trial court erred in holding, that the
action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment of the note
Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the

property inherited by the defendants from their

deceased grandfather by the right of
representation is subject to the debts and
obligations of their deceased father who died
without any property whatsoever.lawphi1.net
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500
;
SC ONLY CONSIDERED THE FF AS THE
FACTS
-In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma
lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while
the latter was still single, of which relation,
lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter
who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma.
In 1921, it seems hat the relation between
Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came
to an end, but the latter executed a deed
(Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana
Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on
January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note
-Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the
defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he
had four children, who are the other defendants.
-On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
(Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December
15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died,
and as the latter left real and personal properties
upon his death, administration proceedings of
said properties were instituted in this court, the
said case being known as the "Intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153
of this court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON CLAIMS:
-Upon the institution of the intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment
of the committee on claims and appraisal, the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935,
filed before said committee the aforequoted
promissory note for payment,
-and the commissioners, upon receipt of said
promissory note, instead of passing upon it,
elevated the same to this court en consulta
(Exhibit F),
-and as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito,
presiding over the First Branch, returned said
consulta and refrained from giving his opinion

thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid

commissioners on claims and appraisal,
alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the
claim, denied the same
- On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court
issued an order of declaration of heirs in the
intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as
Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among
the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother
of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which
the court denied. From the order denying the
said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu
thereof there was filed the complaint which
gives rise to this case.
ISSUES:
1-whether or not the action to recover the sum
of P1,500, representing the last installment for
the payment of the promissory note Exhibit C,
has prescribed
***According to the promissory note Exhibit C,
executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco,
on January 21, 1922, the last installment of
P1,500 should be paid two years from the date
of the execution of said promissory note, that is,
on January 21, 1924.
-The complaint in the present case was filed on
June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after
he expiration of the said period.
-The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma
filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the
committee on claims and appraisal appointed in
the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period
of the judicial action for the recovery of said
debt, because the claim for the unpaid
balance of the amount of the promissory note
should not have been presented in the
intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased
not being the one who executed the same, but
in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco
-More than ten years having thus elapsed from
the expiration of the period for the payment of
said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery
has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2. that the trial court erred in holding that the
properties inherited by the defendants from
their deceased grandfather by representation are

subject to the payment of debts and obligations

of their deceased father, who died without
leaving any property,
***articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a
children presents his father or mother who died
before him in the properties of his grandfather
or grandmother, this right of representation does
not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or
mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer
with the properties received from their
predecessor.
-The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio
Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo
M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the
indebtedness of their said father from whom
they did not inherit anything.
SC RULING AND CONCLUSION:
-(1) That the filing of a claim before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in
the intestate of the father, for a monetary
obligation contracted by a son who died before
him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of
the judicial action for the recovery of said
indebtedness;
(2) that the claim for the payment of an
indebtedness contracted by a deceased person
cannot be filed for its collection before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in
the intestate of his father, and the properties
inherited from the latter by the children of said
deceased do not answer for the payment of the
indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of
said person.
******the appealed judgment is reversed,
and the defendants are absolved from the
complaint, with the costs to the appellees
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIA
DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION
NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND
FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendantsappellants.

action for recovery of the ownership and

possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in
the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria
del Rosario and her four children named
Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of
minor age,
FACTS:
-Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow
Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that
when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving
her of their possession and enjoyment.
COURT PROCEEDINGS:
-Defendants in their answer set up as special
defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson
and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda,
executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of their separation, Maria Uson
was given a parcel of land by way of alimony
and in return she renounced her right to inherit
any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death
-After trial, at which both parties presented their
respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the
plaintiff the ownership and possession of the
lands in dispute without special pronouncement
as to costs
-Defendants interposed the present appeal
-It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of
the new Civil Code.
-With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels
of land he was seized of at the time passed from
the moment of his death to his only heir, his
widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code)
-"The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,

321).
-From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested.
-The claim of the defendants that Maria
Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question because she expressly
renounced to inherit any future property
that her husband may acquire and leave
upon his death in the deed of separation they
had entered into on February 21, 1931,
cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject
of a contract nor can it be renounced
-defendants contend that, while it is true that the
four minor defendants are illegitimate children
of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old
Civil Code are not entitled to any successional
rights, however, under the new Civil Code
which became in force in June, 1950, they are
given the status and rights of natural children
and are entitled to the successional rights which
the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these
successional rights were declared for the first
time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the
prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
-There is no merit in this claim.
-Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time
shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is
so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin.
-The new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson
over the lands in dispute.
RULING: the decision appealed from is
affirmed, without costs
G.R. No. L-48372 July 24, 1942
GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLASA RAFOLS,
ET ALS., defendants-appellees
FACTS:
-The land in question described in the appealed

in the decision originally belonged to Juan

Melgar.
-The latter died at the judicial administration of
his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to
a close on December 2, 1924, only
-During the pendency of the said
administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana
Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar,
sold the land with the right of repurchase to
Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during
the period for the repurchase she would
continue in possession of the land as lessee of
the purchaser
-On December 12, 1920, the partition of the
estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was
made, and the land in question was adjudicated
to Susana Melgar.
-1921, she conveyed, in payment of
professional fees, one-half of the land in favor
of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who,
entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has
been in possession thereof up to the present.
-On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action
to recover said half of the land from Nicolas
Rafols and the other half from the other
defendants
-while that case was pending, or about August
4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in
question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiffappellant.
LOWER COURT RULING:
-After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of
the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar,
and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other
half but express acknowlegment of the other
defendants.
-The plaintiff appealed from that part of the
judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
-The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon
the theory that Susana Melgar could not have
anything to Pedro Cui because the a land was
then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial
administration.
SC: This is error
-That the land could not ordinarily be levied
upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that
one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest
or participation which he has or might have in
the lands under administration.

-Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the

possession of hereditary property is deemed to
be transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the instant of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance be accepted."
-And according to article 399 of the Civil Code,
every part owner may assign or mortgage his
part in the common property, and the effect of
such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to
the portion which may be alloted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community.
-It results therefore that the sale made by
Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was
valid, but it would be effective only as to the
portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon
the partition of the property left by her deceased
father Juan Melgar.
-And as on December 12, 1920, upon the
partition of said property, the land in question
was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of
the whole land which the latter made in favor of
Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.
Upon the confirmation of the sale of December
12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance
by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in
1921 could no longer be done.
-Nicolasa Rafols may not allege prescription of
action, for Pedro Cui filed the first complaint in
1921, or the year following the confirmation of
the sale in his favor. And as Nicolas Rafols
deprived Pedro Cui of the possession and the
enjoyment of one-half of the land since 1921 to
the present, it is only just that he should pay an
indemnity therefor. Six per cent of P1,500,
which is the price of one-half of the land, may
be considered as the reasonable amount of this
indemnity.
-Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed,
and Nicolas Rafols is sentenced to deliver to the
plaintiff Generosa Teves de Jakosalem, one-half
of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar,
and to pay by way of damages the sum of P90 a
year from the filing of the complaint that is,
from July 23, 1921, until the delivery of the
land, with the cost of both instances against
him.
G.R. No. L-16544 March 30, 1921
LEONARDO OSORIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
TOMASA OSORIO, administratrix of the
estate of Petrona Reyes, and THE
YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendants-

appellants
-The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of
stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the
dividends corresponding to them, which were
included in the inventory of the properties of
the deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose
estate is administered by the defendant.
FACTS:
-D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti
& Co., a joint account association for the
exploitation of the shipping business, he being
the owner of the one-third of the company's
capital. This capital amounted to P500,000, of
which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged
to D. Antonio Osorio.
-Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize
the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio, then
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to
present a project of partition, and said
administratix inserted in the project with the
consent of all the heirs, among the properties
which belonged to the widow Da. Petrona
Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in the
"share of the estate in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over
P166,666.66
-The project of partition was approved on May
10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the
Court of First Instance of Cavite,
-On February 28, 1914, the widow of D.
Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also
deceased, executed before the notary D.
Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in
favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the
plaintiff giving to him one-half of her share in
the one-third part which belonged to her
husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti
& Co., a donation which was duly accepted by
the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said
document with the plaintiff.
-On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of
D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed
among his heirs, and the donor Da. Petrona
Reyes in order to correct the error in said
document, wherein it was stated that said half
was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal
property, when the partition was yet being
effected, executed another document dated July
3, 1915, maintaining said donation in effect in
the sense that she ceded and donated to her son
D. Leonardo Osorio, for the same reasons stated

in the document of February 28, 1914, al

interest or participation in said shipping
business of Ynchausti & Co., which was
adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of
D. Antonio Osorio, which division was
approved by the Court of First Instance of
Cavite
-After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and
before the distribution of the estate,
Ynchausti & Co. purchased the steamer
Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of
D. Antonio Osorio as having an interest to
the extent of one-third in the ownership and
business of said steamer
-It was agreed upon by all the interested parties
that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow of
Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the
time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti
Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent to 610
shares of stock of said corporation.
-Said sum was deposited with the Steamship
Co. until the final settlement of the question that
had arisen between the heirs of Da. Petrona
Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the
plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation
made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is
the owner of said shares and of their value
which is P61,000; the defendant on the other
hand contends that said shares are not included
in the donation in question and belong to the
heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes.
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
-The trial court rendered judgment in the case,
declaring that the 610 shares of stock in dispute
and their dividends belong to the plaintiff, and
ordered the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio,
administratrix of the estate of Da. Petrona
Reyes, to exclude them from the inventory and
her accounts, and the other defendant "The
Ynchausti Steamship Co." to inscribe them in
the name of the plaintiff D. Leonardo Osorio,
delivering to him the dividends corresponding
thereto, and denied the counterclaim for the
sum of P45,000, on the ground that said sum
represents the dividends corresponding to the
P94,000 adjudicated to Da. Petrona Reyes, in
the partition of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio,
and donated by her to the defendant in the
counterclaim.
ISSUES:

-1. The donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in

favor of the plaintiff was of no value and effect;
and
2. That, supposing said donation valid, the 610
shares of stock, the value of which is P61,000,
cannot be considered as included among them.
In support of the first proposition, the appellant
invokes as the legal provision violated, article
635 of the Civil Code, which says:
-A donation can not include future property
-By future property is understood that of which
the donor can not dispose at the time of making
the donation.
-This definition in reality includes all properties
which belong to others at the time of the
donation, although they may or may not later
belong to the donor, thus connecting two ideas
which, although lacking apparently in relation,
are merged in reality in the subject which we
examine and which gives assurance to their
application
-Article 635 refers to the properties of third
persons but it may be said that id does so in
relation to a time to come; there can be
properties which may latter belong to the donor;
but these properties cannot be donated, because
they are not at present his properties, because he
cannot dispose of them at the moment of
making the donation.
-It is alleged that the donation made by Da.
Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on
February 28, 1914, a future property, such as
the share in the business of the deceased Osorio,
which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915,
and because in 1914 she did not have the right
to all or part of the share which her deceased
husband had in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co.
SUPREME COURT OPINION: RE: ART
635 OF CC
-we believe that the future properties, the
donation of which is prohibited by said article,
are those belonging to other, which, as such,
cannot be the object of the disposal by the
donor; but the properties of an existing
inheritance as those of the case at bar, cannot be
considered as another's property with relation to
the heirs who through a fiction of law continue
the personality of the owner. Nor do they have
the character of future property because the died

before 1912, his heirs acquired a right to

succeed him from the moment of his death,
because of the principle announced in article
657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the
deceased by the mere fact of his death. More of
less time may elapse before the heirs enter into
the possession of the hereditary property, but
this is not an obstacle, for the acquisition of said
property retroacts in any event to the moment of
death, according to article 989 of the Civil
Code. The right is acquired although subject to
the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary
portion.
-an inheritance already existing, which is no
longer future from the moment of death of the
predecessor, may legally be the object of
contract.
-which may be the object of contract may also
be the object of a donation
-We conclude that the donor Da. Petrona Reyes,
on February 28, 1912, and could legally dispose
of her right through an act of liberality, as she
had done.
ISSUE: With respect to the point that Da.
Petrona Reyes did not have in 1914 any right to
all or part of the share of her deceased husband
in the shipping business of Ynchausti and Co., it
must be observed that in the project of partition
of the property of D. Antonio Osorio :
-We do not have before us the will of D.
Antonio Osorio but supposing that he had left
no property but the share which he had in the
shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., can it be
denied that the donor by law had the right to
half of said share as her part of the conjugal
property? Clearly not.
-That Da. Maria Petrona Reyes did not donate
to the plaintiff more that her share in the
shipping business of the firm Ynchausti & Co.
which was adjudicated to her in the partition of
the property of D. Antonio Osorio and that said
share amounts to P94,000.
This admission of the defendant is conclusive,
and makes it unnecessary for us to enter into
another discussion in order to deduce that Da.
Petrona Reyes had in 1914 a right to a certain
part of the interest of the deceased Osorio in the
shipping business of the firm Ynchausti & Co.,

and could donate it, as she did, to her son D.

Leonardo Osorio.
The allegation that the document of July 3,
1915, is void, because it does not show the
acceptance of the donee, is of no importance,
because of the conclusion we have reached in
discussing the document of donation of
February 28, 1914.
-In the second document, the donor only tried to
correct what she believed to be an error in the
first, wherein it is stated that in the partition of
the property of her husband there was
adjudicated to her the part of the interest in the
shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. which
she donated to her son Leonardo, when in fact
said partition was yet pending.
-After its approval by the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, the donor executed the
document of 1915, ratifying and correcting the
document of donation. She did not make a new
donation. She executed a personal act which did
not require the concurrence of the donee.
-The wills of the donor and of the donee having
concurred, the donation, as a mode of
transferring ownership, becomes perfect,
according to article 623 of the Civil Code.
-The question whether the steamer Governor
Forbes was or was not purchased with money
furnished by Ynchausti and the heirs of Osorio,
indepedently of that former partnership in
which the deceased Osorio had an interest, is
one of the fact and must be resolved in view of
the evidence adduced at the trial.
-All of the above shows that the estate of Osorio
had a one-third part of the steamer Forbes
represented by the capital which was distributed
among the heirs, there accruing to the widow,
by agreement of the interested parties, the sum
of P61,000. And this sum being part of the onehalf of one-third of the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co., which one-half part accrued
to the widow in the distribution of the
properties of Osorio; and the widow Da.
Petrona Reyes having disposed of this half,
donating it to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, it
clearly results, in our opinion, that the sum of
61,000, or the corresponding shares of the new
corporation "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." are
included in said donation, and therefore belong

to the plaintiff-appellee.
-With respect to the counterclaim of
P45,609,91, we are of the opinion that the
evidence justifies the conclusion of the trial
court that they are the profits or dividends
accruing to the P94,000, which were
adjudicated to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes in
the distribution of the estate of the deceased
Osorio and which were donated by her to the
plaintiff, and as such profits they belong to the
latter, upon the principle of law that ownership
of property gives right by accession to all that it
produces, or is united or incorporated thereto,
naturally or artificially. (Art. 353 of the Civil
Code.)
SUPREME COURT RULING:
In view of what has been said, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-23126 March 17, 1925
In the matter of intestate estate of the
deceased Juana Servando. JOSE P. TINSAY,
administrator-appellee, vs. JOVITA YUSAY
and PETRA YUSAY, heirs-appellants
-It appears from the record that one Juan Yusay
died some time before the year 1909, leaving a
widow Juana Servando and five children,
Candido, Numeriana, Jovito, Jovita and Petra.
-As far as the record shows his estate consisted
of his interest in a track of land situated in the
town of Iloilo, divided into two lots by Calle
Aldeguer and which was community property
of his marriage to Juana Servando.
-In 1909 Jovito Yusay (son) purchased the
interests of brother and sister Candido and
Numeriana in the land, thus acquiring a
three- fifths interest in the same.
-Jovito Yusay appears to have died some time
between the years 1909 and 1911, leaving a
widow, Perpetua Sian, and five minor
children, Juana, Elena, Aurea, Elita and Antonia
Yusay.
-AGREEMENT BETWEEN PERPETUA
AND JOVITA AND PETRA:
In 1911 Perpetua Sian for herself and in

representation of her children entered into an

agreement in writing (Exhibit 1) with Jovita and
Petra Yusay which purported to provide for the
partition of the land mentioned and whereby
Perpetua Sian and her children were to occupy
the portion to the northeast of Calle Aldeguer
and Jovita and Petra were to have the portion or
lot to the southwest of this street.
-The document is very imperfectly drawn
and is in some respects somewhat ambiguous
in its terms but it is, nevertheless, quite clear
that in its final clause Jovita and Petra Yusay
expressly relinquish in favor of the children
of Jovito Yusay any and all rights which they,
Jovita and Petra, might have in the land
assigned to Perpetua Sian and her children
in the partition.
-cadastral survey the portion alloted to Perpetua
Sian and her children was designated as lot No.
241,
-The portion which under the partition of 1911
fell to the share of Jovita and Petra Yusay was
given the lot number 283;
-At the trial of the cadastral case lots Nos.
241 and 713 were claimed by Perpetua Sian
on behalf of her children and the lots were
adjudicated to the latter without opposition.
Lots Nos. 283 and 744 were claimed by
Jovita and Petra And adjudicated to them,
also without opposition.
RE-OPENING OF THE CASE:
-Shortly thereafter, on August 10, 1915, Juana
Servando (WIDOW OF YUSAY) filed a
petition in the cadastral case asking for the
reopening of the case as to lots Nos. 241 and
713 on the ground that she was the owner of a
one-half interest in said lots, but that at the time
of the trial of the case Perpetua Sian had falsely
lead her to believe that a claim had been
presented in her behalf for her interest in the
land.
1915-RULING OF LOWER COURT: -The
petition for reopening was granted, the
former judgment set aside and the two lots Nos.
241 and 713 were thereupon decreed in favor of
Juana Servando and the children of Jovito
Yusay in the proportions of an undivided half
interest in favor of Juana Servando and the
remaining one-half interest in favor of the
children of Perpetua Sian in equal shares,
APPEALED TO THE SC: The case was

appealed to this court and the decision of the

lower court affirmed
-It may be noted that Juana laid no claim to lots
Nos. 283 and 744 decreed in favor of Jovita and
Petra Yusay who therefore remained the
registered owners of said lots
YEAR 1919-DEATH OF JUANA
-On April 12, 1919, after the death of Juana
Servando, the appellee Jose P. Tinsay was
appointed administrator of her estate.
-In July and October, 1922, Jovita and Petra
Yusay sold lot No. 283 to one Vicente Tad-Y for
the sum of P20,000.
-On March 22, 1924, the administrator of the
estate of Juana Servando filed an amended
inventory in which the P20,000 received by
Jovita and Petra from the sale of lot No. 283
was included as bien colacionable. On the same
day a scheme for the distribution of the estate
was submitted to the court in which the
aforesaid P20,000 were brought into collation
with the result that the total value of the estate
being only P28,900, according to inventory, no
further share in the estate was assigned to Jovita
and Petra Yusay.
SCHEME OF PARTITION OF JUANA AND
JOVITA AND PETRA:
-The scheme of partition was opposed by Jovita
and Petra
-The court approved the scheme of partition and
declared the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos.
283 and 744 "fictitiously collationable"
-and held that this being in excess of their share
of the inheritance, Jovita and Petra Yusay could
claim no further participation in the other
property described in the inventory and in the
scheme of partition.
-From this order Jovita and Petra Yusay appeal.
JOVITA AND PETRA APPEAL TO SC RE:
SCHEME OF PARTITION ORDER
ISSUES:
-W/N the court below erred in taking into
consideration in its decision evidence which it
had ruled out at the trial of the case = It is, of
course, clear that the court below erred in taking
into consideration in its decision evidence
which it had ruled out at the trial of the case
-W/N It it was error to exclude Exhibits 1, 2
and 3. Exhibit 1 is the document of partition

between Perpetua Sian and Jovita and Petra

Yusay executed in 1911; Exhibits 2 and 3 are
deeds executed by Numeriana and Candido
Yusay transferring their interests in all of the
lots above-mentioned to Jovito Yusay
-We also agree with counsel for the appellants
that the case involves no question of this kind of
colacion provided for in articles 1035-1050 of
the Civil Code, nor are we here dealing with
advancements to lineal heirs under section 760
of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the
time of the execution of Exhibit 1. As far as we
can see, the appellee must rest his case upon
entirely different principles.
SC STATED GUIDELINES FOR LOWER
COURT TO AVOID FURTHER APPEAL:
-Juana Servando not being a party to the
partition agreement Exhibit 1, the agreement
standing alone was, of course, ineffective as
against her. The attempt to partition her land
among her heirs, constituting a partition of a
future inheritance was invalid under the second
paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code and
for the same reason the renunciation of all
interest in the land which now constitutes lots
Nos. 241 and 713 made by the appellants in
favor of the children of Jovito Yusay would
likewise be of no binding force as to the
undivided portion which belonged to Juana
Servando. But if the parties entered into the
partition agreement in good faith and treated all
of the land as a present inheritance, and if the
appellants on the strength of the agreement
obtained their Torrens title to the land alloted to
them therein, and if Perpetua Sian in reliance on
the appellants' renunciation of all interest
claimed by her on behalf of her children in the
cadastral case refrained from presenting any
opposition to the appellants' claim to the entire
fee in the land assigned to them in the partition
agreement and if the appellants after the death
of Juana Servando continued to enjoy the
benefits of the agreement refusing to
compensate the heirs of Jovito Yusay for the
latter's loss of their interest in lots Nos. 283 and
744 through the registration of the lots in the
name of the appellants and the subsequent
alienation of the same to innocent third parties,
said appellants are now estopped from
repudiating the partition agreement of 1911 and

from claiming any further interest in lots Nos.

241 and 713. There is, however, no reason why
they should not be allowed to share in the
distribution of the other property left by Juana
Servando.
-We may say further that if a case of estoppel
should not be established, the appellants might
still, under article 1303 in relation with article
1073 of the Civil Code, be compelled to restore
to the estate of Juana Servando one- half of the
amount received by them from the sale of lots
Nos. 283 and 744, unless it is shown that
Juana's interest in the lot was transferred to
them either by sale or by valid donation. The
registration of land does not necessarily
extinguish obligations of that character.
SC RULING: The decision appealed from
being based on evidence not properly before the
trial court, must be reversed,
-but inasmuch as the errors committed by that
court are of such a character as to have worked
what amounts to a mistrial, it will be necessary
to remand the case for a new trial.
-For the reasons stated, the order appealed from
is reversed and the case remanded to the court
below for a new trial upon the issues herein
suggested. No costs in this instance. So ordered
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate
of Thomas Hanley, deceased, plaintiffappellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR.,
Collector of Internal Revenue, defendantappellant.
LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS:
-On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo
Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate
of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this
action in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan
Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal
Revenue, for the refund of the amount of
P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance
tax on the estate of the deceased,
-and for the collection of interst thereon at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from
September 15, 1932, the date when the
aforesaid tax was [paid under protest
-The defendant set up a counterclaim for

P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax

in question and which was not included in the
original assessment.
LOWER COURT DISMISSED BOTH
ACTIONS , BOTH PARTIES APPEALED
TO SC.
FACTS:
-It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas
Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga,
leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and considerable
amount of real and personal properties.
-On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate
of his will and the settlement and distribution of
his estate were begun in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted
to probate.
COURT APPOINTED TRUSTEE:
-The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
considered it proper for the best interests of the
estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real
properties which, under the will, were to pass to
Matthew Hanley (nephew) ten years after the
two executors named in the will, was, on March
8, 1924, appointed trustee.
-Moore was the first trustee and then the
plaintiff replaced after he resigned
CIR INHERITANCE TAX:
-During the incumbency of the plaintiff as
trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the
deceased at the time of his death consisted of
realty valued at P27,920 and personalty valued
at P1,465, and allowing a deduction of P480.81,
assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in
the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with
the penalties for deliquency in payment
consisting of a 1 per cent monthly interest from
July 1, 1931 to the date of payment and a
surcharge of 25 per cent on the tax, amounted to
P2,052.74.
-On March 15, 1932, the defendant filed a
motion in the testamentary proceedings
pending before the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga (Special proceedings No. 302)
praying that the trustee, plaintiff herein, be
ordered to pay to the Government the said
sum of P2,052.74.
LOWER COURT: The motion was granted.
-On September 15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said
amount under protest, notifying the defendant

at the same time that unless the amount was

promptly refunded suit would be brought for its
recovery.
-defendant overruled the plaintiff's protest and
refused to refund the said amount hausted,
plaintiff went to court with the result herein
above indicated.
ISSUES:
-(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and
when must it be satisfied?
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on
the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
the testator's death, or on its value ten years
later?
(c) In determining the net value of the estate
subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
compensation due to trustees?
(d) What law governs the case at bar? Should
the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the
tax-payer be given retroactive effect?
(e) Has there been deliquency in the payment of
the inheritance tax? If so, should the additional
interest claimed by the defendant in his appeal
be paid by the estate?
RULING:
1ST ISSUE
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct
from the obligation to pay the same. Section
1536 as amended, of the Administrative Code,
imposes the tax upon "every transmission by
virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift
mortis causa, or advance in anticipation of
inheritance,devise, or bequest." The tax
therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or
devolution of property of a decedent, made
effective by his death.
-the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for
the same before his death."
-Plaintiff, however, asserts that while article
657 of the Civil Code is applicable to testate as
well as intestate succession, it operates only in
so far as forced heirs are concerned. But the
language of article 657 of the Civil Code is
broad and makes no distinction between
different classes of heirs. That article does not

speak of forced heirs; it does not even use the

word "heir". It speaks of the rights of
succession and the transmission thereof from
the moment of death.
-The authentication of a will implies its due
execution but once probated and allowed the
transmission is effective as of the death of the
testator in accordance with article 657 of the
Civil Code. Whatever may be the time when
actual transmission of the inheritance takes
place, succession takes place in any event at the
moment of the decedent's death.
-The time when the heirs legally succeed to
the inheritance may differ from the time
when the heirs actually receive such
inheritance
-Thomas Hanley having died on May 27,
1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the
date.
-From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley
died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that
the obligation to pay the tax arose as of the
date. The time for the payment on inheritance
tax is clearly fixed by section 1544 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by
Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of the
same Code.
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions
and transmissions. The following shall not
be taxed:
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of
the naked title.
(b) The transmission or delivery of the
inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or
legatee to the trustees.
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee,
or donee in favor of another beneficiary, in
accordance with the desire of the predecessor.
In the last two cases, if the scale of taxation
appropriate to the new beneficiary is greater
than that paid by the first, the former must pay
the difference.
-SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. The tax
fixed in this article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next
preceding section, before entrance into
possession of the property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months
subsequent to the death of the predecessor;
but if judicial testamentary or intestate
proceedings shall be instituted prior to the
expiration of said period, the payment shall

be made by the executor or administrator

before delivering to each beneficiary his
share
-It should be observed in passing that the word
"trustee", appearing in subsection (b) of section
1543, should read "fideicommissary" or "cestui
que trust". There was an obvious mistake in
translation from the Spanish to the English
version.
-The instant case does fall under subsection (a),
but under subsection (b), of section 1544
above-quoted, as there is here no fiduciary
heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the
subsection, the tax should have been paid
before the delivery of the properties in question
to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10, 1924.
2ND ISSUE:
-If death is the generating source from which
the power of the estate to impose inheritance
taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of
the decedent, succession takes place and the
right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax
should be measured by the vlaue of the estate as
it stood at the time of the decedent's death,
regardless of any subsequent contingency value
of any subsequent increase or decrease in value.
-we hold that a transmission by inheritance is
taxable at the time of the predecessor's death,
notwithstanding the postponement of the actual
possession or enjoyment of the estate by the
beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value
of the property transmitted at that time
regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
3RD ISSUE:
-A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair
compensation for his services (Barney vs.
Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047).
But from this it does not follow that the
compensation due him may lawfully be
deducted in arriving at the net value of the
estate subject to tax.
-There is no statute in the Philippines which
requires trustees' commissions to be deducted in
determining the net value of the estate subject
to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705).
Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has
been created, it does not appear that the testator
intended that the duties of his executors and
trustees should be separated.

4TH ISSUE:
-The defendant levied and assessed the
inheritance tax due from the estate of Thomas
Hanley under the provisions of section 1544 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by section 3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606
went into effect on January 1, 1930. It,
therefore, was not the law in force when the
testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at the
time was section 1544 above-mentioned, as
amended by Act No. 3031, which took effect on
March 9, 1922.
-It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is
governed by the statute in force at the time of
the death of the decedent
-The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to
be required to guess the outcome of pending
measures.
-Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions
indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive
effect
-The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
maintains, however, that certain provisions of
Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the
taxpayer than those of Act No. 3031, that said
provisions are penal in nature and, therefore,
should operate retroactively in conformity with
the provisions of article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is the reason why he applied Act No.
3606 instead of Act No. 3031. Indeed, under
Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent is
based on the tax only, instead of on both the tax
and the interest, as provided for in Act No.
3031, and (2) the taxpayer is allowed twenty
days from notice and demand by rthe Collector
of Internal Revenue within which to pay the tax,
instead of ten days only as required by the old
law.
-a statute is penal when it imposes punishment
for an offense committed against the state
which, under the Constitution, the Executive
has the power to pardon. In common use,
however, this sense has been enlarged to
include within the term "penal statutes" all
status which command or prohibit certain acts,
and establish penalties for their violation, and
even those which, without expressly prohibiting
certain acts, impose a penalty upon their
commission (59 C. J., p. 1110). Revenue laws,
generally, which impose taxes collected by the

means ordinarily resorted to for the collection

of taxes are not classed as penal laws
5TH ISSUE:
The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to
pay a tax may arise at a certain time and the tax
may be paid within another given time. As
stated by this court, "the mere failure to pay
one's tax does not render one delinqent until and
unless the entire period has eplased within
which the taxpayer is authorized by law to
make such payment without being subjected to
the payment of penalties for fasilure to pay his
taxes within the prescribed period."
-The appointment of P. J. M. Moore as trustee
was made by the trial court in conformity with
the wishes of the testator as expressed in his
will. It is true that the word "trust" is not
mentioned or used in the will but the intention
to create one is clear. No particular or technical
words are required to create a testamentary trust
-The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for
the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use
of these two words is not conclusive on the
question that a trust is created
-to constitute a valid testamentary trust there
must be a concurrence of three circumstances:
(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (2) a
definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object;
statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in
effect so providing."
-P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10,
1924. On that date trust estate vested in him
(sec. 582 in relation to sec. 590, Code of Civil
Procedure). The mere fact that the estate of the
deceased was placed in trust did not remove it
from the operation of our inheritance tax laws
or exempt it from the payment of the
inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance
tax should have been paid on or before March
10, 1924, to escape the penalties of the laws.
-A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the
cestui que trust
-He did not acquire any beneficial interest in the
estate. He took such legal estate only as the
proper execution of the trust required (65 C. J.,
p. 528) and, his estate ceased upon the
fulfillment of the testator's wishes.
-That taxes must be collected promptly is a
policy deeply intrenched in our tax system.
Thus, no court is allowed to grant injunction to

restrain the collection of any internal revenue

tax
-The delinquency in payment occurred on
March 10, 1924, the date when Moore
became trustee. The interest due should be
computed from that date and it is error on the
part of the defendant to compute it one month
later.
SC FINAL RULING: The judgment of the
lower court is accordingly modified, with
costs against the plaintiff in both instances.
So ordered.
SEVERINA MARABILLES, ET AL., plaintiff and
appellants, vs. ALEJANDRO QUITO and AIDA
QUITO, defendants-appellees.1956 Oct 18En
BancG.R. No. L-10408
LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS:
-This concerns an action instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur by plaintiffs against
defendants for the recovery of a parcel of land consisting
of 18 hectares situated in Pili, Camarines Sur
-Defendants, instead of answering the complaint, filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue, (2) that the complaint states
no cause of action, and (3) that the action had prescribed.
-Defendants attached to their motion as Annex A Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1065 issued in the name of one
Guadalupe Saralde on March 31, 1941 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 1018 as Annex B issued in the
name of Patricio Marabiles on February 19, 1954. This is
a homestead patent granted under Act No. 2874.
-Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion, to
which defendants replied, and thereafter the court issued
on November 8, 1954 an order sustaining the motion.
RTC: , it dismissed the complaint with costs against
the plaintiffs.
CA: Court of Appeals, the case was certified to us on the
ground that the questions raised are purely of law.
CASE BEFORE THE SC:
ISSUES:
1. W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint
of the plaintiffs because they have no capacity to
sue.....because it appears that the title of the land was
issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles who already
died and the complaint does not allege that Severina
Marabiles and her child who now appears as plaintiffs
had been duly declared as his heirs to entitle them to
bring the action.
=This theory is erroneous.
-The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although
he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly

proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction.

-the property of a deceased person, both real and
personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere
fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he
can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the
deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations
which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the
deceased himself
-Thus, it has been held that "There is no legal precept or
established rule which imposes the necessity of a
previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs
to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal
capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person,
in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a
right which belonged to their ancestor"
2nd ISSUE:
-the complaint states no cause of action because while it
appears in the complaint that the land was transferred to
one Guadalupe Saralde, deceased wife of defendant
Alejandro Quito, there is no allegation that said Alejandro
Quito and his daughter Aida, a co-defendant, had been
declared heirs or administrators of the estate of the
deceased.
-the court has concluded that plaintiffs have no cause of
action against defendants because there is no legal bond
by which the latter may be linked with the property.

compel a trustee to convey the property registered in his

name for the benefit of the cestui que trusT
-And when a person through fraud succeeds in registering
the property in his name, the law creates what is called
"constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and
grants to the latter a right to vindicate the property
regardless of the lapse of time.
-It is clear that the defense of prescription cannot be set
up in this case.
SC FINAL RULING: Wherefore, the order appealed
from is hereby set aside, with costs against appellees.

G.R. No. L-27531 December 24, 1927

In re estate of the deceased Victoriana
Saavedra. MACARIO MACROHON ONG
HAM, administrator-appellant, vs. JUAN
SAAVEDRA, ET AL., opponents-appellees
-Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and
executor of the joint last will and testament of
Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said
will for probate

COURT:This conclusion is also erroneous.

-to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a
motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered, 1 and considering the facts herein
alleged, there is enough ground to proceed with the case.
-Thus, it appears in the complaint that Guadalupe Saralde
is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the defendant, and as said
Guadalupe has already died, under the law, the husband
and his daughter Aida are the legal heirs.

-This executor submitted a scheme of partition

and distribution of the property in accordance
with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan
Saavedra and others filed an opposition.
-The executor rejoined insisting upon the
approval of the scheme and asking that the
opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be
overruled.

3RD ISSUE:
-the action of the plaintiffs had already prescribed
because the 4-year period within which an action based
on fraud may be brought had already elapsed it appearing
that the title of plaintiffs' ancestor was cancelled and a
new one issued in the name of Guadalupe Saralde in
1941, whereas the complaint was only filed in 1954.
-court expressed the opinion that the fraud which is the
basis of the action is deemed to have been discovered
from the time the original title was cancelled and a new
one issued in 1941 upon the theory that those titles
constitute a public record which serves as a constructive
notice to the public.
COURT: We also find his conclusion erroneous.
-While legally the registration of real property serves as a
constructive notice on which an action based on fraud
may be predicated, however, this cannot be invoked in
the present case, for there is an averment in the complaint
that the issuance of such title has been accomplished by
defendant Alejandro Quito through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation and not through a valid and voluntary
transfer.
-It is a rule well settled that the defense of prescription
cannot be availed of when the purpose of the action is to

-On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a

statement of facts, which reads as follows:
1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the
municipality and Province of Zamboanga, P. I.,
without descendants or ascendants, being at that
time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,
both of them having executed a joint will,
which joint will has been duly admitted to
probate in this court.
2. That the only near relations of the said
Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit
her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo
Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo
Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana
Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra,
Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and
Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana
Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of
her property in said will.
3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the

said last will and testament, duly probated by

this Honorable Court, there exist another parcel
of land, acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by
purchase from Ong Tah, and adjudicated to the
said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).
-5. That the parties representing Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham admit that he sold lots
Nos. 34 and 35, of Expediente No. 8196, for the
sum of P1,900, believing in good faith that he
could sell the same for his personal uses.
6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra,
and the other relations heretofore named hereby
withdraw their opposition which they have
presented to the final account of the surviving
spouse, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and
conform to the same, and ask that the Court
approve the said final account.
JOINT WILL:
-In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, we hereby
order that the properties hereinafter described
be jointly given to NEPHEWS Ong Ka Chiew
and Ong Ka Jian , and should either of the two
die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we
order that all the said properties be given to the
survivor, which properties are described as
follows:
-In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, the lands and
properties described below shall belong
exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra,
-Should Victoriana Saavedra die before Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that lot No. 817A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate No. 1247,
be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow,
sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens
and encumbrances.
LOWER COURT:
-The lower court solving the question raised by
the parties in their agreement of facts, held that
the one-half of the property described in the
will, all of lot No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6;
one-half of the cash balance of the final account
to be rendered by the executor, and half of the
proceeds of the sale of lots No. 34 and 35 of
Proceeding No. 8196, belong to Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham;
-and as it appears from the will quoted, as well
as from the agreement dated March 25, 1926,

that Victoriana Saavedra left no legitimate

ascendants or descendants at the time of her
death Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, her
widower, is, according to the provisions of
articles 837 of the Civil Code, entitled to the
usufruct of one-half of the estate of the said
Victoriana Saavedra, consisting of one-half of
the property described in the will, excluding
lots No. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880,
given to Segunda Saavedra with the consent of
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; of one-half of the
cash balance of the executor's final account, and
of half of the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos.
34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196,
-adjudicated as follows: one-half of the same
belongs in usufruct to the widower Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, and the naked ownership
of this half as well as the full ownership of the
other half is adjudicated to Victoriana
Saavedra's heirs, named in the said agreement
dated March 25, 1926,
-As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of
proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda
Saavedra, the court adjudicates the same to the
said Segunda Saavedra, in accordance with the
clauses on lines 99-111 of the will.
Finally, the court orders that the executor, after
paying the inheritance tax, distribute among
Victoriana Saavedra's heirs named in the
agreement of
March 25, 1926, the part belonging to each of
them as hereinabove stated, and after this
delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any,
is paid, this proceeding is to be considered
closed ipso facto.
APPEALED BY COUNSEL OF THE
EXECUTOR
ISSUES: W/N THE LOWER COURT
ERRED:
I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926,
that the deceased, Victoriana Saavedra, died
partially intestate, and did not dispose of all
her property by the joint last will and testament
executed by herself and her husband, Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that
under the terms of the aforesaid joint will the
legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian,
named therein, were entitled to receive her
estate and participation in the sixteen parcels of
land devised under the said joint will, by the

said spouses.
II. In holding that the brother and the sister of
Victoriana Saavedra, by name, Juan Saavedra
and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces,
by name, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra,
Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan
Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio
and Macra Carpio, her next of kin were entitled
to receive any part of her estate and
participation in the said sixteen parcels of land,
devised to the above named legatees, Ong Ka
Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the
said joint last will and testament.
-Appellant alleges that the trial court erred
in holding that Victoriana Saavedra died
partly intestate. Article 658 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 658. Succession is effected either by the
will of man expressed by the testament or, in
the absence of a testament, by operation of law.
The first is called testamentary, the second legal
succession.
It may also be effected partly by the will of man
and partly by operation of law.
According to this, there are three ways in which
succession may be effected: by the will of man,
by the law, or by both at the same time.
-In the first case the succession is called
testamentary, because it is based on the last will
and testament, which is the orderly
manifestation of the testator's will; in the
second, it is called legal, because it takes effect
by operation of the law; and the third is called
mixed, because it partakes of the character of
both testamentary and legal succession.
-articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code.
According to the first of these articles, a will is
valid even though it does not contain any
institution of an heir, or if such institution does
not include the entire estate, and even though
the person instituted does not accept the
inheritance or is disqualified to inherit;
according to the second, one of the ways in
which legal succession may take place is when
the will does not institute an heir to all or part of
the property, or does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator, in which case legal
succession shall take place only with respect to

the property which the testator has not disposed

of.
-Assuming that the joint will in question is
valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana
Saavedra specified therein that parcels 187 and
768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a
legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra, the first
parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and
the second on the condition that the legatee
devote the products of the same to having
masses said for the repose to the testatrix's soul.
As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix
disposed of her part in them conditionally, that
is to say, in case her husband Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham died before she died, said
parcels were to be awarded to her husband's
nephews, or to either of them in case one should
have died before the said Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as
precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees
Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to
the legacy, not having been complied with, the
trial court found that the part of said property
belonging to the testatriz should be partitioned
among the persons called on to succeed her
under the law.
COURT'S OPINION:
-We are of the opinion that this finding is in
accordance with the law, since, under article
791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon
heirs and legatees shall be governed by the rules
established for conditional obligations in all
matters not provided for by this section (articles
790 to 805)
-And, in accordance with article 1114 of the
Code, in conditional obligations the acquisition
of rights, as well as the extinction or loss of
those already acquired, shall depend upon the
occurrence of the event constituting the
condition.
2ND ISSUE:
-The part of the will invoked by the appellant,
states:
In case of the death of Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, we
hereby order that the properties hereinafter
described given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian jointly, and should either of the two die
before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order
that all the said properties be given to the
survivor.

COURT'S OPINION: The trial court, in

interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard
to legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian,
reached the right conclusion, and rightly, in our
opinion, that it provides for the substitution of
legatees in case either of them should die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and that the
acquisition by these legatees of any right to the
property described in the will depended on the
condition that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham
died before Victoriana Saavedra.
3RD ISSUE:
-The appellant also assigns as error the holding
of the trial court that the opponents, the brother,
sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were
entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen
parcels of land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka
Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the
said joint will
COURT'S OPINION:
-Such a contention is untenable
-the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees
depends on the occurrence of the event
constituting the condition, that is, the death of
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior to that of his
wife; and this condition not having been
complied with, the said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong
Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and
therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided
among her heirs in accordance with the law.
SC'S MODIFICATION: To the sixteen parcels
of land to which reference is her made, that is,
those given to the nephews of the testator,
should be added lot No. 838--A, proceeding No.
7880, certificate 1257, which the testatrix had
reserved to herself (together with lots 817 and
768), in case she survived her husband Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham.
One-half of these seventeen parcels of land
belong to the widower, Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham, and the trial court shall order the division
of the other half, that is, the estate of the
deceased Victoriana Saavedra, being one-half of
the conjugal property, between the widower and
the opponents, as provided for in articles 945,
948 and 953 of the Civil Code.

SC FINAL RULING: With this

modification, the order appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects. So ordered.
[G. R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909.]
PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-Appellant.
appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the
special proceedings brought in the Court of
First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement
of the intestate estate and the distribution of the
property of Casiano Abaya
-Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of
Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on
the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the
mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista
Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano
Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved
the settlement of the said intestate succession;
-that an administrator having been appointed
for the said estate on the 25th of November,
1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said
Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the
parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came
forward and opposed said appointment and
claimed it for himself as being the nearest
relative of the deceased;
-this was granted by the court below on the
9th of January, 1906
-on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman
Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the
court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano
Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons,
especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore
entitled to take possession of all the property of
said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him;
-That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula
Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of
Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she
stated that she acknowledged the relationship
alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his and
moved for a hearing of the matter,
-and, in consequence of the evidence that she
intended to present she prayed that she be
declared to have preferential rights to the
property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the
same be adjudicated to her together with the
corresponding products thereof.

provided in the last preceding section.

LOWER COURT RULING:
-That the administrator of the estate of
Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and
Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano
Abaya; that the Petitioner Paula Conde should
succeed to the hereditary rights of her children
with respect to the inheritance of their deceased
natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it
is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the
property of the said intestate estate, to the
exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya
APPEAL BY ROMAN ABAYA:
1ST ISSUE:
1. The fact that the court below found that an
ordinary action for the acknowledgment of
natural children under articles 135 and 137 of
the Civil Code, might be brought in special
probate proceedings.
-1ST ISSUE:
whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distribution of an intestate
estate, an action might be brought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the
person from whom the inheritance is derived,
that is to say, whether one might appear as heir
on the ground that he is a recognized natural
child of the deceased, not having been so
recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or
compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial
decision, but asking at the same time that, in the
special proceeding itself, he be recognized by
the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased
who claim to be entitled to the succession
opened in the special proceeding.
-According to section 782 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
If there shall be a controversy before the Court
of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of
the deceased person are, or as to the distributive
share to which each person is entitled under the
law, the testimony as to such controversy shall
be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and
signed by witness. Any party in interest whose
distributive share is affected by the
determination of such controversy, may appeal
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
determining such controversy to the Supreme
Court, within the time and in the manner

2ND ISSUE:
- whether or not the mother of a natural child
now deceased, but who survived the person
who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also
deceased, may bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor
of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the person who is
supposed to be his natural father.
COURT'S OPINION: YES (?)
REASON: Manresa says: chanrobles
virtualawlibrary An acknowledgment can only
be demanded by the natural child and his
descendants whom it shall benefit, and should
they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such
person as legally represents them; the mother
may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is
under her authority.
BUT!!! The above doctrine, advanced by one of
the most eminent commentators of the Civil
Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The
power to transmit the right of such action by the
natural child to his descendants cannot be
sustained under the law, and still less to his
mother.
-It is without any support in law because the
rule laid down in the code is most positive,
limiting in form, when establishing the
exception for the exercise of such right of
action after the death of the presumed parents,
as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any
doctrine, because up to the present time no
argument has been presented, upon which even
an approximate conclusion could be based.
-Although the Civil Code considerably
improved the condition of recognized natural
children, granting them rights and actions that
they did not possess under the former laws, they
were not, however, placed upon the same plane
as legitimate ones.
-Art. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy
may be brought by the child at any time of its
lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs,
should it die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed

a period of five years in which to institute the

action.
-Art. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment
of natural children can be instituted only during
the life of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may institute the action before the expiration of
the first four years of its majority.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother,
some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted within
the six months following the discovery of such
instrument.
DIFFERENCE AS TO RIGHT OF ACTION:
On this supposition the first difference that
results between one action and the other
consists in that the right of action for legitimacy
lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that
is, it can always be brought against the
presumed parents or their heirs by the child
itself, while the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child does not last
his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it
cannot be instituted against the heirs of the
presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be
exercised only during the life of the presumed
parents.
DIFFERENCE AS TO THE TRANSMISSION
TO THE HEIRS OF RIGHT:
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the
transmission to the heirs of the presumed
parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate
filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation,
there exists the most radical difference in that
the former continues during the life of the child
who claims to be legitimate, and he may
demand it either directly and primarily from the
said presumed parents, or indirectly and
secondarily from the heirs of the latter;
-while the second does not endure for life; as a
general rule, it only lasts during the life of the
presumed parents.

AGAINST WHOM BROUGHT:

that an action for legitimacy is always brought
against the heirs of the presumed parents in case
of the death of the latter, while the action for
acknowledgment is not brought against the
heirs of such parents, with the exception of the
two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed
above.
-As to the transmission to the heirs of the child
of the latters action to claim his legitimacy, or
to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural
filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the
first case, but not the second.
-It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of
correct interpretation, that the right of action to
secure acknowledgment by the natural child
should be presumed to be transmitted,
independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the
right of action to claim legitimacy from his
predecessor is not expressly, independently, or,
as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the
legitimate child, but only relatively and as an
exception.
-The pretension that the right of action on the
part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment
of his natural filiation is transmitted to his
descendants is unfounded.
-It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a
better footing than the heirs of the legitimate
one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a
natural child is no better than, nor even equal to,
that of a legitimate child.
-Usually the right of action for legitimacy
devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and pertains exclusively to him, only
the child may exercise it at any time during his
lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases
only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the
child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or
while insane, or after action had been already
instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child may, as an exception, be exercised against
the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases:
first, in the event of the death of the latter
during the minority of the child, and second,
upon the discovery of some instrument of

express acknowledgment of the child, executed

by the father or mother, the existence of which
was unknown during the life of the latter.
But as such action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to
his ascendants.
-The right of action pertaining to the child to
claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to
that of the child who claims acknowledgment as
a natural child. And it is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of
those rights which the legitimate child may
transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no
part of the component rights of his inheritance
SC FINAL RULING:
-For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby
reverse the judgment appealed from in all its
parts, without any special ruling as to the costs
of this instance.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V.
ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA
ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,
respondents
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the
latter, her mother-in-law.
FACTS:
-It appears from the record of the case that on
February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales.
-Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the
herein petitioner
-The estate of the dismissed has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
COURT PROCEEDINGS:

-On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes

instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
-the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
-In the course of the intestate proceedings, the
trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal
heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R.
Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
-These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-inlaw together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the
aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied
her plea. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
-First is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Second are the Orders of the trial court
which excluded the widow from getting a share
of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
1ST ISSUE:
-Our answer to the first question is in the
negative.
-Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two
(2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can
only inherit either by his own right, as in the
order of intestate succession provided for in the
Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
-Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and

descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other
descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or their descendants
and illegitimate children or their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow
or widower shall be entitled to the same share
as that of a legitimate child.
-There is no provision in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir
in accordance with the provisions of Article 887
of the Civil Code which provides that:
-Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
article 287;
-The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate
of a parent-in-law.
-By the same token, the provision of Article 999
of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the
said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this
case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox
Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the

right of representation as provided by Article

981 of the Code.
-The essence and nature of the right of
representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that
Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession
by law because of his blood relationship. He
does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales
(the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner
cannot assert the same right of representation as
she has no filiation by blood with her motherin-law.
-Petitioner however contends that at the time of
the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he
had an inchoate or contingent right to the
properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir.
Be that as it may, said right of her husband was
extinguished by his death that is why it is their
son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did
not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
SC FINAL RULING:
-WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be
remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y
Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER
CHILDREN, respondents

marriage.
-Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on
December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage
six children named Eleuterio, Agripino,
Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina;
-and by his second marriage with Ignacia
Akutin, five children named Gracia, Godofredo,
Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma.
-Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on
October 2, 1923, a little less than eight years
before the death of said Agripino Neri y
Chavez, and was survived by seven children
named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen,
Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda.
-In Agripino Neri's testament, which was
admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he
willed that his children by the first marriage
shall have no longer any participation in his
estate, as they had already received their
corresponding shares during his lifetime.
LOWER COURT FINDINGS:
-At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the
trial court found, contrary to what the testator
had declared in his will, that all his children by
the first and second marriages ARE intestate
heirs of the deceased without prejudice to onehalf of the improvements introduced in the
properties during the existence of the last
conjugal partnership, which should belong to
Ignacia Akutin.
CA:
-Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision with the modification that the will was
"valid with respect to the two-thirds part which
the testator could freely dispose of. "

-The appellate court thus seemed to have rested

its judgment upon the impression that the
testator had intended to disinherit, though
ineffectively, the children of the first marriage.
SC: There is nothing in the will that supports
this conclusion.
-the testator expressly denied them any share in
his estate; but the denial was predicated, not
upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the
belief, mistaken though it was, that the children
by the first marriage had already received more
than their corresponding shares in his lifetime in
the form of advancement.
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the
case is one of voluntary preterition
PRETERITION: OMMISSION OF TESTATOR
OF SOME OF HIS HEIRS WH ARE
ENTITLED TO LEGITIME either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited.
of four of the children by the first marriage, and
of involuntary preterition of the children by the
deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage, and
is thus governed by the provisions of article 814
of the Civil Code, which read in part as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall void the institution of heir;
but the legacies and betterments shall be valid,
in so far as they are not inofficious.

This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now

sought to be reviewed in this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the omission of the children of the first
marriage annuls the institution of the children of
the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or
2. whether the will may be held valid, at least
with respect to one-third of the estate which the
testator may dispose of as legacy and to the
other one-third which he may bequeath as
betterment, to said children of the second

-In the instant case, while the children of the

first marriage were mentioned in the will, they
were not accorded any share in the heriditary
property, without expressly being disinherited.
It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as
contended by appellants.
-Except as to "legacies and betterments" which
"shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code),
preterition avoids the institution of heirs and

gives rise to intestate succession

-In the instant case, no such legacies or
betterments have been made by the testator.
"Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly
provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of
the Civil Code, and where no express provision
therefor is made in the will, the law would
presume that the testator had no intention to that
effect.
-Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and that of the trial court affirmed, without
prejudice to the widow's legal usufruct, with
costs against respondents.