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The Beautiful
Every object implies a certain kind of subject. Psychoanalysis is, of course, dedicated to uncovering this kind of relation. The fetish object, for example, implies
a subject that is split along the lines of acknowledgement and denial of castration. The glossy perfection of objects in fashion magazines, for another example,
implies a narcissistic subject who fears and defends against the ravages of the
body in pieces. Or again, the immaculate new kitchen as object implies a subject
trying to keep a lid on a repressed desire for glorious muck; the kitchen is what's
called a "reaction formation." You will notice that in each of these cases, the
object does not, so to speak, "match" the subject; rather, there is an inverted relationship, since the object is supposed to compensate somehow for a subjective
sense of deficiency.
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And what about the beautiful? What kind of subject is implied by the object
of aesthetic judgment? One of the most important defining features of aesthetic
judgment, according to Kant in The Critique of Judgment, is its"disinterestedness."
There are different types of interest, for example, ethical, instrumental, and
appetitive. The first two of these answer a rational demand; the last stipulates
that the judgment cannot be determined by something that satisfies a desire
or lack. Psychoanalytic categories, then, would seem to be of little relevance
in this case. It seems as though the judgment is made by some part of the self
unlike what we normally think of as subjectivity.Yet, neither can the judgment
be objective, in the sense of rational or cognitive. This is because the object
of aesthetic judgment is one that eludes conceptual definition and cognitive
clarity. It is the focus of an opaque, if suggestive, sensory experience. And it is
this opacity that stimulates the free play of imagination and understanding. In
concert, these two faculties search for and find analogies, associations, formal
rhymes and rhythms. This activity is pleasurable in itself because it satisfies the
mind's demand for coherence, but without subsuming the sensuous particular
under any definite concept and so bringing the activity to an end. This is why
the judgment is said to be reflective rather than determinate; it relates to the
sensory and mental activity occasioned by the object. Both our ordering, rational
capacity and our receptivity to sensuous impressions are engaged. This activity
helps both to heal the divisions between our various faculties and, briefly, to
overcome the mind's estrangement from the world.' Is there anything to be
salvaged from this account of the beautiful? Or is it hopelessly conciliatory
and mired in a particular Western, male, bourgeois individuality, whose disinterested attitude is just the assumption of the position of the subject in general
entitled to legislate for all?"There are two features of this account that I want
to draw out and examine in the light of contemporary art practices and critical
discourses. One is the issue of disinterestedness; the other is the object's cognitive opacity.
Kant offered very few examples of the kind of experience he was describing, but both Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Arthur Schopenhauer connected the disinterested aesthetic attitude with Dutch art. Schopenhauer's stress
on the dominance of the will in our everyday lives meant that he particularly
admired Netherlandish depictions of the everyday, undistorted by appetite or
desire. Seventeenth-century Dutch still-life and genre painting, he argued, show
an objective, that is, disinterested, view of the most insignificant things. "The
aesthetic beholder does not contemplate this without emotion, for it graphically
describes to him the calm, tranquil, will-free frame of mind which was necessary for contemplating such insignificant things so objectively, considering them
so attentively, and repeating this attention with such thought." 7 What is being
described here is an art practice that tries to circumvent selfish desire, power,
mastery, possessiveness-the whole complex of relations that normally governs
our lives.The accomplishment of this is called disinterestedness.
A later, Symbolist critical discourse would reinvent this aesthetic attitude
by calling for a kind of poetry that avoided all personal obtrusion. In this case,
disinterestedness is invoked in favor of an extrapersonal and intrinsically poetic
domain of language. Stephane Mallarme, for example, wrote an appreciative
account of Edouard Manet, praising the way his hand became "an impersonal
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abstraction.... The artist's personal feeling, his particular tastes are, for the
time being, absorbed, ignored." Manet was determined to paint "entirely without himself." Searching for a way to accomplish this feat, Manet looked to the
Dutch and Flemish artists and to an artist who had absorbed their lessons, Diego
Velazquez." In the early 1970s, Michael Fried invoked Mallarme's essay to characterize the impersonal work of Morris Louis and his apparent" elocutionary
disappearance." Jackson Pollock, on the other hand, is seen as locked in a struggle between "the specificity of urgent personal feeling and the impersonal, and
in that sense abstract, demands of painting itself." 9 Mallarrne is also the key figure in Roland Barthes's "The Death of the Author" (1968): "In France, Mallarme
was doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to
substitute language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to
be its owner. For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author." 10
Photography's"objective" vision of the world was also celebrated in these terms;
mechanization was understood as a way of cutting through the carapace of our
habitual, interest-laden perceptions. Salvador Dali, for instance, praised "the
anaesthetic stare of the extremely clear eye-the lashless eye of Zeiss." II And if
the mechanically reproduced image can be understood as "disinterested," so also
might the factory-made, mass-produced object-provided that it is denatured
so as to neutralize its status as a commodity intended to satisfy desire. The celebrated autonomy of the work of art, it turns out, implies the obliteration of
the poet or painter in his or her medium. It is fundamentally about the displacement of one's own agency so that something other can surface. The aim is to
cut through stereotype and sentiment so as to discover what Mallarrne called "a
strange new beauty." I2
8. Stephans Mallarme, "The Impressionists and
Edouard Manet" (1876), repro in Penny Florence,
Readymade
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197.
19. See. for instance. TheDuchamp Effect, ed.
Martha Buskirk and Mignon Nixon (Cambridge.
Mass.: MIT Press. 1996). and Thierry de Duve,
71-94.
21. Roland Barthes, "That Old Thing Art ...,'.
in The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on
Music, Art,and Representation (New York: Hill
and Wang. 1985).200. Barthes's insistence on
the asymmetry of the relation between the artist/
author and the reborn viewer/reader is not
shared by all commentators who see the artist's
reticence mirrored in an equally desubjectivized
response to the work.
Found Object
One can easily see how Kant's characterization of aesthetic judgment as disinterested could lead to the various desubjectivizing artistic practices I've mentioned.
But if one stresses another aspect of Kant's aesthetic, the initial perplexity and
prelogical play in relation to the object that eludes our full understanding, one
can also readily see how the aesthetic, modified through Freud, might survive
in some form in Surrealist art and writing. I want to draw out this continuity
in relation to Breton's conception of the found object. The found object shares
with the readymade a lack of obvious aesthetic quality and little intervention
on the part of the artist beyond putting the object in circulation, but in almost
every other respect it is dissimilar. The difference is attributable to Breton's positioning the found object in a different space-the space of the unconscious.
In "Surrealist Situation of the Object" (1935), Breton called on both poets and
painters to incorporate in their work the "precision of sensible forms." He
described a situation in which photography had taken over the mimetic function
of representation, so that Surrealist painting was forced to retreat to the domain
of inner perception. This would not mean, however, that painting would detach
itself from external reality. As Breton said, there is no such thing as "spontaneous
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generation" in mental reality. Rather, Surrealist images and objects are like the
"visual residues" from past experience that turn up in dreams." Freudian theory
enabled Breton to overcome the gap between internal and external domains,
because, as Steven Harris nicely puts it, it "mediated relations between external
nature, perception and the unconscious.T"
Like Kant, Breton saw art as a means of overcoming the breach between
mind and world. For Kant, it was the beautiful object's formal purposiveness that
gestured toward the idea of a "prearranged" harmonious relation of mind to its
objects. For the modern materialist Breton, however, the relation is established
by external reality's effects on the psyche: "Chance would be the form taken by
external reality as it traces a path (se fraie un chemin) in the human unconscious.T'"
The object found as if by chance is situated at the point of connection between
external nature, perception, and the unconscious, and thus has a peculiar, elusive
relation to vision. The space occupied by the found object is carved out by traumatic experience, defined precisely as an experience that has failed to achieve a
representation, but on which, nonetheless, one's whole existence depends. I will
argue that this object calls attention to itself by creating a hole in the fabric of
normal perception. This may sound as though I'm contrasting the found object
with the readymade in terms of a subjectivity/ antisubjectivity polarity, but the
matter is not so simple. The traumatic subject is not the personal self that was so
strenuously avoided in the tradition of disinterested art. Both that tradition and
Surrealism were interested in the displacement of the artist's agency.
What kind of subject is implied by the found object? I would suggest a
Lacanian one. Reading Breton's Mad Love (1937) and Jacques Lacan's 1964 seminar,
The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsycho-Analysis, in tandem one can see how they both
circle around Freud's Beyond thePleasure Principle and, also, how deeply influenced
Lacan was by Breton's notion of the objet trouve or trouvaille (found object)." Breton
described the trouvaille as a solution found not by logical means, and one that
differs completely from what is anticipated. "In any case, what is delightful here
is the dissimilarity itself which exists between the object wished for and the
object found."26 In his book Compulsive Beauty, Hal Foster has analyzed in some
detail the passages in Mad Love about the two key trouvailles-a wooden spoon and
a metal mask; he demonstrates clearly that they do not represent simple wish
fulfillments, but are laced with desire and death. He suggests that Breton's conception of the found object anticipates Lacan's objet petit a-the lost object which
sets desire in motion and which, paradoxically, represents both a hole in the
integrity of our world and the thing that comes to hide the hole. 27
I think, however, that Lacan's elusive object is actually modeled on Breton's
found object. The example of the marvelous slipper-spoon is most telling. Breton
wanted Alberto Giacometti to make him a literal, material instantiation of the
perplexing phrase Cinderella-ashtray (Cendrillon-cendrier), but it was not forthcoming.
On a visit to a Paris flea market with the sculptor, Breton lit on a curious wooden
spoon with a little boot carved under its handle and carried it off. Only when he
got the object home did it transform itself into the object of his desire: "It was
clearly changing right under my eyes. From the side, at a certain height, the little
wood spoon coming out of its handle, took on, with the help of the curvature
of the handle, the aspect of a heel and the whole object presented the silhouette
of a slipper on tiptoe like those of dancers.T"
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Like the anamorphic skull in Hans Holbein's painting The Ambassadors, which
resolves into a skull "from the side, at a certain height," the opaque, incomprehensible spoon is suddenly transformed into the lustrous lost object par excellence,
Cinderella's glass slipper. "It is just what, in our folklore, takes on the meaning of
the lost object. "29 If the reflection in the mirror is the prototype of all images of the
ego, then this contradictory, ungraspable, fleeting object is the prototype
for images of the castrated, barred,
split, in short, anamorphic subject.
This subject, called punningly by
Lacan lesujet troue (the subject full
of holes), uses an objet trouve (a found
object) to figure both the hole and
the bit that's missing. 3 The slippery
spoon of love has its counterpart, the
mask of death, found by Giacometti
on the same occasion and which,
according to Breton, enabled him to
finish his sculpture L'Objet invisible.
If, as I argue, Lacan formulated his idea of the object of desire with Breton's
trouvaille in mind, then he must also have borrowed the Surrealist notion of the
encounter for his conception ofJa rencontre monquee (missed or failed encounter).
In effect, Lacan recast Freud's conception of trauma in terms of the Surrealist
encounter. The found object is encountered and the effect is traumatic. The
contrast between the Duchampian rendezvous and the Bretonian encounter
should now be clear.While the readymade is essentially indifferent, multiple,
and mass-produced, the found object is essentially Singular or irreplaceable,
and both lost and found.
Throughout his career, Lacan insisted that there was something about the
subject not captured in the articulations of language or in a series of imaginary
captivations. The allusions in his early writings to personality and to the style
of the subject attest to this, as does the following remark from Seminar III, The
Psychoses: "There is, in effect, something radically unassimilable to the signifier.
It's quite Simply the subject's singular existence." 31 The mark of the subject's singularity is objet petit a.Yet, since objet petit a cannot become an object of consciousness and is unspecularizable, it is not susceptible to the criticism that it revives
a nostalgia for lost immediacy or presence. Treading carefully, Malcolm Bowie
remarks that, with the introduction of objet petit a, Lacan allowed "the ghost of
referentiality to regain admission to his scheme." 32
A ghost of referentialiy is exactly what Barthes invoked in his Camera Lucida,
where he stressed the greater importance for photography of chemistry rather
than the camera obscura: it is light-sensitive paper that gives the photograph its
essential nature as a "that-has-been." Barthes emphasized the photograph's intimate connection with the object, attesting to the reality of the thing-but a
reality in a past state, an ectoplasm, a reality one can no longer touch. As I have
argued elsewhere, Barthes formulated his idea of the subject's relation to photography with one hand in the pages of Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts.v He argued,
for instance, that the defining characteristic of photography is its attachment to
SO SUMMER 2004
"the absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency, matte and somehow stupid,
the This ... in short, what Lacan calls ruche, the Occasion, the Encounter, the
Real, in its indefatigable expression."> ruche is experienced by the subject as a
painful intrusion, as a trauma-an encounter with a real beyond the pleasure
principle. In the first part of Camera Lucida, the real is located in a detail, a punctum,
also called by him "petite tache" (little mark or stain)
-a reference to Lacan's blind spot in the orthodox
perceptual field also called the stain and defined as
"that which always escapes from the grasp of that
form of vision that is satisfied with itselfin imagining itself as consciousness.l'Y For Barthes, photography, like the found object, has a privileged relation to this blind spot, this hole, this traumatic real.
If this is so, then photography is a fascinatingly
ambivalent medium: not only readymade/simulacral, but also traumaticlreal.
Mary Kelly
34. lbid., 4.
5I
art journal
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Anonymous. Photograph of
bronze glove belonging to a
woman, 1928. Published with
caption "Gant de femme
aussi . " in Andre Breton,
Nodjo, 65.
opposite:
Mary Kelly. Interim, Port I:
Corpus, 1984-85. Laminated
photo positive, silkscreen, and
acrylic on Plexiglas.Thirty
panels, ea. 35 x 48 in. (90 x
122.5 em), Courtesy of
Postmasters Gallery, New York.
Courtesy of the artist.
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Gabriel Orozco
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If Kelly shows us the object's proximity to that central lack, then Orozco
wants to show us the unrepresentable threshold itself: the next-to-nothing, the
ripple in water, "the wake of an action," as he puts it. In short, "photography as a
hole." See, for example, Orozco's photograph of a found Zen drawing done with
rain water for ink and bicycle wheels for a brush, Extension ofReflection, 1992. His
Breath onPiano, 1993, shows a smoky patch of condensation on the cool black surface of the piano. The Waiting Chairs, 1998, are expectant objects, parexcellence. These
photographs present objects on the threshold of visibility or invoke an absence or
past moment in time. In this way, Orozco heightens photography's that-has-been
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character, but also generalizes it to include the whole texture of our experience of
the world, punctuated as it is with holes leading down to the unconscious.
We saw that the modernist tradition of disinterested art displaced subjectivity in favor of the medium; the effect of Duchamp's (postmodern?) intervention
was to expand the idea of medium to include the whole institution of art. The
desubjectivizing strategy of the readymade, with its systematic work of negation
and testing of the limits of what counts as art, has sustained art practice for most
of the last century and continues to do so.Yet the dominance of the Duchamp
effect may have blinded us to the legacy of the found object, which is less visible
and less concerned with reflecting on and undermining the conventions and
institutions of art. The examples of Mary Kelly and Gabriel Orozco show that
there is a wealth of art that breaks the self-critical circle and opens itself to wider
issues of subjectivity and SOciality, loss and memory, love and death. As Zizek
so pithily put it, with regard to cultural theory: "The celebrated postmodern
'displacement' of subjectivity rather exhibits an unreadiness to come to terms
with the truly traumatic core of the modern subject."49 My proposal for an
aesthetic beyond the pleasure principle is aimed at approaching that core and
so sets about complicating the tradition of Kantian disinterestedness and the
displacement or effacement of subjectivity implied by the reiteration of the
readymade. However, it retains the value Kant placed on the engagement with
an opaque, elusive object that sets into play the senses, imagination, and
understanding.
Margaret Iversen is Professor of Art History. University of Essex, England. She is the author of A/ois Riegl:
Art History and Theory and MaryKelly (with Douglas Crimp and Homi Bhabha). She also edited (With Dana
Arnold) Art and Thought.
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