1. USON v.

DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 53
*Can future inheritance be the subject of a contract or can it be renounced?
FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged
wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and
possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario,
decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant
presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others a statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an
alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from
Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor
defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new
Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article
2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights
were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?
HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels
of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to
his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court
aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of
the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it
be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply
and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides
indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated
in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which
commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore,
be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)

Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. (657a) The rights of inheritance of Maria Uson
over the lands in question became vested from the moment of the
decedents death.
2. IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721
*s formal or judicial declaration needed to confirm the children's title over
the decedents estate?
FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving
spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire
parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff
Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her
minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion
now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.
ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?
HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code
provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is
incorporated
in
the
new
Civil
Code
as
article
777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it
already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was
null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority
of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it
has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary,
still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no
other cause than his own opposition.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It
is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the
death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
3. ALEJANDRINO vs. CA.
G.R. No. 114151. September 17, 1998
* May an heir of a property validly sell specific portions thereof to a third
party?
Facts: Late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six
children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and
Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, Cebu City identified as Lot No.
2798. Upon the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the property should have
been divided among their children with each child having a share of 36.50

square meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not
settled in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased total area of
97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square meters. It
turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private
respondent in this case, also purchased 121.67 square meters of the
Alejandrino property. However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the
121.67 square meters of the property) later questioned the sale in an action
for quieting of title and damages against private respondent Nique. lower
court rendered a decision declaring that the defendant as the owner in fee
simple of the share of plaintiff Laurencia Alejandrino and the shares of
Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio, all surnamed Alejandrino. Laurencia
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may
validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party.
HELD: Yes. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.
Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co -owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance,
alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article
1088 that provides:
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her
pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular
portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the
object of the sale.
The legality of Laurencias alienation of portions of the estate of the
Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in

that case had become final and executory with Laurencias withdrawal of her
appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the
portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent
was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law,
partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs
themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition,
or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for
quieting of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the
property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs
themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on
the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to private
respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity
on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the nonpublication thereof.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified
in writing of the sale by the vendor.
*Partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs
themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition,
or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
4. Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., vs. PRADO
G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004
*Can a share of the conjugal property be sold?
Facts:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently
married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her
first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed
on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former
agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for the
sum of P10, 500.00. On July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built
a two-storey duplex with firewall on the northern half portion of the property.
Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not
object to the construction. Subsequently, respondents filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half
portion of the subject property against petitioners. Respondents alleged that
the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between
Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; the court a quo
dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that the
Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly
executed. Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Decision
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the sale in dispute is declared valid
only with respect to the one -seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant
NARCISA H. PRADO.

Issues: The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or
paraphernal? (2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that
the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the land subject of the sale?
HELD: 1. Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was
entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership to operate.
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she
bought the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with
her own funds, she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and
Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share.
2. Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage?
Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in
favor of Tomas is contained in a notarized document. Furthermore, Narcisa,
in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo
and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey duplex
and her house sometime in 1976. Respondents belatedly claimed that only
P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00 consideration was paid. Both the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale state that
said consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the presumption is that there
was sufficient consideration for a written contract.
3. Assuming that the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the land
subject of the sale?
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of
the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other
half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his
widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the
legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of coownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the
property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate
succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa
Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch
as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the
said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal
share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could
validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas.
Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)
Article 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate
property as well as her share of the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property. (n)
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of
the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership
5. BALUS vs BALUS
G.R. No. 168970
*The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.

Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo
and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land,
which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result,
the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sole
bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale
in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the
Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them
a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,
246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement
also
contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their
father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to
redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents.
Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995,
respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of
the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. The RTC
held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share
in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents
bought the subject lot from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of
the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA
ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their coownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject
property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title
thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually
bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Held: The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize
that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo,
at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties
during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.
Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank
on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither
any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died
on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a
person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists
of
the
property
and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as
well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject
property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs
may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited
the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention

that he and his siblings intended

to
continue
their
supposed
coownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested the intention
of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each
of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of
the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole
estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which
negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. (657a)
There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name
before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank
acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of
Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of
his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property
and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death,
as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of
the succession. Thus, the petitioner and respondents never inherited the
subject lot from their father.
6. Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228
*Can there be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated?
Can the obligation of the deceased be passed to his legitimate heirs?
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the
payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again,
Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of
the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence,
executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for
Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness
of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken
by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank. Demand letters
were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the
heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind
her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement

signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the
joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil
Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped
Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying
to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the
claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at
the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an
existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been
subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the
heirs or third parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with
the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibaez was pending. Whether or not the agreement between Edmund
and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of the estate) was void
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. Whether or
not there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a
holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution,
there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers
holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed
its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86
of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the
claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing
guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as comaker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty.
RELEVANCE TO SUCCESSION: (applicable Article of Succession)
Article 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (619a)
The heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is not binding.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties
thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and
use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which
is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was
made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each
to receive. The partition being invalid, then the heirs in effect did not receive
any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by
the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.