G.R. No.

135962, March 27, 2000

Metropolitan
Manila
Development
Authority,
petitioner vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
respondent
POnente: Puno
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners of BelAir Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of
the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA
requesting Bel-Air to open Neptune St. to public vehicular
traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction
against Bel-Air; and prayed for a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the
next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. MMDA question the denial and appealed to the
CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA
proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision
finding MMDA no authority to order the opening of Neptune
St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this
recourse.
Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening
of Neptune St. to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory
and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a
condition precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air
estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was BelAir denied of due process despite the several meetings
held between MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to
court with unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it
is an agent of the Government endowed with police power
in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the
premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for
an ordinance to be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police
power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which
the latter can delegate to the President and administrative
boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.
**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a
legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and
administrative region in 1995. And the administration of
metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which
includes, transport and traffice management. It should be
noted that MMDA are limited to the acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,

management, monitoring, setting of policies and

installation of a system and administration. MMDA was not
granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by
petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The
notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as
the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in
Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the
present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P.
D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the
present MMDA.
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government
units became primarily responsible for the governance of
their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems
involving basic services that transcended local boundaries.
It did not have legislative power.
Petition Denied.
G. R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit
Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on
September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People s Liberation
Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration
agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the
two parties. Such agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive
Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera
panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was
drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the
representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then
signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera
Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the
primary ground that by issuing the said order, the
President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had
virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of
enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling: The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that
petitioners are unfounded.

E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region

contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution
on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since
such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw
it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent
needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic
act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region
created. At this time, the President was still exercising
legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet
convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing
the basic structure of government in the autonomous
region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies
created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure; nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the
existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and nongovernmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the
Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October
23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act
which completed the autonomous region-creating process
outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed
for lack of merit.
GANZON VS CA
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City.
10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of
Local Government issued several suspension orders against
Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the
CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon
asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the
President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What
was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government,
as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove
local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the
power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control

given to him over executive officials of our government

wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from
the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the
president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Limbona vs. Mangelin
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21,
1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the
Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that
there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a
session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on a question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction
over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the
extent of self-government given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an

abdication of political power in the favor of local

governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first
place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power
of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can
make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,
with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor
of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2
and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in
accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner
called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of
good faith.
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
GR 152774May 27, 2004
FACTS:In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48
establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres.

Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by

the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to
the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding
funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas,
petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of
P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:Yes.The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000,
and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and
must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the
State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power
over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon
v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the
discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or
decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that
the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the
rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of
the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that
the just share shall be automatically released to the
LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent
required to perform any act to receive the just share it
shall be released to them without need of further action.
To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic
release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue
collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of
the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The
exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the
implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or
subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over
the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but
only through a separate law and not through appropriations
laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money

dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit

any provision therein which is intended to amend another
law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of
1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit
the Congress to undertake these amendments through the
GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the
LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our
national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
Mathay Jr. vs Court of Appeals 320 SCRA 703 (1999)
G.R. No. 124374, 126354, 126366

institution all games of chance authorized by existing

franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently
proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also
to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and public order, among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila
to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption
clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of
Local Autonomy;

FACTS: In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was

signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil Service Unit (CSU)
office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City
mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU.
Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed providing,
among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be
automatically absorbed into the QC Department of Public
Order and Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next
mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51
never became a law because it was never published.
Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU
personnel, at the same time, they were not reappointed to
the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU
personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Eventually, the CSC Commissioner ruled that based on the
QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel
to QC-DPOS.

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the

Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR
while most other forms are outlawed together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

ISSUE: Whether or not

Commissioner is correct.

The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the

grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn
by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the
National Government. Necessarily, the power to
demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City
of Manila.

the

decision

of

the

CSC

HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for

automatic absorption of the QC-CSU personnel to the QCDPOS, it divested the mayor the power to choose as to who
should fill said office. Just like in the national government,
the local sanggunian can only create an office, it cannot
choose the personnel who should fill such office that is a
power vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is
also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code.
The power to appoint is vested in the local chief
executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on
the
other
hand,
is
limited
to creating,
consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions
supported by local funds. The city council has no power to
appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power to
appoint to both the city council and the local chief
executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the
mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS.
Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right to
choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU
never came into existence for it has no legal basis to speak
of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any.
It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a
natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory

Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy
and toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869
is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.

LGUs have no power to tax Government

instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore
exempt from local taxes. The National Government is
supreme over local governments. As such, mere
creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using
the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to
tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality
of the very entity which has the inherent power to
wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is
always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs
sovereign within a state, it simply means
decentralization.

Basco v. PAGCOR GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)

A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all

persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact
that some gambling activities are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws unconstitutional.

FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential
Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government,
to regulate and centralize through an appropriate

1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless

allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not
mean that the government can not regulate it in the
exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the

authority to enact legislation that may interfere with

personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was
created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also,
local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities
of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law, provided it is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the
legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are
within the domain of the political branches of government
and the people themselves as the repository of all state
power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
Ordillo vs COMELEC 192 SCRA 100 (1990) G.R. No.
93054
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and KalingaApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled
An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.The official Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and
city above-mentioned.Consequently, the COMELEC, on
February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao.the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to
declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the
Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not
the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.It is explicit in Article X,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that region is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term region
used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself.

To become part of a region, it must join other

provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766
provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of
the Regional Government and local government units. It
further provides that:SECTION 2. The Regional
Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within
the Autonomous Region . . .From these sections, it can be
gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area.
Abbas vs COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 G.R. No. 89651,
89965
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by
petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the
following:(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution, and(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734
conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally
creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the
autonomous region which make the creation of such region
dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II,
section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that [t]here is
hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting
favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute,
such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes
were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and
its composition needs to be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces
and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not
be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even
if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen
(13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II,
section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A.
No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether
there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao

and (2) which provinces and cities, among those

enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend, not on the
total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will
of the majority in each of the constituent units and
the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of
the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could
have simply adopted the same phraseology as that
used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the
Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving
the organic Act in individual constituent units and
not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this
is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the
plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have
been understood by the people when they ratified the
Constitution.

local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization
and operation of the local units.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the
national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
provided by law, including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have
sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as
set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by
law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition,
shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.

ARTICLE XLOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 1. The territorial and
Republic of the Philippines
municipalities, and barangays.
regions in Muslim Mindanao and
provided.

political subdivisions of the

are the provinces, cities,
There shall be autonomous
the Cordilleras as hereinafter

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy

local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable

Section 13. Local government units may group themselves,

consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources
for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with
law.
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of
local government officials, regional heads of departments and
other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of
the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region.

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when

approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units

in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
Administrative organization;
Creation of sources of revenues;
Ancestral domain and natural resources;
Personal, family, and property relations;
Regional urban and rural planning development;
Economic, social, and tourism development;
Educational policies;
Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies
which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security
of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.