Ernest Germain

Prospects and Dynamics of the Political

Revolution against the Bureaucracy
Report Presented by Comrade Ernest Germain
(October 1957)
Since Stalin s death, the domination of the Soviet bureaucracy over the Soviet Uni
on, over the Peoples Democracies, and over the Communist Parties of the whole world
, has been deeply shaken.
The sensational suppression of the Stalin cult at the XXth Congress of the Sovie
t C.P. produced great agitation in the Communist Parties, of the whole world. Al
l the fundamental points of Communist policy began to be reexamined in a critica
l way by an ever greater number of the militants of these parties. The result is
the formation of groups, tendencies, sometimes even organized fractions, in mos
t of the C.P.s. all things unknown in the previous 30 years. The servile subordi
nation of the fate of the international working class to the Kremlin s diplomatic
manoeuvres is being questioned at the very moment when critical communists withi
n the U.S.S.R. are beginning to question the grounds of these manoeuvres from th
e point of view of interests of the Soviet state itself.
The struggles for economic demands, the strikes, the workers uprisings which occu
rred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and partly also in the U.S.S.R., h
ave dramatically stressed destalinisation. They have confirmed the Trotskyist opin
ion that all manoeuvres on the part of the leaders are only a pale reflection of
the pressure, the indignation, and the spirit of revolt ripening in the popular
masses. The Hungarian revolution showed beyond all doubt that a political revol
ution is building up, and that it is absolutely necessary for the overthrow of t
he power of the bureaucratic clique.
This tumultuous development which has been taking place for the last four years
did not catch us unawares. We were armed to understand it, for we had predicted
it. Without exaggeration, but also without false modesty, we can state that we w
ere the only tendency of the international workers movement that accurately fores
aw these events, at least in their main lines, and that prepared itself to face
the historical tasks which might arise from these developments.
To analyze their meanings and laws, we have had to raise some of the most diffic
ult problems of Marxist theory. Once more it has become clear that each step for
ward of the international revolution also gives rise to a progress of revolution
ary thought. The assimilation of this progress by the whole revolutionary party
is, in turn, necessary to the victory of the revolution.
Political Revolution or Social Counter-Revolution
The traditional Trotskyist analysis of the U.S.S.R. as a degenerate workers state
confined the possible outcome of the historical evolution of the first workers s
tate to the following alternative: either restoration of capitalism or re-establ
ishment of soviet democracy guaranteeing the building of socialism. Either socia
l counter-revolution, or political revolution.
The two terms of this alternative were conceived in close connection with the de
velopment of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Either international
revolution would undergo another series of international defeats, fascism would
slowly spread to a large part of the world, Trotsky wrote in 1935, and then the
workers state would be irremediably lost; we should see the victory of the socia

l counter-revolution. Or else new advances of the revolution would reverse the p

redominant reactionary tendency of the years 1923 1939 and then political revoluti
on would have a good chance of winning in the U.S.S.R.
Two terms of an alternative do not mean two possibilities of simultaneous soluti
ons. When Trotsky formulated this perspective for the first time in a precise wa
y, that is, after Hitler s victory in 1933, he was obliged to place a question mar
k over the future dynamics of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Wou
ld revolution advance again, or would it go on being defeated everywhere in the
world? No-one could seriously answer this question in 1935. But, towards the end
of the Second World War, with the victory of the Jugoslav revolution, the victo
ry of the Chinese revolution, and the spread of the colonial revolution, with th
e enormous progress of the Soviet economy, it became clear that the relationship
of forces was turning in favor of Revolution on the world scale.
Under these conditions, to hang on to an alternative prospect, at least for shor
t- or medium-term forecasts, meant to substitute vulgar eclecticism for Marxist
dialectics. To repeat in 1953 what had been true in 1933, i.e. that the U.S.S.R.
could experience either the re-establishment of capitalism or political revolut
ion, was to change Trotskyist theory from an instrument of analysis of reality i
nto a collection of ritual formulae. It meant refusing to settle a question whic
h had already been settled for a whole historical period at Stalingrad, Belgrade
, Peking, Dien-Bien-Phu, and on the Yalu, where capitalism had been dealt such p
owerful blows that its re-establishment in a short time in the U.S.S.R. was no l
onger a possibility.
A double change in the relationship of forces has favored the evolution towards
political revolution in the U.S.S.R. It has done so objectively and subjectively
.
Trotsky had always foreseen that the preservation of the production relations bo
rn of the October Revolution would finally create objective conditions which wou
ld facilitate the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship. In his theses The
Fourth International and the U.S.S.R., he wrote at the end of 1933:
Though squandering an enormous part of the national income in an unproductive way
, the bureaucracy has an interest in the economic and cultural upsurge of the co
untry; the higher the national income, the richer the funds from which it drawn
its privileges. But on the social bases of the Soviet state, the economic and cu
ltural rise of the toiling masses will undermine the bases of bureaucratic domin
ation itself.
This is what has actually happened. Above all, it is the numerical strength and
the specific weight of the proletariat in Soviet society, its high level of skil
ls and its superior culture, the rise in its living conditions, its progressive
liberation from the worst slavery of poverty, the widening of its political hori
zon, its needs growing faster than the amount of goods accorded to it by the bur
eaucracy
it is above all this overall result of the economic and cultural progre
ss of the U.S.S.R. which tolls the knell of bureaucratic dictatorship.
But the change in the relationship of forces on the world scale creates the subj
ective conditions for the political revolution. In The Revolution Betrayed, anal
yzing the reasons for the apparent stability of the Stalinist dictatorship, Trot
sky wrote:
If in contrast to the peasants the workers have almost never come out on the road
of open struggle, thus condemning the protesting villages to confusion and impo
tence, this is not only because of the repressions. The workers fear lest, in th
rowing out the bureaucracy, they will open the way for the capitalist restoratio
n. [...] The workers are realists. Without deceiving themselves with regard to t

he ruling caste
at least with regard to its lower tiers which stand near to them
they see in it the watchman for the time being of a certain part of their own c
onquests. They will inevitably drive out the dishonest, impudent and unreliable
watchman as soon as they see another possibility. For this it is necessary that
in the West or the East another revolutionary dawn arise. (U.S. edition, pp. 285 28
6.)
The revolutionary opening has come about in the East. Capitalism has been terrib
ly weakened on the world scale. Because of this, the fear of restoration of capi
talism has very much diminished in the U.S.S.R. The working class has giving up
its passive attitude. It no longer tolerates the dishonest watchman. On the contra
ry, it hounds him more and more, waging war on the field of factories and on tha
t of principles, forcing him to put aside his insolence, and preparing to overth
row his power.
Three Conceptions of the Bureaucracy
The question of our revolutionary prospects in the U.S.S.R. and in the glacis is
closely linked to that of our specific analysis of the bureaucracy. In the prol
etarian movement, if we leave out those who consider the bureaucracy a new class
, there exist two false conceptions of the nature of the bureaucracy.
The first, the subjective conception, is most often developed by Stalinists or f
ormer Stalinists. For them, the bureaucracy is the result of psychological and m
oral phenomena, instead of social phenomena. It is a question of habits, manners
, and customs: to prefer to sit in a office rather than move around where work i
s actually being done; to use a rough commanding tone with workers; to to be aloo
f from the aspirations of the people ; to show scorn for manual work, etc. ... etc.
... The theoreticians of the Chinese Communist Party have prepared for us a whole
catalogue of the sins which might be the basis of bureaucratism.
The opposite of this subjective conception is the objective deviation, of which
the most typical representatives are the Brandlerites, some Communist currents i
n Eastern Europe such as the Gomulkists, and also Deutscher, at least in his fir
st works. They say: Russia was a backward country; the proletariat was weak, lac
king skills and culture. It was thus unable to manage industrialization. So it i
nevitably had to be managed by a bureaucracy.
But, as industrialization involved a considerable increase in the rate of invest
ment, it also involved a very severe lowering of the standard of living. The wor
kers did not want to accept this lowering of the standard of living. It therefor
e had to be forced upon them. Hence the objective necessity of the bureaucratic
dictatorship, which disappears with the historical conditions which gave birth t
o it.
The Trotskyist, the Marxist, analysis of the phenomena of the bureaucracy is opp
osed to these two equally wrong conceptions.
Bureaucratism, in the form of habits of work and undemocratic customs, is an end
emic phenomenon in mass organizations, where it is normally corrected by the fre
e play of elections and of the democratic control of the rank and file. It becom
es a serious evil only when social advantages are grafted on to personal shortco
mings, in other words when we pass from the plane of psychology to that of socio
logy. In the capitalist regime, the development of bourgeois parliamentary democ
racy and of a reformist mass movement transforms persons with bureaucratic tende
ncies into members and profiteers of the bourgeois state apparatus off which the
y live. In the workers state, the ebb of the revolution and the defeat of the rev
olutionary opposition allowed the bureaucracy to seize the state and the economy
, from which were derived enormous privileges. This is how parasitic bureaucrati

c castes are born, linked to particular social systems, from which they suck awa
y part of the wealth.
We know, as Lenin did that the compete disappearance of all functionaryism and a
ll bureaucracy, i.e. the carrying out of all the functions of leadership by all
producers in turn is impossible in the first days after the revolution in any co
untry in the world, and certainly in a poor country. Thus we know that there was
already a certain bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. in 1918 and that there will be on
e in any country after the victory of the proletarian revolution. We also know t
hat the poorer a country is, and the weaker and more backward its proletariat, t
he greater is the risk that this bureaucracy become powerful and accumulate new
privileges.
But what separates us from the objectivists is that, like Lenin, who passionately
defended this point of view during the last years of his life, like Trotsky, and
like the best Soviet Bolsheviks, we are convinced that this ebb is not inevitab
le, and that the growth of bureaucratic degeneration can be stopped by well-advi
sed action on the part of the subjective factor. Neither, the national nor inter
national relationship of forces is unalterable. After the defeat of 1923. there
were possibilities of victory in China in 1927, in Germany in the beginning of t
he 30s, in Spain and in France in 1936. If the bureaucracy was triumphant, it is
in large measure because the Bolshevik Party, instead of being aware of this dan
ger right from the beginning, underestimated it; because it had itself become bu
reaucratic, and part of its cadres reacted too late, when they were already a mi
nority in their own house, when the party, tool of the proletariat, had already
become a tool of the bureaucracy.
This Trotskyist answer to the problem of the bureaucratic degeneration of the U.
S.S.R. and of the Communist International corresponds exactly to the state of mi
nd of the whole critical and oppositional mass appearing today in the C.P.s, inc
luding the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. All are asking the question: How was this possibl
e? All are trying to find the link between the overall objective conditions unfav
orable to the growth of soviet democracy in the U.S.S.R. and the particularly ma
lignant, even catastrophic, form taken by the development of the bureaucracy. On
ly our Trotskyist conception of bureaucracy can explain this process to them, in
cluding in the analysis the great gains of the new economic and social basis of
the first workers state.
Currents in Society, Tendencies in the Party, Divisions in the Bureaucracy
Our traditional conception of the Soviet bureaucracy enables us to answer also t
wo questions of analysis which have been continually brought up by international
working-class opinion since Stalin s death:
Are the divisions which have appeared in the Kremlin group explained essentially
by a struggle for power, or are they a reflection of what is happening in the w
hole of Soviet society?
To what extent can the bureaucracy as a caste resist the final onset of the mass
es?
We know that, traditionally, in regimes based on a single party, all the social
contradictions tend to be reflected inside this party. We said it in the past ab
out the Bolshevik Party during the 20s. We say it today for the C.P. of the Sovie
t Union. In this sense, it is absolutely clear that the different tendencies whi
ch are already formed, or are in course of being formed, in the C.P. of the U.S.
S.R., are not without relation to the great currents which are already beginning
to manifest themselves in Soviet society.
But what relations does this mean? We distinguish two phenomena. When the differ

ent fractions appeared in the Bolshevik Party, we defined the Left-Opposition fr

action as the one which consciously expressed the interests of the proletariat.
As for the rightist, Boukharinist, fraction, it was under the pressure of the pe
asantry in its way of stating tactical problems, and especially of solving them.
But never did Trotsky describe Boukharin as the representative of a peasant cur
rent, or as an agent of the petty-bourgeoisie; or as a bourgeois politician. His
being a communist, i.e. a militant of a revolutionary party of the proletariat,
was never questioned.
It is the same distinction which we use as a starting point to explain the divis
ions which appeared in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. after Stalin s death. If we judge
by a great number of the positions they took, especially in the economic and ide
ological field, it seems unquestionable that the Molotov-Kaganovitch group can b
e considered as the most conscious and direct representative of the most privile
ged strata of the bureaucracy, above all of the trust and factory directors. As
for the other groups and intermediate groups, they have, to different degrees, u
ndergone the pressure of the proletariat and of the peasantry, in the sense that
they have been obliged to raise problems whose solutions the masses were more a
nd more insistently demanding and that they have, to different degrees, undergon
e the pressure of the masses and have put forward certain reforms in the sense o
f these solutions.
But we have never said and we shall never say that either Malenkov, Mikoyan, or
Khrushchev represents, even indirectly, a proletarian tendency in the C.P. of th
e U.S.S.R. All of them are politicians of the bureaucracy who are trying, each i
n his own way and with his own character, to protect the interests, the power, a
nd the privileges of the bureaucratic caste as such.
Because of their past, their complicity in many of Stalin s crimes, a complicity w
ell known to the masses, and because of their very functions in society at prese
nt, all the members of the Presidium are identified in the eyes of the masses wi
th an ever more hated power: the dictatorship of the bonzes, the bureaucrats, the
bureaucracy. It is excuded that any one of them should play the part which Tito,
Gomulka, or Nagy played, that of popular and centrist leaders of one wing of th
e bureaucracy, channeling for their own benefit the masses hostility against the
bureaucracy as a whole. All of them have more or less tried to do so: Beria, by
declaring himself against police despotism and backing out of the affair of the d
octors ; Malenkov by promising a forced-draught development of light industry; Mik
oyan, by launching the decisive attack against the Stalin cult; Khrushchev, by p
romising abundance of bread, butter, and meat. None of them will succeed.
But for us. bureaucracy is not a new class; it is a caste which has its roots de
ep in the proletariat. If we examine the social composition of the C.P. of the U
.S.S.R., we notice that one third of its members are still factory workers. Even
if they are Stakhanovists or foremen, they are, because of their way of life, c
loser to the workers than to the big shots who roll around in automobiles and gi
ve their sons a thousand rubles a week for spending-money.
The trade-union cadres in the factories, the secretaries of the factory cells of
the C.P., even leaders of districts, small towns, and sometimes even provincial
cities, especially the Komsomols, can thus become true transmission belts of th
e proletarian currents which are crystalizing in society. And, from their ranks
there may appear future Nagys and Gomulkas, perhaps even future Bolshevik leader
s. This dialectical and dual nature, of the tendencies appearing in the C.P. of
the U.S.S.R. in their relations to the proletariat, reflect the dual nature of S
talinism and of the bureaucracy itself, which have never definitively cut the um
bilical cord which bound them to the proletariat.
It is by starting out from these same premises that we can solve the problem of
the possible resistance of the bureaucracy to the revolutionary onset of the mas

ses, Trotsky had already solved this problem in advance. He wrote in 1933:
The social roots of the bureaucracy, as we know, are to be found in the proletari
at, if not in its active support, at least in the fact that it tolerates it. If
the proletariat become active again, the Stalinist apparatus will find itself ha
nging in mid-air. If it tries to oppose it, repressive police measures will have
to be taken, rather than civil-war measures. At any rate, it will not be an upr
ising against the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the removal of a malignan
t tumor from this dictatorship.
There can be no real civil war between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the proletar
iat in uprising, but only between the proletariat and the active forces of count
er-revolution.
These predictions have been completely confirmed by the experience of the 16th a
nd 17th of June 1953 in Eastern Germany and by the experience of the Polish end
Hungarian revolutions. In all cases, before the Soviet military forces intervene
d, the native bureaucracy collapsed without seriously resisting the masses action.
Only small nuclei of the secret police defended themselves. The rest of the bure
aucracy divided: on the one hand, those who went over bag and baggage to the cam
p of the political revolution (in hundreds of factories and dozens of towns, str
ikes and demonstrations were led by official trade-union, party, or youth leader
s); and on the other, those who went into hiding or ran away (in the physical me
aning of the word) from the revolution.
As in the U.S.S.R. no foreign army will be able to intervene, the problem will b
e solved by the behavior of the Soviet army itself. We shall examine this proble
m in a few moments. But we can already predict that Trotsky s analysis will probab
ly be verified in the most striking way at the moment of the outbreak of the pol
itical revolution in the U.S.S.R. As there will also be confirmed the fact that
real civil war can break out only between the proletariat and the counter-revolu
tion. The Hungarian revolution was about to confirm this prediction when the cri
minal intervention of the Russian army changed the givens of the problem.
The Role of the Army
If we try to sum up what has been happening in the upper regions of the bureaucr
acy since Stalin s death, we can distinguish two different processes:
The falling apart of the solid nucleus of Stalin s faithful lieutenants into different
groups fighting each other more and more violently, and successively eliminatin
g series of leaders from the Presidium, each group quickly breaking down in face
of the impossibility of reconciling its desire to maintain the privileges of th
e bureaucracy with the necessity of making concessions to the masses.
The swift rise of the importance of the army, personified by the rise of Marshal
Zhukov, today a member of the Presidium and actually No. 2 or No. 3 man in the c
ollective leadership. [1]
We have already explained the first process as the indirect reflection, through
the prism of the bureaucracy, of the fundamental currents which run through the
whole Soviet society in ferment. In this connection, we must stress a very chara
cteristic phenomenon. In Stalin s time, the secretary-general alone made decisions
. After his death, a small group of lieutenants (Malenkov, Molotov, Beria) reall
y held the reins of power. After the fall of Beria, power passed into the hands
of a Presidium, composed of a dozen persons. When Khrushchev was voted into mino
rity within this Presidium, he appealed over its head to the C.C., composed of m
ore than one hundred persons. To give more authority to its decision, he was obl
iged to go and explain the matter to the workers, in the factories, and to the r
ank and file of the party. Tomorrow, a leader of a group within the C.C., if he

is put in a minority within this organism, may be tempted to appeal over its hea
d to the members of the party, to the workers in the factories. It will be a dec
isive event, a turning point in the post-Stalinist history of the U.S.S.R.
What does the rise of the army mean? Under Stalin, the real power of the secreta
ry-general was exercised through the omnipotence of the secret police, which con
trolled all the spheres of Soviet society, beginning with the party, the governm
ent, and the army. The death of Stalin, the execution of Beria, the reestablishm
ent of control over the secret police by the party, destroyed this system of pow
er. Outside the operation of bureaucratic centralism, of the nomination of offic
ials, the bureaucracy no longer has any instrument of power over the people othe
r than the army. All the information that we have confirms the fact that the arm
y, and more precisely the Moscow garrison, played a key role in the elimination
of Beria, then in Khrushchev s victory over Malenkov on one side, and over Molotov
-Kaganovitch on the other.
Does this mean that there is danger of a military dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.?
Without wishing a priori to exclude the possibility of short intermediate phases
in the process towards the victory of the political revolution, we think that t
he eventuality of military dictatorship is impossible as a stable form of govern
ment by the Soviet bureaucracy.
The Soviet army is today the true mirror of Soviet society. It is no longer a ma
inly peasant army. It has become an army of mechanics and drivers, reflecting th
e enormous technical and cultural progress of the workers state. It is true that
it includes a caste of extremely privileged and arrogant officers. Probably we s
hall soon see a Zhukov group appear in the Presidium, striving to represent the
interests of this caste. But the great reckoning which is building up in Soviet
society between the proletarian current and that of the most privileged strata o
f the bureaucracy will take place also in the army. The ideas of equality will p
enetrate there; the officers caste has already been obliged to make concessions,
especially by abolishing the separate officers messes. Many signs suggest that th
e decisive phase before the political revolution will be that in which revolutio
nary ideas will penetrate the army and make it unable to play its part as a shie
ld of the bureaucracy s privileges and power.
The Polarization of Forces in Soviet Society
Beginning with 1953, we have been saying that three parallel currents are being
polarized in Soviet society:
the current of the privileged strata of the bureaucracy;
the current of the peasantry, the least articulate of the three;
the current of the proletariat.
We had added that these three currents would have not only an indirect expressio
n, by the echo of their demands in the speeches and writings of authors and poli
tical leaders, but also a direct expression, on the level of openly stated deman
ds and of action, first economic, then even political. The social aims which the
se three currents strive to reach are. in short, the following:
the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy seek to enlarge the legal bases wh
ich guarantee their privileges; they seek to transform usurped powers into veste
d rights (especially in the factories);
the peasants strive to defend their private bits of land and the rights to the t
otal profits which they yield;

the workers demand better living conditions, and more rights in the economy and
in the state (basically they aim at the management of the factories).
In the very last discussion, preparing the great reform introduced by Khrushchev
in the management of the economy, these three currents appeared clearly:
As at the Moscow economic conference in 1955, the factory directors, taking adva
ntage of the principle of decentralization, again insisted that their rights and t
hose of the foremen be increased, especially the right to fire and punish worker
s. Khrushchev mentioned these demands in his report to the Supreme Soviet. The i
deological reflection of this pressure of the most privileged bureaucrats is the
new theory which appeared in the Economic section of the Academy of Sciences of t
he U.S.S.R., a theory according to which the means of production in the U.S.S.R.
should also be considered as merchandise! It is well known that the directors il
legal selling of certain pieces of equipment directly from one factory to anothe
r, without the authorization of the Plan, was confirmed as their right.
The peasants received from Khrushchev a quite sensational concession: starting f
rom 1958, they will pay no taxes on the products of their private bits of land.
This great principled Bolshevik has thus moved, in a few years time, from the strug
gle for agrovilles, for the statification of the kolkhozes, and for strict limitat
ion of private bits of land, to a policy of concessions to the powerful instinct
of private appropriation which remains more predominant than ever in the kolkho
zian peasantry.
The workers have increased their pressure in favor of an increase in real wages,
against a revision of the wage system which would end up by reducing the overal
l wage for the most skilled workers. They demand more equality and protest again
st the bureaucratic abuses of power. The strikes which broke out in the Donbas i
n October 1956 and which spread to Leningrad, the slow-down strikes which paraly
zed the Ordjonikidze factories in Moscow as well as other large factories, had e
ssentially the same aims.
The incident reported by the daily newspaper Trud and picked up by Deutscher is
very significant. A worker on the Red Square in Moscow went up to a Deputy of th
e Supreme Soviet who was leaving the Kremlin. He took him by the lapel of his ja
cket and said: That is good cloth. A worker could not buy cloth like that. This an
ecdote shows exactly how much the relationship of forces has changed in favor of
the proletariat since Stalin. But the worker, after having made this gesture, j
ust disappeared into the crowd. That shows how far there still is to go.
The Lessons of Hungary
What will be the concrete form of the proletariat s political revolution against t
he Soviet bureaucracy? Without going into fruitless speculations, we can bring o
ut a few specific characteristics of the experiences of Hungary, Poland, and Eas
tern Germany.
First of all, the political revolution will have the dynamics of permanent revol
ution. All the strata of the population are mobilized against the dictatorship o
f the bureaucracy. In the beginning of the revolution, all these strata will par
ticipate in the movement. It is in the very course of the revolution that the pr
oletariat and its conscious vanguard will conquer leadership and will bring the
revolution to the victory of soviet democracy.
The relationship of forces between the classes will decide whether this victory
can be won without an armed struggle against the organized forces of the counter
-revolution (in Eastern Europe and China). In the U.S.S.R., this hypothesis is e
xcluded because of the complete disappearance of those forces. This means that t
o forecast that from the very beginning of the revolution the forces will be div
ided into two clearly distinct camps, on the one side that of the Bolshevik-Leni

nists, and on the other that of the Stalinists, the confusionists, and the count
er-revolutionaries, is absolutely contrary to reality. To have such an idea of t
he political revolution is to deny in practice the enormous discredit and confus
ion that the Stalinist dictatorship has sown concerning the most elementary idea
s of Leninism.
The duration and the rapid outcome of this process of permanent revolution will
depend above all on the organization and the leadership of the proletarian vangu
ard. The working class itself will quickly find its own form of organization, th
at of workers councils. The examples of Hungary and Poland have proved this beyon
d all doubt. This is the general precondition of soviet democracy, which is thus
reestablished. But it is not enough that these councils should exist; they must
also quickly aim towards the exercise of all political power. The mere existenc
e of the councils is not a guarantee of the rapid victory of the political revol
ution. It can be combined, during a transitional period, with political compromi
se, the re-creation of petty-bourgeois parties, the attempt to give life again t
o bourgeois parliamentarism, etc. ... Only the presence in the councils of a con
scious revolutionary leadership will make them become the centre around which th
e whole class will gather, reestablishing its revolutionary democratic power on
the ruins of bureaucratic absolutism, and crushing any counter-revolutionary att
empt.
The national question will play an important part in the political revolution. H
ere there is a very important difference between the countries of the Soviet glac
is and the U.S.S.R. itself. In the countries of the glacis, the national question,
the feeling of oppression and exploitation undergone at the hands of the Kremlin
, are a powerful stimulus to the revolution, increasing the desire of the masses
for revolt and revenge. At at later stage, the national question could feed the
prejudices of the more backward strata and of petty-bourgeois groups. But a cle
ar and bold attitude on this question can channelize national feelings for the b
enefit of a workers solution to the revolution, as is shown by the Jugoslav and P
olish examples, even under the centrist leaderships of Tito and Gomulka.
It is not the same thing in the U.S.S.R. The national feeling, the feeling that
the U.S.S.R. has become the second world power, is more a prop for the bureaucra
tic dictatorship. The sentiment of national oppression, felt by certain oppresse
d nationalities in Europe (Ukrainians, Balts, and to a certain extent the Caucas
ian nationalities), will introduce a dissociating and centrifugal element into t
he popular movement of which the bureaucracy is already taking advantage (e.g.,
stationing troops on other nationalities territory). Finally, the Asian nationali
ties have in part a completely different attitude toward the bureaucracy from th
at of the European nationalities, because of the enormous progress accomplished
in their territories, even during the Stalinist period. This fact is also skilfu
lly exploited by the bureaucracy (mobilization of the authors of surrounding reg
ions against the most oppositional authors of Moscow). For all these reasons, th
e national question threatens to slow down the outbreak of the political revolut
ion and hinder its quick outcome in the victory of soviet democracy in the U.S.S
.R.
But it must be made clear that these are not absolute obstacles. In any case, th
e faster the proletariat can regroup and go into action, the faster its vanguard
can get organized and fight for the Bolshevik-Leninist programme, and the more
all the transitional phases of inevitable confusion and compromise can be shorte
ned, then the more quickly the revolution will appear in its purest aspect: that
of the struggle for the power of the workers councils.
The Programme of the Political Revolution
It is for this reason that the programme of the political revolution, which will

be discussed with passion by the communist vanguard, both workers and intellect
uals, beginning in the period of preparation of the revolution, takes on a decis
ive importance, and must be carefully prepared by this Congress. The theses whic
h have been placed before you strive to achieve this preparation in the light of
all the experiences of these last decades. We shall particularly stress two poi
nts.
Our theses state that soviet democracy cannot be achieved without the right for
the masses to organize different soviet parties. It is on this point that Trotsk
y, and ourselves still more clearly, go one step further than the fundamental do
cuments of the Third International and the Left Opposition. We believe that this
step is justified by the Soviet experience. If the proletariat does not have th
e right to organize different parties, the tendency struggle inside the class pa
rty itself is inevitably stifled, for sooner or later this struggle threatens to
end up by splitting the party. It is only if the revolutionary party honestly a
ccepts the rule: all power to the workers councils, if it acts within the framewo
rk of these councils as an organized vanguard fighting for the triumph of its id
eas without repressing the minority or. if such be the case, the majority of the
workers who do not accept these ideas, only then does the idea of the dictators
hip of the proletariat take on its true meaning, in opposition to the theories a
nd still more the bureaucratic adventurist practices of the Stalinists. Any othe
r solution ends up in bureaucratic arbitrariness, in which the party takes the p
lace of the class, the Central Committee takes the place of the party, and the s
ecretary-general of the Central Committee takes that of the Central Committee.
Our theses stress the real difficulties and contradictions, which live on into t
he transitional period, between the different economic functions of the workers s
tate: the administration of the economy and the distribution of the national inc
ome; the advancement of socialist accumulation and the increase of the masses sta
ndard of living, etc. To guarantee the most progressive solution of these contra
dictions, they stand for a sharing out and autonomy of various powers: the shari
ng of power by the workers councils administering the factories, the trade unions
defending the workers interests as consumers, and the Soviets (territorial worke
rs councils) exercising the democratic political power of the proletariat; mutual
autonomy of the Soviets, the trade unions, and the party.
This solution is simultaneously opposed to the bureaucratic centralization of th
e Stalinists, and to the Jugoslav decentralization which maintains bureaucracy at
the central level, but at the same time re-introduces into the economy, by the w
ay of factory autonomy, the phenomena of waste that result from competition. For
instance, the Jugoslav factories hide technical improvements, new ways of organ
izing work, even patents, from each other, to win this socialist competition of a
new type.
Neo-Centrism
With the collapse of the Stalin cult, there also collapsed a whole way of politi
cal thinking, purely pragmatist and opportunist, among the leaders of the Commun
ist Parties, purely schematic and mythological among the rank and file: the Vozj
d, the leader (or the Central Committee of the C.P. of the U.S.S.R.), is always
right ... In the void left by the disappearance of these reflexes of obedience,
and with the lack of truly revolutionary Marxist criteria of analysis, there are
appearing all sorts of theories, of shadings of thoughts which lie between Stal
inism and Marxism. The two most important varieties are the following:
The semi-reformism of the rightist opposition tendencies: Giolitti and Reale in
Italy, Herv-Lecoeur in France, some oppositionals in Great Britain, some elements
of Harich s ideas in East Germany, some revisionists of the Polish C.P., the Gates
tendency in the American C.P., etc. Taking their inspiration from some of the id

eas launched by Khrushchev at the XXth Congress (parliamentary road to socialism

, etc.), these people are drawing near the Social-Democracy and throwing overboa
rd essential elements of Leninist thought.
The neo-centrism of the former Stalinists who, under the pressure of the masses
and of events, go farther and farther in the Marxist analysis of the phenomena o
f bureaucracy and of soviet democracy, including the real nature of Stalinism. T
hus Gomulka stands for the right to strike; Mao also stressed it in his first re
port on the movement for rectification. Mao even analyzes the sources of bureauc
ratism, in the contradiction between the manual workers (producers) and the intelle
ctual workers (administrators). All this goes much further than Khrushchev s scanty
theoretical notions on the personality cult.
True, in most cases, these centrists actions are not in conformity with their wor
ds. As representatives of a tendency of the bureaucracy, they are equally incapa
ble of continuing the road all the way to Bolshevism. The numerical and cultural
weakness of the Jugoslav proletariat, the real danger of counter-revolutionary
uprisings in China, constitute additional subjective obstacles on the road to a
victory of soviet democracy in these countries. Nevertheless, the importance of
this neo-centrism is enormous, because it keeps up a ferment in the minds of all t
he Communist Party militants in the world (including those in the U.S.S.R.), and
because it creates possibilities, for a revolutionary vanguard to use it as a s
tarting platform in its struggle for a return to Lenin.
The experience of the Polish revolution since October 1956 enables us to draw up
an objective balance-sheet of the meaning of this neo-centrism. The revolution
had achieved four great conquests: national independence; the workers councils in
the factories; the end of forced collectivization of agriculture: a certain fre
edom of the press and especially of speech in the workers movement. The first and
third of these conquests still exist and will probably not be abolished without
a civil war. But the second and fourth are always being questioned and run the
risk of being lost if the revolution continues to mark time as it has unquestion
ably been doing for a certain time.
Caught between the revolutionary pressure of the left and the conservative press
ure of the Stalinist right, Gomulka and his centrist group are striving to conso
lidate the position by avoiding any new concession either to one side or the oth
er. But each blow which they deal to the left strengthens not their own group bu
t the right: this is the most important lesson of the IXth Plenum of) the C.C. o
f the United Workers Party of Poland. What warps this process is the perfect orga
nization of the right, led by the Soviet embassy, and the lack of organization o
f the left, whose leaders are disoriented and demoralized. A revival of the left
with the slogan All power to the councils, opening the way to a concrete programm
e of economic and political reorganization, would, however, enable the real rela
tionship of forces to find expression, and would give a new start to the revolut
ion, which is far from being defeated.
The Return to Lenin
Stalin s epigones have incautiously launched the struggle against the personality c
ult with the keynote of the return to Lenin. In so doing, they have lit the fire wh
ich will destroy them! Khrushchev strives to spread the story that the present l
eaders all sincerely believed in Stalin as as long as he lived. But Communist mi
litants and the mass of the workers vanguard are discovering, and will discover m
ore and more, that this is not true.
The Czechoslovakian Stalinist leader on the cultural front, Vladimir Dostal, gave
the following answer in the organ of the Czechoslovakian Writers Association, Lit
erarni Noviny, to the objection by the Polish writer Jan Kott that Soviet litera
ture had lived in the midst of lies, since it said nothing of the crimes of the

Stalinist period:
I can imagine that the tragic conflict between duty and conscience has tortured m
any writers. But I consider it a natural and temporary surrender to historical n
ecessity that they finally decided to keep silent and to wait, for by acting aga
inst the government, they would have weakened their own country in years of a gr
owing threat of war. On one side, there was the fate of the country and of the r
evolution; on the other a few [!] human lives, the honor of a few, and the purit
y of principles. Between the two, there was no other course.
This is what a Stalinist leader says in Czechoslovakia, the country where the C.
P. has remained the most Stalinist in all Europe! But the new generation of Commun
ists, which is rising with the keynote of the return to Lenin will answer the bure
aucrats that in Lenin s mind the defense of principles can never be opposed to the
interests of the Revolution!
It will denounce those who have trampled these principles underfoot, not for the
interests of the Revolution, to which they have done great injury, but for the
interests of a caste of ravenous and bloodthirsty upstarts.
Drawing their inspiration from Lenin s faithfulness to principles, it will redisco
ver in the Oppositionals, and above all in the Left Oppositionals and in the Tro
tskyists, those who, without yielding to fear or temptation, have upheld the ban
ner of communism, keeping it clean and unstained. It will build a granite monume
nt to these thousands of nameless heroes who have, by their apparently hopeless
resistance in the past, assured the perpetuity and the magnificent worldwide rev
ival of Leninism which we are witnessing today. It will come to the conclusion t
hat the Fourth International, heir to these traditions, is capable of re-establi
shing them fully in the entire world communist movement. And by overthrowing the
dictatorship of the bureaucracy, by re-establishing soviet democracy, under the
banner of Lenin, it will clear the way to the victory of the World October.
Footnote
1. This report was presented before the Zhukov affair broke out. The passage in th
is report concerning the army precisely casts light on this affair. [Ed. Note]

Ernest Germain
The Law of Value in Relation to Self-Management
and Investment in the Economy of the Workers States
(1963)
The Cuban magazine Nueva Industria Revista Economica, organ of the Ministry of I
ndustry, published two polemical articles in issue No. ? (October 1963) of great
interest, one written by Ernesto Che Guevara and the other by Commandante Alber
to Mora, Minister of Foreign Trade. This polemic testifies to the vitality of th
e Cuban Revolution in the field of Marxist theory, too. It deals with a number o
f questions of the utmost importance in the construction of a socialist economy:
role of the law of value in the economy during the epoch of transition; autonom
y of enterprises and self-management; investments through the budget or by means
of self-investment, etc. Involved in these issues is the problem of the ideal m
odel for the economy in the epoch of transition from an underdeveloped country,
a problem of absorbing interest to the Bolsheviks during the 1923 1928 period and
which arose again, even if on a rather low theoretical level, in Yugoslavia, Pol
and and even in the Soviet Union in recent years.

The Law of Value in the Economy During the Epoch of Transition

The question of the application of the theory of value in the planned and socializ
ed economy of the epoch of transition has been subjected to the worst confusion,
mainly because Stalin, in his last work, posed it in a both gross and simplisti
c way: Does the law of value exist (sic) and does it apply in our country? ... Ye
s, it exists there and it applies there. This is an evident truism. To the extent
that exchange occurs, commodity production survives, and exchange is thereby ob
jectively governed by the law of value. The latter cannot disappear until commod
ity production withers away; that is, with the production of an abundance of goo
ds and services.
But this does not answer the concrete question around which turns the fundamenta
l discussion begun in 1924-25 between Preobrazhensky and Bukharin which has cont
inued to develop, with ups and downs, among Marxist economists and theoreticians
up to now: to what exact degree and in what sphere does the law of value apply
in the economy during the epoch of transition?
Stalin himself, while muddying the problem, had to admit a fact which the Khrush
chevist economists are nevertheless beginning to draw into question; namely, tha
t in the socialist economy, the law of labour-value cannot be the regulator of pro
duction, that is, cannot determine investments.
In developed capitalist economy, the law of value determines production through
the play of the rate of profit. Capital flows toward the sectors where the rate
of profit is above the average and production increases there. Capital recedes f
rom the sectors where the rate of profit is below the average, and production de
creases there (at least relatively). When the means of production are nationaliz
ed, so that there is neither a market for capital nor its free entry and withdra
wal, nor even the formation of an average rate of profit with which the rate of
each particular branch can be compared, clearly there is no longer a possibility
for the law of value to be directly the regulator of production.
If, in an underdeveloped country which has carried out its socialist revolution,
the law of value were to regulate investments, there would flow preferentially to
ward the sectors where profitability is the highest in relation to prices on the
world market. But it is precisely because these prices determine a concentratio
n of investments in the production of raw materials that these countries are und
erdeveloped. To escape from underdevelopment, to industrialize the country, mean
s to deliberately orient investments toward the sectors that are least profitable
for the time-being according to the criterion of the long-term economic and soci
al development of the country as a whole. When it is said that the monopoly of f
oreign trade is indispensable for industrializing the under-developed countries,
this means precisely that it cannot be accomplished until these countries are a
ble to pull the teeth of the law of value.
But perhaps this qualification applies only to the law of value on the world mark
et ? Cannot the law of value at least alter investments on the national scale, onc
e world prices are left aside? This is wrong again. The industrialization of an
underdeveloped country cannot be carried out rapidly and harmoniously except by
deliberately violating the law of value. [1]
In an underdeveloped country, and precisely because of its underdevelopment, agr
iculture tends from the beginning to be more profitable than industry, handicrafts
and small industry more profitable than big industry, light industry more profitab
le than heavy industry, the private sector more profitable than the nationalized se
ctor. To channel investments according to the law of value, that is, according to
the law of supply and demand of commodities produced by different branches of th

e economy, would imply developing monoculture for the export trade by priority;
it would imply preferential construction of small shops for the local market rat
her than steel plants for the national market. The construction of comfortable l
odgings for the petty-bourgeois or bureaucratic layers (an investment correspond
ing to effective demand ) would have priority over the construction of low-cost hom
es for the people which clearly must be subsidized. In short, all the economic a
nd social evils of underdevelopment would be reproduced despite the victory of t
he revolution.
In reality, the decisive meaning of this victory, of the nationalization of the
means of industrial production, of credit, of the transportation system and fore
ign trade (together with the monopoly of the latter), is precisely to create the
conditions for a process of industrialization that escapes from the logic of th
e law of value. Economic, social and political priorities, consciously and democ
ratically chosen, take the lead over the law of value in order to lay out the su
ccessive stages of industrialization. Priority is placed not on immediate maximu
m returns, but on the suppression of rural unemployment, the reduction of techno
logical backwardness, the suppression of the foreign grip on the national econom
y, the guarantee of the rapid social and cultural rise of the masses of workers
and poor peasants, the rapid suppression of epidemics and endemic diseases, etc.
, etc.
That is why the industrialization of the workers states follows a different road
from that of the capitalist countries where industries are built beginning with
the sectors that will most easily satisfy effective demand.
To violate the law of value is one thing; to disregard it is something else agai
n. The economy of a workers state can disregard the law of value only at the pri
ce of losses to the economy which could be avoided, of useless sacrifices impose
d on the masses, as we shall later demonstrate.
What does this mean? In the first place, that the whole economy must be carried
on within the framework of a strict calculation of the real costs of production.
These costs will not determine investments; these will not automatically go tow
ard the least costly projects. But to know the costs means to know the exact amoun
t of subsidies which the collectivity grants the sectors which it has decided to
develop by priority. In the second place, that it is necessary to have a stable
yardstick for these calculations; without stable money, no rigorous planning. I
n the third place, that all sectors where economic or social priorities do not d
ictate any preference are to be actually guided by the law of value, (for example,
different crops aiming at the domestic market). In the fourth place, so longs a
s the means of consumption remain commodities, and aside from the commodities an
d services deliberately subsidized or distributed free by the state (pharmaceuti
cal products, school and training materials, books, etc.), the preferences of th
e consumers will freely operate on the market the law of supply and demand will
affect prices, and the plan will adapt its projected investments to these oscill
ations (within the limits of what is available in finances, equipment, raw mater
ials, etc.).
In the light of these initial remarks, we can consider the importance of the two
problems raised in the Guevara-Mora polemic: What is value? Are means of produc
tion commodities in the transitional epoch? Mora affirms that value is not essen
tially abstract human labour; that it is a relation existing between the limited
disposable resources and the growing needs of man (p. 15). Still better: he holds
that value is a category created by man under certain conditions and for certain
(!) ends (p. 15).
It is clear that we are faced here with a subjective deformation of the Marxist
concept of labour-value, of which Marx specified the essence to be abstract huma
n labour. It is not by chance that Mora refers to the neo-Marxist Soviet economist

s [2], who have been attacked, in the USSR itself, and rightly so, as wanting to
introduce surreptitiously the marginal theory of value. His conception, accordi
ng to which the law of value is the economic criterion for regulating production i
n the epoch of transition (p.17) while he affirms that it is not the only regula
tor necessarily involves the notion according to which exchange of the means of p
roduction occurs even when these are completely nationalized, that sale of commodi
ties occurs even when these means of production pass from one nationalized enterp
rise to another, and that the contradictions between the state enterprises justify
the assertion that a change in ownership occurs at the time of these exchanges (p
.19). All these affirmations are contrary to the reality and to Marxist theory.
On all these questions, Che Guevara is entirely right against Mora.
Mora states that if in investments, one leaves aside the law of value, one must p
ay the price ; in doing this, you automatically limit the social resources availab
le to satisfy other needs. This is true, and we, likewise, underline the necessi
ty for strict calculation of production costs in all fields. But in limiting one
self to this economic truth, the social content of the epoch of transition is do
ne away with; that is, in abstracting from the class struggle, Mora leaves out a
whole important side of the problem.
In fact, it is impossible to operate in the economy of the epoch of transition a
ny more than in any other economy containing different social classes
with aggre
gates like social revenue,
social costs,
social price of investments, without at the s
ame time posing the question: Who is to pay this price to whom?
The society of the epoch of the transition to capitalism to socialism is not hom
ogeneous. In conducting an appropriate policy of investments, of prices, wages,
foreign trade, etc., the workers state can act in such a way that the social ben
efits of priority investments (numerical reinforcement of the working class; ele
vation of its standard of living, skill, culture and consciousness; reinforcemen
t of its leading role in the state and economy; accentuation of its participatio
n in political life, etc., etc.) are paid economically by other social classes;
the residue of the former owning classes; imperialism; the small commercial entr
epreneurs and independent peasants. In an expanding economy, this economic price
, paid particularly by the merchants, artisans and independent peasants can more
over be accompanied by a rise in their standard of living, on condition that thi
s rise is less than it would have been in the framework of the free play of the l
aw of value (thanks, for example, to a progressive income tax). [3]
The Law of Value and Foreign Trade
All the preceding evidently constitutes only a general framework for replying to
the specific problems which the question of economic calculation and the orient
ation of investments raises in each particular workers state. Here, Mora is righ
t when he stresses (p. 18) that in a small country like Cuba, which depends stri
ctly on foreign trade for the current functioning of its industry (spare parts a
nd raw materials) and for the equipment of its new enterprises, the necessity fo
r rigorous economic calculation is imposed with all the more reason than in a bi
g, largely autarchic country like the Soviet Union.
Exports are made according to prices on the world market. So that these exports
will not constitute a constant drain on the national economy (they must be met i
n any case in order to keep industry and industrialization going through imports
), it is necessary that the production costs of exported goods should as a whole
be below the prices obtained on the world market. It is necessary to fix the ob
jective on progressively suppressing all exports at a loss, so that exports are
not only a means supplying the national economy but, in addition, an important s
ource of accumulation, a means of defraying part of the expense of industrializa
tion a part of the costs of not observing the law of value on the national marke

t!
from abroad. The tendency for current prices of sugar to rise on the world ma
rket creates, moreover, a favorable framework for the success of such a policy.
The progressive diversification of exports, to render the Cuban economy independ
ent of future fluctuations of current sugar prices on the world market, must poi
nt to the selection of other export, products where production costs remain belo
w the prices obtained abroad (that is, average prices on the world market).
But Mora mixes up the need to carry out all these calculations in the most stric
t way with the extension of the field of application of the law of value in the
Cuban economy. The two phenomena are not identical; they can even be directly co
ntradictory.
The law of value determines the exchange value of commodities according to the q
uantity of labour socially necessary to produce them. The concept of socially nec
essary labour is determined in turn by the average level of the productivity of l
abour in a country, and by the concept of the effective demand of society
which
must never be confounded with human needs or social needs from an objective poin
t of view. In an underdeveloped country like Cuba, all production of many indust
rial branches can correspond to an effective demand, that is, all labour in these
branches can appear as socially necessary, despite a very low level of productivit
y. The reference to the law of value, far from thereby resolving the problem of
rapid improvement in the productivity of labour, of the technological transforma
tions which these industries must undergo, can only obscure it. Because the law
of value will have a tendency to keep alive archaic enterprises, as long as the
state of scarcity exists, from the moment there ceases to be free movement of ca
pital and free imports of commodities which could stimulate competition with the
se enterprises.
Far from being a field of application of the law of value, the dependence of Cub
a on foreign trade thus implies the necessity of economic calculation of compara
tive international costs, which could provide a choice of economic criteria, ind
ependently of any rigid law. The necessity to assure the country s supply of spare p
arts and raw materials imposes a certain volume of exports, even if these are ca
rried out at a loss. The necessity to maintain and develop the existing level of
industries dependent on foreign supplies imposes searching, as quickly as possi
ble, for profitable exports in relation to prices on the world market
even if th
is means switching investments toward branches that are already profitable in re
lation to the national market (branches that already sell their commodities at t
heir exchange value). The possibility of exporting at a profit, of gaining suppl
ementary resources from exports, of transforming trade into a constant source of
socialist accumulation, will moreover permit just the liberation of the economy
from the tyranny of the law of value, that is, will permit the development of new
industries despite the fact that their production costs at the beginning will b
e higher than the prices of imported products, without lowering the standard of
living or the rate of accumulation in the country. This is an aspect of the real
dialectics of the dependence on foreign trade and the play of the law of value
that is decidedly more complex than Comrade Mora thought!
The Law of Value and Autonomy of Decision at the Enterprise Level
In the debate which has raged in some of the workers states, the problem of the
area of application of the law of value is intimately linked with the problem of
autonomy of decision at the enterprise level in the field of investment. The Yu
goslav authors have even formulated with regard to this a veritable new dogma wh
ich requires critical analysis: Without the right of the self-management collecti
ves to dispose of a considerable part of the social surplus product, no genuine
self-management. [4] This analysis must examine the problem from two aspects: eco
nomic efficiency (criteria for choosing one investment project rather than anoth
er), social and political efficiency (success in the struggle against the bureau

cracy and bureaucratization).

The more backward a country is, the more conditions of almost universal scarcity
rule not only in the means of production sector but also for much of the indust
rial means of consumption (at least for the great majority of the population), a
nd the more detrimental the practice of self-investment is, the more detrimental
is it to permit the self-management collectives to determine for themselves the
projects for priority of productive investments.
It is evident in fact that under conditions of almost general scarcity of indust
rial commodities, almost all the investment projects can be economically profita
ble, no matter how gross the economic errors that are committed. Almost every pr
ofitable industrial or agricultural enterprise (providing funds for investment)
is like an island in a sea of unsatisfied needs. The natural tendency of self-in
vestment is therefore to attend to what is most pressing, both locally and in ea
ch sector.
In other words: if the self-management enterprises hold large funds for self-inv
estment, they will have a tendency to orient their investments either toward the
commodities which they lack the most (certain equipment goods; raw materials; a
uxiliary products; emergency sources of energy), or toward the commodities which
their workers or the inhabitants of the area lack the most. Thus, criteria of l
ocal or sector interest are placed above national interests, not because the law
of value is denied, but precisely because it is applied! This means, once more, t
o orient industrialization toward the traditional road which it followed in the hi
storic framework of capitalism, in place of reorienting it according to the requ
irements of a nationally planned economy.
An attempt can be made to reconcile national planning requirements and allocatin
g self-managed enterprises considerable funds for self-investment. The means cho
sen for this aim can be a levy-tax in behalf of national development funds and e
qualization funds for regional development. This is evidently a step in the righ
t direction, but it does not at all resolve the problem.
Since an underdeveloped economy is characterized precisely by the fact that the
enterprises of high productivity are still the exception and not the rule, it is
sufficient to leave them a part of their net surplus product and the inequality
of development between the industrialized localities and the non-industrialized
localities, the inequality of development and of revenue between the archaic en
terprises which enjoy only an average level of productivity and the enterprises
technologically up to date will increase instead of diminishing. It is necessary,
moreover, to insist on this fundamental idea of Marxism: any economic freedom, a
ny autonomy of decision and any spontaneity increases the inequality so long as ther
e exist side by side strong and feeble enterprises or individuals, rich and poor
, favored and unfavored from the point of view of location, etc. This is the rea
son why, it should be noted in passing, that according to Marx the mechanism of
the law of value leads to its own negation; competition inevitably ends in monop
oly.
The economic logic of a planned economy therefore speaks completely in favor of
productive investment by budgetary means at least for all the big enterprises. W
hat must be left to the enterprises is an amortization fund sufficiently large t
o permit modernization of equipment with each renewal of fixed equipment (gross
investment). But all net investments should be made in accordance with the plan,
in the branches and places chosen according to preferential criteria selected f
or the society and its economy as a whole. In this respect, too, the thesis of C
omrade Guevara is correct.
The problem has been obscured, above all in the USSR, through associating it wit
h the problem of heightening the material incentives in enterprises. Numerous So

viet economists have criticized the stimulants still employed today in the econo
my of the USSR to incite the enterprises (?) to carry out the plans. This critic
ism is in general pertinent. It has but to repeat what anti-Stalinist Marxists h
ave said critically for many years. Yet, it is only necessary to examine closely
the arguments of these economists to see that what is involved in reality is he
ightening of material incentives for the bureaucracy for whom the growth of reve
nues must in some way be the essential stimulus for the expansion of production
in the enterprises.
This is where certain partisans of self-management, particularly in Yugoslavia,
maintain that decentralization of the decisions on investment would be a powerfu
l guarantee against bureaucratization. This thesis is based on a fallacy. The Yu
goslavs are right in stressing that the power of the bureaucracy grows in relati
on to its freedom in disposing of the social surplus product. But the technician
s and economists of the planning commission dispose of the surplus product only in
the form of figures on paper; the real power of disposal is situated at the lev
el of the enterprise. [5] The more that means other than consumption funds (dist
ributed revenues and social investments) are left at the free disposal of the en
terprises, the more is precisely bureaucratization stimulated, at least in a cli
mate of generalized scarcity and poverty; also the greater the temptation become
s for corruption, theft, abuse of confidence, false entries
temptations that do
not exist at the level of the planning commission, if only because of multiple c
hecks. The concrete experience of Yugoslav decentralization has shown, moreover, t
hat it is an enormous source of inequality and bureaucratization at the level of
the enterprises.
But doesn t the possibility of complete centralization of the means of investment
at the state level create the danger of the economic policy as a whole favoring
the bureaucracy, as was the case in Stalinist Russia? Obviously. But then the ca
use does not reside in the centralization itself; it lies in the absence of work
ers democracy on the national political level. [6] This means that a genuine gua
rantee against bureaucratization depends on workers management at the enterprise
level and workers democracy at the state level. Without this combination, even
the autonomy of the enterprises will eliminate none of the authoritarian, bureau
cratic and (often) erroneous character of economic decisions made at the governm
ent level of the plan. With this combination, the centralization of investments
priorities being democratically established, for example through a national cong
ress of workers councils would not encourage bureaucratization, but, on the cont
rary, suppress one of its principle sources.
The Law of Value and Self-Management
Heightening material incentives in the enterprises cannot be a stimulant in the ques
tion of investments. But heightening material incentives in the self-management co
llectives can actually stimulate continual growth of production and productivity
among the enterprises.
Certainly, under a regime of genuine socialist democracy, creative enthusiasm, t
he free development of all the capacities of invention and organization of the p
roletariat, constitute a powerful motor for the growth of production. But it wou
ld be a grave idealist and voluntarist error to suppose that in a in a climate o
f poverty
inevitable in an underdeveloped country immediately following the vict
ory of the socialist revolution
this enthusiasm could last long without a suffic
ient material substructure.
The example of the Soviet Union, where the proletariat gave proof of an enthusia
sm and spirit of self-sacrifice without parallel in the first years after the Oc
tober Revolution, is instructive in this respect: a long period of deprivation e
nded inevitably in mounting passivity of the workers, daily material concerns ta

king precedence over attentiveness to meetings.

It is therefore imperative to link self-management to the possibility for the wo
rkers to immediately judge the success of each effort at increasing production b
y the elevation of their standard of living. The simplest and most transparent t
echnique is that of distributing a part of the net revenue of the enterprise amo
ng the workers in the form of one or more months of bonus wages, the amount incr
easing or diminishing automatically with the level of revenue. The increasing co
llective material interest of the workers in the management of the enterprises m
oreover is superior to piece wages, inasmuch as it does not introduce division a
nd conflicts in the workers collectivity, inasmuch as it corresponds better to co
ntemporary technique, which place less and less importance on individual output
and more and more importance on the rational organization of labour.
Self-management (and not mere workers control) seems to be the ideal model for o
rganizing socialist enterprises. But it by no means hinders more or less unlimit
ed competition among the enterprises, which flows from their autonomy in the dom
ain of prices and investments. This autonomy cannot but reproduce a series of ev
ils inherent to the capitalist regime: monopoly positions exploited in the forma
tion of prices and revenues; efforts to defend these monopolies by hiding discover
ies and technical improvements; waste and duplication in the field of investment
s; high cost or errors in decision, revealed a posteriori on the market (includi
ng the shutting down of enterprises); reappearance of unemployment, etc., etc. U
seless and detrimental from the economic point of view, it by no means constitut
es a sufficient guarantee against bureaucratization, as we have indicated above.
In this connection, the polemic of Lenin and Trotsky against the theses of the Wo
rkers Opposition is still completely valid. Marxism is not to be confused with th
e doctrine of anarcho-syndicalism. The genuine guarantee of workers power lies o
n the political level; it is on the state level that it must be established; any
other solution is utopian; that is, unworkable in the long run and a source for
the reappearance of a powerful bureaucracy.
For all these reasons, self-management does not at all imply wider recourse to t
he law of value in relation to centralized planning. [7] The fundamental data of t
he problem remain the same. It is necessary to carry out strict calculations of
production costs to show in the case of each commodity whether its production ha
s been subsidized or not. But nothing calls for the conclusion that prices must
be determined by the law of value, that is, by the law of supply and demand. If su
ch a conclusion still has some meaning with regard to the means of consumption,
it is senseless for the means of production which, we repeat, are not commoditie
s, at least in the great majority of cases. And even means of production which a
re still commodities those produced by the private or co-operative sector for th
e delivery to the state, and which the state furnishes to private enterprises or
co-operatives cannot be sold at their value without encouraging under certain con
ditions private primitive accumulation at the expense of socialist accumulation.
But, if the means of production are not sold at their value, the value of the means
of consumption is itself profoundly modified.
Prices are, then, instruments of socialist planning and cannot be anything else
in the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. If you say instrument o
f planning you likewise say instrument for determining the distribution of the n
ational revenue between consumption and investment, an instrument for determinin
g the distribution of revenues among the different classes and layers of the nat
ion. To leave the determination of this distribution to the law of value, is to le
ave it in the final analysis to the laws of the market, to the law of supply and de
mand, that is, to economic automatism. And economic automatism would rapidly take
us back to an economy of the semi-colonial type.
But to say that prices cannot be determined by the law of value does not at all

signify that they can be independent of the latter. Society can never distribute
more values than it has created without progressively destroying its accumulate
d wealth and impoverishing itself increasingly in the absolute sense of the term
. The total sum of prices must therefore be equal to the total sum of value of t
he commodities produced (granting that there has been no monetary depreciation).
The distribution of certain products
in goods or vouchers below their value (su
bsidies!) automatically signifies a distribution of other products above their v
alue. Without strict calculation of production costs; without book-keeping aided
by an objective criterion; without a kind of double entry system that faithfull
y registers, for each product, alongside the price fixed by the state, the real
cost and the subsidy (or the tax) there is not only no possibility for genuine s
cientific planning, there is above all no stimulus for the fundamental economic
dynamic of the epoch of transition the dynamic that progressively elevates one n
ew branch of industry after another to the point of rendering it competitive in re
lation to prices on the world market, up to the time socialism announces its nex
t triumph when socialist industry as a whole operates with a productivity superi
or to that of the most advanced capitalist industry.
At the moment, the law of value could theoretically govern the dynamic of the work
ers state (or more exactly: the workers states as an international whole; becaus
e it appears excluded that this situation could be first obtained in a single cou
ntry ). But at the precise moment when it is on the point of triumphing, its reaso
n for being disappears. The highest level of productivity attained under capital
ism in all its branches cannot be surpassed without approaching such a level of
abundance that commodity production withers away. In the workers state law of val
ue cannot channel investments except to the precise degree that it withers away a
nd to the degree that along with it all the economic categories, products of a r
elative scarcity of material resources, likewise wither away.
Top of the page
Notes
1. Planned economy in the transitional period, while founded on the law of value,
violates it nevertheless at every step and establishes relations among the diff
erent economic branches, and between industry and agriculture in the first place
, on the basis of equal exchange. The state budget plays the role of a lever for
forced accumulation and planned distribution. This role must be increased in ac
cordance with the latest economic progress. Credit financing dominates relations
between the coercive accumulation of the budget and the fluctuations of the mar
ket, insofar as the latter enter in ... If the domestic Soviet market is freed and
the monopoly of foreign trade suppressed
exchange between the city and countrys
ide will become much more equal, the accumulation of the village (I refer to the
capitalist accumulation of the farmer, the kulak ) will follow its course, and it
will soon be seen that Marx s formulas likewise apply to agriculture. Once on this
road, Russia would rapidly become a colony that would serve as the base for the
industrial development of other countries. (Leon Trotsky: Stalin Theoretician. A
vailable in French in Ecrits 1928 40, Tome I, p. 106) [Available in English in dif
ferent translations as Stalin as a Theoretician in Militant, 15 September 11 Decem
ber 1930 and Stalin as a Theoretician in International Socialist Review, Fall 19
56 & Winter 1957.]
2. Among others, Novochilov, Kantorovitch and Menchinov. This question underlies
the famous debate on the possible use of profit as the sole criterion in carryi
ng out the plan. In reality, these economists are the spokesmen of the economic
bureaucracy, who demand increased rights for the directors of enterprises
partic
ularly the right to freely dispose of a part of the invisible funds (fixed equipme
nt).
3. From 1924 to 1927, the Stalinist faction violently accused the Left Oppositio

n Preobrazhensky in particular
with wanting to increase the prices of industrial
products. Preobrazhensky had simply proposed that industrial products could be so
ld above their value to the village, which could have been tied in perfectly with
a progressive lowering of the sales price in view of the rapid growth of the pro
ductivity of labour. But when the Stalinist faction made the turn to accelerated
industrialization, it increased the prices of industrial consumers goods throug
h extremely high indirect taxes. While in 1928, the tax on turnover was not abov
e 17.9% of the real turnover of retail trade, it rose to 78.1% in 1932, and in 1
936, the nominal turnover of this trade was 107 billion rubles, of which taxes a
ccounted for 66 billion rubles and the real turnover only 41 billion! (L.H. Hubb
ard: Trade and Distribution in the Soviet Union)
4. Thus Milentiji Popovic, in an article entitled Self-management and Planning:
On the other hand, in the sector of expanded social reproduction, in perfecting t
he system of investment on the basis of the new relations, our results are less
conclusive, although the first steps have been taken in this direction. The esta
blishment of non-administrative relations, of economic relations, in this sphere
, reverts quite simply to the establishment of credit-interest (!) relations, an
d to taking them as the basis ...
One must first of all counteract the contradiction which arises from the fact tha
t the resources servicing social reproduction are deducted exclusively through a
dministrative measures (taxes, duties, contributions) thus leaving free the orga
nization of labour without the latter on the other hand becoming the proprietor; t
he organization of labour evolves, in fact, into a unique system of credit in wh
ich these resources are at one and the same time theirs and common (article 11) ...
It is possible to avoid, on the other hand, having subjective and political cons
iderations as the only ones to be taken into consideration at the time of the ad
option of the decisions concerning investments. It goes without saying that this
method cannot and must not ever be pushed to its final conclusion. But a system
can be constructed in which the political decisions will bear on the general or
ientation of the political economy while the distribution of the means destined
for investment is carried out in accordance with the credit mechanism, according
to financial and material (!) criteria fixed with more or less precision. In op
erating in this way the process of expanded reproduction is likewise depoliticali
sed. This depoliticalization is not absolute. It must be carried out to the degree
that bureaucratism must be deprived of its base in this sphere as in the others.
(My emphasis E.M.).
Current Questions of Socialism, No. 70, July Sept. 1963, pp. 6
7 68.
5. This obviously does not apply to cases where raw materials, equipment, goods
and sometimes even means of consumption are centrally distributed, becoming veri
table hotbeds for germinating corrupted bureaucrats.
6. Only the co-ordination of three elements, state planning, the market and Sovie
t democracy, can assure correct guidance of the economy of the epoch of transiti
on and assure, not the removal of the imbalances in a few years (this is utopian
), but their diminution and by that the simplification of the bases of the dicta
torship the proletariat until the time when new victories of the revolution will
widen the arena of socialist planning and reconstruct its system. (Leon Trotsky:
The Soviet Economy in Danger. Available in French in Tome I of Ecrits 1928 1940,
p.127). [In English, in a different translation, see The Soviet Economy in Dange
r in Militant, 12 November 1932 7 January 1933.]
7. Certain Yugoslav authors take quite correct positions in this respect. See, f
or example, Dr. Radivoj Uvalic: While the open market can be widely utilized, it
cannot be the sole or even the principle regulator of the socio-economic relatio
ns of a socialist country. And again: The importance of the planned guidance of ec
onomic development under the conditions of socialism lies first of all in the po
ssibility that is offered of considering profitability from the point of view of
the economy as a whole and not from the point of view of each particular unit o
f the economy ... This is the case in all branches of high concentration of capi

tal (?), such as the production of the means of production and raw materials, wh
ich could be never developed sufficiently on the basis of the accidental play of
the market, with the rate of profit as the sole stimulate. (In: Socialist Though
t and Practice, No. 6, pp. 47 and 55)

E. Germain
An Answer to the Chinese Communist Leaders

Defense of Stalin

(November 1963)
The article On the Question of Stalin, published September 13 by the joint edito
rial boards of the Peking People s Daily and Red Flag as the second in a series of
answers to the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist part
y of the Soviet Union], is undoubtedly the worst contribution of the Chinese Com
munist Party [CCP] in the present discussion in the world Communist movement, th
e one which does most damage to the favorable reception given up to now to the C
CP and the one which most seriously hinders the progress of Communist cadres and
militants towards revolutionary Marxism insofar as it is being advanced by this
discussion.
Full of factual errors and distortions, it is also loaded with contradictions ei
ther within the article itself or with other important documents of the CCP or r
ecent declarations made by Mao Tse-tung.
But the most striking aspect of the article is its complete divorce from reality
. Nobody with the slightest knowledge of the opinions or aspirations of the mass
es inside the Soviet Union or the East European workers states can take seriousl
y a statement like this: This great majority of the Soviet People disapprove of s
uch abuse of Stalin. They increasingly [!] cherish the memory of Stalin.
Any attempt by the leaders of the CCP to build their tendency within the world C
ommunist movement on such a line can only lead to rapid and increasing isolation
, greatly facilitating the efforts of the Khrushchevite tendency to re-establish
monolithism and some kind of central bureaucratic control over the greater part
of the world Communist movement.
We are convinced that the leaders and members of the left-wing oppositional tend
encies inside the CPs of the colonial and imperialist countries will also rapidl
y discover this through their own experience. We are convinced that they will wa
rn their Chinese comrades with increasing insistence that a fight against rightwing revisionism that at the same time attempts to revive the cult of Stalin is
doomed from the beginning. We are convinced that they will raise the slogan, In t
he fight against Khrushchev s revisionism, let s not go back to Stalin but move forw
ard to full-fledged Leninism. And we are convinced that with the help of experien
ce and fraternal discussion, this slogan will find increasing echoes within the
Chinese CP itself, including its leadership. For that reason, we think it worthw
hile to submit the article On the Question of Stalin to much more searching crit
icism than it intrinsically deserves in hope that it will help speed the process
of clarification among left-wing Communists, in China as well as everywhere els
e.
Some of the arguments advanced in the article On the Question of Stalin are so s
elf-defeating that they seem almost naive. The authors write:
Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a despot of the type of Ivan the Terrible. Does n
ot this mean that the experience of the great CPSU and the great Soviet people p

rovided over 30 years for peoples the world over was not the experience of the d
ictatorship of the proletariat, but that of life under the rule of a feudal despo
t ? ... Khrushchev has maligned Stalin as a fool. Does not this mean that the CPSU,
which waged heroic revolutionary struggles over the past decades, had a fool as it
s leader?
They seem to forget a detail. The Soviet people and the CPSU have been led for n
early ten years now by a group headed by Khrushchev whom this very same article
denounces as a slanderer, a maligner, a falsifier of history, a fool, a coward,
a splitter of the world Communist movement, an objective agent of revisionism th
at serves as a bourgeois agency within the working-class movement. Other CCP doc
uments have compared Khrushchev and his group to the social-patriots of 1914 who
m Lenin termed bourgeois agents within the working-class movement. Yet these repel
lent figures have been at the head of the CPSU for some ten years and have been
part of the top leadership of the Soviet Union for 30 years! Why should this be
assumed to be a self-apparent absurdity in the case of Stalin and yet be taken a
s perfectly logical in the case of Khrushchev?
The authors of the article On the Question of Stalin say that Khrushchev maligne
d Stalin in his secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU when he admi
tted that Stalin had murdered the main cadres of Lenin s Bolshevik party. They dar
e to say that this admission is a distortion of historic truth. But facts are fact
s! Let the leaders of the Chinese CP answer these questions:
Yes or no, did Stalin execute the majority of the members of the Leninist Centra
l Committee that led the October Revolution, founded the Soviet state and the Th
ird International, and won the Civil War?
Yes or no, were these great Communist leaders murdered under the vile slander an
d absurd accusation that they were spies and agents of fascism and imperialism not
only from the moment they opposed Stalin but even before the first world war?
Yes or no, did Stalin murder not only thousands of Communists in the political o
pposition but also the majority of delegates to the Fifteenth and Sixteenth part
y congresses of the CPSU; i.e., the majority of Communist cadres who had support
ed him against the Trotskyist Opposition but who were still too much tied to the
old Bolshevik tradition to accept the monstrous Moscow trials and the systemati
c use of lies, slander and physical violence to solve inner-party discussions?
We venture to predict that the authors of the article On the Question of Stalin
will not attempt to answer these questions. No honest answer is possible but Yes.
Yet if the answer is yes, then it follows that Khrushchev did not malign and slander
talin in his secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. What he did wa
s to admit part of the historical truth and reveal some fresh details. Against t
his truth, sophisms evaporate like snow in the sun.
The authors of the article even dare to approve an old speech made by Khrushchev
in January 1937 in which the present first secretary of the Central Committee o
f the CPSU said of those who opposed Stalin, In lifting their hand against Comrad
e Stalin, they lifted it against all of us, against the working class and the wo
rking people!
Have the authors of the article forgotten that the first one to lift his hand agai
nst Stalin was no one but Lenin himself? Have they forgotten Lenin s testament, in
which the founder of Bolshevism advised the Central Committee to remove Stalin
from his post of general secretary? By making this judgment of Stalin, calling f
or his removal, did Lenin lift his hand against the working class?
An

Error

The leaders of the CCP fall into another glaring contradiction when on the one h
and they try to defend Stalin against Khrushchev s maligning him as a murderer and a
despot while on the other hand they themselves state:
On certain [!] occasions and on certain questions, he [Stalin] confused two types
of contradictions which are different in nature, contradictions between ourselv
es and the enemy, and contradictions among the people, and also confused the dif
ferent methods needed in handling them. In the work led by Stalin of suppressing
the counter-revolution, many counter-revolutionaries deserving punishment were
duly punished. But at the same time there were innocent people who were wrongly
convicted, and in 1937 and 1938 there occurred the error [!] of enlarging the sc
ope of the suppression of counter-revolutionaries.
What was the scale of this error ? Zinoviev, first head of the Communist Internatio
nal, was shot as a counter-revolutionist. So was Bukharin who succeeded Zinoviev
as the leading figure of the Comintern. So was Kamenev, member of the Leninist
Political Bureau. Trotsky, founder of the Red Army, was murdered by an agent of
Stalin. Rykov, another member of the Leninist Political Bureau and former chief
of the Soviet government, was executed as a counter-revolutionist. Piatakov, Rad
ek, Sokolnikov, Rakovski, Smilga, Serebriakov, I.N. Smirnov, Muralov and many ot
hers were similarly liquidated.
Do the leaders of the Chinese CP believe that all these Communists, these comrad
es-in-arms of Lenin, the majority of the members of the Central Committee in whi
ch Lenin sat from 1917 to 1923, were really counter-revolutionaries? Do the lead
ers of the Chinese CP believe that the top staff of the Red Army, executed after
a secret mock trial in 1937, were really counter-revolutionaries? Do the leaders
of the Chinese CP believe that the majority of the delegates of the Fifteenth an
d Sixteenth congresses of the CPSU were really counter-revolutionaries?
Their dilemma is insoluble. If they say yes then the only possible conclusion is t
hat the Soviet Union was founded by counter-revolutionaries and Lenin himself gu
ided the Communist party and the Soviet Union until he died with the help of a m
ajority of counter-revolutionists, spies and fascist agents. In that case, by the
logic used by the leaders of the Chinese CP, he was a fool if not worse. The ban
ner must then be raised for the rehabilitation of Lenin against the authors of the
article as apologists for the crimes of Stalin!
If they say no, if they decide that these slaughtered comrades were innocent victi
ms of Stalin s purges, innocent people wrongly convicted, then how can they reduce t
his mass slander and mass murder, often accompanied by mass torture, of thousand
s of old Bolsheviks and the majority of Lenin s closest collaborators to a mere err
or and react indignantly when someone speaks the truth and calls Stalin what he w
as, a despot and a murderer?
The authors of the article On the Question of Stalin declare: Khrushchev has mali
gned Stalin as the greatest dictator in Russian history. Does this not mean that t
he Soviet people lived for 30 long years under the tyranny of the greatest dictator
in Russian history, and not under the socialist system? By stating the question in
this form, the authors only prove that they have not yet learned how to disting
uish between the socio-economic foundations of society and its political superst
ructure.
In the history of capitalism many different forms of state and government have a
ppeared, from the extremes of autocracy and fascist dictatorship to what Lenin c
alled the most advanced forms of bourgeois democratic republics (including those i
n which citizens keep arms in their homes as in Switzerland or nineteenth-centur
y America). In the Soviet Union, capitalism was overthrown by the October Revolu
tion and has not been restored since. Property relations remain those of sociali
zation, of a transition towards socialism. The bourgeoisie has completely disapp

eared as a class.
But just as political counterrevolutions proved possible after the decisive vict
ory of the bourgeois revolution and the definitive establishment of capitalist p
roperty relations (for example, the Restoration of 1815 in France) so, experienc
e has shown, a political counter-revolution can destroy the political power of t
he working class after the destruction of capitalism without qualitatively modif
ying the socialized property relations.
Such a political counter-revolution occurred in the Soviet Union under Stalin. T
he social layer that dispossessed the Soviet proletariat in the exercise of poli
tical power was the bureaucracy. That there exists a deep antagonism between thi
s bureaucracy and the proletariat is not a Trotskyite invention. In his last years
Lenin had deep misgivings about the increasing power of the bureaucracy and he
was constantly warning about it and preparing for the coming struggle with it. I
n the final codicil to his testament, which was published for the first time in
the Soviet Union only two years ago, Lenin proposed that several hundred workers
should be brought into the Central Committee while remaining on the job.
The majority of the Central Committee decided not to act on this advice. They co
mpletely misunderstood or underestimated the danger of the bureaucracy as a soci
al formation. Unwittingly they thereby facilitated Stalin s destruction of Soviet
and party democracy and the establishment of his bureaucratic dictatorship. When
they finally grasped the danger, it was too late. For this mistake they paid wi
th their lives.
Left Opposition
It will remain the eternal merit of Trotsky and the Left Opposition to have corr
ectly understood the gravity of the danger from the time of Lenin s death. They co
rrectly defended a policy of industrialization and the maintenance of Soviet dem
ocracy, Success in this could have limited the bureaucratic deformation of state
and party. Although they suffered defeat, their struggle saved the honor of Bol
shevism and the program of communism, making it possible to transmit these preci
ous assets to a new generation. The cause of the Left Opposition became the caus
e of the Fourth International. It is the cause of revolutionary Marxism today, t
he cause of Leninism.
Khrushchev and the ruling strata of the Soviet bureaucracy, it is true, are tryi
ng to transform Stalin into a scapegoat for the collective crimes committed by t
he bureaucracy and the leadership of the CPSU in the 1930s and later. When the a
uthors of the article On the Question of Stalin recall Khrushchev s declarations i
n 1937 38, when they refer obliquely to Khrushchev s own role as a butcher of Ukrain
ian Communists and intellectuals during the Yezovtchina, they do well, be it for
obscure reasons of their own.
They write, for instance:
Why does Khrushchev, who was in the leadership of the party and the state in Stal
in s period, and who actively supported and firmly [!] executed the policy of supp
ressing counter-revolutionists, repudiate everything done during this period and
shift the blame for all the errors on to Stalin alone, while altogether whitewa
shing himself?
This scores a good debating point and at the same time serves the more serious p
urpose of warning Khrushchev that if the fight becomes rougher, the Chinese, or
people allied to them, might at a certain point begin disclosing specific crimes
committed during the period of the purges by Khrushchev and other associates of
his now on the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

If this approach is pursued, two possibilities are open. One is to whitewash Sta
lin which also whitewashes Khrushchev and the whole Soviet bureaucracy. The othe
r is to indict Khrushchev and the rest of his colleagues for their joint respons
ibility in Stalin s crimes. The Chinese leaders seems
for the time being to have a
dopted the first course. This leads away from the truth, away from Leninism, awa
y from the Soviet masses. As for us, we prefer the other course.
Un-Marxist Theory
The authors of the article under examination satisfy themselves with denouncing
the completely un-Marxist theory of the personality cult, without attempting to of
fer a Marxist, dialectical materialist explanation of the contradictions of Sovi
et society. Indeed, they even maintain that these contradictions are essentially
nonexistent and that all that is involved is the interrelationship of leaders, p
arty, class and masses.
This is all the stranger in view of the fact that Mao Tse-tung himself, as late
as 1957, i.e., after the Hungarian Revolution, in his speech entitled On the Con
tradictions within the People, came close to a Trotskyist
that is, a Marxist analy
sis of these contradictions. Mao s view was quite different from Khrushchev s rambli
ngs on the personality cult, which cannot be taken seriously by any Marxist. (A cu
lt that dominated society completely, yet had no roots whatsoever in its infrast
ructure!) Mao s view was different, too, from that of the authors of On the Questi
on of Stalin with their vulgar platitudes about the leaders and the masses.
In his well-known speech Mao reduced the basic contradiction within the people, in
the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the contradiction between
workers engaged in production and administrators. (We prefer the term used by Mar
x and Lenin, bureaucrats. ) From this analysis it is but a step to understanding th
e crimes of the Stalinist era as resulting from a temporary defeat of the worker
s by the bureaucracy under specific conditions of isolation of the revolution, b
ackwardness of the country and lack of understanding by the subjective factor (the
party) after the death of Lenin.
Instead of taking this step forward in the direction of Leninism, the Chinese le
aders seem today to be taking a step backward to an absurd denial of social cont
radictions within the people during the dictatorship of the proletariat, to an abs
urd denial of the crimes of Stalin. The stream of history is moving in a directi
on opposite to these new errors!
Hungarian Revolution
It is in the light of this same contradiction between the workers and peasants o
n one hand and the bureaucracy on the other that the working-class uprisings in
East Berlin and East Germany July 16 17, 1953, and the demonstrations in Poland an
d revolution in Hungary in October 1956 must be viewed. The contradiction betwee
n the social forces in these countries was rendered all the more violent by econ
omic exploitation and national oppression practiced in these countries under Sta
lin.
In their first article of reply to the Open Letter of the Central Committee of t
he CPSU, the editors of the People s Daily and Red Flag implicitly recognize this
fact, for they state: By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comr
ades by armed force, it [the leadership of the CPSU] committed the error of grea
t-power chauvinism.
The authors also reveal (a fact widely known in Communist circles) that the lead

ers of the Chinese Communist party strongly opposed Kremlin intervention in Pola
nd and thereby probably saved the Polish working class and Gomulka from a repeti
tion of the Hungarian tragedy. All the more astonishing is their pride in having
pressed for counter-revolutionary intervention against the Hungarian workers: We
insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter-revolutio
nary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungar
y.
The main social force in rebellion in Hungary was the working class. A couple of
facts prove this to the hilt. After Soviet troops smashed the Nagy government,
the workers organized one of the longest and most solid general strikes in the h
istory of the international workers movement. The freely elected leadership advan
ced the following purely socialist demands:
We state expressly that the revolutionary working class considers the factories a
nd the land as property of the people ... We ask for free elections, but only th
ose parties should be allowed to participate in them who recognize and have alwa
ys recognized the socialist order.
The authors of On the Question of Stalin did not, of course, compose a pure and
simple apology for Stalin, as some people have incorrectly assumed. They note ma
ny errors committed by Stalin in many fields. Among other things they censure Stal
in for also giving some bad counsel in the international Communist movement. Thes
e mistakes caused some [!] losses to the Soviet Union and the international Comm
unist movement.
When the authors turn to their own country and their own Revolution, this heavy
veil of discretion and understatement is replaced by a thinner curtain. We learn
that in the late 20s, the 30s and the early 40s, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists r
epresented by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Liu Chao-shi resisted the influence of S
talin s mistakes ...
In other words, in Chinese affairs, Stalin was wrong for 20 years! A slight erro
r, of course, especially if you happen to know, as the article admits for the fi
rst time
at least by implication that the right-wing errors that led to the trag
ic defeat of the Chinese Revolution of 1925 27 were directly inspired by Stalin s bad
counsel.
Instead of repeating the tired phrases about Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharini
tes and other bourgeois agents, the leaders of the Chinese Communist party would
do better to make an objective study of the real positions held by L.D. Trotsky
and the movement founded by him, both in the past and at present. Thus they woul
d discover that Trotsky correctly opposed both the rightist and leftist errors of St
alin and the Comintern leadership up to 1932, even before Mao Tse-tung felt that
something was wrong.
Surely the leaders of the Chinese Communist party must know that the Trotskyists
everywhere in the world have been the staunchest defenders of the great Chinese
Revolution and the great People s Republic of China against the attacks of Nehru s
capitalist regime and its apologists. Surely they must know that these same Trot
skyists everywhere in the world defend the Chinese Communist party against the s
landers of the Khrushchevites who have suddenly discovered that it is Mao Tse-tu
ng and his comrades and not the American imperialists who are warmongers and peopl
e desirous of provoking nuclear world war. At a moment when the Chinese CP is unde
r a constant barrage of slander of the purest Stalinist type; at a moment when K
hrushchev and his henchmen are labeling the Chinese-comrades splitters and wreckers
because they dare introduce their Communist literature into the Soviet Union, ev
en printed what blasphemy!
in the Russian language, it is scarcely a good exampl
e of proletarian morals for the Chinese comrades to employ the same kind of slan
ders against the Trotskyists. Please don t do to others what you don t want done to

you, comrades!
When Izvestia devotes a half page to proving that the Fourth International favor
s the side of the Chinese CP on some important points in the dispute with Moscow
and hence a bloc exists between Peking and the Trotskyists, shouldn t it prove emba
rrassing to the leaders of the Chinese CP to claim that these supporters are bour
geois agents?
But Stalin s bad counsel was not limited to Chinese affairs. Let us recall a few exa
mples. Isn t it well known that Stalin opposed the Yugoslav Communist party s fighti
ng for power from 1943 on, as in 1946 he opposed Mao Tse-tung s turning toward the
struggle for power? Isn t it well known that he advocated the same capitulationis
t line for Vietnam? How do the Chinese leaders judge the fact that every revolut
ion that achieved a dictatorship of the proletariat by its own independent force
in Stalin s time had to do so against his opposition?
Some of Stalin s errors happily did not prevent final victory. But what about the mo
re disastrous errors that continue to bear consequences to this very day? Do the C
hinese leaders believe today that Stalin was right in the criminal line he advoc
ated in Germany from 1929 to 1933, according to which not fascism but the social
-democracy was the main enemy and the main target to be attacked by the German C
ommunist party?
Do they approve of the class-collaborationist, right-wing, opportunist line appl
ied by Stalin in Spain in 1936-39 which strangled the Spanish social revolution
and thereby greatly facilitated Franco s military victory? And what about particip
ating in and upholding capitalist governments, aiding in reconstructing the bour
geois army and the bourgeois state apparatus in France and Italy after the secon
d world war, a course carried out by the Communist parties under direct instruct
ions from Stalin which ended up by destroying highly favorable conditions for th
e victory of the working class in Western Europe?
The balance sheet of these errors is indeed staggering. Repeated over such a long
period, in so many countries, can they still be called just errors ? For a Marxist,
wouldn t it be more correct to call it a fundamentally wrong policy? And in that
case, isn t it necessary to probe for the social roots of Stalinist opportunism, j
ust as Lenin probed for the social roots of reformist opportunism?
Feeble Control
It is true, as the authors of the article claim in passing, that the leaders of
the Chinese CP succeeded in correcting or preventing some of these errors and esse
ntially kept their own counsel. They were able to do so and finally lead the Chi
nese Revolution to victory because of the feebleness of Comintern control due to
their relative geographical isolation. But they know that Stalin intervened dir
ectly in the leadership of the Chinese CP several times to try to put people in
charge whom he considered sufficiently subservient to himself.
It is scarcely cause for wonder then that in most Communist parties, ruthless in
tervention by the Stalinist international apparatus succeeded in eliminating fro
m leadership genuine revolutionary figures, rooted in the labor movements of the
ir own countries. The Kremlin replaced these revolutionists by servile, spineles
s executors of Stalin s orders, no matter how contradictory or how they subordinat
ed the interests of the international revolutionary movement to the diplomatic m
aneuvers and passing needs of Soviet foreign policy.
Ever since the Tito crisis of 1948, and more especially since Stalin s death in 19
53, the world crisis of Stalinism has continued to deepen. In order to save what
they rightly consider to be the essence of their rule economic privileges and a

monopoly of politics
the Soviet bureaucrats have been forced to make one conces
sion after another to the Soviet masses as they press for restoration of Soviet
democracy. The abandonment of the Stalin cult in 1956 at the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU was the most important of these concessions, the one that created th
e most contradictions within the international Stalinist apparatus itself.
Today no objective basis whatever exists, either in the Soviet Union or in the E
ast European workers states, for a return to that cult. The Soviet masses are not
much interested in Byzantine speculation about what Stalin said or really meant
by this or that statement about the party and its cadres. But they are extremel
y interested in preventing any return to the system under which workers could be
condemned to hard labor for being as little as 20 minutes late to the job. They
are extremely interested in preventing a return to a system under which their s
tandard of living was ruthlessly sacrificed in the name of an industrial giantism
in which heartbreaking waste occurred due to bureaucratic mismanagement. They ar
e very interested in overcoming the inhuman housing shortage that began in Stali
n s time. They are more and more interested in participating directly in control a
nd management of the economy and state
rights, the exercise of which was utterly
destroyed under Stalin.
When they hear the Chinese leaders say, Long live Leninism! they think of Lenin s te
achings on socialist democracy, on the highest functions being exercised by simp
le workers, on the dictatorship of the proletariat being the first form of the s
tate destined to wither away from the moment of its creation. On all these great
themes of Lenin s work State and Revolution, the Chinese leaders are, however, st
rangely silent.
Faced with this deepening mood of the masses, no sector of the Soviet bureaucrac
y that keeps in touch with reality dares to play with the defense of Stalin, for t
his would be the most certain way of cutting themselves from the rank and file o
f the party and the masses of workers and peasants, and most likely precipitatin
g an immediate violent political crisis in the country. For the same reason, any
policy geared to rehabilitate Stalin bars a bloc with any part of the Soviet bureau
cracy. It is a sterile attempt to make an alliance with the shade hanging over t
he bureaucracy in opposition to all the real social forces of the Soviet Union,
including the bulk of the bureaucracy itself.
To seek such an alliance can lead to nothing but isolation and utter failure. In t
he same way, no objective basis exists today for the creation of an internationa
l faction in the world Communist movement that would prove subservient to the Ch
inese state or any other state. The Yugoslavs found this out at some cost to the
mselves.
On the other hand, it is perfectly true that ever since the Twentieth Congress,
a dual process has been affecting the leadership of the world Communist movement
. Parallel to the so-called de-Stalinization process a more and more pronounced ri
ght-wing orientation has appeared among the leaderships of nearly all the Commun
ist parties in the capitalist countries, imperialist and colonial alike.
Because they rightly criticize the neo-reformist, neo-Bernsteinian theory and pr
actice of a peaceful, parliamentarian road to socialism through gradual structura
l reforms ; because they condemn the criminal policy of trying to convince the Ame
rican workers and Negroes that they should support the Democratic Party, which a
lso happens to be the party of the most rabid Jim Crow Southern Bourbons; becaus
e they violently and correctly condemn the shameful capitulation of the Dange le
adership before the Indian bourgeoisie; because they advocate that the Latin-Ame
rican masses should follow the road blazed by the Cuban revolutionists; in brief
because they in general advocate in most capitalist countries a more leftist po
licy albeit often not a completely correct revolutionary Marxist one
and defend
the ABCs of Lenin s teachings on the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat

, the Chinese Communists have already won much sympathy among the rank and file
of the world Communist movement and they can win more.
Poor Policy
But the rank and file of these parties are well aware that it is utterly impossi
ble to advance the cause of socialism by defending Stalin. They can only feel emba
rrassment over anyone who tries it. To try to rehabilitate Stalin will neither hel
p them win Communist militants to the Chinese position nor facilitate the task o
f winning stronger positions among the masses of their respective countries. Thi
s line also cuts them off from the genuine left-wing Communists in the workers st
ates, who are against Khrushchev, not because he has carried out de-Stalinization
but because he doesn t go far enough with it! Since the elements most sympathetic
to the Chinese CP are generally the most independent-minded in all these Communi
st parties, the strange campaign advocating a return to Stalin instead of a return to
Lenin insults their intelligence, clashes with their class consciousness and pro
letarian instincts and arouses an opposition which they will most certainly expr
ess.
The bureaucratic maneuver of speaking up for Stalin thus only leads into an impa
sse. In China itself, the Communists who come to understand this will increase i
n number from month to month. In the case of China, as has already been shown in
the case of the Soviet Union, the effort to build an international faction will
have important consequences through the introduction of strong pressures and co
ntradictions within the movement of those who start it. It is very important to
have a correct program!
For Chinese Communists the choice today is very clear: either backward to Stalin
, to complete isolation from the masses in the socialist camp and growing isolatio
n from the advanced militants and left Communists of the capitalist countries; o
r forward to Lenin, to full restoration of Leninism in correspondence with the n
eeds and aspirations of the great majority of Communists in the workers states as
well as the capitalist states and in correspondence with the objective needs of
the world socialist revolution today.

Ernest Mandel
After Imperialism?
(1964)
Michael Barratt Brown s After Imperialism is undoubtedly one of the most important
economic works recently published in English
indeed probably the most important
for socialist theory and practice. The author s purpose is ambitious: to test Len
in s definition of imperialism against the realities of the British Empire, from t
he eve of the industrial revolution up to the present day. In doing so, he provi
des a fascinating history of the British Empire s rise and decline, and describes
the economic and social transformations both in Britain and in the colonial coun
tries from which it sprang, and the economic and social changes it has in turn w
rought in all the countries it has touched.
For the first time, the whole history of the British Empire has been analysed by
a scholar with a good knowledge of marxist method, an excellent knowledge of ac
ademic economic theory, and an exceptional gift for the exposition of economic h
istory.

The development of the Empire is divided into four periods: a period of exploita
tion by plunder, often camouflaged as trade, culminating in the rape of India on
the eve of the industrial revolution, and roughly ending with the Napoleonic wa
rs, which established Britain s naval, military and commercial supremacy on a worl
dwide scale; a second period which extends roughly till the First World War (or
the beginning of the 20th century), during which the expansion and consolidation
of the Empire was mainly based on the need to conquer safe markets and keep the
trade routes open, under the control of military and naval strongholds; a third
period, which stretches from the beginning of this century till the early fifti
es, in which the Empire (and the Commonwealth which formally succeeded it) becam
e mainly a means whereby big vertically-integrated oligopolistic trusts could pr
eserve their private sources of raw materials and private markets, in the face o
f competition from other capitalist powers; and a fourth period, which we have v
ery recently entered, in which the sharpening of international competition, as w
ell as the changed structure of industrial output, forces the dominant oligopoli
es especially in the heavy engineering and mass production sectors
to create sub
sidiaries in the sterling area countries, in order to defend their exports in a
more efficient way than simply by protected markets.
This classification seems substantially correct for Britain. Michael Barratt Bro
wn himself makes the point that Lenin s definition of the main driving forces behi
nd colonial conquest was already correct in the case of Germany before the First
World War, and became more and more correct for most imperialist countries afte
r the First World War. An analysis of the specific nature of each particular col
onialism is certainly necessary. Recent studies have shown, for instance, that t
he particular nature of Portuguese colonialism lies in its rle as purveyor of che
ap manpower and as the generally parasitic middle-man for oligopolistic colonial
companies of other nations (mainly British and Belgian). French, Dutch, Belgian
, German, and Italian colonialism should each be analysed in the same specific w
ay as Barratt Brown analyses British colonialism. And when one abstracts from th
ese specific traits, Lenin s general characterization retains its overall validity
an abstract one, it is true, but Lenin did not intend to generalize on any othe
r level than that of abstraction.
I must take exception however to the title of the book, and to the way that its
author has neglected to summarize his own characterization of the present stage
of the Empire (Commonwealth) in a single formula. The French have coined such a
formula, which has already been widely accepted. They call the present phase of
imperialism, in which the former colonies have gained formal political independe
nce, but continue to be subjected to economic domination and exploitation by for
eign companies, neo-colonialism. That would have been a more correct title for t
he book. For its whole analysis drives home this very point; that imperialism
in
the sense of domination by monopoly capitalism of underdeveloped countries has
not disappeared, but has only changed its form.
Before he lays bare the roots of neo-colonialism, Barratt Brown deals with a mas
s of fascinating problems, many of which I have also dealt with in my book, Trai
t d Economie Marxiste. It will not surprise many Marxists that, using the same meth
ods while not always the same sources, we arrive at substantially identical conc
lusions. This holds true for such different problems as the reasons why the firs
t industrial revolution was located in Western Europe; the rle and impact of colo
nialism on the economy of the colonial countries, which were arrested in their d
evelopment and often actually regressed; the relation between the agricultural r
evolution (increase in productivity and output of agriculture) and the industria
l revolution [1]; the real nature of today s so-called mixed economy in Western Euro
pe, which is in reality a classical form of monopoly capitalism; the incorrect a
ssumption that a managerial revolution has eliminated owners of capital from the c
ontrol of the big oligopolistic trusts, and so on.

One of the interesting questions Barratt Brown tries to elucidate is Lenin s theor
y of a labour aristocracy , said to have been created in the metropolitan countries
where imperialists distributed some crumbs of their colonial surplus-profits to
the upper layers of the working class. Barratt Brown presents a convincing arra
y of evidence to undermine this theory. I substantially share his revisionism on t
his point. (Incidentally, the first Marxist to question this particular theory o
f the labour aristocracy was the late Fritz Sternberg, in his book Der Imperialism
us).
One important reservation should, however, be made. Lenin is certainly correct i
n stating that the colonial surplus-profit injected into the economy of certain
capitalist countries created big reserves which explain the general operation of bo
urgeois democracy . It is no accident that Fascism triumphed in the twenties and t
hirties essentially in the poorer imperialist countries, where the absence of colo
nies and hence of such reserves rendered social and economic contradictions much
more explosive, and where the margin for compromises was therefore much narrowe
r and sooner eliminated. The term labour aristocracy is therefore a correct descri
ption of those layers of the labour movement which can easily find a satisfying
niche for themselves within the framework of bourgeois democracy, and thereby sol
ve the social question at least for their own families: high trade-union official
s; MP s and municipal administrators: journalists, writers, and lecturers; and in
general all kinds of labour statesmen whose great apparent variety is only equaled
by their desperate monotony of outlook. There is no doubt in my mind that there
exists a definite relationship between surplus profits (both colonial and monop
olistic), and the reformist integration of some of the leading strata of the org
anized labour movement into capitalist society.
But what is true of the labour movement is not necessarily true of the working-c
lass, in the period of mass production (which was already predominant before the
First World War in countries like Germany and the USA), where it is no longer ar
istocratic craftsmen but mass production workers in big factories who become the
highest paid workers in the metropolitan countries. To say that these best paid
workers are a reformist labour aristocracy flies in the face of many historical fa
cts. In many imperialist countries (e.g. in Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and
even in the USA in the thirties), these layers became the social basis of commun
ist or left-socialist mass parties or tendencies, whereas the lesser paid worker
s, often less concentrated, less unionized and less militant, became precisely t
he mainstay of right-wing reformism or even non-socialist (e.g. catholic) unions
or political parties.
As a matter of fact, the difference in standard of living between the best paid
and the lower paid layers of the working class inside a particular capitalist co
untry has always been much less pronounced than the overall difference in income
between all the workers of one country and all the workers of another country,
especially between the workers of the imperialist countries and the workers of t
he colonial countries. In this sense, the working class of the imperialist count
ries as a whole could be considered a kind of a labour aristocracy compared with t
he workers and poor peasants of the colonial world. But this view too would impl
y a mechanistic form of Marxism. It would be historically inadequate to explain l
abour imperialism and lack of solidarity by workers in metropolitan countries wit
h colonial uprisings as an automatic result of these differences in standard of
living. The history of the international labour movement shows many examples of
great international solidarity, and many examples of desperate lack of solidarit
y, by metropolitan workers towards colonial revolutions, within the framework of
the same basic differences in wages. Thus the explanation of these different fo
rms of behaviour cannot be found in this permanent economic fact alone, but lies
rather in the inter-action between these facts of life and the conscious leadersh
ip provided by the organized labour movement.
It has been the failure to provide such a leadership for the movement that has g

enerally been responsible for the apathy of metropolitan workers towards struggl
es for colonial freedom, of which the attitude of the French working-class towar
ds the Algerian revolution was the most demoralizing example. But in the same wa
y, widespread and systematic political propaganda in favour of active solidarity
with colonial uprisings by the mass organizations of the working-class, general
ly succeeds in triggering successful actions of solidarity by the working class
itself
such as the agitation of the Italian Socialist Party against the Tripoli
expedition in 1913, which led to a general strike; the action of the internation
al communist movement in the twenties in favour of solidarity with the Chinese r
evolution, which met with great success in Germany, Britain, France, etc.; and t
he threat of a general strike by the Belgian trade-union movement which prevente
d the government from sending conscripts to the Congo in 1959-1960.
As a matter of fact, Engels formulas favour this revision of Lenin s aristocracy of la
bour theory much more than they support the theory itself. In his two letters to
Marx and Kautsky, from which Lenin quotes, Engels speaks about the bourgeois men
tality of the whole English working class in the 19th century, and not of any upp
er layer . It is true that in his famous introduction to the second edition of The
Conditions of the Working Class in England, on which Lenin draws extensively, E
ngels writes that these conditions have been improved only for two groups of the
working class, whom he then represents as an aristocracy of labour : the factory w
orkers who enjoy a legally limited working day, and the unionized workers. But i
t is obvious that as a result of economic transformations which took place not l
ong after Engels wrote, the majority of the working class came to be included in
these two categories, at least in most of the industrialized imperialist countr
ies. Thus one can no longer speak today of an aristocratic minority as opposed to
a miserable mass of the Western working class. [2] The contrast is rather between
the vast mass of factory workers, and the over-exploited minorities: home-indust
ry workers, agricultural workers, domestic workers, crippled and old-age pension
ers, colonial immigrant workers, negro workers in the USA.
Engels points out correctly that Britain s surplus profits were based not so much
on direct colonial exploitation as on the use of Britain s industrial monopoly, or t
o put this more exactly, its productivity differential compared with every other
country, from which significant wage differentials also sprang. [3] Barratt Bro
wn is therefore also right when he revises Lenin on this point too
that is, when h
e returns to a more general and less conjunctural analysis than that of colonial
surplus profit . Colonial surplus profit is one special aspect of a general catego
ry of monopoly surplus profit, which in a country like the USA today is much big
ger as a result of exploitation of less developed trade-partners than it ever ha
s been in an imperialist country directly exploiting a colonial empire.
But here we arrive at the heart of Barratt Brown s thesis. After the initial perio
d of outright plunder and primitive accumulation, and setting aside the obviousl
y devastating objective results of colonial rule upon the economic development o
f the colonies, (of which Barratt Brown gives a very adequate description), to w
hat extent has there in fact been economic exploitation of colonial, or generally
backward countries, by advanced industrial countries? Carried away by the moment
um of his substantially correct criticism of some of Lenin s more conjunctural ana
lysis, Barratt Brown seems here to go overboard on the other side of the argumen
t.
The facts he marshalls indicate quite clearly, it is true, that income from fore
ign investment (which did not even go mainly to the colonies anyway!) has not pl
ayed a decisive rle in the profits of British capitalism although it has been dec
isive for balancing Britain s balance of payments over a long period, and for coun
teracting the falling rate of profit, two points which Barratt Brown readily adm
its. He is also correct in stating that throughout the 19th century and up to th
e First World War exports of goods was more important than exports of capital fo
r the prosperity of British capitalism. He correctly picks out Engels formula of i

ndustrial monopoly (or more correctly: the productivity differential) as the real
basis of British capitalism s world-wide power.
But all this does not answer the question. Or rather, when Barratt Brown infers
from it that the wealth of rich lands such as Britain has not been a function of
the poverty of poor lands , i.e. when he eliminates the category of exploitation fr
om his analysis of international economic relations in the 19th and early 20th c
entury he overstates his case. For if he is basically right in saying that the w
ealth of British capitalism was rooted in trade (exports) and not in foreign cap
ital investment, then it is precisely this trade which was the main form of expl
oitation of the underdeveloped countries by the developed ones.
What Barratt Brown misses in his analysis is Marx s whole explanation of internati
onal trade as often an exchange of unequal quantities of labour: less (skilled a
nd intensive) labour of highly productive countries against more (skilled and le
ss intensive) labour of backward countries.
Marx s theory of international trade is a variation of Ricardo s theory of comparati
ve costs, perfected by a better understanding and application of the labour theo
ry of value. [4] Under capitalism, there is no international equalization of the
rate of profit, given a high degree of international immobility of capital and
labour. But there is the creation of a world market with single prices for many
commodities. How will these prices be established? By averages between the produ
ction prices of the advanced countries and production prices of the backward cou
ntries (Marx calls these average utilities of universal labour ). As long as the wo
rld level of industrialization does not prevent this, prices of exported manufac
tured goods, will be above the production price in the advanced capitalist count
ries (i.e. will fetch the exporter a surplus-profit over and above the average p
rofit he enjoys on his home market) and prices of imported primary goods will be
below the production price of these same goods in the advanced countries (i.e.
will cheapen the cost of constant capital, and enable a reduction
or a lesser in
crease in nominal wages). Of course, as these export prices of manufactured goods
will still be lower than the production prices inside the underdeveloped countr
ies, and as these import prices of primary goods will still be higher than what
their owners could fetch for them on their under-developed home market, the back
ward countries have an immediate interest in specializing in this form of intern
ational division of labour at least from a capitalist point of view.
In this way, by maintaining a roughly speaking three scales of value
in the adva
nced countries; in the backward countries; and on the world market an internatio
nal division of labour which confines the backward countries to output of primar
y products is created. Barratt Brown rightly underlines that this division of la
bour has no natural origin whatever, but is the result of a deliberate policy by t
he imperialist powers, which enables the industrialized countries to enrich them
selves through trade and to counteract their falling rate of profit. Trade betwe
en industrialized and underdeveloped countries at world market prices is not based
on an equal exchange of value, but on a constant transfer of value (surplus pro
fit) from the underdeveloped to the industrial countries, exactly in the same wa
y as exchanges between firms some of which enjoy monopolies of technical know-ho
w (and so produce at a level of productivity above the national average) transfe
r surplus profits to those firms on the national market of a capitalist country.
Barratt Brown s counter-argument runs along these lines: in order to import manufa
ctured goods, the underdeveloped countries have to export primary products. If t
he terms of trade turn against them
and the long-term evolution of the terms of
trade precisely reflects the phenomenon of transfer of value just described! thi
s automatically reduces their international purchasing power. Therefore, the eco
nomy of the imperialist countries does not really profit from an evolution of th
e terms of trade in their favour; paradoxically, periods of booming exports in B
ritain are traditionally linked to periods during which the terms of trade tend

to move adversely against Britain. [5]

Basically, this counter-argument is simply a variation of the old Ricardian thes
is that foreign or colonial trade provides no means of increasing the rate of pr
ofit in the industrial countries. Marx proves convincingly that Ricardo was wron
g. [6] To apply his answer to Ricardo
to the problem posed by Barratt Brown: the
adverse evolution of the terms of trade is no absolute check on the imports of
manufactured goods by underdeveloped countries, as long as supplementary purchas
ing power can be found: a) in the revenue of the native ruling classes, exchange
d for imported luxury goods (which might imply a drain of gold and silver, if th
e adverse trend of the terms of trade creates a balance of payments deficit); b)
through an increase in the quantities of primary products produced and exported
, which might offset the effects of the adverse movement of the terms of trade o
n the balance of payments; c) through a development of capital exports by the in
dustrialized countries, which play the rle of credit, enabling the underdeveloped
countries to increase their imports of manufactured goods, and so eventually to
increase their output of primary products, and thereby to increase their purcha
sing power for exports, etc.
The very statistics quoted by Barratt Brown for various periods prove the point.
For instance, between 1884 and 1900 the terms of trade became more and more fav
orable for Britain; in fact they rose by 20 per cent, which is as big an increas
e as that witnessed since 1952. Nevertheless, the volume of British exports rose
by nearly 50 per cent during these 16 years, and the share of these exports abs
orbed by the underdeveloped countries did not diminish at all.
Today, this development has taken a peculiar form. The initial industrialization
of many semi-colonial countries has, of course, completely changed the situatio
n in some fields of traditional light industry such as textiles. Precisely becau
se of backward conditions in the semi-colonial countries, above all the much low
er level of wages there, these countries have become formidable competitors for
imperialism in this field. No British or American industrialist or trader can ho
pe to make surplus profit by exporting cotton goods to India or Egypt, or by expor
ting nylon shirts to Hong Kong. But this very movement of industrialization crea
tes a new and no less impressive productivity differential in favour of the imperi
alist countries in international trade. This takes the form of a heavy premium o
n exports of the means of production, especially industrial and electrical equip
ment. Whatever may have been the results of sharpened international competition
on the price-level of these export goods, the prices paid by the underdeveloped
countries for these imports imply a transfer of value (exchange of more labour a
gainst less labour) as great, if not actually greater, than the exchange of cott
on goods against raw cotton involved in the 19th century.
This is, by the way, the economic rationale both of neo-colonialism and of all t
he variegated initiatives in favour of aid to the underdeveloped countries . Far fr
om being pure philanthropy or a simple product of the cold war (an attempt to prev
ent these countries from going communist ), it is in one sense a huge permanent sub
sidy to the heavy equipment manufacturers of the imperialist countries themselve
s. This point is perhaps insufficiently stressed by Barratt Brown.
There remains to be examined the conclusion which Barratt Brown draws from his l
ong and rich analysis. He shows that the social structure of most of the newly i
ndependent countries (as compared with the social structure of a country like Ch
ina), is a major obstacle to their rapid economic growth. He goes on to state
wi
th the necessary prudence, but much more clearly than the Soviet and Polish memb
ers of the UN commission which drafted the report on the economic consequences o
f disarmament! that it is unlikely that monopoly capitalism will advance aid in
such massive volume to the underdeveloped countries as to make their rapid indus
trialization possible. Finally, Michael Barratt Brown winds up his inevitably di
stressing picture of the chances of world industrialization today by an appeal t

o the British labour movement

and the labour movement of Western Europe generall
y to undertake this formidable task itself. His proposals imply a scheme for lon
g-term guaranteed purchases of both industrial and primary products, as part of
a multi-lateral trade clearing system, leading to some form of international eco
nomic planning (e.g. the Regnar Frisch matrix). This in turn implies much more n
ational planning, both in the Western European countries and in the underdevelop
ed countries, than is being practiced today.
Barratt Brown stresses that this will mean a major challenge to capitalism every
where. I wholeheartedly agree with this conclusion. I would even go further and
say that without a conscious break with capitalism, without a planned economy at
tuned to production for needs and not production for profit, the successful appl
ication of such a scheme on a wide scale will prove to be utterly utopian.
It is very improbable that governments which are not ready to break with capital
ism on a national scale will be ready to do so on an international scale. Barrat
t Brown s real challenge is therefore directed at the labour movement itself; he c
alls its leftward-moving militants and cadres to become conscious of their treme
ndous international responsibilities once a new Labour Government comes to power
. They could, if they really wanted to, dramatically hasten the end of world imp
erialism, and assist economic and social emancipation of the colonial peoples an
d their thrust forward towards planned industrialization on a socialist basis. W
hatever may be the intentions (or rather the very lack of them!) of the present
leaders of the Labour Party, if the majority of the militants of that party pres
ses forward with all its strength for a basic break with capitalism, in national a
s well as international terms, no power in Britain could stop that break from beco
ming a fact.
Top of the page
Footnotes
1. Since many writers think they have just discovered the truth (see an interest
ing book by Paul Bairoch: Rvolution industrielle et sous-development, Socit d Edition
d Enseignement Suprieur, Paris), it is worth pointing out that Marx was well aware
of this fact and wrote about it very clearly:
the development of industry presup
poses that agriculture has already witnessed an important variation (distinctive
development) of constant and of variable capital, i.e. that a mass of people ha
ve already been expelled from tilling the land (Theories of Surplus Value, vol.II
, chapter VIII, p.100, in the sensational new edition first published by the Mar
x-Engels Institute in Moscow which appeared in German in 1959, published by the
Dietz Verlag of East-Berlin.
2. Barratt Brown is wrong when he speaks in this context of the failure of Marx s p
rophesy of increasing misery for the workers . In none of his major economic works
(Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, Zur Kritik der politischen Oe
konomie, Theorien ber den Mehrwert, Das Kapital), can there be found a trace of t
he so-called theory of increasing misery (or theory of absolute pauperization ). This
theory was in fact attributed to Marx by his critics, especially the so-called r
evisionists at the turn of the century, and it was later hastily and unwisely ado
pted by many marxists. One can find in Marx s mature economic writings two theorie
s which in my opinion have been empirically confirmed: a theory of long term rel
ative impoverishment (i.e. of a declining of wages in the total national income,
this part of course weighed by the percentage of the total active population en
gaged in wage labour); and a theory of periodic short term absolute impoverishme
nt, as a result of unemployment.
3. The USA has, of course, enjoyed the same productivity differential for the last
30 or 40 years with much the same impact on the level of American wages and the
political consciousness of American workers as this differential had in 19th cent

ury Britain.
4. Some years ago, an interesting discussion took place in Yugoslavia between tw
o economists, Yanez Stanovnik and Yoj Vilfan, on Marx s theory of international tra
de: (see: Questions actuelles du Socialisme no.51, November-December 1958). Alth
ough, in my opinion, it is Vilfan who adopts the more generally correct position
s in this discussion, it is Stanovnik who stresses the evident relation between
Marx s theory of international trade and Ricardo s theory of comparative costs.
5. Barratt Brown makes the point, however, that a minority did in fact profit fr
om it (especially in the twenties and thirties of this century). Marx of course
states that the exploitation of the backward countries by the advanced ones thro
ugh international trade, generally favors only the capitalist class in the indus
trialized countries.
6. Capital, vol.III, ch.XIV; pp.219-220 in Fr. Engels edition (5th printing, Otto
Meissners Verlag, Hamburg 1921), and Theorien ber den Mehrwert, vol.II, chapter
XV, pp.433-435, in the above-mentioned new edition.

Pierre Gousset
Brief Analysis of Czech Crisis
(August 1968)
What is the result of the Cierna and Bratislava conferences? The form of the pub
lished communiqu (see the long Declaration of the Six Communist Parties in Le Mon
de of 6 August 1968) is that of a compromise. But was a compromise also made ins
ofar as the content is concerned? This is the question asked by both Czechoslova
k workers and intellectuals and Socialists and Communists of the entire world, a
fter a week of accrued tension which led us to the brink of a Soviet military in
tervention.
In any case, two major points have been won, at least momentarily. Soviet troops
have been withdrawn from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic s right to build socialism taking into consideration national ch
aracteristics and conditions, that is, its right to undertake a new experiment in
socialist democratization, has been recognized.
This means that the Warsaw Five-Power Declaration, which condemned this experime
nt and declared it dangerous for the entirety of the socialist camp, has been buri
ed without flowers or fanfares. This also means that the brother parties have deci
ded to stop the campaign of inflammation, slander and threats waged against the
leaders of the new course currently in power in Prague.
In return, the Czech leaders agree to reaffirm the principle of necessary and gr
owing cohesion of the socialist camp, and that of the leading role of the Communist
Party in the building of a socialist society.
The implication of the first point is clear: Czechoslovakia will not leave the W
arsaw Pact or CEMA (which it never intended to do anyway); within the framework
of these two treaties, it will accept decisions not always greatly to its liking
(such as the military maneuvers which have just taken place on its territory).
What freedom of movement has Czechoslovakia gained in this regard? This is less
clear. Will it have the right to ask the West for the 500 million dollars in cre
dit which the USSR has refused it, and which the technocrats in power at Prague
consider indispensable for the modernization of the economy? Has the USSR withdr
awn its refusal? We shall soon be informed on this topic.

More important
and more obscure
are the implications of the second point concede
d by the Czechoslovaks: the guiding role of the Communist Party. This doubtless
means that the creation of new parties will not be permitted, unless they are bo
und to the Czechoslovak CP by a pact for unity of action. But the true problem l
ies elsewhere. For the bone of contention between the Czechoslovak CP and the fiv
e brother parties did not involve so much the leading role of the Communist Party,
as its internal structure and the rights of its members.
Does reaffirmation of the leading role of the Communist Party mean a reintroductio
n of censorship? Will it put an end to freedom of speech and of the press for Co
mmunists, Socialists and workers? In other words, in what manner will the Czecho
slovak CP assert its leading role ? By suppression, repression and terror, as under
Novotny, or by persuasion, discussion and dialogue, as is being attempted by Du
bcek and his friends?
For the moment, it seems that the Czechoslovak liberals have carried the field on
this point. If this is really the case, all friends of socialism can only rejoic
e.
Nevertheless, we would tend towards caution in this regard. Dubcek s situation is
not without similarities to that of Gomulka in October 1956. Holding strong popu
lar support, Gomulka was able to remain within such limits that the USSR, after
having threatened him with its entire arsenal (with tanks already on the move),
could finally tolerate the experiment.
Subsequent events are well known. In order to maintain this precarious balance,
Gomulka moved against the Left with the increasingly warm approval of Moscow. Th
e masses were betrayed, and fell back into apathy. From a belated rebel, Gomulka
rapidly became the Kremlin s most valuable ally. The conquests of October 1956 we
re liquidated one by one.
Finally there was nothing left of the freedom of discussion seized in 1956. The
prisons were filled with students, intellectuals and oppositionist Communists. A
nd Gomulka is about to stumble under the pressure of the partisan faction, which i
s ceaselessly pushing him further to the Right.
Dubcek, who has none of the qualities of an intrepid revolutionary, could meet a
n analogous fate. The temptation to which he might succumb is that of moving aga
inst the Left, not only in order to reinforce the still fragile Pressburg Peace, b
ut also because the Left is disturbing his balancing act.
In the long run, only politicalization and radicalization of the Czechoslovak wo
rking masses, their increasingly direct participation in management of the econo
my and the State, the appearance of workers councils, the institutionalization of
workers power and of workers administration in these councils, can guarantee to t
he Czechoslovak workers that the conquests of February 1968 will remain alongsid
e of those of February 1948.

Ernest Mandel
The Revolutionary Student Movement:
Theory and Practice
(21 September 1968)

Introduction
In September and October of 1968 Ernest Mandel spoke at thirty-three colleges an
d universities in the United States and Canada, from Harvard to Berkeley, and fr
om Montreal to Vancouver.
His presentation at the International Assembly of Revolutionary Student Movement
s, which was sponsored by the Columbia University Students for a Democratic Soci
ety, was considered to be the outstanding event of the Assembly, and one of the
high points of his entire tour. This meeting took place on Saturday evening, Sep
tember 21st, at Education Auditorium of New York University. More than 600 peopl
e packed for the auditorium; and the question and answer period extended for sev
eral hours. This pamphlet is made up of the main address of the evening, and maj
or excerpts from the discussion period.
Mandel s speech was a powerful polemic against the tendencies of pure activism and sp
ontaneism which have recently sprung up among some radicals in the West. He argue
d in defense of the Marxist conception of the indispensable integration of theor
y and practice. During the question period, Mandel gave extended replies to a nu
mber of controversial questions in radical circles today. Among them were the so
cio-economic nature of the Soviet Union, the Cultural Revolution in China, the n
ecessity for a Leninist party, moral vs. material incentives, and many others.
Ernest Mandel is editor-in-chief of the Belgian left socialist weekly, La Gauche
. His major work, the two-volume Trait d conomie Marxiste, has gone through three ed
itions since its original publication in France in 1962, and has been translated
into numerous languages, from German to Arabic. The English and American editio
ns appeared early in 1969 under the title Marxist Economic Theory.
His popular pamphlet, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, also published
by the Young Socialist Alliance, has already had three printings in this countr
y. His latest work, La Formation de la Pense conomique de Karl Marx, traces the pr
incipal discoveries of Marx from his first economic investigations in 1843 to th
e publication of Capital.
I. The Revolutionary Student Movement: Theory and Practice
Rudi Dutschke, the leader of the Berlin students, and many of the other represen
tative student figures in Europe, have advanced as the central idea of their act
ivity the concept of the unity of theory and action, of revolutionary theory and
revolutionary action. This is not an arbitrary choice. The unity of theory and
action can be considered the most important lesson of historical experience draw
n from past revolutions in Europe, America and other parts of the world.
The historical tradition which embodies that idea goes from Babeuf through Hegel
to Marx. This ideological conquest means that the great liberation movement of
mankind must be directed by a conscious effort to reconstruct society, to overco
me a situation in which man is dominated by the blind forces of market economy a
nd starts to take his destiny in his own hands. This conscious action of emancip
ation cannot be carried on effectively, and certainly not carried through, unles
s man is aware of the social environment in which he is living, of the social fo
rces he has to confront and the general social and economic conditions of this l
iberation movement.
Just as the unity of theory and action is an essential guide for any emancipatio
n movement today, so Marxism teaches that revolution, conscious revolution, can
only be successful if man first understands the nature of society in which he is
living, if he understands the motive forces behind social and economic developm
ent in that society. In other words, unless he understands the forces that comma
nd social evolution, he will not be able to change that evolution into revolutio
n. That is the main conception that Marxist consciousness has been introducing i
nto the revolutionary student movement in Europe.
We will try to show that these two concepts, unity of theory and action, and a M

arxist understanding of the objective conditions of society, which existed for a

long time before the student movement in Europe was born, were rediscovered and
reintegrated in practical struggle by the European student movement as a result
of its own experiences.
The student movement starts everywhere
and it is no different in the United Stat
es as a revolt against the immediate conditions students experience in their own
academic institutions, in the universities and high schools. This aspect is obv
ious in the West where we live, though the situation is completely different in
the underdeveloped countries. There, many other forces and circumstances impel t
he university or non-university youth to rise up. But over the past two decades
the type of youth who goes to the university in the West has not, by and large,
found in their homes, in the conditions of their families, or in the local commu
nities pressing reasons for social revolts.
There are, of course, exceptions. The black community in the United States is su
ch an exception; the lower paid immigrant workers in Western Europe provide anot
her one. However, in most Western countries, students who come from this poorest
proletarian milieu are still a tiny minority. The overwhelming majority of stud
ents come either from petty bourgeois or middle bourgeois milieu or from the hig
her paid layers of salary earners or wage earners. When they reach the universit
y, they are generally not prepared by the life they have led up to that point to
understand very clearly or fully the reasons for social revolt. They first come
to realize this within the framework of the university. I do not refer to the e
xceptional small minorities of politically conscious elements but to the great m
ass of students who become confronted with a certain number of conditions which
lead them on to the road of revolt.
Briefly, these embrace the inadequate organization, structure and curriculum of
the university along with a whole series of material, social and political facts
of experience within the framework of that bourgeois university which become un
endurable to a larger and larger part of the students. It is interesting to note
that bourgeois theoreticians and educators who want to understand the reasons f
or student revolt have had to reintroduce within their analysis of the student m
ilieu certain notions which they have long eliminated from their general analysi
s of society.
A few days ago, when I was in Toronto, one of the leading Canadian educators gav
e a public lecture on the causes of student revolt. These reasons, he said, are e
ssentially material. Not that their living conditions are unsatisfactory; not th
at they are badly treated like nineteenth century workers. But socially, we have
created a sort of proletariat in the universities who have no right to particip
ate in the determination of the curriculum, no right to at least co-determine th
eir own life during the four, five or six years which they spend at the universi
ty.
While I cannot accept this non-Marxist definition of the proletariat, I do think
that this bourgeois educator has partially revealed one of the roots of the gen
eralized student revolt. The structure of the bourgeois universities is only a r
eflection of the general hierarchical structure of bourgeois society; both becom
e unacceptable to students, even with their present elementary level of social c
onsciousness. It would take us too far afield to probe into the deeper psycholog
ical and moral roots of that phenomenon. But in certain Western European countri
es, and probably also the United States, bourgeois society as it has operated du
ring the last generation over the past 25 years has provoked very widespread dec
omposition of the classic bourgeois family. As youngsters, the dissenting studen
ts have been educated first of all through practical experience to question all
authority, beginning with the authority of their parents.
This is extremely striking in a country like Germany today. If you know somethin

g about German life or study its reflections in German literature, you will know
that, until the second world war, paternal authority was least questioned in th
at country. The obedience of children towards parents was very deeply ingrained
in the fabric of society. Then the German youth passed through a series of bitte
r experiences beginning with a generation of German parents which largely accept
ed Nazism, went on to embrace the cold war, and lived comfortably on the assumpt
ion that so-called peoples capitalism (called social market economy ) would have no re
cessions, no crises and no social problems. The successive failures of these two
or three generations of parents have today created among the youth a deep feeli
ng of contempt for the authority of their elders and prepared them, when they co
me to the university, not to accept without challenge or without serious reserva
tions any form of authority.
They find themselves confronted in the first place with the authority of their p
rofessors and university institutions which, at least in the field of social sci
ences, are obviously out of touch with reality. The teachings they do get do not
allow any objective scientific analysis of what goes on in the world or in the
different Western countries. This challenge to academic authority as an institut
ion very quickly becomes a challenge to the contents of education.
In addition, in Europe very likely more than in the United States, we have very
inadequate material conditions in the universities. They are overcrowded. Thousa
nds of students are obliged to listen to professors through sound systems. They
cannot talk with their professors or have any contact, normal exchange of opinio
n, or dialogue. Housing and food conditions are also bad. Certain supplementary
factors extend the forces of student revolt. However, I must insist that the mai
nspring of the revolt would persist even if these material conditions were corre
cted. The authoritarian structure of the university and the inadequate substance
of the education received, at least in the field of social science, causes more
discontent than these material conditions.
That is why attempts at university reform which have been pushed by the more lib
eral wings of the different establishments in western neo-capitalist society wil
l probably fail. These reforms will not achieve their purpose because they do no
t get at the real sources of student revolt. Not only do they not tend to suppre
ss the causes of alienation of students but if widely applied, they would even i
ntensify that alienation.
What is the goal of university reform as proposed by liberal reformists in the w
estern world? It is in reality an attempt to streamline the organization of the
university to fit the needs of neo-capitalist economy and neo-capitalist society
. These gentlemen say: of course it is very bad to have an academic proletariat;
it is very bad to have many people who leave universities and are not able to f
ind jobs. This makes for social tension and social explosion.
How to solve this problem? We will do so by reorganizing the universities and di
stributing the number of places accessible according to the requirements of neocapitalist economy. In a country which needs 100,000 engineers we will be assure
d of 100,000 engineers rather than 50,000 sociologists or 20,000 philosophers wh
o cannot find gainful employment. This will do away with the main causes of stud
ent revolt.
Here is an attempt to subordinate the functions of a university, even more than
in the past, to the immediate needs of neo-capitalist economy and society. It wi
ll generate a still higher degree of student alienation. If these reforms are en
acted, the students will not secure a university structure and education which c
orresponds to their wishes. They will not even be allowed to choose the career,
the field of learning, the disciplines they want and which correspond to their t
alents and needs of self-realization of their personalities. They will be forced
to accept those jobs, disciplines and fields of learning which correspond to th

e interest of the rulers of capitalist society, not to their own needs as human
beings. Thus a higher level of alienation will be imposed through reform of the
universities.
I do not say we should be indifferent to any kind of reforms of the university.
It is necessary to find some transitional slogans for university problems just a
s Marxists have tried to find transitional slogans for other social movements in
whatever sector these come to life.
For example, I do not see why the slogan of student power could not be raised with
in the framework of the university. This would not do for the whole society sinc
e this would mean that a small minority allocates to itself the right to rule th
e overwhelming majority of society. But within the university the slogan of stude
nt power, or any slogan along the same lines of self-management by the mass of st
udents, has a certain validity.
Even there I would be a bit cautious because there are many problems which make
a university different from a factory or from a productive community. It is not
true to say, as some American SDS theorists do, that students are already worker
s. The majority of students are future workers or partial workers. They may be c
ompared with the apprentices in a factory since they are the same from the viewp
oint of intellectual labor as apprentices are from the viewpoint of manual labor
. They have their social role and their special transitional place in society. W
e must therefore be cautious how we formulate such a transitional slogan.
However, it is not necessary to pursue this argument further at this moment. Let
us accept for the time being the idea of student power or student control as an acc
eptable transitional slogan within the framework of the bourgeois university. Bu
t it is absolutely clear that even the realization of such a slogan, which in it
self is impossible for any length of time, would not change the roots of alienat
ion of students because these do not lie in the university itself but in society
as a whole. And you cannot change a small sector of bourgeois society, in this
case the bourgeois university, and think that social problems can be solved with
in that small segment so long as the problem of changing society as a whole has
not been solved.
As long as capitalism exists, there will be alienated labor, alienated manual la
bor and inevitably also alienated intellectual labor, and thereby alienated stud
ents, whatever changes direct action is able to achieve within the framework of
the university.
Here again, this is not a theoretical observation which is plucked from the sky.
This is the lesson of practical experience. The European student movement, at l
east its revolutionary wing, has gone through such an experience in practically
all Western European countries. In broad outline, the student movement started w
ith inner university issues and then spilled over the limits of the university r
ather quickly. It went on to raise a series of general social and political prob
lems which were not directly related with what was going on inside the universit
y. What happened at Columbia where the question of the oppression of the black c
ommunity was raised by the rebellious students is similar to what has happened i
n the Western European student movement, at least among the more advanced elemen
ts, who were most sensitive to the problems of the most exploited parts of the w
orld capitalist system.
They engaged in various acts of solidarity with the revolutionary emancipation s
truggle of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries, with Cuba, Vietnam and o
ther oppressed parts of the Third World. The identification of the more consciou
s sections of the French student movement with the Algerian revolution, with the
emancipation struggle of the Algerians against French imperialism, played a ver
y great role. This was probably the first framework in which a real political di

fferentiation took place on the left of the student movement. The same students
later played the vanguard role in the struggle for the defense of the Vietnamese
revolution against the war of aggression by American imperialism.
In Germany this sympathy with the colonial people had an unusual starting point.
The big student revolt was triggered by an action in solidarity with the worker
s, peasants and students of another so-called Third World country, Iran, on the
occasion of the visit of the Shah of Iran to Berlin.
The student vanguard does not merely identify with the particular struggles in A
lgeria, Cuba, Vietnam: it shows sympathy with the revolutionary emancipation of
the so-called Third World in general. The development proceeded from there. In F
rance, Germany, Italy
and the same process is now going on in Britain
it was not
possible to start revolutionary action in solidarity with the peoples of the Th
ird World without a theoretical analysis of the nature of imperialism, of coloni
alism, of the motive forces responsible on the one side for the exploitation of
the Third World by imperialism and on the other side for the self-liberation mov
ement of the revolutionary masses in these countries against imperialism.
Through the detour of an analysis of colonialism and imperialism the more consci
ous and organized forces in the European student movement were brought back to t
he point where Marxism starts, that is, to the analysis of capitalist society an
d the international capitalist system in which we live. If we do not understand
this system, we cannot understand the reasons for colonial wars or the colonial
liberation movements. Nor can we understand why we should solidarize ourselves w
ith these forces on a world scale.
In the case of Germany, this process took less than six months to unfold. The st
udent movement started by questioning only the authoritarian structure of the un
iversity, went on to question imperialism and the misery in the Third World, and
then by solidarizing with its liberation movements was brought to the necessity
of re-analyzing neo-capitalism on a world scale and in the country itself where
the German students were active. They had to come back to the starting point of
the Marxist analysis of the society in which we live to understand the deeper o
bjective reasons for social misery and for social revolt.
Unity of Theory and Action
In the total process of the dynamic unity of theory and action, theory is someti
mes in advance of action and at another time action comes ahead of theory. Howev
er, at each point the necessities of the struggle force its participants to rees
tablish that unity on a constantly higher level.
To understand this dynamic process we must recognize that any counterposing of i
mmediate action to long-range study is a wrong method. I was struck during the S
ocialist Scholars Conference and at various other gatherings I have attended in
the United States during the last two weeks by the systematic manner in which th
is division was defended one way or the other. It was like a debate between deaf
people in which one part of the audience says, It is only necessary to initiate
action, immediate action, anything else is useless, while the other part of the a
udience says, No, before you act, you must know what to do, so don t act yet. Sit d
own, study, write books. (applause)
The obvious answer gained from historical experience not only of the Marxist but
even of the pre-Marxist period in the revolutionary movement is that you cannot
do one without the other. (applause) Action without theory will not be efficien
t or of a deepgoing emancipatory nature because, as I said before, you cannot em
ancipate mankind unconsciously. On the other hand, theory without action will no
t be genuinely scientific because there is no other way to test theory except th

rough action.
Any form of theory which is not tested through action is not adequate theory; it
is useless theory from the point of view of the emancipation of mankind. (appla
use) It is through a constant effort to pursue the two at one and the same time,
simultaneously, and without division of labor that the unity of theory and acti
on can be reestablished on a progressively higher level so that any revolutionar
y movement, whatever its origins and socially progressive goals, can really atta
in its objectives.
In connection with the division of labor, another idea was expressed which struc
k me as extremely odd to be put forward at a body of socialists. This prevailing
division between theory and action, which is already very bad in itself, is giv
en a new dimension in the socialist movement when it is said: in one category th
ere are the activists, the simple people who do the dirty jobs. In another categ
ory is the elite which has to think. If this elite gets involved in picket lines
, it won t have the time to think or write books, and in that case a precious elem
ent of the emancipation struggle will be lost.
I must say that any notion of reintroducing within the revolutionary movement th
e basic division of labor between manual labor and intellectual labor, between t
he infantry which does the dirty work and the elite which does the thinking is p
rofoundly unsocialist. It goes against one of the main aims of the socialist mov
ement, which is precisely to achieve the withering away of the division or disti
nction between manual and intellectual labor (applause) not only within organiza
tions but, much more important, on the scale of society as a whole. The revoluti
onary socialists of fifty or a hundred years ago could not grasp that so clearly
as we do today when there are the objective possibilities of achieving that goa
l. We have already entered an objective process of technology and education whic
h is working towards that end.
One of the main lessons to be drawn from the degeneration of the Russian Revolut
ion is that, if this division between manual and intellectual labor is maintaine
d in any society in transition between capitalism and socialism as a permanent i
nstitution, it cannot but breed bureaucracy, new inequalities and new forms of h
uman oppression which are incompatible with a socialist commonwealth. (applause)
So we must start by eliminating to the extent possible any idea of such a divisi
on of labor in the revolutionary movement itself. We must maintain as a general
rule that there are no good theoreticians if they are not capable of participati
ng in action, and that there are no good activists if they are not capable of as
similating, strengthening and developing theory. (applause)
The European student movement has tried to achieve this to a certain extent and
with some success in Germany, France, and Italy. There has emerged a type of stu
dent leader who is an agitator, who can even, if need be, build a barricade and
fight on it, but who at the same time is able to write a theoretical article and
even a book and to discuss with the leading sociologists, political scientists
and economists of his country and beat them in the field of their own discipline
s. (applause) This has made us confident not only about the future of the studen
t movement but also about the time when these students will no longer be student
s but will have to undertake different functions in society.
The Need for a Revolutionary Organization
Here I want to deal with another aspect of the unity of theory and action which
has been under discussion in the European and North American student movements.
I am personally convinced that without a real revolutionary organization, by whi
ch I mean not a loose formation but a serious, permanent organization, such a un

ity of theory and practice cannot in the long run be achieved. (applause)
I will give two reasons for this. One is linked with the very nature of the stud
ent. The status of the student, unlike that of the worker, is by its very nature
of short duration. He remains in the university, four, five, six years, and nob
ody can predict what will happen to him afterwards when he leaves the university
. Here I want at once to answer one of the more demagogic arguments which has be
en used by some leaders of the European Communist Parties against the rebellious
students. They have said scornfully: Who are these students? Today they revolt,
tomorrow they will be our bosses who will exploit us, so let us not take their a
ctions very seriously.
This is a foolish argument because it does not take into consideration the revol
utionary transformation of the role of university graduates in present society.
Had they referred to the statistics, they could have learned that only a tiny mi
nority of today s student graduates become bosses or direct agents of bosses as to
p managers. That may have been the case when there were no more than 10,000, 15,
000, 20,000 student graduates a year. But when there are a million, four million
, five million students, it is not possible for the majority of these to become
capitalists or managerial executives because there are not that many capitalists
or managerial jobs available.
The kernel of truth in this demagogic argument is that a departure from the acad
emic environment can have detrimental consequences on the level of social consci
ousness and political activity of the graduated student. So long as he remains i
n the university, this atmosphere no longer surrounds him and he is more suscept
ible to the pressures of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology and interests. T
here is great danger that he will reintegrate himself within his new social mili
eu, whatever it may be. There will ensue a process of backsliding to reformist a
nd left liberal intellectual positions which no longer involve revolutionary act
ivity.
It is instructive to study the history of the German SDS, the oldest of the curr
ent revolutionary student movements in Europe, in this light. Since it was expel
led from the German Social Democracy nine years ago, a whole generation of SDS m
ilitants have left the university. After several years, in the absence of a revo
lutionary organization, the overwhelming majority of these militants, whatever t
heir individual wish to be convinced and active socialists, are no longer politi
cally active from a revolutionary point of view. Thus, to preserve the continuit
y in time of revolutionary activity, you need an organization which is broader t
han a purely student organization, an organization in which students and non-stu
dents can work together.
There is an even more important reason why there is need for such a party organi
zation. Because without it, no permanent unity of action with the industrial wor
king class in the broadest sense of the word can be achieved. As a Marxist, I re
main convinced that without the action of the working class it is not possible t
o overthrow bourgeois society and construct a socialist society. (applause)
Here again, in a remarkable way, we see how the experiences of the student movem
ents, first in Germany, then in France and Italy, have arrived in practice at th
at theoretical conclusion. The same sort of discussions that are going on in the
United States today about the relevance or irrelevance of the industrial workin
g class for revolutionary action were being held a year, or even six months ago,
in countries like Germany or Italy.
This question was settled in practice not only by the May-June 1968 revolutionar
y events in France but also by the common action of the students of Turin with t
he Fiat workers in Italy. It has also been clarified by the conscious attempts o
f the German SDS to involve parts of the working class in its agitation outside

the university against the Springer publishing combine and its campaign to preve
nt the emergency laws restricting civil liberties from being enacted.
Such experiences have taught the student movement in Western Europe that it is a
bsolutely indispensable to find a bridge to the industrial working class. This q
uestion has different aspects on different levels. It has a programmatic aspect
which I cannot go into now. It poses the question of how students can approach t
he industrial working class, not as teachers, because then the workers will send
them packing, but within a common field of interest and social endeavor.
It poses above all else the problem of party organization. Otherwise a series of
self-defeating experiments to build collaboration on a low level of immediate a
ction between a small number of students and a small number of workers will, aft
er three to eight months, dribble away and come to nothing. Even if you start al
l over again, when the balance sheet is made after a year or two or three, there
will be very little left.
The function of a permanent revolutionary organization
ocal integration of student and working class struggle
ontinuous way. There is not simply a continuum in time
continuum in space in the form of a continuity between
ho have the same socialist revolutionary purpose.

is to facilitate a recipr
by their vanguards in a c
but also, so to speak, a
different social groups w

We must ask if such an integration is objectively possible. It is much easier to

answer yes after the experiences in France, Italy, and certain other Western Eu
ropean countries and to defend that line concerning Western Europe than for the
United States. For historical reasons which I cannot go into now, a special situ
ation exists in the United States where the majority of the working class, the w
hite working class, is not yet receptive to socialist ideas of revolutionary act
ion. This is an incontestable fact.
Of course, this can change quickly. Some people said the same thing about France
only a few weeks before May 10, 1968. Yet even in the United States, there is a
n important minority of the industrial working class, the black workers, of whom
nobody can say after the experiences of the last two years that they are inacce
ssible to socialist ideas or incapable of revolutionary action. Here at least is
one immediate possibility for unity in theory and practice with part of the wor
king class.
In addition, it is essential to analyze the social and economic trends which in
the long run will shake the predominant political apathy and conservatism of the
white working class. The example of Germany under very similar circumstances sh
ows that this can happen. A few years ago the German working class was mired in
the same stability, conservatism, and unshakable integration in capitalist socie
ty as many people picture the North American working class today. That has alrea
dy begun to change. This case illustrates how a slight shift in the balance of f
orces, a little downslide of the economy, an attack by the employers on traditio
nal union structure and rights can create social tensions which can change a lot
in that domain.
In any event, it is no more my task to inform you about the problems of your own
class struggle than it is yours to preach to the workers. I want rather to poin
t out one of the main channels through which socialist consciousness and revolut
ionary activity may be transmitted between students and workers, as not only Wes
tern Europe but also Japan has indicated. That specific transmission belt is the
working class youth. As a consequence of the technological changes over the pas
t years affecting the structure of the working class, the bourgeois educational
system is inadequate to prepare the young workers, or part of the young workers,
to play the new role in this changed technology which they should play even fro
m the point of view the capitalists themselves. The United States exhibits an ex

tremely striking example of this in the total breakdown of education for the you
ng black workers who have an unemployment rate as high as the average during the
Great Depression for the total American working class. That fact explains a goo
d deal about what is going on amongst the black youth in this country.
This is only one expression of a more general tendency which dictates extreme se
nsitivity to everything which goes on amongst the youth. There is no more ominou
s sign of the decrepitude and decomposition of a social system than the fact tha
t it must condemn and reject in toto its youth. The French rulers during the May
events not only seized upon any distinctions between young students, young empl
oyees and young workers but considered the youth as such an enemy.
A concrete example was the incident at Flins during the general strike. After a
young high school student was killed by the police there was a tremendous tumult
. The police moved in and started to screen the demonstrators, asking people for
their identity cards. Everyone under 30 was arrested because he was considered
as a potential insurrectionist, as somebody who was going to fight against the p
olice. (applause)
If you carefully examine contemporary literature, the movie industry and other f
orms of the reflection of social reality in the cultural superstructure during t
he last five or ten years, you will find that, under the very dishonest cover of
talking about juvenile delinquency, the bourgeoisie has really drawn a picture
of the kind of youth its system produces as well as the rebellious spirit of tha
t youth. This is not at all limited to students or minorities like the black you
th in the United States. It likewise applies to young workers.
It is imperative to study whatever goes on in the milieu of young workers becaus
e the struggle to win these young workers to a socialist consciousness, to the i
deas of socialist revolution, will probably be decisive for the fate of most of
the Western countries over the next ten or fifteen years. If we succeed in makin
g social revolutionists out of the best of these youth, as I think has been done
to a large extent in Western Europe, we can be confident about the future of ou
r movement. If this possibility is missed and a large part of this youth drifts
to the extreme right, we shall have lost a decisive struggle and be in the same
grave predicament as the European socialist and revolutionary movement had to fa
ce in the early 30 s.
The unity of theory and action in practice means also that a whole series of the
key ideas of the old socialist movement and the revolutionary tradition are bei
ng rediscovered today. I know that part of the student movement in the United St
ates wants to create something completely new. And I heartily agree with any pro
posal to do things better because a balance sheet of what former generations hav
e succeeded in achieving from the point of view of building a socialist society
is not too convincing. But here a word of warning is in order. Ninety-nine times
out of 100, when you think you are creating or discovering something new, what
you are really doing is going back to a past which is even more remote than the
past of Marxism.
Virtually all the new ideas which have been advanced in the student movement in
Europe over the last two or three years and are now becoming current in the Unit
ed States are very, very old. And for a very simple reason which is lodged in th
e history of ideas. The logical trends of social evolution and the main projecte
d trends of social criticism were developed in their general lines by the great
thinkers of the 18th and the 19th centuries. Whether you like this or not, it re
mains as true for the social sciences as for the natural sciences where a series
of basic laws have been established in the past. If you want to develop new tre
nds, you have to proceed from the foundation which has been created by the best
that previous generations have been able to achieve.

This desperate search for something completely new is only an episodic aspect of
the initial phase of student radicalism. When the movement becomes broader and
mobilizes large masses then, paradoxically, the opposite will appear, as French
sociologists have underlined with great surprise in regard to the May events. Th
en the broad revolutionary student masses will strive to rediscover their histor
ical tradition and their historical roots.
They must be instinctively aware that they are much stronger if they can say: we
are fighting in an extension of a struggle for freedom which began 150 years ag
o, or even 2,000 years ago when the first slaves rose up. This is far more convi
ncing than saying: we are doing something completely new which is cut off from h
istory and isolated from the whole past as if that past had nothing to teach us
and nothing we can learn from. (applause)
This quest will ultimately bring the student rebels back to a few but very basic
historical concepts of socialism and Marxism. We have seen how the French, Germ
an, Italian, and now the British student movements have reverted to the ideas of
socialist revolution and of workers democracy. For somebody of my school of tho
ught it was a tremendous joy to see with what jealous precautions the French rev
olutionary movement protected the right of every tendency to free speech, linkin
g up with the best traditions of socialism. Your own assembly renews ties with t
he old socialist and Marxist tradition of internationalism when you say that the
student revolt is worldwide and the student movement is international.
Yet this is an internationalism of the same type, with the same roots and with t
he same goal as the internationalism of socialism, as the internationalism of th
e working class. The imperative international problems with which the students a
re faced are problems of solidarity with our comrades in Mexico, Argentina, and
Brazil who are leading tremendous struggles propelling the Latin American revolu
tion to a new and higher stage after the defeats which were imposed on them by b
ad leadership, by internal reaction and imperialist repression over the last yea
rs. Most of all, we have to hail the courage and audacity of the Mexican student
s. (applause) In a few days they have fundamentally changed the political situat
ion in that country and torn away the mask of false democracy which the Mexican
government put on to receive millions of visitors during the Olympic games. Now
everybody who goes to these Olympic games will learn that he goes to a country w
here the leaders of the railway union have been kept in jail long years after th
eir sentences were served, where many political leaders of the left have been im
prisoned for years without trial, where student leaders and a thousand student m
ilitants are in jail without any basis in law. Their heroic protests will have t
remendous consequences for the future of Mexican politics and the Mexican class
struggle. (applause)
It is also necessary to say a few words about persecuted students in other semicolonial countries about whom nobody speaks, such as the leaders of the Congo st
udents who have been in jail for nearly a year for having organized a small demo
nstration against the Vietnam war when vice-president Humphrey came to their cou
ntry. We must not forget the leaders of the Tunisian students who have been cond
emned to 12 years in jail for the same reason, just for leading a demonstration.
Twelve years in jail! We must alert public opinion so that these crimes of repr
ession will not be forgotten.
We must also think about our comrades in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (applause
) who have led great struggles this year. They have shown that their fight for i
ntroducing and consolidating socialist democracy in the countries of Eastern Eur
ope is a fight which parallels our struggle against capitalism and imperialism i
n the West. We will not let either Stalinist or imperialist reaction misrepresen
t the nature of this fight as pro-imperialist or pro-bourgeois, which it is to n
o extent whatsoever. (applause)

Finally, we must not forget, as some can do, because it may not be in the headli
nes, the fight against US intervention in Vietnam which is still the main strugg
le in the world today. Just because negotiations have started in Paris, that doe
s not mean we have nothing more to do to help the struggle of our Vietnamese com
rades. Therefore, I call upon you to participate in the worldwide action which h
as been endorsed by the Japanese student movement, the Zengakuren, by the Britis
h Revolutionary Student Federation together with the Vietnamese Solidarity Campa
ign there and by the Student Mobilization Committee in this country. This is the
Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution from the 21st to the 27th of
October. That week hundreds of thousands of students, young workers and young re
volutionists will come out at the same moment in a common worldwide action for t
he concrete goal which the Vietnamese comrades themselves tell us is the most im
portant today for them! Show the world that in the United States hundreds of tho
usands of people are for the immediate withdrawal of the American troops from Vi
etnam. That will be a very great accomplishment. (interrupted by applause)
II. Questions from the Audience
Q. Does Mr. Mandel believe the Leninist party structure is necessary to win a st
ruggle of the kind he projects?
A. The answer is yes. But in order to make that answer relevant to the discussio
n, let me first define what Leninist party structure really means. I will apply
the method of the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski by saying what it does no
t mean.
Leninist party structure does not mean the struggle for the one-party system bec
ause the one-party system was never part of Leninist doctrine. You will not find
a single line in any writing of Lenin where he said that in order to have a soc
ialist revolution or a workers state you have to have a one-party regime.
A Leninist party structure does not mean a new form of political organization in
which a monopoly of power rests with the party. It means a new form of social o
rganization in which power rests with the organized mass of producers, organized
in workers councils. And it is only within the framework of these organized wor
kers councils that a Leninist vanguard party fights for its hegemony by ideologi
cal, political means, not through repression of other tendencies, except when an
y of these other tendencies start to shoot at you. If the other tendencies start
to shoot at you, you have to defend yourselves. (applause)
That, by the way, is what happened in Russia after 1917. And that s what so many b
ad things came from. They did not come, as so many think, from the Leninist part
y structure. They came from the fact that the other Soviet parties did not recog
nize a clear majority at the Second Congress of Soviets which voted for a total
transfer of power to the Soviets, not to the Bolshevik party but to the Soviets.
If the other Soviet parties had accepted a majority vote and not started a civi
l war against that government legally elected by the Soviet power, then very lik
ely many other things would not have happened in the Soviet Union which we all d
o not accept.
Third, a Leninist party structure does not mean the absence of free press, of fr
ee speech, of free organization for all tendencies which rest on the basis of so
cialism and are against the reintroduction of capitalist property. Even for such
pro-bourgeois tendencies, Lenin said explicitly, it is not a matter of principl
e to deprive them of the right to propagandize for their ideas but only a questi
on of the concrete relationship of forces.
The Soviet leaders who defend their intervention in Czechoslovakia today by the
argument that some people were writing pro-bourgeois articles 20 years after a v
ictorious overthrow of capitalism forget that Lenin said very clearly whether or

not you deprive the bourgeoisie of its political rights is not a matter of prin
ciple. A small number of people at the top is not to be the judge of whether the
relationship permits freedom of the press for capitalists. That decision belong
s to the mass of workers organized in their workers councils. In any Western soc
iety that would comprise 80 or 85 percent of the population.
Fourth, a Leninist party structure does not mean a party in which the central co
mmittee, the politbureau or any other body dictates to the members what they hav
e to think. A Leninist party structure must be a party in which every member is
free to exercise his own critical thought, to examine political problems on the
basis of his own understanding armed with his own theory and experience. And whe
n he arrives at other conclusions than the leadership, he and his co-thinkers ha
ve the right to express them in political platforms.
During the life of Lenin every party congress of the Russian Bolshevik party had
organized minorities with the right to submit tendency platforms to congresses
which called for votes for or against. Unanimous congresses were the invention o
f Stalinism, not the product of Leninism, which had a completely different pract
ice. The leaders of the Soviet Union today accuse the Czech Communist Party of r
eintroducing in their statutes the right of minorities to organize themselves, t
o have their own platforms, to present their views internally in that party. And
even if they are voted down at one congress, they can present them again at the
next. These steps in returning to Leninist tradition are something the Moscow i
nvaders cannot tolerate.
From what I have just said about what Leninist party structure does not mean, yo
u can deduce what it should mean. It means simply that all those who are convinc
ed of the ideas of revolutionary Marxism, of revolutionary socialism, instead of
acting in a dispersed, disorganized, discontinuous way, should act in an organi
zed and coherent way, with the fullest possible democracy and with the necessary
coherence and centralization which makes their action efficient. It does not me
an anything other than that and I am one hundred percent for it. (applause)
Q. If, as I assume you think, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not a L
eninist party, where does one exist?
A. Here we must introduce another distinction. If you advance a theoretically pu
re definition of a party, which is not only a body of people holding a certain n
umber of ideas with a program, structure, statutes and so on, but which also has
a certain concrete impact on its own class and on the whole of society, I would
have to answer that in no place today have revolutionary Marxists already achie
ved such an influence. That is to say, they cannot yet mobilize under their own
banner a significant section of their own class.
What we do have today are the nuclei of such parties in various countries on all
the continents. There are groups which, on the basis of a correct political pro
gram and the organizational structure which corresponds to these principles such
as I outlined a few minutes ago, are seeking with more or less success to build
such parties. I personally think that such organizations adhere to the Fourth I
nternational on a world scale. The Socialist Workers Party in the United States
is an organization of this type although, as you know, it is prevented from bein
g a member of the Fourth International by reactionary legislation.
Q. If the workers councils are to decide all vital questions on economic, politi
cal, cultural matters, and if at the same time you maintain that political parti
es have ideological roles to play separate from these workers councils, what the
n is the separation between the workers councils and these parties in practice a
nd theory?

A. The way the question is posed shows a significant and dangerous similarity to
the type of argument with which the ruling ideologues of the Soviet bureaucracy
have defended their one-party system. They say: where you have one ruling class
, you need no plurality of parties.
My position is that, if you have one class and you want real democracy, you must
have different tendencies, which at least implies the right to have different p
arties. I will first try to explain the last point. If you don t have the right to
have different parties, every opposition, every critical tendency can be suppre
ssed under the pretext that it is potentially a new party. That s true. Any form o
f opposition, however unorganized it is, (Lenin once used the formula that spont
aneity is but the embryonic form of organization) can be denounced by its enemie
s as the nucleus, the starting point of a counter organization.
So if you do not accept at least the principle not to mention the advisability
f the right to form several parties, you will have from the outset an almost irr
esistible force to be thrown against any form of free discussion, critical analy
sis, divergence of views, and so on.
Second, it is argued in justification of a monolithic and one-party state that t
he working class cannot rule in the same way as the capitalist class ruled. But
there is a tremendous gap between the character of a class and the complete iden
tification of its interests with the ruling party and power at every moment. The
capitalists have also faced this problem. The American capitalists tried to est
ablish a threefold division of powers within the constitution as an institutiona
l framework in order to prevent their differences from leading to a suppression
of the political rights of the majority of the capitalist class.
Experience has shown that even when the capitalist class is dominant through its
private property, it can have its political rights suppressed. In its history b
ourgeois society has installed different dictatorial and monarchical regimes in
which the economically ruling class had no, or very little, political rights, at
least in its vast majority.
To understand the functional nature of parties it must be grasped that there nee
d not be a full and direct identity between the exercise of economic power and t
he capacity to express at the same moment the collective interests of all parts
of that class. For the working class, parties are instruments for achieving a hi
gher level of self-consciousness, a higher level of self-activity. If you start
from the recognition of the fact that all members of the class do not have the s
ame experience, the same past, the same roots, the same ideas, the same understa
nding, you must then find some institutional framework for preventing a situatio
n where minorities, or even demagogues, can wrest power away or impose political
orientations contrary to the interests of the majority of the class.
Third, the distinction between the mass of the class and its political parties i
s not a distinction between practice and theory; it is the recognition of the id
eological diversification of a class. Every class in society has been ideologica
lly differentiated. There has never been a social class in which everybody thoug
ht the same thing at the same time. Can you give any example of such uniformity?
So why assume that for the working class?
Once you do not assume it, why would you prevent people who have different ideas
within that class from organizing themselves in order to further their ideas? W
hat you ought rather to prevent is any institutional framework in which a minori
ty of that class can impose its rule upon the majority. Why deny minorities the
right to organize themselves, to put forward their ideas, deepen their analysis,
discuss, debate? Why prefer unorganized debate, for that s what it really becomes
. Instead of debate openly and freely organized in different ideological tendenc

ies, currents, and platforms, experience has shown that unorganized debate witho
ut structured tendencies does not lead to more but to much less democracy. When
there are different organized currents which can clearly pose and counterpose di
fferent options, this enables the mass to make an informed and deliberate choice
. The essential thing is that the main decisions and the right to decide should
be vested in the workers councils. To prevent members of the workers councils fr
om defending their own ideas seems to me neither democratic nor socialist.
You ask: what is ideology? Marx, as you know, distinguished between theory and ide
ology. Theory is a scientific analysis or reproduction of social reality. Ideolo
gy is a false or partially false interpretation of that reality. Unfortunately a
large part of the working class today does not have a correct theory but adhere
s to different forms of false ideology. If you do not believe that, you give the
capitalist system the credit of being able to produce, under conditions of its
exploitation and degradation, scientific knowledge in 80 percent of the populati
on. I deny that; I think it is impossible to achieve that under capitalism. (app
lause)
Q. Do students have an intrinsic value as a revolutionary agency, and if so, wha
t is it?
A. There may be some confusion here about what I said. I did not say that studen
ts must become workers in order to have revolutionary consciousness. That flies
in the face of history. I m sorry if I speak a little like a grandfather; I am not
even a father. The revolutionary role of students has existed as long as the wo
rking class movement. The fact that revolutionary students can introduce revolut
ionary ideas to the working class was recognized by socialists, not only by Leni
n but by Kautsky, Adler and many other Social Democrats nearly 100 years ago. St
udents can play an independent role
of course they can. Students can give the fi
rst impulse to revolutionary action, of course. They can have revolutionary cons
ciousness; nobody can deny that. Read the history of the past 80 or 90 years of
the socialist movement and you will see that at numerous moments students played
precisely the same role as they are doing today in many underdeveloped countrie
s and even in some more developed countries.
What I said was that students will not always remain students. When they leave t
he university, if they do not have an organization which enables them to remain
integrated with other revolutionary elements, they are in danger of integrating
themselves into a hostile social milieu. Why? Because many enter a milieu which
is completely different from student life. They become employees, white collar w
orkers, technicians, state functionaries. They live and work amongst people with
different ideas than the student milieu with strong conservative prejudices aga
inst socialism, where there are material temptations. My point was once they cea
se to be students, they need a revolutionary organization to avoid losing their
revolutionary consciousness.
In addition to the revolutionary consciousness of the students is the question o
f the effectiveness of their action. I said that beyond the initial stage of pro
test and impact on a restricted scale, it is impossible to take effective revolu
tionary action (action, not consciousness) if you are not linked with the indust
rial working class. This is a question of social power. The workers have a colos
sal potential of social power because of their strategic position in the product
ive process. Students also have a certain degree of social power today, more tha
n they had 20 or 50 years ago when you could close the university for 5 years an
d it wouldn t change anything in the economy of the country. Today no industrial c
ountry can afford to close the universities for 5 years. That would create big p
roblems inside the technologically advanced industrial sectors.
However, this power is limited and students cannot get a real social transformat

ion going unless they are linked with a stronger social force such as the workin
g class. That is on the level of activity, not on the level of consciousness. Wh
at I sought to emphasize was the interaction that could take place between these
two unequal social forces.
Q. Do you believe in the relevance of the analysis made by Mao of the social con
tradictions in a socialist society? Are the contradictions in that society socia
l or ideological contradictions? Has the experience of the Cultural Revolution e
nabled us to go a step farther than formal democratic solutions by taking into c
onsideration the real contradictions of a social nature and real activity of the
masses for solving those contradictions?
Q. I am very happy this was asked because I have been waiting a long time to ans
wer such a question posed by a comrade influenced by Maoist thought. Of course I
believe that the contradictions in the transitional societies where capitalism
has been abolished are social in nature. Socialism means a classless society and
there are no such classless societies anywhere in the world. What exists are so
cieties in transition from capitalism to socialism. In these societies ideologic
al conflicts are not simply and purely ideological. No Marxist can believe that.
Of course they have deep social roots. I would agree with Mao that it is necess
ary to distinguish between two types of social contradictions. The contradiction
s within the working class, the toiling people, on the one hand, and the contrad
ictions between the working class and other social classes on the other.
I differ with Mao because he lumps workers and peasants together. Peasants do no
t belong to the same class as workers, that s very un-Marxist, but let s leave that
aside. When it comes to characterizing these contradictions, however, the Maoist
comrades have created a tremendous confusion. It is they, and not the tradition
al Marxists, who tend to put an identification sign between any form of politica
l, ideological, cultural difference and the class struggle. They say that if you
write an unorthodox theater piece, or make such a movie, or paint such a painti
ng, you are really starting the class struggle to re-establish capitalism.
I totally deny this. History has shown that classes which have been overthrown c
an continue to have an ideological influence in society, and they will have that
. This is nothing new that Mao has discovered. However, this ideological influen
ce by itself will not enable obsolete classes to re-establish their former rule.
Weighty social and economic causes prevent restoration in this manner. Theatric
al productions, ideology, even religion itself cannot lead to the restoration of
the old regime.
For example, the French nobility, French feudalism, was economically, socially,
politically overthrown in the French revolution. In 1815 came a political restor
ation. But by then it was economically and socially impossible to return to feud
al society. There is a large body of proof that the Catholic Church remained the
main ideological influence in the majority of the French population 100 years a
fter the overthrow of its political power. Did this lead to a reintroduction of
big church property? A restoration of nobility rights? A restoration of feudal s
ociety? No. It could not do that because the fundamental social and economic fra
mework made it impossible. French society no longer had a social class, a group
of people with the material interests and economic strength to bring back the ol
d pre-revolutionary regime.
Now let me ask: does there exist in China today any social group, either in the
Chinese working class or in the Chinese peasantry which has interests and power
to reintroduce capitalism? That must first be proved. You cannot assume that is
on the point of happening simply because some people write bad theater pieces or
bad poetry. You must prove that there is a force which has the power and an ove
rriding interest in reintroducing capitalism.

What is really assumed, by such reasoning

and this is extraordinary for comrades
who have come through the ideological debate between Khrushchev and Mao is that
it is possible to go gradually and imperceptibly from socialism to capitalism.
That is, credence is given to those peaceful evolution and peaceful transition t
heories which were so indignantly rejected when the Khrushchevists proposed them
for the history of the change-over from capitalism to socialism. In this case y
ou are, excuse me, revisionist. You revise fundamentally (applause) the Marxist
theory of the state which teaches that, in order for state power to pass from on
e class to another, what happens on the field of ideology is not decisive.
What determines the qualitative replacement of one economic system by another is
what happens in the field of social relations. This means you must prove that t
here are tens of millions of people today in China who have a material interest
in overturning the conquests of the revolution in favor of capitalism. So long a
s you do not prove that, all the other explanations are useless and unconvincing
.
Q. If we set aside theater pieces, film or drama sketches, are there not objecti
ve tendencies flowing out of economic policy which can restore capitalism in Chi
na or the Soviet Union?
A. I deny most strongly that it is possible to pass from one mode of production
to another simply by objective economic evolution. Remember that Marxism begins
with the assertion that society cannot be changed except through class struggle,
that is to say, without the confrontation and duel to the death of social force
s with social interests that would benefit by transforming one society into anot
her. This is more than a process of mere objective economic evolution. Neither i
deological discussion nor objective economic evolution as such can bring about c
apitalist restoration. Even Mao does not tell us where, when and how capitalist
restoration took place in Russia because, were he to say so, he would have to dr
aw many important conclusions on a world strategic scale.
Where there actually existed a danger of capitalist restoration in Russia, Lenin
indicated why that danger existed and did it clearly and precisely as a classic
al Marxist should. He said that, so long as there is petty commodity production
on a large scale, so long as there are millions of independent peasants, self-pr
oducing peasants, any one of these self-producing peasants can grow into a capit
alist. There was the source of danger of capitalist restoration.
But Mao cannot say this in so many words because he has based so much of his wor
ld strategy of socialist revolution precisely on the role of that social class,
the peasantry, which can embody the danger of capitalist restoration as long as
it remains private owners of the means of production. The real problem which Mao
has tried to cope with in the Cultural Revolution is not the problem of capital
ist restoration but the problem of bureaucracy. Whatever may be its negative sid
es, this represents an important confirmation of Marxist analysis.
In China, as in the Soviet Union and the other countries in transition between c
apitalism and socialism, what looms up as the problem of problems is the mushroo
ming of the bureaucracy. This was not an invention of Trotsky. When both Marx an
d Lenin spoke about a new workers state, they indicated that the main danger for
that state would be bureaucratic deformation. That is classical Marxist analysi
s and terminology.
Mao is trying to cope with this problem and that s a good thing. He s not the first
one. Fidel Castro, Tito, Trotsky, Lenin
all tried to cope in their own time and
way with this same problem. Now we have a big body of historical experience to h
elp guide us in this field. I agree that mass mobilization and the political act

ivity of the working class are preconditions for an effective fight against bure
aucracy. But workers democracy is as essential as mass activity, because without
workers democracy, one man or small group of men can try to manipulate the mass
es, and before they know it, they can be moved from one extreme to the other.
Until 1964, Liu Shao-Chi was a great hero of the Chinese people, hailed by milli
ons on the same level as Mao Tse-Tung. Then, from one day to the other, he becam
e the Chinese Khrushchev, the number one person in authority to wants to restore
capitalism. People are asked to believe white Monday and black Tuesday. They have
no right and no possibility to discuss why this is true or false.
Liu Shao-Chi wrote a book 27 years ago which could not be criticized in China un
til one year ago. Liu Shao-Chi s book is now attacked because he does not include
the dictatorship of the proletariat in it. But, if you read The New Democracy by
Mao Tse-Tung, which was written at the same time as the work of Liu Shao-Chi wa
s edited, Mao s book not only does not include the dictatorship of the proletariat
, it rejects it black on white. Is there any outspoken challenge to the Maoist p
ropaganda, is there anybody in China today who has the right
or the audacity
to
point out in public what I have just said? As long as this political right does
not exist, one essential barrier against bureaucratization will remain erected.
This is the manipulation of the masses by very small groups of people in power.
The political democracy of the working class is an absolute precondition for fre
e mass activity and real mass mobilization to limit the danger of bureaucracy. (
applause)
Q. Can a transitional society return to capitalism as well as go forward to soci
alism and don t certain economic features in the Soviet Union and East European co
untries indicate that the process of restoration of capitalism has gone exceedin
gly far, if it has not yet been consummated?
A. I did not say that a society in transition cannot return to capitalism. I eve
n gave an example of that concrete danger in Lenin s day. All I said was that, in
order to prove that such a danger exists, you have to designate the specific soc
ial forces whose economic interests promote policies at a given moment which lea
d to that conclusion. You cannot assume this restoration as something which is a
lready proven, and then cite all kinds of phenomena in the superstructure like p
olitical decisions, literary decisions, decisions of a technical or scientific n
ature, and see in these the reflection of something that has first to be proven
in the social field.
In Marxist methodology you first make an analysis of the existing class relation
s which define the mode of production, and then find reflections of these intere
sts in the superstructure. My own conviction is that, as long as a society is in
transition, the theoretical danger of restoring capitalism exists. But, in orde
r to judge whether that danger has really become greater or smaller, a concrete
analysis of the relation of the social forces has to be made.
The comrade says I am wrong to speak about bureaucracy in the Soviet Union; I sh
ould have referred to capitalism. Here we must discuss the basic relationships o
f production which are relations between social classes. Marx explained a thousa
nd times that the difference between Marxist economics and bourgeois economics i
s that the latter sees in an economic relationship a relationship between things
, where the former sees a relationship of social forces mediated by things.
More specifically, Marxist theory explained that the capitalist relationship of
forces is basically between private owners of the means of production and anothe
r class which is forced to sell its labor power to the owners of these means of
production. Now the person who is trying to prove that there is restoration of c
apitalism in Russia has to operate with two notions which are obviously complete

ly opposed.
First he speaks about the growth of private plots. Tell me, what is the weight o
f these private plots in the Soviet economy? Is Albania an industrialized countr
y because industrial production is increasing? If you produce five bicycles inst
ead of one, that represents an increase. But how great is the weight of the bicy
cles in the totality of the economy? In Russia, private plots in agriculture con
tribute less than 5 percent to the national income. Can you seriously regard so
minor a sector as proof of the capitalist nature of a country?
Now I shall ask a question in return: what was the weight of the private plots i
n 1921 during Lenin s time? It was not 5 percent but 50 percent. Yet that you do n
ot call that capitalism. Second, you speak about the profit motive. But the profit
motive in and of itself is not an adequate definition of the relations of produ
ction. Profit under capitalism is not a motive; profit under capitalism is the r
ule by which the entire economy is governed. Investments are determined by profi
t.
Show me whether the Soviet Union has abandoned economic planning so that its inv
estments are determined by profit considerations. This would mean that, if the p
roduction of pants and shoes makes more profit than the production of turbines a
nd big power stations, there will be less and less production of turbines and bi
g power stations and more and more output of pants and shoes. This you cannot pr
ove, because it does not correspond to the reality.
Profit has been used only as a minor instrument to increase what the bureaucrats
believe will improve the rationality of their operations. I m not for it; I m again
st it. But it must be recognized as a minor feature of Soviet economy. The main
feature of Soviet economy, which anybody who wants to study the functioning of t
hat economy can see immediately, is not lodged in the profit motive, but in the
way planning is organized.
To be sure, it is overcentralized and based on the material interests of a certa
in restricted group, the bureaucracy. But who owns the machines? What are the re
lations of production? Are they relations of production between owners of the me
ans of production and workers who have to sell their labor power to these owners
? Obviously not. A bureaucrat owes his position and power to his function, not t
o his ownership. And when he loses his position, he loses all power. He has no c
apital. He is not the embodiment of capital. He is only functional. If you conce
de, as you do, that the bureaucrats are not a class, that they are only on the w
ay to becoming a class, then there is no capitalism. You cannot have capitalism
without a class of owners of the means of production. (applause)
But you not only said the Soviet Union was a capitalist country, you even said i
t was an imperialist country. Excuse me, that s not serious. The Soviet bureaucrat
s do not have the same economic relationships with Eastern Europe as the monopol
ists with the countries they exploit. Show me the export of capital from Russia
to Czechoslovakia. You talk like a bourgeois moralist, not a Marxist! Is there a
ny imperialist country which has no investment in colonial countries? Hasn t Ameri
can imperialism a big investment in Venezuela? How do they plunder? They plunder
through investment and through the exchange of industrial goods against raw mat
erials.
Soviet-Czech relationships are just the opposite. Russia exports raw materials t
o Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia exports industrial goods to Russia. To be consi
stent, you would have to argue that imperialism does not spring from export of c
apital, from industrialization, but from something quite different. This is to a
bandon Marxism.
The comrade who argues like this is unable to give a consistent definition of th

e class nature of the Soviet Union. He talks about the process of formation of a
class; he says that there is a group which will become a class; he goes on to s
ay that capitalism has already been restored but later that it is going to be re
stored. Then he speaks about imperialism which is not linked with capitalism. In
other words, he has no coherent definition. And he cannot have a coherent defin
ition of the Soviet economy and of the Soviet society if he starts by departing
from the basic framework of Marxist sociology and Marxist economy which teach th
at there is no capitalism without a capitalist class and no capitalist class wit
hout private ownership of capital.
Once you leave that firm ground, you will come by many sideroads, as the history
of socialist thought especially in the United States has shown, to deny that Am
erica is capitalist or to affirm that both the United States and the USSR are es
sentially the same, and finally conclude that this society is a lesser evil beca
use it is more democratic, more open.
In discussing this question of bureaucratic degeneration versus capitalist resto
ration, let us consider the specific example of Yugoslavia in the framework of M
arxist sociology. In Yugoslavia there are different social groups: the peasantry
, the working class, the bureaucracy. Some people go to the absurd length of say
ing that the proof of the existence of capitalism are the workers councils which
give workers the right to manage their own means of production inside the facto
ries. If there is a danger of restoration of capitalism today in a country like
Yugoslavia, it is not because there are workers councils; it is not because of t
he nationalized means of production but because of a strong private sector in th
e economy. There are people who embody the interests of this private sector: pri
vate peasants, private craftsmen, private merchants, as well as technocrats in c
ertain parts of the state apparatus and ideologues in the universities who try t
o establish ties with such social forces. The outcome of the struggle going on b
etween these forces based on private property and the forces defending socialist
forms is not going to be decided by Tito s foreign policy or by what is written i
n novels and dramas, but by the conflict between the contending social forces.
Do you believe that the workers of Yugoslavia, who made a socialist revolution i
n 1945 and then in 1948 conquered the right to administer their own means of pro
duction, are going to allow anybody to take this control away from them? I say n
o and I have some proof of this resistance. Such a discussion as this had a rath
er abstract and theoretical character 6 months or a year ago. But developments d
uring this summer made it concrete. On the basis of a bad economic policy there
was growing unemployment. On the basis of a wrong foreign policy, there was a da
ngerous tendency of adaptation to American imperialism.
What happened then? The workers resisted. The students resisted, occupying the u
niversities for ten days in June 1968. They called for a return to equality and
full self-management in the whole economy, not only on the level of the factory.
After that came the trade union congress where hundreds of workers delegates fro
m all the plants of the country said: We do not accept growing inequality. We wan
t more equality. We do not want shoes exported for the American army in Vietnam;
we are for international solidarity. We do not want workers to be laid off. We
are for full employment.
All this signifies that a big social struggle is going on. And you will not rest
ore capitalism until the Yugoslav workers and students have been crushed in head
-on struggle. They will not give up their socialized means of production and new
mode of production any more readily than capitalists will give up their mode of
production without a fight to the death. The Yugoslav workers are aware of thei
r own class interests, even if they can be fooled politically; they will defend
themselves very strongly. The more socialist democracy there is, the stronger be
comes the possibilities that the workers will resist this restoration.

Those who think such a restoration can be prevented in Yugoslavia or Czechoslova

kia through military intervention from outside, by destroying workers democracy,
by destroying free expression of the workers and by imposing a dictatorial regi
me which is rejected by 99 percent of the working class, are making a fatal mist
ake. If the danger of capitalist restoration will grow in Czechoslovakia, that w
ill be the consequence of the Soviet intervention there which can create a count
er-revolutionary political atmosphere at least in parts of the working people. B
efore that intervention, the overwhelming majority of the Czechoslovak working c
lass was for socialism. Their doubts about socialism are the consequences of the
Soviet intervention, not the cause of that intervention. (applause)
Q. Shouldn t moral incentives take priority over material ones in building a socia
list economy?
A. I am certainly opposed to excessive material incentives. I wrote an article w
hich was published in Cuba during the debate between Che Guevara and his opponen
ts in 1964 on that question [Mercantile Categories in the Period of Transition,
in Bertram Silverman, ed., Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate, (New Yor
k: Atheneum, 1973), pages 60 97]. In it I came down very resolutely in favor of ve
ry limited material incentives and those of a collective and not an individual n
ature. This stand is similar to the one the Cuban comrades themselves have taken
on this question.
The comrade who asks this question seems to ignore two very basic facts. First o
f all, the original argumentation in favor of material incentives comes from Len
in, not from Khrushchev. You can say that Lenin was wrong; but at least have the
honesty to say it comes from Lenin.
Secondly, you must not obscure the historical fact that material incentives were
applied on the largest possible scale under Stalin. The wage differentials unde
r Stalin were the greatest that have ever prevailed in a non-capitalist country.
The wage differentials have actually gone down somewhat since Stalin died. They
are still too big in my opinion. I am against any wage differential over a cert
ain restricted limit. Under Stalin the wage differential went as far as 1 to 50.
What about Mao s China? In the official code of decrees and laws of the People s Rep
ublic of China the wage differential which is recognized goes from 1 to 15. This
in my opinion is at least three times too much. In this kind of argument, it is
essential to be objective about the existing facts and not make a big scandal a
bout some countries while keeping quiet about others.
I am personally convinced that the wage differential in Czechoslovakia was lower
than in China. Although I do not have the concrete facts, I would be surprised
if it was as great as 1 to 15 in Czechoslovakia. In any case, it s too much in all
these countries, and a consistent fight for equality should be one of the main
goals of the vanguards in these countries.
But you have to recognize the facts as they are and not make a special case for
some countries and close your eyes to what prevails in other countries or other
periods.
Q. What can be done about improving the relations between the student movement a
nd the American workers?
A. It is most important to distinguish between what is episodic and what is perm
anent in the condition of the working class, here as elsewhere. Many of the Fren
ch workers who made the general strike and occupied the factories in the number
of ten million were the same who voted for de Gaulle on several occasions after

the 1958 military coup. In the first national referendums, de Gaulle got somethi
ng like 60 percent of the vote. With the structure of French society, this means
that an important part of the working class voted for him.
In other words, you have to distinguish very carefully between conjunctural mood
s, even if these sometimes last a very long time as they have in America where t
he political apathy and lack of understanding of the white working class seems i
nterminable. Still, the phenomenon is conjunctural and not rooted in the very st
ructure of society. The only other logical argument against the anticapitalist p
otential of the working class has a bourgeois nature and is repeated by the refo
rmists in the labor movement. They tell us over and over again that a higher sta
ndard of living, the acquisition of an automobile, washing machine and televisio
n set, will negate socialism and integrate the working class tightly into bourge
ois society.
All those who use this argument, whatever form it may take, are only repeating a
basically bourgeois argument, that it is possible to destroy class consciousnes
s and class action through some material concessions. I deny that. I say there a
re basic class relations and basic class interests; that the workers, because of
their place in the process of production and in the factory, are basically alie
nated. They will not accept fundamentally and forever a system in which a few pe
ople tell them what to produce, how to produce it, and when to produce it.
Under certain circumstances, it is difficult for them to achieve political consc
iousness as the result of certain causes, which you should be better able to exp
lain. But if you are better specialists in American history, I am somewhat of an
expert in the understanding of capitalist society. One hundred and fifty years
of capitalism has taught us that the bourgeois class has at no time and nowhere
definitely integrated the working class into its system. Conjunctural moods, yes
. These can last as long as 20 or 25 years, as in postwar West Germany. But now
even in that country there are clear signs that this class stagnation is coming
to an end.
You must make your own analysis of American society to discern the factors which
will start to change the situation. I will indicate just one vulnerable point.
International competition, as the capitalists very well know, leads to an equali
zation of the technological level on a world scale. Yesterday American industry
had to compete with international competitors with a much lower technology; toda
y and tomorrow it is confronted with international competitors who have an equal
ly good technology. But in these other countries of Western Europe and Japan, wa
ges are half what they are in America, one third, or less. Just think what an ex
acerbated world competition will do to social contradictions in America, to the
functioning of the trade unions, to the relations between the leaders of the tra
de unions and the rank and file when technology becomes the same but there is a
huge wage differential. The drive of the corporations to reduce labor costs will
tend to upset the long-standing quiescence and apathy of the American working c
lass, especially among the working class youth which I spoke about before.
Q. What has all this economic theorizing got to do with our problems of action i
n the student movement?
A. I tried to show that the European student movement through its experience in
struggle has already solved a series of dilemmas which you are erecting as treme
ndous obstacles. There is no contradiction between theory and practice. There is
no contradiction between working among the students and trying to work among th
e workers. There is no contradiction between student power and workers revolutio
n. That s what I tried to show.
The European student movement has gone through the same kind of discussions and

in practice has succeeded in solving at least part of them. It has turned in its
very large majority in a certain direction. It has tried to find a common basis
of struggle with the industrial working class. And it has succeeded very largel
y in France, and partially in other countries. It has also turned towards a stri
cter type of organization.
Remember that I did not bring up in my presentation this question of the Leninis
t type of organization; that was brought up from the floor. You can t have it both
ways. You can t reproach me at one and the same time for answering the questions
which are posed to me on the floor and for evading the debate. I tried to answer
the questions that were posed; I did not raise them.
The relevant questions are: what should a growing student movement do in order t
o try and achieve a stronger basis in working towards a possible social transfor
mation in the United States? What are the lessons of the European student moveme
nt for the American student movement?
Q. I was in Eastern Europe last year and didn t notice that anyone was concerned a
bout Vietnam. And aren t you wrong in operating with the old, worn-out Marxist cat
egories instead of seeing the processes as they actually unfold?
A. You are mistaken in saying that there has not been in Eastern Europe any emot
ional reaction to the question of Vietnam. Let me give two examples. First, the
students of Ljubljana University. In the May 1 issue of their student paper last
year, instead of devoting that paper to the anniversary of Comrade Tito, they d
evoted it to the denunciation of the fact that Yugoslav factories were exporting
shoes for the American Army in Vietnam. This created a tremendous sensation in
their country. A few weeks afterward there were three large demonstrations of mo
re than 10,000 people against the American war in Vietnam, before the American e
mbassies, the consulates and US Information Service.
Second, Czechoslovakia. Comrade Rudi Dutschke was in Czechoslovakia in March jus
t before the attempt on his life and had long discussions with the Czechoslovak
students, of which several thousands were present, on the question of Vietnam. I
n general, the response was not very positive. For what reason? Because these pe
ople came from a background where they have been for so long forced to believe e
verything which is written in censored papers that they start from a position of
not believing anything anymore. They are hypercritical. But a hypercritical min
d also means the capacity for political differentiation.
Only three months afterwards, the SDS comrades at the Sofia youth festival initi
ated a huge demonstration against the Bulgarian police before the American embas
sy in Sofia in defense of Vietnam. The mass of the Czech students present in Sof
ia fought with the SDS comrades against the Bulgarian police and against all tho
se who tried to prevent that demonstration. So be cautious. People do not contin
ue to think this year as they thought last year or two years ago.
There is a process. Once there is an element of free debate in these countries,
political differentiation sets in. Hasn t it been like that in this country, too?
All American students are not for the withdrawal of the American troops from Vie
tnam; you have had political differentiation as a result of the developing debat
e. It has been like that in Czechoslovakia. When the debate opened up in Czechos
lovakia, a process of differentiation started and now these people do not contin
ue to think in the same way.
You refer to the indifference of the Slovaks. Remember that these people have be
en nationally oppressed for 20 years. You have the same phenomenon in the United
States where a nationally oppressed minority like the blacks will first react t
o events in a nationalist sense. But you cannot equate the nationalism of an opp

ressed minority with nationalism of the oppressors. There is a very fundamental

difference. (applause)
Secondly, in regard to the basic philosophical question you raised in which you
say you see processes at work while I try to operate with categories. But our di
fference is not on that level. You also operate with categories. Nobody can oper
ate or think without categories, without general concepts. The point is not whet
her or not either one of us operates with or without categories or even whether
we take processes into account.
The crucial point to understand is that, in order to have structural changes in
any process, there must be more than gradual changes. There must be a jump. In t
his sense the discussion we have had here tonight on the socio-economic nature o
f the Soviet Union used the old type of Marxist concepts for which you exhibit a
certain contempt. This is extremely relevant, not only to day-to-day American p
olitics, but also to all problems posed by revolutions in the world. What your e
xultation of the idea of process represents is something very old and not so goo
d. This is a certain tendency to glorify gradualism.
The balance sheet of gradualism, of any tendency which sees processes only, is a
balance sheet of reform. And reform means integration into the existing society
. Whatever may be the intention of individuals, the disregard for what you call
categories, that is, all understanding of social realities with the aid of Marxi
st categories and concepts, involves a lack of understanding of the necessity fo
r breaks in the process, of interruptions in gradualness, of jumps of a revoluti
onary nature.
Revolution is the understanding that processes must be interrupted by big jumps
if they are to lead to vital and decisive changes. Let us talk of the realities
of capitalist society. It is not possible to change that society piecemeal, by i
ndividual effort alone, by small group action, by community actions. You can cha
nge this society only if you bring to bear sufficient power to break the hold of
the capitalist class over the means of production and break the capitalist stat
e s machine. Those are the real problems which Marxism poses in theory and which u
nfortunately remain to be solved in practice. And that is precisely why its cate
gories are very, very up-to-date in every capitalist country today. (applause)

Ernest Mandel
On Workers

Democracy

(November 1968)
The lamentable incidents which occurred at the ULB [Universitaire libre de Bruxe
lles Free University of Brussels] when Garaudy came to speak there have induced m
e to explain once again why we adhere to the principles of workers democracy.
Workers democracy has always been a basic tenet of the proletarian movement. It
was a tradition in the socialist and communist movement to firmly support this p
rinciple in the time of Marx and Engels as well as Lenin and Trotsky. It took th
e Stalinist dictatorship in the USSR to shake this tradition. The temporary vict
ory of fascism in West and Central Europe also helped to undermine it. However,
the origins of this challenge to workers democracy are deeper and older; they li
e in the bureaucratization of the large workers organizations.
The Social Democratic and trade union bureaucrats were the first to begin to und

ermine the principles of workers democracy. They started calling general members
hip meetings at infrequent intervals. Then they began to rig them, or often to d
o away with them altogether. They began likewise to restrict or abolish freedom
of discussion and criticism within their organizations. They did not hesitate ev
en to appeal to the police(including the secret police) for help in fighting rev
olutionary minorities. At the time of the first world war, the German Social Dem
ocracy set a dismal example of collusion with the state repressive forces. In su
bsequent years, the Social Democrats everywhere followed this example.
The Soviet bureaucracy first and then the bureaucrats in the Stalinist Communist
parties (or in trade unions under Stalinist leadership) simply followed the pat
tern established by the Social Democrats, extending it further and further. They
abolished freedom of discussion and of tendencies. Slander and lies replaced ar
gument and debate with opponent tendencies. They made massive use of physical fo
rce to prevent their opponents from causing any harm. Thus, the entire Bolshevik o
ld guard which led the October Revolution and the majority of the members of Len
in s Central Committee were exterminated by Stalin during the dark years of the Gr
eat Purge (1935-38).
The young generation of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist militants now devel
oping a revolutionary consciousness are spontaneously returning to the tradition
s of workers democracy. This was apparent in France in May and June when freedom
of speech for all tendencies was jealously safeguarded in the assemblies of stu
dents and revolutionary workers and students. But this new generation is not alw
ays conscious of all the principled and practical reasons for workers democracy.
This is why the youth can be vulnerable to a kind of Stalinist-derived demagogy
being spread by certain pro-Chinese sects, which seek to make people believe tha
t workers democracy is contrary to the interests of the revolution. Therefore, it
is necessary to reaffirm these reasons strongly. The workers movement lights for
the emancipation of the proletariat. hut this emancipation requires the aboliti
on of all forms of exploitation to which the workers are subjected. Rejecting wo
rkers democracy means quite simply that you want to maintain a situation like th
e one today in which the masses of workers are unable to make their opinions hea
rd. The Marxist critique of bourgeois democracy starts from the idea that this d
emocracy is formal because the workers do not have the material means to exercis
e the rights which the bourgeois constitutions formally grant all citizens. Free
dom of the press is just a formality when only the capitalists and their agents
are able to get together the millions of dollars needed to establish a daily new
spaper.
But the conclusion that follows from this critique of bourgeois democracy, obvio
usly, is that means must be created enabling all the workers to have access to t
he media for disseminating ideas (printing presses, meeting halls, radio and tel
evision, posters, etc.). If, on the contrary, you conclude from this that only a
self-proclaimed leading party of the proletariat
or even a little sect which decl
ares that it alone is genuinely revolutionary has the right to speak, to use the
press, or to propagate its ideas, then you risk increasing the political oppress
ion of the workers rather than abolishing it.
The Stalinists often reply that abolition of the capitalist system equals emanci
pation of the workers. We agree that abolition of private ownership of the means
of production, of the profit economy, and of the bourgeois state are essential
conditions for the emancipation of the workers. But saying that these are essenti
al conditions does not mean that they are sufficient. Because as soon as the capita
list system is abolished, the question arises of who is going to run the factori
es, the economy, the municipalities, the state, the schools and universities.
If a single party claims the right to administer the state and the society; if i
t imposes a monopoly of power by terror; if it does not permit the mass of worke

rs to express their opinions, their criticisms, their worries, and their demands
; if it excludes the workers from administration then it is inevitable that a wid
ening gulf will develop between this omnipotent bureaucracy and the mass of work
ers. Then, emancipation of the workers is only a deception. And without real wor
kers democracy in all areas, including freedom of organization and press, real e
mancipation of the workers is impossible.
These principled reasons are rein- forced by practical ones. Like all social cla
sses in history, the working class is not homogeneous. It has common class inter
ests, both immediate interests and historical interests. But this community of i
nterests is interwoven with differences which have various origins immediate spe
cial interests (professional, group, regional, craft interests, etc.) and differ
ent levels of consciousness. Many strata of the working class have not yet becom
e conscious of their historical interests. Others have been influenced by bourge
ois and petty-bourgeois ideologies. Still others are weighed down by the burden
of past defeats and failures, of skepticism, or of the degradation caused by cap
italist society, etc.
However, the capitalist system cannot be overthrown unless the entire working cl
ass is mobilized in action against it. And this unity in action can only be obta
ined if these various special interests and levels of consciousness can be expre
ssed in, and little by little neutralized through, de bate and persuasion. Denyi
ng this diversity can only result in a breakdown of unity in action and in drivi
ng successive groups of workers into passivity or into the camp of the enemy.
Anyone with experience in strikes has been able to see in practice that the most
successful actions are pre pared and conducted through numerous assemblies, Fir
st of the unionized workers and later of all the workers concerned. In these ass
emblies, all the reasons in favor of the strike can be developed, all opinions c
an be expressed, and all the class enemy s arguments can be exposed. If a strike i
s launched without the benefit of such democracy, there is much more risk that m
any workers will observe it half-heartedly, if at all.
If this is true for an isolated strike, it holds all the more for a general stri
ke or for a revolution. All the great revolutionary mobilizations of the workers
from the Russian revolution to the revolutionary upsurge of May and June 1968 i
n France and including the German and Spanish revolutions, to cite only these ex
amples have been characterized by veritable explosions of workers democracy. In
these instances, many working-class tendencies coexisted, expressed themselves f
reely in speeches and in the press, and debated before the entire class.
The word soviet
council of workers delegates presses this unity of opposites the uni
ty of the workers in the diversity of their tendencies. In the Second Congress o
f Russian Soviets, which took power in the October Revolution, there were a doze
n different tendencies and parties. Every attempt to repress this workers democr
acy by the Social Democracy in Germany, by the Stalinists in Spain
has presaged,
if not expressed, a setback or defeat for the revolution.
The absence of workers democracy not only hampers unity in action, it also obstr
ucts working out a correct political line.
It is true that the workers movement has an excellent theoretical instrument to
guide it in the often extremely complicated twists and turns of economic, social
, and political struggles
revolutionary Marxism. But this tool must still be use
d correctly. And no one person has a monopoly on its correct application.
Without any doubt, Marx and Lenin were geniuses. But life and history ceaselessl
y pose new problems which cannot be solved simply by turning to the scriptures.
Stalin, who was considered by many honest Communists before his death to be infal
lible, ill reality committed many errors, to say nothing of crimes, some of which

as in agricultural policy
have had pernicious consequences for three decades fo
r the entire Soviet people. Mao Zedong whom other naive souls also consider infal
lible, endorsed the policy of Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian CP, up until th
e eve of the military coup d tat. his policy was at least partially responsible for
the deaths of 500,000 Indonesian Communists and workers. As for the myth that t
he Central Committee of a party is always right, or that the majority of this comm
ittee is always right, Mao himself rejected it in the famous resolution passed by
the CC of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] on the cultural revolution in April 19
67. But if no person or group has a monopoly on truth and wisdom, then discussio
n is indispensable to deter- mine a correct political line. Rejection of discuss
ion under any pretext (and the pretext that a political opponent is counterrevolu
tionary or an enemy agent is as old as bureaucracy), or substituting epithets or ph
ysical violence for debate, means condemning oneself to remain the victim of fal
se ideas, inadequate analyses, and errors with debilitating if not catastrophic
consequences.
Marxism is a guide to action, they often say. That is true. But Marxism is disti
nguished from utopian socialism by its appeal to scientific analysis. It does no
t focus on action per se. It focuses on action which can influence historical re
ality, which can change it in a given direction
in the direction of socialist re
volution, toward the emancipation of the workers and of all humanity.
Out of the clash of ideas and tendencies, the truth emerges which can serve as a
guide to action. Action inspired by monolithic, bookish, and infantile thought
ich is not subjected to the uninhibited criticism possible only in a climate of
workers democracy is condemned to certain failure. It can only result, in the ca
se of small groups, in the disillusionment and demoralization of individuals; in
the case of unions or larger parties, in defeats for the class; and where the m
ass of the workers is concerned, in defeats with a long train of humiliations, p
rivations, and impoverishment, if not casualties.
Often these arguments in favor of the principles and practice of workers democra
cy are countered in Stalinist circles by the assertion that workers democracy ca
nnot be extended to the enemies of socialism inside the workers movement. Curiousl
y, certain groups which claim to be anti-bureaucratic and very left take a simil
ar line to justify booing and hissing or resorting to physical violence as a sub
stitute for debate with their political opponents.
Both the Stalinists and the ultra- leftists cry: You don t argue with revisionists,
capitalist forces, and the representatives of the enemy. In practice, the Stalin
ists try to replace debate by repression, if not murder and the use of tanks aga
inst the workers (from the Moscow Trials to the intervention in Hungary and Czec
hoslovakia). The ultra-leftists limit them- selves more modestly to preventing G
araudy from speaking, doubtless until the dreamed-of day when they can use more e
ffective means modeled on the Stalinist ones.
Of course, the working-class bureaucracies objectively act in the interests of c
apital, primarily by channeling the workers periodic revolutionary explosions tow
ard reformist outlets and thereby blocking opportunities to overthrow capitalism
. They play the same role by influencing the workers on a day-to-day basis in fa
vor of class collaboration, undermining their class consciousness with ideas tak
en from the bourgeois world.
But the objective function and role of these bureaucracies is not confined to ma
intaining class peace. In pursuing their routine reformist activities, they come
in conflict with the everyday interests of capitalism. The wage increases and s
ocial welfare laws won by the reformists in exchange for their pledge to keep th
e workers demands within limits that do not threaten the bases of the system
redu
ce the capitalists profits somewhat. The trade union organizations which they lea
d inject the collective power of labor into the daily relationships between the

wh

bosses and the workers. And as a result, these conflicts have an altogether diff
erent outcome from the past century, when the strength of the trade unions was s
light or non-existent.
When the capitalist economy is flourishing, the bourgeoisie is willing to pay th
e price represented by these concessions in return for social peace. But when the
capitalist economy is in a bad way, these same concessions rapidly become unacce
ptable to the bourgeoisie. Then, it is in the capitalists interest to eliminate t
hese organizations completely, even the most moderate and reformist ones. The ve
ry existence of the unions be comes incompatible with the survival of the system
.
This shows the real nature of the reformist bureaucracy in the workers movement.
This bureaucracy is not composed of owners of capital who buy labor power in or
der to appropriate surplus value. It is composed of salaried employees (of the w
orkers organizations or the state) who vacillate and waver between the camp of c
apital and of me Proletariat, some times leaning toward one, sometimes toward th
e other, depending on their particular interests and the pressures to which they
are subjected. And, in facing the class enemy, the vanguard workers have every
reason to do their utmost to force these bureaucrats to return to their camp. Ot
herwise, the common defense would be greatly weakened.
Overlooking these elementary truths leads to the worst catastrophes. The workers
movement learned this to its cost during the rise of fascism. At that time, the
genius Stalin invented the theory of Social Fascism. According to this theory there
was no difference between the revisionist Social Democrats and fascists. It was e
ven pro claimed that the Social Democracy had to be defeated before the struggle
against the Nazis could be won.
While the Social Democratic and Communist workers were happily bashing each othe
r s heads in
the reformist leaders shared the responsibility this time equally wit
h their Stalinist counterparts
neither came to power, massacred thousands of wor
ker militants, and dissolved all the workers organizations. Thus, he made possib
le a temporary, if some what embittered, reconciliation be between the Social De
mocrats and the Communists in the concentration camps. Would it not have been be
tter, while not making any concessions in the ideological struggle against revis
ionism, to fight together against the Nazis and prevent them from taking power?
On an infinitely smaller and less tragic scale, the situation in the university
can lead to a dilemma of the same type overnight. All the left tendencies are fi
ghting to gain recognition of their right to carry on political activism on me cam
pus. Hut it is quite possible that the administration will take the incidents su
rrounding Garaudy s visit as a pretext for banning any more political lectures. Wh
at other course, then, is there but to fight together to win minimum political f
reedom in the university? Would it not be preferable to respect the rules of wor
kers democracy from now on, since they conform to the common interests of the wo
rkers movement and the student confrontation movement? If subjective criteria ( An
ybody who doesn t support every one of my tactical turns is a capitalist and a cou
nterrevolutionary, even if he served as president of the People s Republic of Chin
a and vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party for twenty years! ) are substit
uted for these objective criteria, then you fall into complete arbitrariness. Yo
u end, of course, by wiping out the distinction between contradictions among the
people and conflicts with the class enemy, treating the former more and more like
the latter.
Of course, it is impossible to make an absolute and total separation be between
the two. Marginal cases are possible. We advocate frank debate in meetings of st
rikers. We do not think that we need restrict ourselves to polite discussion wit
h strike breakers.

In every marginal case, however, we must distinguish acts (or crimes) from opini
ons and ideological tendencies. Acts must be proved and judged according to clea
rly established, well-defined criteria of the workers interest (or after the over
throw of capitalism, of socialist legality) so as to prevent arbitrariness. Fail
ure to distinguish between acts and opinions can only result in extinguishing wo
rkers democracy, lowering the level of consciousness and mobilization of the wor
kers, and progressively robbing the revolutionists themselves of their ability t
o orient themselves politically ...

Top of the page

Note
1. Roger Garaudy, one of the leading intellectuals of the reactionary Communist
party of France, visited Belgium November 5, 1968 to give a lecture on May 1968
in France, at the request of the Communist Student Union of Brussels University.
It was not surprising that radical students considered a lecture on this topic
by a representative of the French CP as a provocation.
In any case, when the meeting started, a few dozen Maoists carrying portraits of
Chairman Mao and anarchists carrying a black flag persistently tried
for the mo
st part successfully to prevent Garaudy from addressing the audience.
A confused debate followed in which the question of whether Garaudy should be al
lowed to speak was mixed with the question of whether or not a revolutionary sit
uation had existed in France in May. Finally, the Maoists and anarchists ended t
he debate by pushing Garaudy out of the meeting hall.
This incident raised serious questions about the norms of democratic debate and
behavior in the working class and socialist movement. In answer to some of the q
uestions raised, Ernest Mandel, the well-known Marxist economist and editor of t
he Belgian socialist weekly La Gauche, wrote an article on the subject of worker
s democracy which appeared in two parts in the November 16 and November 23 issue
s of La Gauche. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.

Ernest Mandel
Marxist theory of the state
(October 1969)
Foreword
Every branch of knowledge has a central concept that expresses the fundamental f
eature or function of the sector of reality it investigate and deals with. The p
ivotal category of political science is the state.
The political thought of the various social classes and groupings throughout civ
ilization is above all characterized by their attitude toward the state and thei
r definition of its essential nature. Thus the ancient Greek aristocrat Aristotl
e conceived of the state
or, more precisely, the city-state of his time
as an ass
ociation for the good life , based on the family and village; excluded from the ri
ghts and benefits of citizenship, however, were labourers and artisans, women, f
oreigners, and slaves.

The bourgeois philosopher Hegel, like his idealist precursor Plato, asserted tha
t the nation-state was a product of the Objective Mind, best governed by a const
itutional monarchy.
Middle-class liberals nowadays
and the reformist socialists and Stalinists who t
rail in their wake and mimic their ideas
believe in the existence of a state tha
t stands as an impartial arbiter above the selfish contention of classes and dea
ls justly with the respective claims of diverse interest groups . This exalted noti
on of a classless state presiding over a pure democracy, based on the consent of
the people, rather than engaged in the defence of the property, rights of the r
uling class, is the core of bourgeois-democratic ideology.
Historical materialism takes a more realistic view of the nature of the state. T
he state is the product of irreconcilable class conflict within the social struc
ture, which it seeks to regulate on behalf of the ruling class. Every state is t
he organ of a given system of production based upon a predominant form of proper
ty ownership, which invests that state with a specific class bias and content. E
very state is the organized political expression, the instrument, of the decisiv
e class in the economy.
The principal factor in determining the character of the state is not its prevai
ling form of rule, which can vary greatly from time to time, but the type of pro
perty and productive relations that its institutions and prime beneficiaries pro
tect and promote.
In antiquity, monarchical, tyrannical, oligarchical, and democratic forms of the
state rose upon the slave mode of production. The medieval feudal state in West
ern Europe passed through imperial-monarchical, clerical, absolute monarchical,
plutocratic, and republican regimes.
In the course of its evolution, bourgeois society, rooted in the capitalist owne
rship of the means of production, has been headed and governed by various kinds
of monarchical sovereignties (from the absolute to the constitutional), republic
an and parliamentary regimes, and military and fascist dictatorships.
The twelve workers states in the postcapitalist societies, which have arisen from
the socialist revolutions in the half century since the founding of the Soviet
republic, have already exhibited two polar types of rule. One is more or less de
mocratic in character, expressing the power, and guarding the welfare, of the wo
rkers and peasants. The other is despotic and bonapartist, bent on defending the
privileged positions of a commanding caste of bureaucrats who have succeeded in
usurping the decision-making powers from the masses.
At the dawn of the bourgeois era, long before Marx, Engels, and Lenin, that astu
te political scientist Machiavelli had expounded the view that the state was the
supreme, organized, and legitimate expression of force. Machiavelli s theory, wrote
the German historian Meineke, was a sword which was plunged into the flank of th
e body politic of western humanity, causing it to shriek and rear up.
Similarly, the teaching of the Marxists, elaborated by Lenin and the Bolsheviks,
that the state was based upon the principle of force, has caused the whole of b
ourgeois society
to shriek and rear up
at its alleged cynicism and inhumanity. H
owever, it would seem that the colossal arsenals used in two world wars and the
preparations for a third, the destructiveness of the US military machine in Viet
nam, as well as the barbarous reprisals taken by the bourgeois classes
from the
Germany of 1933 to the Indonesia of 1965 against their own citizens, should have
amply validated that proposition by now.
Marxism added a deeper dimension to Machiavelli s observation by exposing and expl
aining the organic bond between the existence and exercise of state force and th

e property system that constituted the fabric of the socioeconomic structure. Th

e coercion exercised by the state was the ultimate resort for maintaining the ma
terial interests of the strongest section of the exploiters.
It should not take much perspicacity to see that the industrialists and bankers,
who own and operate most of the resources of the United States and control the
major political parties, likewise direct the employment of the military machine
and other repressive agencies of the federal government The use of police, state
guards, and federal troops to put down the ghetto uprisings testifies to the op
enly repressive function of the capitalist state apparatus. Yet liberal American
s find it difficult to generalize from these quite flagrant facts and thus to ac
cept the sociological definition of state power offered by Marxism.
They are blinded or baffled by three misconceptions: (1) that there are no clear
ly defined class formations in American society; (2) that there are no serious o
r irreconcilable conflicts between classes; and (3) that the government is not th
e executive committee administering the general affairs and furthering the aims o
f the capitalist exploiters, but that it is
or can be made into
the supreme agen
cy for taking care of the welfare of the whole people, rather than serving the i
nterests of the minority rich.
The analysis of the evolution and essence of state power given by Ernest Mandel
in these pages should do much to dispose of such false views. He is editor-in-ch
ief of the Belgian weekly La Gauche and probably the most influential and author
itative exponent of the political economy of socialism in the West today. He has
taken the lead in bringing the Marxist teachings in this field up to date throu
gh his masterful two-volume work entitled Marxist Economic Theory. This book, no
w available in English, has gone through three editions in France since it was f
irst published in 1962 and has been translated into many languages, from German
to Arabic.
Mandel has contributed many articles on a broad range of subjects to periodicals
throughout the world and has spoken at leading universities in the United State
s and Canada.
On the hundredth anniversary of the publication of Das Kapital, Mandel s The Forma
tion of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx: 1843 1863 was brought out by the French
publishing house of Maspero. His volume analysing the Common Market and the pen
etration of American capital into Western Europe, written in answer to J.J. Serv
an-Schreiber s The American Challenge, was recently a best seller in Germany. It w
ill soon be issued in English translation.
Mandel s pamphlet An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory is now in its fourth
English printing and is widely used by teachers and students in courses througho
ut the country. The present pamphlet on the Marxist theory of the state serves a
s a valuable complement to that popular exposition of the dynamics of the capita
list system.

George Novack
October 1, 1969

I. Origin and Development of the State in the History of Societies

A. Primitive society and the origins of the state
The state did not always exist.

Certain sociologists and other representatives of academic political science are

in error when they speak of the state in primitive societies. What they are rea
lly doing is identifying the state with the community. In so doing, they strip t
he state of its special characteristic, i.e., the exercise of certain functions
is removed from the community as a whole to become the exclusive prerogative of
a tiny fraction of the members of this community.
In other words, the emergence of the state is a product of the social division o
f labour.
So long as this social division of labour is only rudimentary, all members of th
e society in turn exercise practically all its functions. There is no state. The
re are no special state functions.
In connection with the Bushmen, Father Victor Ellenberger writes that this tribe
knew neither private property nor courts, neither central authority nor special
bodies of any kind. (La fin tragique des Bushmen, pp. 70 73 [Paris: Amiot-Dumont,
1953]) Another author writes of this same tribe: The band, and not the tribe, is
the real political body among the Bushmen. Each band is autonomous, leading its
own life independently of the others. Its affairs are as a rule regulated by th
e skilled hunters and the older, more experienced men in general. (I. Shapera, Th
e Khoisan Peoples of South Africa, p. 76 [London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd.
, 1930])
The same holds true for the peoples of Egypt and Mesopotamia in remote antiquity
: The time is no more ripe for the patriarchal family with paternal authority tha
n it is for a really centralized political grouping ... Active and passive oblig
ations are collective in the regime of the totemic clan. Power and responsibilit
y in this society still have an indivisible character. We are here in the presen
ce of a communal and egalitarian society, within which participation in the same
totem, the very essence of each individual and the basis for the cohesion of al
l, places all members of the clan on an equal footing. (A. Moret and G. Davy, Des
Clans aux Empires, p. 17 [Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1923])
But to the extent that social division of labour develops and society is divided
into classes, the State appears and its nature is defined: The members of the c
ollectivity as a whole are denied the exercise of a certain number of functions;
a small minority, alone, takes over the exercise of these functions.
Two examples will illustrate this development, which consists in taking away fro
m a majority of the members of the society certain functions they formerly exerc
ised (collectively in the beginning) in order to arrogate these functions to a s
mall group of individuals.
First example: Arms.
This is an important function. Engels said that the state is, in the final analy
sis, nothing other than a body of armed men.
In the primitive collectivity, all male members of the group (and sometimes even
all adults, male and female) are armed.
In such a society the concept that the bearing of arms is the particular preroga
tive of some special institution called army, police, or constabulary, does not
exist. Every adult male has the right to bear arms. (In certain primitive societ
ies, the ceremony of initiation, which marks coming of age, confers the right to
bear arms.)

It is exactly the same in societies that are still primitive but already close t
o the stage of division into classes. For example, this holds true for the Germa
nic peoples at about the time they attacked the Roman Empire: all free men had t
he right to bear arms and they could use them to defend their person and their r
ights. The equality of rights among free men that we see in primitive Germanic s
ocieties is in fact equality among soldiers
which the anecdote of the Soissons v
ase [1] illustrates so well.
In ancient Greece and Rome, the struggles between patricians and plebeians often
revolved about this question of the right to bear arms.
Second example: Justice.
In general, writing is unknown to primitive society. Thus there are no written c
odes of law. Moreover, the exercise of justice is not the prerogative of particu
lar individuals; this right belongs to the collectivity. Apart from quarrels dec
ided by families or individuals themselves, only collective assemblies are empow
ered to render judgments. In primitive Germanic society, the president of the pe
ople s tribunal did not pass judgment: his function consisted in seeing that certa
in rules, certain forms, were observed.
The idea that there could be certain men detached from the collectivity to whom
would be reserved the right of dispensing justice, would seem to citizens of a s
ociety based on the collectivism of the clan or the tribe just as nonsensical as
the reverse appears to most of our contemporaries.
To sum up: At a certain point in the development of society, before it is divide
d into social classes, certain functions such as the right to bear arms or to ad
minister justice are exercised collectively
by all adult members of the communit
y. It is only as this society develops further, to the point where social classe
s appear, that these functions are taken away from the collectivity to be reserv
ed to a minority who exercise these functions in a special way.
What are the characteristics of this special way ?
Let us examine our Western society at the period when the feudal system begins t
o be the dominant one.
The independence (not formal, not juridical, but very real and almost total) of
the great feudal estates can be shown by the fact that the feudal lord, and only
he, exercises throughout his domain all the functions enumerated above, functio
ns that had devolved on the adult collectivity in primitive societies.
This feudal lord is the absolute master of his realm. He is the only one who has
the right to bear arms at all times; he is the only policeman, the only constab
le; he is the sole judge; he is the only one who has the right to coin money; he
is the sole minister of finance. He exercises throughout his domain all the cla
ssic functions performed by a state as we know it today.
Later, an evolution will take place. As long as the estate remains fairly small,
its population limited, the state functions of the lord rudimentary and not very
complicated, and as long as exercising these functions takes only a little of th
e lord s time, he an handle the situation and exercise all these functions in pers
on.
But when the domain grows and the population increases, the functions for which
the feudal lord is responsible become more and more complex and more and more de
tailed and burdensome. It becomes impossible for one man to exercise all these f

unctions.
What does the feudal lord then do?
He partially delegates his powers to others
but not to free men, since the latte
r belong to a social class in opposition to the seignorial class.
The feudal lord delegates part of his power to people completely under his contr
ol: serfs who are part of his domestic staff. Their servile origin is reflected
in many present-day titles: constable comes from comes stabuli, head serf of the s
tables; minister is the serf ministrable, i.e., the serf assigned by the lord to m
inister to his needs
to act as his attendant, servant, assistant, agent etc.; mar
shal is the serf who takes care of the carriages, the horses, etc. (from marah sc
alc, Old High German for keeper of the horses).
To the extent that these people, these non-free men, these domestics, are comple
tely under his control, does the seigneur partially delegate his powers to them.
This example leads us to the following conclusion
f the Marxist theory of the state:

which is the very foundation o

The state is a special organ that appears at a certain moment in the historical
evolution of mankind and that is condemned to disappear in the course of this sa
me evolution. It is born from the division of society into classes and will disa
ppear at the same time that this division disappears. It is born as an instrumen
t in the hands of the possessing class for the purpose of maintaining the domina
tion of this class over society, and it will disappear along with this class dom
ination.
Coming back to feudal society, it should be noted that state functions exercised
by the ruling class do not only concern the most immediate areas of power, such
as the army, justice, finances. Also under the seigneur s thumb are ideology, law
, philosophy, science, art. Those who exercise these functions are poor people w
ho, in order to live, have to sell their talents to a feudal lord who can take c
are of their needs. (Heads of the church have to be included in the class of feu
dal lords, inasmuch as the church was the proprietor of vast landed estates.) Un
der such conditions, at least as long as dependence is total, the development of
ideology is controlled entirely by the ruling class: it alone orders ideological
production ; it alone is capable of subsidising the ideologues .
These are the basic relationships that we have to keep constantly in mind, if we
don t want to get lost in a tangle of complications and fine distinctions. Needle
ss to say, in the course of the evolution of society, the function of the state
becomes much more complex, with many more nuances, than it is in a feudal regime
such as we have just very schematically described.
Nevertheless, we must start from this transparently clear and obvious situation
in order to understand the logic of the evolution, the origin of this social div
ision of labour that is brought about, and the process through which these diffe
rent functions become more and more autonomous and begin to seem more and more i
ndependent of the ruling class.

B. The modern bourgeois state

Bourgeois origin of the modern state
Here, too, the situation is fairly clear. Modern parliamentarism finds its origi

n in the battle cry that the English bourgeoisie hurled at the king, No taxation
without representation! In plain words this means: Not a cent will you get from us
as long as we have no say in how you spend it .
We can immediately see that this is not much more subtle than the relationship b
etween the feudal lord and the serf assigned to the stables. And a Stuart king,
Charles I, died on the scaffold for not having respected this principle, which b
ecame the golden rule all representatives, direct or indirect, of the state appa
ratus have had to obey since the appearance of modern bourgeois society.
The bourgeois state, a class state
This new society is no longer dominated by feudal lords but by capitalism, by mo
dern capitalists. As we know, the monetary needs of the modern state the new cen
tral power, more or less absolute monarchy become greater and greater, from the
fifteenth to sixteenth century onward. It is the money of the capitalists, of th
e merchant and commercial bankers, that in large part fills the coffers of the s
tate. Ever since that time, to the extent that the capitalists pay for the upkee
p of the state, they will demand that the latter place itself completely at thei
r service. They will make this quite clearly felt and understood by the very nat
ure of the laws they enact and by the institutions they create.
Several institutions which today appear democratic in nature, for example the pa
rliamentary institution, clearly reveal the class nature of the bourgeois state.
Thus, in most of the countries in which parliamentarisrn was instituted, only t
he bourgeoisie had the right to vote. This state of affairs lasted in most Weste
rn countries until the end of the last century or even the beginning of the twen
tieth century. Universal suffrage is, as we can see, of relatively recent invent
ion in the history of capitalism. How is this explained?
Easily enough. In the seventeenth century, when the English capitalists proclaim
ed No taxation without representation . It was only, representation for the bourgeo
isie that they had in mind; for the idea that people who owned nothing and paid
no taxes could vote, seemed absurd and ridiculous to them. Isn t parliament create
d for the very purpose of controlling expenditures made with the taxpayers money?
This argument, extremely valid from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, was ta
ken up and developed by our Doctrinaire [2] bourgeoisie at the time of the deman
d for universal suffrage. For this bourgeoisie, the role of parliament consisted
in controlling budgets and expenditures. And only those who pay taxes may valid
ly exercise this control; because those who do not pay taxes would constantly ha
ve the tendency to increase expenditures, since they are not footing the bill.
Later on, the bourgeoisie regarded this problem in another way. Along with unive
rsal suffrage was born universal taxation, which weighs more and more heavily on
the workers. In this way the bourgeoisie reestablished the inherent justice of th
e system.
The parliamentary institution is a typical example of the very direct very mecha
nical bond that exists even in the bourgeois state
between the domination of the
ruling class and the exercise of state power.
There are other examples. Let us look at the jury in the judicial system. The ju
ry appears to be an institution eminently democratic in character, especially wh
en compared to the administration of justice by irremovable judges, all members
of the ruling class over whom the people have no control.
But from what social layer were
and still in very large measure today, are the m
embers of a jury chosen? From the bourgeoisie. There were even special qualifica

tions, comparable to property-holding requirements for voting, for being able to

sit on a jury
a juror had to be a homeowner, pay a certain amount of taxes, etc
. To illustrate this very direct link between the machinery of the state and the
ruling class in the bourgeois era, we can also cite the famous Le Chapelier law
, passed during the French Revolution, which, under pretext of establishing equa
lity among all citizens, forbids both employers organizations and workers organisa
tions. Thus, under pretext of banning employers corporations
when industrial soci
ety has gone beyond the corporation stage trade unions are outlawed. In this way
the workers are rendered powerless against the bosses, since only working-class
organization can, to a certain extent (a much too limited extent), serve as a c
ounterweight to the wealth of the employers.

II. The Bourgeois State: the Face of Everyday Reality

Through the struggle waged by the labour movement certain institutions of the bo
urgeois state become both more subtle and more complex. Universal suffrage was s
ubstituted for suffrage for property-owners only; military service has become co
mpulsory; everybody pays taxes. The class character of the state then becomes a
little less transparent. The nature of the state as an instrument of class domin
ation is less evident than at the time of the reign of the classical bourgeoisie
, when the relationships between the different groups exercising state functions
were just as transparent as in the feudal era. The analysis of the modern state
, therefore, will also have to be a little more complex.
First, let us establish a hierarchy among the different functions of the state.
In this day and age, nobody but the most naive believes that parliament really d
oes the governing, that parliament is master of the state based on universal suf
frage. (That illusion is, however, more widespread in those countries in which p
arliament is a fairly recent institution.)
The power of the state is a permanent power. This power is exercised by a certai
n number of institutions that are isolated from and independent of so changeable
and unstable an influence as universal suffrage. These are the institutions tha
t must be analysed if we are to learn where the real power lies: Governments come
and governments go, but the police and the administrators remain .
The state is, above all, these permanent institutions: the army (the permanent p
art of the army
the general staff, special troops) the police, special police, s
ecret police, the top administrators of government departments ( key civil servants
), the national security bodies, the judges, etc. everything that is free of the i
nfluence of universal suffrage.
This executive power is constantly being reinforced. To the extent that universa
l suffrage appears and a certain democratisation, albeit completely formal, of c
ertain representative institutions develops, it can be shown that real power sli
ps from those institutions towards others that are more and more removed from th
e influence of parliament.
If the king and his functionaries lose a series of rights to parliament during t
he ascending phase of parliamentarism, on the contrary, with the decline of parl
iamentarism (which begins with the winning of universal suffrage), a continuous
series of rights are lost by parliament and revert to the permanent and irremova
ble administrations of the state. This phenomenon is a general one throughout We
stern Europe. The present Fifth Republic in France is presently the most strikin
g and most complete example of this phenomenon.
Should this turnabout, this reversal, be seen as a diabolical plot against unive

rsal suffrage by the wicked capitalists? A much deeper objective reality is invo
lved: the real powers are transferred from the legislative to the executive; the
power of the executive is reinforced in a permanent and continuous fashion as a
result of changes that are also taking place within the capitalist class itself
.
This process began at the time of World War I in most of the belligerent countri
es and has since continued without interruption. But the phenomenon often existe
d much earlier than that. Thus, in the German Empire this priority of the execut
ive over the legislative appeared concomitantly with universal suffrage. Bismarc
k and the Junkers granted universal suffrage in order to use the working class t
o a certain extent as a lever against the liberal bourgeoisie, thus assuring (in
that already essentially capitalist society) the relative independence of the e
xecutive power exercised by the Prussian nobility.
This process shows full well that political equality is more apparent than real
and that the right of the citizen-voter is nothing but the right to put a little
piece of paper in a ballot box every four years. The right goes no farther, nor
, above all, does it reach the real centres of decision-making and power.
The monopolies take over from parliament
The classical era of parliamentarisin was the era of free competition. At that t
ime the individual bourgeois, the industrialist, the banker, was very strong as
an individual. He was very independent, very free within the limits of bourgeois
freedom, and could risk his capital on the market in any he wished. In that ato
mized bourgeois society, parliament played a very useful, and even indispensable
, objective role in the smooth functioning of everyday affairs.
Actually, it was only in parliament that the common denominator of the interests
of the bourgeoisie could be determined. Dozens of separate capitalist groups co
uld be listed, groups opposed to one another by a multitude of sectional, region
al, and corporative interests. These groups could get together in an orderly fas
hion only in parliament. (It s true that they did meet on the market too, but ther
e it was with knives, not words!) It was only in parliament that a middle line c
ould be hammered out, a line that would express the interests of the capitalist
class as a whole.
Because that was then the function of parliament: to serve as a common meeting p
lace where the collective interests of the bourgeoisie could be formulated. Let
us recall that in the heroic era of parliamentarism it was not only with words a
nd votes that this collective interest was hammered out; fists and pistols were
used, too. Didn t the Convention, that classical bourgeois parliament during the F
rench Revolution, send people to the guillotine by the slimmest of majorities?
But capitalist society is not going to remain atomized. Little by little, it cal
l be seen organizing itself and structuring itself in a more and more concentrat
ed, more and more centralized way. Free competition fades away: it is replaced b
y monopolies, trusts, and other capitalist groupings.
Capitalist power is centralized outside parliament
Now a real centralization of finance capital, big banks and financial groups, ta
kes place. If the Analytique [3] of parliament expressed the will of the Belgian
bourgeoisie a century ago, today it is above all the annual report of the Socit Gnr
ale [4] or of Brufina [5], prepared for their stockholders meetings, that must be
studied to know the real opinions of the capitalists. These reports contain the
opinions of the capitalists who really count, the big financial groups who domi

nate the life of the country.

Thus, capitalist power is concentrated outside parliament and outside the instit
utions born of universal suffrage. In the face of so high-powered a concentratio
n (we need only remember that in Belgium a dozen financial groups control the ec
onomic life of the nation), the relationships between parliament and government
officials, police commissioners and those multimillionaires is a relationship bu
rdened very little by theory. It is a very immediate and practical relationship:
and the connecting link is the payoff.
The bourgeoisie s visible golden chains

the national debt

Parliament and, even more, the government of a capitalist state, no matter how d
emocratic it may appear to be, are tied to the bourgeoisie by golden chains. The
se golden chains have a name the public debt.
No government could last more than a month without having to knock on the door o
f the banks in order to pay its current expenses. If the banks were to refuse, th
e government would go bankrupt. The origins of this phenomenon are twofold. Taxe
s don t enter the coffers every day; receipts are concentrated in one period of th
e year while expenses are continuous. That is how the short-term public debt ari
ses. This problem could be solved by some technical gimmick. But there is anothe
r problem
a much more important one. All modern capitalist states spend more tha
n they receive. That is the long-term public debt for which banks and other fina
ncial establishments can most easily advance money, at heavy interest. Therein l
ies a direct and immediate connection, a daily link, between the state and big b
usiness.
The hierarchy in the state apparatus ...
Other golden chains, invisible chains, make the state apparatus a tool in the ha
nds of the bourgeoisie.
If we examine the method of recruiting civil service people, for example, we see
that to become a junior clerk in a ministry, it is necessary to pass an examina
tion. The rule seems very democratic indeed. On the other hand, not just anyone
can take any examination at all for any level whatsoever. The examination is not
the same for the position of secretary general of a ministry or chief of the ar
my general staff as it is for junior clerk in a small government bureau. At firs
t glance, this too would seem normal.
But a big but
there s a progression in these examinations that gives them a select
ive character. You have to have certain degrees, you have to have taken certain
courses, to apply for certain positions, especially important positions. Such a
system excludes a huge number of people who were not able to get a university ed
ucation or its equivalent, because equality of educational opportunity doesn t rea
lly exist. Even if the civil service examination system is democratic on the sur
face, it is also a selective instrument.
... mirror of the hierarchy in capitalist society
These invisible golden chains are also found in the remuneration received by mem
bers of the state apparatus.
All government agencies, the army included, develop this pyramidal aspect, this
hierarchical structure, that characterizes bourgeois society. We are so influenc
ed by and so imbued with the ideology of the ruling class that we tend to see no

thing abnormal in the fact that a secretary general of a ministry receives a sal
ary ten times higher than that of a junior clerk in the same ministry or that of
the woman who cleans its offices. The physical effort of this charwoman is cert
ainly greater; but the secretary general of the ministry, he thinks!
which, as e
veryone knows, is much more tiring. In the same way, the pay of the chief of the
general staff (again, someone who thinks!) is much greater by far than that acc
orded to a second-class private.
This hierarchical structure of the state apparatus leads us to emphasize: In thi
s apparatus there are secretaries general, generals of the army, bishops, etc.,
who have the same salary level, and therefore have the same standard of living,
as the big bourgeoisie, so that they are part of the same social and ideological
climate. Then come the middle functionaries, the middle officials, who are on t
he same social level and have the same income as the petty and middle bourgeoisi
e. And finally, the mass of employees without titles, charwomen, community worke
rs, who very often earn less than factory workers. Their standard of living clea
rly corresponds to that of the proletariat.
The state apparatus is not a homogeneous instrument. It involves a structure tha
t rather closely corresponds to the structure of bourgeois society, with a hiera
rchy of classes and identical differences between them.
This pyramidal structure corresponds to a real
h to have at their disposal an instrument they
te obvious why the bourgeoisie has been trying
hard, to deny public service workers the right

need of the bourgeoisie. They wis

can manipulate at will. It is qui
for a long time, and trying very
to strike.

Is the state simply an arbiter?

This point is important In the very concept of the bourgeois state regardless of
whether it may be more or less democratic in form
there is a fundamental premise,
linked, moreover, to the very origin of the state: By its nature the state rema
ins antagonistic, or rather non-adaptive, to the needs of the collectivity. The
state is, by definition, a group of men who exercise the functions that in the b
eginning were exercised by all members of the collectivity. These men contribute
no productive labour but are supported by the other members of society.
In normal times, there is not much need for watchdogs. Even in Moscow, for examp
le, there is no one in charge of collecting fares on buses: passengers deposit t
heir kopeck on boarding, whether or not anyone is watching them. In societies wh
ere the level of development of the productive forces is low, where everyone is
in a constant struggle with everyone else to get enough to live on for himself o
ut of a national income too small to go around, a large supervisory apparatus be
comes necessary.
Thus, during the German occupation [of Belgium], a number of specialized supervi
sory services proliferated (special police in the railway stations, supervision
of printshops, of rationing, etc.). In times like that, the area of conflict is
such that an imposing supervisory apparatus proves indispensable.
If we think about the problem a bit, we can see that all who exercise state func
tions, who are part of the state apparatus, are
in one way or another
watchdogs.
Special police and regular police are watchdogs, but so are tax collectors, jud
ges, paper pushers in government offices, fare-collectors on buses, etc. In sum,
all functions of the state apparatus are reduced to this: surveillance and cont
rol of the life of the society in the interests of the ruling class.
It is often said that the contemporary state plays the role of arbiter. This sta
tement is quite close to what we have just said: surveillance and arbitrating

aren t t

hey basically the same thing?

Two comments are called for. First, the arbiter is not neutral. As we explained
above, the top men in the state apparatus are part and parcel of the big bourgeo
isie. Arbitration thus does not take place in a vacuum; it takes place in the fr
amework of maintaining existing class society. Of course, concessions to the exp
loited can be made by arbitrators; that depends essentially on the relationship
of forces. But the basic aim of arbitration is to maintain capitalist exploitati
on as such, if necessary by compromising a bit on secondary questions.
The watchdog-state, testimony to the poverty of society
Second, the state is an entity created by society for the surveillance of the ev
eryday functioning of social life; it is at the service of the ruling class for
the purpose of maintaining the domination of that class. There is an objective n
ecessity for this watchdog organization, a necessity very closely linked to the
degree of poverty, to the amount of social conflict that exists in the society.
In a more general, historical way, the exercise of state functions is intimately
connected with the existence of social conflicts. In turn, these social conflic
ts are intimately, connected with the existence of a certain scarcity of materia
l goods, of wealth, of resources, of the necessary means for satisfaction of hum
an needs. This fact should be emphasized: As long as the state exists, it will b
e proof of the fact that social conflicts (therefore the relative scarcity of go
ods and services as well) remain. With the disappearance of social conflicts, th
e watchdogs, rendered useless and parasitical, will disappear
but not before! So
ciety, in effect, pays these men to exercise the functions of surveillance, as l
ong as that is in the interests of part of society. But it is quite evident that
from the moment no group in society has a stake in the watchdog function being
exercised, the function will disappear along with its usefulness. At the same ti
me, the state will disappear.
The very fact that the state survives proves that social conflicts remain, that
the condition of relative scarcity of goods remains the hallmark of that vast pe
riod in human history between absolute poverty (the condition during primitive c
ommunism) and plenty (the condition of the future socialist society). As long as
we are in this transitional period that covers ten thousand years of human hist
ory, a period that also includes the transition between capitalism and socialism
, the state will survive, social conflicts will remain, and there will have to b
e people to arbitrate these conflicts in the interest of the ruling class.
If the bourgeois state remains fundamentally an instrument in the service of the
ruling classes, does that mean that the workers should be indifferent to the pa
rticular form that this state takes parliamentary democracy, military, dictators
hip, fascist dictatorship? Not at all! The more freedom the workers have to orga
nize themselves and defend their ideas, the more will the seeds of the future so
cialist democracy grow within capitalist society, and the more will the advent o
f socialism be historically facilitated. That is why, the workers must defend th
eir democratic rights against any and every attempt to curtail them (anti-strike
laws, institution of a strong state ) or to crush them ( fascism).

III. The Proletariat in Power

The foregoing serves to answer some questions that arise about the state and abo
ut socialism.

Does the working class need a state?

When we say that the state remains in existence up to and including the transiti
onal society between capitalism and socialism, the question arises whether the w
orking class still needs a state when it takes power.
Could not the working class, as soon as it takes power, abolish the state overni
ght? History has already answered this question. Certainly, on paper, the workin
g class could do away with the state However, this would be only a formal, jurid
ical act to the extent that the workers had not seized power in a society alread
y so rich and with such an abundance of material goods and services that social
conflicts as such, that is, centring on the distribution of these products, coul
d disappear; and that the necessity for arbiters, watchdogs, police, to control
all that chaos disappeared at the same time as did the relative scarcity of good
s. This has never happened in the past and it is hardly likely that it ever will
.
To the extent that the working class takes power in a country in which there is
still a partial scarcity of goods, or in which a certain amount of poverty exist
s, it takes power at a time when the society cannot as yet function without a st
ate. A mass of social conflicts remain.
One can always resort to a hypocritical attitude, as do certain anarchists: Let s
abolish the state and call the people who exercise state functions by another na
me. But that s a purely verbal operation, a paper abolition of the state. As long as
social conflicts remain, there is a real need for people to regulate these conf
licts. Now, people who regulate conflicts that s what the state is. It is impossib
le for humanity, collectively, to regulate conflicts in a situation of real ineq
uality and of real incapacity to satisfy the needs of everyone.
Equality in poverty
There is an objection that can be raised to this, although it is a little absurd
and not many people raise it anymore.
A society can be imagined in which the abolition of the state would be linked to
the reduction of human needs; in such a society perfect equality could be estab
lished, which, of course, would be nothing but equality in poverty. Thus, if the
working class were to take power in Belgium tomorrow, everyone could have bread
and butter and even a little more than that.
But it is impossible artificially to deny human needs created by the development
of the productive forces
needs that have appeared as a result of the fact that
society has reached a certain stage of development. When production of a whole r
ange of goods and services is not sufficient to cover everyone s needs, banning th
ose goods and services will always be ineffective. Such a ban would only create
ideal conditions for a black market and for the illegal production of those good
s.
Thus all the communist sects which, during the Middle Ages and modern times, sou
ght to organize the perfect communist society immediately, based on perfect equa
lity of its members, forbade production of luxury items, of items of ordinary co
mfort including printing! All these experiments failed, because human nature is
such that from the moment a man becomes aware of certain needs, these cannot be
artificially repressed. Savonarola [6], preaching repentance and abstinence, inv
eighed against luxuries and demanded that all paintings be burned; he would not
have been able to prevent some incorrigible or other, a lover of beauty, from pa
inting in secret.

The problem of distribution of such illegal products, which would then become even
scarcer than formerly, would still arise again
inevitably.
The proletariat s gamble
Another reason, although less important, should be added to what was said at the
beginning of this chapter.
When the proletariat comes to power, it does so under very special conditions, d
ifferent from the seizure of power by any other previous social class. In the co
urse of history, when all other social classes seized power, they already held t
he actual power of society in their hands
economic, intellectual, and moral. The
re is not a single example, before that of the proletariat, of a social class co
ming to power while it was still oppressed from the economic, intellectual, and
moral standpoint. In other words, postulating that the proletariat call seize po
wer is almost a gamble, because collectively, as a class in the capitalist syste
m, this proletariat is downtrodden and prevented from fully developing its creat
ive potential. For we cannot fully develop our intellectual and moral capacities
when we work eight, nine, or ten hours a day in a workshop, a factory, an offic
e. And that is still the proletarian condition today.
As a result, the power of the working class, when it comes to power, is very vul
nerable. In many areas, the power of the working class must be defended against
a minority that will continue, for the duration of an entire historical period o
f transition, to enjoy enormous advantages in the intellectual area and in their
material possessions at least in their stock of consumer goods
in relation to t
he working class.
A normal socialist revolution expropriates the big bourgeoisie as holders of the
means of production; but it does not strip the bourgeois holders of their accum
ulated possessions or diplomas. Still less can it expropriate their brains and k
nowledge: during the entire period preceding the taking of power by the working
class, it was the bourgeoisie who had an almost exclusive monopoly in education.
Thus, in a society where the proletariat has held power for only a little while
(political power, power of armed men), many levers of real power are and remain
in the hands of the bourgeoisie more exactly, in the hands of a part of the bour
geoisie, which might be called the intelligentsia or the intellectual and techno
logical bourgeoisie.
Workers power and bourgeois technicians
Lenin had some bitter experiences on this score. Actually, it can be proved that
no matter how you look at the problem, no matter what laws, decrees, institutio
ns are promulgated, if there is a need for professors, high-level functionaries,
engineers, highly trained technical people at all levels of the social machiner
y, it is very difficult to place proletarians in these positions overnight
and e
ven five or six years after the conquest of power.
During the early years of Soviet power, Lenin, armed with a theoretically correc
t although slightly incomplete formula, said: Today engineers work for the bourg
eoisie; tomorrow they will work for the proletariat; for that they will be paid
and, if necessary, they will be forced to work. The important thing is that they
be controlled by the workers. But a few years later, shortly before his death,
Lenin, drawing a balance sheet of that experience, asked himself the question: W
ho controls whom? Are the experts controlled by the communists, or is the revers
e happening?

When we grapple with this question day after day and in concrete terms in the un
derdeveloped countries, when we see what it means in practice in a country like
Algeria, we realize full well that this is a problem that can be solved easily e
nough on paper with a few magical formulas, but that it is a completely differen
t matter when the problem has to be solved in a real country, in real life. In a
country like Algeria, for example, it means utter control; the privilege of uni
versity education (or any kind of education) is possessed by an infinitesimal mi
nority of society, while the great mass of people, who fought heroically to win
independence, find themselves, when the time comes to exercise power, confronted
with their lack of knowledge, knowledge they must now only begin to acquire. An
d they find that, in the interim, they must completely surrender to the educated
few the power they so heroically fought for and won.
The most heroic experiment in this area, the most radical and the most revolutio
nary in all human history, is the one undertaken by the Cuban revolution. Drawin
g lessons from all the varied experiences of the past, the Cuban revolution unde
rtook to resolve this problem on a broad scale and in a minimum of time by condu
cting an extraordinary educational campaign* to transform tens of thousands of i
lliterate workers and peasants into that many teachers, professors and universit
y students
and in a minimum of time. At the end of five or six years work, the r
esults obtained are considerable.
Nevertheless, a single engineer or a single agronomist in a district containing
tens of thousands of workers can in practice become, despite the revolutionary s
pirit of the Cuban people, master of the district, if he has a monopoly on the t
echnical knowledge vital to the district. Here again, the false solution would b
e to revert to so simple a level that technicians would not be needed. That is a
reactionary utopia.
The state, guardian of workers

power

All these difficulties indicate the necessity for the proletariat, the new rulin
g class, to exercise state power against all those who might wrest power from it
, whether bit by bit or all at once. The proletariat must exercise state power i
n this new and transitional society in which it possesses political power and th
e principal levers of economic power, but in which it is held in check by a whol
e constellation of weaknesses and newly made enemies. This is the situation that
makes it necessary for the working class to maintain a state after its conquest
of power and that makes it impossible to abolish the state overnight. But this
working-class state must be of a very special kind.
Nature and characteristics of the proletarian state
The working class, by its special position in society (which has just been descr
ibed), is obliged to maintain a state. But in order to preserve the power of tha
t state, the latter has to be radically different from the state which in the pa
st upheld the power of the bourgeoisie, or the feudal or slaveholding class. The
proletarian state is, at one and the same time, a state and not a state. It bec
omes less and less a state. It is a state that begins to wither away at the very
moment it is born, as Marx and Lenin correctly said. Marx, developing the theor
y of the proletarian state, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as he called
it, the state that withers away, gave it several characteristics, examples of w
hich were found in the Paris Commune of 1871. There are three essential characte
ristics:
(1) No distinct separation between the executive and legislative powers. Bodies
are needed which enact laws and at the same time enforce them, In short, it is n
ecessary to revert to the state that was born of the primitive communism of the

clan and the tribe and that can still be found in the ancient Athenian popular a
ssembly.
This is important. It is the, best way of reducing as much as possible the cleav
age between real power, more and more concentrated in the hands of permanent bod
ies, and the increasingly fictitious power that is left to deliberative assembli
es. This cleavage is the characteristic of bourgeois parliamentarism. It is not
enough to replace one deliberative assembly with another, if nothing is essentia
lly changed regarding this cleavage. The deliberative assemblies must have real
executive power at their disposal.
(2) Public offices to be elective, to the greatest extent. It is not only member
s of the deliberative assemblies who should be elected. Judges, high-level funct
ionaries, officers of the militia, supervisors of education, managers of public
works, should also be elected. This may be a bit of a shock to countries with an
ultra-reactionary Napoleonic tradition. But certain specifically bourgeois demo
cracies, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, or Australia for example, have
conserved the elective character of a certain number of public functions. Thus,
in the United States the sheriff is elected by his fellow citizens.
In the proletarian state, this electing of public officials must be accompanied
in all cases by the right of recall, i.e., voting unsatisfactory officials out o
f office at any time.
Thus, permanent and extensive control by the people over those exercising state
functions must be made possible, and the separation between those who exercise s
tate power and those in whose name it is exercised must be as small as possible.
That is why it is necessary to assure a constant changing of elected officials,
to prevent people from remaining in office permanently. The functions of the st
ate must, on an ever wider scale, be exercised in turn by the masses as a whole.
(3) No excessive salaries. No official, no member of representative and legislat
ive bodies, no individual exercising a state power, should receive a salary high
er than that of a skilled worker. That is the only valid method of preventing pe
ople from seeking public office as a way of feathering their nests and sponging
on society, the only valid way to get rid of the career-hunters and parasites kn
own to all previous societies.
Together these three rules well express the thinking of Marx and Lenin concernin
g the proletarian state. This state no longer resembles any of its predecessors,
because it is the first state that begins to wither away at the very moment of
its appearance; because it is a state whose apparatus is composed of people no l
onger privileged in relation to the mass of society; because it is a state whose
functions are more and more exercised by members of the society as a whole who
keep taking each other s place; because it is a state that is no longer identical
with a group of people who are detached from the masses and exercise functions s
eparate and apart from the masses, but which, on the contrary, is indistinguisha
ble from the people, from the labouring masses; because it is a state that withe
rs away with the withering away of social classes, social conflicts, money econo
my, market production, commodities, money, etc. This withering away of the state
should be conceived of as self-management and self-government of producers and
citizens which expands more and more until, under conditions of material abundan
ce and a high cultural level of the entire society, the latter becomes structure
d into self-governing producer-consumer communities.
What about the Soviet Union?
When we look at the history of the USSR in the past thirty years, the conclusion
to be drawn concerning the state is simple: a state with a permanent army; a st

ate in which can be found marshals, managers of trusts, and even playwrights and
ballerinas who earn fifty times as much its a manual labourer or a domestic wor
ker; where tremendous selectivity for certain public functions has been establis
hed, making access to these functions practically impossible for the vast majori
ty of the population: where real power is exercised by small committees of peopl
e whose tenure is renewed in mysterious ways and whose power remains fixed and p
ermanent for long historical periods
such a state, obviously, is not in the proc
ess of withering away.
Why?
The explanation for this is simple. In the Soviet Union the state has not wither
ed away because social conflicts have not withered away. Social conflicts have n
ot withered away because the degree of development of the productive forces has
not permitted this withering away
because the situation of semi-scarcity that ch
aracterises even the most advanced capitalist countries continues to characteris
e the situation in the Soviet state. And as long as these conditions of semi-sca
rcity exist, controllers, watchdogs, special police are necessary. Of course, in
a proletarian state, these people would be serving a better cause, at least to
the extent to which they defend the socialist economy. But it must also be recog
nized that they are detached front the body of society, that they are in large m
easure parasites. Their disappearance is directly linked to the level of develop
ment of the productive forces, which alone can permit the withering away of soci
al conflicts and the abolition of functions linked to these conflicts.
And to the extent that these watchdogs, these controllers, more and more monopol
ize the exercise of political power, to that extent obviously can they be assure
d of increasing material privileges, the choice morsels in the relative scarcity
that dominates distribution. They thus constitute a privileged bureaucracy, bey
ond the reach of control by the workers and prone to defend first and foremost t
heir own privileges.
The argument of the cordon sanitaire [7]
The dangers resulting from being surrounded by capitalism are always cited by th
ose who object to the above criticisms. The argument goes: As long as an externa
l danger exists, a state will be necessary, as Stalin said, if only to defend th
e country against the hostility that surrounds it.
This argument is based on a misunderstanding. The only thing that the existence
of a threatening capitalist encirclement can prove is the necessity for armament
and for a military institution, but that does not justify the existence of mili
tary institutions separate and apart from the body of society. The existence of
such military institutions, separate from society as a whole, indicates that wit
hin this society there remains a substantial amount of the social tension which
prevents governments from permitting themselves the luxury of arming the people,
which makes the leaders afraid to trust the people to solve the military proble
ms of self-defence in their own way. This the people would be able to do if the
collectivity really had that degree of extraordinary superiority that a truly so
cialist society would have in relation to capitalist society.
In reality, the problem of external environment is only a secondary aspect of a
much more general phenomenon: The level of development of the productive forces,
the economic maturity of the country, is far from the level that would have to
exist for a society to be a socialist society. The Soviet Union has remained a t
ransitional society whose level of development of productive forces is comparabl
e to that of an advanced capitalist society. It must, therefore, fight with comp
arable weapons. Not having eliminated social conflicts, the USSR must maintain a

ll organs of control and surveillance of the population and, because of this, mu

st maintain and even reinforce the state instead of allowing it to wither away.
For numerous specific reasons, this has fostered bureaucratic deformations and d
egenerations in this transitional society, which have clone the cause of sociali
sm grave injury, especially to the extent that the label socialist has been attach
ed to Soviet society for fear of telling the truth: We are still too poor and to
o backward to be able to create a true socialist society. And to the extent that
they wanted to use the label socialist at all costs for propaganda reasons, they
now have to explain the existence of such things as socialist purges, socialist conc
entration camps, socialist unemployment, socialist violations of the rights of natio
nal minorities, etc., etc.
Guarantees against bureaucracy
What guarantees can be introduced in the future to avoid the abnormal growth of
the bureaucracy that appeared in the USSR?
Scrupulously respect the three rules enumerated above concerning the beginning o
f the withering away of the workers state (and especially the rule limiting salar
ies of all administrators
economic and political).
Scrupulously respect the democratic character of management of the economy: work
ers self-management committees elected in the enterprises; a congress of producer
s ( economic senate ) elected by these committees, etc. In the last analysis those w
ho control the surplus social product control the entire society.
Scrupulously respect the principle that if the workers state must of necessity re
strict the political liberties of all class enemies who are opposed to the adven
t of socialism (a restriction that should be in proportion to the violence of th
eir resistance), it should at the same time extend these same liberties for all
workers: freedom for all parties that respect socialist legality; freedom of the
press for all newspapers that do the same; freedom of assembly, association, de
monstration for the workers without any restrictions; real independence of the t
rade unions from the state, with recognized right to strike.
Respect the democratic and public character of all deliberative assemblies and t
heir full freedom of debate.
Respect the principle of a written law.
Theory and practice
Marxist theory concerning the withering away of the state has now been fully dev
eloped for more than a half-century. In Belgium there is only one little detail
missing, one little thing we still have to do
put this theory into practice.
Top of the page
Notes
1. Anecdote of the Soissons vase. Legendary account of an incident during the re
ign of King Clovis of the Franks, in the fifth century AD. (Clovis was the first
Frankish king to embrace Christianity, and it was during his reign that most of
what is now Belgium and France was united into a kingdom.) After a victorious b
attle at Soissons (486 AD), when the booty was to be divided equally among all t
he soldiers, Clovis wanted to keep a certain vase for himself. A soldier thereup
on strode out of the ranks and smashed the vase with his sword, to indicate that

no fighter had the right to any special privilege in sharing the booty.
2. Doctrinaire. Members of the conservative wing of the Liberal Party in ninetee
nth century Belgium were called Doctrinaires. They were violently opposed to uni
versal suffrage, whereas the so-called Progressives in the Liberal Party were re
ady to accept it.
3. Analytique. The equivalent in Belgium of the US Congressional Record.
4. Socit Gnrale. Belgium s most important capitalist grouping since its independence i
n 1830. Originally organized in the form of a merchant bank, the Socit Gnrale was a
forerunner of finance capital , which became general in other capitalist countries
only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This resulted from the Socit s e
arly possession of controlling interests in many joint stock companies, especial
ly in coal and steel. Later it controlled the famous Union Minire du Haut Katanga
, as well as other companies in the Congo.
Today it has reorganised in the form of a central holding company that controls
stock in many apparently independent companies, among them Belgium s main savings
bank.
5. Brufina. Belgium s second largest capitalist grouping, Brufina grew out of the
Banque de Bruxelles, the second largest Belgian bank.
6. Savonarola (1452 1498). Italian religious reformer and mass leader who attacked
corruption and vice in fiery oratory. Incurred the enmity of Pope Alexander VI
as a result of scandals he uncovered, and publicised, in the pope s court. Accused
of heresy, he was burned to death at the stake in Florence.
7. Cordon sanitaire . Literally, the sanitary cordon or quarantine placed around the
young Soviet republic by the United States and its World War I allies. The Sovie
t Union was isolated or cordoned off from diplomatic, commercial and ideological
intercourse with the rest of the world by the belt of countries encircling it a
nd allied navies patrolling the sea-lanes. This policy, which caused tremendous
hardships in the Soviet Union but which ultimately failed, was an earlier versio
n of Washington s current attempt to destroy the Cuban revolution by economic bloc
kade and to quarantine the revolutionary infection by forbidding travel there.

Ernest Mandel
World Revolution Today

Trotskyism or Stalinism?

(1970)
The very fact that Monty Johnstone is here debating with me this evening on the
problem of Trotskyism today should in itself be considered evidence of what Trot
skyism is not. I am not going to insult the intelligence of anyone present by sa
ying that it is not counterrevolutionary or an agency of fascism, or an agency o
f imperialism, or any of that nonsense. For if that were the case, not only woul
d this debate not take place but many other things which have been happening in
the world in the last few years would be incomprehensible.
One thing Trotskyism is not is a defeated tendency in the international workers
movement. It is not Menshevik-type revision of Marxism that has been crushed def
initively, as was said in the Soviet Union in its fifteenth party congress in 19
27; as was repeated by the unfortunate Nikita Sergeivitch Khrushchev at the twen
tieth party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956; as has
been repeated over and over again in innumerable publications under the control
of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Because, if it were really a crushed, defeated, no
nexistent, eliminated, Menshevik tendency, why would anybody want to discuss wit
h it? Why is the Soviet bureaucracy after having crushed, destroyed, eliminated
and vanquished this tendency, forty, thirty, twenty, and ten years ago, why are
the spokesmen for these bureaucrats today forced to write books, pamphlets, and

articles and keep coming back to this problem? Why have there been three or four
new books on Trotskyism published in the Soviet Union in the last twelve months
, if ours is a definitively defeated tendency?
So I think the first point we ought to make this evening is to render historical
justice to the founder of the Red Army and to the leader of the insurrection of
the October revolution which initiated the first victorious working-class revol
ution in a whole country. On this ninetieth anniversary of the birth of Leon Tro
tsky, which coincides with the anniversary of the October revolution, the politi
cal movement he founded, the ideas he stood for, the program he defended, live s
tronger than ever in the world.
There is today a vibrant youth movement. Thousands of young people are coming to
Trotskyism all over the world. And that is the only reason Monty Johnstone of t
he Communist Party feels obliged to debate with us about Trotskyism, that is the
only reason why the Soviet bureaucracy has to put out a steady stream of speech
es, pamphlets, magazine articles and books on the subject of Trotsky.
Trotskyism today is mainly a youth movement, a movement of youth that is being b
uilt and expanded on the five continents. For that very same reason I am not goi
ng to dwell in the least on the question that Monty Johnstone is going to talk a
bout quite a lot: What Trotsky wrote or did not write in 1905, in 1912, in 1917,
or in 1918. For I want to say from the beginning that this is pretty irrelevant
to the actualities of the contemporary revolutionary struggles. Does anyone rea
lly think that 250,000 people vote for a Trotskyist presidential candidate in Fr
ance, does anyone really think that in Ceylon today a Trotskyist trade union lea
der leads tens of thousands of workers in big strikes, does anyone really think
that tens of thousands of people demonstrate behind banners which the whole of p
ublic opinion in Japan today calls Trotskyist, because of what Trotsky wrote in
1907 or 1912?
The overwhelming majority of these people have not read what he wrote and are no
t interested in reading all that
this is a mistake on their part, because everyb
ody should be interested in the history of the revolutionary movement
but they r
ightly regard that as irrelevant to the main problem which we have to understand
and explain: What is the origin, what is the root of the strength of world Trot
skyism today, why do thousands and thousands of people flock to its banner on a
world scale, and why do the Soviet bureaucrats and Monty Johnstone, their Britis
h spokesman, have to reopen a debate which they hoped had been finished with mac
hine-gun bullets thirty or thirty-five years ago, in the period of the infamous
Moscow Trials?
I will give four basic reasons why the Trotskyist movement is stronger now than
ever before; why thousands of people are adhering to it throughout the world; wh
y it has a bigger numerical, geographical and political extension than ever befo
re, even during the 1920s, while it was still a tendency inside the Communist pa
rties and the Communist International.
The first reason has to do with a basic problem of the colonial revolution and t
he way forward for the underdeveloped, semicolonial countries. Stalinism and Sta
linist parties, parties which call themselves Communist, still follow a Menshevi
k or semi-Menshevik policy. That is, they believe as the Russian Mensheviks beli
eved, that because these countries are backward, because the industrial bourgeoi
sie has not yet come to political power, that the immediate strategic task for t
he working class and poor peasantry is somehow to establish an alliance with thi
s national bourgeoisie against imperialism and against feudal and semi-feudal fo
rces. The aim of such an alliance would be to arrive at a coalition form of gove
rnment a government of the four classes as it was called in China from 1925 to 192
7 government of the National Front, or a regime of National Democracy, as it was cal
led in the new official program of the Soviet Communist Party.

Experience has confirmed what Trotsky s theory of the permanent revolution proclai
med as early as 1906, that there is no way out for any underdeveloped colonial o
r semicolonial country along such a road; that any struggle that limits itself t
o fighting against rural feudal or semifeudal landlords, or foreign imperialism,
while keeping the national bourgeoisie in power, while maintaining capitalist p
roperty relations intact, while refraining from establishing the dictatorship of
the proletariat allied to the poor peasantry, will inevitably leave these under
developed countries backward, stagnating, exploited and super exploited by inter
national and national capital.
Such a policy will not be able to tear the millions populating these countries o
ut of their age-old miseries. Experience has also taught a much more terrible le
sson. Thousands and thousands of Communists in Brazil in 1964, in Iraq in 1958,
and five hundred thousand Communists in Indonesia in 1965 had to pay with their
lives for the illusion that it was possible, desirable, or necessary to establis
h durable relationships of coalition and collaboration with bourgeois or semi bo
urgeois political forces. Such a subordination and sacrifice of independent mass
struggle can only lead to a crushing defeat for the working class and the poor
peasantry.
Trotskyism lives and grows with new members, attracts new tendencies and builds
new parties in the underdeveloped countries because it stands for this basic rul
e of revolution. There is no way out for these colonial and semicolonial countri
es but the way of the permanent revolution. There is no possibility of acquiring
real national liberation, real independence from imperialism, without overthrow
ing the bourgeois class together with the agents of foreign imperialism and the
feudal and semifeudal landlords. There is no possibility of liberating the peopl
e, peasants and workers, without establishing the dictatorship of the proletaria
t allied with the poor peasantry, without creating a workers state. Only in thos
China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and it s happening now
e countries where this happened
in South Vietnam is there a way to social and economic progress. Wherever, thro
ugh the responsibility of the Communist parties following the Moscow line, which
is Stalinist Menshevism, that has been prevented from happening, there have bee
n defeats, misery, tears and bloodshed for the working people of these countries
.
It is this contemporary reality, rather than quotations from 1907, 1917, or 1921
, that has to be faced by anyone who wants to understand what is going on in thi
s sector of the world revolution. For the Trotskyist movement, for the revolutio
nary Marxists throughout the world, it was a moment of great vindication when th
e leading idea of the permanent revolution that the only road to victory in a ba
ckward country is through a socialist revolution
was taken over by the Cuban rev
olutionaries and proclaimed in the Second Declaration of Havana, after the first
victorious revolution in the Western Hemisphere. This gave proof that Leon Trot
sky and the Fourth International had been one hundred per cent correct in their
strategic line for the underdeveloped countries.
The second reason for the growth of Trotskyism on a world scale is that we stand
completely and unconditionally for the revolutionary road to socialism in the i
ndustrialized imperialist countries as against the reformist electoral road defe
nded by the Communist parties in Western Europe, Japan, North America, Australia
and New Zealand. When we say that we follow the revolutionary road, this does n
ot mean that we are partisans of putschism or adventurism, that we think a few h
undred people here and a few hundred there can snatch power unexpectedly without
anybody taking notice of it, in the advanced capitalist countries. There the bo
urgeoisie represents tremendous power. It has political experience, it has the b
enefits of political tradition and political continuity. Its rule over these cou
ntries does not depend simply and solely upon its weapons of repression
its army
and police but rather upon the ideological and political influence it still wie

lds over a large part of the petty bourgeoisie and even among a part of the work
ing class itself.
Our clear and uncompromising stand in favor of the revolutionary road to sociali
sm essentially pivots around three points:
Firstly, objective situations independent of the will and control of any group o
r party periodically create prerevolutionary situations in industrially advanced
countries. At these moments of revolutionary mass upsurge these objective situa
tions unavoidably lead to large-scale actions of the working class such as gener
al strikes and factory occupations which obviously go beyond the limits of strug
gle for immediate wage demands and working conditions. The duty of revolutionary
parties and groups representing the revolutionary vanguard is to prepare themse
lves and the best working-class militants to intervene during these hours, days
and weeks, for it is only through these periodic upsurges of the mass movement t
hat the chance is presented to overthrow capitalist power.
You cannot overthrow capitalism gradually, you cannot abolish a bourgeois army b
attalion by battalion, you cannot destroy the power of the bourgeoisie piece by
piece. You can only accomplish these aims through the revolutionary mobilization
of the masses, and revolutionary actions of this sort are not possible every da
y when business as usual prevails. Revolutionary action is possible only during th
ose prerevolutionary situations when the tension of class relations is at its ma
ximum and the class conflict is sharpest. A party, a vanguard and a class must b
e prepared to intervene at that juncture in a decisive manner in order to make a
breakthrough toward the conquest of power and a victorious socialist revolution
.
Secondly, if you want to develop a situation in which the working class wants to
know what to do next, in which conditions for revolution are favorable, you mus
t engage in prior propaganda, agitation, and action for transitional demands, es
pecially for the key demand for workers control of production, which crowns all
the other demands of the working class in its struggle for power in the industri
alized countries. To think that a working class which has been educated, day aft
er day, month after month, year after year, in nothing but immediate trade union
demands and electoral politics will in some mysterious way suddenly become capa
ble of revolutionary consciousness and action in a revolutionary situation is to
believe in magic or miracles.
Lenin said that the ABC of revolutionary policy and the duty of a revolutionary
party is to conduct revolutionary propaganda also in periods that are not yet re
volutionary. Lenin said that this is precisely what makes the difference between
a revolutionary party and a reformist or a centrist party. When revolution does
break out, many people suddenly discover their revolutionary soul. But a revolu
tionary party has the constant duty to propagandize for revolution even if the s
ituation has not yet reached the point of showdown between the classes. Its work
in this respect can be an influential factor in accelerating revolutionary cons
ciousness.
Thirdly, we believe that the struggle for transitional demands, for those demand
s which cannot be incorporated or assimilated into the normal functioning of bou
rgeois society should not be conducted solely by propagandistic means. Every opp
ortunity should be taken to impel the working class into motion around such dema
nds. They should be introduced into the ongoing daily struggle of the class by a
ll avenues. Unless the workers acquire experience by fighting for these demands
in partial struggles they will be unable to generalize their outlook at the heig
ht of revolutionary intensity. Otherwise these demands will appear to them as so

mething that falls from the sky, that is imposed from without or advocated only
by small minority groups.
I would like to ask Monty Johnstone how he squares the following quotation from
Lenin regarding the obligations of a vanguard party with the course followed by
the French Communist Party in May 1968. Lenin said:
Will this situation last long; how much more acute will it become? Will it lead
to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer
can be provided only by the experience gained during the development of revolut
ionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced clas
s, the proletariat. There can be no talk in this connection about illusions or the
ir repudiation, since no socialist has ever guaranteed that this war (and not th
e next one), that today s revolutionary situation (and not tomorrow s) will produce
a revolution. What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of
all socialists
that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary
situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat s revolutiona
ry consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revol
utionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organizations suited to the revo
lutionary situation.
Just compare that quotation, which breathes the spirit of genuine Bolshevism, wi
th the conduct of the Communist parties of France, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and o
ther capitalist countries over the past twenty-five years (not to go still furth
er back to the prewar period), especially with the conduct of the French CP in M
ay 1968, and you will understand both the fundamentally reformist character of t
hese parties and why thousands of young rebels are adhering to Trotskyism in the
se countries.
The third reason for the growth of Trotskyism today has to do with the crucial q
uestion of workers democracy. The main historical goal to be attained in those c
ountries that have already abolished capitalism is the institution of democratic
ally centralized workers self-management in opposition to the material privilege
s and the monopoly of political and economic power wielded by the bureaucracy. T
he bureaucratic rulers are the object of hatred by thousands of youth, criticall
y minded intellectuals, and advanced workers in these postcapitalist states. Tha
t was graphically evidenced during those few months in the Czechoslovakia of 196
8 when these elements of the population had the chance to speak out, at least in
part, their real thoughts and feelings.
The bureaucratic regimes in these countries are one of the main reasons for the
discrediting of the cause of socialism in the industrialized West which deters m
uch larger numbers of students, intellectuals, and workers from coming out whole
heartedly in favor of a socialist revolution and communism.
What I am referring to is not a full-fledged socialist society, that is to say,
a society without any social differentiation, where commodity production and mon
ey relations have withered away. Such conditions cannot exist in any of the East
European countries today and that is not what is involved in our discussion of
their political situation and problems.
What is both possible and urgently called for in the existing situation is what
I call a political revolution, a set of changes in the superstructure of the sys
tem which would initiate or fulfill the elementary demands of the Marxist and Le
ninist program on the nature of a dictatorship of the proletariat, leading to th
e building of a socialist society. In none of the works by Marx or Engels will y
ou find a single sentence, for example, which asserts that the dictatorship of t
he proletariat means the monopoly of power by a single party.
Nor will you find the slightest support for the abominable notion that the dicta

torship of the proletariat means the application of a repressive censorship, not

against nonexistent representatives of capitalism and landlordism, but against
the working class. These practices have been introduced and implemented by Stali
nism.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Kremlin bureaucracy not only violated the
sovereignty and independence of a small nation and a fraternal and allied worker
s state. It was equally criminal in other respects. It identified the suppressio
n of democratic rights such as freedom of expression for workers, students and i
ntellectuals, with the name of communism by taking away from the Czechoslovakian
workers the rights they had regained between January and August 1968 to vote in
dependently on resolutions, to have them published in their trade union journals
, to criticize the government if they disagreed with its policies and to critici
ze the managers of their factories.
These were not very extensive rights and they were a far cry from the full-fledg
ed socialist democracy they were entitled to and striving for. Lenin in State an
d Revolution says that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the workers sho
uld have a thousand-fold more freedom of self-expression and self-organization t
han they enjoyed under bourgeois democracy.
Nevertheless, even this elementary right was taken away and hundreds of thousand
s of soldiers were sent into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for that purpos
e. That was a shameful disgrace. That is why we Trotskyists first have to reesta
blish what Marxism and Leninism really stand for, because the crimes of Stalinis
m have so distorted their true content in the minds of many workers.
Socialist democracy involves far more than the self-evident right of the workers
to free expression without state censorship or penalties. Socialist democracy m
eans the self-management of the working class on a democratically centralized ba
sis. It means that the workers should run the factories not only as individual a
nd separate units, but the economy as a whole. This requires the subordination o
f the national planning authorities to the congress of workers councils. It mean
s that the mass of the working class actually exercises the power and determines
through its discussions and decisions how the annual national income shall be d
ivided between the consumption and the accumulation funds, that is, between what
is used up and enjoyed for immediate needs, and what is set aside and invested
for future growth.
Without the possession and exercise of such rights the working class does not re
ally rule, whatever compliments the official propagandists may offer to console
it for its lack or loss of power. It is because the Trotskyist program most cons
istently advocates such democratic rule of the workers that it is bound to win m
ore forces in the Soviet Union and East Europe, where the underlying trends of d
evelopment are more and more directed toward a political revolution by the masse
s against the arbitrariness of the bureaucratic autocracy.
Finally, Trotskyism is most noteworthy today for its uncompromising internationa
lism. After August 1914 and still more after October 1917, Lenin and the Bolshev
iks set about to revive the principles and the instrument of internationalism wh
ich had been trampled upon by the prewar and pro-imperialist social democratic l
eaders. One of the most bitter fruits of the anti-Marxist theory of socialism in
one country, which Stalin originated and imposed upon world Communism from 1924
on, was the violation and the betrayal of the international solidarity of the w
orking-class struggle. This flouting of internationalism culminated in the scutt
ling of the Communist International by Stalin in 1943 as a favor to Churchill an
d Roosevelt.
Now the leaders and followers of international Stalinism are beginning to taste
some more of these bitter fruits, which result from subordinating the welfare of

the workers movement to the narrow and selfish dictates of the Kremlin bureaucr
acy. They see the appalling spectacle of the two largest workers states in the w
orld at each other s throats, and even hinting at the possibilities of hostilities
between each other. This situation has come about not because either the Soviet
or the Chinese masses willed it, but because it is a logical consequence of the
despicable petty bourgeois nationalist tendencies and outlooks that guide the b
ureaucratic strata at the head of these countries today.
The Soviet leaders have gone so far as to encourage and allow so-called communis
t journalists to talk about the yellow peril and to depict the Chinese people as m
isled by new Genghis Khans and as a menace to civilization. The fact that such utter
ly reactionary and racist utterances can come from a government and a party that
still call themselves communist shows the degree of degeneration to which these
organizations have succumbed.
At the height of its power, Stalinism boasted of the monolithic character of the
world Communist movement which was bound together by ideological terror and enf
orced conformity. Now all that is passed. The last Moscow conference of the World
Communist Parties demonstrated how far disintegration has proceeded. There are h
ardly two Communist parties which have any measure of autonomy today that think
alike and pursue the same line.
They cannot contend against one another and harbor all sorts of divergent tenden
cies and factions. One can count up to fifteen different Communist tendencies on a
world scale. The Stalinists used to deride the Trotskyist movement in the past
for being ridden by incessant factionalism and splits. They are silent on this s
core nowadays
and for good reason! None of the splits among the Trotskyists has
been comparable to the gigantic fissures that have opened up in the internationa
l Communist movement and keep widening from year to year.
Confronted with the tremendous centralized power of the imperialist counterrevol
ution in the world arena, the youth and the revolutionaries on all continents ke
enly feel the need for an equivalent centralization of their own forces. They ca
nnot believe that the polycentrism and decentralization that characterize world
Stalinism where the revolutionary movement and the working class in each country
is left to its own devices and no one is concerned with the international inter
ests and aims of the struggle for socialism
is ideal. They cannot believe this b
ecause it runs counter to the most urgent needs of the struggle of the working m
asses and to the traditions of Marxism and Leninism.
They were moved to respond so powerfully to Che Guevara s famous appeal for two, th
ree, many Vietnams because it corresponded to their innermost urge for an interna
tional coordination of their anticolonialist, anti-imperialist, anticapitalist e
fforts. Che s final message was essentially a call for some central leadership for
the world revolution.
This explains why the idea of the Fourth International as a new revolutionary wo
rking-class organization carrying on the best traditions of Marxism, which so ma
ny dismissed as unreal and utopian, is capturing the minds and stirring the imag
ination of thousands of young people all over the globe. The socialist revolutio
n cannot advance and certainly cannot triumph on a world scale without the resur
gence of the need for a new revolutionary international impressing itself on the
consciousness of serious fighters for a new world. The international we want to
build and are building will be centralized, but it will not be bureaucratically
centralized. It was the bureaucratic centralism of the Stalinist type, that fak
e centralism which had nothing in common with Lenin s conceptions or organizing th
e working-class vanguard, which spawned the disintegrated and reactionary tenden
cies at work in the world Communist movement today. History will prove that demo
cratic centralism, with its freedom of discussion, is not an obstacle but the in
dispensable vehicle for elaborating a program and implementing united action aga

inst the class enemy.

These, then are the four pillars of Trotskyism today: the theory and practice of
the permanent revolution, the revolutionary road to socialism through working-c
lass mass action in the advanced capitalist countries, political revolution for
socialist democracy in the Soviet bloc and China, and proletarian internationali
sm. The Fourth International is a growing force on all of the continents because
its fundamental ideas express the objective requirements of the world revolutio
nary process and carry on the ideas of Leninism, of socialism and communism in o
ur epoch.

Ernest Germain
The Beginning of a Revision of Marxism
(September 1973)
In the document In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International,
we specified four points of Marxist theory on the national question in the imper
ialist epoch, points that seemed dangerously misunderstood by the majority of th
e Canadian section:
The need to make a distinction between supporting all demands for self-determina
tion advanced by the oppressed nationalities on the one hand, and support to nat
ionalism, a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology that can be used against the
struggle for the emancipation of the exploited and oppressed masses on the other
.
The need, since the beginning of the revolutionary process in the backward count
ries, to consider the national question as inextricably linked to the agrarian q
uestion and to other tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution that have not
been carried out in these countries; that is, the need to avoid considering a ph
ase of national liberation as a separate entity distinct from the overall process
of permanent revolution in these countries.
The need to make a distinction between the role of the national question (and of
democratic demands in general) in the backward countries and its role in the im
perialist countries.
The need to approach the national question, as Lenin said, by beginning:
... not on abstract and formal principles but, first, on a precise appraisal of t
he specific historical situation and, primarily, of economic conditions; second,
on a clear distinction between the interests of the oppressed classes, of worki
ng and exploited people, and the general concept of national interests as a whol
e, which implies the interests of the ruling class; third, on an equally clear d
istinction between the oppressed, dependent and subject nations and the oppressi
ng, exploiting and sovereign nations ... (Preliminary Draft Theses on the Nationa
l and Colonial Question, Collected Works, Vol.31, p.145.)
We believe that fundamental aspects of the Marxist theory on the national questi
on are involved (not just those cited above, obviously, but rather all the aspec
ts on which there was disagreement during the discussion). After reading Comrade
Gus Horowitz s discussion bulletin, Comrade Germain s Errors on the National Questi
on (International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol.10, No.10, July 1973), the l
east that can be said is that his position is not clear in this regard. In fact,
he has succeeded in covering twenty-four densely packed pages without giving th
e slightest resemblance of a reply to the questions that have been raised; inste
ad he dredges up spurious quarrels over interpretations, presents us with a scho
lastic study of quotations and counter-quotations, and refrains from dotting the i s a
nd crossing the t s where this is required for clarity in the debate.

Unfortunately, resorting to these subterfuges can only confirm the impression th

at has already emerged from the documents of the Canadian section cited in In De
fence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International. We are confronted wit
h the beginning of a revision of Marxism, a beginning whose implications are pre
gnant with consequences in many areas.
Once Again: Permanent Revolution and Revolution by Stages,
Or How to Unscramble Scrambled Eggs
We have emphasized what in our opinion constitutes the fundamental basis of the
theory of permenent revolution, that is, the fact that semi-feudal, imperialist,
national capitalist, and other relations of exploitation overlap to such an exten
t in the backward countries that it is absolutely impossible to make a distincti
on between stages in the revolutionary process. The dynamic of the class struggle
is decisive, no matter whether the revolutionary struggle first breaks out again
st a foreign colonial or imperialist power, whether it first breaks out against
despotic national oppression, or whether it is first set off by the agrarian revol
ution or by strikes of students or workers. And if the revolutionary process is
to escape being throttled by counterrevolution, its leadership must pass over to
the working class allied with the poor peasantry. This is true not only because
the national bourgeoisie s ties to imperialism render it incapable of leading to vi
ctory the struggle for national independence, but also and above all because the
peasants begin to occupy the land that belongs to them, and the workers begin t
o challenge the exploitation in their factories. By virtue of its class interest
s the bourgeoisie inevitably passes over into the camp of counterrevolution: thi
s is the basic reason why proletarian leadership is indispensable for a victorio
us revolution, even in backward countries.
The fact that the bourgeoisie only vacillates in the struggle for national liber
ation is just a single and minor aspect of a much broader phenomenon: its opposi
tion to the interests of the proletariat and the poor (and even middle) peasantr
y compels it to slide over into the camp of counterrevolution.
Comrade Horowitz makes solemn declarations to the effect that he is in agreement
with this highly orthodox exposition of the theory of permanent revolution. He
states he is completely satisfied with our outline of the combined character of
the tasks of the permanent revolution. But once he enters the polemic, he makes
it clear that what he is really trying to do is to unscramble the white of the e
gg from its yolk insofar as combined development is concerned:
Two experiences are worth noting in this regard: the liberation struggles in Pale
stine and in Bangladesh. In both of these struggles similar democratic nationali
st demands (?) were put forward and won wide mass support: for a democratic, secu
lar Palestine and for a democratic, secular Bangladesh. Proponents of these demands
include (!) bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalists. The leadership of Fateh
, for example, a petty-bourgeois nationalist organization, was the main populari
zer of the demand for a democratic, secular Palestine. Naturally the bourgeois a
nd petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders did not have any intentions of advancing
the socialist revolution. They interpreted these slogans in their own way, linki
ng them to their own class programs which are opposed to the program of Marxism.
Does this mean that revolutionary Marxists are duty bound to oppose these democ
ratic demands and counterpose to them on all occasions specifically socialist sl
ogans?
No, not at all. These democratic demands corresponded to the interests of the pro
letarian and peasant masses: for political democracy; for separation of religion
and the state; for a specific expression of national self-determination (a unit
ary Palestine, an independent Bangladesh). Revolutionary Marxists have the duty
to advance demands like these, at the same time to show how the petty-bourgeois

and bourgeois nationalists betray the struggle for these demands, and point to t
he socialist revolution as the only way to achieve them. For example, in raising
the demand for political democracy, revolutionary Marxists differentiate themse
lves from the Menshe-vik-Stalinist concept for forming a classless democratic st
ate, a formula which generally conceals the goal of forming a bourgeois state.
These demands, linked with other democratic, immediate, and transitional demands
indicated in our transitional program, have the potential for mobilizing the opp
ressed proletarian and peasant masses in struggle against their oppressors and e
xploiters. (Horowitz, p.9)
Comrade Horowitz s entire scholastic confusion is summed up in these two paragraph
s.
No one in our movement has ever denied that even a struggle for an independent b
ourgeois state in Bangladesh would be progressive. We have written quite clearly
that it is the duty of revolutionary Marxists to support every demand that expr
esses oppressed nationalities right to self-determination. The right to their own
state is the most fundamental expression of self-determination. We do not under
stand, therefore, who it is among us that Comrade Horowitz is polemicizing again
st on this point.
Comrade Horowitz then manages to say in one sentence the exact opposite of what
he said in a previous sentence. First he says we support the demand for a democra
tic Bangladesh or a democratic Palestine ; then he says we differentiate ourselves fro
m the Menshevik-Stalinist concept of a classless, democratic state. But the slogan
for a democratic and secular Palestine or a democratic and secular Bangladesh is ch
aracterized precisely by the fact that the class nature of the state has not bee
n specified! Perhaps by this formulation Comrade Horowitz means to imply a worke
rs state. But 99.99 percent of the Palestinians and Bengalis who read or heard h
is call for a democratic, secular Palestine or for a democratic, secular Bangladesh
would understand this slogan as meaning precisely a democratic state without a spe
cific class content, something that could only serve as a cover for a bourgeois
state. Thus if revolutionary Marxists advance this slogan themselves, that means
(whether one wishes it or not) that they are declaring themselves in favor of a
bourgeois-democratic state.
Comrade Horowitz s line of argument focuses exclusively on slogans and is totally pr
opagandistic. Underlying this argument is the concept that so long as there is n
o mass revolutionary party it is impossible to do anything but carry out propaga
nda work. But once the question is approached from the point of view of revoluti
onary Marxists intervention in the struggle, a sage dosage of slogans is no longe
r the priority. It is then appropriate to anticipate the dynamic of mass struggl
es, and to emphasize in particular the aspects of the struggles that permit the
dialectic of permanent revolution to unfold fully.
This means that once the Arab or Bengali revolutionary process is set in motion,
revolutionary Marxists are duty bound to explain the following to the workers a
nd peasants:
We are opposed to all national and imperialist oppression. We support an Arab rep
ublic, an independent Palestine and Bangladesh, even if bourgeois. But we do not
make a distinction between the struggle for national independence and the strug
gle for distributing the land. Take up the arms you are offered, seize them when
they are not offered; fight the imperialist oppressor, but do not limit yoursel
ves to fighting the foreign enemy. Occupy the land! Form peasant leagues! Organi
ze the workers in unions! Never forget your class interests, which are irreconci
lably opposed to those of the landlords and the national capitalists. Mobilize the
maximum number of forces possible in the revolutionary process, under a leaders
hip independent of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships. Yo

ur national and social liberation is at stake, and the one is indissolubly linke
d to the other.
Naturally, it is difficult to describe this language as nationalist. But it is the
language of Trotskyists who understand the combined character of the revolution
.
At the beginning of the growth of the mass movement, no one can tell whether or
not a certain line will carry the majority of the workers and peasants. In other
words, no one can tell at what point in the revolutionary process the proletari
at, supported by the poor peasantry, will be able to gain hegemony over the revo
lutionary process, wrenching it away from the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nati
onalist parties. But it is certain that it is the duty of revolutionary Marxists
to fight along these lines right from the beginning. With this aim in mind, dem
ands for agrarian revolution and for defense of the material interests of the wo
rking class must be linked from the beginning with demands for national liberati
on. It is obvious that propaganda focusing on the slogans for a democratic, secul
ar Palestine and for a democratic secular Bangladesh does not permit attaining this
goal. These so-called slogans, incidentally, are not, as Comrade Horowitz state
s, advanced by everyone, including the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships
of the national movement. They are deliberately put forward in the struggle by
the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships in order to separate the agrarian
revolution and the emancipation of the working class from the struggle for natio
nal liberation. By providing a cover for this classical maneuver, by going so fa
r as to become an accomplice, Comrade Horowitz abandons the theory of permanent
revolution and goes over to the concept of revolution by stages.
What is the actual meaning of his thesis that it is necessary to support the slo
gans mentioned above while at the same time [showing] how the petty-bourgeois and
bourgeois nationalists betray the struggle for these demands ? Apart from a purel
y propagandistic concept of the struggle ( unmask the traitors by driving them int
o a corner ), it involves the notion that before the role of the bourgeois leaders
hips can be called into question, they must first be put to a political test to
prove that they will not go all the way in a struggle for national independence.
It is not as easy as Comrade Horowitz thinks to carry out this political test in
a rapid and convincing manner. Consider the task of convincing the Algerian peasa
nts that the leading wing of the ANL [National Liberation Army] around Colonel B
oumdienne did not go all the way in the struggle for national independence. That wi
ll perhaps convince a few who have already made up their minds, but it will hard
ly sway the broad masses before they go through a number of painful experiences.
It is much easier, however, to convince them of the fact that the agrarian revol
ution has not been achieved. They can see this every day. But making this argume
nt pay off politically would have required establishing an indissoluble link bet
ween national liberation and the agrarian revolution from the very beginning of
the Algerian revolution.
According to Comrade Horowitz s thesis, in the mass movement in the backward count
ries the differentiation between the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaders of th
e national movement on the one hand, and the revolutionary vanguard on the other
, revolves essentially, if not exclusively, around the question of who is the be
st nationalist. We counterpose to this the thesis that the differentiation appears
above all through the struggle for specific (peasants, workers, democratic, and
even national) demands in which class interests place the bourgeoisie and the w
ell-to-do petty-bourgeoisie on one side of the barricades, and the workers and p
oor peasants on the other. Comrade Horowitz s thesis leads toward a revolution by s
tages, while ours leads to the classical application of the theory of permanent r
evolution:

Really to arouse the workers and peasants against imperialism, is possible only b
y connecting their basic and most profound life interests with the cause of the
country s liberation. A workers strike
small or large an agrarian rebellion, an upr
ising of the oppressed sections in city and country against the usurer, against
the bureaucracy, against the local military satraps, all that arouses the multit
udes, that welds them together, that educates, steels, is a real step forward on
the road to the revolutionary and social liberation of the Chinese people. With
out that, the military successes and failures of the Right, semi-Right or semi-L
eft generals will remain foam on the surface of the ocean. But everything that b
rings the oppressed and exploited masses of the toilers to their feet, inevitabl
y pushes the national bourgeoisie into an open bloc with the imperialists. The c
lass struggle between the bourgeoisie and the masses of workers and peasants is
not weakened, but, on the contrary, it is sharpened by imperialist oppression, t
o the point of bloody civil war at every serious conflict. (Leon Trotsky: The Chi
nese Revolution and the Theses of Comrade Stalin, May 17, 1927, in Problems of t
he Chinese Revolution, p.22, University of Michigan Press edition.)
And further:
Insofar as a victorious revolution will radically change the relation not only be
tween the classes but also between the races and will assure to the blacks that
place in the state that corresponds to their numbers, thus far will the social r
evolution in South Africa also have a national character.
We have not the slightest reason to close our eyes to this side of the question o
r to diminish its significance On the contrary, the proletarian party should in
words and in deeds openly and boldly take the solution of the national (racial)
problem in its hands.
Nevertheless, the proletarian party can and must solve the national problem by it
s own methods.
The historical weapon of national liberation can be only the class struggle. The
Comintern, beginning in 1924, transformed the program of national liberation of
colonial people into an empty democratic abstraction that is elevated above the
reality of class relations. In the struggle against national oppression, differe
nt classes liberate themselves (temporarily) from material interests and become
simple anti-imperialist forces. (Leon Trotsky: On the South African Theses, April 2
0, 1935, in Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1934-35, pp.249-50, Pathfinder Press. Emph
asis in original.)
Alas, Comrade Horowitz as well is beginning to transform the program of national
liberation of colonial people into an empty democratic abstraction by focusing hi
s position on Palestine and Bangladesh around such slogans as for a democratic, s
ecular Palestine and for a democratic, secular Bangladesh, and by not putting the c
ombination of national, democratic, and agrarian tasks, and the defense of the d
emocratic and material interests of the workers and poor peasants at the center
of the revolutionary Marxists propaganda and agitation in the colonies, from the
very first stage of the revolutionary process.
This has nothing to do with underestimating the importance of national demands.
What is involved is an understanding of the fact that they can only be fully rea
lized when the poor peasants and workers rise up and organize themselves indepen
dently. And this is only possible on the basis of defending their own class inte
rests, not on the basis of some classless nationalism.
The deviations Comrade Horowitz s thesis can lead to was demonstrated by Comrade T
ony Thomas when he sought in The Militant to defend Trotsky s interpretation of th
e Second Chinese Revolution against the Maoists. In his article, we find the fol
lowing:

The major tasks confronting a revolution to win national liberation for China inc
luded driving out the imperialists and smashing the reactionary Chang Tso-lin go
vernment; unifying the country; distributing the big landholders lands to the hun
dreds of millions of peasants; establishing democratic liberties; and laying the
groundwork for the industrialization and development of China. In addition to t
hese democratic tasks affecting the nation as a whole, the growing working class
in the cities was faced with vicious economic exploitation at the hands of both
Chinese and foreign capitalists. (The Militant, August 31, 1973. Emphasis added.
)
To state that the agrarian revolution
the distribution of land is a task that aff
ects the nation as a whole is to close your eyes to the fact that not only the bi
g landholders (who are also part of the nation), but also and especially the bou
rgeoisie, own the peasants land; and the fact that far from unifying the country, t
he agrarian revolution necessarily divides it along class lines. In an article p
ublished two weeks later, Comrade Tony Thomas correctly describes how the develo
pment of peasant mobilizations necessarily pushed the Chinese big bourgeoisie in
to the counterrevolutionary camp, given its ties to the big landholders. But, pr
isoner that he is to revisionist formulations a la Horowitz, he nonetheless pers
ists in labeling as tasks that affect the nation as a whole, tasks that are really
the tasks of an irreconcilable class struggle between two parts of the same nat
ion.
The inextricable overlapping between national liberation and the agrarian revolu
tion, between all the tasks faced by a revolution in a backward country, means t
hat national liberation in regard to imperialism cannot be accomplished without
destroying national unity and class collaboration within the oppressed nation.
This is the dialectic of the permanent revolution.
Oppressed Nationalities Right to Self-Determination and the Struggle Against Nati
onalist Ideology
We now have a better understanding of the logical connection between revolutiona
ry Marxists unconditional defense of the right of oppressed nations to determine
their own destiny
of the right of colonial peoples and national minorities to fo
rm separate states if they so desire and of all concrete demands that express th
is right, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, their relentless struggle aga
inst all nationalist ideology.
It is precisely because national liberation can only be achieved when the prolet
ariat, allied with the poor peasants, has won the leadership of the revolutionar
y process; because it cannot win this leadership unless it organizes itself (as
well as the peasant masses) independently of the nationalist bourgeoisie, on the
basis of defense of its class interests; and because it can only organize itsel
f in this way by continually developing the masses distrust of and opposition to
the national bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois nationalist appendages; it is for
all these reasons that the struggle against the nationalist ideology of nationa
l unity, of national exclusiveness, of classless national collaboration, is absolu
tely indispensable. Above all, it is indispensable even for accomplishing the na
tional tasks of the revolution.
Comrade Horowitz can only extricate himself by either making a pirouette and ide
ntifying the national-democratic demands of the oppressed masses with bourgeois
and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology, or by continuing to drift from Trotsky
ist positions to Menshevik-Stalinist positions of revolution by stages:
It is true, of course, that the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation tries to use

nationalism for its own class interests

up to a certain (!) extent and then only
as a thoroughly deceptive and mystifying ideology. But what Comrade Germain fai
ls to see is that in the era of permanent revolution, the nationalism of the mas
ses of the oppressed nationalities tends to mesh with socialist consciousness no
t bourgeois ideology, because (!) the real momentum of the struggle for national
ist goals tends to mesh with the socialist revolution not the bourgeois revoluti
on.
Rather than substituting or covering for internationalism, the nationalism of the opp
ressed directed against their oppressors will tend to impel oppressed nations (!
) in the direction of internationalism provided, of course, that a revolutionary
Marxist leadership is present to help advance the political consciousness of th
e masses. It is in that sense that we support the nationalism of oppressed natio
ns. (Horowitz, p.12.)
Thus we have nations oppressed as a whole, which will become internationalist prov
ided, of course, that there is a Leninist combat party, the notion our internation
al minority is so fond of. But aren t nations, even oppressed nations, divided int
o social classes that are already well defined (with the exception, of course, o
f those we have called attention to in In Defence of Leninism: Afro-Americans, C
hicanes, South African Blacks, etc)? Are the bourgeoisie and the well-to-do pett
y-bourgeoisie no longer part of the nation? Have they too become internationalist
s ? Isn t internationalism the result of educating working people in the spirit of i
rreconcilable class opposition, not only in regard to imperialism but also in re
gard to their own bourgeoisie? And how can workers class consciousness be labeled
nationalist when it combines the struggle against imperialism with the class stru
ggle against the landlords, the comprador bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeois
ie ? Does nationalist ideology imply a class struggle within the nation itself?
Once again, the notion underlying Comrade Horowitz s thinking is that of a revolut
ion that first goes through a national stage. During this stage, according to hi
s concept, all the classes are united against the national oppressor, and the Len
inist combat party wins leadership of the national struggle bit by bit by proving
it is a better fighter for nationalism than the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeo
isie. But this concept, which is the only one that provides a logical and cohere
nt basis for glorifying the nationalism of the oppressed nations, is in total op
position to the theory of permanent revolution, which holds that revolutionary M
arxists must from the outset educate working people in the spirit of an irreconc
ilable class opposition toward their own bourgeoisie.
Comrade Horowitz agrees with our definition of nationalism as an ideology that w
as correct in the past. But what is the content of this ideology if not national
solidarity, national collaboration, against foreign enemies? To deny this is to
go against the whole of Marxist literature on the subject. To acknowledge it is
to acknowledge that the nationalism of oppressed nationalities, far from tendin
g to overlap with socialist consciousness, is an obstacle on the path toward att
aining this consciousness. For socialist consciousness is a proletarian class-co
nsciousness based on an understanding of the class struggle, whereas nationalist
ideology seeks to deny or subordinate an understanding of the need for proletar
ians to carry out their class struggle against their own bourgeoisie, and seeks
to establish supposed common national interests against the foreign oppressor, i
nterests which, as Lenin rightly said, are actually those of the ruling classes.
Let s take up once again the example of Bangladesh. What is the content of the nat
ionalist ideology of Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League? East Bengal is oppresse
d by Western Pakistan. Everyone will work together to create an independent Bang
ladesh workers, poor peasants, kulaks, intellectuals, important and minor govern
ment officials, artisans, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, usurers, an
d the agents of imperialism. How does a revolutionary Marxist reply to this? Does
he simply say, Fine, but this struggle will only succeed under proletarian leade

rship ? That would be opportunism of the Maoist variety. Does he say on the contra
ry, No, I disagree because we are content with defending our material interests a
s workers and peasants ? This would be economist sectarianism, with a good dose of
opportunism (which, moreover, would become the dominant feature if this respons
e is suggested from abroad, and still more so if suggested from a country that i
s oppressing Bangladesh).
In contrast to these two false responses, the correct reply is obviously the fol
lowing:
We support an independent Bangladesh 100 percent because the peasants and workers
cannot liberate themselves as a class if they are still oppressed as a nation.
For this reason we will be in the front lines of the fight for an independent Ba
ngladesh. But we have no desire to exchange a pack of foreign hangmen and bloods
uckers for a national team of hangmen and bloodsuckers. We will therefore organize
independently of you, Mr. Awami League leader and Mr. representative of the exp
loiters. We will form our own workers and peasants organizations. We will fight
with our own arms, although when necessary we are prepared to make tactical agre
ements with you for- an anti-imperialist united front. But we will educate the w
orking masses in a spirit of fundamental distrust in you, because you are our ex
ploiters. In addition to independence we want land, bread, and the cancellation
of debts. You are not only incapable of giving us all this, but when the time co
mes you will try to disarm us and crush us completely.
Is this language, which conforms completely to the teachings of Trotsky, the lan
guage of nationalism or support to nationalism ? The word would have to be emptied of
all its content in order to arrive at this unlikely conclusion. As long as the
working and peasant masses remain prisoners of nationalist ideology they run the
risk of following Mujibur, and over the course of several years too. They can o
nly free themselves from this grip by learning, through independent leadership a
nd organization, to make a distinction between the struggle for their just natio
nal-democratic demands on the one hand, and the mystification of nationalist ide
ology, based on the supposed solidarity of all the classes of a single nation, o
n the other.
In In Defence of Leninism we established that Lenin and Trotsky always defended
this basic distinction between nationalism as an ideology on the one hand, and t
he defense of oppressed nations right to self-determination (and of every concret
e demand that expresses this right) on the other. Comrade Horowitz in no way rep
lies to this argument. In place of a reply he offers us
after a warning about sc
holasticism! a bagful of quotations in which Lenin and Trotsky are opposed to na
tionalism and a number of others in which they seem to support it. Talk about sc
holastic sophistry!
The Marxist method does not consist in weighing a certain number of quotations f
rom the classics against each other, but in understanding the logic and internal
coherence of a theory in order to determine the interrelation between its diffe
rent parts. It is therefore impossible to challenge the fact that for Trotsky th
e importance of the national question in the colonial and semi-colonial countrie
s is indissolubly linked to the solution he proposes, that is, a class struggle
of workers and poor peasants, in a revolution based on the inseparably combined
nature of the national and social tasks. The logic of such a theory leaves no ro
om for any apology for or adoption of progressive nationalism on the part of revol
utionary Marxists. This is why Horowitz has been unable to find a single quotati
on from Lenin suggesting support to the supposedly progressive nationalism of oppr
essed nations.
The two quotations from Trotsky that Horowitz gives us show exactly the contrary
of what he says they mean. He was particularly unfortunate with the quotation a
bout Catalan nationalism (Horowitz, p.13). Actually, two pages after the passage

cited by Horowitz, Trotsky gives his thoughts on the matter in two sentences th
at are as clear as a rap from a billyclub, a quotation that Horowitz is very car
eful not to cite:
I have already written that Catalan petty-bourgeois nationalism at the present st
age is progressive
but only on one condition: that it develops its activity outs
ide the ranks of communism and that it is always under the blows of communist cr
iticism. To permit petty bourgeois nationalism to disguise itself under the bann
er of communism means, at the same time, to deliver a treacherous blow to the pr
oletarian vanguard and to destroy the progressive significance of petty-bourgeoi
s nationalism. (Leon Trotsky: The Spanish Revolution: 1931-39, Pathfinder Press,
New York 1973, p.155. Emphasis added.)
A few pages later, Trotsky speaks of the need for a principled struggle against p
etty-bourgeois nationalism in Catalonia. (Ibid., p.189)
We have denounced the fact that the LSO [Ligue Socialiste Ouvrire], the Trotskyis
t organization in Quebec, became an attorney for petty-bourgeois nationalism and
even went so far as to disguise a general strike of public workers as a patriots
struggle. What was involved here was not, therefore, a matter of considering the
petty-bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nationality as progressive in relati
on to the bourgeois nationalism of the oppressors. It was actually a matter of i
ntroducing the fraud of progressive petty-bourgeois nationalism into the ranks of
the proletariat and its communist vanguard. Trotsky s verdict on this attempt by A
lain Beiner, for whom Gus Horowitz is now playing the role of attorney, is clear
, plain, and expressed in terms much more violent than ours.
Comrade Horowitz was overjoyed with his discovery of a letter Trotsky sent to th
e Indochinese Bolshevik-Leninists September 18, 1930. Finally, he has found Trots
ky s clearest and most explicit statement in support of the nationalism of the opp
ressed. (Horowitz, p.13.) Once again, scholasticism is the method.
Trotsky wrote thousands of pages on the tactics of revolutionaries in the backwa
rd countries. Is it possible to seriously believe that his real position on the na
tional question in these countries has remained hidden in a 1930 letter that had
never been published in English before, and not in the chapter of the History o
f the Russian Revolution devoted to the national question, nor in The Permanent
Revolution, nor in his writings on the Chinese question, nor in his comments on
the tasks of revolutionaries in India?
In July 1939 Trotsky wrote An Open Letter to the Workers of India. India was at
that time the most populous colony in the world, and had at the same tune the br
oadest national-democratic and anti-imperialist mass movement. If Trotsky was re
ally of the opinion that the nationalism of an oppressed nation is progressive,
one would expect that his letter would exalt Indian nationalism, an oppressed na
tion if ever there was one. But this letter does not contain a single word about
the supposedly progressive Indian nationalism. On the contrary, it educates the w
orking people in the spirit of irreconcilable class opposition in regard to thei
r own bourgeoisie:
The self-same danger also menaces the Indian revolution where the Stalinists, und
er the guise of People s Front, are putting across a policy of subordinating the pro
letariat to the bourgeoisie. This signifies, in action, a rejection of the revol
utionary agrarian program, a rejection of arming the workers, a rejection of the
struggle for power, a rejection of revolution.
In the event that the Indian bourgeoisie finds itself compelled to take even the
tiniest step on the road of struggle against the arbitrary rule of Great Britain
, the proletariat will naturally support such a step. But they will support it w
ith their own methods: mass meetings, bold slogans, strikes, demonstrations and

more decisive combat actions, depending on the relationship of forces and the ci
rcumstances. Precisely to do this must the proletariat have its hands free. Comp
lete independence from the bourgeoisie is indispensable to the proletariat, abov
e all in order to exert influence on the peasantry, the predominant mass of Indi
a s population. (Writings of Leon Trotsky: 1938-9, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1969
, p.38. Emphasis in original.)
In order to win a free hand in relation to the national bourgeoisie, to assure compl
ete independence in regard to the bourgeois Congress Party for whom nationalism
was the main ideological weapon for preventing the independent organization of t
he proletariat should revolutionaries in India have applauded nationalism or cri
ticized it, should they have exalted it or tried to eliminate it from the ranks
of the working class? To pose this question is to answer it.
But what does Trotsky say in the letter to the Indochinese Oppositionists, the l
etter Comrade Horowitz is so enthralled with?
The declaration states quite correctly that the nationalism of the bourgeoisie is
a means for subordinating and deceiving the masses. But the nationalism of the
mass of the people is the elementary form taken by their just and progressive ha
tred for the most skillful, capable, and ruthless of their oppressors, that is,
the foreign imperialists. The proletariat does not have the right to turn its ba
ck on this kind of nationalism. On the contrary, it must demonstrate in practice
that it is the most consistent and devoted fighter for the national liberation
of Indochina. (Letter to the Indochinese Oppositionists, International Socialist
Review, September 1973, p.41.)
What is Trotsky saying here, if one wishes to grasp the content of his reasoning
rather than engage in a scholastic manipulation of quotations?
That the nationalism of the oppressed colonial bourgeoisie is reactionary, a mean
s for subordinating and deceiving the masses. On this important point, even in th
is unique quotation, Trotsky confirms our position, and not Horowitz s, on this cruc
ial point.
That the nationalism of the exploited colonial masses is the elementary form taken
by the hatred for imperialist exploitation. There is nothing objectionable abou
t this statement. Trotsky in no way states that the peasant masses are following
a progressive ideology, but rather that they are making use of some elementary
notions to give vent to their class indignation. The task of revolutionary Marxi
sts begins from this means of expression, but it certainly does not consist in a
dapting to it.
That to grasp what there is of a positive nature in this nationalism of the peasan
t masses, the proletariat must demonstrate in practice that it is the most consis
tent and devoted fighter for the national liberation of Indochina.
We are obviously in complete agreement with this formulation. We have repeated o
ver and over again that the task of revolutionary Marxists is to unconditionally
defend the just national demands of the masses. But nowhere in this quote does
Trotsky say that the proletariat must demonstrate in practice that it is the most
consistent and devoted representative of nationalist ideology ! He would be very
careful not to present such a thesis, which would be in contradiction to his ent
ire life s work.
We see therefore that Horowitz cannot even use this unique quotation he thinks h
e has found in support of his thesis of identifying nationalist ideology and the
struggle for national liberation.
In accordance with Lenin and Trotsky, our entire argument is based on the need t
o distinguish between the two. Comrade Horowitz never has anything to say about
this distinction. All the rest is therefore just scholastic sophistry.

Nationalism, Multi-class Mass Party, and Class Struggle

In order to demonstrate that the thesis of the progressive nationalism of oppresse
d nations is only a false generalization of the specific case of Blacks and Chic
anos in the United States, we have posed the following question: Can a slogan ca
lling for a mass nationalist party with an unspecified class content, which the SW
P has advanced for Blacks and Chicanos, be exported to a colonial or semi-coloni
al country that has already experienced deep class divisions?
Horowitz begins by stating that the absence of Black or Chicano bourgeoisie of a
ny consequence is not the reason why the SWP has been able to advance this sloga
n. (Horowitz, p.15) But a few pages later he himself admits:
One of our central tasks is to promote a mass break from the bourgeois parties al
ong working class lines. This is necessary to advance the independent organizati
on of the working class as a whole. Our call for a labor party fits into this fr
amework. So does our call for a Black party. And in this regard, the fact that B
lack people are overwhelmingly proletarian in composition, that there is only an
inconsequential Black bourgeoisie, and a relatively weak Black petty bourgeoisi
e, is an important factor. Under these specific conditions, all indications are
that an independent Black party would be a proletarian party, albeit in national
ist guise. (Horowitz, p.18. Emphasis in original.)
In general, the argument is acceptable. But what conclusion must be drawn from i
t? Obviously that wherever a bourgeoisie has already arisen in an oppressed nati
on, wherever the petty bourgeoisie is not so weak, wherever the bourgeoisie and
petty bourgeoisie are already making systematic use of nationalism to prevent th
e formation of an independent workers party, it would be criminal folly to call
for the formation of mass nationalist parties that could only be multi-class parti
es controlled by the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie in its wake.
Following the logic of this correct position, Comrade Horowitz states that it wo
uld in fact be incorrect to call for a mass (nationalist) multi-class party in Que
bec, Palestine, Bangladesh, Ceylon, etc. We are happy to learn of this conclusio
n, which is the same as ours. But three questions arise immediately:
If the call for an independent Black party and for an independent Chicano party is i
n fact the exception and not the rule insofar as the oppressed nationalities are
concerned, isn t it also necessary to conclude that the situation
that is, the cl
ass structure
of some oppressed nationalities is an exception in relation to the
others? This is precisely the thesis that we defended in In Defence of Leninism
: In Defence of the Fourth International.
If the call for an independent Black nationalist party is an exception and corresp
onds to the exceptional class structure of a few nationalities, isn t it necessary
to conclude that the character of nationalist ideology (corresponding to the ob
jective situation and class structure) is different for Black Americans, Black S
outh Africans, and Chicanes on the one hand, and for all the other oppressed and
exploited nationalities on the other hand? How can you say in the same breath t
hat the class structure is exceptional but that the social function of nationali
sm is identical?
If comrade Horowitz holds simultaneously like a tightrope-walker balancing on a
high wire
that the exceptional situation of Black Americans justifies using the
slogan for a mass Black nationalist party in the US but does not justify the use o
f a similar slogan for the greater part of the oppressed and exploited nationali
ties (although multi-class nationalism is supposedly progressive in the case of al
l these nationalities), how does it happen that a number of minority comrades, n
ot quite so adept at this balancing act, lose their footing and pass over direct
ly to the call for a mass, independent Puerto Rican party, a mass, independent Alge
rian party, etc.?

At least this is what came out during the oral discussion preparing for the SWP
1973 convention. We would be happy to learn that Comrade Horowitz could categori
cally deny this statement, and that nothing more about it will be heard in the w
orld Trotskyist movement. The adoption of such a line would be a disaster for re
volutionary Marxists in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.
It is Comrade Horowitz who is inconsistent on this point, and not the extremists i
n his faction. For if the nationalism of oppressed nations is progressive, what
argument would he use to refuse to base a mass party on this progressive and highly
popular foundation?
Up to this point, everything in this document has obviously been concerned with
our rejection of having revolutionary Marxists in colonial and semi-colonial cou
ntries advance the slogan for a mass nationalist party of such and such nationalit
y. It is something quite different to determine what tactic they should adopt in
regard to parties or fronts of this sort that come on the scene independently of
their own propaganda or initiative.
In this case, a class analysis must be made to determine the real nature of this
mass party or front, taking into account its program; its social composition; its o
bjective role in society; the extent to which it engages in real struggle agains
t the imperialists, the oligarchy, and their allies; the way it intervenes in th
e class struggle, etc., etc. ... Support to actions or movements launched by suc
h formations is far from excluded. But the orientation of revolutionary Marxists
would remain an orientation of promoting an autonomous organization for the wor
ker and peasant masses, an organization that is independent of any bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership. An organization of this sort could even
tually arise from the left wing of such a mass party or front, and once that happene
d revolutionary Marxists would have to promote its consolidation and its separat
ion in regard to the nationalist leaderships.
Among the arguments we have used against the exploitation of the slogan for an inde
pendent party of oppressed nationalities beyond the boundaries of the United Stat
es, there is one, of some importance, that Comrade Horowitz takes exception to:
the possibility of the national bourgeoisie in colonial and semi-colonial countrie
s forming a formally independent bourgeois state that would become a powerful we
apon of oppression against the worker and peasant masses. In the United States,
it is impossible to conceive of the appearance of an independent bourgeois Black
or Chicano state. The very formation of such a state would presuppose the total
disintegration of the US society and capitalist economy. But in the rest of the
world the threat of seeing essentially nationalist agitation deviate toward the
creation of new puppet bourgeois states is quite real.
No, replies Comrade Horowitz: In the event of powerful workers struggles, it is t
heoretically true but unlikely that there is no fundamental class interest which w
ould prevent imperialism from transforming any such [oppressed] nationality into
independent puppet states ! (Horowitz, p.7. Emphasis added.) Of all Comrade Horow
itz s arguments, this one is the most improbable. What he considers the most unlike
ly has actually occurred in more than 80 countries around the world since the fir
st world war, from Finland and Poland in 1918 to India and nearly all the old co
lonies after the second world war.
Sectarians draw the conclusion that it is better to turn one s back on the nationa
l question. They are obviously wrong. But opportunists who refuse to criticize n
ationalism are deaf, dumb, and blind in the face of half a century of world hist
ory. How can it be seriously denied that nationalism has been the main ideologic
al weapon used by the ruling classes in all these countries to slow down and smo
ther the independent class struggle of the workers and peasants? How can you cal
l for the proletariat to organize independently and then refuse to attack the ma
in ideological barrier on the road to such an independent organization the ideol

ogy that says common interest against foreign oppression must unite the landlord,
capitalist, kulak, intellectual, poor peasant, and worker?
We Have Not Changed Our Orientation
Comrade Horowitz tries, though without much conviction, to counterpose documents
we have written in the past to In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth
International. He wishes to demonstrate that we have changed our position on th
e national question, in fact, that we have taken a giant step backward in relati
on to our previous positions. But it is sufficient to examine the documents he c
ites to discover that our position remains exactly what it always was.
Comrade Horowitz begins by quoting passages from our intervention in a debate wi
th Maxime Rodinson in March 1971, reprinted in the French magazine Partisans (No
.59-60) and in the International Socialist Review (March 1972). These passages s
tate that a distinction should be made between the nationalism of the oppressors
and the nationalism of the oppressed. But in In Defence of Leninism: In Defence
of the Fourth International we said exactly the same thing:
This principled opposition to nationalism does not imply an identification betwee
n nationalism of oppressor nations
nationalism of scoundrels, as Trotsky used to
call it and the nationalism of oppressed nations. It especially imposes on comm
unists who are members of oppressor nations the duty to concentrate their fire u
pon their own oppressive bourgeoisie, and to leave the struggle against petty-bo
urgeois nationalism of the oppressed to the communist members of the oppressed n
ationalities themselves. Any other attitude
not to speak of the refusal to suppo
rt national self-determination struggles under the pretext that they are still l
ed by nationalists becomes objectively a support for imperialist, annexionist or
racist oppressors. But all these considerations do not imply a support for bour
geois or petty-bourgeois nationalism by revolutionary Marxists of the oppressed
nationalities, leave alone unconditional support. After all, Alain Beiner like Mic
hel Mill were discussing the attitudes of Qubcois Trotskyists, not the attitude of
Anglo-Canadian revolutionary Marxists. (International Internal Discussion Bullet
in, Vol.10, No.4, April 1973, p.33)
Does the last part of this paragraph contradict the orientation I defended in th
e debate with Maxime Rodinson? Not at all. Because that orientation included the
following passage, which Comrade Horowitz takes care not to quote:
I have been asked a question concerning Palestinian nationalism and my attitude v
is--vis the nationalism of the countries in the Third World in general. In my opi
nion, this is a matter that must not be oversimplified. When we say that the str
uggle for national liberation of Third World people, of oppressed peoples, is a
just struggle in contradistinction to the imperialist countries attempting to ma
intain their oppression of these countries, we are by no means saying that every
political and ideological manifestation of this struggle is progressive ... A d
istinction must be made between the objective historical significance of a mass
struggle and the various ideological, political, and theoretical currents compet
ing for the allegiance of the society and oppressed people involve
... the influence of reactionary ideologies must be combated in the theoretical f
ield within the revolutionary camp. But the existence of these reactionary ideol
ogies must not be used as a pretext for refusing support, support which is absol
utely justified from the Marxist point of view, to the liberation struggle of a
clearly oppressed people (International Socialist Review, March 1972, pp.38-39.)
And in In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International, we stated
in the same way:

Sectarians and opportunists alike fail to make this basic distinction between the
struggle for national self-determination and nationalist ideology. Sectarians r
efuse to support national self-determination struggles under the pretext that th
eir leaders
or the still prevalent ideology among their fighters is nationalism.
Opportunists refuse to combat bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist ideologi
es, under the pretext that the national self-determination struggle, in which th
is ideology is predominant, is progressive. The correct Marxist-Leninist positio
n is to combine full support for the national self-determination struggle of the
masses including all the concrete demands which express this right on the polit
ical, cultural, linguistic field, with the struggle against bourgeois and pettybourgeois nationalism. (p.33. Emphasis added.)
It is clear that there is absolutely no difference between these two positions
he one defended in 1971 and the one defended in 1973.

The second forgotten example cited by Comrade Horowitz is supposedly that of the b
ooklet I wrote against Healy in 1967. The only quotation Horowitz can produce to
support his thesis that I have supposedly changed my position since then is one
concerning the fact that ... the Cuban revolution both resolved the national qu
estion and liberated Cuba from dependence on American imperialism. But he forgets
to mention that the two paragraphs concerning the anti-imperalist character of t
he Cuban revolution are preceded by four pages about the solution of the agraria
n question. He also neglects to point out that I nowhere characterize the Cuban
revolution as a national liberation struggle, but rather as a process of permanent
revolution in which the agrarian revolution and the anti-imperialist struggle a
re (in that order!) the most burning tasks. There is not an atom of difference b
etween this position and the one defended in In Defence of Leninism: In Defence
of the Fourth International.
To discover a difference, Comrade Horowitz has to undertake a sleight-of-hand mane
uver that comes very close to falsification:
The booklet goes on to argue in chapter eight against the SLL s abstentionist line
toward the national liberation movements and its political myopia which says tha
t there is no colonial revolution but only a proletarian revolution. Some of the
same arguments can be directed against Comrade Germain s latest document, which s
ays that it is confusing to speak of a national liberation struggle rather than
a process leading to a socialist revolution. (Horowitz, p.14.)
What did we really say in our latest document ?
For that reason, it is confusing, to say the least, to present any revolution in
a backward country
be it the Algerian revolution, the Cuban revolution, the Viet
namese revolution, the Palestinian or the Arab revolution
as a national liberatio
n struggle. The Trotskyist way of looking at these revolutions is as processes of
permanent revolution in which the struggle for national liberation, for agraria
n revolution, for full democratic freedoms for the masses, and for defence of th
e class interests of the working class are inextricably combined and intertwined
, whatever may be the aspect of that struggle which appears in the forefront ...
(In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International, p.31. Emphasis
in original.)
There is not so much as a comma here that cannot be found in the classic texts o
f Trotsky on this question. Horowitz comes dangerously close to the Stalinist po
lemicists who accused Trotsky of having substituted socialist goals for the bourgeo
is-democratic goals of the revolution (the notorious accusation of having advance
d in 1905 the slogan Down with the Czar; long live the workers government! ). The o
nly way he was able to do this was by surreptitiously substituting the words soci
alist revolution or proletarian revolution for the words process of permanent revolu
tion, which are in my text. Now, the process of permanent revolution is precisely

the process that leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of a str
uggle to achieve in the first place the tasks that were not accomplished by the
bourgeois-democratic revolution, above all the agrarian question and the nationa
l question.
If Comrade Horowitz finds himself caught up in a sleight-of-hand maneuver of thi
s sort it is because
despite all the ritual references to other democratic and tr
ansitional demands that must be joined with national demands
he is being irresistab
ly swept toward the logic of revolution by stages by his revisionist position on n
ationalism.
What he believes is that there is first a national liberation struggle which, with
out regard to the agrarian revolution and the class struggle, leads to a socialis
t solution, because the Leninist combat party surpasses its petty-bourgeois and bou
rgeois rivals in ... nationalism!
It is clear that our changed positions have been created out of whole cloth by Com
rade Horowitz. No trace of any such change survives the slightest analysis of the
documents.
Subjectivism , Objectivism, and Class Struggle
We are now at the very heart of the debate. Comrade Horowitz accuses us of being
guilty of a subjectivist explanation for the theory of permanent revolution. He q
uotes the following passage from In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourt
h International to support his thesis:
Revolutionary Marxists do not reject this Menshevik theory of stages only or main
ly because they stress the inability of the national bourgeoisie to actually con
quer national independence from imperialism, regardless of the concrete circumst
ances. They reject it because they refuse to postpone to a later stage the peasa
nt and workers uprisings for their own class interests, which will inevitably ri
se spontaneously alongside the national struggle as it unfolds, and very quickly
combine themselves into a common inseparable programme in the consciousness of
the masses. (p.31)
Just comparing this quotation with those from Trotsky at the beginning of the pr
esent document is enough to assert that Trotsky did not reason any differently.
But Horowitz now takes a more conscious step toward revisionism and replies with t
he following:
No, Comrade Germain. It is not because we refuse to postpone these struggles (a sub
jectivist explanation), but because the struggles for the pressing bourgeois-dem
ocratic demands including national liberation (but of course not limited to this
task) are inextricably and objectively intertwined under present conditions wit
h the socialist revolution. (Horowitz, p.9. Emphasis in original.)
Here we have a Marxist for whom the class struggle is a subjectivist phenomena; we
will certainly have seen everything under the sun by the end of the debate now
under way within the Fourth International. We state firmly in accordance with th
e experience of every revolution in the backward countries in this century
that
the struggle of workers and peasants for their class interests will arise, inevi
tably and spontaneously, in the course of the struggle for national liberation.
What is involved here is really a historical, social, and objective phenomenon,
not just a case of subjectivism.
But is it true that under present conditions, which we suppose means the imperia
list epoch, the struggle for national liberation as well as struggles for other p
ressing bourgeois-democratic demands are inextricably and objectively intertwined

with the socialist revolution, as Comrade Horowitz says? If it is true, how do yo

u explain the fact that in the great majority of cases the struggle for national
liberation has not led to a socialist revolution ?
Once again Comrade Horowitz s accusations are like Freudian slips, revealing the d
ialectic of a tendency struggle in which Comrade Horowitz has been pushed furthe
r and further along a revisionist path. For by falsely accusing us of subjectivis
m, it is really his own objectivist error
an error of quite some magnitude!
that
he reveals.
In reality it is absolutely false to posit that the struggle for national libera
tion is inextricably and objectively intertwined under present conditions with th
e socialist revolution. So long as the struggle for national liberation is led by
bourgeois parties or groupings, or by their petty-bourgeois junior partners, th
ese leaderships will do everything in their power to prevent not only any link-up
between the present national struggle and a future socialist revolution, but eve
n an independent mobilization of workers and peasants during the national strugg
le. There is no objective dynamic, no pressure of circumstances,
no internal logic of
the historical process, that leads to such a link. It can only come about throug
h the independent organization of workers and poor peasants, through the proleta
riat and its revolutionary vanguard s gaining hegemony in the revolutionary proces
s, and through the political defeat of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationa
list leaderships of the national movement.
But in order to create the necessary political and subjective preconditions for
the elimination of the bourgeois leadership from the revolutionary process, the
workers and peasants must begin without delay to struggle for their own class in
terests. The bourgeoisie has every interest in limiting the objectives of the em
ancipation movement to the sole question of national liberation. The bourgeoisie s
allies and accomplices even when they call themselves communists, and sometimes e
ven Trotskyists (as was the case in Ceylon), and regardless of all their socialist v
erbiage
seek to demobilize and paralyze the class power of the proletariat and t
he poor peasantry. Their eternal refrain is: national liberation comes first, th
en we ll see about the rest. Stalin and Bukharin sang a version of this plaintive
ballad during the Second Chinese Revolution: first, it s necessary to support the
Kuomintang expedition toward the north; when the anti-imperialist struggle is wo
n we ll start thinking about distributing the land and forming Soviets.
Revolutionary Marxists, on the contrary, use all means possible in the attempt t
o develop the struggle of the workers and peasants for their own class interests
; they do this right from the start of the revolutionary process in a backward c
ountry, including in cases where the struggle opens around objectives of nationa
l liberation. It is all these teachings of Trotsky that Comrade Horowitz now der
ides as subjectivist. Only if this class struggle of the poor peasants and workers
leads to a powerful and massive class organization
Soviets, in a word will it b
e possible to achieve the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution through t
he establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, allied with the poor pe
asants.
And only in that case
that is, if the workers, the peasants, and above all the r
evolutionary Marxists follow our subjectivist conception will it be possible to es
tablish in practice, i.e., in the political arena, an inseparable link and an inter
twining between the accomplishment of these tasks and the socialist revolution. T
o view this intertwining as an objectively given fact means a complete failure to
understand the struggle to the death Trotsky speaks of an inevitable and bloody
civil war
that will arise between the bourgeois and proletarian forces within th
e movement for national liberation. It means a complete failure to understand th
e dynamic of the class struggle that dominates this entire process. It means tak
ing a step toward breaking with Marxism.

Our Supposed

Errors

on the National Question

Comrade Horowitz tries to take up the counter offensive by uncovering our suppos
ed errors on the national question. But as in his attempt to demonstrate that we s
upposedly modified our previous positions, he comes home from the hunt empty-han
ded; there s nothing in his knapsack but wind.
The first error he discovers is that we underestimate the importance of national str
uggles, and that we do this right hi the middle of a period hi which the nationa
l question has a growing importance for the world socialist revolution. This arg
ument strangely resembles the classic Stalinist argument that Trotsky underestima
ted the peasantry. It has precisely the same merit
that is, none.
Nowhere have we belittled the importance of the national question. Comrade Horow
itz would have done better to have said that we are in no way inclined to underes
timate the national question, inasmuch as we are from a country where two nationa
lities live, nationalities whose aspirations and conflicts have for decades been
intertwined with the class struggle in the most diverse and manifold forms. Whe
n it came to convincing the Trotskyist movement of the crucial importance of the
colonial revolution; when it came to understanding the explosive character of s
uch problems as the Flemish question, the Walloon question, the Quebecois questi
on, or the Basque question; when it came to grasping the importance of the Ukrai
nian question in the present stage of preparation for the anti-bureaucratic poli
tical revolution in the USSR; when it came to all of these questions, not only d
id we never show any sign of any such underestimation, but it would even be diffic
ult to demonstrate that we have shown signs of being slow to raise these questio
ns, in comparison with the leaders of the minority. Comrade Horowitz cannot prov
ide the slightest proof to the contrary.
In In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International we repeat agai
n and again that it is the duty of the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguar
d to support all mass struggles for concrete demands concerning the right of opp
ressed nationalities to determine their own fate. We state this over and over ag
ain in theory, and we carry it out in practice.
What lies behind Comrade Horowitz s attack on our supposed underestimation of the na
tional question is our stubborn and consistent refusal to identify support to th
e mass movement for national liberation with capitulation to the petty-bourgeois
or bourgeois nationalist ideology that may dominate this movement during a cert
ain phase of its development. Yes, the task of revolutionaries in the oppressed
nations is to extend the most resolute and energetic support with methods approp
riate to proletarian struggles to oppressed nationalities struggles for self-dete
rmination, combined with an uncompromising ideological and political critique of
nationalist ideology. For nationalist ideology is an ideology of class collabor
ation against the common foreign enemy, an ideology for which we try to substitute
the development of proletarian class consciousness. This class consciousness is
based on an understanding of the irreconcilable character of the differences be
tween the interests of the workers and poor peasants on the one hand and the nati
onal bourgeoisie on the other. It is also based on proletarian internationalism,
that is, on the common interests of the workers of all nations.
One supposed proof of our underestimation of the national question is the fact that
we state there is an important difference between the semi-colonial and colonia
l countries insofar as national oppression is concerned.
In advancing this argument, Comrade Horowitz forgets that we have stated quite c
learly: 1) that the formally independent states formed by the national bourgeoisi
e are puppet states; and 2) that the national bourgeoisie can initiate the strugg
le for national liberation, but cannot carry it through.

To draw from all this the conclusion that the India, Algeria, and Egypt of today
are oppressed nations that have yet to win their right to self-determination
in
the same sense as when they were colonies is to once again cross the dividing l
ine between dialectics and sophistry. If colonial slavery really continues to ex
ist after a backward country has won national independence, how can you justify
the support revolutionary Marxists gave to the war in China
even under the leade
rship of Chiang Kai-shek against Japanese imperialism s attempt to transform it in
to a colony? How can you justify the support the Fourth International rightly ga
ve to the Algerian war of national liberation against French imperialism? Weren t
these wars justified by the fact that they led in the direction of a socialist r
evolution? Here it is Comrade Horowitz who verges on a position that underestimat
es the importance of the national question in a sectarian fashion, notably the im
portance of the struggle for even formal independence.
Replying in advance to Horowitz, Lenin wrote:
... if we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by jugg
ling with legal definitions, or inventing abstract definitions, but by examining t
he historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably r
each the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political s
eparation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an i
ndependent national state ...
Not only small states, but even Russia, for example, is entirely dependent, econo
mically, on the power of the imperialist finance capital of the rich bourgeois cou
ntries. Not only the miniature Balkan states, but even nineteenth-century Americ
a was, economically, a colony of Europe, as Marx pointed out in Capital. Kautsky
, like any Marxist, is, of course, well aware of this, but that has nothing what
ever to do with the question of national movements and the national state.
For the question of the political self-determination of nations and their indepen
dence as states in bourgeois society, Rosa Luxemburg has substituted the questio
n of their economic independence. This is just as intelligent as if someone, hi
discussing the programmatic demand for the supremacy of parliament, i.e., the as
sembly of people s representatives in a bourgeois state, were to expound the perfe
ctly correct conviction that big capital dominates in a bourgeois country, whate
ver the regime in it. (The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Collected Work
s, Vol.20, pp.397-399.)
And further:
The independence Norway achieved in 1905 was only political. It could not affect it
s economic dependence, nor was this the intention. That is exactly the point mad
e in our theses. We indicated that self-determination concerns only politics, an
d it would therefore be wrong even to raise the question of its economic unachie
vability ...
In this situation it is not only achievable, from the point of view of finance capi
tal, but sometimes even profitable for their trusts, for their imperialist polic
y, for their imperialist policy, for their imperialist war, to allow individual
small nations as much democratic freedom as they can, right down to political in
dependence, so as not to risk damaging their own military operations. To overlook
the peculiarity of political and strategic relationships and to repeat indiscrim
inately a word learned by rote, imperialism, is anything but Marxism. (A Caricature
of Marxism and Imperialist Economism, Collected Works, Vol.23, pp.48-51.)
It is clear that we are in good company with our spurious argument that gaining fo
rmal national independence ends national oppression and achieves the right to se
lf-determination. Perhaps Comrade Horowitz will accuse Lenin as well of having u

sed a

semantic trick ?

The real substance of the question, we state once again, can be grasped quite ea
sily despite the artificial, scholastic mist Comrade Horowitz has created. Throu
ghout the imperialist epoch there are many different links between the economic
and military dependence in relation to imperialism on the one hand, and politica
l dependence as well as national oppression on the other. This is why complete a
ccomplishment of the tasks of the national-democratic revolution is only possibl
e by wrenching a country out of the domain of international capital. But the ove
rlapping of colonial slavery, economic exploitation, financial domination, and m
ilitary pressure does not mean there is an identity between them. Semi-colonial
countries cannot be identified with colonial countries without falling into sect
arianism and underestimation of the national question. The national independence w
on by such countries as India, Algeria, etc., cannot be called purely illusory. It
is the product of a process of anti-imperialist struggle, of a process that has
been frozen since its inception and has not been completed, but that has noneth
eless produced real results.
The colonial bourgeoisie makes careful and conscious use of nationalist ideology
in order to freeze the struggle on the level of conquering no more than formal p
olitical independence (although acquiring a few small slices of imperialist prope
rty at the same time wouldn t displease them). Revolutionary Marxists try to trans
form this struggle into a process of permanent revolution in the course of which
the national democratic tasks as a whole will be accomplished through establish
ing the dictatorship of the proletariat, which will then permit the revolution t
o go over to the solution of socialist tasks. But this is neither the inevitable
product of objective conditions nor the natural outcome of national aspirations.
is the result of the unfolding of the independent class struggle of the workers
and poor peasants.
The political significance of this analysis becomes clear right away in light of
the political tasks of revolutionary Marxists. Take once again the example of B
angladesh. When the struggle for national independence broke out under the leade
rship of the Awami League, what was the task of revolutionary Marxists? Was it t
o state that this struggle was illusory and that there could be no national indepe
ndence without a socialist revolution? That would have been infantile sectariani
sm. Was it to state that the struggle for independence should have been supporte
d because it is inextricably linked to the socialist revolution, and that revoluti
onary Marxists should try to be more nationalist than Mujibur Rahman? That would
have been opportunism of a no less infantile sort. Furthermore, the two positio
ns would amount to the same thing inasmuch as they are both incapable in practic
e of winning sectors of the masses away from the influence of the national bourg
eoisie. The correct position would be to -support the struggle for national inde
pendence while seeking to organize the workers and peasants in an independent ma
nner by advancing at the same time the specific class objectives already mention
ed above: occupation of the land, arming of the people, cancellation of debts, e
xpropriation of the big foreign and national landlords, the conquest of democratic
rights for the masses, etc. Once it is actually won, national independence pave
s the way for the struggle for all these objectives, provided that the proletari
at and its revolutionary vanguard adopt a correct position at the very beginning
of the struggle.
The second error we are supposed to have committed on the national question allege
dly consists in our having put primary emphasis in the national struggle on the d
anger that nationalist demands will play into the hands of the bourgeoisie of th
e oppressed nation, rather than on the proven potential that nationalist demands
have shown for advancing the class struggle. (Horowitz, p.5)
The formula nationalist demands belongs to Horowitz and was never used by us. We h
ave systematically coun-terposed the concrete, just demand expressing the strugg

It

le of the masses against national oppression

which we support 100 percent
and na
tionalist ideology, which must be fought. Nor have we put primary emphasis on the
struggle against this ideology. We have simply underscored the fact that a corre
ct Leninist approach that is, one that is not one-sided and takes into account a
ll the aspects of the question
must combine support to the just demands of the m
asses with the struggle against nationalist ideology. The error we are criticized
for is in reality a criticism of Lenin, who wrote quite unequivocally:
The interests of the working class and of its struggle against capitalism demand
complete solidarity and the closest unity of the workers of all nations; they de
mand resistance to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie of every nationalit
y. Hence, Social-Democrats would be deviating from proletarian policy and subord
inating the workers to the policy of the bourgeoisie if they were to repudiate t
he right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of an oppressed natio
n to secede, or if they were to support all the national demands of the bourgeoi
sie of oppressed nations. (The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Collected
Works, Vol.20, p.424. Our emphasis.)
For Lenin, the struggle for just national demands and the struggle against bourg
eois and petty-bourgeois nationalism in the oppressed nations are the two indiss
oluble aspects of the same class-struggle policy. By dropping the second aspect
of this Leninist orientation in practice, Comrade Horowitz little by little tran
sforms it from a class-struggle policy to a policy of class collaboration. The er
ror he has discovered in our position is that we have remained faithful to the Le
ninist and Trotskyist tradition, which consists in relentlessly combining these
two aspects of revolutionary policy on the national question.
On the Attempt to Apply the Theory of Permanent Revolution to the Imperialist Co
untries
Comrade Horowitz has committed the methodological error Lenin had already warned
Marxists against fifty-three years ago, when he wrote his theses on the nationa
l and colonial question. Instead of beginning with a precise appraisal of the spe
cific historical situation and, primarily, of economic conditions, and instead of
making a clear distinction between the interests of the oppressed classes, of wo
rking and exploited people, and the general concept of national interests as a w
hole, which implies the interests of the ruling class, Comrade Horowitz begins wi
th an abstract and formal principle: in the epoch of imperialism, the nationalism
of the oppressed is progressive because it is inextricably linked to the socialis
t revolution.
The most serious consequence of this error appears in the mechanical transpositi
on of the theory of permanent revolution to the industrially developed countries
, the imperialist countries.
In In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International, we wrote as f
ollows on this point:
The whole notion of applying the formula of permanent revolution to imperialist c
ountries is extremely dubious in the best of cases. It can only be done with utm
ost circumspection, and in the form of an analogy. (p.34)
This is simply wrong,

retorts Comrade Horowitz.

The permanent revolution can indeed be applied in the advanced capitalist countri
es, and the Trotskyist movement has been doing so for a long time ... (Horowitz,
p.7)
As proof, he offers us ... one quotation from Trotsky, taken from an internal di

scussion at the beginning of the 1930s concerning an American comrade, Weisbord.

We are once again confronted with scholastic sophistry. To find out what Trotsk
y thought about the theory of permanent revolution, there is no need to study hi
s classic works or to analyze the internal logic of his theory; it is necessary
instead to collect a bunch of quotations and hunt through them for a peg for every
thing one is trying to smuggle in.
The question is so elementary that one is almost ashamed to refer to it. Trotsky s
theses on the permanent revolution state clearly:
With regard to countries with a belated bourgeois development, especially the col
onial and semi-colonial countries, the theory of permanent revolution signifies
that the complete and genuine solution of the tasks of achieving democracy and n
ational emancipation is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proleta
riat as the leader of the subjugated nation, above all of its peasant masses. (Th
e Permanent Revolution, Pathfinder Press edition, p.276. Emphasis at beginning o
f sentence added.)
In the Transitional Program Trotsky wrote:
The relative weight of the individual democratic and transitional demands in the
proletariat s struggle, their mutual ties and their order of presentation, is dete
rmined by the peculiarities and specific conditions of each backward country (ou
r emphasis) and to a considerable extent by the degree of its backwardness. Neve
rtheless, the general trend of revolutionary development in all backward countri
es can be determined by the formula of the permanent revolution in the sense def
initely imparted to it by the three revolutions in Russia (1905, February 1917,
October 1917). (The Transitional Program, Pathfinder Press edition, p.98)
This is what the programmatic documents say. Can a casual remark about Weisbord
in an internal bulletin neutralize these documents?
We didn t need Comrade Horowitz to understand that there are certain analogies bet
ween the combined tasks that confront the revolution in an imperialist country a
nd in a backward country. We have explained this at some length in In Defence of
Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International (pp.34-35). But as we said in
this document:
... it would be pure sophistry to draw the conclusion that no qualitative differe
nce exists between the combined tasks facing the revolution in imperialist count
ries, and those facing it in colonial or semi-colonial countries, simply because
of the undeniable fact that some tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution r
emain unsolved in the most advanced imperialist nations, or rise up again there
... (p.34. Emphasis added.)
Since Comrade Horowitz compels us to go back to the ABC s, let s refresh his memory
about the qualitative differences between the revolutionary dynamic in the colon
ial and semi-colonial countries on the one hand, and in the imperialist countrie
s on the other.
The most burning tasks of the revolution in the former countries are the tasks t
hat were not resolved by the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the agrarian quest
ion, the national question, national unification, etc.). In the latter countries
it is the tasks of the proletarian socialist revolution that are the most burni
ng: socialization of industry and the banks, withering away of commodity product
ion and wage labor, etc.
In colonial and semi-colonial countries the majority of the population is made u
p of petty-bourgeois (and semi-proletarianized) elements; in imperialist countri
es the majority of the population is composed of proletarian elements. Consequen
tly, the struggle between capital and labor wholly dominates the political and s

ocial evolution of the imperialist countries, whereas the class struggle in the
backward countries takes the predominant form of combining the struggle of the p
easants against the landlords and usurers, and the struggle of the national bourge
oisie against foreign capital, with the struggle of the workers against the capi
talists making all three elements an essential part of the class struggle.
For this reason, every broad-based mass struggle in the backward countries inevi
tably takes on the aspect of a combination of classes (only one variant of which
a worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the proletariat
can lead the
revolutionary process to victory). In the imperialist countries, every mass stru
ggle inevitably takes on a proletarian and socialist dynamic, given the numerica
l preponderance of the proletariat in the nation.
In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the main tasks of revolutionary str
ategy and tactics concern the overlapping of the revolution s bourgeois-democratic
tasks and the defense of the proletariat and poor peasantry s own class interests
; these are the problems of the worker-peasant alliance, of the proletariat s gain
ing hegemony within the national-democratic movement. In the imperialist countri
es, the key question of revolutionary strategy and tactics is the unification of
the proletarian forces in the broad sense of the term (wage-earners as a whole)
on an anti-capitalist basis for the revolutionary conquest of power. This makes
it absolutely essential to clarify the question of the nature of the state, to
carry out a merciless struggle against all confusion on classless democracy, and t
o conduct a relentless education of the proletariat against reformism and illusi
ons about the gradual, peaceful,
electoral road to socialism.
Any consideration about the specific weight of the national question in the semi
-colonial and colonial countries on the one hand and the imperialist countries o
n the other
and of course any consideration about the objective function of bour
geois and petty-bourgeois nationalism
must be integrated into this overall theor
etical view. It is clear that if the national question played a qualitatively di
fferent role in the Indian or Algerian revolution in the 1940s and 1950s than it
does in the Spanish revolution of today, it is not, as Comrade Horowitz thinks,
because the Basques represent a smaller percentage of the population but becaus
e the proletariat and the heavy industry predominate in Spain to an extent that
is qualitatively different.
We repeat: stating these elementary truths in no way signifies an underestimation
of the Basque, Irish, Walloon, Flemish, etc., national question. What it actuall
y does is place the question in a different socio-economic framework and thereby
deduce a different dynamic for the revolutionary process. To fail to understand
this is to totally ignore the class structure and the class struggle as determi
ning factors for Marxist analysis.
It Is Time to Stop Before It Becomes Too Late
When we wrote In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International, we
thought that the minority represented an unprincipled bloc on the national ques
tion (and on a few other questions) between the SWP leadership which was trying
to defend a certain Trotskyist orthodoxy, although in a dogmatic way
and comrade
s like those of the LSA/LSO and those of the PST, who have been pulled along the
path of right opportunism. We expected that the leaders of the SWP would become
embarrassed by the excesses of their allies and try to correct them. This is some
times a by-product of tendency struggles, and the inducement to make such adjust
ments is not the least of their positive results.
But this is not what happened. It was the openly revisionist forces in this bloc
that began to set its tone and determine the dynamic of its political evolution
. It s not Comrades Breitman, Novack, and Hansen who are correcting the errors of
Alain Beiner and Moreno. It s Beiner and Moreno who are compelling the SWP leaders
hip to follow in their footsteps.

In this sense, Comrade Horowitz s article is quite revealing. If it must be acknow

ledged that the SWP leadership approves and supports it, an entire sector of the
Trotskyist movement would then be on the path toward open revisionism on the na
tional question.
Despite all his inclination toward scholasticism and sophistry, Comrade Horowitz
is honest enough to recognize this. He writes:
In recent years, the Trotskyist movement (?) has introduced a change in terminolo
gy, using the word nationalism not so much to describe its specific origins in con
nection with bourgeois ideology, but in a more limited sense to describe the sim
ple concept of identification with the nation. (Horowitz, p.12)
The unfortunate thing is that with the exception of the Black question in the Un
ited States and few rare connected cases of the same sort, this change was not int
roduced into the Trotskyist movement as a whole or accepted by it, but is rather n
ow being surreptitiously slipped into documents by a few comrades who have taken
the path of revising Marxism. This revision has enormous consequences.
If all that were involved were a simple question of semantics, the polemic would
be of little interest. Unfortunately, the concepts correspond to social and polit
ical realities. If the concept of nationalism is used to designate identification wit
h the nation (a vague notion, but let s leave that aside for another time), it does
not for all that eliminate the fact that these nations are divided into classes
and social layers, each with its particular interests and with varying ideologi
es that tend to express these interests. Comrade Horowitz s use of the concept of nat
ionalism in a sense that is different from the way it is used by the great majori
ty of humanity in no way changes the fact that there are bourgeois-nationalist p
arties, that they have their petty-bourgeois nationalist representatives, and th
at there are attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations to pre
vent the working class from organizing in an independent way and from carrying o
ut its class struggle against capitalism, etc., under the pretext of common nati
onal interests. All these phenomena, which are decisive for the daily political
and social life of oppressed people, do not disappear by magic simply because Co
mrade Horowitz modifies the traditional vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism. It is th
ese decisive social and political phenomena that we are concerned with here, and
not with concepts or semantics.
These are vital problems for the future of all our sections, present and yet to
be formed, in the backward countries. If we were to adopt a revisionist position
on the national question, if we were to abandon a merciless struggle against bo
urgeois nationalism and its paralyzing influence within the working class and th
e peasantry, we would risk transforming the Trotskyist organizations into de fac
to appendages of the bourgeoisie (and, let it be said in passing, into a brake o
n every consistent struggle for national liberation). This is a matter of life o
r death for revolutionary Marxists in the semi-colonial and colonial countries.
Operating on a mixture of pragmatism and dogmatism, the minority has already ope
ned the door to a serious revision of Marxism through the theoretical implicatio
ns of its way of explaining the victory of the Third Chinese Revolution. (The majo
rity has sought to demonstrate this revision in its document The Differences of
Interpretation on the Cultural Revolution at the Last World Congress and Their The
oretical Implications International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol.10, No.22,
November 1973.) Now Comrade Horowitz has widened the breech with his revision o
f the Marxist position on the national question.
But the supposedly orthodox leaders of the SWP, blinded by their passion in the
struggle against ultra-leftism, are now the victims of the objective dialectic of
factionalism. The entire history of Marxism testifies to the enormous power of t
his dialectic. The old German poet Goethe, a dialectician who was not without ta

lent, had already summed it up in his time:

you who are being pushed.

you think you are pushing, but it is

The comrades of the minority would do well to stop for a moment and reflect on t
he objective forces that are pushing them in the direction of a revision of Marx
ism. There is still time to stop, but it is five minutes before the hour. Otherw
ise the malady can spread like wildfire and, as Trotsky reminded us, go from a s
cratch to gangrene.
September 15, 1973

Ernest Mandel
Historical Materialism and the Capitalist State
(1980)
Historical materialism elevates the principle of the dialectical relationship be
tween the particular and the general, which reveals the essence of phenomena, to
the theoretical foundation of the dialectical understanding of history.
Leo Kof
ler, Geschichte und Dialektik
Theoretical discussion about defining and explaining of the class nature of the
capitalist state has increased significantly in recent years. [1] Although at th
is stage it is still mainly occurring in the West Germany, Britain and Italy, it
is nevertheless a discussion which
often within the context of debates about sta
te monopoly capitalism and the class nature of the national-democratic state (in so
me ex-colonies in Africa and Asia) is taking place around the globe. [2] It is n
ot my aim here to discuss in detail the most important texts published on the to
pic. Instead my inquiry concerns some general problems in applying the method of
historical materialism to the question of the class nature of the capitalist st
ate problems which directly or indirectly play an important role in the controve
rsy.
The central category of the materialist dialectic is that of a totality impelled
and being driven to change by its immanent contradictions. The forms of this mo
vement itself vary (for example, purely quantitative changes should not be confl
ated with qualitative changes). But the motion of the structure is just as impor
tant as the character of the structure. For historical materialism, there exist
no eternal, unchangeable forms in any social phenomena.
This category of a totality replete with contradictions, and therefore subject t
o change, directs Marxist research to inquiry into the origins of phenomena, the
ir laws of motion and their conditions of disappearance, both with regard to the
base and with regard to the superstructure of society. For historical materiali
sm, the being of each social phenomenon can only be recognized and understood in a
nd through its becoming .
That being the case, it should be clear from the start that every attempt to def
ine the class nature of the capitalist state which abstracts from the historical
origins of that state, i.e. which rejects the genetic method, conflicts with hi
storical materialism. Every attempt to deduce the character and essence of the c
apitalist state directly from the categories of Marx s Capital whether from capital
in general , from the exchange and commercial relations at the surface of bourgeo
is society, or from the conditions for the valorization of capital [3]
overlooks
that this state, as an institution separated from society and transformed into

an autonomous apparatus, was not created by the bourgeoisie itself.

In reality, this class originally took over a state which existed prior its conq
uest of political power (in Europe, the semi-feudal absolutist state) and then r
eshaped it according to its class interests. To understand the class character o
f the capitalist state, we should therefore start off by asking: why did the bou
rgeoisie not destroy the absolutist state machine, but only transform it? How di
d this change occur? For what purpose does the bourgeoisie use the state machine
ry it has conquered and adapted, and how does it necessarily have to be used? Ho
w does the bourgeoisie succeed in using the state machine for its own class ends
, notwithstanding the autonomy that the state has?
The objection that such a methodological approach to the problem is ambivalent a
nd eclectic can be dismissed straightway, because the field of action of the sta
te is never reducible to purely economic conditions . As an outgrowth of the social
division of labor, state functions as such originally gained independence, i.e.
became the responsibility of special institutions separated from society, when
the division of society into classes was occurring, i.e. they were the instrumen
ts of an existing class order. Technical necessity or reified consciousness [4]
by themselves cannot explain why the majority of the members of society are comp
elled to leave the exercise of particular functions to a minority. Behind functi
onal necessities or reified consciousness exist relations among people, class re
lations and class conflicts. So if we try to deduce any given state form, includ
ing the capitalist state, from purely economic relations, we either remain trapp
ed in reified reflexes of class relations, or else we reduce class conflicts in
a mechanistic way to pure economics .
On the other side, the origins and development of the capitalist state cannot si
mply be reduced to some general imperative to use non-economic force against the
class enemies of the bourgeoisie either. The basis of this imperative must be r
elated to the specific forms of capitalism, and viewed as a necessary feature of
the rule of capital, rather than of the ruling class in general. If the essence
of the capitalist state is detached from the conditions of existence of the sta
te, then what distinguishes it from all other class states, is lost sight of, in
stead of being included in the analysis. Only by linking the special functional
conditions of the capitalist state with the specificities of capitalist producti
on and bourgeois ideology co-determined by the structure of bourgeois society. a
s well influencing each other
can we frame the problem of the class nature of th
e capitalist state exhaustively, and solve it.
The corollary is that every modern capitalist state combines general features of
this class nature with unique characteristics, which derive from the moment in
history (the stage of capitalist development, of the formation of the bourgeoisi
e and the working class) when the national bourgeoisie fought to conquer indepen
dent political power, as well as from the historical conditions of the class con
flicts (including the balance of power between the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy,
and plebeian/pre-proletarian, semi-proletarian and fully proletarianized worker
s). Not just the specific institutional arrangements and the precise state form
obtained (e.g. a constitutional monarchy in Great Britain and Sweden, versus a r
epublic in the USA and France), but also the unique political tradition of each
bourgeois nation and its prevailing political clichs and ideologies (which also p
lay a very important role in the emergence and development of the modern labor m
ovement) are bound up with this.
It is also important to distinguish clearly between what is intrinsic to bourgeo
is society generally, and those special features of the capitalist state which o
nly reflect specific power alignments between the social classes. Several author
s unjustifiably claim that the reproduction of capitalist relations is more or l
ess automatically guaranteed, because those relations directly influence and sha
pe the consciousness of the producers (the working class). Since wage earners ex

perience their exploitation as the result of an exchange, so it is argued, they

will not question these exchange relations. Hence they will also not question co
mmodity production, or the capitalist mode of production, or the accumulation of
capital. From this idea, it is then inferred that, in contrast to other class s
tates, it is sufficient for the capitalist state to provide formal legal equalit
y which separates political-legal relations between people from actual social pr
oduction.
Three conceptual confusions are involved here. Firstly, the fact that a given mo
de of production generates its own forms of reified consciousness, does not mean
at all that these forms suffice to guarantee the reproduction of the social ord
er. Secondly, even a consciousness which cannot rise beyond exchange relations c
an threaten the reproduction of capitalist relations of production; workers who
are politically uneducated can nevertheless stage rebellions which threaten priv
ate property and the bourgeois order. Such revolts might have little chance of s
uccess, but they can cause so much damage, that the capitalist class believes th
at maintaining a costly and parasitic state apparatus as a bulwark against the p
ossibility of such revolts is essential (cf. the second German empire). And thir
dly, this train of thought contains an economistic error. The continuation of co
mmodity production and privately owned means of production does not automaticall
y guarantee that a rapid valorization of capital will occur all of the time. Tha
t also requires among other things a specific distribution of the new value prod
uced by labor-power between wages and surplus value, which permits a normal valori
zation of capital. Aside from quality, quantity thus plays a central role here.
Capitalism has a built-in limit preventing wages from rising above a level that
would endanger the valorization of capital, principally through an expansion of
the reserve army of labor, in reaction to a decline in the accumulation of capit
al. But this longer-term tendency does not have a continuous and uninterrupted e
ffect. In spite of the fact that it is bounded by exchange relations , wage-labor c
an thus demand, and achieve, wage rises in some situations which make the valori
zation of capital more difficult, and endanger it in the short term.
Moreover, precisely because wage earners (be it with a false consciousness ) experi
ence their exploitation at the most basic level only as the result of exchange, th
ey are forced into a fight to defend and increase their wages. Thus, so-called re
ified consciousness could even lead them to conclude that this fight will succeed
only through united collective action and organized solidarity. Mutually contra
ry aspects of reified consciousness (resignation and rebellion) are therefore inhe
rent in the system, but each of them obviously has different consequences for po
tential threats to the system. Out of the impulse towards trade unionism, emerge
s an elementary proletarian class consciousness, which can at least potentially
and episodically lead to anti-capitalist struggles.
And so, with a less mechanistic analysis of the connection between generalized c
ommodity production, reified consciousness and the need for a state machine for
the bourgeoisie, we arrive at conclusions quite different from many participants
in the debate. In contrast to slaves or serfs, wage earners are free workers, a
circumstance which should be understood dialectically and as replete with contr
adictions, and not simply reduced to separation from the means of production . Addi
tionally, capitalism implies not just a universalized market (and thus the inevi
table reification of social consciousness), but also in contrast to the work of
private producers in simple commodity production the objective socialization and
co-operation of labor in large-scale industry. That is precisely why non-econom
ic power is essential for capital. It must guarantee the reproduction of the soc
ial relations of bourgeois society, and market mechanisms alone are not sufficie
nt for this.
Free workers can at least temporarily refuse the sale of their labor-power under
conditions most favorable for the valorization of capital. They can do this mor

e effectively if they have collective resistance funds and collective organizati

ons, and these have emerged everywhere in response to capitalism, just like reif
ied consciousness. Securing the reproduction of social relations within bourgeoi
s society therefore demands coercion and violence by the agents of capital, to p
rohibit, prevent, frustrate, or restrict the collective refusal to sell the comm
odity labor-power (the right to strike) or at least make it less successful. Tha
t imperative is visible throughout the whole history of bourgeois society.
Not only because free wage-labor in reality (implicitly) also means work under com
pulsion not just economically or personally, but also at the level of law and ord
er
freedom and coercion necessarily co-exist in bourgeois society. Without coerci
on for the working class, no freedom for the employer: the young Marx had alread
y grasped this when he noted in his article On the Jewish Question that Security
is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of police, the conce
pt that the whole of society is there, only to guarantee to each of its members
the conservation of his person, his rights and his property. In this sense, Hege
l calls civil society the state of need and of reason . [den Not- und Verstandestaat
] . [5] Indeed. Without police, private property and the valorization of capital a
re not secure; without capitalist state violence, there is no secure capitalism.
It follows that there has never been, and will never be, a capitalist state base
d on the preservation of juridical equality , or on the securing of the application
of formal principles . The capitalist state is and remains, like all other politic
al states before it, an instrument for the preservation of the rule of a definit
e class not just indirectly, but also directly. Without a permanent repressive a
pparatus and in times of crisis the hard core of the state reduces to this apparat
us, to a body of armed men as Frederick Engels put it
the capitalist state could n
ot exist, the reproduction of capitalist relations of production becomes at the
very least uncertain, and bourgeois rule is vulnerable to challenge.
One could actually turn the theories of many (especially German) participants in
the discussion on their head; precisely because the conditions of capitalist ex
ploitation seem to be based exclusively on exchange relations and not on direct,
personal master-servant relations, the potential threat always exists in bourge
ois society that the wage earners will abuse their freedom to threaten the existin
g social order, if not overthrow it altogether. Since the capitalist state was i
tself the product of bourgeois revolutions, and since revolutions are, as is kno
wn, dangerous schools in the possibility of changing society radically, the bour
geoisie understood immediately after the conquest of political power that it nee
ded a permanent non-economic repressive apparatus to oblige resistant workers to
the sale of the commodity labor power, at prices promoting, and not braking, th
e valorization of capital.
For the same reason, it is simply wrong to suggest that some or other tendency t
owards formal-political equality before the law of all citizens of a bourgeois nat
ion necessarily follows from the formal equality of all individuals in bourgeois
society. To the contrary: to neutralize the contradictory effects on the market
of the formal equality of capital and wage-labor an equality essential for the
continuation of capitalism and the valorization of capital the tendency towards
violating or contesting the political rights of the working class is built into
the capitalist state. The idea the capitalist state or all of bourgeois ideology
tends spontaneously and automatically towards equal voting rights for all peopl
e is belied by the real history of bourgeois society. It is one of the great ach
ievements of Leo Kofler to have demonstrated this in detail.
In the real history of the capitalist state, the combination of the universal fr
anchise, equal voting rights with a secret ballot, and effective freedom of poli
tical organization for the working class, has been the exception. Even in Wester
n Europe, it became the norm only after World War I. In the rest of the capitali
st world, it remains until this very day the exception rather than the rule.

More significant is that even this purely formal political, legal and organizati
onal equality for the working classes was in Western Europe nearly everywhere fo
rced on the bourgeoisie by the other social classes, and that the bourgeoisie in
no sense voluntarily granted it to all citoyens. [6] Just exactly under what co
nditions and within what limits it could turn this political defeat temporarily
into a political victory is an issue which does not alter the importance of the
historical fact in any way whatever
if only because in the last sixty years the
ostensibly bourgeois-democratic achievement has already been overturned again on m
any occasions (Mussolini, Salazar, Hitler, Franco, Petain, to mention only the m
ost important West European examples) and because a renewed questioning of these
rights is again a definite theme in Western politics.
The form of the capitalist state as the means of government of the bourgeois cla
ss is therefore determined by class interests. It can only assume a given form,
if it coheres with its nature. So long as the bourgeoisie has not lost its econo
mic and social power i.e. its command over the means of production and the socia
l surplus product
any suggestion that a fundamental change in the form and funct
ion of the state is possible assumes that the ruling class would use the social
surplus-product not for maintaining itself but for its own self-destruction. The
re exists not a single historical example of such a process of the self-destruct
ion of ruling social classes, neither in the history of pre-capitalist societies
, nor in the history of capitalist society. So the primary task of the capitalis
t state is to provide, secure and reproduce the social conditions (the social fr
amework) of the existing class domination, those conditions in other words which
Frederick Engels indicates in Anti-Dhring with the formula external conditions of
production . The state is an organization of the particular class, which [is] pro
tempore the exploiting class, for the maintenance of its external conditions of
production and, therefore, especially, for the purpose of forcibly keeping the e
xploited classes in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mod
e of production (slavery, serfdom, wage labor) . [7] The way in which it fulfills
this task is determined by the specificity of the capitalist mode of production
and the nature of the social classes that it creates. It is also determined by t
he given, historically emergent relationship of forces between the classes speci
fic to each specific bourgeois form of society, in each given phase of its devel
opment.
To carry out this task, both a repressive and ideological-integrative instrument
must be applied. The formal-legal equality of individuals in bourgeois society
and the absence of direct master-servant relations certainly creates the possibi
lity of much stronger legitimation of the capitalist state in the eyes of the do
minated classes as the (false) representative of society as a whole than was the
case in pre-capitalist states. But the universal franchise, freedom to organize
politically for the workers movement, and the integration of the leaders of the
ir mass organizations in the capitalist state are only necessary, not sufficient
conditions for this perception of legitimacy. A definite long-term decline of m
ass participation in class struggles, or a definite low level (or a definite dec
line) of the average class consciousness of the working class, due to particular
historical circumstances, is also a factor.
Whether the complex concatenation of objective and subjective factors actually e
nables the bourgeoisie to camouflage its class rule successfully in the eyes of
the exploited as being the result of popular sovereignty and as the will of the peo
ple expressed in electoral outcomes is something which only an social and politic
al analysis of a specific state in a specific era can reveal. But whatever the c
ase may be, there is no convincing proof that particular state forms
such as in
Great Britain at the time of the prince-regent and of Queen Victoria, in France
during the reign of Louis Philippe or the Second Empire, in the German Empire un
der Wilhelm I and Wilhelm II, in Belgium under Leopold I and Leopold II, not to
mention Mussolini s Italy or Franco s Spain
were perceived as the legitimate represen

tatives of the whole society by the working class of these countries. Similarly w
e can justifiably doubt the presence of such a perception in the North American
state in the Coolidge-Hoover period.
The capitalist state must not only secure the external conditions, but also the
social conditions of the capitalist mode of production. That is, it must also cr
eate those general conditions for production proper which the functioning capital
ists cannot produce themselves, either because it is not profitable for them to d
o so, and because of the prevailing competition among private capitals. Capitali
sm presupposes social production and social exchange. But capital cannot of its o
wn accord, by its actions, produce the social character of its existence by any
means , as Altvater puts it so well. [8] The relationship between state and societ
y is therefore not reducible to the relationship between politics and economics;
because the capitalist state is also a directly economically active institution
of the capitalist order.
This is most clearly shown by the monetary regime. Just as generalized commodity
production presupposes the independent existence of exchange value in a univers
al equivalent, in money, the normal reproduction of total social capital require
s a continual division and reconstitution of productive-, commodity- and money-c
apital. [9] And that process cannot occur, at least not on any large scale, with
out a currency and credit system which is guaranteed and secured by the state. I
f we examine the supply of money and credit, it is immediately obvious that with
out a central state authority, a fully functional capitalist mode of production
could not exist. But money and credit point straightaway to other directly econom
ic functions of the capitalist state. Capitalist competition manifests itself in
the history of capitalism in two ways: as competition between individual capital
s, and as competition between fractions of world capital sited in territorial st
ates. In this second form of competition, the capitalist state fulfills a defens
ive role for national capitals against foreign competitors, in the area of currency
, customs and trade policy, colonial policy, etc. This role of the state is like
wise, at least initially purely economic and without it the system would again fai
l to function, or function fully.
In his Grundrisse, Marx concluded that the ideal conditions for the capitalist m
ode of production are those in which private capitals themselves can create a ma
ximum of those general conditions of production . [10] Nevertheless, in the case of
a third category of these general conditions of production , namely those related
to the provision of infrastructure and education, the general tendency was demon
strably in the opposite direction, from the time that large-scale industry began
to dominate. These functions were increasingly and later almost exclusively ful
filled by the capitalist state, because far too much tension existed between pri
vate interests seeking to organize them according to the profit motive, and the
collective interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, or the objective requirement
s of the valorization of capital in general.
A unified taxation system connects the money and credit system with the infrastr
uctural tasks which must be fulfilled. The link between the external (social) and
the economic (general) conditions is formed by those state functions that fall und
er the general heading of administration . Included here are not only the administr
ation securing law and order and the protection of private property, but also th
e police and military apparatus protecting the bourgeoisie from internal and exter
nal enemies as well as all of the administration concerned with other public serv
ices, such as the infrastructure proper (e.g. the public health system, which, g
iven the raw poverty of the early proletariat was essential to protect the bourg
eois class in the large cities from the danger of epidemics).
In the course of the development of bourgeois society, the number of general cond
itions of production met by the state grew almost without interruption. But this
apparently linear process must be analyzed in its different aspects. In some are

as there really existed something like technical necessity here, i.e. the logic
of technology demanded ever stronger centralization, and forced the bourgeoisie
to recognize the objective socialization of labor in these areas, through a genu
ine nationalization of these functions. That applied, for example, to railway co
nstruction and management, and later to the regulation of air traffic. Private o
rganization in this area was so strongly stamped by partial rationality [11] that
it endangered the system as a whole, so that bourgeois society could, despite gl
orifying private enterprise, not afford it.
With the unfolding of the long-term laws of motion of capital (inter alia the in
creasing concentration and centralization of capital on the one hand, and the gr
owing difficulties for the valorization of capital on the other side) there is a
n increasing number of productive areas in which the risk of losing the gigantic
investments required becomes too great to attract any private capital. But with
in a complex social division of labor precisely these areas can play an importan
t or even crucial role in securing or threatening the competitiveness of a given
capitalist class on the world market. Nationalizing these activities, or increa
singly subsuming them under the general conditions of production in that case does
not express any technical necessity but rather the requirements of capital valo
rization under given historical circumstances. The nationalization of energy and
steel production in Great Britain, or the raw materials industry in France, and
more generally the nationalization of losses of unprofitable branches of industry
necessary for the material reproduction of capital, just like the nationalizati
on of the gigantically rising costs of research and development, belong to this
category.
There is, finally, nevertheless also a tendential expansion of the general condit
ions of production in areas where neither technical necessity nor immediate condi
tions of valorization play a crucial role. Late capitalism tends to bring all th
e conditions for the reproduction of the commodity labor-power under its control
, i.e. subordinate human beings and human needs directly to its valorization obj
ectives. Nationalized health care, education and land-use authorities ultimately
rest on the need to discipline people and not on technical necessities. In the
many of these areas, parasitic centralisations which so clearly manifest themsel
ves could be eliminated in a systematic and planned way after the collapse of th
e political power of capital, and be replaced by an integrated system of sociali
st self-management.
In the development of the capitalist state, a specific, contradictory relation t
o the history of the state in general emerges, congruent with an analogous relat
ion of capitalist industry (capitalist productive forces) to the general develop
ment of the productive forces. On the one hand, despite the historic tendency of
the bourgeoisie to weaken state absolutism, particularly in the phase of modern
imperialism, classical monopoly capitalism and late capitalism, the capitalist
state leads to a hypertrophy of state functions which is almost unprecedented in
the history of class society. The number of functions which become distinct, in
dependent activities through a re-division of labor in basic productive and accu
mulation functions, grows uninterruptedly and with an accelerating tempo. No dou
bt the numerical growth of state apparatuses, the growth of material wealth, and
the growing complexity and specialization of the administrative activities them
selves are part of the explanation but, for reasons already mentioned, we should
not attribute to them the significance which bourgeois ideology postulates here
.
At the same time, the average level of culture among large masses in society gro
ws, including the working classes, although this culture may be less and less co
mpatible with, or able to truly satisfy, the real needs of individuals as social
beings. In this way, the objective potential grows to stop the further hypertro
phy of the state radically, and to eliminate it, if the social interests of the
associated producers rather than the interests of capital valorization begin to

determine the developmental tendencies of the state. Precisely because the worki
ng class, which fuses more and more with the technical intelligentsia, itself ac
quires the growing capacity for self-management as the capitalist mode of produc
tion develops, a workers state could, after the downfall of capitalism, become a
state tending towards generalized self-management in all social areas, i.e. a st
ate which begins to wither away from the moment it is established, as Lenin so i
ncisively and radically put in The State and Revolution. [12]
The specificity of the capitalist state is not just defined by its special relat
ionship to the working class, but also by its origins in the relationship of the
bourgeoisie to the semi-feudal nobility in class struggles. This class conflict
is closely related to an essential distinction between bourgeois and pre-bourge
ois class society with respect to class rule, and between the capitalist class a
nd the pre-capitalist ruling classes, to which we ought to pay attention in anal
ysing the class nature of the capitalist state. Pre-bourgeois ruling classes app
ropriated the social surplus product mainly for the purpose of unproductive cons
umption. The form of this appropriation varies according to the prevailing mode
of production, but the goal is generally the same. Although accumulation as goal
was not entirely absent in the history of pre-capitalist modes of production an
d ruling classes, it nevertheless played a smaller, subordinate role compared to
the capitalist mode of production.
The capitalist class is compelled by generalized commodity production, by privat
ely owned means of production and the resulting market competition to maximize c
apital accumulation. This limitless drive for enrichment (production of exchange
-values as an end in itself) is made possible by the fact that the social surplu
s product takes the form of money. But that circumstance also means a contradict
ion emerges between different possibilities for investing the social surplus pro
duct which is specific to the capitalist mode of production alone (although it m
ay also present to some extent in other types of society partly based on cash ec
onomy). The immanent tendency of capital to maximize accumulation (i.e. to maxim
ize both the production and realization of surplus-value, and of the productive
expenditure of realized surplus-value to capitalize it) collides with the tenden
cy towards increased squandering of surplus-value on unproductive consumption by
the ruling class and its hangers-on ( third parties ) on the one side, and with the
growth of unproductive state expenditures on the other. Just how much capital t
ries to restrict the unproductive waste of surplus value by individuals to normal
limits but also to the level of one s social station is well known, and requires no
further comment here. It is important, however, to note that capital historicall
y first experienced the unproductive expenditure of the social surplus-value as
the waste of this surplus-value by a power alien and hostile to it, namely the s
emi-feudal absolutist monarchy, which distributed the social surplus product to
the parasitic court nobility and the higher clergy, who were exempted from taxat
ion.
The battle of the rising bourgeois class to maximize accumulation of capital, or
rather, remove all restrictions on its free development, was initially a strugg
le against the unlimited powers of the pre-capitalist state to levy taxes. Thus
originally its battle for the conquest of political power was fundamentally abou
t the power to decide itself what fraction of surplus-value would be withdrawn t
hrough taxation from immediate capital accumulation by functioning capitalists , i.
e. objectively socialized. It is indisputable, and cannot be dismissed as mere em
pirical detail , that all successful bourgeois revolutions between the 16th and th
e 19th century were sparked off by taxation revolts, and that all modern parliam
ents emerged from the fight of the bourgeoisie to control state expenditure. The
specific organizational forms of bourgeois political power, with its complex ar
ray of informal political structures (parties, clubs, pressure groups, networks
and lobbies), trade associations representing different interests in economic di
sputes (which were at first mainly, if not exclusively, taxation disputes), elec
tions and elected parliaments, as well as a permanent administrative apparatus a

nd a suitable state ideology (including the doctrine of the

is largely reducible to this basic conflict.

separation of powers ),

The real contradiction involved does not require elaboration in detail. It is cl

ear that when, after its triumph over absolutism, the bourgeoisie did not smash
the state machine but transformed according to its own needs, it also had to pay
for this state as soon as there was no longer any major source of revenues othe
r than the surplus-value appropriated by capital.
When an actively organized labor movement did not yet exist, the political life of
bourgeois society revolved mainly around the question of how much surplus-value
should be withheld from private accumulation through government taxes (direct c
ollectivization), at the expense of which fractions of the propertied classes, f
or what specific purposes, and with what financial advantages for particular fra
ctions of the bourgeoisie.
We can also view the question more generally in terms of the direct material bas
is for the existence of the state apparatus. Things are probably less cut-and-dr
ied when we frame the problems in this way, and do not limit ourselves to abstra
ct philosophical definitions. I think however that, if we do not reduce everythi
ng to individual corruption of government leaders and higher functionaries, it i
s no vulgar Marxism to ask the macro-economic (or macro-sociological) question: wh
at, then, is the material basis (in capitalist society, the financial basis) of
the state ? And the final conclusion of a materialist investigation of the class
nature of the bourgeois state must return us to the Marxist axiom that the soci
al class controlling the social surplus product therefore also controls the stat
e.
The classical pre-capitalist state had its autonomous material basis. The Roman
Empire of the slave owners, in its heyday, maintained the army (and the slave ma
rket) through conquests abroad. The court in ancient Asiatic modes of production
lived on the plunder of their own producers, and on the plundering of foreign c
ountries, and not on the gifts of the mandarins, priests or generals. The feudal
king was originally the foremost landowner, and as such was supported by tribut
es paid from the surplus product appropriated by other lords. But with the gener
alization of a cash economy, closely related to the victory of capital, i.e. wit
h its penetration in the sphere of production, a state form appears which does n
ot possess autonomous sources of revenue apart from taxing the population (in th
e last instance, this signifies collectivizing a fraction of the social surplusproduct).
The absolutist monarchy, very aware of its income source, for centuries battled
(ideologically aided by its legal counsels) to maintain sovereign rights to taxa
tion. This battle, in which it sometimes united with fractions of the rising bou
rgeois classes, was ultimately lost. The unrestricted power to levy tax was brok
en, and since that time even the most autonomous or most tyrannical bourgeois state
(including Hitler s Third Reich) failed to force unacceptable taxes on the bourge
oisie.
In capitalist society, the individual capitalist obviously experiences every tax
as an expropriation of a fraction of his own surplus-value, profit, or income. Ho
wever much he might consider taxes as inevitable under given circumstances, or e
ven a communal necessity, this expropriation always remains a burden, an obstacl
e to maximizing accumulation. Since the capitalist class nevertheless also needs
security for its capital, a genuine role conflict reproduces itself within this c
lass as such, and within the consciousness of each individual capitalist, betwee
n the member of civil society and the personification of capital accumulation: t
wo souls are continually at war in his Faustian breast. In different historical
periods and in different capitalist states, this produced wide variations in att
itudes among individual capitalists, from a very ordinary conformity to fiscal d

iscipline to maximal tax evasion. These attitudes can be explained in part conju
ncturally and in part historically. The conflict here is a conflict between bour
geois private interests and bourgeois social interests, not a conflict between t
he private interests of unspecified citoyens in general and unspecified social inte
rests independent from class divisions. In the consciousness of other citizens, h
owever false or reified, this conflict mostly appeared in that special form.
Workers knew very well that they did not have political equality when the right
to vote was based on property ownership. It is an anachronistic error to project
modern capitalist ideologies onto early capitalism or classical 19th century ca
pitalism without regard for the specific state forms and political structures of
-these periods. For citizens living in the period from the 16th century to the e
nd of the 19th century, or even the beginning of the 20th century, it was self-e
vident that only men of property had full political rights. Only tax payers coul
d have the full right to participate in decisions about state expenditure. Other
wise unrestricted taxation, i.e. collectivization of surplus-value, would have n
o limit. This principle was not just articulated by bourgeois intellectuals, but
also by countless bourgeois politicians of the past. Precisely for this reason,
the contradiction between the private interests and the social interests of the
bourgeois class, reflecting the contradiction between the expenditure of surplu
s value for immediate accumulation and for tasks which at best benefit this accu
mulation only indirectly, remained limited in two ways.
There was a time when all (or a great majority) of the owners of surplus-value w
ere fully prepared to sacrifice a little to keep the lot , i.e. there was a general
consciousness to defend the class and state interests together. The battle for
the conquest of political power by the bourgeoisie was an historical process, in
which this bourgeois class consciousness was formed and crystallised. On the ot
her side, the whole bourgeoisie (with the possible exception of the lumpen-bourge
oisie who live by the direct plunder of the public purse) has a social interest o
nly in offering as little as possible, i.e. an interest in a poor state . This is n
ot only because the entire bourgeoisie is interested in maximum accumulation, bu
t also because the permanent poverty of the state is the solid material basis fo
r the permanent rule of capital over the state apparatus. The golden chain of nati
onal and international debts tie the state inextricably to the rule of capital,
regardless of the state s hypertrophy and its autonomisation. Precisely because th
is dependence exists, regardless of how large the state budget may be
the fiscal
crisis of the state can be greater given a budget which absorbs 40% of the nati
onal income than with a budget which only represents 4% of that income it is a p
ermanent structural dependence, without which the class nature of the bourgeois
state cannot be fully understood. Because the specificity of the capitalist stat
e derives from the class conflicts between the bourgeoisie, the working class an
d pre-capitalist classes, it is simultaneously rooted in the characteristics of
the capitalist class itself. The conflict between individual and social interest
s of the bourgeoisie, a conflict that centres on private expenditure versus soci
al expenditure of surplus-value, is closely tied to the problem of the functiona
l division of labor within national territory created by the specific organizati
onal form of the capitalist state.
Just as in pre-capitalist society the state commands a qualitatively bigger inde
pendent material basis than the capitalist state, the pre-capitalist state also
features a much closer personal union between the top of the ruling class and th
e top of the state apparatus. In the Roman Empire (even in Julius Caesar s decaden
t republic) the ruler was the largest slave owner. In the feudal state, the king
was often also the most important landowner. In the absolutist monarchy, all im
portant offices of the lord, the central administration and diplomacy were exerc
ised by the most important families of the court nobility (and often the court c
lergy). In capitalist society by contrast, at least in the epoch of bourgeois as
cendancy, this was impossible because most capitalists are busy with their priva
te business and simply lack the time to specialize in affairs of state. Insofar

as these tasks were not left to the decadent or bourgeoisified nobility (i.e. a
rentier class), they were more and more taken over by a subdivision of the bourg
eois class, namely by professional politicians and a growing bureaucracy. [13] A
lthough the latter developed parallel to the absolutist monarchy, it could never
assume anything other than limited leadership functions, except through entry i
nto the aristocratic elite (noblesse de robe). This bureaucracy identifies to a
large extent with the state in itself , and this identification resonates best with
the ideology of the state as representative of society s collective interests (in
contrast to the traditional bourgeois conception of the state as representative
of the propertied citizenry). The relative credibility of that ideology in turn
depends on the degree of genuine relative autonomy of the capitalist state vis-vis functioning capitalists . This autonomy is obviously only relative, but it is n
ot just a mere appearance insofar as it is based on the mentioned functional divis
ion of labour, and insofar as it does not necessarily imply a functional divisio
n of labour within the capitalist class (top civil servants can also be drawn fr
om the small bourgeoisie, professionals etc.). This division of labour is struct
urally rooted in the essence of capitalism, i.e. private property and competitio
n. Private property and the pressure of competition create an objectively inevit
able conflict within the capitalist class between private and social interests.
A functioning capitalist forsaking his private interest consistently for a commo
n capitalist interest would fare just as badly as capitalist (i.e. lose out in t
he competitive battle) as a functioning bourgeois politician who systematically
neglected the common interests of capital in order to advance his own private in
terests a bad, and from a class point of view incompetent politician. Under norma
l conditions of capital accumulation and valorization, the capitalist class deleg
ates direct exercise of political power to professional politicians or top burea
ucrats only if they provide basic guarantees that they will subordinate their pr
ivate affairs to common class interests
which is something which functioning cap
italists usually cannot provide. If professional politicians fail in this respec
t, they suffer the same fate as Nixon or Tanaka. Even so, the relative autonomy
of the capitalist state, shaped by private property and competition vis-a-vis fu
nctioning capitalists, should not be exaggerated. Especially to avoid platitudes
and prevent abstract Poulantzian formulas about the structural dependence of the
state on the bourgeoisie from degenerating into empty tautologies or simplistic
petitio principii, a few more aspects should be integrated into the analysis.
It is a mechanistic error to reduce the capitalist class to functioning capitalis
ts . All owners of capital belong to it, including rentiers and all those that cou
ld live from their interest receipts, regardless of whether they work in some pr
ofession. The high income of top state functionaries and parliamentarians, as we
ll as their opportunities for getting access to confidential information enablin
g risk-free speculation, almost automatically guarantees the inclusion of top po
liticians and top public servants in the capitalist class, regardless of backgro
und because their position enables them to accumulate capital, which they do in
most cases. As owners of capital they then have a vested interest in the preserv
ing the foundations of bourgeois order.
In capitalist countries there are few top politicians or top public servants who
, at the end of a successful career, have not become owners of substantial asset
s, stocks and share portfolios beyond owning their own home etc., and this purely
economically makes them full members of the capitalist class.
If in analyzing the structure of capitalist society we do not pay due attention
to this aspect tying capitalists and the state together, for fear of vulgar Marxi
sm or descriptive verbiage , we turn a blind eye to the pivot of society, i.e. capit
al itself. The universalized drive for enrichment and the cash economy are not ex
ternal or secondary phenomena of capitalism but defining structural characteristi
cs. No group in society can permanently escape their influence, and that include
s professional politicians and bureaucrats.

It is not a matter of individual corruption, but rather the inevitable effect of

the intrinsic tendency of capitalism to convert every substantial sum of money
into a source of surplus-value, i.e. capitalize it. Only a state in which top po
liticians and public servants would not receive salaries higher than the average
wage of workers would evade this direct structural bind. It is no accident that
Marx and Lenin made this demand as basic precondition for real workers power, an
d that it is a norm that never has been, nor will be, realized in a capitalist s
tate. [14]
The special nature of the capitalist state is also defined by its hierarchical c
onstruction, more or less mirroring the structure of society. Key public servant
s are no more elected by staff at lower levels or the citizenry than company man
agers or employers are elected by employees, or army officers by their men. Betw
een this hierarchical structure and great disparities in income there is again a
structural nexus characteristic of capitalist society. Competition, the drive f
or private enrichment and the measure of success according to financial gain can
hardly dominate social life while inexplicably playing no role at all in govern
ment affairs. Again, the negative test can round off the analysis: there never w
as, and never will be, a capitalist state where the hierarchical principle is re
placed by democratic elections in all key areas (police, army, central administr
ation). Only a workers state could realize such a radical revolution in the makeup of the state.
Another characteristic of the capitalist state is the selection process leading
to the choice of top positions in politics and administration. This selection pr
ocess based less on direct buying of state functions, nepotism, inherited preben
ds or reward for service to the head of state than was the case in pre-capitalis
t states is governed to a large extent by the pressure to perform and competitio
n, which dominate economic life. It is important though to stress that in this s
election process, those modes of behaviour and ways of thinking must win out whi
ch objectively make successful capitalist politicians and key public servants th
e instruments of capitalist class rule, regardless of their personal motivation
or the self-image they happen to have.
The functional character of the bureaucracy plays a decisive role here. One coul
d imagine prison guards who occasionally help a prisoner to escape. But it is in
conceivable that wardens who did this regularly would gain posts at the summit o
f the justice administration. One pacifist lieutenant is possible, one might eve
n have a few hundred of them, but a military general staff exclusively made up o
f committed pacifists is obviously improbable. Only those who exercise the speci
fic functions which capitalist society requires with minimum efficiency can reac
h top positions. Only those who conform long-term to the prevailing laws, rules
of the game and ruling ideology which the social order expresses and secures, ca
n make a successful career in the system.
The weakest point of all reformist and neo-reformist conceptions of the democrat
ic state (including the Eurocommunists [15]) consists in not understanding this
specific character of the capitalist state apparatus, inextricably bound up with
capitalist society. As an extreme hypothesis, the possibility cannot be ruled o
ut that an absolute majority in a normal parliament could somewhere vote to abol
ish private ownership of the means of production. But what can be safely ruled o
ut is that the local Pinochets would not regard it as violation of the constituti
on , contempt for basic human rights or a terrorist attack on Christian civilization .
They will promptly react like Pinochet, among other things with mass murder of p
olitical opponents, mass torture and concentration camps. [16] In so doing, they
would of course take care to draw attention away from the abolition of all demo
cratic freedoms. When the stakes are high, the eternal values of capitalist soci
ety turn out to be limited to private ownership, and the necessity to defend it
legitimates every violation of even a merely formal popular sovereignty, every k
ind of violence and even declaration of war on one s own countrymen (in the course

of history, the Thiers, Francos and Pinochets have proved this in a purely forma
l way). In this sense, it is pure utopia to try not only to use the capitalist st
ate apparatus to abolish capitalism, but also to think this apparatus could some
how be neutralized instead of needing to be replaced by a radically different st
ate apparatus, so that the economic and political power of capital can be abolis
hed.
And finally, the management of ongoing state affairs should not be confused with
the wielding of political power at the highest level. If in an enterprise vario
us functions are delegated to specialist managers, this does not mean that the b
oard of directors and the shareholders lose their power of command over the asse
ts and the workers. In the same way, just because the haute bourgeoisie leaves t
he day-to-day tasks of governing to professional politicians or key public serva
nts, this does not mean that big business also leaves the most important strateg
ic and political decisions to them. If we scrutinize some of the crucial decisio
ns taken in the 20th century
such as for example the decision to appoint Hitler
as imperial chancellor, the approval of the popular front government in France (
almost at the same time as the approval of the Mola-Franco putsch against the Sp
anish popular front government); the green light for the start of World War 2 in
Germany and Britain; the decision to orient the USA towards participation in th
e war; the decision of the USA and Britain to ally with the Soviet Union and lat
er to break that alliance; the decision by the Western powers to reconstruct the
economic power of Germany and Japan after World War 2
then we find that these d
ecisions were taken not in parliaments or in ministerial offices or by technocra
ts but directly by the captains of industry themselves. When the very survival o
f capitalism is at stake, then the big capitalists suddenly govern in the most l
iteral sense of the word. At that point, every semblance of autonomy of the capita
list state vis--vis business disappears completely.
Engels s maxim that the capitalist state is the
real-total capitalist can only be an aggregation
ny capitals , must be understood and interpreted
t is a question of applying the dialectic of the

ideal-total capitalist, because the

of the sectional interests of ma
dialectically. [17] Here again, i
general and the particular.

Top of the page

Notes
1. A review of the discussion can be found in Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (
Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982)
2. For a brief discussion of the theory of state monopoly capitalism, see Gerd H
ardach, Dieter Karras and Ben Fine, A short history of socialist economic though
t (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), pp. 63-68. See also Ernest Mandel, Late Capital
ism (London: Verso, 1981), pp.515-522. On the concept of the national democratic
state, see Michael Lowy, The politics of uneven and combined development (Londo
n: Verso, 1981), pp.196-198 and Henri Valin [pseudo. Ernest Mandel], Le neo-colo
nialisme et les Etats de democratie nationale, in Quatrime Internationale, vol.26
no.23, April 1968, pp.43-49.
3. Valorisation of capital (Kapitalverwertung) refers to the process whereby cap
ital increases its value through production. In Marx s theory, capitalist producti
on is viewed as the unity of a labour-process creating use-values and a valoriza
tion process creating additional capital value (surplus-value). The newly valori
zed capital must however be realized through sales of output before it can be ap
propriated and thus effectively accumulated. Many English translations render Ka
pitalverwertung as self-expansion of capital or realization of capital but this is r
eally misleading because capital cannot self-expand without exploitation of living

labour nor does it realize itself through market-sales automatically. The same pr
oblem arises with Entwertung (devalorisation, i.e. the loss of capital value) wh
ich is often translated as devaluation .
4. Reification (Verdinglichung, thingification) was a term coined by Destutt de
Tracy but in Marx s sense refers both to the process whereby human attributes and
relations are transformed into attributes of or relations between things, and fo
rms of consciousness resulting from this transformation. The outcome is typicall
y distorted, one-sided or false views of reality. Marx sees the cause of reifica
tion objectively in the mediation of social relations by market transactions, an
d subjectively in uncritical, dehistoricized thinking patterns.
5. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), in Early Writings, Penguin edition,
p.230
6. See Goran Therborn, The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy, New Left R
eview 103 (1977), pp.3-41.
7. Frederick Engels, Anti-Dhring (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), p. 340.
8. Elmar Alvater, Zu einigen Problemen des Staatsinterventionismus. See Ernest M
andel, Late Capitalism, pp.479-480
9. See Karl Marx, Capital Volume 2.
10. Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Penguin edition), pp.530-531 etc.
11. See Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, pp.508-511.
12. Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Collected Works, vol.25, p.424f.
13. Bureaucracy in the sense of a social stratum of functionaries.
14. See Lenin, op. cit., and Marx s writings on the Paris Commune.
15. See Ernest Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism (London: NLB, 1978).
16. See e.g. Les Evans (ed.), Disaster in Chile (New York: Pathfinder Press, 197
4).
17. In Anti-Dhring, Engels states that the modern state is only the organization t
hat bourgeois society takes on in order to support the general external conditio
ns of the capitalist mode of production against encroachments as well of the wor
kers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is
essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal perso
nification of the total national capitalist (op. cit., p.338).
Translator s Note
1*. I made a translation of this article by Mandel in the 1980s and edited it fo
r readability
it originally appeared in Marxismus und Anthropologie (Bochum: Ger
minal, 1980) which was a volume of essays in honour of Leo Kofler, but I based m
y translation on a subsequent Flemish version appearing in Toestanden (Antwerp),
vol.1 no.3, August 1981, adding a few notes. It might be of interest to a few r
eaders, though possibly a bit dated nowadays.
JB

Ernest Mandel
China: The Economic Crisis
(January 1981/January 1982)
Ever since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the different factions
and coalitions of factions that have succeeded each other at the head of the Ch
inese Communist Party (CCP) and governments have faced a series of strategic pro
blems rooted in the country s backwardness. They include:
How to feed a population that grows by between ten and fifteen million people a
year, when China s traditional agriculture is already among the most productive in

the world and it will not be possible for a long time yet to resolve the proble
m through a radical modernisation. Related to this question is the attitude towa
rds population growth as such: should one favour it (as Mao did), oppose it by c
rude material disincentives or repression (as Deng does) or adopt some third roa
d?
How to reduce the enonnous extent of rural underemployment and urban unemploymen
t caused by demographic growth and the inevitable rural exodus.
How to divide national income between consumption and accumulation, and the accu
mulation fund between agriculture, heavy industry and light industry; and how to
deal with the consequence of these decisions for feeding the population, provid
ing employment and stimulating productivity.
How to organise planning and management and to gauge the implications of the tec
hniques chosen for the rate of growth, the satisfaction of basic food needs, and
the degree of social equality and social tension; as well as the repercussions
of these implications on the relative efficiency of planning itself.
How, and at what pace, to industrialise and modernise China, for whatever the id
ealists may say to the contrary, modernisation cannot go without industrialisati
on. This modernisation is indispensable not only for national defence, but also
for satisfying the population s most basic needs, including literacy, universal me
dical care and the raising of the general cultural level. [1]
What position to take up in relation to the world market that avoids autarchy on
the one hand and total integration on the other, since total integration would
mean that China s forms of development would be determined by the logic of capital
ist profit and imperialist super-profit.
To be schematic and overly simple, one might sum up the choices as follows. Gros
so modo the Chinese peasant family produces one ton of cereal per work-year. How
much of this ton of rice or wheat should it keep for its own consumption (which
presently fluctuates between 300 and 350 kg per year) or for that of the villag
e as a whole? What proportion of it should stay in the village for agricultural
accumulation? If this proportion is changed, relatively or absolutely, what effe
ct will that change have on the productivity of agricultural labour, on the rate
of growth of agricultural production and on the peasantry s degree of tolerance f
or the regime?
How much of this ton of rice should go to the cities to feed workers and bureauc
rats, or to be exchanged for foreign capital goods? What would be the implicatio
ns of the decision made here for the rate of industrial growth, the pace of indu
strialisation, the productivity of industrial labour and the lowering of unemplo
yment? In what form should the agricultural surplus be extracted &om the village
? By forced levy? By manipulating market price mechanisms? And what would be the
consequences of the method of extraction for the satisfaction of basic food nee
ds and the degree of inequality within the peasantry itself?
Changes in Economic Policy since 1949
After 1949 the CCP leaders at first committed themselves to a Sovietstyle policy
, although they behaved much more cautiously than the Soviet bureaucracy towards
the peasantry. But it soon became clear that China was too underdeveloped to fo
llow Stalin s path to industrialisation. In ten to fifteen years some 200 million
young people could be expected to leave the villages for the cities. To give eac
h a job would cost at least $2,000 in investment (at 1955-65 prices). This would
have meant investing $400 billion in industry. But such an amount was clearly b
eyond the purse of an economy whose annual national revenue was calculated at on
ly $50 billion in 1957. [2] Moreover since traditional Chinese agriculture is al
ready highly productive, to increase that productivity so that it was capable of
feeding 200 to 300 million more individuals would be impossible without massive
mechanisation. Already the marginal productivity of Chinese agriculture is fall
ing disastrously because the Chinese peasant (who throughout large parts of the
country is better described as a gardener than a farmer) can no longer increase

output without huge amounts of new investment in chemical fertilisers. [3] It is

hard to imagine a more vicious circle. There could be no big increase in indust
rial production unless there were one too in agricultural output. But agricultur
al output would only rise quickly if investment in it were greatly increased, wh
ich required a big increase in industrial output. Clearly a change of course was
necessary. And so one after the other the following economic policies were adop
ted.
During the Great Leap Forward of 1958-62 the focus was on labourinvestment , i.e. m
obilising the peasantry s underemployed labour on projects designed to raise agric
ultural production (including irrigation works, backyard blast furnaces and work
shops to produce simple agricultural tools). The original idea was not wrong. Bu
t it soon became coupled with an excessive extraction of agricultural surplus an
d even of the agricultural necessary product by the state, and with bureaucratic
methods of leadership. The peasants became dissatisfied, and output dropped dis
astrously.
In 1962-66, during the period of rectification and cautious modernisation under Li
u Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, the centralisation of agricultural labour in giant c
ommunes was abandoned. Brigades incorporating several villages and even work tea
ms (incorporating one village) became the basic units of production. The commune
s retained only a few of their functions. Peasants were allowed to dispose of a
limited part of their farming surplus on the free market. Plans were laid for th
e modernisation of some branches of industry. At the same time, China embarked o
n a policy of autarchy as a result of the simultaneous Soviet and Western blocka
des.
In 1966-71, during the Cultural Revolution, the private sector was hard hit but
it was not completely abolished (especially not in the countryside). During this
period the strategy of labour-investment was followed in industry as well as in a
griculture, particularly in the oil industry, which made its first important adv
ances thanks to the extensive application of labour (the Daqing experiment). Aut
archy was stressed more than ever before or since, and modernisation stopped. Th
ere was probably even some disinvestment.
In the period 1971-76 Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping succeeded in putting an end t
o autarchy by making overtures to Japan and the West. China began once more to i
mport modern technology, although these imports were still only on a limited sca
le. A free market for the agrarian surplus, which was left in the hands of the p
easants, was partially reestablished. But this new course , which oscillated betwee
n the policies of the Cultural Revolution and those of the period 1962-66, was c
onstantly challenged, and it scored no striking successes.
After Mao s death in 1976 the Deng Xiaoping leadership committed itself more whole
heartedly to the Four Modernisations and speeded up China s reintegration into the
world market, the search for capitalist credits, the dismantling of the People s
Communes, and the full rehabilitation of material incentives. But the very magni
tude of the turn threw the economy off balance again in 1979. A new adjustment b
ecame necessary.
For nearly two decades workers wages and real income had stayed practically froze
n, and the communes surplus labour was hired out to industrial enterprises at wages
well below the official rates. When these coolies of Mao demonstrated against the
ir conditions during the Cultural Revolution, they were accused of economism by th
e extremist Maoist faction and harshly repressed.
Bureaucratic privileges were slightly reduced during the Cultural Revolution: an
d the technocratic layer lost out to the political cadres and the military. But
despite Mao s promises and the Red Guards demands, there was no workers power in the
factories, let alone in the country as a whole. After 1968 the more militant la

yers of youth and workers were harshly repressed by the Gang of Four , which explai
ns why the Maoist leaders got no mass support when they were finally removed fro
m power. [4] Since 1976, workers have had their wages raised and their condition
s improved. Between 1978 and 1980, around 60 per cent of urban wageearners were
said to have received a modest increase of 10-15 per cent. But at the same time
the power of the technocratic wing of the bureaucracy has grown rapidly. Social
inequality has widened, so that wealth and poverty mingle in the cities more tha
n at any time since the early 1950s.
The Four Modernisations
The decision to strive towards the Four Modernisations was taken above all becau
se the Chinese leaders came to see that China could never be transformed into a
modern great power before the century was up if they continued with their policy
of relying mainly on labour investment . Such a policy would have brought social t
ensions to the point of explosion. To freeze (or, even worse, cut) living standa
rds over the next quarter century would raise neither industrial nor agricultura
l output. It would also have made it impossible to integrate the mass of unemplo
yed (in the cities) and the underemployed (in the villages) into modern industry
in the foreseeable future.
And so a more pragmatic strategy was developed. This strategy foresaw combining
accelerated development of modern industry through applying foreign aid with the
development of the private or the cooperative sector, which despite its low pro
ductivity would at least absorb some workless. So this is not a return to the St
alinist model: for Deng s economic policies have no more in common with Stalin s lin
e than did Mao s in their time. If Deng s policy has any precedent at all, it is rat
her in Tito s Yugoslavia (but without the workers self-management) or better still
in the Hungarian reforms . Rehabilitating the market economy and material incentive
s is the foundation of Deng s strategy (or rather, of the strategy of Hu Qiaomu, Z
hao Ziyang and Chen Yun, who are the reform s true initiators).
According to the new strategy, it is the market that will connect the various ec
onomic sectors: the leading industries from which modernisation of the country s ent
ire infrastructure is to proceed; the export industries , i.e. plainly oil, coal an
d textiles, but also many industries competing with Hong Kong and Taiwan; agricu
lture (which is to be stimulated by increased supplies of chemical fertiliser [5
]); industrial consumer goods; and the rapidly expanding private and cooperative
sector.
China s new prime minister, Zhao Ziyang, had already tested this new strategy exte
nsively in the country s most populous province, Sichuan, which he administered fr
om 1975 to 1979. In Sichuan he dismantled the People s Communes more vigorously th
an anywhere else in China. The peasant family (rather than the brigade or produc
tion team) was made responsible for achieving production goals, and got the three
freedoms : bigger private plots; a bigger free market on which to dispose of it
s surpluses; and the chance to form private non-agricultural enterprises (mainly
in handicrafts and commerce). According to the Neue Zrcher Zeitung (5 December 1
980) private activity today procures on average 40 yuan per year per peasant hou
sehold, i.e. some 30 per cent of their total income, but with great differences
between rich and poor communes, villages and households.
But at the same time Zhao Ziyang returned to one of the main themes of Mao s econo
mic policy during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (although M
ao himself had more and more clearly abandoned it after 1970): the idea that rur
al industry should be developed to serve the needs of the peasants and of agricu
lture, and that this industry should be mainly financed by agricultural expansio
n (or even by labour investment in the villages). But Zhao, unlike Mao, is trying
to reach this goal by crude but effective material incentives rather than by polit

ical mobilisation, indoctrination or coercion. [6] However, the basic premiss st

ays the same (and in this sense the fundamental difference with Stalin and Khrus
hchev remains): that China s cities and her modern industry cannot absorb the labo
ur surplus of her villages, and that another way must be found.
Overheating and Skidding
After a fine start industrial output is said to have risen by 14.3 per cent in 1
977 and 13.5 per cent in 1978
the Four Modernisations soon came up against some
intrinsic obstacles.
1. Exports did not grow at the same rate as imports of modem technology. Oil ext
raction in particular has stagnated, mainly because of bad management and lack o
f modern technology. One illustration of the problems facing this industry was t
he oil-rig disaster in the Gulf of Bohai, when 72 workers died. [7] Oil exports
to Japan seem to be falling. They are expected to drop from 9 million tons in 19
81 to 8.3 million in 1982, whereas the original contract foresaw increases of 9.
5 and 15 million tons respectively. [8]
Had China maintained the pace of modernisation projected since 1975-76, she woul
d have accumulated a colossal debt on the level of Poland s or even Brazil s. The tr
ade deficit with the imperialist countries rose from $1.2 billion in 1977 to $3.
5 billion in 1978 and $4.5 billion in 1979 (although it is true that this was pa
rtly offset by a favourable balance with Hong Kong of $1.7, $2.2 and $2.6 billio
ns over the same period). The US Department of Commerce forecast in July 1980 th
at China s gross external debt of $3.5 billion in 1980 (with an annual debt servic
e of $2 billion) would grow to a minimum of $16 billion in 1985 (with an annual
debt service of $3.2 billion).
This the Chinese leaders were not prepared to accept, so they cut back heavily o
n their original plans, cancelling some of the more expensive projects and slowi
ng down the overall pace of expansion. In particular they cancelled various plan
s to import whole factories. [9] In his speech resigning as head of the governme
nt, Hua Guofeng officially announced that the 1976-85 Ten Year Plan, which had i
ncorporated the most ambitious goals of the Four Modernisations, would not be ca
rried out. [10]
2. Many modernisation projects set up since Deng returned to power have failed o
r fallen short of the desired results because of lack of qualified staff, planni
ng errors, bureaucratic negligence and workers indifference. These problems were
similar to those facing Poland under Gierek, but the comparison is hardly useful
, since China is so much larger and less developed than Poland.
Two scandals symbolised these failures: the Wuhan Steelworks, which was supposed
to produce four million tons of steel and was bought in West Germany at a high
price, was without enough electricity had been overlooked in the plan; and the B
aoshan Steelworks near Shanghai, ordered from Japan with a capacity of six milli
on tons, was assigned a construction site in the middle of quicksands. [11]
More generally, output targets in steel, oil and agricultural machinery were gre
atly scaled down. Priority was no longer to be given to steel ( cereals and steel w
ere the two axes of economic expansion under Mao); the goal of 60 million ingots
of steel by 1985 seems to have been reduced to 45 million. Also abandoned was t
he hare-brained scheme to achieve rural mechanisation in the main by 1980, which h
ad been reconfirmed as late as January 1978 and would have meant manufacturing t
he equivalent of 3.5 million units of fifteen-horsepower tractors and motorised
implements in the space of three years (as opposed to a more realistic target of
six to eight years). [12]

Coal, by contrast, will get high priority, and may make up for declining oil exp
orts to Japan, as well as cover China s energy deficit (which threatens to get wor
se in coming years). [13]
3. It was impossible to reconcile concessions to peasants in the form of increas
es in the purchase price of agricultural products and to workers in the form of
higher wages. As a result, inflationary pressures built up and there were shorta
ges of some staple goods.
In mid-1980, the rate of inflation was put at 6-7 per cent [14]; by the end of t
he year there was talk of a 15-20 per cent inflation. [15] The main cause of thi
s inflation is China s large budget deficit-her first ever since 1949. This defici
t has been put in the $10 billion range, representing 15 per cent of the entire
budget expenditure for 1979. (Other sources give the figure of $12 billion. [16]
) It was mainly to cut this deficit that austerity was introduced and investment
policy was readjusted.
4. Covert resistance to the Four Modernisations by part of the political leaders
hip especially the military
has delayed, curbed and even prevented reforms and h
as further increased the imbalances. But this resistance probably stems as much fr
om the incompetence of officials selected in the course of factional struggles a
s from genuine political disagreements.
5. There have been less joint ventures with foreign capital than was originally
expected. At first most of those capitalists who entered into joint ventures wer
e Overseas and Hong Kong Chinese. They were granted important concessions in exc
hange for participating in these schemes, including the recovery of all bank acc
ounts expropriated during the Cultural Revolution and the restitution of various
compensation payments suspended between 1966 and 1976. The new policy got off t
o a bad start when output fell instead of rising at the Jiang Sho Spinning Mill
in Guangdong Pronvince, which was the first of these joint ventures set up with
a Hong Kong and a Macao firm. [17] By late 1980, only thirteen of the 800 joint
venture projects submitted had been definitively approved and were operational.
[18] To make up for lost income the Deng regime has even begun to export cheap l
abour [19], but here too the results have.been meagre, at least up to now.
To summarise, one could say that Deng s modernisers have committed the same sin as
Mao and his supporters: that of immoderation. They have set out to do too much
too fast, even though the means they used were different from those used by the
Maoists. [20] Of course, this was hardly a coincidence. When the same mistakes a
re made so frequently, it is not enough to put them down to the innate defects o
f the bureaucracy alone. One should seek their roots also in objective problems.
For a poor, backward country like China to feed, house and provide even a minim
al level of welfare for one billion human beings is a colossal task that will ne
ed a Herculean effort to resolve.
Any government in power in Beijing that does not serve the interests of a posses
sing class subordinated to foreign interests would face the same drama. Its hist
orical villains are not the Chinese Communist leaders, but the foreign imperiali
sts who plundered China, dismantled her economy and mired her in underdevelopmen
t; Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, who did their best to subordinate the Chines
e Revolution to their own state interests; and the leaders of the American, Euro
pean and Japanese workers, who refused to lessen the colossal weight of China s un
derdevelopment by broad, generous and disinterested aid. World revolution will m
ake up for these shortcomings. But in the meantime, while we wait and fight for
its victory, those billion mouths must be fed. Here and nowhere else lies the ma
in source of the twists and turns of the CCP s economic policy since 1949.
Social Tensions

Alongside problems connected with the modernisation drive, important social tens
ions have appeared at all levels of Chinese society. These tensions are not new.
They also plagued earlier phases of China s economic development. But economic lib
eralisation unquestionably sharpened them, while the limited democratisation of 197
8-79 and the growing scepticism of workers and youth towards all factions of the
Party allowed them to be displayed more openly. Among these social tensions we
should note the following.
1. The rise of youth unemployment in the cities. Youth unemployment was already
an important factor in the emergence of the Red Guard movement. It was resolved
in a particularly cruel way when Lin Biao and the Gang of Four liquidated the Cult
ural Revolution and deported huge numbers of these youth to the countryside. Eve
n though ideological indoctrination at first softened the impact on some of the
victims, most soon changed their minds, especially when they saw that the peasan
ts welcome was less than lukewarm (for the one thing that Chinese agriculture nee
ds least is more labour).
As a result, great masses of young people returned illegally to the cities, wher
e they started a crime wave. They had to live mainly by their wits, since they h
ad neither residence permits nor work permits. It seems likely that the terroris
t incident at Beijing Railway Station on 29 October 1980 was the work of a young
desperado of this type. [21] The authorities response to the youth troubles was
surprisingly mild. This is because the Deng faction does not (as yet) want to be
associated with the massive deportation of youth in the years 1968-70. [22]
In September 1978, 50,000 young people working on state farms in Yunnan went on
strike, and in December thousands of unemployed youth staged demonstrations in S
hanghai. In early 1979 some youths rioted in Shanghai, blocking rail traEc for t
welve hours. Two ringleaders went to prison for nine and five years. [23]
It is therefore obvious why the Chinese leaders are concerned about the problem
of youth unemployment, and cautious in how they treat it. The size of the proble
m is staggering. Some twenty million young people are thought to have been depor
ted to the countryside in the late sixties and early seventies. Of the twelve mi
llion urban young people who left school in 1979 and were looking for jobs, only
seven million got them. [24]
The Chinese leaders have tried to bring down this unemployment in two ways that
combine typical features of the Deng approach. One way is to use material incent
ives and the free market to channel rhe problem out of the public sector. Young
people are now allowed to set up small retail businesses and workshops, or to en
ter the repair trade. China is experiencing a rapid expansion of the service sect
or , as have many underdeveloped capitalist economies. Of course the authorities t
end to favour cooperative enterprises, but even private initiatives are tolerate
d.
Another way is by encouraging resettlement in the countryside, although the coer
cion used under Mao has been replaced here too by a system of material incentive
s. One million young people are reported to have organised 30,000 collective far
ms where they can earn twice what they would in a People s Commune and almost as m
uch as in the cities. [25]
2. Increased differentiation in the countryside. The gradual dismantling of the
People s Communes and the key role that the market is increasingly playing in the
rural economy can only accentuate social differentiation in the countryside. As
in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, the difference between rich and poor
areas (communes and brigades) and even between rich and poor peasants is growin
g now that the old levelling drive (which led to a dangerous slowdown in the ris
e in food output) has been abandoned.

Zhao Ziyang s flatterers stress that Sichuan peasants now take their (private) pig
s by (private) bike, (private) motorbike or (cooperative) truck to be sold on th
e free market. The watchword is familiar: Enrich yourselves! But for how many Pe
ople s Communes, or for that matter how many Chinese peasants, is this prospect re
alistic?
I have already mentioned that according to official sources the average farmer s i
ncome is half that of the average urban worker s, which is 75 yuan a month. It is
easy to picture the poverty in which a great part of the Chinese peasantry still
languishes especially that part of it which carried the Revolution to victory t
hirty years ago. Vice-Premier Yao Yilin recognised that ten per cent of peasants
do not eat enough to still their hunger. Here too the discontent has acquired p
olitical form. In January 1979 tens of thousands of peasants demonstrated in Bei
jing under the slogan Down with famine!
The average income per peasant household is said to oscillate between 30 yuan a
year in poor communes and 400 yuan a year in rich ones (45 and 450 yuan if you a
dd that part of the grain harvest that the peasants consume.) Average income per
peasant household is estimated at around 100-120 yuan a year. One leader of the
Deng faction has even claimed that the average peasant consumed less cereals in
1978 than in 1957. [26] But this claim is not too credible, and was probably in
tended to paint the Maoist years in the worst light. The American journalist Fel
ix Butterfield reported that according to Chinese government sources, life expec
tancy in China has risen from 32 years in 1949 to 68 years in 1978. [27] Since a
verage consumption in 1957 or 1937 was below 2000 calories per day per person, a
ny further reduction in calorie intake would have ruled out a rise in life expec
tancy in a country where 80 per cent of the population still live in the country
side. The same point could be made about Nicholas Lardy s claim that per capita fo
od intake was lower throughout the years 1958-78 than it was in the 1930s. [28]
The Deng faction s policy of encouraging the free market has led to reactions that
Mao foresaw and feared: rich communes, rich brigades and even rich work teams a
re more interested in growing crops that sell well on the market than cereals to
be delivered to the state at fixed prices. As a result cereal output has stagna
ted and even dropped, while agricultural production as a whole has risen. [29] A
ccording to official sources 14.6 per cent of farm products were sold on the fre
e market in 1978. [30] The government s dilemma is cruel: either raise the price o
f the cereals it buys from the communes (which would increase the budget deficit
and quicken inflation) or return to a system of fixed quotas, i.e. severely res
trict the newly granted market freedom .
3. Growing urban inequality. This is the combined result of various factors, inc
luding salary rises for top officials; the restoration of the privileges of the n
ational patriotic bourgeoisie ; the extension of the private sector; and the massi
ve reappearance in China after thirty years absence of well-to-do foreign tourist
s, businessmen and technicians, and Overseas Chinese. Things like luxury stores,
luxury goods, luxury restaurants, the black market, prostitution and the like,
which were cut to a minimum or discretely hidden from view in the decade before
Mao s death, are now openly flaunted.
Foreign currency plays a key role in widening and consolidating social inequalit
y, just as it does in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. China now has a spraw
ling black market in Hong Kong dollars, Japanese yen and other strong currencies
, where domestic and foreign luxury goods (including illegally imported ones) ar
e up for sale. Tourists are considered one of the main supply sources for this m
arket, and the authorities now require them to exchange their currency for Chine
se special money in an effort to prevent the black market getting out of hand. But
this has merely led to a new black market in special money . [31] Like Eastern Eur
ope s foreign currency stores, this alternative money circuit has led to protests a

nd demonstrations by some Chinese. [32]

The regime is trying to make the politicians who came to power through the Cultu
ral Revolution into scapegoats for the growing inequality. Official propagandist
s have exposed amazing cases of corruption among the Gang of Four and their suppor
ters. The carruption of the Party bureaucracy under Liu Shaoqi and Deng (which w
as no less genuine) was similarly denounced during the Cultural Revolution. But
when jobless youth and low-paid workers see privilege flaunted once again and on
an even wider scale under the present regime, it must occur to them that the va
rious trials and -purges of the last few years were none too effective. The conc
lusion must be that grave social tensions are accumulating in China, and that a
Polish-style explosion is not to be ruled out in the coming years.
The New Management Model
During the second session of the Fifth People s Congress, Deng explained that fact
ory life was to be democratised in the framework of overall economic liberalisati
on . But he emphasised that democracy was to be firmly wedded to centralised leadersh
ip . Just as the Party is centralised at national and provincial levels, so should
firm management be centralised in the hands of a director. Workers would gain t
he right to elect team and workshop leaders, but not directors.
As for the various Western comments about the rehabilitation of profit and even th
e return to a market economy , they are as wrong now as they were about the Liberma
n-Trapeznikov reforms in the Soviet Union. What the debate in China is really ab
out is what criteria central authorities should use in judging an enterprise s per
formance. Should they look at gross product, total transactions (sales figures),
added value , or profit? Profit is far from becoming the autonomous motor of econo
mic development, but is simply an instrument for achieving the plan. Firms have
been granted neither the freedom to fix (or change) prices nor, where essential
products are concerned, the freedom to change the assortment they have been assi
gned to manufacture. In one sense (as Thierry Pairault rightly noted [33]), the
central institutions control over large institutions is even stronger under the n
ew management system than it was in the past. For although firms may now choose
their suppliers and contract relations are therefore established between firms,
all expenditure must now pass through the banking system, which has become as in
the Soviet Union
the main instrument through which the implementation of the pl
an can be checked. Any expenditure outside the framework of the plans for produc
ing and supplying the main products will not be authorised by the banks and is t
herefore impossible. The role of profit (apart from its use in accounting) is re
duced to that of a small material incentive , in the sense that workers get increas
ed bonuses that average out at some ten per cent of wages. (No doubt bureaucrats
will benefit more from it, but as yet there is no evidence of this.)
On the whole one gets the impression that the big changes have taken place not s
o much in large industry as in local and rural industry. During the Cultural Rev
olution when (partly for defence reasons) the idea of provincial self-sufficienc
y was pushed very strongly, it was above all small-scale local and rural industr
y that was affected by decentralisation. At the same time efforts were made to d
evelop a parallel basic industry (mainly steel, but also energy) in each provinc
e, to be managed by provincial and local authorities.
Once again, despite appearances, the change brought in by the current reform mov
es more towards centralisation than decentralisation. The idea of backyard blast
furnaces has been abandoned once and for all, as has that of provincial self-suff
iciency. The emphasis is now on the diversity of natural resources and the need
for a greater division of labour between local industries on a national scale. T
his has inevitably reduced the weight and power of local authorities in favour o
f that of managers on the one hand and central branch administration on the othe

r, although it has not meant a return to the old Stalinist system in which minis
tries in each branch controlled everything from the top. It is possible that the
se administrations will be replaced by national trusts . In the new climate the gov
ernment encourages local and provincial units to develop new resources in whatev
er ways they see fit; but these local and provincial initiatives must stay withi
n the broad framework and under the ultimate control of the central authority.
I should stress that this does not mean that the weight of the market has not gr
eatly increased under China s new management system, or that Hungarian-style reform
s did not really take place. There is no doubt that the cooperative and private s
ector, i.e. that sector of the economy outside state control, has broadened grea
tly in recent years, both in the cities and the countryside. Moreover the new se
lf-management system, which was introduced cautiously and in the most profitable
firms first, gives the managers a wider margin of manoeuvre and uses rivalry an
d competition between firms to improve productivity. But there has been no chall
enge to the general framework of top-down centralised planning or to the bureauc
ratic determination of priorities in distributing and developing national resour
ces by a small handful of top bureaucrats.
But here a problem arises that already became apparent in the Soviet Union durin
g the Liberman-Trapeznikov reforms. Although profit is in command , the firms (i.e.
the managers) are not able to influence the essential determinants of profit, i
.e. the price of raw materials and machines; the wage fund; and the sale price o
f finished products. No wonder the technocratic wing of the bureaucracy, like it
s counterparts in Hungary and Poland, would like to extend the reforms in the di
rection of granting directors the right to fire workers. (The director of a Chon
gqing steelworks that currently employs 40,000 workers would like to see his wor
kforce cut by half.) [34]
Moreover growing inflationary pressures and recent budget cut-backs have now bee
n translated into what is clearly a policy of austerity. Wages will not be raise
d by 15-20 per cent as-promised, and the whole question of bonuses will be reexa
mined in the light of the need to tighten up .
General Balance Sheet
A balance sheet of China s economic evolution since the Great Leap Forward, and ev
en more so since 1949, leads to two general conclusions.
First, it is now clearer than ever that socialist revolution in China was necess
ary and historically justified. The Chinese Revolution matches the Russian one a
s the most important and progressive event of the century. It brought about chan
ges that benefited huge numbers of human beings
this despite inordinate costs an
d sacrifices, some avoidable, others not.
Today this positive assessment of the Chinese Revolution is challenged not only
by pro-imperialists and by Moscow, but also by some anti-Maoists in the Chinese
leadership. But facts are stubborn. Contrary to a current legend, China s economic
progress over the last thirty years has easily outstripped that of India. Offic
ial statistics of the present leaders show that if China s per capita output is st
ated as 100, India s stood at 68 for cereal production, 60 for electricity, 48 for
steel and 46 for cement. [35] The area of Chinese farming land that is irrigate
d has grown from 60 million acres in 1949 to 110 million in 1980. Nothing of the
kind has happened in India.
Social conditions vary greatly from one area of China to the next, and even from
one village to the next. There is still terrible poverty in China. But that she
has progressed enormously is beyond dispute. Felix Butterfield summarised the p
rogress made as follows:

Every day, just after noon, in the office buildings of Beijing many employees ca
refully clear away their desks and unfold sleeping bags. They prepare for one of
the most important and satisfying rites of Chinese life, the long noon nap, the
xiuxi.
... An American engineer who visited an oil-prospecting platform in the South Ch
ina Sea was surprised to see that the workers stopped drilling at lunch time. Th
ey stopped all the machines and went to sleep ... The xiuxi is one of the comfor
ts brought about by the Communist revolution. It is even codified in the Constit
ution, whose Article 49 states: The labouring people has the right to rest.
Instead of the constant threats of famine, banditry and pestilent epidemics whic
h haunted the country before 1949, the Communists have created what sometimes lo
oks like a giant welfare state.
In addition to a generous rest period, there is guaranteed employment for life,
a system called the iron rice bowl . It is almost impossible for a factory to fire
a worker if he is not a thief or a murderer. Medical care and education are free
. Urban housing is heavily subsidised; the average rent is about $2.70 per month
. [36]
One might object and one would be right
that this leads to a very low level of l
abour productivity. But it was no higher under the old regime, and then it went
coupled with intolerable physical effort and unconscionable misery for the mass
of the producers.
What are the causes of China s progress? The main one is that China s labour power i
s no longer a commodity, that there is no longer a labour market in China, that
workers have job security and a guaranteed minimum wage (despite the enormous ma
ss of unemployed), and that the means of production are collectively owned (alth
ough the state that controls them is highly bureaucratised). This shows that cap
italism has not been restored in China, and that China retains an economic struc
ture comparable to that of the Soviet Union, the people s democracies , Yugoslavia, C
uba and Vietnam, which sets in motion the same long-term dynamic and similar eco
nomic problems.
Second, the enormous weight of underdevelopment has imposed rigid constraints on
China s economic development. These constraints have remained remarkably unchange
d over the last thirty years, despite violent political convulsions. Rhetoric ap
art, what strikes one about China s economic policy over the past thirty years is
not so much its change as its continuity. When it came down to fundamental choic
es, all leadership factions gave priority to developing heavy industry and syste
matically neglected light industry (see Table 1), even though light industry is
the most developed part of Chinese industry and extremely important both for sat
isfying immediate needs and for exports.
TABLE 1
Light industry s share in total investment
First Five Year Plan, 1953-57
5.9%
Second Five Year Plan, 1958-62
3.9%
Third Five Year Plan, 1966-70
4.0%
Fourth Five Year Plan, 1971-75
5.4%
1978

5.4%
1979
5.8%
(The figures for the Five Year Plans up to 1975 are from
People s Daily, 25 May 1979. The figures for 1978 are
based on reports by You Jiuli and Jiang Jingfou in
People s Daily, 29 and 30 June 1979.)
Faced with the problem of a modern industry that constantly threatened to go und
er in an ocean of archaic production, all factions maintained and tried to stren
gthen central tutelage over large-scale industrial enterprises, although the mea
ns they used to do so differed greatly. This is true not only of Deng s faction bu
t also of Mao s (although many of Mao s Western admirers blithely ignore this).
Faced with the problems of satisfying food needs and the threat of famine, all f
actions have regularly imported large amounts of cereals, ranging from 3 million
tons in 1971 to an estimated high of 10.5 millions in 1981.
TABLE 2
Economic growth, 1952-79
1952
1959
1979
Steel (millions of tons)
2.3
13.3
35
Coal
66.5
347.8
635
Crude oil
0.4
5.5
106
Cement
2.9
6.0
73.9
Chemical fertilisers
0.2
2.0
53.5
Cotton thread (millions of bales)
3.5
8.2
14.7
Bicycles (units)
80,000
?
10.1 million
Radios
?
13.8 million
Watches
?
17.1 million
Electricity (billions of kWh)

7.3
41.5
282
Cereals (millions of tons)
164
185-200
332
Cotton
1.3
2.4
2.2
Sugar
0.45
1.1
2.5
Pigs (millions at year s end)
90
140
319
(The figures for 1952 and 1979 are from Chinese official sources. The figures fo
r 1959 are
from Jacques Guillermaz, Le Parti Communiste Chinois au Pouvoir, Payot, 1972.)
But it would be wrong to assume that this basic continuity is an automatic resul
t of the constraints of underdevelopment. The only inevitable outcome of these c
onstraints is that the choice range is narrowed. No economic policy could give o
ne billion Chinese a level of consumption and culture comparable to that of indu
strialised or even semi-industrialised countries. But precisely because the rang
e is narrow, the consequences of bureaucratic management and planning, wrong pol
icies, bad investments, wasted resources and the smothering of mass initiative h
ave been far worse in China than they would have been in more developed countrie
s. The crisis of the Chinese economy is a crisis of its bureaucratic management
and not of its socialised nature, and in this sense China is basically no differ
ent from the Soviet Union and Poland. It is a crisis of the underproduction of u
se-values, not a crisis of the over-production of exchange-values as in the capi
talist countries. It is a crisis of the under-utilisation of resources (material
and human), not a crisis of the over-accumulation of capital.
The Chinese case confirms that socialist democracy is not a luxury for rich count
ries . It is not an ideal that can only be achieved after the final elimination of
imperialism, but that in the meantime must be subordinated to the imperatives o
f Realpolitik. Socialist democracy is a material, immediate requirement in all t
he workers states, the indispensable condition for a minimally rational use of ma
terial and human resources, the only framework that can permit a minimally harmo
nious planning, and the only means to cut waste, incompetence and fraud in the m
anagement of the collectivised means of production to a minimally acceptable lev
el. Without socialist democracy how can one know the true needs and priorities o
f consumers? And how can one know the true productive capacity of enterprises an
d check that it is efficiently used? It is impossible to plan effectively as lon
g as bureaucrats have a material interest in hiding some of their firms resources
. The whole of economic life becomes opaque. In this sense China s main dilemma, a
s a country that is far less developed than the Soviet-bloc countries and Yugosl
avia and where the proletariat is far less developed and skilled, is that social
ist democracy is much more difficult to realise. But by the same token socialist
democracy is all the more necessary. It is precisely because China lacks many o
f the safety valves of other countries that the absence of this democracy impose
s such serious imbalances on the economy and such intolerable sacrifices on prod
ucers. Luckily, one can expect growing numbers of workers, young rebels and crit
ical Communists in People s China to draw the necessary conclusions. A sign of the
times is that China s unofiicial democratic movement has made The Fifth Modernisat
ion its watchword: democracy, upon which depends the realisation of the other fou

r modernisations, the scientific and the economic.

15 January 1981
Post Scriptum
Throughout 1981 the general trend of the CCP s economic policies continued to cent
re on readjustment, retrenchment and austerity. Economic growth seems to have fa
llen to 2 per cent; total industrial output rose by only 0.8 per cent in the fir
st semester, as against the 2.7 per cent planned. Inflation remained rampant, it
s main source being the cumulative budget deficits of 1979, 1980 and 1981. But t
he budget deficit was cut from 20.6 billion yuan in 1979 to 13 billion in 1980 a
nd an estimated 3 billion in 1981. These budget deficits in their turn originate
from an explosion of capital construction outlays, triggered off by the Four Mo
dernisations. These reached 48 billion yuan in 1978, 51.5 billion in 1979 and 53
.9 billion in 1980. It is true that central budget capital expenditures were cut
in 1980 and in the first half of 1981 were even cut by 22 per cent compared wit
h the first semester of 1980. But these cuts were more than offset by a huge ris
e in local investment of 25 per cent in 1979, and a significant new rise above t
arget in 1980. The target for 1981 is to reduce capital construction outlays by
a full 45 per cent, from 54 to 30 billion yuan (Far Eastern Economic Review, 25
September 1981).
Currency in circulation rose 26.3 per cent in 1979, and again 29.2 per cent in 1
980. In 1981 inflation fell markedly and part of the excess liquidity was mopped
up the sale of government bonds to enterprises. But industrial profits, which p
rovide a large part of the state budget s revenues, were down 12 per cent ori 1980
in the first half of 1981 (Financial Times, 30 September 1981). In spite of ret
renchment, negotiated with Japan for large loans and joint ventures were apparentl
y restarted.
Foreign trade continues to grow. Exports grew by 28.7 per cent in 1980 and by 15
per cent in the first half of 1981 (FEER, 25 September 1981). China s main export
s continued to go to Hong Kong, Japan and the EEC, while its main imports came f
rom Japan, the USA (especially grain) and the EEC. China is now a member of the
International Monetary Fund and has extensively used Special Drawing Rights to c
over conjunctural deficits in her balance of payments.
A main development in 1981 was the loosening of the right to work
to the International Herald Tribune of 4 September 1981,

rule. According

For several months China s leaders have been experimenting quietly in dozens of fa
ctories with notions that workers who do not work should be subjected to pay cut
s and, if that fails, be dismissed. These ideas were put forward last week in a
front-page article in the People s Daily, which leaders often use to signal policy
changes. The newspaper reported that since April (1981) 30 factories in Shangha
i have been experimenting with forms of labour discipline in which unproductive wo
rkers receive a range of warnings, demerits and pay cuts eventually leading to d
ismissal.
As a result of retrenchment, thousands of factories have been idled or shut down
, and urban unemployment is currently estimated at a minimum of ten million. (Of
ficially unemployment is said to have grown from five million in 1980 to seven m
illion at the end of 1981.) So the threat of dismissal now hangs over the heads
of 100 million wage-earners in China.
But the Chinese leaders are acting cautiously here, fearful of Polishtype developm
ents. In scattered but recurrent slowdowns, demonstrations and strikes, industri
al workers are protesting against low pay, poor working conditions and lay-offs.
Dissident journals report continuing efforts to form independent trade unions.

The Chinese bureaucracy s flirtation with Yugoslav-type self-management has been q

uietly abandoned and replaced by purely advisory workers congresses , which now func
tion in 120,000 of China s 400,000 industrial enterprises. But only a quarter of t
hese congresses are said to function in a satisfactory way:
The trade unions, now under Party instructions to represent the workers more eff
ectively, complain that they are frequently frustrated by government officials w
ho side with enterprise managers. The production-at-any-cost-mentality still blin
ds many leading cadres to the real dangers in worker resentment , a union leader t
old a Peking conference ... Chinese officials appear to have dealt successfully
with most of last year s protests through conciliation. These involved coalminers,
tool-and-die makers and chemical industry workers who have demanded unions inde
pendent of the Party and the government. Young steelworkers in Taiyuan west of P
eking have demonstrated for better living conditions. Other actions involved a t
wo-day strike at the large Anshan steelworks in northeast China ..., another two
-day strike at a Shanghai glass works and half a dozen reported protests over la
y-offs when old plants were shut. The latest reported strike was by workers of a
n electrical transformer plant in the southweatern Chinese city of Kunming to pr
otest the plant management s allocation of new apartments to the director, Party s
ecretary, trade union leader and their friends, instead of the workers forwhom t
hey were built (International Herald Tribune, 30 October 1981.)
For this same reason the Deng faction seems to have changed its position on Pola
nd, giving de facto support to Jaruzelski s counter-revolutionary coup.
The other main economic development concerns the broadening of the private secto
r in agriculture, the service sector and retail trade. This broadening is linked
to the problem of unemployment. A joint decision of the Party s Central Committee
and the State Council on 23 November 1981 explains that increases in employment
are more likely to be found in the retail trade, and over the past three years
are said in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou to have come from private businesses
and urban cooperatives.
The decision authorises private businessmen to hire up to seven wageearners rath
er than the two previously permitted. The Dazhalan Multi-Service Centre in Beiji
ng is said to employ 223 workers, to have a gross turnover of $780,000 a month a
nd to make thirteen per cent profits (US News and World Report, 23 March 1981).
Some private businessmen make profits as high as ten times the average industria
l worker s wage.
In agriculture, private land has been extended from seven to fifteen per cent of
the cultivated surface (Le Monde, 17 November 1981). In 40 per cent of China s vi
llages the Commune work-points system has been abolished and replaced by a famil
y contract system, enabling the peasants to sell their surplus on the country s 40
,000 free markets (People s Daily, 5 November 1981 and Time, 16 November 1981). He
re again, the main pressure is hidden rural unemployment, estimated at 50 per ce
nt of the 300 million agricultural producers.
Some rich farmers could make as much as $6,000 a year (nearly 10,000 yuan); in S
handong Province, 2,000 families were able to buy private tractors (Newsweek, 19
October 1981). This now poses a further problem: the need for a flow of industr
ial consumer goods into the countryside, without which material incentives for t
he peasants will not work, even in the medium term.
At the end of 1981, prime minister Zhao Ziyang predicted four per cent economic
growth in 1982; while the finance minister spoke of a budget deficit of around t
hree billion yuan for the same year. The goal is to quadruple the country s gross
output by 1999 (Neue Zrcher Zeitung, 2 December 1981).

All these developments clearly explain why the Deng faction put a rapid damper o
n the modest political liberalisation of the previous years, and has again embarke
d on a course of sharpening repression.
10 January 1982
Top of the page
Notes
1. Sixty per cent of school-age children cannot attend school; twenty per cent o
f primary school graduates cannot enter lower middle school; half of those who g
raduate from lower middle school cannot enter upper middle school; and only five
per cent of those qualified to do so can enter university (People s Daily, 11 Aug
ust 1979).
2. Jacques Guillermaz, Le Parti Communiste Chinois au Pouvoir, Payot, 1972, p.19
8.
3. In the famous Dazhai model brigade the immense earthworks undertaken by thous
ands of peasants between 1970 and 1974 only extended the area of land sown with
wheat by 3 hectares and the average yield by one per cent (Pierre Pan, Aprs Mao: L
es Managers, Fayolle, 1977, p.113). It has (almost) been forgotten that one of t
he first charges against the Gang of Four was that they had sabotaged Dazhai . Hua Gu
ofeng (following Mao) was a great propagandist of the Dazhai model, whose achiev
ements are now said to have been falsified. We leave aside the question of thev
very real ecological risks of applying massive amounts of chemical fertilisers t
o irrigated areas.
4. Around 1975-76, the average monthly industrial wage was about 30 yuan (36 yua
n in the Guangzhou Paperworks). The most skilled workers earn 120 yuan, the high
est-paid technicians and engineers 200 yuan, a few economic executives and polit
ical leaders 300 yuan (to which one should add important benefits in kind) and t
alented artists 400 yuan (Pan, op. cit., p.53). These figures had stayed unchange
d for ten years.
5. Importing factories and petro-chemical technology was aimed at rapidly develo
ping the production of chemical fertiliser, which was to rise from 8.7 million t
ons in 1965 to 28 million in 1975 and 53 million in 1979 (Thierry Parault, Les P
olitiques Economiques Chinoises, Notes et tudes Documentaires, La Documentation F
ranaise, 1980, pp.100 and 173). At the same time the imgated surface grew from 16
million hectares in 1949 to 35 million hectares in 1957 and 45 million in 1977.
6. The Western press gave wide coverage to the Sichuan pilot scheme . (e.g. Far Eas
tern Economic Review (hereafter FEER) 21 November 1980). Christian Science Monit
or of 13 October 1980 reports how the Sichuan press discussed the case of the ric
h peasant Luo who, having saved 1000 yuan and got a bank loan of 300 yuan, bought
a two-and-a-half ton truck which he then rented to his commune for 400 yuan a m
onth.
7. FEER, 10 October 1980.
8. FEER, 26 September 1980.
9. See especially Neue Zrcher Zeitung, 7 November 1980; Financial Times (hereafte
r FT), 4 December 1980; and Le Monde, 10 January 1981.
10. FEER, 12 September 1980.
11. Parault, pp.84 and 86.
12. Ibid., p.112.
13. Christian Science Monitor, 21 April 1980; and FT, 17 September 1980.
14. FEER, 6 June and 26 September 1980; and Business Week, 19 January 1981.
15. Le Monde, 17 December 1980.
16. The Times, 29 September 1980.
17. FT, 10 October 1980; Business Week, 19 January 1981.
18. FT, 26 November 1980.
19. Those sent abroad are mainly building workers, 1200 of whom were recruited b

y two Japanese companies working in Iraq (Business Week, 28 Janaury 1980). Accor
ding to Newsweek, 14 September 1980, the Chinese government reportedly committed
itself to 40 contracts to provide labour in exchange for $100 million in wages.
20. Pairault, p.75, makes an interesting historical review of the origins of the
concept of the Four Modernisations. It was first used by Liu Shaoqi at the Eigh
th Congress (1956). and then by Mao in his 1957 speech on contradictions (when c
ulture took the place of technology). One has the impression of an alternation o
f feverish spurts and readjustments: the Great Leap Forward, then the readjustme
nt of 1962-65; the Cultural Revolution, then the readjustment of 1971-74; the Fo
ur Modernisations (with overinvestment and overheating), then the readjustment o
f 1979-81 (or even 1979-82).
21. Libration, 14 November 1980, reports the bomb attack in detail.
22. Two books describe the poverty, bitterness, revolt and disarray of Chinese y
outh: Avoir vingt ans en Chine la campagne, Le Seuil, 1978; and Le printemps de
Pkin, Archives Gallimard, 1980.
23. Keesing s Contemporary Archives, p.30,491.
24. Ibid., p.30,941-2.
25. New China News Agency, 2 November 1979.
26. Jingji yanjiu, No.12, 1979, quoted in Pairault, p.97; Neue Ziircher Zeitung,
5 December 1980.
27. New York Times, 1 Janury 1981.
28. New York Times Magazine, 28 December 1980.
29. Between 1977 and 1979 cereal production only rose by an average of 8.5 per c
ent a year, while oil-seed rose by 16.5 per cent, sugar-cane by 10.5 per cent an
d sugar-beet by 12.5 per cent. Grain production is said to have stagnated or eve
n fallen in 1980.
30. FT, 1 October 1980.
31. The Guardian, 9 October 1980.
32. AFP (2 January 1981) reports that the Chinese press denounced the black mark
et dealing on the train between Guangzhou and Beijing (Guangzhou being the trans
it-point for Hong Kong). Fifty per cent of travellers are said to board the trai
n for the sole purpose of illegal trading. Between January and September 1980, 4
10 cases of precious coins, gold and silver jewellery and gold bars were reporte
dly seized by police.
33. Pairault, fn 11.
34. FEER, 21 November 1980.
35. Pairault, pp.13-16.
36. The New York Times, 1 January 1981.

Ernest Mandel
The Role of the Proletariat
(1982)
Marx carried out a revolutionary transformation of all social sciences. He revol
utionized conventional approaches to philosophy, society, history, political eco
nomy, politics and the prospects of human emancipation. These transformations ca
n be subsumed under the general formula of the theory of historical materialism . K
ey to this theory, argues Ernest Mandel, is the centrality of the revolutionary
potential of the working class.
Marx viewed history as determined by objective laws which science could uncover.
These laws derive from the specific structure and dynamics of each particular m
ode of production. These objective laws have to be discovered for each particula

r society. Marx simultaneously stressed the social determination of history as a

science and the historical determination of sociology (and economics) as a scie
nce. There are no eternal economic laws. There are only particular economic laws f
or particular forms of social organization of the economy.
But while endeavouring to discover the laws of motion of each particular mode of
production, concentrating on the laws of motion of bourgeois society dominated
by the capitalist mode of production, Marx rejected the mechanically determinist
ic view of history, characteristic for the French materialists of the 18th centu
ry (later to be largely recuperated by the vulgar evolutionism which influenced
socialist thinkers like Kautsky).
Marx stressed the active aspect in history, so typical for human versus purely a
nimal behaviour (this stress can be found not only in the Theses on Feuerbach, b
ut also in Vol. I of Capital, not to speak about the Grundrisse and various phil
osophical and historical comments by Marx and Engels). Marx s philosophy of histor
y like his philosophy in general
is a philosophy of praxis. Historical materiali
sm does not deny that humanity makes its own history, which is not imposed upon
it through mysterious outside forces. To be sure, men and women don t make it inde
pendently from the circumstances they encounter, in the first place the material
possibilities given by the existing and potential level of development of the p
roductive forces, and the resulting possibilities for the extension of enjoyment
, and the self-realisation of the producers.
But they do make their history themselves. Their level of consciousness and awar
eness of their own conditions and future, their degree of objective (scientific)
approach to reality, the degree of self-delusion they still suffer, all strongl
y react upon the way in which they will shape their own destiny. Marx believed i
n the possibility of humankind to do just that to shape its own destiny, not onl
y through understanding the objective laws of motion of society, but also throug
h its capacity to actively attain emancipatory goals. Through Marx s writing, ther
e remains the emancipatory purpose: to abolish all social conditions which make
men and women into oppressed, exploited, mutilated, miserable beings; to realize
a society in which the free development of each becomes a precondition for the
free development of every individual.
Thus, Marx was not only a social scientist. He did not limit himself to revoluti
onizing the sciences of society, history, economics, and philosophy. He also rev
olutionized politics and the drive towards human emancipation ( socialism ), which a
re much older than bourgeois society, in fact, as old as class society itself. W
hile it is necessary to separate methodologically his revolutions in science (wh
ich have to be judged from a purely scientific and not a class criterion), from hi
s revolutions in politics and emancipatory endeavours, these revolutions in thou
ght and action constantly interact upon each other. Only if we synthesise them c
an we understand and represent Marxism in its totality, in its majestic richness
, as a totality in movement, which has nothing to do with dogma or religion.
For the epoch starting with the industrial revolution, the totality of the theor
y and practice involved in Marxism can best be summarized through the revolution
ary potential of the working class as the only social force objectively and subj
ectively capable of replacing bourgeois society (the capitalist mode of producti
on) with a higher form of civilization and of socio-economic organization: class
less society, communism, of which socialism is the first or lower stage. This does
not mean that for Marx and Engels the victory of socialism was an inevitable pr
oduct of the inner contradictions of capitalism. Quite the contrary: they often
stressed that human societies can, throughout history, either progress or regres
s; they can even disappear.
There is nothing fatalistic in Marx s view of history, which asserts as a result o
f a scientific understanding of bourgeois society, and in light of the lessons o

f 3,000 years of class struggle, that no other class than the contemporary worki
ng class, ie, wage labour, has the potential to replace capitalism by a socialis
t society. The fate of humankind is for that reason tied to the victory of the w
orld working class (from the German Ideology till his death, Marx always viewed
the possibility of socialism as an international one, having to be realized on a
world scale).
The destructive potential of capitalism, flowing from its very progressive featu
res, in the first place its capacity to develop the productive forces but in spe
cific forms which cannot shed its ties to private property, commodity production
, competition and disregard for global social rationality, leads humanity to the
crossroads: either socialism or barbarism. The awareness of the potential selfdestruction of humankind (ecological disaster, nuclear world war, etc.) is today
growing. But Marx and Engels were conscious of that danger nearly one and a hal
f centuries ago. For them, the dilemma socialism or barbarism (the formula was fir
st shaped in that precise way by Rosa Luxemburg) meant: either the victory in th
e real class struggle of the existing world working class, i.e., world socialist
revolution, or the decline and fall of human civilization, if not the disappear
ance of the human race. What Lenin, the Communist International, Trotsky and lat
er revolutionary Marxists would write on that subject is already present in the
basic economic and political works of Marx, even if he was not able to include t
he imperialist stage of capitalism in his analysis, as it had not started before
his death. For him this dilemma was not a result of a given historically limite
d phase of capitalism. It was a result of bourgeois society, of the capitalist m
ode of production as such.
Scientific socialism, i.e., the revolutionizing of politics and humanity s emancip
atory endeavours, involves a series of transformations of traditional social and
political practices which are as radical and as fundamental as Marx s revolutions
in the social sciences:
The reintroduction of consciousness, i.e., of science, into the determination of
political action at least for the social class which is not inhibited by peculi
ar social-material interests (and Marx viewed the working class as the only pote
ntially revolutionary class capable of just that!) and for all those individuals
capable or reaching the same level of lucidity, through shedding as far as huma
nly possible, all influences of bourgeois and petty bourgeois (or semi-feudal) i
deologies which hinder that scientific awareness of social problems.
This implies, for Marx, that these individuals as least objectively strive to id
entify with the historical interests and the concrete struggles of the working c
lass. Before Marx, political activity was seen as a product either of blind pass
ions and greed or abstract Reason. Marx made an enormous leap forward in underst
anding that as political action is tied to the class struggle in a given society
, and as that society can be scientifically analysed in its structure and dynami
cs, political action should therefore first be seen in the framework of the laws
governing the destiny of that society and the dynamics of that class struggle.
The lifting of the emancipatory purpose to a higher level, through its fusion wi
th scientific knowledge and revolutionary consciousness.
Contrary to what the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer said ( Politics is the science of p
rediction ), Marxists do not limit themselves to foreseeing what is going to happen.
Or, to state it more correctly: they do not fatalistically think that the outco
me of history, at each decisive stage, is completely preordained. The outcome of
history in class society is the outcome of the class struggle. And the outcome
of the class struggle depends itself, at least in part, upon the conscious actio
n of the revolutionary (and of the counter-revolutionary) social class, its aver
age level of class consciousness, its vanguard and revolutionary leadership, its
active intervention, the quickness and scope of the class s reactions, its self-c
onfidence, its experience, etc. All these factors are not the fatal and inevitab

le result of a given set of circumstances, of material conditions. They depend a

lso upon the actual, concrete course of the class struggle now and during the pr
eceding years and decades, i.e., they reintroduce the subjective factor into the
shaping of history.
The Marxist concept of politics is not limited to discovering the laws of motion
of a given society and adapting to them. Marxist politics means the understanding
of these laws of motion in order to make the struggle for a given goal (the bui
lding of a classless society, and the necessary preconditions for this: the over
throw of capitalism, the emancipation of the working class and the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the sense of the conscious effort of
the working class to rebuild society according to a conscious plan) more effici
ent and more likely to succeed globally.
The reunification of emancipatory endeavour ( socialism ) and the real historical mo
vement (the real class struggle) of a really existing and struggling social clas
s: the proletariat, the class of wage labour, as an objective social category re
gardless of its (varying) level of self-consciousness.
This was not at all self-evident for socialists till far into the second half of
the nineteenth century. It began to be partially rejected again at the beginnin
g of the twentieth century. The Goodbye to the Proletariat of Andre Gorz is not
at all a new discovery; it is the day before yesterday s pseudo-wisdom. You can al
ready find it in Sorel, Michels and many anti-Marxist socialists of pre-first worl
d war vintage. It is interesting to note that nearly all the proponents of really
existing socialism (an absurd formula, if ever there was one) reject that basic
tenet of Marxism, too. For if you have to start from the working class, from the
wage earners as they are and as they struggle concretely in real life, then of
course many of the theoretical and political assumptions of the various ruling tre
nds and bureaucracies inside the organized labor movement get undermined.
How can the role of the ruling Communist Parties in the so-called socialist coun
tries be explained as representing and leading the working class, when, periodical
ly, the overwhelming majority of that working class, of the really existing work
ers, rebel and revolt against that rule, as did more than 80 per cent recently i
n Poland? How can the Western working class be seen as bourgeoisified and integra
ted in existing society (the basic theoretical and political axiom of all reformi
st and neo-reformist tendencies, including the so-called Eurocommunist ones) whe
n, periodically, that same working class, through huge mass actions, by the mill
ions, challenges capitalist relations of production, as it did in Spain in 19367, in Italy in July 1948, in Belgium in December 1960, in France in May 1968, in
Italy in autumn 1969, in Portugal in 1974-75, etc., not to mention the period o
f 1918-1929?
Through that reunification Marx gave socialism and socialists a potential lever
of action of gigantic dimensions. His answer to the question, is socialism possib
le? was affirmative but at the same time conditional. Yes, socialism is possible,
provided in practice, in real life, a fusion is accomplished between the concre
te, unavoidable, elementary class struggle of a real social class, encompassing
hundreds of millions of people (the modern proletariat) and the socialist projec
t of emancipation, of building a classless society.
The reunification of the revolutionary organization with the self-organization o
f the working class.
Revolutionary organizations trying to seize power in order to accomplish a given
set of emancipatory tasks are again much older than bourgeois society and the c
apitalist mode of production. The revolt against the injustice of class oppressi
on and class exploitation is as old as these social evils themselves. Revolution
ary organizations trying to overthrow capitalism are as old as capitalism itself
. The most outstanding pre-Marxist ones were possibly those of Babeuf and of Aug
uste Blanqui in France. Mass organizations of the working class are also much ol

der than Marxism: trade unions and the Chartists in Britain just to name these t
wo, existed before the Communist Manifesto was drafted.
But the revolutionary transformation of politics which Marx achieved was to try
and reunify the self-organization of the working class and the revolutionary act
ivity of individuals. This implied simultaneously a separate organization of com
munists (of the vanguard, those who are permanently active at the highest level
of scientific understanding and class consciousness, different from the masses,
which under capitalism can be active only periodically and at a level of conscio
usness influenced more strongly by the ideology of the ruling class) and their i
ntegration in the mass organization of the class as it is. Trade-unions and inde
pendent political mass parties of the working class are useful and necessary ste
pping stones of that self-organization. But since 1850, and especially since the
experience of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels understood that the highest fo
rms of self-organization of the class are those of the workers councils (soviets),
as analyzed in detail by Lenin in State and Revolution and in many writings of
the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin, Korsch a
nd to a lesser extent the left Austro-Marxist Max Adler, also made valuable cont
ributions to that same understanding).
Socialism can only come about through a successful overthrow of capitalism by a
self-organized working class, i.e., through universal workers councils (soviet po
wer), because only through that form of self-organization of the producers, can
a postcapitalist, transitional society become a society in which the state start
s to wither away from the very inception of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
in which the crystallization of new material social privileges by a special gro
up of people in power can be made impossible. Marx and Engels writings on the Paris
Commune, Lenin s in State and Revolution, were lucid and explicit on these precon
ditions in which the variants of basic economic options can be democratically de
cided by the masses themselves.
All of these revolutions in Marx s concept of politics and emancipation not only i
nvolve a radical transformation of the existing doctrines. They are also negation
s of the negation, i.e., they imply the conservation of the rational kernel in what
is being transcended: utopian socialists, conspiratorial revolutionists, organi
zations limited to the elementary massive proletarian class struggle. All these
revolutions turn around the revolutionary potential of the modern working class.
We deliberately use the word potential instead of the word class struggle. It is obv
ious that the real class struggle of the working class is not always revolutiona
ry. Even less does it lead automatically to an overthrow of the bourgeois state
or of bourgeois society. Elsewhere we have explained the reasons for this histor
ical fact-of-life.
What Marx meant was that in the modern proletariat a class was born which could
periodically reach a point in its struggles, coinciding with a deep social, econ
omical and political crisis of bourgeois society and its state, where capitalism
could be overthrown and power conquered, under conditions which allowed the bui
lding of a classless society objectively and subjectively.
As Marx did not believe that a victorious socialist revolution, not to speak of
a victorious building of world socialism, would be the unavoidable outcome of th
e proletarian class struggle, he never allowed scientific socialism to be comple
tely subsumed by that class struggle. Science continues for Marx and Engels to o
ccupy an autonomous place in history. It is meaningless, irrational and criminal
to suppress certain scientific truths under the pretext that they would discoura
ge the proletariat. Without the maximum of scientific insight, the maximum of tru
th attainable ( absolute truth is of course unrealizable for human beings; the total
identify of being and consciousness is a utopian daydream), the proletarian stru
ggle for emancipation is hindered, not helped. That is not to mention the immedi
ate effects of such an approach which usually results in one-sided and mechanica

l interpretations of the possible variants open for working class action and con
sciousness.
One of the greatest wisdoms humanity has ever formulated is part of Marx s famous
Thesis on Feurbach: the educators need themselves to be educated. Only is one assu
mes absurdly the existence of a person, or of a group of persons ( the central com
mittee, the party ) who are always right, can one seriously challenge the wisdom of th
at statement.
It has, furthermore, not only an epistemological but also a social dimension. Th
e concentrated expression of class exploitation is the division of the social pr
oduct into a necessary product, and a social surplus product appropriated by the rul
ers of society. Through control of the social surplus product, these rulers impo
se a frozen social division of labor between those who exercise the functions of
production and those who exercise the function of accumulation. A key precondit
ion for the building of socialism is the transcendence of that social division o
f labor through the gradual generalization of real self-management, conditioned
by a high level of development of the productive forces, a radical shortening of
the workday, and a growing fusion of manual and intellectual labor. But this is
a gigantic process of self-organization and self-education by huge masses of pr
oducers. You cannot order or command people to
lead themselves. You can only help th
em to do that. And you don t know exactly how this can best be done before the pro
cess unfolds.
The historical balance-sheet of all socialist revolutions since 1917 should lead
revolutionists to modesty on that account. We know more today than Lenin and Tr
otsky did in 1917, not because we are wiser or more intelligent, but because we
have had the advantage of much richer concrete historical experiences than those
on which they could base themselves. But even what we do know today on the basi
s of that concrete historical experience is still pretty limited, be it only bec
ause the process of world revolution is far from having matured. It has not yet
involved victories in the key countries, those where the proletariat has already
become the absolute majority of the population before revolutionary victory. So
the educators need to be educated not only because they know too little, but also
because they have to be involved themselves in a process of gigantic self-educa
tion by the masses, which has already started.
This means that the relation between a revolutionary vanguard organization, whic
h is absolutely necessary for the victory of the socialist revolution and the bu
ilding of socialism, and the self-organization of the mass of workers, which is
likewise indispensable to achieve these goals, is a dialectical one, in which no
part can achieve anything durable without the other.
For that very same reason, while the elementary class struggle of the wage earne
rs is insufficient for the overthrow of capitalism, it is absolutely indispensab
le for achieving the level of self-organization without which a real social revo
lution in an industrially developed country is unrealizable. Great masses learn
above all from experience, not through literary or oral education (which does no
t mean that such education is not vital for obtaining class independence on the
ideological field). The only way in which they can assemble such experience is t
hrough the actual class struggle. So how they act currently will strongly influe
nce how they think in the next ten or twenty years. That is why specific forms o
f current class struggles (large strikes, even only for democratic demands, and so
on) have so much importance for the development of revolutionary potential, i.e
., for the capacity to react in a special way when circumstances are ripe for a
revolutionary crisis.
If revolutionists do not know how to intervene efficiently in these actual strug
gles (e.g., under the pretext that they are economistic or reformist, or that the co
nsciousness of the masses is inadequate or wrong ): if they do not conquer credibil

ity through this intervention, they will not succeed in fusing with the real mov
ement of the class. But if they see their intervention as limited only to adapti
ng to the given level of the class struggle, if they do not strive to elevate th
e level of class consciousness and self-organization through their interventions
, they will not succeed in building a revolutionary vanguard party; they will no
t only become one of the innumerable factors in bourgeois society tending to pre
vent the working class from transcending the level of its elementary struggles.
Finally, while breaking with utopian socialism, Marx and Engels also stuck to it
s rational kernel (they never stopped from having the greatest respect and admirat
ion for Charles Fourier, who formulated one of the greatest and most radical cri
tiques of class society of all times). They never narrowed down the purpose of t
he overthrow of capitalism and building of socialism to a simply workerite project
.
For them, the emancipation of humanity had to be total and global. A relentless
struggle had to be conducted against all forms of oppression and exploitation of
men by men (in the anthropological and not the sexist sense of the word). That is
why the emancipation of oppressed races and nationalities, the emancipation of
over-exploited colonial and semi-colonial nations, the emancipation of women, th
e emancipation of youth, all have such an important weight in their political pr
oject
even if they themselves were limited by the social conditions under which
they lived to understand all the dimensions of these struggles. The overthrow of
capitalism, of private property, commodity production, and wage labour, is a ne
cessary precondition for the successful achievement of these various forms of hu
man emancipation. But it is not a sufficient one. Autonomous struggles of women,
of oppressed nationalities and races, of oppressed youth, against innumerable p
rejudices, will continue long after the victory of the international socialist r
evolution in order to assist the birth of a really classless society, which root
s out all forms of social inequality.
For Marx, the radical revolutionary potential of the working class flows from it
s specific place in the capitalist mode of production and from the consequences
of the latter s laws of motion for that class. Capital s relentless drive to accumul
ate more capital leads to efforts to constantly expand the production of surplus
-value. For there is no other final source of capital accumulation than the prod
uction of surplus-value in the process of production, e.g. through unequal exchan
ge, can only redistribute what has been previously produced. Therefore, the selfexpansion of capital implies the constant expansion of wage labour. The modern p
roletariat is the only class in contemporary society which has the tendency to g
row absolutely and relatively as a function of the very laws of motion of capita
lism.
Of course, to understand this one has to define the proletariat in a correct way
. It is by no means limited to manual labour in industry. That segment of the pr
oletariat has long stopped growing and will tend to become weaker. Scientists or
political militants who narrowly limit the definition of the proletariat to tha
t segment of the class will sooner or later conclude that the possibilities for
the proletariat to change society will tend to decline rather than to grow. For
Marx, however, the proletariat was the Gesamtarbeiter, the total worker, thus incl
uding white collar workers, technicians and even some managers, certainly also s
tate employees, except the top managerial and functionary layers: in other words
all those who remain under the economic compulsion to sell their labour power,
whose income does not allow them on an individual basis normally to accumulate c
apital or to emancipate themselves from that proletarian condition.
The proletariat thus defined has not stopped growing throughout the history of c
apitalism. Today it encompasses half or more than half of the active population
in practically every large country of the world (with the exception of Indonesia
and possibly Pakistan). Even in India, this is already the case, for there is a

tremendous agrarian proletariat or semi-proletariat of landless labourers (peas

ants) in the Indian village, besides the urban proletariat. In most of the devel
oped industrial countries (including the so-called socialist ones) it has passed
75 per cent of the active population. In at least three countries
the USA, Grea
t Britain and Sweden it has passed the threshold of 90 per cent.
While this is clearly a case of quantity turning into a new quality, it is by no
means only that. The development of capitalism creates in the modern proletaria
t not only a numerically predominant social force. It also creates a social forc
e of tremendous potential economic power.
The proletariat is the only substantial human creator of wealth (independent pea
sants and handicraftsmen do create wealth, too, but on a world scale this is pro
bably not more than 15-20 per cent of the totally annually created new product).
The impressive material infrastructure of humankind
the mines, the factories, t
he railways, the airports, the airplanes, the road network, the machines, the au
tomobiles, the power stations, the other sources of energy, the canals, the harb
ours, the cities, domestic equipment, the shops, storehouses and the huge mounta
ins of commodities they contain, have all or nearly all, been created by yesterd
ay s and today s wage labour. Inasmuch as intellectual labour becomes more and more
proletarianised, an increasing segment of humankind s knowledge, blueprints, paten
ts, inventions, are likewise the product of the proletariat. If workers in that
global sense of the word stop working through collective action, no power on ear
th can substitute for them and prevent all economic and social life coming to a
standstill. Far from emancipating society from the proletariat, the higher and hig
her mechanization and semi-automisation prevalent today makes more and not less
vulnerable to real successful mass strikes, as we witnessed in France and Italy
in 1968-69 and in Poland in 1980-81.
This would of course not be true in a completely robotised society. But a completel
y robotised society would be a society without surplus value production and witho
ut commodity production. It could never be approached, let alone reached, under
capitalism.
All other classes in society, independent farmers, including in the Third World,
independent handicraftsmen, independent professional people, free-floating (freis
chwebende) intelligentsia, independent entrepreneurs, are condemned to see their
relative and absolute weight in production and society tendencially and histori
cally to decline and not grow, as the result of the operation of the very laws o
f motion of capitalism. Of course, this is not a mechanical, linear movement; th
ere are medium-term conjunctural ups and downs; there are big differences betwee
n countries and even continents. But the basic secular historical trend is clear
and unequivocal. The law of concentration and centralization of capital has bee
n operating too long and with too clear an outcome for this thesis of the centra
l weight of the proletariat in bourgeois society to be scientifically questioned
(unscientific, impressionistic prejudices and straightforward false consciousnes
s, are, of course, another matter altogether).
Finally, through the very development of capitalism, the working class gradually
acquires a revolutionary potential in the positive economic sense of the word.
In the beginning of the purely capitalistic production of surplus-value, the produ
ction of relative surplus value, i.e., mechanization, the worker is nearly compl
etely subsumed under the machine: a slave of the machine as a slave of capital;
and capital develops a peculiar type of machinery oriented towards the maximum e
xtraction of surplus-value (quite other forms of technology and of machinery are
possible, and were indeed experimented with but not widely applied, because the
y did not serve the capitalist s goal of separate firms profit maximization).
But the very development of capitalist technology, after having reached a certai
n point, starts to operate in the opposite direction. Fragmentation of labour ca

nnot continue infinitely, without beginning to decrease rather than increasing p

rofits. In a highly technicised economic system, the human producers, as the lea
st perfected pieces of the mechanism, make the operation of the whole system more
vulnerable. Capitalism itself cannot rely on more and more unskilled, brutalized
, indifferent labour, operating with more and more sophisticated and expensive m
achinery. The costs of maintaining the value of existing fixed capital becomes o
utrageous, if everything is sacrificed to the production of new surplus-value (n
ew capital).
So capitalism itself, especially late capitalism, has to start overcoming the fr
agmentation and atomization of labour. New labour skills are sought after more t
han unskilled labour. The reunification of intellectual labour and manual labour
is not only the result of the massive reintroduction of intellectual labour int
o the direct process of production. It is also the result of the higher and high
er training of a section of the working class. While the number of drop-outs const
antly grows (they constitute the new layer of the sub-proletariat) the number of
highly skilled workers, of worker technicians, grows parallel to the first phen
omenon.
This transformation is accompanied by a succession of political, social and econ
omic crises of the system. So the basic attitude of the working class towards th
e ruling class starts to change as a result of the very operation of the long te
rm laws of motion of the given mode of production. Till the post-first world war
period, and to a large extent throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the workers respe
cted the employers, even when they hated them. They thought, by and large, that
you couldn t run factories and the economy without bosses and experts. But now, seei
ng the mess into which the employers and experts have worked themselves (and all o
f us), they increasingly challenge the capacity and the right of those on top to m
ake things work. At least at factory level, and at the level of the cities, they
increasingly feel that they have the capacity of making things run better (we d
on t say in an ideal way, but better) than those on top. Again these sentiments, w
hich were expressed very powerfully in the big strike wave of 1968-1975 througho
ut the capitalist world (and in Poland 1980-81 too!) might conjuncturally recede
a bit under the impact of the present crisis. But if a first wave of that crisi
s has reduced somewhat the self-confidence of the working class, a second and ha
rsher wave will make it rise again with a vengeance.
To this objective potential must be added a subjective one which is as important
for the building of socialism as is the first. This subjective potential is lik
ewise, for Marx, the very product of the specific place the working class occupi
es in the capitalist mode of production.
Capitalism not only increases the number of wage earners, their economic potenti
al, and later their skills and levels of culture (the conquests of working class
struggles of course contribute more to these latter achievements). Capitalism a
lso concentrates these wage earners in huge work places (mines, factories, offic
e buildings) where they are assembled by the thousands if not the tens of thousa
nds. There, after long painful experiences with the opposite patterns of behavio
ur, which periodically still break towards the surface because they are pure produ
cts of bourgeois society, the working class goes through a permanent practical s
chool of social behaviour based upon co-operation, solidarity and collectively o
rganized action, seeking collective as opposed to individual solutions to the soc
ial questions.
No other class can systematically achieve over a long period these patterns of b
ehaviour as a result of its practical day-to-day experience and its overall soci
al interests, as does the class of wage earners, certainly not independent peasa
nts or intellectuals. Lenin can hardly be accused of having underestimated the pe
asantry. But Lenin was clearer than any other Marxist as to the basic difference
between the peasant s and the worker s attitude towards competition, commodity produ

ction, and therefore social behaviour based upon co-operation and solidarity.
Again, this is not an absolute rule, but a general historical tendency. It can b
e interrupted by the results of great shocking defeats of the working class, or
huge historical disappointments, of extremely unfavourable material conditions (
unemployment rates higher than 30, 50 or 75 per cent). But it reappears again an
d again, like the Hydra s head, because it is rooted in the very socio-economic na
ture of capital and wage labour.
This social preparation of the working class to base its collective behaviour, i
ts intervention in society, on the non-bourgeois values of collective co-operation
, solidarity and organization the very antithesis of bourgeois and petty-bourgeo
is competition gives it a powerful potential for social revolution. And gives it
a powerful potential for rebuilding society on the basis of collective ownershi
p of the means of production, of solidarity between all producers, of planned co
nscious co-operation substituting itself to market laws as the basis of economic l
ife, of the withering away of commodity production, money, economic inequality a
nd the state, all of which are social preconditions for the successful achieveme
nt of a classless society, as is a high level of development of the productive f
orces.
The point is not that the working class is sure to accomplish all that. Nothing
is sure in the bad world in which we live. Socialism is a possibility, nothing m
ore. But it happens to be the only possible alternative to a collapse of human c
ivilization if not to a disappearance of the human race. The working class is th
e only potential social force which could, under a given complex set of favourab
le circumstances, realize socialism. To deny the revolutionary role of the worki
ng class means to make a giant historical leap backward, i.e., to condemn social
ism to become utopian, to become again a nice dream which will never be realized
and which will therefore not prevent humankind from disappearing in a nuclear h
olocaust.
No proof can be offered, nor ever has been offered that other social forces
an a
ssociation of intelligent individuals, third world peasants, marginalized sub-pr
oletarians in the imperialist ghettos, socialist state armies
have the social and
economic power to take the fate of society out of the hands of Big Capital and t
o reshape that society on the basis of world-wide massive solidarity and co-oper
ation between the producers. For that reason alone, it would be wise not to revi
se Marx s concept of the centrality of the revolutionary potential of the working
class for emancipating humanity as long as history has not presented us with def
inite proof of such a capacity. It would be equally wise to devote all one s power
and energy to helping the working class to realize that potential.
ERNEST MANDEL is the author of Late Capitalism, The Second Slump, Marxist Econom
ic Theory, and many other works on Marxism. He is also secretary of the Fourth I
nternational.

Ernest Mandel
Three-Phase Stalinism
(April 1989)
The article by Phil Hearse and Dave Packer (The way out of a tangle on Stalinism
) which appeared in SO 12 contains a distortion of my position. I have never ass
erted that the Chinese, Albanian and Vietnamese states, regimes, or ruling burea

ucracies, are less authoritarian and manipulative than Khruschev s, not to say Gor
bachev s Russia. At the most I said that in spite of that authoritarianism, they e
njoyed more mass support up to a certain period, because of the role they played
in the revolution in their country (this applies to China and Vietnam, probably
not to Albania). But that is neither a question of definition nor of theoretica
l analysis, but just a question of facts.
I could accept Hearse and Packer s position that a stalinist or neo-stalinist part
y is one which subordinates the interests of revolution (i.e. of the working cla
ss) in its country, to those of any state bureaucracy (defined as a hardened bur
eaucratic caste exercising state power in a workers state) whether the Russian,
Chinese, Yugoslav or Vietnamese one.
But such a definition reveals the contradictions in Hearse and Packer s assessment
s, not mine. To what ruling state bureaucracy did the Yugoslav Communist Party s
ubordinate the interests of the Yugoslav revolution in 1942? Or the Chinese CP i
n the 1948 Chinese revolution? Or the Vietnamese CP in the Vietnamese revolution
in 1949? To the Russian bureaucracy? Obviously not. To the Yugoslav, Chinese, V
ietnamese state bureaucracies? But these did not exist in the years cited!
So the correct definition involves
inist when they had an orientation
bourgeois-oligarchic (in Vietnam,
en they subordinated the interests
aucracy.

a three-phase approach. The parties were Stal

of refusing to fight for the overthrow of the
colonial) state following the Moscow line. Th
of the revolution to those of the Soviet bure

They broke with stalinism when they took the conscious decision to change that s
trategic line and to fight for the overthrow of the bourgeois state. To this end
they educated their cadres and mobilized huge masses (albeit in a manipulative
way) for that revolutionary goal.
They became neo-stalinist parties when, after having destroyed the bourgeois sta
te through their conquest of power, they started to subordinate the interests of
the working class and the revolution to those of their own emerging national bu
reaucratic caste.
This is a more complex assessment than that of Hearse and Packer. It might even
sound awkward. But we don t approach theory from the point of view of whether it i
s easily expressed or understood. We approach it from the point of view of wheth
er it enables us to understand the moving reality in its totality, without losin
g theory s inner coherence. This, I believe, is the case with my definition of sta
linism. It is not fully the case with Hearse and Packer s definition.
Ernest Mandel

Ernest Mandel
Making Revolution
The Rebirth of East German Socialism
(November 1989)
A combination of May 68 in France and the Prague Spring, multiplied by two: That s
how you can summarize what is occurring at present in the German democratic revo
lution. It s the beginning of a genuine revolution, a struggle to build a democrat
ic, popular alternative to both communist oppression and free-market despotism.

All that has been achieved

promises of free elections, independent inquiries int
o repression, freedom to travel, the dismissal of the old Politburo, etc.
was ex
clusively the result of direct, peaceful, mass action on a gigantic scale. Durin
g the three days of November 4, 5, and 6, two million people descended on the st
reets. At that level, quality transforms itself into quality. If in the main ind
ustrial city, Leipzig, 350,000 out of 500,000 inhabitants take to the streets, i
t means that the entire working class has gone into action. Petitions urging the
removal of the Politburo circulated, not in universities, but in factories. The
se petitions were backed by the threat of a strike and the Politburo, soon enoug
h, was gone.
Even more important, perhaps, than the size of the demonstrations was the politi
cal sophistication of the demonstrators. In Berlin alone, on November 4, we coun
ted about 7,000 different posters; with few exceptions, these were manufactured
by small groups, not organizations. They expressed an impressive variety of dema
nds, but all partaking of common themes. We didn t see a single one demanding Germ
an reunification. We saw only a few urging a market economy. The overwhelming ma
jority were socialist and democratic in content; they were also sarcastic, insol
ent, humorous, concrete, heavily anti-authoritarian and anti-militaristic.
The working people of the GDR have been oppressed for 40 years by a bumbling sta
te bureaucracy. East German officials, despising their own people, have behaved
like satraps of the Soviet leadership. Long cowed by fear, resigned, and lacking
perspectives, the masses have now risen to shed their chains. This is not refor
m; this is revolution. We have the power, shouted thousands in Berlin, Leipzig, Dr
esden, Halle, Magdeburg, Karl-Marx-Stadt (formerly Chemnitz). We are the people.
When the Berlin Wall fell on November 10 and freedom of travel was granted, West
ern commentators debated about who was really behind the victory. But the mayor
of West Berlin, who at least knows the score, didn t hesitate a minute to congratu
late the courageous people of the GDR who have achieved a peaceful democratic rev
olution. You had to be deaf and blind to believe that anybody but the working men
and women of the GDR had broken the Berlin Wall.
At least two million East Germans have poured into West Berlin and West Germany
since, enjoying their new freedom. Then, however, they return home. In all the m
ass demos we saw, there was near unanimity behind the slogan: We don t leave our co
untry.
For many months now a rather repetitive chorus has been heard in various world c
apitals: Communism is dead. Socialism is finished. Capitalism has triumphed. But h
ardly has the spittle dried and here you have socialism and revolution proudly a
sserting themselves. Where is the death of socialism? The East German opposition
groupings, which will probably win any democratic election, assembled in Septem
ber in the little town of Bhlen. Their existence was still illegal, but they met
anyway and issued a common platform. Here are two significant quotes:
The example of the Hungarian People s Republic shows that in these conditions [the
crisis of actually existing socialism ], uncritical borrowing from the arsenal of
market regulators in an attempt to carry out economic reform itself produces cri
ses and social differentiation.
We firmly reject any replacement of political-bureaucratic oppression with capital
ist exploitation. The left must unite on the following basis:
The predominance of social ownership of the means of production as the basis for
socialist socialization.
The development of self-determination of producers in achieving real socializati
on of total activity.

Consistent application of the principle of social security and justice for membe
rs of society.
Political democracy, the rule of law, consistent application of all human rights
and free development of the individuality of every member of society.
Restructuring of industrial society to conform to the needs of protecting the en
vironment.
The organizations united behind the Bhlen Platform
the most important of which is
the New Forum, an extremely influential group in Leipzig
have reached out to op
position forces within the East German Communist party. The party opposition is
often more radically critical of the bureaucracy than is the independent opposit
ion: 25,000 of them gathered on November 8 before the Central Committee building
, calling for an extraordinary party congress this year. Where is the demise of
socialism? Where is the triumph of capitalism? When we say that genuine people s p
ower is being born in the GDR we mean just that: We are at the beginning of a pr
ocess, not at its end.
For this revolution is far from victory. Two main threats weigh heavily on its f
urther progress: The first is the disorganization of the groups and currents inv
olved, including the Communist party opposition. They must find specific institu
tions through which to enforce the power they have taken. Otherwise, the bureauc
racy s reform wing, centered around Hans Modrow, will propose all manner of compro
mises and coalitions to keep power in party-bureaucratic hands. The repressive a
pparatus has withdrawn into the background. It has not been dismantled, and coul
d return if the people weary of demonstrating and become discouraged by a lack o
f permanent, radical change.
The second, more serious threat is an increase in economic difficulties and tens
ions. Freedom to travel will bring a powerful desire to consume Western goods. T
hat desire will translate into pressure to make East German marks convertible in
to the West German variety. Such convertability cannot be achieved without big a
ssistance from the West German state and private banks, with the IMF lurking beh
ind the boardroom curtain. All these players will be inclined to demand their po
und of flesh in exchange for credit: the right to invest in the GDR, to buy land
and goods, to assist the private sector, or to impose austerity. Today the great ma
jority of East German workers reject such management from abroad. But if the eco
nomic situation deteriorates, if their real incomes decline far enough, demorali
zation may set in. Joining the EEC, and even uniting with West Germany, may then
appear as lesser evils.
So the East German people s revolution can still be defeated. Indeed, defeat is mo
re likely than victory. But an initial victory is in hand, and the chance of ext
ending it is real. It is the greatest chance for democratic socialism
quite dist
inct from the social democracy that has been integrated into capitalism since 19
18.
On November 4, the platform in front of the huge crowd in Berlin presented 26 sp
eakers in an astounding manifestation of socialist, pluralist democracy. The dai
s even featured two members of the East German Communist party, though these lon
ely figures were not well received by the audience. The meeting opened with a tr
emendous surprise: a moving song sung in honor of Nicaragua, sung by two young s
ingers in the Wolf Biermann style. Solidarity with the South African freedom str
uggle, with the Czech dissidents, with the Chinese students, and with the victim
s of Stalinism in the USSR was as widespread among the demonstrators as on the p
latform. That wonderful display of internationalism was not accidental. The defi
ant masses of the GDR are the first German generation largely liberated from nat
ionalism and militarism, deeply addicted to nonviolence, and hating the traditio
ns of the Reich, of fascism, of Prussia.
The superpowers are afraid of the contamination that could spread from East Germ
any to the rest of Europe and to their own homelands. But for the time being the

y cannot impose order through violence. There is nothing to fear from a democratic
, socialist, antimilitarist and antinationalist East Germany. Quite the contrary
; it carries a hope for all of us.
If the East German people don t want to exchange bureaucratic despotism for the de
spotism of the market, if they don t want reunification
that is, absorption into a
capitalist West Germany it is their perfect right to make that choice. They hav
e suffered enough from being bossed over. They don t want anybody s tutelage, includ
ing that of the combined superpowers. They want to be their own masters, to dete
rmine their own fate.

Ernest Mandel
Communism
(1990)
The term communism was first used in modern times to designate a specific economic
doctrine (or regime), and a political creed intending to introduce such a regim
e, by the French lawyer Etinne Cabet in the late 1830s; his works, especially the
utopia L Icarie, were influential among the Paris working class before the revolu
tion of 1848. In 1840 the first communist banquet was held in Paris
banquets and b
anquet speeches were a common form of political protest under the July monarchy.
The term spread rapidly, so that Karl Marx could entitle one of his first polit
ical articles of 16 October 1842 Der Kommunismus und die Augsburger Allgemeine Z
eitung. He noted that communism was already an international movement, manifesting
itself in Britain and Germany besides France, and traced its origin to Plato. H
e could have mentioned ancient Jewish sects and early Christian monasteries too.
In fact, some of the so-called utopian socialists , in the first place the German W
eitling, called themselves communists and spread the influence of the new doctri
ne among German itinerant handicraftsmen all over Europe, as well as among the m
ore settled industrial workers of the Rhineland. Under the influence of Marx and
Engels, the League of the Just (Bund des Gerechten) they had created, changed i
s name to the Communist League in 1846. The League requested the two young Germa
n authors to draft a declaration of principle for their organisation. This decla
ration would appear in February 1848 under the title Communist Manifesto, which
would make the words communism and communists famous the world over.
Communism, from then on, would designate both a classes society without property
, without ownership either private or nationalised of the means of production, w
ithout commodity production, money or a state apparatus separate and apart from
the members of the community, and the social-political movement to arrive at tha
t society. After the victory of the Russian October revolution in 1917, that mov
ement would tend to be identified by and large with Communist parties and a Comm
unist International (or at least an international communist movement ), though ther
e exists a tiny minority of communists, inspired by the Dutch astronomer Panneko
ek - who are hostile to a party organisation of any kind (the so-called council c
ommunists , Rtekommunisten).
The first attempts to arrive at a communist society (leaving aside early, mediev
al and more modern christian communities) were made in the United States in the
19th century, through the establishment of small agrarian settlements band upon
collective property, communally organised labour and the total absence of money
inside their boundaries. From that point of view, they differed radically from t
he production co-operatives promoted for example by the English industrialist an
d philanthropist Robert Owen. Weitling himself created such a community, signifi

cantly called Communia. Although they were generally established by a selected g

roup of followers who shared common convictions and interests, these agrarian co
mmunities did not survive long in a hostile environment. The nearest contemporar
y extension of these early communist settlements are the kibbutzim in Israel.
Rather rapidly, and certainly after the appearance of the Communist Manifesto, c
ommunism came to be associated less with small communities set up by morally or
intellectually selected elites, but with the general movement of emancipation of
the modern working class, if not in its totality at least in its majority, enco
mpassing furthermore the main countries (wealth-wise and population-wise) of the
world. In the major theoretical treatise of their younger years, The German Ide
ology, Marx and Engels stated emphatically:
Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of dominant peoples all at onc
e and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive f
orces and the world intercourse bound up with them. . . . The proletariat can th
us only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have
a world-historical existence.
And, earlier in the same passage:
This development of productive forces (which at the same time implies the actual
empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being)
is an absolutely necessary practical premise, because without it privation is me
rely made general, and with want the struggle for necessities would begin again,
and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restored ... (1845-6, p.49
).
That line of argument is to-day repeated by most orthodox Marxists (communists),
who find in it an explanation of what went wrong in Soviet Russia, once it was is
olated in a capital environment as a result of the defeat of revolution in other
European countries in the 1918-23 period. But many official Communist Parties sti
ll stick to Stalin s particular version of communism, according to which it is pos
sible to successfully complete the building of socialism and communism in a sing
le country, or in a small number of countries.
The radical and international definition of a communist society given by Marx an
d Engels inevitably leads to the perspective of a transition (transition period)
between capitalism and communism, Marx and Engels first, notably in their writi
ngs about the Paris Commune
The Civil War in France
and in their Critique of the
Gotha Programme (of the German social-democratic party), Lenin later
especially
in his book State and Revolution tried to give at least a general sketch of wha
t that transition would be like. It centres around the following ideas:
The proletariat, as the only social class radically opposed to private ownership
of the means of production, and likewise as the only class which has potentiall
y the power to paralyse and overthrow bourgeois society, as well as the inclinat
ion to collective co-operation and solidarity which are the motive forces of the
building of communism, conquers political (state) power. It uses that power ( the
dictatorship of the proletariat ) to make more and more despotic inroads into the r
ealm of private property and private production, substituting for them collectiv
ely and consciously (planned) organised output, increasingly turned towards dire
ct satisfaction of needs. This implies a gradual withering away of market econom
y.
The dictatorship of the proletariat, however, being the instrument of the majori
ty to hold down a minority, does not need a heavy apparatus of full-time functio
naries, and certainly no heavy apparatus of repression. It is a state sui generi
s, a state which starts to wither away from its inception, i.e. it starts to dev
olve more and more of the traditional state functions to self-administrating bod

ies of citizens, to society in its totality. This withering away of the state go
es hand in hand with the indicated withering away of commodity production and of
money, accompanying a general withering away of social classes and social strat
ification, i.e. of the division of society between administrators and administra
ted, between bosses and bossed over people.
That vision of transition towards communism as an essentially evolutionary proce
ss obviously has preconditions: that the countries engaged on that road already
enjoy a relatively high level of development (industrialisation, modernisation,
material wealth, stock of infrastructure, level of skill and culture of the peop
le, etc.), created by capitalism itself; that the building of the new society is
supported by the majority of the population (i.e. that the wage-earners already
represent the great majority of the producers and that they have passed the thr
eshold of a necessary level of socialist political class consciousness); that th
e process encompasses the major countries of the world.
Marx, Engels, Lenin and their main disciples and co-thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg
, Trotsky, Gramsci, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, Bukharin et al. incidentally
also Stalin until 1928 distinguished successive stages of the communist society:
the lower stage, generally called socialism , in which there would be neither comm
odity production nor classes, but in which the individual s access to the consumpt
ion fund would still be strictly measured by his quantitative labour input, eval
uated in hours of labour; and a higher stage, generally called communism , in which
the principle of satisfaction of needs for everyone would apply, independently
of any exact measurement of work performed. Marx established that basic differen
ce between the two stages of communism in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, t
ogether with so much else. It was also elaborated at length in Lenin s State and R
evolution.
In the light of these principles, it is clear that no socialist or communist soc
iety exists anywhere in the world today. It is only possible to speak about reall
y existing socialism at present, if one introduces a new, reductionist definition o
f a socialist society, as being only identical with predominantly nationalised p
roperty of the means of production and central economic planning. This is obviou
sly different from the definition of socialism in the classical Marxist scriptur
es. Whether such a new definition is legitimate or not in the light of historica
l experience is a matter of political and philosophical judgement. It is in any
case another matter altogether than ascertaining whether the radical emancipator
s goals projected by the founders of contemporary communism have been realised i
n these really existing societies or not. This is obviously not the case.

Bibliography
Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1845-6. The German Ideology.

Ernest Mandel
Socialism and the future
(July 1992)
Since the mid-1970s a deterioration of the balance of forces between the classes
has taken place on a worldwide scale. The main reason has been the onset of a l
ong-lasting depressive wave in the capitalist economy with a continuing increase
in unemployment. In the imperialist countries, unemployment has increased from

10 to 50 million people; in the Third World it has reached 500 million. In many
of the latter countries, this means that 50% or more of the population find them
selves without work.
This massive rise in unemployment, and in the fear of unemployment among those w
ho have jobs, has weakened the working class and facilitated the worldwide capit
alist offensive aimed at increasing the rate of profit through pushing down real
wages and cutting social and infrastructural costs. The neo-conservative offens
ive is only the ideological expression of this social and economic offensive.
The large majority of the leaderships of the mass parties who claim to be social
ist have capitulated before this capitalist offensive, and have accepted austeri
ty policies; this has been seen in countries as diverse as France, Spain, the Ne
therlands, Sweden, Venezuela and Peru. This has disoriented the working class an
d, during a whole period, has made it more difficult for the masses to undertake
defensive struggles.
This capitulation of the Social Democracy has been coupled with the ideological
and political impact of the crisis of the systems in eastern Europe, the ex-Sovi
et Union, the People s Republic of China and Indochina, which is fomenting a profo
und and near universal crisis of the credibility of socialism.
In the eyes of the great majority of the population of the planet, the two princ
ipal historical experiences in constructing a classes society
the Stalinist/post
-Stalinist/Maoist and the Social Democratic have failed.
Of course, the masses understand very well that this is the failure of an overal
l radical social objective. But that does not imply a negative assessment of the
important concrete changes in social reality in favour of the exploited that ha
ve taken place. In this latter sense, the balance sheet of more than 150 years o
f the activity of the international workers movement and all its tendencies, rema
ins positive.
But this is not the same as a belief by millions of workers that all immediate s
truggles will increasingly lead to the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism
and the advent of a classless society without exploitation, oppression, injustic
e or mass violence. In the absence of such a conviction, immediate struggles are
fragmented and discontinuous, without overall political objectives.
The political initiative is in the hands of imperialism, the bourgeoisie and its
agents. This is clear from what is happening in eastern Europe where the fall o
f the bureaucratic dictatorships under the impact of broad mass struggles has le
d not to a political initiative in the direction of socialism but rather, toward
s the restoration of capitalism. The same thing is beginning to happen in the ex
-Soviet Union.
The masses in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, not to mention countries l
ike Cambodia, identify the Stalinist and post-Stalinist dictatorship with Marxis
m and socialism, and they reject all of these equally. Stalin murdered a million
Communists and repressed millions of workers and peasants.
This was not the product of Marxism, socialism or of the revolution; it was the
result of a bloody counter-revolution. But that the masses still see these thing
s differently is an objective fact that bears heavily on international political
and social realities.
This crisis of the credibility of socialism explains the principal contradiction
of the world situation at a time when the masses are fighting in many countries
, often on a larger scale than ever before.

On the one hand, imperialism and the international bourgeoisie are not capable o
f crushing the workers movement as they did in the 1930s and the beginning of th
e 1940s in the big cities of Europe and Japan and in many other countries. But,
on the other, the working masses are not yet prepared to fight for a global anti
-capitalist solution. For this reason we are in a period of worldwide crisis and
disorder in which neither one of the principal social classes is capable of ass
uring its historical victory.
The principal task of socialists and communists is to try to restore the credibi
lity of socialism in the consciousness of millions of men and women. This will b
e possible only if our starting point is the immediate needs and concerns of the
se masses. Any alternative model of political economy must include these proposa
ls. Such proposals must give the most concrete and efficient aid to the masses t
o fight successfully for their needs.
We can formulate these in near biblical terms: eliminate hunger, clothe the nake
d, give a dignified life to everyone, save the lives of those who die for lack o
f proper medical attention, generalise free access to culture including the elim
ination of illiteracy, universalise democratic freedoms, human rights, and elimi
nate repressive violence in all its forms.
None of this is dogmatic or utopian. Although the masses are not ready to fight
for socialist revolution, they can wholly accept these objectives if they are fo
rmulated in the most concrete way possible. They can unleash broader struggles i
n the most diverse forms and combinations. For this we must try to be as concret
e as possible in our propositions. What type of food production is possible? Wit
h what agrarian techniques? In which places? Which materials can be produced? In
which localities or nations on the largest international scale?
But when we examine the conditions needed to achieve these goals, we arrive at t
he conclusion that such a program implies a radical redistribution of existing r
esources and a radical change in the social forces that hold the decision making
power over their use. We should be convinced that the masses who are struggling
for these objectives will not abandon the struggle when reality demonstrates th
ese implications.
Herein lies one of the historical challenges facing the socialist movement: to b
e capable, without prior conditions, of leading the broadest mass struggles to a
chieve humanity s most pressing current needs.
Is such an alternative model possible in today s society without a short or medium
term goal of taking or participating in concrete power, in the short or medium
term? I believe that this is the wrong way to put the question. It is clear that
there is no way of avoiding the problem of political power. But the concrete fo
rm of the struggle for power and, above all, the concrete forms of state power,
must not be decided beforehand. Above all, the formulation of concrete objective
s and concrete forms of struggles for definite needs must not be subordinate to
objectives realisable on the political plane in the short term.
On the contrary, the objectives and forms of struggle must be determined without
any political prejudices whatsoever. The formula must be that of the great tact
ician Napoleon Bonaparte which was repeated many times by Lenin: on s engage et pui
s on voit (we join the battle and then we ll see).
This is how the international workers movement in the period of its most impressi
ve mass activity conducted its campaigns for two central objective: the eight-ho
ur working day and universal suffrage.
Cannot imperialism today or, more accurately, imperialism allied with big capita
l, impede the realisation of these same objectives in the countries of Latin Ame

rica? Cannot imperialism block the influx of capital and the transference of tec
hnology even more than is already being done through the pressures of the IMF an
d World Bank?
Again, I believe that posing the question in these terms can lead us into a trap
. The truth is that nobody can give an answer to this beforehand. In the final a
nalysis, all depends on the balance of forces. But these are not predetermined a
nd are constantly changing.
Furthermore, the struggle for realisable, precise objectives by mass action is p
recisely one way to change the balance of forces in favour of the workers and al
l the exploited and oppressed.
It must not be forgotten that imperialism is undergoing a profound crisis of lea
dership. While consolidating its military dominance, Yankee imperialism has lost
its technological and financial dominance. It is no longer capable of imposing
its will on its principal competitors, Japanese and German imperialism. Neither
can it control the possible reactions of the masses in the United States nor on
an international scale.
Under these conditions there are many possible forms for a successful struggle f
or the immediate cancellation of payments on the foreign debt. It is highly unli
kely that the Latin American governments and those of the Third World will take
any such step. But if a country like Brazil in the event of a PT [Workers Party]
victory were to do so, we cannot beforehand predict the reaction of imperialism
. They could impose an economic blockade, but it is far more difficult to blocka
de Brazil, the most developed country in Latin America, than smaller countries l
ike Cuba, not to mention Nicaragua.
And Brazil has the capacity to respond with a political offensive, with a politi
co-economic Brest-Litovsk and to lead many countries and masses of all countries
by saying: Do you agree that our people are being punished for wanting to elimi
nate hunger, sickness and violations of human rights? The answer of the working
masses of the world is not a foregone conclusion; it could be insufficient, it c
ould be positive. But it is a great battle that could change the world political
situation. It could allow a further change in the balance of forces; it could h
elp restore faith in a better world.
These themes are the fundamental methodological approach of Karl Marx: the strug
gle for socialism is not the dogmatic and sectarian imposition of some pre-estab
lished objective on the real movement of the masses. It is only the conscious ex
pression of this movement out of which the constituent elements of a new society
can grow out of the seeds of the old.
We can illustrate these themes in relation to the central problems of today. Mul
tinational companies exercise a greater and greater domination over ever larger
sectors of the world market. They represent a qualitatively superior form of the
international centralisation of capital. This leads to a greater internationali
sation of the class struggle.
Unfortunately, the international bourgeoisie is much more prepared and coherent
in this sense than the working class. In a fundamental sense there are only two
possible answers for the working class to the actions of the multinationals: eit
her it retreats into protectionism and defence of so-called national competitive
ness, that is, class collaboration with the bosses and the government of each co
untry against the Japanese , the Germans or the Mexicans ; or solidarity with the worker
s of all countries and against all national and international exploiters.
In the first case, an inevitable downward spiral of cuts in wages, social protec
tion and labour conditions in all countries would occur, because the multination

als could always exploit a country with lower wages, transfer production there o
r blackmail the worker s movement into giving concessions beforehand.
In the second case, there is at least the possibility of a rising spiral that ca
n steadily raise wages, increase social protection of the less developed countri
es and reduce differences in living standards in a positive direction.
This second possible response is not at all opposed
he creation of jobs in the Third World. It implies,
elopment which is not based on the exporting of low
owth of the national market and the satisfaction of
e.

to economic development or t
rather, another model of dev
wages, but rather, on the gr
the basic needs of the peopl

The struggle for this internationalist response to the offensive of the multinat
ional companies requires immediate common concrete initiatives on the union leve
l, especially between delegates; and independent and militant rank-and-file init
iatives in all the factories of the world that work for the same multinational o
r in the same industrial branch. This has already begun in a small but real way;
the North American Free Trade Agreement, the attempt to transform Mexico into a
vast maquiladora [low-wage free economic ] zone, opens the road to this response a
nd can be extended to all of Latin America in opposition to the so-called Initia
tive for the Americas.
At the same time, the so-called new social movements merely reflect the anguish
of large social layers abandoned by the dynamics of late capitalism. This dynami
c involves the danger that these layers will increasingly depoliticise and could
constitute a social base for right- wing attacks, including neo-fascist ones, a
gainst democratic freedoms. Any policy of social peace or of pseudo-realistic cons
ensus with the bourgeoisie produces the impression that there are basically no o
ther political options, and thus makes the danger worse. This is why it is vital
for the workers movement to establish structural alliances with the
underclass , t
he unorganised, and help them organise, defend themselves and achieve dignity an
d hope.
In all of these instances, this must be done in a non-dogmatic way, free of the
attitude that one possesses all of the truth -the definitive answer. The buildin
g of socialism is a huge laboratory of new experiences which are still undefined
. We must learn from practice, especially from these same masses. For this reaso
n, we must be open to dialogue and fraternal discussion with the entire left, wi
th all firmly defending the principles of their current and organisation.
In a larger sense, we must take into account the fact that the stakes in the wor
ld today are dramatic: it is literally a question of the physical survival of hu
manity. Hunger, epidemics, nuclear power, the deterioration of the natural envir
onment: all of this is the fundamental reality of the new and old capitalist wor
ld disorder.
In the Third World, 16 million children die of hunger of curable diseases a year
. This is equivalent to 25% of the deaths of the second world war, including Hir
oshima and Auschwitz. In other words, every four years, there is a world war aga
inst children. This is the reality of imperialism and capitalism today.
This inhuman reality produces inhuman political and ideological effects. In nort
h-east Brazil, the lack of vitamins in the diet of the poor has produced a new s
pecies of pygmies, of men and women who have undergone physical changes that mak
e them 30 centimetres smaller than other people in the same country. There are m
illions of these unfortunates, called by the ruling class and its agents human ra
ts , with all the de-humanising implications of such terms, reminiscent of those d
eveloped by the Nazis.

With the gradual restoration of capitalism in eastern Europe and the ex- Soviet
Union, everything that is barbaric and socially retrograde is beginning to be re
produced. The privatisation of the large enterprises could produce up to 35-40 m
illion unemployed and a 40% fall in workers earnings. Socialism can regain its cr
edibility and validity if it is ready to totally identify with the struggle agai
nst these threats. This supposes three conditions:
1. The first is that under no circumstances does it subordinate its support for
the social struggles of the masses to any political project. We must be uncondit
ionally on the side of the masses in all their struggles.
2. The second is that we carry out propaganda and education amongst the masses f
or an overall socialist model that takes into account the experiences and new fo
rms of consciousness of recent decades.
We must defend a model of socialism that will be totally emancipatory in all are
as of life. This socialism must be self-managing, feminist, ecological, radicalpacifist, pluralistic; it must qualitatively extend democracy, and be internatio
nalist and pluralist including in terms of multiparty system.
But it is essential that it emancipate the direct producers, which is impossible
without the progressive disappearance of the social division of labour between
those who produce and those who administer.
The producers must hold the real decision making power over what they produce an
d receive the best part of the social product. This power must be exercised in a
completely democratic manner; that is, it must express the real aspirations of
the masses. This is impossible without party pluralism and the possibility of th
e masses to choose between various concrete variants of the central economic pla
n. It is also impossible without a radical reduction in the daily and weekly wor
k load.
More or less everyone agrees about the rising level of corruption and criminalis
ation in bourgeois society and the disappearing post-capitalist societies. It is
utopian and unrealistic to hope for the moralisation of civil society and of th
e state without a radical reduction in the importance of money and market econom
ies.
A coherent vision of socialism cannot be defended without systematically opposin
g selfishness and the pursuit of individual gain in spite of their consequences
for society as a whole. Priority must be given to solidarity and cooperation. An
d this presupposes precisely a decisive reduction in the importance of money in
society.
3. The third condition is the total renunciation on the part of socialists and c
ommunists of all substitutionalist, paternalist and top-down practices. We must
reflect upon and transmit Karl Marx s principal contribution to politics: the eman
cipation of the workers will be the work of the workers themselves. It cannot be
done by states, governments, parties, supposedly infallible leaders or experts
of any kind. All of these are useful, even indispensable, for the struggle of em
ancipation. But they can only help the masses to free themselves; they cannot be
a substitute for them. It is not only immoral, but impractical, to try to secur
e the happiness of people against their own beliefs. This is one of the principa
l lessons that can be drawn from the collapse of the bureaucratic dictatorships
in eastern Europe and the USSR.
The practice of socialists and communists must be totally consistent with their
principles. We must not justify any alienating or oppressive practices whatsoeve
r. We must, in practice, realise what Karl Marx called the categorical imperativ
e: to struggle against all conditions in which human beings are alienated and hu

miliated. If our practice is consistent with this imperative, socialism will onc
e again become a political force that will be invincible.

Note
1. From International Viewpoint. This is the text of a speech delivered to the t
hird meeting of the Sao Paulo Forum of left parties, held in Nicaragua in July 1
992.

Ernest Mandel
The Irresistible Fall of Mikhail Gorbachev
(1992)
The attempt at reforming the bureaucratic Soviet regime undertaken by Mikhail Go
rbachev was doomed to failure. This confirms the impossibility of an attempt at
self-reform by the bureaucracy.
Gorbachev s failure is in line with that of Tito, Khrushchev, Mao or Dubcek. The S
oviet bureaucracy is too vast, its social networks too strong, the web of inerti
a, routine, obstruction and sabotage on which it rests too dense for it to be de
cisively weakened by actions from above. Its removal demands the initiative and
action of tens of millions of workers, that is, a real popular revolution from b
elow, an anti-bureaucratic political revolution. Gorbachev was incapable of unle
ashing such a revolution
nor did he wish to. His aim was to preserve the system
while profoundly reforming it.
Gorbachev s course towards a radical reform of the system was not, in the first pl
ace, the result of any ideological choice. It was the outcome of unavoidable obj
ective conditions, of the ever deepening crisis of the system in which the USSR
was mired since the end of the 1970s.
The main signs of this crisis were:
The continuous fall in growth rates, which remained lower than those of the USA
for more than a decade;
The impossibility in these conditions of maintaining at one and the same time th
e drive for the modernization of the economy, the arms race with imperialism, a
constant, if modest rise in the living standards of the masses and the maintenan
ce and expansion of the privileges of the bureaucracy. At least two if not three
of these objectives had to be abandoned.
The failure, predicted by Trotsky in the 1920s, of the conversion of extensive i
nto intensive industrialization. This conversion demanded giving priority to pro
blems of quality rather than quantity, exact calculations of costs, transparency
of economic mechanisms and the growing sovereignty of the consumers. All of whi
ch are incompatible with bureaucratic dictatorship;
The beginning of a pronounced social regression, expressed particularly by the e
xistence of 60 million poor and the marked deterioration of the health system (i
ncluding for several years an absolute fall in life expectancy);
The loss of any political legitimacy by the regime, with the appearance of broad
sectors of opposition (experts, writers, young people, the oppressed nationalit
ies, and workers acting to some extent independently);
A very deep ideological and moral crisis that the bureaucracy could no longer co

ntrol.
Gorbachev s defeat is above all the defeat of economic perestroika. Badly conceive
d from the beginning, changing direction several times, combining increasingly c
ontradictory objectives, perestroika ended up dismantling the old command econom
y without replacing it with anything coherent.
From stagnation to economic decline
After several somersaults, economic decline followed stagnation from 1990 onward
s. Galloping inflation contributed to precipitating the decline. The links betwe
en enterprises began to unravel. Consumer goods disappeared from the official di
stribution circuits, being gradually monopolized by various mafias and the free
market, where they were sold at exorbitant prices.
The essential minimal income in Moscow at the start of 1991 was 200 rubles a mon
th per person, which was still covered by the minimum wage. In October 1991 the
essential minimum income had risen to 521 rubles according to calculations by th
e unions. Some 90% of Muscovites got less than this sum. Since then the situatio
n has got still worse. And now we have the massive price rises of January 2, 199
2. Given this progressive deterioration of the living conditions of broad masses
, Gorbachev completely lost his popular base.
The fundamental driving force behind Gorbachev s foreign policy was from imperiali
sm to save the sinking ship. This led to counter-revolutionary regional accords
at the expense of the Central American and Cuban revolutions, and the liberation
struggles in South Africa and the Arab world. In this, Gorbachev was doing noth
ing more than continuing the long history of betrayals of the international revo
lution by Stalin, his successors and their acolytes: the betrayal of the Spanish
, Yugoslav and Greek revolutions, the betrayal of the opportunities for revoluti
onary breakthroughs in France and Italy in 1944-48 and 1968-9, and the betrayals
of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban (in the first phase) and Portuguese revolutio
ns.
However, if it was illusory to expect Gorbachev to succeed, it would also be an
error to close one s eyes to the profound and positive changes that took place in
the USSR under Gorbachev.
These changes are essentially summed up by glasnost, or, if you prefer, the subs
tantial extension of democratic liberties in practice enjoyed by the Soviet mass
es.
These liberties are of course limited, partial and not constitutionally guarante
ed and have been combined with authoritarian features that were accentuated in t
he last period of Gorbachev s reign. But these democratic liberties were real enou
gh. Many parties, political associations, social groupings, and independent work
ers organizations arose. A press entirely outside the control of the party s censor
ship appeared. Public demonstrations, often of great size, took place. There wer
e an increasing number of strikes. Elections offering the voters a choice of can
didates with genuinely different political orientations were organized.
To deny that this was a colossal change for the masses compared to the Stalinist
and post-Stalinist regimes, and to describe the Gorbachev regime as totalitarian ,
amounts to prettifying the Stalinist dictatorship.
Under Stalin there were millions of political prisoners. Under Gorbachev there w
ere less than in the USA, Britain, the Spanish State or Israel. Under Stalin all
strikes were bloodily suppressed. Under Gorbachev no strike was bloodily suppre
ssed.

Such a mistaken vision of the political reality in the USSR is the result of an
ultra-leftist conception of variants of political regimes. In this conception on
ly one distinction exists: the power of the Soviets and the fascist
or fascist-i
nclined bourgeois dictatorship. All intermediary forms disappear from view.
The August 1991 putschists wanted to severely limit or even suppress the democra
tic liberties that existed in reality. They intended to suppress the right to st
rike and independent workers organizations. This is why the putsch had to be opp
osed by all means available. And this is why the failure of the putsch should be
hailed.
This means the working masses of the ex-USSR must now undertake a struggle on tw
o fronts: for the defense, extension and consolidation of democratic liberties o
n the one hand, and on the other against privatization. To abandon one of these
two central struggles would be to sacrifice the fundamental interests of the wor
king class.
There is no chance of the development and victory of the political revolution in
the ex-USSR without the working class regaining its capacity for mass independe
nt political class organization. This objective, in turn, can only be realized b
y a long period of apprenticeship, of the development of struggles and the emerg
ence of a new vanguard. Without democratic liberties in reality, this process wi
ll be much longer, more difficult and would have fewer chances of reaching a suc
cessful conclusion. And without such a political revolution, the restoration of
capitalism is inevitable in the long term.
Gorbachev was not overthrown by a mass mobilization. Nor was he overthrown by an
offensive by imperialism or domestic bourgeois forces. He has been overthrown b
y a wing of the bureaucracy led by Boris Yeltsin.
Yeltsin: a man of the apparatus
Yeltsin, just as much, if not more than Gorbachev, represents a faction in the t
op levels of the nomenklatura. Yeltsin, by his whole past and education, is a ma
n of the apparatus. His gifts as a populist demagogue do not permit the modifica
tion of this judgement. If there is something that distinguished Yeltsin from Go
rbachev it is that he is less inclined to evasion, more authoritarian and thus m
ore dangerous for the masses.
People will say that, unlike Gorbachev, who continued in some vague fashion to c
all himself a socialist, Yeltsin has come out openly for the restoration of capi
talism. This is true. But professions of faith are not enough for us to form an
assessment of politicians. We have to look at what happens in practice and what
social interests they serve.
From this point of view, Yeltsin and his allies in the liquidation of the
n favour of the Commonwealth of Sovereign States represent a faction of
latura distinct from the bourgeois forces properly so-called (essentially
pen-millionaires , the new bourgeoisie), although they can overlap at the

USSR i
the nomenk
the lum
margins.

The most typical cases are those of the presidents of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan
who, together with Yeltsin, have betrayed Gorbachev (in the latter s own phrase) to
liquidate the USSR.
Both were leaders of the Stalinist apparatus in these two republics at the begin
ning of the Gorbachev era. Both continue to rely on the local, hardly changed, K
GB. At the start both played a waiting game, or even supported the putsch. They
have both used the legitimate revolt of the masses of their region against natio
nal oppression to convert themselves into nationalist leaders .

Their cynicism is manifested by their readiness to associate, at least for the t

ime being, with Yeltsin and his acolytes, who are authentic Great Russian chauvi
nists.
What we are seeing in the ex-USSR is a triangular struggle between: factions at
the top of the nomenklatura; directly restorationist, that is, bourgeois forces
in the social sense of the term; and the labouring masses. These three forces ar
e distinct, acting in society according to their own distinct interests.
New putsches are possible. Yeltsin may well rapidly lose popularity, given the a
nti-worker and anti-popular policies he is pursuing. Behind him can be seen the
sinister figure of Vladimir Shirinovsky, the Soviet LePen, who looks for inspira
tion at one and the same time to Stalin, the Tsar, and Pinochet; he has the supp
ort of a wing of the army and is furiously Great Russian, xenophobic, anti-semit
ic and racist. His popularity should not be underestimated.
We do not today face either a revolutionary or a pre-revolutionary situation in
the ex-USSR. Without doubt, the working class is infinitely stronger than its ad
versaries, far stronger than in 1917 or 1927. At the same time Stalinism is, as
we have always predicted, in the process of collapsing. But for it to be overthr
own by a political revolution, the working class must act as an independent poli
tical force, which is not the case today.
Due to the enormous discredit thrown on the very ideas of communism, socialism o
r Marxism by the Stalinist dictatorship, the void created by the profound ideolo
gical/moral crisis of Soviet society is not about to be filled by the working cl
ass. This is active, but only for a short-term immediate ends and in a fragmente
d and discontinuous way. The right wing has the political initiative.
The broken thread of history
Contrary to our legitimate hopes up until 1980-81 (the first rise of Solidarnosc
), the thread that leads from the revolt in the Vorkuta labour camp and the East
German uprising of 1953 through the Hungarian revolution of 1956 to the Prague S
pring and the first steps of Polish Solidarnosc has been broken. It will take tim
e to restore it.
Does this mean that a lasting restoration of the power of the nomenklatura or a
real restoration of capitalism are the most likely outcomes? Not at all. They ar
e just as unlikely as a rapid move to political revolution.
Certainly, the Yeltsin government has taken some initial steps towards capitalis
t restoration. But there is a huge distance between the beginning and the end of
such a process.
For a real restoration of capitalism, an extension of the commodity economy
whic
h remains today less developed in the ex-USSR than in the time of the New Econom
ic Policy of the 1920s is not enough. The big means of production and exchange m
ust also become commodities. This requires at least $1,000bn, a sum which is not
available in present conditions, either in the West or the ex-USSR itself.
It is also necessary for labour power to be subjected to the laws of the labour m
arket . This implies 30 to 40 million unemployed and a drop in living standards of
the order of 30 to 50%; this will meet with fierce resistance.
The most probable eventuality is a long period of decomposition and chaos. Our m
odest but real hope must be that in this period the Soviet working class will be
able gradually to reconquer its class independence. The main task of the small

and fragmented socialist forces is to link up with the workers and aid them to o
vercome the obstacles to that end.

Ernest Mandel
Why Keynes Isn t the Answer
The Twilight of Monetarism
(1992)
As the disastrous consequences of super-free market policies become apparent, vo
ices are being raised in capitalist and social democratic circles demanding stat
e intervention to revive the economy. But is it really an alternative; and would
a new round of state economic intervention and debt-financing of growth have be
neficial effects for working people? Here ERNEST MANDEL argues that traditional
Keynesian reflationary policies must be distinguished from the budget deficit po
licies of Thatcher and Reagan; and that capitalist reflation only brings short-t
erm advantages for the working class, and inevitably ends up in a new recession.
The fundamental idea of Keynesianism is that state spending, a national budget d
eficit, can be used to combat economic crisis and recession.
From a theoretical point of view, raising overall demand in a given country will
facilitate a recovery insofar as there is disposable productive capacity (unemp
loyed workers, stocks of raw materials, machines working below capacity). These
unused resources are mobilized by the additional purchasing power created by the
budget deficit. Only when these reserves are exhausted do you get the fatal ons
et of inflation.
But there is a snag. In order for the budget deficit not to fuel inflation befor
e full employment is reached, direct taxes must increase in the same proportion
as income.
Given that the bourgeoisie prefers to buy state bonds rather than pay taxes, and
that tax evasion by the bourgeoisie is endemic, the higher tax burden implied b
y Keynesian policies falls on the workers.
As the public debt grows, servicing this debt eats up a growing part of public s
pending, so there is a tendency for the budget deficit to grow without any corre
sponding beneficial effects on employment.
So in the end Keynesian expansion tends to undermine itself through growing infl
ation and diminishing returns from the initial budget deficit-driven push; a new r
ecession is the result. And the growing tax burden tends to redistribute income
towards the bourgeoisie.
The historical balance sheet of Keynesian policy is clear. The most extensive ex
periment, Roosevelt s New Deal in the United States during the 1930s, ended in fai
lure.
Despite the rise in public spending, it ended in the crisis of 1938 when unemplo
yment reached 10 million. It was the massive rearmament thanks to the war which
reduced mass unemployment.
There is something bizarre in the way in which neo-liberal dogmatists contrast t

heir supply-side policies to those based on creating demand through budget deficit
s. Never, in fact, have budget deficits been higher than under the neo-liberals c
hampion Ronald Reagan.
The same is true to a large extent of the reign of Mrs. Thatcher. They implement
ed record-breaking neo-Keynesian programmes while all the time professing quite
the opposite faith. The real debate was not about the size of the budget deficit
but what it was to be used for.
The facts speak for themselves. Reagan/Thatcher neo-Keynesianism has brutally re
inforced the austerity offensive everywhere. Social spending and spending on inf
rastructure have been cut; arms expenditure has expanded massively in the USA an
d Britain and to a lesser extent in Japan and Germany.
Subsidies to private enterprise have increased. Unemployment and widening social
inequalities have been stimulated. In the last 20 years the number of unemploye
d in the OECD countries has risen fourfold.
The overall social effect has been disastrous. You can learn in any college cour
se on economic development that the most productive long-term investments are th
ose in education, public health and infrastructure.
However, the neo-liberal dogmatists overlook this elementary truth when they app
roach problems from the point of view of an equilibrium which must be re-establish
ed at any cost. Their favourite targets for cuts are precisely education, health
care, social security and infrastructure, with the inevitable harmful effects,
including on productivity.
Does this mean that socialists prefer traditional Keynesianism and the welfare s
tate to the poisonous cocktail of monetarism and neo-Keynesianism currently on o
ffer? If our answer is positive, it must be heavily qualified.
Traditional Keynesianism implies various forms of the exercise and division of p
ower within the framework of bourgeois society. This leads to various forms of s
ocial contract and consensus with those who currently hold economic power, on th
eir terms.
This is a purely one-way consensus and it runs counter to the interests of the w
orking class. Traditional Keynesianism is only the lesser evil in that compared
to a deflationary policy insofar as it promotes an immediate and rapid fall in u
nemployment.
However, in present conditions neo-Keynesianism is leading to an increase in une
mployment and marginalization of growing sections of the population, with all so
rts of reactionary consequences.
Furthermore, advocates of traditional Keynesian policies have to deal with a fun
damental awkward fact; the effectiveness of their approach is being greatly redu
ced by the growth in the power of the multinational corporations. While of cours
e it is ridiculous to say that state intervention today is powerless, it is of c
ourse much less powerful than during the 1930s and 1950s.
Faced with the growth of transnational enterprises, the national state is no lon
ger an adequate economic instrument for the dominant factions of the bourgeoisie
. Thus, an effort is being consistently made to substitute supranational institu
tions for it, the classic case being the various institutions of the European Co
mmunity.
But many obstacles have to be overcome if supranational institutions are to take
on the characteristics of a real supranational state, for example in Europe.

European unification remains suspended between a vague confederation of sovereig

n states and a European federation with some of the characteristics of a state,
with a single currency, a central bank, a common industrial and agricultural pol
icy, joint army and police forces and, finally, a central government authority.
In the process of European capitalist unification there is a time bomb, which is
beginning to explode in the strikes in Italy and Greece. It is the simple fact
that the budgetary stabilisation required for monetary union will have an enormous
deflationary and austerity effect. This in itself should be cause enough for th
e workers movement to reject the Maastricht treaty.
Maastricht offers nothing more than an excuse for a continuation and toughening
of austerity policies. It is more vital than ever to continue the fight against
it.

Ernest Mandel
Socialism or neo-liberalism?
(February 1993)
Since the mid- 70s there has been a worldwide offensive of capital against labour
and the toiling masses of the third world. This offensive expresses the sharp de
terioration of the relationship of forces at the expense of the workers. It has
objective and subjective roots.
The objective roots are essentially the sharp rise of unemployment in the imperi
alist countries from 10 million to at least 50 million, if not more. The officia
l statistics are all government statistics, and they re all fake. In the third wor
ld countries, at least 500 million are unemployed. For the first time since the
end of World War II, unemployment is rising in the bureaucratised post-capitalis
t societies too.
The subjective roots lie essentially in the total failure of organised labour an
d mass movements to resist the capitalist offensive. In many countries these org
anisations have even spearheaded it: France, Italy, Spain and Venezuela, just to
name a few. This has undoubtedly made resistance to the capitalist offensive mo
re difficult.
But all this being said, one should not underestimate the concrete impact of pse
udo-liberal in reality neo-conservative
economic policies on world developments.
These policies, codified by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
and symbolised by the governments of Thatcher and Reagan and their many imitato
rs in the third world, have been an unmitigated disaster.
Under the pretext of giving priority to monetary stability, the fight against in
flation, and balanced budgets, social expenditure and the expenditure for infras
tructure have been ruthlessly cut. This has resulted in a worldwide rise in soci
al inequality, poverty, disease and threats to the environment. From a macro-eco
nomic point of view it is increasingly counterproductive and irrational. From a
macro-social point of view it is indefensible and odious. It has increasingly in
human results which threaten the survival of the human race.
I should point out the basic cynicism of the neo-conservative ideological offens
ive which accompanies the conservative economic policies. The neo-conservatives

say that they want to reduce state expenditure drastically. In reality, state ex
penditure has never been as high as in the 1980s and early 1990s under the neo-c
onservatives. What really happened was a shift away from social and infrastructu
re expenditure to military expenditure, which for that period can be estimated a
t $3 trillion, and to subsidies to business. The bailing out of bankrupt and nea
r bankrupt financial institutions like the savings and loans associations in the
United States, as well as the huge interest payments on the steeply rising debt
, belongs in that category.
The neo-conservatives say that they stand for universal human rights, but in rea
lity, given the unavoidable mass reactions against these antisocial policies, ne
o-conservative governments increasingly undermine and attack democratic libertie
s: trade union freedom, the right to abortion, freedom of the press, freedom to
travel. They create the appropriate climate in which extreme right-wing tendenci
es
racism, xenophobia, outright neo-fascism
can arise.
Third world poverty
The worldwide growth of poverty is disastrous. In the third world it has become
a historical catastrophe. According to official United Nations statistics, more
than 60 countries with a total of more than 800 million inhabitants have suffere
d an absolute decline of per capita domestic product between 1980 and 1990. In t
he poorest of these countries this decline is in the order of 30-50%. For the po
orest layers of these countries populations the figure oscillates around 50%. Per
capita domestic product in Latin America in 1950 was 45% of the imperialist cou
ntries. In 1988, it fell to 29.7%.
Decades of modest rise in public welfare were wiped out in a few years. What thi
s means concretely can be illustrated by the example of Peru. According to the N
ew York Times, more than 60% of the population of Peru is undernourished, 79% li
ve below the poverty level, which is quite arbitrarily fixed at $40 a month. Eve
n college-educated civil servants earn only $85 a month. This is not enough to p
ay for a month s car parking in that country.
If one takes into consideration the social differentiation inside the third worl
d countries, the situation is even more disastrous. The poorest inhabitants of t
he poorest country have today a daily food intake which equals that of a Nazi co
ncentration camp of the 1940s. A report of the United Nations World Health Organ
isation prepared for a December 1992 conference estimated that half a billion pe
ople suffer from chronic hunger in addition to several hundreds of millions of p
eople who suffer from seasonal malnutrition. Nearly 800 million people in the th
ird world suffer from hunger. If you add to that figure the number of hungry in
the post- capitalist and imperialist countries, you arrive at nearly one billion
people today suffering from hunger. And this is when there exists an overall si
tuation of overproduction of food.
In the north of Brazil, there is a new race of pygmies which has arisen, with an
average height 35 centimetres less than the average inhabitant of Brazil. The w
ay the bourgeois ruling class and its ideologues characterise these people is to
call them rat people. This characterisation is completely dehumanising, reminis
cent of the Nazis, and has very sinister implications. You know what is done to
rats.
There is widespread malnutrition involving insufficient consumption of vitamins,
minerals and animal proteins. Women and children especially have these deficien
cies. As a result, children in the third world run a risk of dying or catching g
rave diseases 20 times greater than that of children in the imperialist countrie
s.

The fate of children symbolises the rise of barbarism in the third world. This i
s not a question of the future; there barbarism has already started on a huge sc
ale. According to the statistics of UNICEF, every year 16 million children die f
rom hunger or curable diseases in the third world. This means that every four ye
ars there is an equal number of deaths of children as all the deaths of World Wa
r II, Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Bengal famine combined. Every four years a wo
rld war against children. There you have the world reality of imperialism and ca
pitalism in a nutshell. In addition, in south Asia, 20% of baby girls die before
the age of five; 25% die before the age of 15. Baby girl infanticide is growing
from year to year, combined with massive use of child labour under conditions o
f semi-slavery.
Growing inequality
The disastrous effects of neo-conservative economic policies are no way limited
to third world countries or to the living conditions of the mass of the inhabita
nts of post-capitalist societies. They have started to extend more slowly, but i
n a real way, to the imperialist countries too. In these countries, depending on
what source you use, between 55 and 70 million people live below the poverty le
vel. A dual society is developing, with a growing number of social groups less o
r not at all protected by the social security net: the unemployed, casual labour
ers, people living on welfare, mothers having to care for many children alone, d
emoralised petty criminals: these are some of the constituent elements of that u
nderclass.
Here is but one example which is very telling, very sad and very revolting. In t
he heart of what has been historically revolutionary Paris, where five major rev
olutions have started, every day thousands of migrants, workers and casual labou
rers, stand around waiting to be employed. Sometimes they are, sometimes they ar
en t. They are without any kind of social protection, without residence permit. Th
ey are competing among themselves to work for a pittance, because a pittance is
still higher than what they can get in their own countries.
The situation in the United States ghettos is typical of that trend. Youth unemp
loyment in the ghettos reaches 40% and most of these youths have no hope whatsoe
ver of finding any job in the future. The same phenomenon has spread in a more l
imited way to several southern European countries and Great Britain. Privatisati
on accentuates these trends.
While real wages actually declined in the USA, the number of people having gross
annual incomes of one million stable dollars has risen 60-fold. That of people
getting between $ 60,000 and $1 million has risen from 78,000 to 2 million, but
there s literally not a single worker among this new rich.
The rich get richer
The
ise
ion
the

perverse effects of neo-conservative policies on the world economy are likew

evident. Both the growing poverty of the third world and the third worldisat
of sectors of the population in the imperialist countries constitute one of
major brakes on any significant expansion of the world economy.

Third world debt has led to that perverse and scandalous development of a net fl
ow of capital from the south to the north, with the poorest parts of the poor co
untries subsidising the richest part of the rich countries. One could say in a c
ynical way that that s what capitalism is all about. Nevertheless, in this dimensi
on and amplitude it s at least a new phenomenon in the 20th century.
The same is true for the adverse development of the terms of trade and the role

of intermediaries on world price structure. It is very little known that the sec
ond largest contingent of third world exports after oil is coffee, which we all
drink. At this time, for western consumers, coffee is relatively cheap. A pound
of coffee cost around $5 in the western countries. The workers who produce that
coffee get 30-50 cents a day. The rest is taken in by middle men.
The greatest danger of the third worldisation in the south, the east, and the we
st is the spread of typical poverty-related epidemics like cholera and tuberculo
sis which were assumed to have been wiped out. The ominous threat of AIDS is lik
ewise poverty related. The former director of the World Health Organisation s anti
-AIDS program predicts that at the end of this century, 100 million people will
be HIV infected, of whom 25% will fall ill and die; 85% of these deaths will occ
ur in the third world.
This is not a result of some cultural or ethnic specificity, but of deficiencies
in education, prevention, health care and sanitation. At the same time, $7 bill
ion have been spent in the struggle against AIDS since the beginning of the epid
emic. Only 3% of this sum has been spent in the third world, where 85% of HIV-in
fected people live. It is obviously suicidal to believe, even for the capitalist
class, that the epidemic will not reach the imperialist countries too.
Under these circumstances, the pope s call to limit the struggle against AIDS to s
elf-restraint and the chastity of individuals and to oppose the use of condoms a
nd the contraceptive pill is totally irresponsible. The neo-conservative policie
s of cutting health and education budgets everywhere likewise appear irresponsib
le and suicidal. The overall effects are as economically obnoxious as they are s
ocially obnoxious.
Market economy
In all the university departments dealing with development policies, in all the
countries of the world, it is considered to be a truism that the most productive
investments are those for education, health care and infrastructure. But if you
cross the corridor into the sub-department of economics called public finance,
then you suddenly hear that a balanced budget is more important than investment
in education, health care and infrastructure, and that there have to be ruthless
cuts in these budgets in order to stop inflation.
It should be stressed that pseudo-liberal, neo- conservative policies are being
applied within the framework of a capitalist-dominated world economy. Two import
ant conclusions can be drawn from that basic fact of life.
First, much of the ranting about the alleged superiority of the so-called market
economy is just eyewash. Market economy in the pure or near pure form does not
exist and has never existed anywhere.
Second, any alternative economic policy applied within that same framework, like
the neo-Keynesian policies now proposed by a growing number of international in
stitutions and leading capitalists, will not result in any basic change in all t
hese horrible realities. To give you just one example: the tremendous technologi
cal backwardness imposed upon the third world by imperialism means that while th
at part of the world consumes only 15% of the world s total energy expenditure, it
has to spend five to six times more energy per dollar s worth of domestic product
than the richest countries.
Hence the question arises, don t we need a basic alternative not only to pseudo-li
beral policies, but to the whole capitalist system in all its variants in order
to get to a qualitatively better world than the present one? My answer is obviou
sly yes. That s why we need socialism, and that s why I am and will remain a sociali

st.
Humankind is facing frightful threats to its physical survival: nuclear, chemica
l, and biological warfare, traditional massive wars which could become nuclear w
ars by the bombing of nuclear power stations with conventional weapons, growing
risks of destruction of the environment typified by the greenhouse effect and th
e ozone hole, destruction of the tropical forests, desertification of large part
s of Africa and Asia and the cumulative effects of epidemic catastrophes.
Many people have raised the question, Isn t it already too late? Isn t doomsday unavo
idable? Will humankind be able to survive the coming 50 years? We believe that hu
mankind is not doomed. This is not wishful thinking or pure intuition. It is a b
elief based upon solid scientific data and the ongoing dynamic of scientific res
earch.
Just one example: there exists a concrete, serious approach to completely revers
e the desertification of Africa; to irrigate the desert in order to make it agai
n into a rich food-producing region like it had been up until 1,500 years ago; t
o inspire its inhabitants to apply nature-conserving agricultural techniques to
switch bach from commercial crops to crops which enable them to feed Africans in
a healthy manner. The effect of a green, wooded Sahara on the world climate wou
ld be really stunning.
The problem to be solved in this case is not a technical, natural or cultural on
e. It is a social one. In order for this solution to be applied, you need a soci
al order in which greed, the desire to accumulate personal wealth regardless of
overall social and economic costs, and short-term pseudo- rationality substituti
ng for long-term rationality do not determine social and economic behaviour. We
need power in the hands of social forces which can prevent individuals, classes
and major class fractions from imposing their will on society. Power needs to be
in the hands of the toilers willing to let solidarity, cooperation and generosi
ty prevail by democratic means over short-sighted egoism and irresponsibility.
It is not a question of awareness. The rich, the capitalists, the powers that be
are not stupid. Many of them are perfectly aware of, for instance, the ecologic
al dangers. They try to take them into consideration, include them in their econ
omic planning and projection, but under the pressure of competition, they are fo
rced to act in such a way that the overall threat remains.
Some say that science and technology have developed an irresistible logic of the
ir own, and that uncontrolled development of science and technology is bringing
humankind to the brink of extinction, but this is not the correct way of seeing
things. This is what you could call, in terms of Marxist philosophy, reified thi
nking. Science and technology are presented as forces divorced from the human be
ings who control them. But this is incorrect.
Workers democracy
Science and technology have no power independent of the social groups who invent
ed them, apply them, and bend them to their interests as they see them. The key
problem is to subject science and technology to conscious social control in the
democratically established interests of the great majority of human beings. To f
ree them from submission to special interests, which abuse them regardless of th
e long-term interests of the human race. For that purpose the organisation and s
tructure of society itself must be subjected to democratically determined, consc
ious control.
What socialism is all about in the last analysis is the conquest of human freedo
m for the greatest possible number to decide their own fate in all key sectors o

f life. This is, in the first place, true for all wage earners, who are under th
e economic compulsion to sell their labour power and who represent today a mass
of people bigger than they ever were in the past. There are now more than 1 bill
ion wage earners.
Those who plead for minority rule over and above that freedom
the freedom of the
se wage earners to decide in a democratic way which priorities to apply to produ
ction and how to produce and distribute those who state that this freedom should
be subordinated to the rule of market laws, rule by the rich, or rule by the ex
perts, rule by the churches, rule by the state or by the party, arrogantly assum
e the perfectness of their knowledge and their wisdom and underestimate the capa
city of the masses to equal or overtake them. We reject these claims as empirica
lly unfounded and morally repulsive, leading to increasingly inhuman consequence
s.
We share Marx s warning that the educators in turn have to be educated. Only the d
emocratically organised self-activity of the masses can achieve that. Socialism
is a social order in which these masses decide their own fate in a free way.
In order to look at the world as it is today, we have to look at it in a way tha
t is different from what you generally read in the newspapers or see on televisi
on. People are starting to fight back.
In Uruguay, the people have just rejected, in a referendum by 74% of the vote, p
rivatisation of the telephone company. British miners, and especially Italian wo
rkers, have reacted to the austerity policies which their governments tried to p
ut down their throats in a very big way. Both groups have been on strike against
these austerity policies. In Germany we have witnessed, and this is most heartwarming, a radical reaction of the youth, against the rise on xenophobia, racism
and neo-fascism.
This is completely different from what happened at the end of the 1920s and the
beginning of the 1930s. At that time the Nazis conquered the high schools, the u
niversities
the youth
much before they conquered political power. Today, the mas
s of the youth is moving against xenophobia, racism and neo- fascism while polit
ical parties are going to the right.
The most gratifying example is that of Brazil, where there is a fight back of th
e working class against a corrupt reactionary government. I m rather pessimistic,
I don t think they will win, but a challenge to bourgeois power in this seventh la
rgest country in the world, where there are now more industrial workers than in
Germany in 1918, has at least been made possible.
There is, however, a sober side to the world picture, and that is that many of t
hese movements are generally single-issue movements and are discontinuous becaus
e of the lack of an alternative social order.
Socialism
Over this whole world development hovers what we call in my movement the worldwi
de crisis of credibility of socialism. Workers have no confidence whatsoever in
Stalinism, post-Stalinism, Maoism, Eurocommunism, or social democracy.
Under these circumstances, neither of the two basic social classes, capital and
labour, is capable in the short or medium term of imposing its historical soluti
on to the world crisis. The capitalists can t for objective reasons, because the w
orking class is much too strong. It is much stronger than it was in the 1930s. B
ut the working class cannot solve this world crisis either because it has no bel
ief in an alternative social order.

So we are in for a protracted crisis, the outcome of which is at this stage unpr
edictable. We have to fight for an outcome in favour of the working class, in fa
vour of socialism, in favour of the physical survival of humankind. Because that s
the real choice today. Not socialism or barbarism, but socialism or the physica
l extinction of the human race.
I see the key task of all of us socialists as threefold.
In the first place to defend unconditionally all the demands of the masses every
where in the world which correspond to their real needs as they see them, withou
t subordinating this support to any priorities of a political nature or of any s
pecific power scheme. We have to go back to the example of what the labour movem
ent did in its inception and during the period of its greatest growth from the e
nd of the 188os up until the eve of World War I.
Socialists had two key goals at that time: the eight-hour day and universal suff
rage, and they didn t start from the question: How are we going to realise that, i
n what form of power, what form of government? No, they said these are objective
needs of human emancipation, and we will fight for them by all means possible a
nd necessary and we will see what will come out.
In some countries the eight-hour day was conquered by general strikes. In other
countries it was realised through governments which one could consider workers go
vernments. In others it was given by the bourgeoisie as a concession to a powerf
ul workers movement, thereby trying to prevent it from making a revolution. But
that s neither here nor there. The real fact was that the eight-hour day was, as M
arx and Engels pointed out, in the objective interest of the working class, and
that is the reason why you shouldn t subordinate the fight for such demands to any
pre-established power scheme.
I have many times reminded the comrades of the famous formula of that great tact
ician Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Lenin quoted very approvingly,
First start the st
ruggle, and then we ll see . The important thing is to start the struggle; what come
s afterwards depends on the relationship of forces, but the struggle itself chan
ges the relationship of forces.
The second task of socialists and communists today is basic socialist education
and propaganda. Humankind cannot be saved without substituting for this present
society a fundamentally different society. You can call it anything you want to,
the label makes no difference, but its contents have to be specified, the conte
nts of socialism as it will be accepted by the masses. After the disastrous expe
riences of social democracy, Stalinism and post- Stalinism, the image of sociali
sm can only be one of radical emancipation, having a dimension of radical femini
sm, radical defence of the environment, radical antiwar pacifist consciousness,
political pluralism and total identification with human rights without exception
. Socialism will be accepted only if it is considered radically emancipatory on
a world scale without exception.
The third condition for solving the terrible crisis of credibility of socialism
is the reunification of socialism and freedom. The bourgeoisie has made a terrib
le strategic mistake in raising the human rights issue against socialists the wo
rld over. This will become a boomerang hitting it again and again. But in order
for that to happen, the reunification of socialism and human freedom has to be c
omplete.
In the mid- 20s, the traditional song of the Italian labour movement, Bandiera Ros
sa, contained these wonderful words, Long live communism and freedom!
One of the gravest crimes of Stalinism, post-Stalinism and social democracy has

been to provoke the historical divorce between these two values. We have to come
back to that.
In the United States in the mid- 20s two anarchists, anticommunists
they had absol
utely no sympathy for communism Sacco and Vanzetti, were condemned to death by t
he reactionary bourgeois government. Their cause was taken up by the Communist P
arty of the United States and by the Communist International. The fact that they
were anarchists, anticommunists, didn t make any difference whatsoever. I say wit
h pride that our comrade James P. Cannon played a significant role in organising
that worldwide campaign for these two anarchists. That s the tradition we have to
go back to without any restrictions.
Whoever commits crimes against human rights under whatever pretext in whatever c
ountry should be condemned by the socialists-communists of this world. That s the
precondition to restore confidence among the masses in our movement. Once that c
onfidence is restored we get a moral power, a moral credit, a moral strength whi
ch has 10 times more punch than all the weaponry which the capitalists control.
In defence of Marxism
I want to tell my friends at the Marxist School that they are absolutely right t
o stand for Marxism and not to give in in the slightest way to the anti-Marxist
pressures which are all around us. Some are open, some more diffuse, but they ar
e all around us.
Marxism is the best thing that has happened to social thought and action in the
last 150 years. Those who deny that, those who make Marxism responsible for Stal
inist counter-revolution, for social democratic support for colonial wars, are e
ither ignorant or deliberate liars. Marxism has given humankind two basic conque
sts which we have to defend, but with the assurance, the self-confidence that we
are defending a good cause.
Marxism is the science of society. It is the understanding in a coherent way of
what has been going on for the last 200 years, if not much more than that, on th
e basis of a tremendous wealth of empirical information and without any valuable
, even partially valuable, alternative among the social sciences.
We make no predictions about the future. The only scientific form of Marxism is
open Marxism. Marxism which, like Marx himself said, integrates constructive dou
bt. Everything remains open to reconsideration, but only on the basis of fact. T
hose who do this in an irresponsible way without taking facts into consideration
, those who throw away this tremendous tool of understanding world reality in ex
change for nothing but scepticism, irrationality, mystification, or mythology se
rve no positive purpose.
As important as Marxism is as a science, its second basic component is just as i
mportant, and that is its moral component. Marx himself formulated this in a ver
y radical way. From his youth through to the end of his life he didn t waver for o
ne minute from the definition of what he called the categorical imperative.
That is to fight against any condition in which human beings are despised, alien
ated, exploited, oppressed or denied basic human dignity. Whatever the pretexts
are for the justification of such denials, we have to oppose them unconditionall
y. Understand that you cannot be happier than if you have dedicated your life to
this defence of human rights everywhere in the world: the defence of the exploi
ted, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the despised.
There is no better way to be a good human being in this world than to dedicate y
our life to this great cause. That s why the future is with Marxism.

Note
1. Transcript of a lecture given at the New York Marxist School on February 21,
1993. Slightly abridged, from Bulletin in Defense of Marxism.