A brief history of non-state actors

The west has long pointed an accusing finger at Pakistans

policy of dealing with terrorists, alleging that: a) the state
differentiates between those that directly attack the country,
its citizens, soldiers and institutions the bad Taliban and
those that operate across the eastern border in Afghanistan,
and westwards in Occupied Kashmir and beyond the good
Taliban; and b) that the Deep State actively supports the
former. This accusation has come to be known as Pakistans
good and bad Taliban policy

However, not too long ago, there were no good and bad
Taliban. In fact, there were no Taliban there were
mujahideen. And go a little further back, there were no
mujahids either, only lashkars: groups of civilians banding
(or banded) together for a common, overt or covert, cause.
Over the course of history, numerous countries across the
globe, Pakistan included, have nurtured and used civilians to
either supplement certain requirements of the state or act in
a certain manner on the states behest

These

are

known

as

non-state

actors

.
It all started back in 1947/48, with the fate of the princely
state of Kashmir hanging in a fine balance. A motley crew of

tribal fighters from across Fata and the then North West
Frontier Province (NWFP), coupled with state irregulars,
moved towards the state on the pretext of suppressing a
rebellion but soon turned their focus towards Srinagar. Thats
when Hari Singh solicited the help of our neighbours, who
agreed to help, with the caveat of Singh signing off on the
accession to India

The rallying cry for the 1947 Kashmir incursion had been a
potent mix of patriotism and religion: nationalistic Islam,
shall

we

say

The next time this came around was in 1970/71, when

General Yahya Khan, with the Jamaat-e-Islami, formed,
trained, armed and unleashed on the hapless Bengalis, two
organisations: Al-Badr and Al-Shams. These two are the first
instance of an organised non-state organisation being used
by

the

state

In this particular episode, nationalism took a secondary role

to religion. The groups had been used to smash seculars and
anti-nationalists. To put it plainly, Pakistani nationalism died
in Bangladesh in 1971 and was replaced by religion
.

Then

Afghanistan

happened

.
Much and more has been written about Pakistans role in the

Afghan resistance, which was what it was, until General Zia

decided to use religion to turn it into jihad. From 1979
onwards, Pakistan became the landing ground and launching
pad for any Muslim who wanted to fight in Afghanistan. And
since religion was now the rallying cry against the invading
infidel, madressahs mushroomed across the length and
breadth of the country. Midway through the resistance, the
quintessential jihadist outfit was formed, known as the
Harkatul Jihad al Islami. (HuJI). Retrospectively, the HuJI
came to be the parent group for other outfits such as the
Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM), the Harkatul Ansar (HuA) and
the

Jaish-e-Mohammad

(JeM).

But not of all these groups were focused on the Russians.

Zia, being who he was, (a perfect opportunist) saw the
physical space created by the Afghan mujahids, and the
success of the jihad injection into Afghanistan, to nurture the
next crop of non-state actors, for use on the eastern front.
Groups such as those named above, after the Soviet retreat,
recalibrated their focus towards Kashmir. It is widely believed
that three groups: the HuJi, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the JeM
emerged

from

the

same

source.

By this time, hundreds of jihadi outfits had emerged. Some

were fighting in Afghanistan, others in Kashmir. Many had
disbanded and many small ones had grouped together.

Thousands of seminaries were operating unchecked and

churning out crop after crop of young men, brainwashed with
a skewed version of religion, and trained in the use of
weapons

As the last Soviet tanks rolled out of Afghanistan, a bloody

civil war was already underway. A few years in, no clear
winner emerged. It was in the centre of this bloody mess
that the Taliban were born. The group swiftly grew, with a
little help from their friends, to become the de facto rulers of
Afghanistan in 1996. It is also widely alleged that as the
Taliban rose to power in southern Afghanistan, they were
approached by

some friends across the border,

who

promised active and passive support for the Talibans

takeover of the country. The rest, as they say, is history.
But the Taliban were not non-state actors in their own
backyard. However, their ranks were swelled through a
constant flow of personnel from other non-state actors
named earlier, which, over time, increased the amount of
influence one had over the Taliban. But we digress.
Till this point, Pakistans engagement with non-state actors
hadnt caused much trouble. But 9/11 changed everything.
Two major events are worth mentioning: First, when the US
hammer came down on Afghanistan there was no anvil on
the Pakistani side to stem the influx of escaping Al-Qaeda

and Taliban personnel. They scurried over the border, pretty

much as far into the country as they wanted to. Second,
when General Musharraf decided to abandon the Taliban,
he made two tactical errors: a) he chose to stick with groups
which were not operating there; and b) in siding with the US,
he created enemies for himself and Pakistan

This is where and how the violent non-state actor known as

the

Tehreek-e-Taliban

Pakistan

was

born

Why is this history necessary and does it serve

any

purpose?

Pakistan has a long, chequered and bloody history with the

use of non-state actors. Erroneous decisions by people in
power and other state institutions have created monsters
out

of

those

who

once

did

their

bidding.

Is Pakistan going to go the whole nine yards this time? The

signs, unfortunately, say no.