Constructing International Politics

Author(s): Alexander Wendt

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 71-81
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539217 .
Accessed: 03/01/2012 15:49
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.

http://www.jstor.org

ConstructingAlexanderWendt
biternationalPolitics
John J. Mearsheimer's
"The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions"1is welcome particularlyin
two respects.First,it is the most systematicattemptto date by a neorealistto
address criticalinternationalrelations (IR) theory.2Second, it reminds neoliberalsand criticaltheorists,normallylocked in theirown tug-of-war,
thatthey
have a common,non-realistinterestin the institutionalbases of international
life.3"False Promise" is likely,therefore,
to spur productivediscussions on all
sides.
it will be hard for most criticaltheoriststo take seriouslya
Unfortunately,
discussion of their research program so full of conflations,half-truths,
and
misunderstandings.However, to some extentmisunderstandingis inevitable
when anthropologistsfromone culturefirstexplore another.A dialogue between these two culturesis overdue,and "False Promise"is a good beginning.
CriticalIR "theory,"however,is not a single theoryIt is a familyof theories that includes postmodernists(Ashley, Walker), constructivists(Adler,
Kratochwil,Ruggie, and now Katzenstein),neo-Marxists(Cox, Gill), feminists
(Peterson,Sylvester),and others. What unites them is a concern with how
world politicsis "socially constructed,"4
which involves two basic claims: that
the fundamental structuresof internationalpolitics are social rather than
strictlymaterial(a claim that opposes materialism),and thatthese structures
AlexanderWendtis AssociateProfessor
ofPoliticalScienceat Yale University.
For their exceptionallydetailed and helpful comments I am gratefulto Mike Barnett,Mlada
Bukovansky,Bud Duvall, PeterKatzenstein,Mark Laffey,
David Lumsdaine,Sylvia Maxfield,Nina
Tannenwald,JuttaWeldes, and the membersof the Yale IR Reading Group.
1. JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"The False Promiseof InternationalInstitutions,"
International
Security,
Vol.
19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95). Subsequent referencesappear in parenthesesin the text.
2. Other effortsinclude Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Traditionof Political Realism,"
International
Organization,
Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 287-304, and Markus Fischer,"Feudal
Europe, 800-1300,"International
Organization,
Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-466.
3. On neoliberalismand criticaltheory,see RobertKeohane, "Internationalinstitutions:Two approaches,"International
StudiesQuarterly,
Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988),pp. 379-396,and Wendt,
"CollectiveIdentityFormationand the InternationalState,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.
88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396. Mearsheimer treats collective securityas a third form of
institutionalism,
but thisis unwarranted.Collectivesecurityis an approach to internationalorder,
arguable on eitherneoliberalor criticalgrounds,not a formof institutionalanalysis.
4. This makes themall "constructivist"
in a broad sense, but as the criticalliteraturehas evolved,
this termhas become applied to one particularschool.
International
Security,
Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81
( 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.

71

International
Security20:1 | 72

shape actors' identitiesand interests,ratherthan just theirbehavior (a claim

that opposes rationalism).However, having these two claims in common no
more makes criticaltheorya single theorythan does the factthatneorealism
and neoliberalismboth use game theorymakes them a single theory.Some
criticaltheoristsare statistsand some are not;some believe in scienceand some
do not; some are optimistsand some pessimists;some stressprocess and some
structure.5Thus, in my reply I speak only for myselfas a "constructivist,"
hoping thatothercriticaltheoristsmay agree withmuch ofwhat I say I address
fourissues: assumptions,objectiveknowledge,explainingwar and peace, and
policymakers'responsibilities.

Assumptions
I share all five of Mearsheimer's "realist" assumptions (p. 10): that international politicsis anarchic,and thatstateshave offensivecapabilities,cannotbe
100 percentcertainabout others'intentions,wish to survive,and are rational.
We even share two more: a commitmentto states as units of analysis,and to
the importanceof systemicor "thirdimage" theorizing.
The last bears emphasis,forin juxtaposing"structure"to "discourse" and in
emphasizing the role of individuals in "criticaltheory"(p. 40), Mearsheimer
obscuresthe factthatconstructivists
are structuralists.
Indeed, one of our main
objectionsto neorealismis that it is not structuralenough: that adopting the
individualisticmetaphorsof micro-economicsrestrictsthe effectsof structures
to state behavior,ignoringhow theymightalso constitutestate identitiesand
interests.6Constructiviststhinkthat state interestsare in importantpart con5. These are farmore than differencesof "emphasis," as suggested by Mearsheimer'sdisclaimer,
note 127.
6. "Constitute"is an importanttermin criticaltheory,with a special meaningthatis not captured
by related termslike "comprise," "consist of," or "cause." To say that "X [forexample, a social
structure]constitutesY [forexample, an agent]," is to say thatthe propertiesof those agents are
made possible by,and would not existin the absence of,the structureby which theyare "constituted." A constitutiverelationshipestablishesa conceptuallynecessaryor logical connectionbetween X and Y, in contrastto the contingentconnectionbetween independentlyexistingentities
thatis establishedby causal relationships.
The identity-behaviordistinctionis partly captured by Robert Powell's distinctionbetween
preferencesover outcomes and preferencesover strategies;RobertPowell, "Anarchyin International RelationsTheory,"International
Organization,
Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344. The
main exceptionto the mainstreamneglectof structuraleffectson stateidentityis KennethWaltz's
argumentthatanarchyproduces "like units"; KennethWaltz,TheoryofInternational
Politics(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979),pp. 74-77. Constructivists
thinkthereare morepossibilitiesthan
this;see AlexanderWendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It: The Social Constructionof Power
Politics,"International
Organization,
Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Constructing
International
Politics| 73

structedby systemicstructures,not exogenous to them;this leads to a sociological ratherthan micro-economicstructuralism.

Where neorealistand constructivist
structuralismsreallydiffer,
however,is
in theirassumptions about what structureis made of. Neorealists thinkit is
made only of a distributionof material capabilities,whereas constructivists
thinkit is also made of social relationships.Social structureshave threeelements:shared knowledge,materialresources,and practices.7
First,social structuresare defined,in part,by shared understandings,expectations,or knowledge.These constitutethe actorsin a situationand the nature
of theirrelationships,whethercooperativeor conflictual.A security
for
dilemma,
example, is a social structurecomposed of intersubjectiveunderstandingsin
which states are so distrustfulthat they make worst-caseassumptions about
each others'intentions,and as a resultdefinetheirinterestsin self-helpterms.
A securitycommunity
is a different
social structure,one composed of shared
knowledge in which statestrustone anotherto resolve disputes withoutwar.8
This dependence of social structureon ideas is the sense in which constructivism has an idealist (or "idea-ist") view of structure.What makes these ideas
(and thus structure)"social," however,is theirintersubjective
quality In other
words, sociality (in contrastto "materiality,"in the sense of brute physical
capabilities),is about shared knowledge.
Second, social structuresinclude materialresourceslike gold and tanks. In
contrastto neorealists' desocialized view of such capabilities,constructivists
argue thatmaterialresourcesonly acquire meaningforhuman action through
the structureof shared knowledge in which theyare embedded.9For example,
500 Britishnuclear weapons are less threateningto the United States than 5
North Korean nuclear weapons, because the Britishare friendsof the United
States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmityis a functionof
shared understandings.As studentsof world politics,neorealistswould probably not disagree, but as theoriststhe example poses a big problem,since it
completelyeludes theirmaterialistdefinitionof structure.Materialcapabilities
as such explain nothing;theireffectspresuppose structuresof shared knowledge, which vary and which are not reducibleto capabilities.Constructivism
is therefore
social relations
compatiblewithchangesin materialpower affecting
7. What follows could also serve as a rough definitionof "discourse."
8. See Karl Deutsch, et al., PoliticalCommunity
and theNorthAtlanticArea (Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress, 1957).
9. For a good general discussion of thispoint,see Douglas Porpora,"CulturalRules and Material
Relations,"SociologicalTheory,
Vol. 11,No. 2 (July1993), pp. 212-229.

International
Security20:1 | 74

(cf. Mearsheimer,p. 43), as long as those effectscan be shown to presuppose

stilldeeper social relations.
Third,social structuresexist,not in actors'heads nor in materialcapabilities,
but in practices.Social structureexists only in process. The Cold War was a
structureof shared knowledge that governed great power relationsfor forty
years,but once theystopped actingon thisbasis, it was "over."
In sum, social structuresare real and objective,not "just talk." But this
objectivitydepends on shared knowledge,and in thatsense social lifeis "ideas
all the way down" (until you get to biology and natural resources).Thus, to
ask "when do ideas, as opposed to power and interest,matter?"is to ask the
wrong question. Ideas always matter,since power and interestdo not have
effectsapart fromthe shared knowledge that constitutesthem as such.10The
real question, as Mearsheimernotes (p. 42), is why does one social structure
exist, like self-help(in which power and self-interest
determinebehavior),
ratherthan another,like collectivesecurity(in which theydo not).
The explanatoryas opposed to normativecharacterof this question bears
emphasis. Constructivistshave a normative interest in promoting social
change,but theypursue thisby tryingto explain how seeminglynaturalsocial
structures,like self-helpor the Cold War,are effectsof practice (this is the
"critical"side of criticaltheory).This makes me wonder about Mearsheimer's
repeatedreferences(I count fourteen)to criticaltheorists'"goals," "aims," and
"hopes" to make peace and love prevail on Earth. Even if we all had such
hopes (which I doubt), and even if these were ethicallywrong (thoughMearsheimerseems to endorse them;p. 40), theyare beside the point in evaluating
criticaltheoriesof world politics. If criticaltheoriesfail,this will be because
theydo not explain how the world works,not because of theirvalues. Emphasizing thelatterrecallstheold realisttacticofportrayingopponentsas utopians
more concerned with how the world ought to be than how it is. Critical
theoristshave normativecommitments,
just as neorealistsdo, but we are also
simplytryingto explain the world.

Objectivity
Mearsheimer suggests that criticaltheoristsdo not believe that there is an
objectiveworld out thereabout which we can have knowledge (pp. 41ff).This
is not the case. There are two issues here,ontologicaland epistemological.
10. On thesocial contentofinterests,
see Roy D'Andrade and Claudia Strauss,eds., HumanMotives
and CulturalModels (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1992).

Politics| 75
Constructing
International

The ontologicalissue is whethersocial structureshave an objectiveexistence,

which I addressed above. Social structuresare collectivephenomena thatconfrontindividuals as externallyexistingsocial facts.The Cold War was just as
real forme as it was forMearsheimer.
The epistemologicalissue is whetherwe can have objectiveknowledge of
these structures.Here Mearsheimerignoresa key distinctionbetween modern
and postmodern criticaltheorists.The latterare indeed skeptical about the
possibilityof objectiveknowledge,althoughin theirempiricalwork even they
however,are modernistswho
attendto evidence and inference.Constructivists,
theoriesagainst evidence. In an
fullyendorse the scientificprojectof falsifying
approach to social
articlecited by Mearsheimer,I advocated a scientific-realist
inquiry,which takes a very pro-scienceline.1"And despite his claims,thereis
now a substantial body of constructivistempirical work that embodies a
wholly conventionalepistemology.12
Mearsheimeris right,however,that criticaltheoristsdo not thinkwe can
make a clean distinctionbetween subject and object. Then again, almost all
philosophersof science today rejectsuch a naive epistemologyAll observation
is theory-ladenin the sense that what we see is mediated by our existing
theories,and to thatextentknowledge is inherentlyproblematic.But thisdoes
The world is
not mean thatobservation,let alone reality,is theory-determined.
still out thereconstrainingour beliefs,and may punish us forincorrectones.
Montezuma had a theorythatthe Spanish were gods, but it was wrong,with
disastrousconsequences. We do not have unmediatedaccess to the world,but
this does not preclude understandinghow it works.

ExplainingWarand Peace
Mearsheimerframesthe debate between realistsand criticaltheoristsas one
between a theoryof war and a theoryof peace. This is a fundamentalmistake.
Problemin InternationalRelationsTheory,"Inter11. See AlexanderWendt,"The Agent-Structure
nationalOrganization,Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; and, for fullerdiscussion, Ian
Shapiro and Alexander Wendt,"The DifferencethatRealism Makes," Politicsand Society,Vol. 20,
No. 2 (June1992), pp. 197-223.
Studies
12. See, among others,Michael Barnett,"Institutions,Roles, and Disorder,"International
Quarterly,
Vol. 37, No. 3 (September1993),pp. 271-296; David Lumsdaine,Moral Visionin InternationalPolitics(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993); Samuel Barkinand Bruce Cronin,"The
Organization,Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter1994), pp. 107-130; Rey
State and the Nation," International
Koslowski and FriedrichKratochwilj,"UnderstandingChange in InternationalPolitics,"InternaVol. 48, No. 2 (Spring1994),pp. 215-248;Thomas Bierstekerand CynthiaWeber,
tionalOrganization,
as Social Construct(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, forthcoming);
eds., State Sovereignty
NationalSecurity(workingtitle),forthcoming.
and Peter Katzenstein,ed., Constructing

International
Security20:1 | 76

Social constructiontalk is like game theorytalk: analyticallyneutralbetween

conflictand cooperation."3Critical theorydoes not predict peace.14 War no
more disproves criticaltheorythan peace disproves realism. The confusion
stems fromconflatingdescriptionand explanation.
The descriptiveissue is the extentto which states engage in practices of
realpolitik
(warfare,balancing,relative-gainsseeking) versus acceptingthe rule
of law and institutionalconstraintson theirautonomy States sometimesdo
engage in power politics,but this hardlydescribes all of the past 1300 years,
and even less today,when most states follow most internationallaw most of
the time,15and when war and securitydilemmas are the exceptionratherthan
the rule,Great Powers no longertend to conquer small ones, and freetrade is
expanding ratherthan contracting.16The relativefrequencyof realpolitik,
however,has nothingto do with "realism."Realism should be seen as an explanationof realpolitik,
not a descriptionof it.Conflatingthetwo makes it impossible
to tell how well the one explains the other,and leads to the tautologythatwar
makes realismtrue.Realism does not have a monopoly on the ugly and brutal
side of internationallife.Even if we agree on a realpolitik
description,we can
rejecta realistexplanation.
The explanatoryissue is whystates engage in war or peace. Mearsheimer's
portrayalof constructivist
"causal logic" on thisissue is about 30 percentright.
The logic has two elements,structureand agency.On the one hand, constructivist theorizingtries to show how the social structureof a system makes
actionspossible by constituting
actorswithcertainidentitiesand interests,and
materialcapabilities with certainmeanings. Missing fromMearsheimer's account is the constructivist
emphasis on how agency and interactionproduce
and reproducestructuresof shared knowledge over time.Since it is not possible here to discuss the various dynamics throughwhich this process takes
place,17 let me illustrateinstead. And since Mearsheimer does not offera
13. On the social basis of conflict,see Georg Simmel, Conflictand the Webof GroupAffiliations
(Glencoe,Ill.: Free Press,1955). This is also why I preferto avoid the term"institutionalism,"
since
it associates socialitywith peace and cooperation.
14. Fischer's suggestion that criticaltheorypredictscooperationin feudal Europe is based on a
failureto understandthe fullimplicationsof thispoint; see Fischer,"Feudal Europe, 800-1300."
15. See Louis Henkin,How NationsBehave(New York:Council on ForeignRelations,1979), p. 47.
16. On the inadequacy of "realist"descriptionsof internationalpolitics,see Paul Schroeder,"HistoricalReality vs. Neo-realistTheory,"International
Security,Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp.
108-148.
17. For a start,see Alexander Wendt,"CollectiveIdentityFormation,"and Emanuel Adler,"CognitiveEvolution,"in Emanuel Adler and BeverlyCrawford,eds., Progressin PostwarInternational
Relations(New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1991), pp. 43-88. The best introductionto processes of social constructionremainsPeter Bergerand Thomas Luckmann,The Social Construction
ofReality(New York:AnchorBooks, 1966).

Constructing
International
Politics| 77

neorealist explanation for inter-statecooperation, conceding that terrainto

institutionalists,
let me focus on the "hard case" of why states sometimesget
into securitydilemmas and war, that is, why theysometimesengage in realpolitikbehavior.
In "Anarchyis What States Make of It" I argued that such behavior is a
self-fulfilling
prophecy,18and thatthis is due to both agency and social structure.Thus, on the agency side, what states do to each otheraffectsthe social
structurein which theyare embedded, by a logic of reciprocityIf theymilitarize,otherswill be threatenedand arm themselves,creatingsecuritydilemmas
in termsof which theywill defineegoisticidentitiesand interests.But if they
engage in policies of reassurance,as the Soviets did in the late 1980s,thiswill
have a different
effecton the structureof shared knowledge,movingit toward
a securitycommunity.The depth of interdependenceis a factorhere,as is the
role of revisioniststates,whose actions are likelyto be especially threatening.
However, on the structuralside, the abilityof revisioniststatesto createa war
of all againstall depends on thestructureof sharedknowledgeintowhichthey
enter.If past interactionshave created a structurein which status quo states
are divided or naive, revisionistswill prosperand the systemwill tend toward
a Hobbesian world in which power and self-interest
rule. In contrast,if past
interactionshave created a structurein which status quo states trust and
identifywith each other,predatorsare more likely to face collectivesecurity
responses like the Gulf War.19Historymatters.Securitydilemmas are not acts
of God: theyare effectsof practice.This does not mean thatonce createdthey
can necessarilybe escaped (they are, afterall, "dilemmas"), but it puts the
causal locus in the rightplace.
Contrast this explanation of power politics with the "povertyof neorealism."20Mearsheimerthinksit significantthatin anarchy,states cannotbe 100
percentcertainthatotherswill not attack.Yet even in domesticsociety,I cannot be certainthatI will be safe walking to class. There are no guaranteesin
but the factthatin anarchywar is possible does
life,domesticor international,
not mean "it may at any momentoccur.'"21
Indeed, it may be quite unlikely,as
it is in most interactionstoday Possibilityis not probabilityAnarchyas such

18. A similar argumentis developed in JohnVasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1993).
19. On the role of collective identityin facilitatingcollective security,see Wendt, "Collective
IdentityFormation."
Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring
Organization,
20. RichardAshley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"International
1984), pp. 225-286.
21. KennethWaltz,Man, theState,and War(New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1959), p. 232.

International
Security20:1 | 78

which
is not a structuralcause of anything.What mattersis its social structure,
varies across anarchies.An anarchyof friendsdiffersfromone of enemies,one
of self-helpfromone of collective security,and these are all constitutedby
structuresof shared knowledge. Mearsheimerdoes not provide an argument
forwhy this is wrong;he simplyassertsthatit is.
Otherrealistexplanationsforpower politicsfaresomewhatbetter.Although
neorealistswant to eschew argumentsfromhuman nature,even they would
are prone to fearand compeagree thatto the extenthuman-beings-in-groups
tition,it may predispose themto war.22However,thisfactorfaces countervailing dynamics of interdependenceand collective identityformation,which
sometimesovercome it. The distributionof materialcapabilitiesalso matters,
especiallyifoffenseis dominant,and militarybuild-ups will of course concern
otherstates.Again, however,themeaningof power depends on theunderlying
structureof shared knowledge. A Britishbuild-up will be less threateningto
the United States than a North Korean one, and build-ups are less likely to
occur in a securitycommunitythan in a securitydilemma.
In orderto get fromanarchyand materialforcesto power politicsand war,
neorealistshave been forcedto make additional,ad hocassumptions
therefore,
about the social structureof the internationalsystem.We see this in Mearsheimer's interestin "hyper-nationalism,"
Stephen Walt's emphasis on ideology in the "balance of threat," Randall Schweller's focus on the status
quo-revisionistdistinctionand, as I argued in my "Anarchy"piece, in Waltz's
assumptionthatanarchiesare self-helpsystems.23
Incorporatingtheseassumptions generatesmore explanatorypower, but how? In these cases the crucial
causal work is done by social, not material,factors.This is the core of a
view of structure,not a neorealistone.
constructivist
The problembecomes even more acute when neorealiststryto explain the
relativeabsence of inter-state
war in today's world. If anarchyis so determining, why are therenot more Bosnias? Why are weak states not gettingkilled
offleftand right?It stretchescredulityto thinkthatthepeace betweenNorway
and Sweden, or the United States and Canada, or Nigeria and Benin are all
due to materialbalancing.Mearsheimersays cooperationis possible when core
interestsare not threatened(p. 25), and that"some statesare especiallyfriendly
22. For a good argumentto this effect,see JonathanMercer,"Anarchyand Identity,"International
Organization,
Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995).
23. JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future,"International
Security,
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer1990),
pp. 5-56; Stephen Walt,The Originsof Alliances(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1987); Randall
Vol. 37, No. 1
Schweller,"Tripolarityand the Second World War,"International
StudiesQuarterly,
(March 1993),pp. 73-103; and Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It."

Constructing
International
Politics| 79

forhistoricalor ideological reasons" (p. 31). But this totallybegs the question
of why in an ostensibly "realist" world states do not find their interests
continuallythreatenedby others,and the question of how theymightbecome
friends.Perhaps Mearsheimerwould say thatmost statestoday are statusquo
and sovereign.24But again this begs the question. What is sovereigntyif not
an institutionof mutual recognitionand non-intervention?
And is not being
"status quo" related to the internalizationof this institutionin state interests?
David Stranghas argued thatthose statesrecognizedas sovereignhave better
survival prospectsin anarchythan those that are not.25Far fromchallenging
thisargument,Mearsheimerpresupposes it.
Neorealists' growingrelianceon social factorsto do theirexplanatorywork
suggests that if ever therewere a candidate fora degeneratingresearchprothisis it.26The progressiveresponse(in theLakatosian sense)
gramin IR theory,
would be to returnto realism's materialistroots by showing that the background understandingsthat give capabilities meaning are caused by still
deeper material conditions,or that capabilities have intrinsicmeaning that
cannot be ignored. To show that the materialbase determinesinternational
in otherwords,realistsshould be purgingtheirtheoryof social
superstructure,
not
in turn,should be
content, adding it as theyare doing.27And anti-realists,
tryingto show how the causal powers of material facts presuppose social
content,not tryingto show thatinstitutions
explain additionalvariancebeyond
thatexplained by the distributionof power and interest,as ifthe latterwere a
privilegedpre-socialbaseline.

Responsibility
An importantvirtueof "False Promise"is thatit linksneorealismand its rivals
to the ethical responsibilitiesof foreignpolicymakers.These responsibilities
24. Mearsheimer and Waltz both assume sovereignty,without acknowledging its institutional
character;see Mearsheimer,"False Promise," p. 11, and Waltz, Theoryof International
Politics,
pp. 95-96.
25. David Strang,"Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion," International
Vol. 45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 143-162.
Organization,
26. "Degenerating"problemshiftsare adjustmentsto a theorythatare ad hoc,while "progressive"
shiftsare those that have a principled basis in its hard core assumptions. See Imre Lakatos,
"Falsificationand the Methodology of ScientificResearch Programmes,"in Lakatos and Alan
Musgrave, eds., Criticismand theGrowthofKnowledge(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,
1970), pp. 91-196.
27. The significanceof Dan Deudney's work lies partlyin his appreciationof thispoint; see Dan
Deudney, "Dividing Realism: StructuralRealism versus SecurityMaterialismon Nuclear Security
and Proliferation,"
SecurityStudies,Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3 (1993), pp. 7-37.

International
Security20:1 | 80

depend in part on how much it is possible to change the structureof shared

knowledge withinanarchy If such change is impossible,thenMearsheimeris
rightthatit would be irresponsibleforthose chargedwithnational securityto
pursue it. On the otherhand, ifit is possible, thenit would be irresponsibleto
pursue policies that perpetuate destructiveold orders,especially if we care
about the well-beingof futuregenerations.
To say thatstructuresare socially constructedis no guaranteethattheycan
be changed.28Sometimessocial structuresso constrainaction thattransformative strategiesare impossible. This goes back to the collectivenatureof social
structures;structuralchange depends on changing a systemof expectations
A key issue in determiningpolicymakers'
that may be mutually reinforcing.
responsibilities,therefore,is how much "slack" a social structurecontains.
Neorealiststhinkthereis littleslack in the system,and thus statesthatdeviate
from power politics will get punished or killed by the "logic" of anarchy
Institutionalists
thinksuch dangers have been greatlyreduced by institutions
more
such as sovereigntyand the democraticpeace, and thatthereis therefore
possibilityforpeaceful change.
The example of Gorbachev is instructivein this respect,since the Cold War
was a highlyconflictualsocial structure.I agree with Mearsheimer(p. 46) that
Soviet nuclear forcesgave Gorbachev a marginof safetyforhis policies. Yet
someone else in his place mighthave found a more aggressive solution to a
decline in power. What is so importantabout the Gorbachev regimeis thatit
had the courage to see how the Soviets' own practicessustained theCold War,
and to undertakea reassessmentof Westernintentions.This is exactlywhat a
would do, but not a neorealist,who would eschew attentionto
constructivist
such social factorsas naive and as mere superstructure.Indeed, what is so
strikingabout neorealism is its total neglect of the explanatoryrole of state
practice.29It does not seem to matterwhat states do: Brezhnev,Gorbachev,
Zhirinovsky,what differencedoes it make? The logic of anarchywill always
causes
bring us back to square one. This is a disturbingattitudeif realpolitik
theveryconditionsto which it is a response;to theextentthatrealismcounsels
it is partoftheproblem.Mearsheimersays criticaltheorists
realpolitik,
therefore,
28. Hence, contraMearsheimer,thereis nothingproblematicabout the fact that criticaltheorists
do not make predictionsabout the future.What happens in the futuredepends on what actorsdo
with the structurestheyhave made in the past.
29. This is not true of classical realists;for a sympatheticdiscussion of the latterfroma critical
standpoint,see Richard Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests,"InternationalStudies
Quarterly,
Vol. 25, No. 2 (June1981), pp. 204-237.

Constructing
International
Politics| 81

are "intolerant"of realistsforthisreason (p. 42). The ironiesof thissuggestion

aside, what mattersis gettingpolicymakersto accept responsibilityforsolving
conflictsratherthan simply managing or exploitingthem. If neorealism can
move us in thatdirection,thenit should, but as I see it,neorealistethicscome
down to "sauvequi peut."
To analyze the social constructionof internationalpoliticsis to analyze how
processes of interactionproduce and reproducethe social structures-cooperative or conflictual-that shape actors' identitiesand interestsand the significanceof theirmaterialcontexts.It is opposed to two rivals: the materialist
view, of which neorealismis one expression,thatmaterialforcesperse determine internationallife,and the rationalchoice-theoreticview thatinteraction
does not change identitiesand interests.Mearsheimer'sessay is an important
opening to thecomparativeevaluationofthesehypotheses.But neorealistswill
contributenothingfurtherto the debate so long as they thinkthat constructivistsare subversive utopians who do not believe in a real world and who
expect peace in our time.