MONGOLIAS DPRK POLICY

Engaging North Korea

Migeddorj Batchimeg

Abstract
Since the end of the 1990s, in order to improve relations, Mongolia has intensified
its engagement policy with North Korea. This article analyzes the overall development and future prospects of bilateral relations and various aspects of this policy.
Keywords: Mongolia, North Korea, DPRK, Northeast Asia, engagement

During the Cold War era and Sino-Soviet confrontation,

Mongolia was an ally and satellite state of the former Soviet Union, providing
Moscow with a buffer against China. Major decisions in Mongolias foreign
policy were made in the Kremlin, and its foreign relations were developed mostly
with former socialist countries. The end of the Sino-Soviet confrontation greatly
diminished Soviet dominance over Mongolian foreign policy, and the country
began to enjoy greater freedom in strengthening its relations with the rest of
the world, particularly China and Western countries such as the United States
(diplomatic relations were established in 1987) and Japan (in 1972). In the
early 1990s, the Mongolian Parliament adopted two key policy ideas, respectively, the Concept on National Security and the Concept on Foreign Policy,
that were consistent with the principles of its new Constitution guaranteeing a
democratic society and free-market economy. The foremost importance of these
new policy documents lay in Mongolias declaration that its foreign policy
would be based on its own national interests rather than ideological factors.1
Migeddorj Batchimeg is former Senior Researcher at the Institute for
Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Currently, she is Ulaanbaatars Trade and Economic Representative
in Taipei. She wishes to thank Dr. Stephen E. Noerper and an anonymous reviewer for their help
in preparing this article.
1. The Concept of Foreign Policy, at http://www.mongolia-foreign-policy.net/, accessed
April 25, 2004.
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 275297, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.
2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests
for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California
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According to the new concepts, Mongolia sees itself as an integral part of

Northeast Asia.2 Integrating with regional economic cooperation efforts is a
decisive factor in the development of this landlocked country, situated between
Russia and China. Mongolias geographical isolation and lack of regional integration into Northeast Asia are the two major factors impeding the countrys
development.
Since the early 1990s, the Northeast Asian countries have contributed to the
development of the Tumen River Development Project, which aims to accelerate regional integration under the direct support of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). However, because of a combination of factors, including the
unpredictability of the Korean Peninsulas security situation and absence of
Japans participation, the project has not demonstrated much success to date.
In recent years, the Northeast Asia railway and energy network projects have
been widely discussed among interested parties. If these projects can be realized in the coming years, Mongolia stands to gain two strategically important
benets. One is the possibility of obtaining sea access on the Korean Peninsula via Chinas northeastern provinces; the second is an international railway
or highway link between the Korean Peninsula and Europe. Currently, Mongolia is greatly dependent on Chinas major northeastern port of Tianjin.
In the current strategic environment, balancing the power of regimes and
enabling collective defense arrangements represent the main components of
Northeast Asian regional security architecture. Although the possibility of establishing a cooperative security mechanism among regional governments has
been discussed for years, limited progress has been made. As the smallest
country in Northeast Asia in terms of economy, population (2.7 million), and
military power, Mongolia actively supports establishing multilateral security
cooperation and has made some proposals in that direction.3 Therefore, developing regional integration, promoting regional stability by strengthening cooperation, and making its own contribution to this dynamic processrather
than simply observing itare all important directions in Mongolias current
foreign policy.4
Mongolia is a non-aligned country that does not possess enough strength to
contain or threaten other countries. It enjoys friendly relations with all countries
2. No clear-cut consensus exists among Mongolian and international scholars on the geographical or political definition of the Northeast Asian region. However, most researchers see Russia,
China, Mongolia, Japan, South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), and North Korea (Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea, DPRK) as the Northeast Asian countries.
3. On September 21, 2001, at a U.N. General Assembly general debate, the Mongolian foreign
minister suggested creating a dialogue mechanism to discuss regional security issues among
Northeast Asian governments.
4. Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia, Foreign Policy Blue Book (Ulaanbaatar: Admon
Publishers, 2000), pp. 2728.

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in the region without the cloud of unresolved historical bilateral problems.

Moreover, Mongolia has close relations and a special historical afnity with
the Korean people;5 it is not directly involved in the divisive politics and continuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.6 Because of this, Mongolias
policy has been to contribute toward strengthening peace and stability on the
peninsula and increasing mutual understanding and trust there. In 1999 and
2003, Mongolian Prime Ministers Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal and Nambaryn
Enkhbayar visited both North and South Korea during the same trips, clearly
demonstrating Mongolias interest in nding solutions for the peninsula and
multilateral cooperation in this region.
Without North Koreas cooperation or at least purported willingness to cooperate, the agenda of facilitating a peaceful solution on the Korean issue
could become idle talk. After experiencing years of stagnation in bilateral relations, Mongolia began to conduct an engagement policy toward North Korea
in the late 1990s, recognizing that it had few trusted friends around the world.
(While China seems to be the closest partner and patron of North Korea, anxiety and distrust still prevail between the two.) During Mongolian President N.
Bagabandis 2004 visit to North Korea, both sides acknowledged their common interests and agreed to strengthen bilateral relations.
This article has several objectives. It analyzes the overall development of
bilateral relations between Mongolia and North Korea. It also summarizes the
goals, means, outcomes, and limits of Mongolias engagement policy toward
North Korea and forecasts prospects for enhanced bilateral relations. Although
interdependence is currently minimal, bilateral cooperation draws upon Mongolias engagement policy, rather than from any immediate necessity or pressing impetus from Pyongyang.
5. Mongolians and Koreans have acknowledged their ethnic and cultural ties for centuries.
There was considerable intermarriage among Mongolian and Korean elites in the 13th century. Koreans believe their ancestors came from Mongolia; they see the blue spot or Mongol spot seen
on the back of every newborn Korean child as a symbol of this ethnic heritage. Ch. Dalai, MongolSolongosyn ertnii tuuhen hariltsaa [Historical relations between Mongols and Koreans] (Ulaanbaatar: Academy of Science of Mongolia, 1998), p. 9. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Dae Jung
specifically emphasized the historical relationship between Mongolians and Koreans during their
visits to Mongolia in 1986 and 1999, respectively. K. Demberel, Kim Ir Sen ba Mongol [Kim Il
Sung and Mongolia], paper presented at the Mongolia and the Cold War International Workshop, Ulaanbaatar, March 2004, p. 5; and Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia, Information
Bulletin of Foreign Relations, no. 13, 1999, p. 10.
6. The North Korean nuclear crisis reemerged after the U.S. stated publicly that Pyongyang had
acknowledged having a nuclear weapons program to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
in October 2002. In December the DPRK announced that it was unfreezing its nuclear facilities:
official seals were cut, and surveillance cameras installed by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) were removed. Increasingly provocative actions by the U.S. and North Korea have
escalated the crisis; Pyongyangs expulsion of IAEA inspectors and withdrawal from the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) further complicated the situation.

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Overview of the Bilateral Relationship,

19482005
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Mongolian Peoples Republic (MPR) and the DPRK, bilateral relations have gone through three stages:
a period of ideology-driven friendship, a period of stagnation, and a period of
reengagement.
Period of Ideology-driven Friendship,
19481990
On October 15, 1948, the MPR established diplomatic relationship with the
newly born DPRK, becoming the second country to offer recognition after
the Soviet Union. Although Mongolia did not directly participate in the Korean War, it nevertheless expressed ideological support for North Korea and
provided livestock as material assistance, including more than 200,000 head
of horses, cows, and sheep. After the war, Mongolia received and brought up
more than 200 war-orphaned children. In 1956, North Korean leader Kim Il
Sung visited Mongolia and expressed his appreciation of Mongolias support during wartime; Mongolian leader Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal paid a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang later that year. At that time, the two countries signed the
Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation and in the following year
began to conduct bilateral trade. During the Cold War, while not ofcially
allies Mongolia and North Korea maintained friendly relations as socialist
countries.
In 1986, Mongolian leader Jambyn Batmunkh visited North Korea. Two
years later, during the intensifying Sino-American rapprochement and as the
Soviet Union and China were developing economic ties with South Korea,
Kim Il Sung paid a visit to Ulaanbaatar. He told Batmunkh the following:
Among the socialist states in Northeast Asia, with the exception of our two countries, the rest are all large countries. The Soviet Union is a superpower; China is a
big power too. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, we (North Korea and Mongolia) should keep a close relationship.7

The main purpose of Kim Il Sungs visit was to assess Mongolias policy motivations. Kim discussed broadly developing bilateral economic ties, expressing a willingness to help Mongolia develop its heavy industry.8 After the visit,
the two countries established the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientic, and Technical Cooperation.
7. Archive documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Mongolia, as cited in
Demberel, Kim Ir Sen ba Mongol, p. 5.
8. Ibid., pp. 25.

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279

Period of Stagnation, 19901996

Shortly after Kims visit, the pro-democracy movement emerged in Mongolia, riding the new global democratic wave. According to a Mongolian scholar
of international relations, the rst priority of young democrats in Mongolia was to end Soviet dominance, in other words, to set the condition for
Mongolia to conduct independent domestic and foreign policy, rather than
to introduce new democratic institutions.9 In March 1990, the Politburo of the
Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party (MPRP) Central Committee resigned,
and shortly thereafter the new government, consisting of democratic and former
communist politicians, came to power. After only a few days in ofce, Mongolias new government established diplomatic relations with South Korea,
becoming the rst Asian former socialist country to offer such diplomatic
recognition.
The economic incentive was the foremost factor that led Ulaanbaatar to establish ties with Seoul. Disintegration of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual
Economic Cooperation (COMECON)and the abrupt termination of Soviet
aidcaused quasi-bankruptcy in the Mongolian economy at the beginning of
the 1990s. Mongolia faced the immediate task of nding new partners capable
of lling the vacuum. Moreover, Mongolia considered South Korea, one of the
four newly industrialized Asian economies, to be a model for its free-market
economy. Contrary to the challenge facing Soviet and Chinese leaders, recognizing South Korea appeared easier for the new generation of leaders of Mongolia. In October 1991, President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat visited Seoul, and
subsequently the South Korean government provided grant aid of $1.5 million. South Korea was one of the largest donor countries to Mongolia until the
mid-1990s, the most difcult period for the latters structural reform.
Understandably, Soviet and Chinese recognition of South Korea, coupled
with the loss of many ideological partners in the socialist family, left the North
Korean leadershipdetermined to maintain its juche (self-reliance) ideology
and authoritarian regimein a difcult situation. By the end of 1990, Mongolias domestic policy of radical political and economic reforms and its warming relations with South Korea had had a direct impact on ties with the DPRK,
and bilateral relations entered a period of stagnation.
In Mongolias Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in 1994, South Korea was
mentioned as one of the few countries having specic importance to Mongolias foreign relations after nations such as Russia, China, the U.S., Japan, and
Germany. Countries formerly belonging to the socialist family were given
penultimate place in the priority list. North Korea was totally ignored. The
9. Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolian-Russian Relations in the Past Decade, Asian Survey
43:6 (November/December 2003), p. 955.

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figure 1 Bilateral Trade between Mongolia and the ROK (US$million)

SOURCE: Ministry of Industry and Trade of Mongolia, 19912003.

figure 2 Bilateral Trade between Mongolia and the DPRK

SOURCE: Ibid. to Figure 1.

same year, the annual meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission

for Economic, Scientic, and Technical Cooperation was terminated. While
Mongolian-South Korean bilateral trade was gradually increasing, MongolianNorth Korean trade volume was continuously dropping (see Figures 1 and 2).
The stagnation of bilateral relations was not caused by Mongolian factors
alone; North Koreas further isolation from the rest of the world contributed to
this situation.

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Period of Engagement-Produced Relations,

19972005
By the mid-1990s, the Mongolian economy had begun to recover from its sharp
decline. Following this positive change, the main objective of Mongolias foreign policy gradually shifted focus toward providing necessary support for the
government policy of deepening domestic reforms, laying solid foundations
for further economic growth, and promoting the national interest within the international arena rather than seeking emergency funding to stabilize the scal
crisis at home. Some politicians and scholars began to emphasize the importance of Mongolias participation inand possible contribution tothe process of peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsulas security issues. They
also urged the strengthening Mongolian-North Korean bilateral ties within the
framework of promoting multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.10
In 1996, after a victory in the general election that brought it to power for
the rst time, the Mongolian Democratic Coalition government began to conduct an active policy designed to improve its relationship with Pyongyang. In
1998, Mongolias foreign minister visited North Korea, resurrecting highranking contacts that had been absent for a decade. The deputy foreign minister of North Korea paid a reciprocal visit to Ulaanbaatar the same year. The
Mongolian Parliament Group for Mongolia-DPRK Cooperation was established
soon afterward. Despite its own economic constraints, Mongolia provided
food relief to North Korea in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003, aiding it in
overcoming difculties caused by a wave of natural disasters and internal factors. This assistance clearly demonstrated Mongolias willingness to warm its
relations with the DPRK and play a modest role in Korean Peninsular affairs.
Although the Mongolian government was making progress in restoring its
relationship with the DPRK, in the meantime it also managed to develop close
relations with South Korea. Thus began the policy of taking a balanced approach toward the two Koreas. During the 1999 and 2001 summits in Ulaanbaatar and Seoul, respectively, both the Mongolian and South Korean sides
agreed to develop mutually complementary relations in the new century. Both
sides perceived mutual complementarities arising from the following factors:
Mongolias geographic endowment of natural resources and vast territory and
its strategic location between the two large markets of China and Russia; and
South Koreas development experience, sophisticated technology, and capital
advantage.11 South Korea is the fourth-largest partner of Mongolia in both trade
10. S. Bayar, Solongosyn Hoig: Shine Nuhtsul Baidal [Newly emerging situation on the Korean Peninsula], Strategi Sudlal [Strategic Studies], no. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1997), p. 26.
11. D. Ulambayar, Mongol uls-BNSU-yn hariltsan nuhsun hamtyn ajillagaa, hugjliin tunshlel [Mutually complementary cooperation and partnership for development between Mongolia

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and investment. Approximately one-fth of Mongolians living abroad reside

in South Korea.
In May 1999 Mongolia expressed its support for Seouls Sunshine policy
in a joint statement issued during South Korean President Kim Dae Jungs
visit to Ulaanbaatar.12 Pyongyang condemned the Mongolian government for
taking this position and promptly canceled its participation in an Ulaanbaatar meeting of government representatives of the Tumen River Development
Project.13 Immediately following this condemnation, North Korea closed its
embassy in Ulaanbaatar.14
Despite North Koreas negative reactions, the Mongolian government continued its effort to cultivate friendly relations between Ulaanbaatar and Pyongyang. In November 1999, Prime Minister Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal visited
Pyongyang and declared that Mongolia attached great importance to strengthening traditional friendly relations and did not support any policy designed to
isolate the DPRK in the international arena.15 In essence, this was Mongolias
declaration of its ofcial support forand embracing ofits engagement policy
toward North Korea.
During his visit, J. Amarjargal made clear to North Korean leaders Mongolias interest in developing cooperation with the DPRK within the framework
of the Tumen River Development Project and obtaining sea access through the
port of Rajin-Songbon. The Mongolian side suggested reviving the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientic, and Technical Cooperation to
discuss bilateral economic cooperation in construction, agriculture, and infrastructure. The two sides expressed interest in concluding agreements on double
taxation and investment protection to help revive bilateral economic relations.
A Mongolian diplomat said, following the visit, that the North Koreans had
shown increased interest in bilateral economic contacts, citing their prime ministers statement that developing economic cooperation is nowadays a major
trend in international relations.16
and ROK], Zuun Hoid Aziin Tuluv baidal ba Mongol Uls [The current situation and perspectives
of Northeast Asia and Mongolia] (Ulaanbaatar: Asia Research Center, National University of
Mongolia, 2003), p. 180.
12. See Joint Statement of Mongolia and Republic of Korea, Gadaad Hariltsaa Medeellin
Tovhimol [Information Bulletin of the Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia], no. 13 (1999),
pp. 56.
13. Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolias Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New
Challenges (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 209.
14. However, during the Mongolian prime ministers visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean
side explained that the primary reason for closing the embassy was related to financial constraints.
Gadaad Hariltsaa Medeellin Tovhimol, no. 24 (1999), p. 2.
15. Unuudur [Today], November 6, 1999.
16. Gadaad Hariltsaa Medeellin Tovhimol, no. 24, p. 11.

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The June 2000 general election brought back to power the MPRP, the former
ruling party that had been in opposition since 1996. Despite the turnover,
Mongolias engagement policy toward North Korea has remained unchanged.
It is notable that, as far as foreign policy is concerned, Mongolias major political parties share common ground. In August 2002, North Korean Foreign
Minister Kim Young-il visited Ulaanbaatar, the rst such visit in 14 years,
marking a signicant revival of bilateral ties. The two sides concluded a new
Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation. One month later, the meeting of
the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientic, and Technical
Cooperation between Mongolia and North Korea resumed in Pyongyang.
At this time, Mongolia voiced a willingness to contribute to the multilateral
efforts aimed at maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In
November 2003, then-Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar paid an ofcial
visit to Pyongyang, telling his counterparts that he hoped to facilitate dialogue
on the Korean Peninsula security issue. The two sides agreed to strengthen
economic ties and increase the volume of bilateral trade via goods exchange;
they also concluded agreements on avoiding double taxation and promoting
bilateral investment. North Korea agreed to offer Mongolia use of its RajinSongbon port as means of facilitating sea access for foreign trade. Pyongyang
also announced its decision to reopen its embassy in Ulaanbaatar.17 In August
2004, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il visited Ulaanbaatar
and attended the reopening ceremony. Kim expressed his hope of further deepening traditional friendly cooperation and broadening the bilateral relationship. He suggested building a joint cooperative farm for which North Koreans
would provide manpower.18
In December, President Natsagiin Bagabandi visited Pyongyang and met
with Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme Peoples
Assembly; their talks focused on economic cooperation. A bilateral trade agreement and an accord setting up the Inter-governmental Economic, Trade and
Scientic and Technological Consultative Committee19 were signed.
The year 2005 was marked by a signicant number of exchanges. A January
intergovernmental meeting on economic, trade, and scientic and technological cooperation in Ulaanbaatar produced an accord to boost cooperation in the
trade, agriculture, and construction sectors. As a result, vice-ministers of agriculture subsequently exchanged visits, agreeing to establish joint farm operations in Dornod, Tuv, and Hentii Provinces of Mongolia. The rst such farm
17. Zuuny Medee [Century News], November 22, 2003.
18. Montsame News, August 10, 2004; also UB Post, December 23, 2004, http://ubpost.
mongolnews.mn/northkorea.php, accessed February 15, 2006.
19. Successor of the former Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and
Technical Cooperation.

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will be set up in Dornod Province in the rst half of 2006, with North Korea
planning to send up to 30 agricultural experts and workers. Mongolian Minister of Nature and Environment Ulambayaryn Barsbold visited Pyongyang in
May 2005 and discussed improving cooperation on land and environmental
preservation. He met with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.20 North Koreas Minister of Finance Mun Il Bung, who is also chairman of the DPRKMongolia Friendship Association, visited Mongolia in September to discuss
cooperation. Mongolias Vice Minister of Trade and Commerce Ts. Enkhtuvshin visited Pyongyang the same month and reviewed detailed measures to
intensify bilateral trade relations.
The two countries are reportedly ready to sign an agreement on sea transportation that guarantees Mongolia sea access through North Koreas RajinSongbon port. Mongolian ofcials and business people who have visited North
Korea recently report that gradual economic liberalization is underway in that
isolated country, which is eager to develop economic cooperation with Mongolia in order to diversify its trade relations and pool of investment partners.
It is notable that with the growth of inter-Korean relations, Mongolia-South
Korea relations are now becoming more positive but not impeding MongoliaNorth Korea relations.
Mongolia also has been attaching importance to developing bilateral cultural
ties with North Korea. Interestingly, as some scholars have noted, cultural contacts have remained intact between friendship societies in the two countries,
largely because of the active dedication of individuals.21 Mongolian artists
participate annually in the Spring Festival in Pyongyang, held on Kim Il
Sungs birthday. In 2002, a group of more than 100 delegates headed by the
Mongolian vice minister of education, culture, and science attended this event.
The two governments biannually adopt cultural exchange plans that include an
exchange of performance groups, art exhibitions, movie festivals, etc. In September 2003, North Korea opened a cultural center in Ulaanbaatar.
Military-to-military exchanges are also under consideration. General Tsevegsurengiin Togoo, chief of the general staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces,
had planned to visit Pyongyang in October 2005. However, the visit was postponed andalthough there were rumors that this was somehow related to
President Bushs November visit to Mongoliathe Mongolian side made no
public comment on the matter.
In recent years, the most sensitive issue between Ulaanbaatar and Pyongyang has been the so-called North Korean refugee problem. The Mongolian
government is trying to handle this issue in a careful and delicate manner; for
20. North Korea Interested in Green Wall Program of Mongolia, UB Post, May 19, 2005,
http://www.ubpost.mongolnews.mn/, accessed May 25, 2005.
21. Batbayar, Mongolias Foreign Policy in the 1990s, p. 214.

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that reason, government agencies are reluctant to make public the number of
refugees and other relevant information because of two-fold concern for the
security of refugees and relations with North Korea.
According to Ravdangiin Bold, Mongolias ambassador to the U.S. between
1999 and 2003, more than 600 North Koreans who arrived in Mongolia across
its border with China have been resettled in South Korea.22 Some foreign media
sources have reported that there were attempts by locals and foreigners to establish a North Korean refugee camp in the Dornod (Eastern) Province. However, the Mongolian government denied this on the grounds that Mongolia was
not a signatory to the International Refugee Convention.
However, North Koreas interest in sending more workers to Mongolia
has been welcomed by ofcials in Ulaanbaatar. During the intergovernmental
meeting held in January 2005, Mongolias government has pledged to offer
the workers special favorable conditions including a waiver of the monthly
foreign-worker tax. Bat-Erdeniin Batbayar, chairman of the Northeast Asian
Association (a non-governmental organization [NGO] actively involved in North
Korean relations) and former chairman of the Mongolian Parliament Group on
Mongolia-DPRK Relations, has emphasized that accepting a large labor force
from North Korea would be a wiser choice for Mongolia than establishing
refugee camps for North Koreans.

Interpreting Mongolias
Engagement Policy
Because of its ambiguity in Mongolian, the term engagement (tatan oroltsuulalt) is not commonly used. During the Cold War era, the Mongolian political
concept was based on Marxist and Leninist ideology. But in the early 1990s,
Mongolia began to embrace Western political concepts; the important policy
documents mentioned previously, i.e., the National Security Concept and Foreign Policy Concept, were basically compatible with corresponding international
concepts. In particular, the Foreign Policy Concept, adopted by Parliament in
1994, denounces ideological motivation in foreign policymaking and advocates equal, balanced relations with due consideration given to Mongolias
geographical location and vital national interests. The National Security Concept, adopted the same year, formulates areas of national interest and the
countrys vulnerabilities in accordance with the neoliberal notion of comprehensive security. However, because Western political science is still in an early
stage of development in Mongolia, many conceptsand the translations for
themhave not yet been developed as systematic knowledge. Therefore, some
terms are either not commonly used or their translations are rather confusing.
22. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 14, 2003.

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Although the Mongolian government does not often use the word engagement when describing its North Korea policy, all aspects of this policy clearly
demonstrate its engaging nature, in contrast to policies of containment or
isolation. One often hears Mongolian diplomats and politicians suggesting
that [t]he more isolated North Korea is, the more dangerous it is. Surengiin
Badral, former counselor of the MFA, wrote the following:
North Korea, for its part, naturally needs allies and friends to ease the hardship she
faces due to, among other things, isolation and distrust. Therefore, in order to allow
her to slip further into the hands of uncooperative, hatred-minded, hostile leadership
and a group of such countries, every step should be taken to engage her in all possible
bilateral and regional dialogues.23

Mongolias Interest in the Korean Peninsula

Mongolias policy on the Korean Peninsula is an important component of its
policy toward Northeast Asia. Mongolia shares the same interests with the rest
of the region in ensuring peace and prosperity.24 As Robert A. Scalapino has
noted, . . . long associated ethnically as well as geographically with the Korean
Peninsula, Mongolia cannot escape the impact of the current Korean division.25
Ensuring the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is considered to be a
vital interest for Mongolia. North Koreas possession of a nuclear weapons capability would seriously destabilize the region by challenging the existing balance of power and would provoke nuclear competition among neighboring
countries. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself to be a Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone (NWFZ). Mongolia supports creating NWFZs in various parts of the
region, including Central Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
Mongolia does not support any abrupt or forceful change in the status quo
on the Korean Peninsula, because this would create grave instability in the region and lead to greater distrust among countries there. Moreover, uncertainties caused by this kind of change might intensify an arms build-up, further
damaging regional cooperation and delaying the prospects for integration. In
this scenario, Mongolias external environment for economic development
would deteriorate and its room for international maneuvering would shrink
because of ambiguities in relations among major powers.
23. Suren Badral, Prospects for Political and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, Fifth
Symposium on Northeast Asian Security, Occasional Paper, no. 15 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 19.
24. Priorities of these interests may be defined in different orders by different agencies or
people.
25. Robert A. Scalapino, The Political Process in Northeast Asia and Mongolias Challenge,
paper presented at the U.S.-Mongolian bilateral conference, February 28-March 1, 2005, Washington, D.C.

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A sudden collapse of the existing North Korean regime is not in Ulaanbaatars interest either. Mongolia is still tackling internal development challenges,
many of which were caused by transitional reform from a centrally planned
economy to a free market system. Regional economic development conducive to the countrys reform and international sponsorship aimed at intensifying its political and economic reform are crucial for the sustainable growth
of Mongolias economy. A sudden loss of control by the DPRK regime over
North Korea could create many undesirable circumstances in Mongolias
external environment and likely impede its development. In the long term,
Mongolia wishes to see North Korea evolve into a more open, predictable, cooperative nation. It is assumed that a unied, prosperous Korea will best serve
Mongolias further interests and positively inuence Northeast Asian peace
and prosperity.
External Factors
Indeed, the Mongolian national interest is not the only force driving the Ulaanbaatar government to actively engage Pyongyang: external factors are also at
work. First, growing interdependence and interactions among the Northeast
Asia countries are both important factors. Interdependence and further regional
integration are making Mongolias internal and external policies inseparable,
while frequent interactions are making the country a self-conscious participant
in the regional process.
Second, other countries expectations about Mongolias role vis--vis North
Korea have inuenced Mongolia to reconsider and energize its policy toward
the DPRK. American, South Korean, and Japanese ofcials and scholars frequently mention Mongolia as a possible model for North Korea and point to
its potential for inuencing DPRK behavior.26 Considering that those countries are regarded as Mongolias important third neighbors,27 it is reasonable
to expect some degree of policy coordination with them by Mongolia. The Mongolian governments position in dealing with the North Korean refugee issue is
one example: the speaker of the South Korean National Assembly specically
26. Then-Asia Foundation head Professor Stephen Noerper authored a lengthy essay on Mongolias potential contribution on DPRK issues that sparked extensive discussion in Mongolias
policy making sphere. Stephen E. Noerper, Of Horsemen and Hermits, Mongol Messenger, June
5, 2002, p. 5, later re-printed as Of Horsemen and Hermits: Mongolia, North Korea, and the New
Security Architecture in Northeast Asia, in New Northeast Asia Security Initiatives: Cooperation
for Regional Development and Security, ed. Ikegami (Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies,
Stockholm University, 2003).
27. Third Neighbor(s) is a collective community of democracies supporting Mongolias
transformation, the leading position of which increasingly belongs to the USA. Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, Mongolia in 2003, in Asia Pacic Security Outlook 2004, ed. Charles E. Morrison, Asia
Pacific Agenda Project, Tokyo, 2004.

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thanked the Mongolian government for its careful handling of the issue.28
Toward Mongolian diplomats, U.S. and Japanese ofcials express similar
positions.
After the North Korean nuclear crisis reemerged in 2002, the question of
Mongolias possible contribution to peaceful resolution of the problem was
raised frequently during bilateral dialogues between Mongolia and the United
States. In a joint statement issued during President Bagabandis 2004 visit to
the United States, the two sides noted their common support for the permanent, thorough, and transparent dismantlement of nuclear programs on the
Korean Peninsula.29 However, while Mongolia supported American efforts at
permanent dismantlement, it remained relatively neutral on the details.
The degree of common concern over the North Korean issue appears to be
lower in the dialogue between Mongolia and its two immediate neighbors
(viz., China and Russia) than in discussions with third-neighbor countries.
One rarely hears of broader discussions between Mongolia and China or Mongolia and Russia. However, during President Bagabandis July 2004 visit to
Beijing, a communique was signed committing both sides toward a peaceful,
non-nuclear solution on the Korean Peninsula. Some Chinese ofcials and
scholars express understanding of Mongolias engagement policy. Some even
note that Mongoliaas a small state beneting from the post-Cold War strategic environmenthas a certain amount of potential to foster North Korean
acceptance of the existing international order, based on previous experience.
Seemingly, all these countriesthe U.S., Japan, South Korea, China, and
Russiasomehow recognize that Mongolia can make a contribution to the
peaceful solution of the North Korean issue in neutral ways. These may include a possible modeling and mediating role, rather than Mongolias simply
following the policies of other countries. This is an important factor that
would allow Mongolia to maintain its neutrality and independence in dealing
with North Korea.
Goals of Engaging North Korea
As Victor D. Cha has written, engagement generally aims to ameliorate the
dissatised or revisionist inclinations of the problem state in a manner consistent with peaceful change of the existing order.30
The rst goal of Mongolias engagement strategy toward North Korea is increasing the quality of bilateral cooperation. Mongolia is striving to build mutual trust, even modestly, through reaching a higher level of understanding on
28. Udriin sonin [Daily News], November 15, 2003.
29. http://www.extmin.mn/statement_Mongol_US_20040715eng.html.
30. Victor D. Cha, Engaging China: The View from Korea, in Engaging China, eds. Alastair
Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.

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bilateral and international issues and also through increasing economic interdependence with North Korea. Mongolias efforts toward engagement may be
seen as a way of sending reassuring signals that the country poses no threat to
North Korea. For Pyongyang, engagement may serve as an instrument for reducing uncertainty through dialogues and exchanges, so that some tensions
caused by its security dilemma may be reduced. Moreover, there is reason for
Mongolians to believe that the experience they have gained through the social, economic, and political reform of their country may be useful to North
Koreans. Mongolias success in overcoming transitional difculties by accommodating donor country efforts and promoting international cooperation could
become a reference for North Korea in developing related strategies to overcome current difculties. The development of trade, economic, and other cooperation and the consequent increase of mutual interdependence will show
North Korea that Mongolia is serious about bilateral cooperation.
Without North Koreas participation, at least at a minimal level, any effort at
developing successful regional cooperation in Northeast Asia might ultimately
prove futile. Based on this assumption, Mongolia is seeking to engage North
Korea at the regional multilateral level.31 A second aspect of Mongolias engagement policy seeks to draw North Korea into Northeast Asian regional security and economic cooperation. In the political and security elds, Mongolia
took the initiative to establish dialogue mechanisms for regional foreign ministers, including North Koreas.32 In October 2003, Enkhbayar, then prime minister, noted the possibility of founding broader multilateral security mechanisms
based on the Six Party Talksbut including Mongolia.33 In the economic eld,
North Koreas involvementgiven the countrys geostrategic importanceis
essential for successful implementation of the Tumen River Development Project,
as well as other regional energy and infrastructure network development projects
in which Mongolia seeks a share.
Another purpose of engagement is related to Mongolias self-image in the
region. As noted above, in terms of population, economy, and military capability, Mongolia is the smallest country in Northeast Asia. Making contributions
to peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula situationthe foremost challenge to regional securityby inuencing North Koreas behavior through cooperation or serving as an honest broker would help Mongolia strengthen its
international image. Having a certain role to play, Mongolia ultimately can
31. Foreign Policy Blue Book (2000), p. 28.
32. In May 2001, the Mongolian foreign minister sent letters to the regional foreign ministers,
emphasizing the need for multilateral dialogue among them. Later, in July that year, he expressed
this position at the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi.
33. N. Enkhbayar, Stability and Prosperity of the Northeast Asia, speech at the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), October 2003, Strategi Sudlal [Strategic Studies],
no. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), pp. 78.

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figure 3 Visits by the Mongolian Side (since 1997)

Period

Head of the Delegation

1997
1998
1999

O. Ochirjav, state secretary of the MFA

Sh. Altangerel, foreign minister
B. Batbayar, chairman, Mongolian Parliament Group on MongoliaDPRK Relations
O. Ochirjav, state secretary of the MFA
R. Amarjargal, prime minister
B. Ganbold, state secretary of the MFA
D. Idevhten, secretary-general, MPRP
B. Erdenesuren, vice minister, Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Science
Ts. Munkh-Orgil, vice minister, Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs;
chairman of the Mongolian Side of the Intergovernmental Commission between Mongolia and DPRK
Sh. Gungaadorj, chairman, Parliament Standing Committee on Environmental Protection and Rural Development
L. Erdenechuluun, foreign minister
N. Enkhbayar, prime minister

2001
2002

2003

SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, 19972003.

obtain a stable place of its own at the table. Developing close relations with
North Korea could provide important leverage in this regard.
Methods of Engagement
At the current stage, maintaining a high-level political dialogue with North
Korea serves as the primary method of engagement (see Figure 3). In order to
build trust, it is very important for Mongolia to show the independent nature of
its policy and position in political relations with North Korea. As a small country with big neighbors, including the third neighbors, Mongolia denitely
takes the positions of those major powers into account in its policymaking
process. However, since the beginning of the 1990s the history of Mongolias
foreign relations has been enriched by facts that demonstrate the comparatively
independent stance of its foreign policy. National interest is the core of Ulaanbaatars foreign policy. There are two arguments that demonstrate Mongolias
independent position on Korean issues. First, Mongolia is trying to be as neutral as possible on Korean Peninsula security-related issues. Although Mongolia has expressed concern about the recent nuclear crisis, it has not taken any
ofcial position that condemns North Korea for its attempt at nuclearization

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or even for its withdrawal from the NPT. Instead, Mongolia called on all parties to respect each other and increase mutual trust.34 Second, Mongolia has
tried to avoid any offense to North Koreas self-respect and national honor,
welcoming the DPRKs proposal for peaceful reunication of Korea.35 Some
sensitive issues such as political reform and regime change are not on the agenda
of bilateral dialogue.
Growing cultural exchange is an important tool in Mongolias engagement
of North Korea. Although political dialogue serves as an instrument to maintain and strengthen high-level contacts, cultural exchange has been useful for
enhancing public diplomacy. Developing trade and economic relations is another important method of engagement. Because of the very limited scope of
trade and economic cooperation, this method does not play a big role in the
current stage of bilateral relations. However, North Korea, in line with its gradual economic reform, has shown increasing interest in developing bilateral
economic relations with Mongolia. Expanded trade and labor cooperation in agriculture, construction, and infrastructure may enhance this level of cooperation.
Outcomes of Engagement
Success of a given policy should be measured by the level of implementation
of its objectives. It is too early for success in Mongolias engagement policy
toward North Korea to be taken for granted. However, the policy has produced
some positive outcomes. First, at the bilateral level Mongolia has seen
progress. Compared to the Cold War period and the period of stagnation in the
early and mid-1990s, bilateral exchanges and contacts between Mongolia and
North Korea have grown steadily. During recent visits by Mongolian prime
ministers and the president, the North Koreans have demonstrated active interest in developing bilateral cooperation, specically in promoting economic
contacts. Within the past two years, several high-ranking North Korean ofcials have visited Mongolia to promote cooperation. Signing the new Treaty of
Friendly Relations and Cooperation and other agreements that provide the legal
basis for bilateral economic cooperation, as well as North Koreas reopening
of its embassy in Ulaanbaatar, have demonstrated both sides willingness to
develop mutual relations.
Despite its minuscule net volume, bilateral trade has begun to grow. The North
Korean Ministry of Light Industry opened a representative ofce in the capital
in 2003, and ministry delegates have been regularly attending the Ulaanbaatar
trade fair. That year the North Korean Study Group visited Ulaanbaatar and
conducted research on the potential for bilateral economic cooperation. As North
Korean Ambassador Pak Jong Do told the UB Post, an English-language weekly,
34. N. Enkhbayar, speech at the SIPRI.
35. Foreign Policy Blue Book, p. 28.

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. . . work has begun in most areas of cooperation that we agreed to develop.36

Recent estimates suggest that about 300 North Korean workers are working in
different construction elds in Mongolia. Cultural exchanges are increasing
under the active support of the two governments.
Compared to bilateral engagement, achieving multilateral engagement, especially in security, seems to be more problematic, mostly because Pyongyang
is unwilling to internationalize the North Korean nuclear issue. However,
whether the major regional players have the rm political will needed to develop a multilateral mechanism is the core issue. On the other hand, economic
cooperation in multilateral frameworks is probably a less sensitive topic.
Nonetheless, the overall political and strategic situation of the region will have
a direct impact on future developments.
Limits of Mongolias Engagement
There are limits to Mongolias effort at engaging North Korea. A lack of public understanding and support of Mongolias engagement policy is a major
factor that diminishes the effectiveness of its effort. Although the government
regards its relations with North Korea as a crucial part of its policy toward
Northeast Asia, the public is not aware of this importance or the reasons for it.
Logically, this situation reects the immaturity of Mongolias policymaking
capacity related to North Korea. Therefore, in order to attain its policy objectives, the Mongolian government needs to take certain measures to promote
the involvement of NGOs, academic institutions, and the private sector in bilateral relations, rather than relying only on a limited number of ofcials and
diplomats.
From a theoretical perspective, [E]ngagement is most likely to succeed when
the countries are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to
use sticks as well as carrots, in their attempts to accommodate the dissatised
power.37 Mongolia is not powerful enough to use its own carrot-and-stick approach to North Korea. Without regional countries supporting Mongolias engagement and willingness to play the role of honest broker, the lone activism
of Mongolia is less likely to succeed.
Minimal political and economic interdependence between Mongolia and
North Korea is another constraint on Mongolias efforts. Realistically, Ulaanbaatar has little material leverage related to vital interests or immediate strategic goals, especially when it comes to North Korea. Because of its strategic
location, Mongolia holds special importance for Russia, China, and some other
36. Interview with North Korean Ambassador Pak Jong Do, UB Post (Ulaanbaatar), June 29,
2005.
37. Randall L. Schweller, Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory, in Engaging China,
p. 36.

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developed nations. As mentioned earlier, Mongolia and South Korea have a

certain mutual complementarity that provides grounds for bilateral cooperation. However, as far as the current North Korean regimewhose main goal is
regime survivalis concerned Mongolia cannot be an ideal partner in providing material support for resolving challenging developmental problems.
The current revival of bilateral cooperation should be considered to be an outcome produced by engagement policy but not as a realist strategic arrangement; this kind of produced cooperation may be quite sensitive to external
factors, including any major change in the surrounding environment.
Finally, as a typical have-not power, North Korea sees engagement policies toward it as being, in effect, foreign tools designed to change its regime
peacefully. Even China, its closest and most inuential neighbor, is distrusted.
Many Chinese scholars admit that Beijings inuence over the North Korean
regime is limited. There is a possibility that Mongolias efforts may also be
seen by the North Koreans as an attempt to affect regime stability. In that case,
Mongolias policy of engaging North Korea might not bring the productive
outcome sought.

Prospects for Regional Development and

Mongolia-North Korean Relations
The geopolitical situation appears very complex in Northeast Asia. China is
emerging as an active player that is more condent and sophisticated in promoting its national interests, both at the regional and global level. Although its
economic and defense capabilities have been increasing rapidly, maintaining
domestic stability is becoming more problematic for Chinese leaders. Russia
is pursuing a strong Russia policy under Putins leadership and seeking to
strengthen its military capability to t major-power status. Gradual economic
recovery will give Russia more opportunity to regain its status in the Asia
Pacic. Amid internal and external pressures and growing distrust from its
neighbors, Japan is gradually shifting its defense policy toward establishing a
normal military and made a signicant breakthrough in dispatching troops
to the Middle East. Rapid changes are taking place in South Korean attitudes
toward relations with North Korea while South Korean public opinion on ties
with the U.S. has been changing in a way not supportive to the bilateral alliance relationship. Despite some signs of economic reform, internal politics in
North Korea remain unchanged and unpredictable.
In this environment the region has been experiencing a process of power
restructuring. Although the U.S.-Japanese alliance remains intact, mostly because of South Koreas generational shift and the continued American hardline policy toward North Korea, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance
seems more problematic. China not only has become South Koreas largest

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trading partner, it is also emerging as a close political and security partner. Although North Korea seeks relative independence, Chinas political and economic leverage over it has been growing. Mongolia, while giving priority to
its relations with its immediate neighbors, is also strengthening its relationship
with the U.S. The two countries agreed to develop a comprehensive partnership; the biggest stakes of bilateral relations lie in the political and security
areas.38 Although the U.S. has remained in close coordination with Taiwan,
with Chinas rise Taiwans international space has been continually shrinking.
What makes the situation more complex is that growing nationalism is one of
the dominant factors in the new power distribution process in the region.
Triggered by the new complexities of the regional security environment
especially in the post-9/11 eraand growing recognition of common values
and interests, regional security cooperation, particularly among the major powers,
has aroused greater attention. Most countries now recognize that the balance
of power or an alliance regime alone is not sufcient for sustaining peace in
the region. Both the U.S. and North Korea have recognized the multilateral nature of the Korean Peninsular nuclear crisis and chosen to handle the issue in
the framework of the Six Party Talks. Until recently, the U.S. has shown very
little interest in developing a formal multilateral mechanism in the sub-region.
Now there appears to be a shift toward Northeast Asian multilateralism, notably by seeking an active Chinese role and Russian inuence in the talks. The
Six Party Talks thus should be considered an important opportunity for developing a more formal multilateral mechanism. Nevertheless, with the failures
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and Four
Party Talks,39 ad hoc multilateralism seems to be insufcient for resolving
years of distrust and confrontation in Northeast Asia. Besides, the North
Korean issue requires broader solutions that include political, economic, and
humanitarian aspects.
38. The term comprehensive partnership, coined during the 2005 summit of the heads of
states, connotes the vision that the two nations should engage in all-rounded cooperation by developing closer ties in political, security, economic, and social spheres of relations, and not merely
succumb to strategic collaboration ala treaty alliances. However, as the geographical and economic
gap between Mongolia and the U.S. remains, political and security fields will, in the foreseeable
future, retain the say in such a partnership.
39. KEDO is an international organization established to advance the implementation of the
October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK. KEDO has served as
a unique vehicle for implementing energy-related projects in the DPRK and, more broadly, for supporting international nuclear non-proliferation efforts and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Four Party Talks was proposed by the South Korean government in 1996, bringing
together the two Koreas and the United States and China. Following the number of preparatory
talks, one high-level session among the four took place in 1997. North Koreas dogged insistence
on regarding the Four Party Talks as negotiations between it and the U.S., with South Korea and
China sitting in as observers, was the main reason the 1997 talks fizzled out.

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In recent years, voices supporting a multilateral security mechanism to supplement the existing balance-of-power regime have grown in Northeast Asia.
The initiative of Presidents George Bush and Roh Moo-hyun during their summit meeting in Gyeongju in November 2005 to begin discussions on a peace
regime in a forum separate from the Six Party Talks appears as a new highlight.
As a party not directly involved in the Korean nuclear crisis, Mongolia has a
very limited role in tackling this problem. Nevertheless, as a neutral country
with an active interest in developing multilateralism, Mongolia could play
a useful part among the ambitious, distrustful powers in efforts to establish a
permanent dialogue and thereby help reduce misunderstanding and build cooperation and condence. As Kim Il Sung once emphasized, North Korea and
Mongolia are the smallest nations in Northeast Asia. North Korea has shown
interest in developing relations with small and medium countries such as Mongolia, Canada, and Australia. These countries efforts in inuencing North Koreas
attitudes toward the international community may indeed be more effective than
those of the more powerful countries.
The potential for economic integration is most promising for future multilateralism in Northeast Asia, which is one of the most powerful economic regions
in the world. The area accounts for about 30% of world gross domestic product and boasts some of the most powerful economiesJapan, China, South
Korea, and Taiwan. Approximately half of world foreign exchange is held by
the Northeast Asia countries. Most importantly, regional countries possess substantial natural resources and complementarities that can help generate further
development.
Russia, Mongolia, and China abound in natural resources. Russia has one of
the richest reserves of gas and oil in the world and wishes to be a strategic energy partner for the major energy importers in the region, Japan, South Korea,
and China. Chinas entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is accelerating its economic cooperation with neighboring countries. China, Japan, and
South Korea are becoming increasingly interdependent in the framework of
East Asian economic integration. Projects developing regional energy and infrastructure networks are moving beyond the stage of assessment to the realm
of reality. Importantly, because of North Koreas strategic location, certain parts
of the road and energy networks will cross the country, helping to incorporate
it into regional cooperation. Therefore, growing economic interdependence
will be an important factor shaping regional political stability and security
mechanisms in the coming years.
Chinas increasing activism to promote broader political and economic cooperation in Northeast Asiaunder its peaceful rise conceptshould be a
constructive means to advance regional integration. China has good political,
security, and economic reasons to support cooperation in this sub-region. It
shares a long boundary with Mongolia, Russia, and North Korea; border peace

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and stability are a prerequisite to development. Among others nations, Mongolia is frequently mentioned as being a country of crucial geopolitical interest. Maintaining good China-Mongolian relations is regarded as a signicant
matter for the security and stability of northern and western China, including
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and the northeastern provinces.40 To accelerate the
development of the northeast, increasing economic cooperation will be needed
to a degree compatible with Beijings development strategy for Chinas west.
Many Chinese scholars suggest that it is now time for Northeast Asian countries
to think about concrete steps to establish a regional cooperation framework.
Some argue that establishing a political and security cooperation mechanism
will be more complicated than establishing a vehicle for economic cooperation.
They believe the achievement of economic cooperation will bring political results.41 Therefore, Chinese policy toward Northeast Asia will provide an important positive impetus not only for regional ties but also to bilateral cooperation
between Mongolia and North Korea.
Mongolia, North Korea, and the Russian Far East constitute the less developed and less integrated region in Northeast Asia. The three share common
ground in development needs. Mongolia has an interest in facilitating economic cooperation between the two Koreas. South Korea perceives Mongolias strategic location between Russia and China, its natural resources, and its
low-cost labor to be attractive factors for investment. Based on North Koreas
interest in exporting labor to Mongolia, some Mongolian companies are working to develop proposals for initiating trilateral cooperation in Mongolian territory combining Mongolias resources, South Koreas technology and capital
investment, and North Korean laborers. Considering the continually growing
economic relations between Mongolia and the two Koreas, as well as an increase in inter-Korean economic cooperation and cultural afnity between the
Mongolian and Korean people, it is reasonable to expect that increasing interdependence among the three countries will emerge in the coming years.

Conclusion
In the post-Cold War and post-Sino-Soviet conict era, Mongolia has formulated an independent foreign policy free from socialist ideology and based on
its own national interest. Defending national security by political and diplomatic means and making full use of the opportunities in the external environment for accelerating the countrys economic and social development are the
40. Li Dongyan, The Interaction between Northeast Asian Cooperation and Chinese Development Strategy, Political, Security, Economic, and Infrastructure Factors of Economic Cooperation in the Northeast Asia, ed. Lhamsurengiin Nyamtseren (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Development
Research Center, 2002), p. 30.
41. Ibid.

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main objectives of this foreign policy. Mongolia has chosen the Asia Pacic
region, Northeast Asia in particular, as the top-priority direction for its foreign
relations, keeping in mind issues of geographical and cultural proximity; moral
support for economic, social, and political reform; and accessibility of foreign
capital.
For the sake of its own security and development and peaceful co-prosperity
of the region, Mongolia seeks to contribute to multilateral efforts aimed at
strengthening peace and accelerating economic cooperation in the region. It
sees engaging North Korea as a potential means to achieve its goals. Through
Mongolias engagement policy, bilateral relations have been transforming from
the ideology-driven bonds of the Cold War period into engagement-produced
state-to-state relations. Although Mongolias policy has achieved little, if any,
appreciable success so far, it has produced certain positive outcomes. Pyongyang,
by reopening its embassy in Ulaanbaatar and actively promoting exchanges
and cooperation, has demonstrated a clear interest in strengthening ties with
Mongolia. Despite inherent limits, the prospects for future Mongolian-North
Korean relations are encouraging, based on existing common interests, cultural and historical afnities, and similar ideological and economic experiences.

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