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The Current Kosovo Conflict: International Recognition of Sovereignty

After political turmoil throughout the 1980s, the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia divided into seven separate political entities: Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. However, this division and granting of autonomy to localized
governments did not cease the riots and violence in the region. Throughout the 1990s, a
humanitarian crisis existed across the territories as corrupt leaders rose to power while the
government was unstable. For example, Slobodan Milosevic rose as a communist, later turned
authoritarian, dictatorial president of Serbia (which at the time included Kosovo) and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia from 1989-2000. During his thirteen-year political reign, Milosevic
ignited three wars within the Balkan region, violated international humanitarian law, and became
the first president to be indicted for war crimes by an international court (Pinos). The unwanted
yet persistent leadership of Milosevic, in conjunction with the sudden and aggressive
intervention from the international community, led to grave human rights violations, specifically
in current-day Kosovo, throughout the 1990s.
The current conflict for Kosovo is that the international community does not universally
recognize it as an independent state. This is in part due to Kosovos war-torn history of the past
two decades. In 1999, there were pro-democracy and anti-regime rallies, which led to the harsh
governmental crack down on its people. This included targeting individual political threats,
controlling the media and distributing propaganda, and systematically terrorizing the Muslim
population (Barlovac, Zimmermann). In addition to these international human rights violations
committed by the government, the international community violated protocol. NATO began
bombing in Serbia before accurate reporting was conducted and did not exclude dropping in
noncombatant areas. Kosovo was continuously bombed for 78 days, causing a death toll around

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4,600 with hundreds of thousands displaced. Additionally, the effects on the environmental lasted
for generations (Shah, The Kosovo Crisis).
Kosovo is the most recent state to declare independence in the Yugoslavic region. The
President of Kosovo officiated a declaration of independence devised by the Kosovo Assembly
in 2008. Although Kosovos independence is not universally recognized by all states, is seen as
legitimate in the eyes of many key players in the West, including the United States and most of
the European Union (Kosovo).
Understanding the extensive history of the region and continuous political power shifts,
there is a pending question around the future of Kosovo: do the deeply rooted political
grievances within the Baltic region hinder or propel Kosovos recognition as a sovereign state by
the international community? To answer this question, I will first describe the nature of the
political grievances, which stem from ethnical tension and territorial dispute. Next, I will outline
how these issues have been converted into multiple forms of violence, including armed, social,
and structural violence. Then, I will connect how this violence is preventing Kosovos mission of
sovereign recognition by the international community. Finally, I will access how Kosovo and its
allies are attempting to supersede this political blockage, and then propose my own solution to
ensuring effective and long-term peacebuilding.
The salient dynamics in this conflict revolve around political grievances, which stem from
ethnical tensions and territorial disputes. The Balkan overall region is filled with ethnic conflicts
since the dismantling of the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavic Wars range in terms of violence and
national goals. The modern-day nations of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro,
Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia all got along well under Soviet control. However, after the Cold
War, Germany and European powers decided to divide the territory into several small states since

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it would be easier to control than one large federation. Ignorantly dividing the territory, ethnic
groups were divided by new borders, causing social problems. For example, in the former
Yugoslavia, ethnic groups had intermingled and intermarried, leaving mixed populations in most
of the Yugoslav republics. When Yugoslavia broke up in 19911992, several republics declared
their independence as separate states (Goldstein).
The Kosovo conflict, in simplest terms, consists of two sides the Serbian and the
Albanian. These distinctly different nationalities have both caused pain and experienced
suffering from decades of regional aggression. Although the Kosovo conflict has many facets
and has shaped the Balkan area across social, political, and economic platforms, I am focusing
solely on how the historical tensions are hindering modern statehood; thus, I am only addressing
on the these two sides. Throughout Kosovos history, its Serbian and Albanian populations lived
in hostile coexistence [] the increase in Albanian power in the 1980s, the subliminal and
sometimes explicit demand for republic status, and the widening demographic difference
(Albanians make up about 90 percent of the two million population today) stoked growing
revanchism among nationalist Serbs (Zimmermann). The Serbians view the conflict as an
ethnical issue (Holy Land claim), whereas the Albanians believe it is a territorial issue
(demographical history claim). Serbian grievances were exploited by nationalists, but founded on
religious, cultural, and ethnic discrepancies over the right to the Holy Land. Propaganda
campaigns led by Serbian nationalists portrayed Albanians as Muslim separatists who have
fought against the West twice in this century, who remained loyal to a foreign power, and who
wanted to take Kosovo and its Serbian identity right out of Yugoslavia (Zimmermann).
Ethnic conflicts capitalize on nationalism and ethnocentrism. Nationalism is the devotion
to the interest of ones own nation over the interest of other states (Thyne). Although nationality

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and national identity are ambiguously defined terms, they commonly consist of a shared
language and culture. Milosevic, also known as Butcher of the Balkans, almost overnight ()
becomes recognized as a spokesperson for Serbs nationalists in the federation after he stood
behind Serbs in Kosovo, who claimed they were being oppressed by Kosovo Albanians. He led
his army with fighting words demonizing the Kosovar, such as: from now on, no one has the
right to beat you (Barlovac).
Alternatively, the Albanian population overall portrays the conflict as a territorial issue.
Territorial disputes center on the desire for statehood but also factor in ethnic relations
(Goldstein). In simplest terms, a states border may divide an ethnic group, causing the members
to call for a redrawing. Specific types of territorial disputes include interstate border, secession,
airspace, and water space. The Kosovo situation is a prime example of a territorial conflict
specifically secession. Kosovo is an interesting case as its population consists of 90% Albanians
and 10% Serbs. The first national policies were against Serbs until the ethnic cleansing of
Albanians in the 1990s. Attracting international attention, the future of Kosovo was discussed at
the highest level through diplomatic means. However, the prolonged dialog forced Kosovars to
initiate their own solution and thus in 2008 declared independence without UN approval. The
U.S. and the majority of EU member states recognized the independence, whereas Serbia,
Russia, and China did not (Goldstein). To secure Kosovos sovereignty, military intervention was
necessary. However, this places NATO with a dangerous precedent for the future.
These political grievances have transcended into multiple forms of violence, including
armed, social, and structural. Violence can be in the form of actions, words, attitudes, or
institutional systems that cause psychological, physical, social, or environmental harm, and/or
prevents people from reaching their full potential (Bobichand). Despite this comprehensive

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definition, identifying and addressing violence can be difficult, as violence can be deeply
structured into the system of relationships, within socio-economic and political arrangements,
and even in the culture of a society and of a global system (Bobichand). Physical violence, for
example, may be clear and apparent, but one must also consider the root causes of the behavioral
aggression, then the instigation causes for violence, then the effects of the violence on the
situation moving forward. Armed violence, or direct violence, includes physical force, such as
killing, torture, and rape, but also encompasses avoidable impairment of fundamental human
needs or life which makes it impossible or difficult for people to meet their needs or achieve their
full potential (Bobichand). The history of Kosovo exhibits direct violence as the Serbian troops
under Milosevics reign were instructed to systematically attack and torture the civilians; any
opposition, whether noncombatants hosting a protest or political activists writing to the media,
was suppressed illegally through violence and murder (Kosovo: Special).
This direct violence derived from the social and cultural violence within the region. In the
modern, globalized world, almost all cultures recognize that killing a person is murder, but
killing tens, hundreds or thousands during a declared conflict is called war or killing of
innocent people by the security forces are often declared as caught in the crossfire (Bobichand).
Thus, culture does not excuse the war-like slaughter ordered by Milosevic in Kosovo. The
regimes aggression is explainable by cultural violence, which addresses the beliefs and attitudes
that are engraved in an individual from childhood development and dictate the actions of daily
life thereafter. Culture focuses on diversity in experiences, kinship, philosophical approaches,
and an individuals relationship with society (Fuentes); certain extremist interpretations of
Serbian culture emphasize the difference in these cultural factors between the Serbian and
Albanian Kosovo population.

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Social exclusion and cultural prejudice as depicted above are also consequences of
structural violence. In Kosovo, structural violence surfaced when the media was completely
regulated by the regime and circulated propaganda. The media circulated stories of Albanians
raping Serbian women, abusing children, and torturing men (Zimmermann). This is a two-tiered
problem: first, it encourages the violence between the Serbian and Albanian population and,
second, it provided false reporting of conditions to the international community. As seen in this
case, structural violence through media manipulation initiated institutional violence from the
international community (Galtung). Discrepancies arose between the UN and NATO over what
actions should be taken. Many nations believed, the Serbians provided a legitimate claim to
sovereignty of the region, but were unreliable to govern themselves based on their illegitimate
use of power, through civilian targeting, and media manipulation (Zimmermann).
Not only did the Kosovo population caused violence domestically, but NATO, the leading
international institution in monitoring the conflict, also engaged in physical direct violence.
NATO, although representing numerous nations and thus receiving backing across the globe,
violated international humanitarian law as well. First, NATO bombed Serbia without
authorization by the UN Security Council. Second, NATO targeted not only military bases, but
also hit civilian infrastructures. Third, NATO bombed the Chinese embassy, although proof of
intention is unclear (Shah, Did NATO) Statistically, the bombing was more of a cause of the
refugee crisis that the initial governmental violence800,000 refugees total fled (Shah,
Mainstream). Aside from being a factor in causing the refugee crisis, NATO also failed to
provide adequate aid to the refugees during their migration (Shah, Did NATO).
The violence throughout the region, although physical fighting and bombings have ended
since the signing of the cease-fire, has detrimentally affected the governmental credibility of the

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nation. The international community today is still divided on recognizing Kosovos sovereignty.
Some scholars argue that even the nations that encourage Kosovos statehood are not concerned
with repairing the humanitarian and refugee crisis, but reaping personal gains. Humanitarian
intervention is replete with invocations of humanitarian intentions by strong powers or
coalitions in order to conceal their own geopolitical interests (Lobel). The current government is
unstable, fractionated, and does not represent the population of Kosovo as a whole. There is
little to no representation of the Albanian population: the Albanians have been purged from all
governmental institutions, and have made no effort to re-join them (Zimmermann. The
population does not participate in election nor end a party to international assemblies, but have
created alternative institutions such as school, health care, and tax systems for themselves.
Kosovo and other actors intervening in the conflict have attempted to supersede this
political blockage and officiate Kosovos national sovereignty. This is not an easy process;
components to consider include the current level of violence within Kosovo, the current (and
future) role of external actors in reducing the violence, and the role of domestic institutions and
civil society. The presence of violence in Kosovo has been consistently inconsistentit swings
like a pendulum catalyzed by certain events. From 1970 onward, domestic and international
dialogs have been held to implement cease-fires, renegotiate terms, and discuss governmental
reform within Kosovo (Pinos). The first step to securing peace is to eliminate political violence,
which is used as a tool of both state and non-state actors, and replacing it by political conflict
management is essential to making sustainable peace (Bekaj). Violence is on a decline
throughout the region, but Kosovo is stumped in the process of facilitating sustainable peace,
mostly due to the stagnate support of the international community. Steps towards a solution
began in 1998 with a ceasefire agreement devised by the Organization for Security and

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Cooperation in Europe. Although Kosovo is not an official member of the OSCE, neighboring
states and allies advocated for the agreement. However, the ceasefire ended with the first NATO
bombing on March 25, 1999 (Clark, Howard). In May, there was a newly drafted peace
agreement, but the contentions were too vague and thus never implemented (Shah The Kosovo
Conflict). In the same month, President Clinton promised that the West the U.S. and its
European allieswould help rebuild the region. However, once again this was an empty
promise.
By June 1999, Yugoslavia accepted a revised peace plan proposed by NATO and Russia.
The Serbian army would withdraw forces and cease all ground attacks on the civilian population,
and NATO would cease bombing (Clark, Howard). There were benefits to this agreement: NATO
officials worked directly with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to reach a compromise there
would be no dissolution. Instead, the KLA would undergo a process of demilitarization and
transformation (Bekaj). Legislation was drafted and signed by numerous members from both
parties; the text detailed the approach and timeline specifically. The process was regulated by the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which monitored the surrendering of 9000 small arms, 800
machine guns, 300 anti-tank mines, 1200 mines, 178 mortars, 2700 hand grenades, 1000 kg of
explosives and over 5 million rounds of ammunition (Bekaj). Further provisions of the peace
agreement assigned peacemaking responsibilities to the KPC, such as organizing disaster
response services, sending humanitarian aid to isolated areas, contributing to infrastructure
redevelopment, and overseeing ceremonial rights of the civilian population (Bekaj). However,
there were three major flaws to this agreement. First, Yugoslavia wanted the UN to monitor the
territory, but NATO took the reigns instead. Second, Kosovo wanted autonomy or independence,
for ethnic grievance reasons, but were not granted sovereignty. Third, the treaty did not address

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the humanitarian crisis with the refugees; 164,000 Serbian refugees had fled to Kosovo (Shah
The Kosovo Conflict).
Upon reflection, President Carter stated that the West did not handle the situation properly.
In his speech Have We Forgotten the Path to Peace, Carter states: the international
community has admirable goals of protecting the rights of Kosovars and ending the brutal
policies of Slobodan Milosevic. However, the decision to attack the entire nation has been
counterproductive, and our destruction of civilian life has now become senseless and excessively
brutal. There is little indication of success after more than 25,000 sorties and 14,000 missiles and
bombs, 4,000 of which were not precision guided (Carter). Specifically referencing the
bombings, Carter states, the result has been damage to hospitals, offices and residences of a
half-dozen ambassadors, and the killing of innocent civilians () the United States' insistence on
the use of cluster bombs, designed to kill or maim humans, is condemned almost universally and
brings discredit on our nation (Carter).
In 2000, fair and monitored elections removed Milosevic from power and implemented the
opposition leader. The new reigning party, consisting of the nineteen regime-opposition parties,
was able to regain control of the parliament, the state media, and the government-run newspaper,
Politika. By this time, the bombing had completely ceased and peace was negotiated on paper,
but the area still needed rebuilding and the refugees still needed relief. Additionally, the new
Kosovo government wanted additional policing to prevent the returning Kosovars from
retaliating against the Serbians (Steele).
Despite the apathetic international leadership throughout the early 2000s, there is still a
hopeful future for Kosovo. The state borders Albania and Macedonia, both independent and
autonomous states. Additionally, Kosovo is allied with Greece, which plays a big brother role in

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the region, as it is affiliated with the European Union and other key international institutions.
There are currently no NATO or UN troops in Kosovo or along its borders. Perhaps this, even a
small deployment, would serve as an effective monitoring agency. Serbia currently has a
stabilized military force and policing around the border; in contrast, the presence of such troops,
particularly if they were from NATO, might have some deterrent effect on the outbreak of major
fighting in Kosovo (Zimmermann). These units would serve as monitoring units. Multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations have numerous facilities available: observer missions,
traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (Fortna).
Effective leadership derives from multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement
traditional peacekeeping forces with large civilian components to monitor elections, train or
monitor police, monitor human rights, and sometimes temporarily to administer the country
(Fortna).
In addition to monitoring missions from external institutions, domestic actions of
nonviolence peacebuilding would be effective immediately. Beginning in the 1990s, a new
generation of activists linked with those elsewhere in Yugoslavia struggling for pluralism and a
non-nationalist democracy rose to civil power (Clark, Howard). This younger generation
engaged in marches, averaging 300,000 in attendance, and revived slogans and flags from the
civil protests through the 1970s (Clark, Howard).
Another example of nonviolence is the influential publications of the Writers Association.
The company stands for intellectual freedom and consequentially was involved and won
many freedom of expression cases since the 1980s. Freedom of the media is imperative in
progressing the status of Kosovo in the eyes of the international community. The Serbian
population, in both Serbia and Kosovo, are still receiving propaganda focusing on justifying the

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ethnic cleansing from the previous leadership. A New York Times journalist reported: people
here think all the world is against us,' Vlada told me. But I don't think the world has interest in
us. There is a mass hypnosis here. The Government wants to stay in power so it suffocates free
thought (Harden). Additionally, media freedom is necessary to dismantle stereotypes of the
Albanian Muslims. Currently, Kosovo is sharing the sentiment of many Eastern European
nations attempting to remain culturally tolerant holistically, but suffering from Islamophobia
due to the recent attack on major cities. Deutsch Welle stated, the unemployment situation
leaves many vulnerable to Arab countries' influence. Since the Kosovo war in 1998-9, Arab
countries have established and funded many NGOs in Kosovo. [] Security agencies believe,
however, that these organizations could be funding radical extremist groups (Cani).
The progression of Kosovar government and civil society over the past decades, with
additional influence from neighboring states and other regional hegemonies, has placed Kosovo
in a unique situation. Its expedited development in recent years qualifies it economically for
statehood, for globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to
spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life
requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms (Ghali). Nonetheless,
globalization is not the determining factor of statehood. Perhaps, identity is. Identity national,
ethnic, cultural, and territorialshapes and moves the expression of conflict, as exemplified in
the Kosovo case study (Lederach). During these conversations about progressing peace
sustainability, participants must be culturally sensitive to the language used, acknowledge
identity factors and differences, and address each identity with the same level of respect
(Lederach). If identity is viewed as a component of, not challenge to, peacebuilding, both
international institutions and domestic society groups can overcome the preexisting political

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grievances preventing Kosovo from being fully recognized as a sovereign state.
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