The Matrix

and Philosophy
Welcome to the
Desert of the Real

Edited by

WILLIAM IRWIN

For Peter H. Hare,

Morpheus to many

Introduction: Meditations on The Matrix

Scene 1
How Do You Know?
1.

Computers, Caves, and Oracles: Neo and Socrates

WILLIAM IRWIN

2.

Skepticism, Morality, and The Matrix

GERALD J. ERION and BARRY SMITH

3.

The Matrix Possibility

DAVID MITSUO NIXON

4.

Seeing, Believing, Touching, Truth

CAROLYN KORSMEYER

Scene 2
The Desert of the Real
5.

The Metaphysics of The Matrix

JORGE J.E. GRACIA and JONATHAN J. SANFORD

6.

The Machine-Made Ghost: Or, The Philosophy of

Mind, Matrix Style
JASON HOLT

7.

Neo-Materialism and the Death of the Subject

DANIEL BARWICK

8.

Fate, Freedom, and Foreknowledge

THEODORE SCHICK, JR.

Down the Rabbit Hole of Ethics

and Religion
9.

There Is No Spoon: A Buddhist Mirror

MICHAEL BRANNIGAN

10.

The Religion of The Matrix and the Problems

of Pluralism
GREGORY BASSHAM

11.

Happiness and Cyphers Choice: Is Ignorance Bliss?

CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, JR.

12.

We Are (the) One! Kant Explains How to Manipulate

the Matrix
JAMES LAWLER

Scene 4
Virtual Themes
13.

Notes from Underground: Nihilism and The Matrix

THOMAS S. HIBBS

14.

Popping a Bitter Pill: Existential Authenticity in

The Matrix and Nausea
JENNIFER L. MCMAHON

15.

The Paradox of Real Response to Neo-Fiction

SARAH E. WORTH

16.

Real Genre and Virtual Philosophy

DEBORAH KNIGHT and GEORGE MCKNIGHT

Scene 5
De-Construct-Ing The Matrix
17.

Penetrating Keanu: New Holes, but the Same Old Shit

CYNTHIA FREELAND

18.

The Matrix, Marx, and the Coppertops Life

MARTIN A. DANAHAY AND DAVID RIEDER

DAVID WEBERMAN
The Matrix: Or, The Two Sides of Perversion
SLAVOJ ZIZEK

20.

The Potentials
The Oracles Index

Acknowledgments
About the Editor
Popular Culture and Philosophy
About The Matrix and Philosophy
Praise for The Matrix and Philosophy

Credits
Cover
Copyright

About Open Court Publishing Company

About PerfectBound

vi

Meditations on The Matrix

Which pill would you choose, the red or the blue? Is ign
bliss, or is the truth worth knowing, no matter what? After
ing The Matrix we are impressed by the action and
effects, and also besieged by questions. Is it possible that w
selves are prisoners of the Matrix? Is this a Christian
Buddhist film? There is no spoon?
A student of mine at Kings College, Adam Albert, firs
my attention to The Matrix. He immediately saw the conn
between the film and Descartess speculations on the po
of deception by dreams or an evil deceiver. My experien
his were similar to those of philosophy professors and s
around the world. The magazine Philosophy Now even h
essay contest for college students. The topic: Which pill
you choose? Why?
With this book, professors follow the trail blazed by th
dents. Each author asks and answers questions about the
sophical significance of the film. As culture critic Slavo
suggests, The Matrix is a philosophers Rorschach inkbl
Philosophers see their favored philosophy in it: existen
Marxism, feminism, Buddhism, nihilism, postmodernism
your philosophical ism and you can find it in The Matri
the film is not just some randomly generated inkblot bu
definite plan behind it and intentionally incorporates mu
is philosophical. The Wachowski brothers, college d
comic-book artists intrigued by the Big Questions,
acknowledge that they have woven many philosophical
and allusions into the fabric of the film. The Matri
Philosophy does not in every instance attempt or purport
vey the intended meaning of the writers and artists resp
for The Matrix. Rather, the book highlights the philosophi
nificance of the film.
To paraphrase Trinity, its the questions that drive u
contributing authors draw on Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, De

(among other philosophers) to address the questions: What

I know? What should I do? What may I hope? What is real? W
is happiness? What is the mind? What is freedom, and do
have it? Is artificial intelligence possible? Answering these qu
tions leads us to explore many of the major branches of phi
ophy including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthet
philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and political phi
ophy. Despite the multitude of questions, there is but one imp
ative: WAKE UP!
People like popular culture; it is the common language of
time. Did you know that Aaliyah died before completing
sequel to The Matrix? Did you know that W.V. Quine died
than a year before that? Many people know about the pop s
Aaliyah, while most people have never even heard of the gr
philosopher, Quine. The contributing authors of this book aim
bring the reader from pop culture to philosophy. Willie Sut
was a criminal mastermind, a genius of sorts. Once ask
Willie, why do you rob banks? he replied straightforward
Because thats where the money is. Why write about pop c
ture like The Matrix? Because thats where the people are.
No one would object if we turned to the works of Hom
Dante, and Shakespeare to raise philosophical questions. T
Matrix does not belong to the list of Western classics, but nev
theless the film raises the same philosophical questions as
great works of literature. If philosophy could be found only
the writing of philosophers and were relevant only to the li
of professors, then it would be the dull and sterile discipline
many people mistakenly believe it to be. But philosophy
everywhere; it is relevant to and can illuminate everyones l
like the Matrix, it is all around us.
This book is not just for philosophers but for all of us w
have ever had a splinter in the mind, driving us mad. Le
be a beginning but by no means an end to your study
philosophy.

Scene

How D
You Know

Computers, Caves, and

Oracles: Neo and Socrate
WILLIAM IRWIN

I tell them that Im doing fine

Watching shadows on the wall.
JOHN LENNON
So often times it happens that we live our lives in chains
And we never even know we have the key.
THE EAGLES

Many people recognize The Matrix as a retelling of the

est story ever told. The biblical imagery is clear, and th
release on Easter weekend 1999 supports the intent. Fe
ple recognize The Matrix as a retelling of the greates
never told, the story of Socrates, an intellectual hero wh
tinued on his quest despite opposition and ultimately p
his noble defiance with his life.
Why dont most people know one of the greatest stor
culture has to offer? The main reason is that we leave the
telling the story to college philosophy professors. Not ev
attends college and, sadly, not everyone who attends
takes a philosophy course. While Philosophy 101 is an id
ting in which to study closely and discuss passionately
of Socrates, theres no need to wait for an opportunity th
never come. Like the story of Jesus, the story of Socrates
be the subject of childrens books, family and classroom

Wachowski brothers directed Keanu Reeves in a veiled telling

the tale, but I would cast Steve Martin as the lead in
unapologetic Socrates cinematic celebration. Spielberg wo
direct. The Matrix is many things; a retelling of the Socrates st
is just one of them, and indeed viewers are certain to miss
element of the film unless they already know the story. If you
unfamiliar with the tale, let this essay be your introduction.

Questions and Missions

Were on a mission from God, said the Blues Brothers. T

had a full tank of gas, half a pack of cigarettes, and one h
dred and six miles to Chicago. It was dark and they were we
ing sunglasses. Their mission? Play a concert to save
orphanage in which they were raised by an old school n
affectionately called the penguin. Neo is on a mission to s
the human race from unwitting enslavement to artificial inte
gence. Socrates too is on a mission, a mission from (the) G
(Apollo), delivered via the Oracle at Delphi to his frie
Chaerephon. His mission, should he choose to accept it, is
wake up the people of his hometown, Athens.
In a whisper through the din of Rob Zombie in the Goth c
from hell, Trinity tells Neo, Its the question that drives u
Their question: What is the Matrix? Like Neo, Socrates had
splinter in his mind and a driving question: What is the go
life? Questioning brings trouble to both our heroes. Socra
finds himself on trial, charged with impiety and corrupting
youth, and Neo is accused by the Agents of committing nea
every computer crime we have a law for.
Socrates was in the habit of asking his fellow citizens qu
tions, often seemingly straightforward and simple questi
whose answers turned out to be elusive. Like a skilled in
viewer, Socrates would follow up with more difficult, prob
questions which would expose the ignorance of the people
asked. For example, Socrates asks his friend Euthyphro: Wha
holy? What makes an act holy? Euthryphros response: Holin
is what all the gods love and its opposite is what all the g
hate, unholiness (Euthyphro 9e). This seems to be a go
answer until Socrates poses the difficult follow-up question.

approve it because it is holy? (Euthyphro 10a) As you can

ine, Euthyphro has a difficult time answering this one and
annoyed with Socrates. This process of asking question
the person either contradicts himself or makes a mista
become known as the Socratic method (as Bill and Ted l
at San Dimas High). Not only does the method of pe
questioning intimidate students (as in The Paper Chas
embarrass politicians (choose your own example), but i
Socrates popular among the socially conscious yout
despised among the self-interested elite.
Despite what was often perceived as a rather arroga
versational style, Socrates was utterly humble concern
knowledge. He claimed ignorance rather than omniscien
his mantra, I know nothing. Why does a guy who know
ing question everyone else so intensely? Like Neo, So
excellent adventure is sparked by the words of an orac
some insight concerning the nature of knowledge and w

What Did the Oracles Say?

The Oracle told Morpheus he would find the One, the

who would break the grip of the Matrix and free humani
the truth. Thus Morpheus unplugs Neo, and, after some
and Kung Fu Fighting, takes him to the Oracle for confirm
Neo resists this grand possibility and rejects the idea that
is fated in any such way, telling Morpheus that he
believe in fatethat he wants to believe he is in contro
life. Socrates was similarly resistant to his fate. At least so
us at his trial, recorded by Plato and entitled the Apology

[Chaerephon] was a friend of mine . . . [H]e went to Del

day, and went so far as to put this question to the oracle
asked if there was anyone wiser than me; and the prie
Apollo replied that there was no one wiser. (Apology 21a)

When I heard the priestesss reply, my reaction was this: W

earth is the god saying? What is his hidden meaning? I a
aware that I have no wisdom, great or small. So what can h
by saying I am so wise? (Apology 21b)

claimed to know nothing? Socrates tells us he set out to dispro

the prophetic words of the oracle.

What I did was this: I approached one of those who seemed to

wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could prove the re
wrong, and say quite clearly to the oracle, This man is wiser t
I am, whereas you said I was the wisest. (Apology 21c)

Socrates was disappointed upon questioning this man, a po

cian, to find that the man thought he knew much but re
didnt know anything. Persistent by nature, Socrates did not g
up but proceeded to question the esteemed playwrights a
then the skilled craftsmen of Athens. He was similarly dis
pointed. Ironically, in realizing his own ignorance Socrates w
indeed the wisest man in Athens.
Consequently, Socrates took it as his divine charge to qu
tion his fellow citizens, to expose them to their own ignora
so that they might wake up and join him in seeking knowled

It is as if the city, to use a slightly absurd simile, were a horse

large horse, high mettled, but which because of its size is so
what sluggish, and needs to be stung into action by some kind
horsefly. I think god has caused me to settle on the city as
horsefly, the sort that never stops, all day long, coming to rest
every part of you, stinging each one of you into action, and p
suading and criticizing each one of you. (Apology 30e)

Like a pest, a horsefly (or gadfly), with constant question

Socrates aimed to awaken the city at large to the truththat
glue factory, not bliss, awaits those who rest in idle ignoran
The homes of the two Oracles are quite different. Accord
to mythology, Zeus released one eagle from the east a
another from the west to find the center of the world. They fl
until they impaled each other in mid air above a spot in Delp
thus declared the omphalos, or navel, of the world. At Delp
a place of majestic beauty at the foot of Mt. Parnassus, Apo
spoke through his priestess, the Oracle, known also as
Pythia. Morpheus takes Neo, not to the omphalos of the wo
but into the heart of the Matrix, to a place as unlike

unlikely Oracle.
Neo, very unsure of himself asks Morpheus, She
what? . . . Everything? Morpheus responds, She would
knows enough. Neo, still skeptical, asks, And shes
wrong? Morpheus with aloof, paradoxical assurance
Try not to think of it in terms of right and wrong. She is a
Neo. She can help you to find the path.
A visitor to the temple of Apollo at Delphi, after mak
appropriate sacrifices and payments, would ask his (no w
allowed) question of one of the Oracles assistants who
ask it of the priestess. Seated on a tripod, the priestess
inhale the breath of Apollo, the fumes (probably ethylene
nating from a chasm in the earth. Like a midnight to
Woodstock, the priestess of Apollo would prophesy by
ing in tongues. A priest would then interpret the incohere
bling and usually put it in hexameter verse. Like the sage
one gets from calling 1-900-PSYCHIC, the prophecies
Oracle were usually vague and open to more than one p
interpretation. Socrates, as we know, found puzzlin
Oracles declaration that there was no one wiser th
Knowing the Oracles reputation for cryptic prophecies t
he set out to disprove it, only to discover its ironic m
Less wise was King Croessus, who wanted to know
Oracle whether it was an auspicious time for him to ma
against the Persians. The Oracles response was, If you
battle now a great kingdom will be destroyed. Taking
terrific news the King led his troops to war and to the sla
He had no genuine grounds of complaint to the Orac
simply pointed out that he was mistaken about which ki
she had meant.
The Oracle of The Matrix not only lives in a rough
the virtual city, she is a grandmotherly black womanno
you expected, much as the Pythia were, for a time, s
from women over 50 rather than from virginal maidens
virtue would be less secure. Unlike her Delphic counterp
inner city Oracle meets face to face with those who se
And despite the fact that, sitting on a tripod, she bl
breathes the cookie fumes issuing from her oven and
smoke from her cigarette, she does not speak in tongu

Pythian in its purpose. Oddly, this Oracle asks the questio

You know why youre here? What do you think? Do you th
youre the one? Neo responds, I dont know. Socrates h
always claimed not to know, but Neo really does not know.
the Oracle quips, hes cute but not too bright. She allows him
conclude for himself that he is not the One and tells him t
being the One is like being in love. No one can tell you. Y
know it through and through, balls to bones. A poor conso
tion, she tells him, You got the gift, but it looks like youre w
ing for something. What? he asks? Her prophetic reply: Y
next life maybe. Who knows? Thats the way these things go
The Oracle is without malice though, and even offers so
free advice in the course of their session. Pointing to a s
above her kitchen door she asks Neo if he knows what it sa
Its Latin, she tells him, it means Know Thyself. This wisd
is in fact the key to making sense of the Oracles prophecy. T

(rather th
same phrase was inscribed in Greek,
,
the barbaric Latin, Temet Nosce) in the temple of Apollo
Delphi, and it was surely more important in interpreting
Pythian prophecy than the actual answer given by the Ora
Socrates realized this and lived by the related maxim The un
amined life is not worth living. Cocky King Croessus did
know himself, as we saw, and paid dearly for it. Only in ti
does Neo come to know himself, and thus believe in hims
and thus fulfill the depth of the Oracles prophecywh
includes Morpheus finding the One and Trinity falling in lo
with the man who is the One.
Self knowledge is the key, and without it we can unlock
other knowledge worth having. This is a theme important
just to Socrates and The Matrix but to other outstanding ph
sophical films. Fight Club poses the seemingly adolescent qu
tion, How much can you know about yourself if youve ne
been in a fight? We see, however, as the plot and the fig
develop, this is not a moronic, testosteronic query. We gain s
knowledge through struggle. Consider also Boys Dont Cry w
Brandons deception of himself and others and the disastr
consequences this brings. Finally, Memento wrestles with
perplexing question: How is it possible for me to lie to mys
Is memory loss part of the answer? Hollywood and Ath
agree, the unexamined life is not worth living.

piece of wisdom inscribed at Delphi and practiced

kitchen, Nothing in excess ( ). Here,
cookie, the Oracle says to Neo, not take some cook
take as many cookies as your heart desires. We kno
smell good, perhaps tempting Neo to overindulge. The
is also drinking something strange (quite likely an adult
age) and smoking a cigarette. Presumably, she can ind
these things without going to excess. This is in stark con
humanity in general, described by Agent Smith as a vir
spreads, using up all the resources in an area before it
on.
Legend has it that there was a time when the fum
inspired the Oracle at Delphi were available to all, but th
ple abused the privilege and harmed themselves, jumpi
the hole from which the fumes emanated. In time the
alone was allowed to inhale the breath of Apollo, and a
interpreter had to hear her prophecy and put it into ve
consumption by the seeker, who was thus two levels re
from the god. If fully digested, the wisdom of Know
and Nothing in excess might allow the chosen One to
truth to the many. Perhaps then all could inhale the pro
smoke and commune with the god for themselves.

A Tale of Two Caves

Morpheus tells Neo he was Born into a prison for [his]

Even slaves, prisoners of war, and concentration camp
sometimes manage to keep their minds free. They ma
my body but theyll never have my mind. This resista
slavery and imprisonment has been implemented throu
ages by countless heroes such as Epictetus, Fredrick Do
Viktor Frankl, James Bond Stockdale, Nelson Mandela
McCain, Malcolm X, and Rubin Hurricane Carter, to n
few. The only thing worse than a prison for your mind
be a prison for your mind you didnt know you were in, a
from which, therefore, you would have no urge to escap
would a person in such a prison even recognize if he w
free?
Suppose one of them were set free and forced sudd
stand up, turn his head and walk with his eyes lifted to th

dazzled to make out the objects whose shadows he had be

used to seeing. What do you think he would say, if someo
told him what he had formerly seen was meaningless illusi
but now, being somewhat nearer to reality and turned towa
more real objects, he was getting a truer view? . . . Would he
be perplexed and believe the objects now shown him to be
so real as what he formerly saw? These lines are from Pla
Republic (514cd) in which Plato tells a story known as the a
gory of the cave (also variously called the simile, myth, or pa
ble of the cave) (514a521b). The account, however, serves
as well to describe Neos predicament upon being freed fr
the Matrix.
The prisoners in the cave are chained by the neck, han
and legs. They have been this way since birth and so have
conception of any other way of life. Shadows appear on the w
in front of them, as their jailers pass animal figures before
light of a fire in the manner of a puppet show. The prison
watch shadows on a wall, shadows not of real animals but
carved figures. The light that makes these shadows possible
firelight, not the best possible kind of light, sunlight. Yet th
prisoners do not know that they are prisoners and do not s
pect there is any reality but that which they experience. O
day, however, one of the prisoners is set free of his chains
dragged to the outside world, and by the light of the
beholds things as they actually are. Rather than selfishly rema
ing in the outside world, the prisoner returns to tell the oth
who reward his kindness with mockery and resistance, beli
ing he has gone insane.
This story parallels the life of Platos teacher,1 Socrates, w
was thought mad and ultimately put to death for trying to dr
attention to a higher plane of reality. Of course it also paral
the story of Neo, who one day is freed from the Matrix to beh
the desert of the real. Like Platos prisoner, Neo finds him
in chains or, more precisely, black cable wires that stimulate
1

Plato uses his teacher Socrates as a character in his writings, including

allegory of the cave in The Republic. For a discussion of the complicated c
nection between Plato and Socrates see my Jerry and Socrates: The Exam
Life? in Seinfeld and Philosophy: A Book about Everything and Noth
(Chicago: Open Court, 2000), pp. 35.

Platos allegory is unclear, though in The Matrix it is Mo

(in Greek mythology the name of the God of sleep, who
changes in shape via dreams). Like Platos prisoner wh
be dragged upward, Neo is at first horrified by the sight
other unwitting prisoners who slumber, plugged in gooe
cave-pods. Neo does not want to accept that what he no
is real, that previously he had been living in a dream
Most of these people are not ready to be unplu
Morpheus assures him. Like Platos prisoners gradual,
period of adjustment to the world outside the cave, Neo
is painful. Why do my eyes hurt? Neo asks. Because
never used them, Morpheus replies.
The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is
wrote Aristotle. And we do well to keep in mind that
tion literally, etymologically, means to lead out, as th
oner is led out of the cave and as Neo is led out of the
The Hippocratic Oath reminds physicians that th
guardians and trustees, not owners, of medical knowledg
must share the knowledge to help others. No solemn oath
those who receive education in philosophy, though the
share is no less attendant. Platos escaped prisoner wou
fer to bask in the light of the sun, of goodness and know
but he returns to help others. Would he not feel like H
Achilles, that he would far sooner be on earth as a hir
vant in the house of a landless man or endure anything
than go back to his old beliefs and live in the old
(Republic 515d) Neo, unlike Cypher, would similarly
anything rather than return to a false reality.

Knowledge and Reality

The allegory of the cave is not only, or even most impo

a veiled retelling of the Socrates story. Rather Plato us
point to, and encourage openness in the reader to, a
level of reality, the Forms. Weall of usare like the pri
for we often mistakenly suppose that the reality in wh
live is the truest and highest reality there is. According to
all we actually experience at the level of reality av
through our five senses, are poor imitations of a higher l
reality, the Forms. We may experience beautiful sunse

imitations of the perfect Forms, copies of Beauty itself, Jus

itself, Goodness itself, and so on.
What splinter in the mind could rouse a person to seek
Forms? And how can they be known? Plato and Socrates te
the importance of understanding not through the senses
through the intellect alone. Morpheus tells Neo that no one
be told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for yourself.
with the Forms, it is not a literal seeing but a direct know
that brings understanding of the Matrix. This essay cannot tr
teach you what the Forms are, not even reading Plato can. T
is part of the challenge and frustration of Platos dialogues. O
finds oneself asking, What is Justice? What is Love? Wha
Goodness? What, after all, is a Form? It was asking such qu
tions that landed Socrates in trouble. So read and proceed w
caution.
Neo too learns that intellect is more important than
senses. Mind is more important than matter. As for Plato
physical is not as real as the Form, so for Neo there is
spoon. Neo is the reincarnation of the man who freed the f
humans. Plato held that the intellect and body are so alien
one another that their union at birth traumatically engend
loss of memory, a kind of amnesia. This is not the total loss
memory Cypher traitorously deals for, but rather the kind o
might suffer after drinking too much of Dozers Lethic mo
shine. The details can come back with the right prompting a
clues. For Plato, dj vu is not evidence of a glitch in the Ma
but a recollection (anamnesis) of the Forms. In the ti
between incarnations, when the soul is free of the body,
behold the Forms. On the earthly plane all learning is actuall
process of recollection in which we recall the Forms, cued in
the resemblance mundane objects bare to them. A child d
not need to be taught that a flower is pretty, for example,
knows it through recollection of the Form of Beauty itself a
the flowers share in it.

Philosophy: The Road Less Traveled

In the car, on the way to see Morpheus, Neo considers turn

back, but Trinity forces the moment to its crisis. You have be
down there, Neo. You know that road. You know exactly wh

not help but think of Robert Frosts famous lines, I took t

less traveled by / And that has made all the difference. W
wonder just how many people this favorite yearbook qu
and valedictory allusion truly fits. After all it would have
super highway, and there would still be a traffic jam, if
one who ever claimed the verse for his or her own actual
it.
The red pill is a new symbol of bold choice, and mo
ple insist they would take it if they were in Neos shoes
the conclusion of my introduction to philosophy course
my students to inhale the fumes from one of my classroo
ing implements, the red marker or the blue marker.
inhale the red marker they will major in philosophy an
how far down the rabbit hole goes. If they inhale th
marker they will return to their previously chosen major a
get they had ever given thought to questions that mat
mysteries of the universe. Most are amusedly annoyed
would like to think there is no such choice. No one really
in philosophyits just too impractical. But, in truth, a sel
cannot resist the lure of knowledge and reality.2

2
Thanks to all my friends and students who offered me their insight
Matrix.

Skepticism, Morality, and

The Matrix
GERALD J. ERION and BARRY SMITH

Most of us think that the world exists pretty much as it loo

and sounds and feels to us. It seems to you that you
presently seated in a chair, reading this book, so you proba
also believe it; you hold it to be true that you are sitting the
in the chair, reading. That it rarely occurs to you to articulate t
sort of thought is irrelevant. All that matters is that, once poin
out, it seems obviously, perhaps trivially, true. Who would e
dare to question it?
But Thomas Anderson, likewise, believes himself to be a t
paying, landlady-helping program writer for a respectable s
ware company. (Of course, he also believes in his other life
criminal activity conducted under the hacker alias Neo,
this life is kept hidden only from the authorities, and not fr
Anderson himself.) In this sense, Andersons beliefs about re
ity are like yours and mine, and as such they explain why i
so painful for him to learn that the world he thinks he lives
the world as it appears to him every day, is not at all re
Instead, the comfortable realm in which Anderson seems to
about his ordinary life is in fact a vast, deliberate deception p
duced in his brain by a system of intelligent computers t
grows, cultivates, and harvests humans as a renewable ene
source.
As Morpheus explains to Neo, this illusory world, t
Matrix, is everywhere:
16

you look out your window, or when you turn on your tel
You can feel it when you go to work, when you go to church
you pay your taxes. It is the world that has been pulled ov
eyes, to blind you from the truth . . . that you are a slave, N
everyone else, you were born into bondage, born into a pri
you cannot smell or taste or touch. A prison for your mind

Anderson and his contemporaries are fooled into th

that they are out in the world reading books, watching f
games, and engaging in other such activities. The truth
matter is that they spend their whole lives confined to sm
tainers that collect and distribute their bio-electrical en
computerized slave-masters.
When Neo first learns of this state of affairs, he be
physically sick, and he tries to return to his previous (
artificial) life in the Matrix. Neos crewmate Cypher finds
uation so awful that he agrees to betray Morpheus in ex
for a rich and important (though, again, artificial) life
upon the lies of the matrix. Ignorance is bliss, Cypher de
as he completes his deal with Agent Smith (no relatio
even as these fictional scenarios horrify us, they can al
voke deep philosophical questions. Some philosopher
even claimed that we might ourselves be caught up in a M
like world of unrelenting illusion. Our aim here is to e
such claims in the spirit of Western thinkers like Ren De
That is, we shall examine the hypothesis that we ou
might now be living inside a matrix. In the end, w
demonstrate that this idea is based upon a fundamenta
and that it represents at best an attitude of metaphysica
lion. We shall also, in a concluding section, examine the
ity of Cyphers choice to return to the matrix, arguing t
mistaken moral principles lead him to flawed judgments
serious ethical issues.

Why You Might Be in a Matrix:

Ren Descartes and the Malicious Dem

In philosophy, the hypothesis that the world we see, he

feel might be an illusion is advanced by defenders of th

with certainty that the external world exists. Hence, they ma

tain that it is possible to doubt our knowledge of the exter
world, much as the main characters in The Matrix come
doubt the everyday world they seem to live in.
Skeptical hypotheses are especially attractive to two gro
of people. First are adolescents, whose teenage rebellion aga
the easy certainties of parental authority sometimes take
metaphysical form that leads them to declare that Nothing
what it seems! or that I alone know what reality is like!
Second, and more importantly, are philosophers, who the
selves divide into two groups. To the first group belong philo
phers who have not outgrown their metaphysically rebelli
phase, and who thus find explorations of absurd and obviou
false hypotheses exciting or glamorous. Philosophers in this f
category may even profess to find the adolescent skeptics
gans plausible. But it is the second group of philosophers wh
is of most importance for us here. This second group compr
those, like Descartes, who see Matrix-like scenarios as use
tools for exploring fundamental questions about knowledge a
reality.
In his classic Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes p
sents an influential skeptical argument designed not to pro
that skepticism is true, but to establish a solid foundation for
ence. To accomplish this task, Descartes opens the Meditati
by declaring his intention to suspend every one of his bel
that he can find the slightest reason to doubt. Only those bel
that are absolutely certain, in the strongest sense of the te
will survive Descartess test, and only such beliefs, he holds,
serve as truly reliable foundations for science. Thus, Descart
radical doubt is methodological in the sense that it is design
to serve an intellectual purpose; it is unlikely that Desca
would in fact deny all of the beliefs he suspends at this stage
his project. Their suspension is temporary only; it is a matte
heuristics.
First to go in this belief-suspension process are the bel
that Descartes had formed on the basis of sensation.1 We jus

1
Ren Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated and ed
by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (Cambri
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 12.

senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. For instan

believe that our roommate Jon has arrived home from sc
we see him walk up the driveway, and we believe that
locked himself out yet again when we hear him fumblin
the door. However, as Descartes notes, From time to
have found that the senses deceive. This is especially
our sensations in relation to very small or distant objects
also holds of other sorts of objects. The figure we take to
could turn out to be a burglar; the fumbling could be th
glars attempt to break into the house. Because our senses
times deceive us, then, many of the beliefs that we justify
basis of sensory evidence do not meet Descartess hig
dard, and so he puts them out of action.
Continuing this exercise, Descartes then suggests tha
such relatively uncontroversial beliefs as that you are sitti
chair and reading this book could be subject to dou
course, such beliefs seem to be more trustworthy tha
beliefs about Jon and about whatever he is doing on the
However, Descartes points out that we often make m
about precisely these kinds of things when we dream.
you are dreaming, it may seem to you that you are si
your chair, reading this book, when in fact you are fast
in your bed (Descartes, pp. 1213). We are unable to
guish waking experiences from experiences of the s
appear to have in dreams until after we awake, a noti
Morpheus affirms as he asks:

Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure w
What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How
you know the difference between the dream world and
world?

Descartes himself concludes on the basis of his dream arg

that sense experience is an unreliable justification mech
and so he suspends all beliefs he has formed on the b
sensory evidence.
Descartes then carries his attack upon his own beli
further. While the dream argument gives us reason to do
opinions about the physical world, it seems to leave, for
ple, beliefs about numbers or geometrical figures unscath

added together are five, and a square has no more than f

sides (p. 14). However, Descartes concludes his first Meditat
by considering the following still more radical thought exp
ment. Suppose, he says, that a malicious demon of the utm
power and cunning has employed all his energies in order
deceive me (p.15). Such a creature, Descartes argues, co
easily lead us to mistaken conclusions about the sum of two a
three or the number of sides to a square. This malicious dem
could even more easily mislead us into thinking that there
physical world external to ourselves, when in fact [T]he sky,
air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things
merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensn
[our] judgment. Thus, Descartes concludes, I shall consi
myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or sens
but as falsely believing that I have all these things. Having re
Descartess first Meditation, then, it is difficult to imagine h
we could show that our lives are not just grand deceptions c
ated by a malicious demon. How could we ever refute the sk
tical arguments advanced by Descartes?
Those who have watched The Matrix might surely, aga
this background, have reason to question whether we co
ever rule out the possibility that the meaningful lives we th
we lead are in fact a matter of deceptions implanted in
brains by intelligent computer systems.

Why You Might Be in a Matrix, Continued

Peter Ungers Evil Scientist
and Hilary Putnams Brain in a Vat

In a contemporary contribution to the debate on skeptici

Peter Ungerhimself a defender of the skeptical positions
gests the possibility that we are all duped not by an evil dem
but by an evil scientist.2 In Ungers scenario, presented in
1975 book Ignorance, the common belief that there are cha
books, and other similar objects in the world around us is s
ply an elaborate deception stimulated in our brains by an
scientist, a super-neurologist who uses a computer to gener
2

Peter Unger, Ignorance (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), pp. 78.

tened to the relevant parts of our central nervous systems

these impulses to stimulate our brains, the scientist dece
into thinking that there are chairs and books, even thoug
are no such things in the world. Such a scenario has,
claims, the following implication; No one can ever know
absolute certainty] that there is no evil scientist who is, by
of electrodes, deceiving him into falsely believing there
rocks, and therefore, nobody can know that there are
Likewise, you cannot know that you are in your chair, r
this book, for you can never know with absolute certain
you are not subject to the manipulation of an evil neur
or for that matter, the manipulation of an evil, Matrix-lik
puter system.
Hilary Putnam pushes this skeptical science-fiction s
even further in his 1981 volume Reason, Truth, and His
Putnams version of the argument, an evil scientist dece
not just about rocks, but about everything we think we p
through the senses.3 Putnam begins by asking us to imagi
our brains have been surgically separated from the rest
bodies and placed in vats filled with brain-nourishing che
A powerful computer then sends electrical impulses in
brains, giving rise, for instance, to the illusion that we are
in chairs, reading books, playing tennis, and so forth.
while, though, our disembodied brains are actually f
around in vats in the evil scientists laboratory.
Putnam presupposes that the computer program is so
cated enough to generate proper feedback for the actio
brains attempt to initiate. For instance, should your brain
rouse your body from your chair to fetch a snack, the co
could provide the appropriate impulses needed to convin
that you had in fact risen from your chair and carried y
into the kitchen. But again, despite the appearance of
you would through all of these experiences remain a
bodied brain in a vat.

Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge U

Press, 1981), pp. 58. Though Putnam himself does not use this sce
argue in favor of skepticism, his work has made a powerful contrib
such discussions.

ilar to the situation facing most humans in The Matrix, Putn

then poses the skeptics question: How do you know you are
in this predicament? Without an answer to this question,
skepticism inspired by Descartess original arguments rema
like a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads.

Relief from the Matrix: Arguing

Against Skepticism

Fortunately, non-skeptical philosophers have come up wit

number of responses to the troubling questions about kno
edge and reality raised by Descartes, Unger, Putnam, and T
Matrix. First, it is important to note that the skeptics scenari
a mere possibility, and a very unlikely one at that. The fact t
we take the trouble to follow Descartes in his exercise of s
tematic doubt is due in large part to its presentation in a spe
philosophical context: the context of Descartess own quest
perfect knowledge, knowledge of the sort that would live up
the highest ideals of science. Remember that, to Descar
knowledge requires absolute certainty; we cannot be absolu
certain that a malicious demon (or an evil computer system
not deceiving us during sensation, so, Descartes argues, we c
not use sensation to justify our claims to knowledge.
A maximally strict standard for knowledge of this sort is p
fectly appropriate in philosophical contexts where we are exa
ining arguments for and against skepticism. In the ordin
contexts of everyday life, however, they are much too strict.
instance, if Jon asks you about tomorrows weather forecast a
you respond with questions like Does weather really exist?
Does time really exist? or What is tomorrow?, then
would, rightly, think that you had gone mad. This is because
ferent standards for what properly counts as knowledge obt
in different contexts.4 In some philosophical contexts, we qu
correctly impose very strict standards for knowledge. In eve
day contexts, though, we equally correctly impose just th
4

See David Lewis, Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philoso

74 (1996), pp. 549567.

satisfied by the vast collections of commonsensical kno

that we all share. In everyday contexts, then, we do indee
knowledge of where we are sitting, of what we are do
current local weather conditions, and of the results of b
games.
Thus, you do indeed know (in the fullest sense of th
many things about yourself and the world around you
beliefs about these things are both true and thoroughl
fied through your everyday experiences. You kno
instance, that you are not currently dreaming. You kno
Descartes (like Elvis) is dead. And you know that The
is just a film. In addition, modern science provides m
amounts of additional, no less genuine knowledgetha
trons are smaller than asteroids, that fish are not mamma
the Moon is not made of green (or any other type of) c
and so on.5 But if we do indeed possess these great an
growing stores of commonsensical and scientific know
then, it follows that we must reject Descartess clai
knowledge always requires that very special sort of
sophical) certainty that he demands in the specific con
his discussion of skepticism.6
Descartess fundamental epistemological principle
effect that only knowledge marked by certainty is g
knowledge has, moreover, problems of its own. Thus it
to be self-defeating, in the sense that its supposed truth
entail that it could not be known. As Theodore Schick,
Lewis Vaughn point out, unless [skeptics] are certa
knowledge requires certainty, they cant know that it

5
This is not to deny the important role played by the doctrine of falli
the advancement of science; that is, by the view that scientific theor
be subject to consistent testing against reality itself. Even evolutiona
gists remain open to the possibility that new evidence could be gat
prove the theory of evolution mistaken; the fervor with which they att
alternative theories as creationism is grounded, however, not in antibigotry, but in the tremendous amount of high-quality evidence that
evolution. See, for instance, Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn,
Think about Weird Things (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1995), pp. 211
lucid discussion of this issue.
6
David Nixon raises a similar point in Chapter 3 of this volume.

about Descartess principle, this principle itself begins to se

much less than certain. Indeed, our commonsensical and sci
tific beliefs are at least as dependable, if not more so, th
Descartess principle. It was through acceptance of these beli
after all, that we were able to trust the evidence of our sen
when reading Descartess own writings. Thus, we have go
reason to doubt his claim that knowledge requires certainty.
We should keep in mind, too, another anti-skeptical ar
ment advanced by the philosopher Bernard Williams.8 Willia
soothes our fears of being locked in a perpetual Matrix-l
dream-prison by pointing out that the fact that we can mak
distinction between dreams and waking experiences itself p
supposes that we are aware of both types of experience and
the difference between them. We can talk sensibly about the
ference between the two only because there is a differe
between them, a difference that we are aware of. As Willia
writes, it is only from the perspective of waking [that] we
explain dreaming (p. 313). Thus, we can make sense of the d
tinction between waking and dreaming itself only if we rea
are awake sometimes, and since we can distinguish the t
kinds of experience, it follows that there can be no serious r
son to worry that our lives might be made up entirely of dre
sequences that never end.
So, philosophy provides a number of tools for relieving
metaphysical uncertainty that a thoughtful viewing of T
Matrix might at first provoke. Since our knowledgeof wh
we are sitting, of what we are doing, of what the world arou
us is likedoes not require philosophical certainty, but o
those sorts of strong, context-appropriate justifications which
employ for everyday and scientific purposes, it follows that
can use the good reasons we have for believing in the exter
world to justify our claims to knowledge not only about
existence of this world, but also about its nature and const
tion. As Martin Gardner puts it:

The hypothesis that there is an external world . . . is so obviou

useful and so strongly confirmed by experience down through
7
8

Schick and Vaughn, p. 100.

Bernard Williams, Descartes (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1978

than any other empirical hypothesis. So useful is the posit t

almost impossible for anyone except a madman or a metap
to comprehend a reason for doubting it. (Martin Gardner, Th
of a Philosophical Scrivener [New York: Quill, 1983], p. 15,
in Schick and Vaughn, p. 87)

Morality and the Matrix:

Cyphers Mistake

In the grips of the sort of skeptical doubt inspired by De

and The Matrix, we might be able to empathize with Cyp
he cuts his despicable deal with Agent Smith. Tired of th
ery of the real world, Cypher agrees to lead Smith to Mo
in exchange for a new life as a wealthy, famous actor ins
Matrix. Cypher knows that the Matrix is not real, but he b
that he can make his life better by simply ignoring th
retreating back into a pleasant world of illusory fantasy.
Cypher is making a big mistake here, however. In ch
to lead his life for pleasure alone, he presupposes that p
is the only thing that could make his life worth living. Th
trine according to which pleasure is the only thing valua
its own sake is known to philosophers as hedonism.9 T
hedonism may seem to have some intuitive appeal, the p
pher Robert Nozick provides a powerful argument again
his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. This argument is especiall
esting for us here, because it involves yet another brain-in
type thought experiment.10
To begin, Nozick again suggests that we might sim
unconscious bodies floating in vats of nourishing chemic
postulates something called the experience machine, a
ticated piece of computer equipment that uses electro
9

Hedonism is one fundamental component of utilitarianism, a mora

ophy that holds that an actions moral value is dependent upon
amount of happiness that it produces. The two founders of utilitariani
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill; see Bentham, An Introductio
Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner, 1948) a
Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979).
10
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Book
pp. 4245.

chine, neurophysiologists could make it seem to us that we

reading books, meeting with friends, drinking beer, and do
other pleasant things. All the while, though, we would in
merely lie dormant inside the machine. Assuming that the ex
rience machine could be configured to generate any experie
we think worthwhile, that it could be programmed to make
seem to be wonderfully successful, rich, happy, and beauti
Nozick asks, Should you plug into this machine for li
(Nozick, p. 42)
Cypher, of course, would answer Yes. Most of us, thou
are rightly much more cautious. For there seems to be som
thing troubling about the idea of turning our lives over in
way to mere stimulation by electrodes.11 Nozick explains w
this is so with a series of arguments against those who, l
Cypher, would choose to submit to the experience machi
First, he says, We want to do certain things, and not just h
the experience of doing them (Nozick, p. 43). Neither the ex
rience machine nor the Matrix allows for genuine, meaning
action; instead, they merely give the appearance of meaning
action. But in addition:

We want to be a certain way . . . [but] someone floating in a t

is an indeterminate blob. There is no answer to the question
what a person is like who has long been in the tank. Is he cou
geous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? Its not merely that its d
cult to tell; theres no way he is. (Nozick, Anarchy, State, a
Utopia, p. 43)

Finally, the experience machine does not allow us to conn

with reality in any substantial way, despite the strong des
most of us have to do so.12 Thus, Nozick concludes, We le
11

Even the great utilitarian John Stuart Mill seems to have been troubled
this sort of objection to hedonism. In responding to his own (and
Benthams) critics, Mill tried to distinguish different kinds of pleasure, som
a higher and some of a lower quality.
12
pp. 4344. Nozick goes on to point out: This clarifies the intensity of
conflict over psychoactive drugs, which some view as mere local experie
machines, and others view as avenues to a deeper reality; what some view
equivalent to surrender to the experience machine, others view as follow
one of the reasons not to surrender!

ining an experience machine and then realizing that we

not use it (p. 44). Likewise, we learn that something ma
us besides pleasure (or fame, or wealth, or beauty) by
ering Cyphers decision and then realizing that we wou
make it. Cyphers decision is, in fact, immoral. In contrast
decision to face the desert of the real allows him to und
genuine action and have genuine experiences that give
meaning, and thus a moral value. As the moral philosoph
Stuart Mill writes, It is better to be a human being diss
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
satisfied (Mill, p. 10).

Know You Are

The Matrix exposes us to the uncomfortable worries of

sophical skepticism in an especially compelling way. Ho
with a bit more reflection, we can see why we need no
the skeptics doubts about the existence of the world
doubts are appropriate only in the very special context
philosophical seminar. When we return to normal life
that they are groundless. Furthermore, we see also the
mistake that Cypher commits in turning his back upon
and re-entering the Matrix. Not only does reason compe
admit the existence of the external world, it also require
face this world, to build for ourselves meaningful lives w
and to engage, as adults, in the serious business of livin

The Matrix Possibility

DAVID MITSUO NIXON

After watching The Matrix I have to ask, Could I be in the Mat

right now? Maybe everything I think that I see, feel, taste, a
touch, everything that I think is real is actually a part of a co
puter generated dream world and in reality my body is float
in a pod of pink goo. Thats such a scary and interesting pro
sition that its worth giving a name to it. For ease of refere
lets call it The Matrix Possibility: Its possible that I am (or y
are) in the Matrix right now.
In this essay I want to examine a number of questions t
surround the Matrix Possibility. Among them are: (a) Even if
arent actually in the Matrix, what implications does the Ma
Possibility have for what we actually do or do not know?
How does Neo come to knowif he does at allthat he wa
the Matrix? (c) Does the Matrix Possibility even make sense?
warned: the conclusions that I will drawespecially in the
ter two sectionsmay be very counter-intuitive and perh
controversial to some readers. But even if you are not convin
by the arguments, I hope you will at least find them thoug
provoking.

Do We Really Know Anything?

What consequences does the Matrix Possibility have for w

we actually do or do not know? Notice that the Ma
Possibility does not say that I am in the Matrix right now. It
28

am in the Matrix right now, then a lot of the beliefs I hav

now are false. For example, I believe that I own a Hond
when actually I dont have any car at all, because Im jus
ing in a pod of pink goo. Thus the Matrix Possibility imp
following: Its possible that a heck of a lot of my belie
now are false.
Lets assume, at least for the moment, that the
Possibility is valid (that it makes sense and is a real poss
and hence that a lot of the beliefs I have right now m
false. There are two typical sorts of reactions that peopl
to the idea that a heck of a lot of their beliefs might be
The first is this: If it is possible that a belief you have
then that belief is not one that you can say you really
For instance, you might believe that the center of the M
not a hollowed-out enclave where moon-goblins live, bu
youve never actually been there, its possible (however u
it might seem) that there are goblins living in the Moon.
cant really say that you really know that there arent gob
ing in the Moon. Of course, Im not saying that you sh
keep on believing what you do. After all, you have to
something, so you might as well keep believing what
most likely to you. But dont think that these are actually
that you know. This is similar to the methodological ske
of Descartes. To find one piece of complete certainty De
employed the method of suspending belief in anythin
could even possibly be doubted. Descartes didnt wat
Matrix, but he had his own scary story. In his story De
toys with the possibility that some malicious demon
utmost power and cunning has employed all his ener
order to deceive me.1 For Descartes, the mere possibil
there is such a demon deceiving him was enough to cas
on his having knowledgeat least of the things that the
might be deceiving him about.
The other sort of response goes like this: If you look
we actually use the word know in the real world, youll s

1
Ren Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by J. Cot
R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres
p. 15.

possibility of having a false belief but we still call it knowledg

In the real world (when were not playing philosopher)
almost never require that a belief be such that it is impossible
be false before we call it known. For example, Im at the
stop and someone asks me, Do you know what time it is? a
I look at my watch and answer, Yes I do. Its 12:30. I rec
nize the possibility that my watch is off, but when I dont h
my philosopher hat on this fact doesnt keep me from say
that I know what time it is. What on earth would justify philo
phers in suddenly having such high standards for knowledg
especially since as soon as they take off their philosopher h
these philosophers dont even adhere to these high standa
themselves? The proper response to someones telling me t
my belief could be false is, So what? Its not possibility t
matters, its probability. So until you give me a good reason
think that my belief is not just possibly false, but probably fa
Im not changing anything about what I believe or what I th
I know.
I tend toward the second response myself. But perhaps
can reconcile the two views by simply understanding them
talking about two different senses of knowledge. The f
refers to a kind of super knowledge, such that you cant pr
erly say that you super-know something unless theres no p
sibility of your getting it wrong. This is the kind of knowled
Descartes, through his methodological skepticism, was seek
for the foundation stone of all other knowledge. The seco
deals with a kind of ordinary knowledge, such that you
still say that you have ordinary knowledge of something ev
when theres a possibility you have it wrong, though you ca
say that you have ordinary knowledge of it if you have a go
reason to think that youre probably wrong. Both sides
agree that the Matrix Possibility implies that we dont h
much (if any) super knowledge, but it doesnt undermine
having as much ordinary knowledge as we think we do.
like that, the question of whether, given the possibility of
Matrix, we really know anything, seems to lose some of
bite. But maybe thats okay.

the Matrix?

Now I want to switch gears a little bit and talk about ho

finds out hes in the Matrix. The movie leads us to want
that Neo comes to know (here Ill restrict my attention
much less demanding sense of acquiring ordinary know
something that he did not know beforenamely, that m
his life has been spent in the Matrix (as a body floating in
of goo, being fed his experiences by a super-computer,
on). How does Neo come to know thisif indeed he do
Before offering Neo the blue and red pills, Morphe
him, No one can be told what the Matrix is. You have t
for yourself. Morpheus doesnt say why, but I can ve
guess: No one would believe him. Well, let me correct th
only people who would believe him are people so gul
foolish that they might be led to believe just about an
And these people are certainly not paradigm examples
sorts of people who wed say have a lot of knowledge,
they might happen to get something right from time to ti
Neo cannot come to know about the Matrix from Morp
testimony alone, because it would be foolish to believe
story and foolish belief (even when it happens to get
right) is not knowledge. For a belief to genuinely co
knowledge, it must be justified. Indeed, the traditional a
of knowledge is that knowledge is justified true belief.
traditional account, if you believe something, and your b
true, and you are justified in believing it, then we can co
say that you know it. Though many have found fault w
venerable account, it is at least correct insofar as its justi
requirement rules out foolish beliefs and lucky guesse
counting as knowledge.
Neo takes the red pill so that he can see how far do
rabbit hole goes. Within minutes he is having some
weirdest experiences hes probably ever had: He sees a
mirror mend itself. He touches the mirror and it begins to
him with a strange oozing mirror-like substance. Sudde
finds himself in a pod of pink goo with plugs and wires
out of his arms, legs, back, and head. He sees millions o
pods. A spider-like robot flies up, grabs him by the neck

and he slides down a tube and lands in some sewer-like slud

only to be lifted out of it by a huge crane the next minute.
drifts in and out of consciousness. Finally he is well enough
take a tour of the ship he is on. Then they put a plug-thing
his head and he is suddenly in the constructthe load
programwhere Morpheus finally tells him the whole story
the Matrix.
Its a hard story to believe. Neo doesnt believe it at first. T
whole experience is so traumatic in fact that he throws up
cant say that I blame him. Finding out that your whole life
to this point has been a fake, a computer generated drea
world, would be a bit dizzying, to say the least. But the qu
tion that I want to ask is not whether this would be someth
emotionally painful to believe, but whether, given Neos rec
experiences, this is something that it would be reasonable
him to believe. Can these harrowing experiences give him w
Morpheuss testimony alone could nota good reason
believe that his life, until recently, has been spent in the Mat
Or would it still, even after these strange experiences, be fo
ish for him to believe this amazing story?
Notice that I am not asking whether it is possible that Ne
new beliefs (that he has spent his life in the Matrix, and is n
free of it) are false. Clearly this is possible. It might be that th
is no Matrix, and Neo has been living in the ordinary world, a
he was recently tricked into taking a red pill which was actu
a powerful hallucinogenic drug, etc., etc. (Admittedly, it wo
be a somewhat disappointing sequel, in my opinion, to find t
this was the case.)
Clearly this is possible. But not everything that is possibl
something that we have good reasons to believe is actu
Again, the possible should not distract us from a discussion
the probable, for it is what we have reason to believe is pro
ble that has a bearing on what it is reasonable to believe.
So, does Neo have good reason to believe what he in
does believethat he was, but now is not, a captive of
Matrix? If so, then we may well want to say that he not o
believes it, but he knows it. (Given the possibility of error,
would have to be ordinary knowledge.)
I want to give some serious thought to the idea that perh
Neo does not have very good reasons to believe the Ma

that Neo is about 25 years old. In that case, in believ

Matrix story, he is being asked to throw away 25 years
fectly normal experiences as untrustworthy, in exchang
few days of very weird experiences that he is supposed
as being the Real McCoy. That seems a bit hastyesp
when we remember that all of these weird recent expe
followed on the heel of his swallowing a strange red pil
The situation gets even worse when we realize that w
abilities Neo has with regard to being able to interpret hi
riences, these abilities were acquired during the part of
that he is now supposed to throw away as entirely untru
thy. That is to say, it is because of the experiences he h
during his first 25 years that he knows what is reason
infer from the information provided by his senses. Bu
believes the story about the Matrix, then everything
learned about how to interpret his experiences must be
away. Here is a very small list of just a few of the rules of
about interpreting ones own experience that would hav
thrown out if Neo accepts the Matrix story:

(a) People dont generally lie, so if it seems as if som

telling you something, you can generally believe
true.

(b) If it sounds as if someone is speaking English, the

ably are.

(c) If you seem to remember doing something, you pr

did it.
(d) People dont switch bodies when they touch.

(e) Peoples heads dont fly off when they are angry.

(f) The noise that peoples shoes make as they walk

a part of the sounds they use to communicate w
(so theres no point in trying to interpret thos
sounds!)

(g) When an object seems to be getting bigger, i

means that it is actually coming closer to you. (S
with seeming to get smaller and going away from

There are lots of things like these that we believe even

theyre so obvious that weve never even stopped to think ab
them. Not only do we (you, I, Neo) believe these strange
obvious things, but we are justified in believing them. Its r
sonable to believe them. But as obvious as they seem, we
not born knowing them. So what justifies us in believing the
We are justified in believing them because they fit with all
experiences weve had (and we dont have any reason not
trust those experiences).2 They seem so obviously corr
because weve never had any experiences that would give
reason to call any of them into question. But if wed had dif
ent experiences, they might not seem obvious; they might ev
seem obviously false. So the justification of these rules of thu
depends crucially on ones past experiences. If you cant tr
your past experiences, then you have no reason to believe th
principles. The principles I pointed out above are especi
important because they help you to interpret present exp
ences. Thus you are only justified in interpreting present ex
riences in the way that you do if you are justified in relying
those rules of thumb for interpreting your experiences. But y
are only justified in relying on those interpretive principle
you can trust your past experiences. If Neo believes that al
his experiences until very recently have been fed to him
malicious computers, then he has no reason to trust them. T
he would not be justified in believing the above interpret
principles, and thus he would not be justified in interpreting
present experience in the normal way that he is used to.
Because of the experiences that weve had in our lives, c
tain things seem normal and others seem unexpected. It wo
seem very strange and unexpected (to us) to find out that so
people weve been talking to actually dont speak English
speak in some other language that sounds just like English
2

I am one of those empiricists who think that the idea of explanatory co

ence is of central importance in understanding epistemic justification. (Th
what I am gesturing at with the idea that ones beliefs are justified because
fit with the experiences one has had.) Those whose philosophical pers
tives put them substantially at odds with such an idea are not likely to find
argument persuasive.

strange and unexpected to find that certain people alway

Tuesdays and Thursdays. Or that some peoples heads p
when they get angry. What is strange and unexpected (
as what is normal and expected) is just a function of w
have experienced, of what were used to. If Neo cant t
past experiences, then he is no longer justified in ex
what he is used to expecting. He is no longer justified in
ing that this would be normal, and that would be strange
pected, and unlikely. If someone (say, Morpheus)
making noises that sounded like the English languag
would, out of habit, be inclined to think that Morpheus is
ing English, for Neo is used to a world where people wh
to be speaking English usually are. But Neo cant tru
world if he believes that it was generated by malicious c
ers. So Neo would not be justified in believing that Mo
really is speaking English, or that he is telling the truth,
his head wont pop off when he gets angry, for his justi
for believing any of those things relies on experiences h
trust.
But this means that if Neo believes that he has spent m
his life in the Matrix, with his experiences having been
him by evil computers, then he is not justified in taking
value the story that Morpheus seems to be telling him.
Neo is not justified in believing Morpheus when Morphe
him (or seems to tell him) that he has spent his life in the
then Neo is not justified in believing that he has spent hi
the Matrix after all. We might call it a self-defeating beli
very act of your believing it undermines your having go
sons to believe it. (Compare: Im so bad with numbers th
50 percent of the statements I make that have numbers i
are false.)
Of course, the audience has access to the bigger pictu
happen to know that the programmed world of the M
similar enough to the real world that the way Neo is incl
interpret his experience (for example, that Morpheus is
ing English, and is telling the truth) actually gets things rig
Neo (unlike the audience) lacks any good reason to thi
the world of the Matrix is similar to the real world. You
think that his new experiences would quickly justify
believing that the real world is similar (in the right ways)

unless he is justified in relying on certain interpretive princip

like those above. And, as we saw, he is not justified in rely
on those principles since he cannot rely on his past experienc
He cant rely on present experiences without relying on p
ones. This conclusion is in fact a consequence of a wid
accepted view in epistemology called Holism: that no bit
experience can do any justificatory work on its own, but only
a part of much larger interconnected set of experiences a
beliefssome of which include, of course, the interpretive p
ciples.3 (If such a view seems manifestly false, the argum
here will likely not be very compelling.) Thus Neo is not ju
fied in interpreting his experiences in the way that he is used
and so the things that he comes to believe thanks to these ex
riences (for instance that he was but is not now in the Mat
are also not justified. The proper conclusion to draw here see
to be that Neo does not really know (even in the less restric
sense of ordinary knowledge) that he was, but is not now
the Matrix.
I think this line of reasoning could be generalized to co
most large-scale skeptical hypotheses similar to the Matrix p
sibility. That is, I think it can be shown that believing in th
fantastic stories is almost always self-defeating. But that w
have to be left for another occasion. For now I would like
return to the idea that started us off, namely the Ma
Possibility.

Does the Matrix Possibility Even

Make Sense?

The Matrix Possibility, remember, is the idea that Its possi

that I am (or you are) in the Matrix right now. The issue th
want to consider now is to what extent something like the Ma
Possibility even makes sense. To what extent is the idea of
being in the Matrix right now really a coherent possibility?
Right off the bat I want to make it clear that in worry
about whether the story of The Matrix really presents us wit
3

Those interested in Holism are directed to the works of W.V. Quine, Don
Davidson, and especially Wilfrid Sellars.

inconsistencies in the plot. Nor am I worried about whet

story is, so to speak, technologically or scientifically po
That is, it might turn out that the story violates certain
physics, for example, and might be held to be impossi
reasons along those lines. But that would not bother me.
I am worried about whether the story is, at some level, no
conceptually coherent.
As I have pointed out already, if you are in the Matr
now, then a heck of a lot of your beliefs are false. (For in
you might believe that you are reading a book right now
actually you are floating in a pod of goo and there are no
anywhere near you.) It is this widespread errorthis t
dous amount of false beliefthat I think begins to threa
coherence of the Matrix story. (Well see why in a momen
of course not all of Neos beliefs turned out to be false.
beliefs about what his face looked like, for example, that
out to be correct. (He could have come out of the Matrix
cover that he looks just like Barbra Streisandwouldn
have been a shock!) But if we can imagine a world like
The Matrix, then we surely can imagine a world where th
puters are just a little bit more malicious; where they at
every last detail to make sure that they maximize the num
false beliefs of the people they hold captive in the Matri
The question I really want to ask then is this: Can we
make sense of the idea of a person who has beliefs bu
beliefs are all or almost all false? If the answer is no, th
mately we will not be able to make sense of stories li
Matrix (or at least my version with increased maliciousne
the computers) that involve people whose beliefs are alm
false. Thus ideas like the Matrix Possibility might not even
sense, even if they sound quite plausible at first. Im goin
to see how far I can push a line of argument that says
cant really make sense of the idea of a person whose bel
all or almost all false.
To be even more precise, what I will try to argue is
person (say, Lisa) will not be able to make sense of a s
which some person (say, Homer) has beliefs but these
are all or almost all what Lisa would consider false. Thu
stituting ourselves for Lisa and Neo for Homer) we will
able, ultimately, to make sense of the idea that Neo (or

all what we would consider false.

The central component of the argument I want to examin
this: It doesnt make sense to say that a person has just one
gle belief on a particular topic. In order to even have one be
about something, one must have a number of beliefs abou
An example will help illustrate this. Suppose Im talking to
friend Cletus, and we have the following conversation:

CLETUS: Bears are scary.

ME: Why do you say that? Is it because theyre so big?
CLETUS: Are they big? I didnt know that.
ME: Is it because they are furry animals?
CLETUS: Are they furry? I didnt know that. Actually, I did
even know they were animals.
ME: Well you least know that they are living creatures t
exist in the physical world, right?
CLETUS: News to me.
ME: Are they scary to you because they look like little bir
CLETUS: Oh, do they?
ME: I was kidding! You must at least know what bears lo
like dont you?4
CLETUS: Uh . . . no. What do they look like?
ME: Come on! Do you know anything about bears?
CLETUS: Sure. Theyre scary.
ME: Besides that?
CLETUS: Um . . . no.

By this time we might begin to suspect that maybe wh

Cletus utters Bears are scary hes just repeating what he he
someone else say, but has no idea what it means. In any cas
is clear that he doesnt have the belief that bears are scary,
he doesnt have the concept of bear at all. In order for it to m
sense for me to attribute the belief Bears are scary to Cle
(regardless of whether I think that particular belief is true
4

Strictly speaking, to know what a bear looks like isnt really to have a
tain belief about bears. Rather, it is to have certain recognitional abilities.
in Rylean terminology, to have know how instead of know that. (See Gil
Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949.) But these abilities are probably also ne
sary in order to have a concept of a bear.

(bear and scariness). But in order for me to be able to

sense of his having the concept of a bear, I have to be
attribute to him a number of beliefs about bears that I
be true (like that bears are animals, that they dont look
tle birds, and so forth). Without these other beliefs there i
ing that would help us to fix what Cletus means by th
bearif indeed, the word has any meaning at all for
contend that we are no more justified in attributing to Cle
belief that bears are scary than we would be in attribu
him the belief that, say, rocks are scary. (This idea, tha
beliefs fix the meaning of ones wordsthat is, fix whic
cepts, if any, your words stand foris yet another facet
general constellation of views that go under the head
Holism. In this case it is often called Meaning Holi
Concept Holism. Again, check out Quine, Davidson, or S
Even if we were to suppose that Cletus has the concept o
ness, and that he at least said very general things like Be
something rather than nothing, the most we would be j
in attributing to Cletus is a belief that there is something
scary, and not the belief that in particular bears (you
those large furry animals that dont look like little birds, e
scary.
Lets generalize these results a bit. Suppose I want to s
someone has a lot of false beliefs. For every false belief
to attribute to that person, I must be able to make sense
person having the specific concepts figuring in that false
But this means I must be able to attribute to the person
ber of beliefs I take to be true. Thus for every false
attribute to some person (say, Homer), I must also attri
Homer a number of true beliefs. If, for every belief of H
that I want to say is false, there have to be a number o
beliefs of Homers that I have to say are true, then it w
make sense for me to say that all of a persons beliefs ar
There will still have to be a number of true beliefs. We ca
make sense of a persons having a false belief against a
ground of her having other beliefs we take to be true. Th
of someone having all false beliefs only makes sense
were not focusing on all of these true beliefs wed h
attribute to the person.
Is this line of argument successful in showing that the

ligible? Unfortunately, I think not. For even if the evil comp

ers of the Matrix could not make all of your beliefs false (
then they would not be recognizable as beliefs at all), th
would still be a lot, perhaps even most of your beliefs that mi
be false if you were in the Matrix. Thus in the end we may h
to concede the intelligibility of the Matrix Possibility. You inde
might be in the Matrix, and indeed a heck of a lot of your bel
might false, even if you can be sure that not all of your bel
are false. 5

I would like to thank the several anonymous reviewers, as well as Bill Ir

whose comments helped me to much improve this paper. As always, mista
that remain are mine.

Seeing, Believing,
Touching, Truth
CAROLYN KORSMEYER

From 1981 to 1990, over 120 mysterious deaths were re

to the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Healthy adu
most of them members of the immigrant Hmong com
from the Laotian highlands, were dying in their sleep. N
ical cause of death could be determined, though the Hmo
their own explanation: they claimed that these men w
victims of a nocturnal spirit which visited them while the
and pressed the breath from their bodies.1 The very fe
vivors of these visitations reported paralyzing terror and t
sation that a malign creature sat astride their chests. C
there was evidence that the victims struggled in violent
mares before they died. Though the scientific commun
not settle on its own diagnosis, reports of what became
as Sudden Unexplained Nocturnal Death Syndrome rais
unsettling possibility that dreams could kill.
Just about any sort of sensory experience can occur
untamed realm of dreams, though as a rule dreams are
visual phenomena invented with wild originality from the
itories of memory and imagination.2 Dreams may be fam
1

Shelley R. Adler, Sudden Unexplained Nocturnal Death Syndrom

Hmong Immigrants: Examining the Role of the Nightmare. Jou
American Folklore 104: 411 (1991), pp. 5471.
2
Owen Flanagan, Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolutio
Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 15.

ing assurance, Its only a dream, relies on the tacit premise t

what you only see cant hurt you, because nothing in the dre
has actually touched you. Injury and death require a palpa
interference with the living tissue; surely a mere dream can
exert such power. Or so we hope.

Living in the Matrix: Some Classic

Philosophical Problems

The supposition of The Matrix is that one could live an entire

made up of illusions caused by brain stimuli induced in a pass
immobile being for which sleep-like paralysis is a perman
state. Individuals who are captive in the Matrixa compu
generated dream world (as Morpheus puts it)believe the
selves to be experiencing life with all its familiar riches. Th
sense receptors are hooked into the Matrix, so that taste, sm
touch, vision, and hearing are stimulated (or simulated) in the u
mate supposition that esse est percipito be is to be perceiv
This plot premise permits the film to raise not only venera
philosophical problems about the relation of mind and body a
the uncertainty of knowledge, but also more contemporary pa
noias about political power in a cyber-infected world. This es
concerns a particular aspect of such issues: sense experience a
the means by which the movie posits what philosophers h
dubbed skepticism with regard to the senses.
The movie invokes scattershot a series of classic problems
perception, of which the most obvious reference is
Descartess First Meditation. In his famous attempt to ind
doubt that sense experience accurately records features of
external world and can therefore ground knowledge, Desca
challenges us to establish criteria by which dreams can be c
tainly distinguished from waking experience. This is a fairly s
cessful way to arouse skepticism about the veridicality
present perception, for the experience of dreams can be so vi
that one is (temporarily) convinced they are real.3 The beg

3
Flanagan argues that the problem of determining whether one is aslee
not the symmetrical converse of the problem of determining whether on
awake: We know we are awake when we are. What we dont normally kn
is that we are dreaming while we are dreaming (Ibid., p. 173).

problem, and more than once Neo awakes in bed sweati

panting from a terrifying encounter with the Matrix. Al
these moments are perhaps too-convenient transition
from scene to scene, like the dreaming argument the
questions about whether valid inferences may be found
any given perceptual experience.
Descartes supplements the dreaming argument with
less persuasive evil deceiver, or malicious demon, arg
whereby he invites us to imagine that not only sense perc
but also absolutely every belief and inference are system
disrupted by a commanding mind. The contemporary ver
the evil deceiver, of course, is the evil computerthe nig
ish cybermind that has reversed the roles of programm
programmer and artificially induces experiences that co
a life. How this is accomplished in The Matrix is reve
what has my vote for the scariest scene in the movie, whe
is flushed into one of the pods that feed human organism
life-dreams. From there he is permittedsomewhat in
ently, given that he is in the very place where he shou
have a vantage on the Matrix itselfa glimpse of mill
other pods filled with dreaming, sentient beings. This sce
rors the scariest philosophical problem I know: the th
experiment that supposes that we are but brains in a v
only electrical impulses provide us with a mental life.
Are grounds for this kind of suspicion even remotel
fied? The senses have long been regarded as the organi
face between mind and body, the means by which we
data in order to form knowledge about the world. And
know from experience, any kind of sense perception
subject to occasional illusion. Might we in fact be suc
oughgoing victims of illusion that every single sense perc
is caused not by contact with objects in the external wo
only by intervening stimuli in our brains?
There is a school of thought that maintains that an
hypothesis is ultimately incoherent, even self-refutin
movie shares a problem with the brain-vat that is freq
noted in the literature on the latter: if one is in a system
deceiving world, how does one attain the ability to mak
ence to that world? How does one even posit that one is
in a vator a casualty of the Matrix? This supposition

not a brain in a vat.4 In this respect the movie is bound b

constraint that limits all dreaming plots from Caldern to The
Files: the narrative point of view is necessarily external to
Matrix. The movie relies on stable points of reference, such
the ship Nebuchadnezzar, where we can see the charac
strapped into the chairs that feed programs into their bra
plugs. Though they enter the Matrix at will, the characters of
movie are not victims of systematic illusion. The supposit
that most people are living totally within a program is a ba
ground claim, for such people function like scenery and are
truly characters at all.
Evidently the film makers were sufficiently aware of su
sticky problems lurking in the premise of their story to in
some wry self-criticism into the dialogue. Consider the exchan
between Mouse and Neo about the food aboard ship. As Neo
covers with his first meal with the crew, outside the Matrix in
twenty-second century, eating has lost its pleasure. Faucets sp
out bowls of nutritious single-celled protein, which is temptin
compared to runny eggs or bowls of snot. Mouse compares
substance to the distant memory of Tasty Wheat. But then
wonders: how do the machines that produce this stuff know w
Tasty Wheat tastes like? And how can anyone know that it tas
like Tasty Wheat, when we have never actually eaten real Ta
Wheat and cant compare it? How indeed? How can it taste
anything at all if there is no reference for it to be like?

Judging Reality

These are very good questions, but they are raised only brie
and no answer is suggested. It is perhaps unfair to requ
extensive argumentation about the logic of illusion in a mo
There is, however, an important collateral question that
explored somewhat more thoroughly: What is perceptual ex
rience, such that it can be judged not only real but also wor
whileworth living for?

Perhaps the most well-known discussion along these lines is Hilary Putn
Brains in a Vat, in Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambri
University Press, 1981), pp. 121.

valuable is that which is free from the interfering illusions

Matrix. While this perspective dominates the film and rep
the point of view that the audience is supposed to accep
is another that has fair claims for our attention: what is
that which provides the most vivid and pleasurable expe
Morpheus and his team seek the former; the latter is the
agenda of the traitorous Cypher. But it is also voiced by th
and sympathetic Mouse, who objects to Dozers claim t
snot food has everything the body needs. It does not, co
Mouse, because it does not give pleasure, a feeling he
ates with essential human responses: To deny our imp
to deny the very thing that makes us human. Dozer look
tical; he evidently holds taste pleasure to be an indulgen
those who fight the Matrix cannot afford.
Such exchanges reveal a conceptual framework emplo
The Matrix, one that is likely to be as much the prod
unquestioned assumptions about the senses as a self-con
device of the script. The film treats the five senses and t
ues they are ascribed in ways that are dramatically inte
though surprisingly traditional, given the radical ske
essayed by the plot line.
From philosophies of antiquity to contemporary psyc
cal studies, the five senses have been ranked in a hiera
importance that reflects an elevation of mind over body, o
lect over emotion, and of knowledge over pleasure.5 Visi
hearing are the distal or distance senses, for they opera
remove from their objects and do not require physica
merce with them. This distance confers an epistemic adv
and vision and hearing are typically advanced to the top
hierarchy because of their importance for gaining knowle
the world around and communicating that knowledge to
Because both require a separation between the body of t
cipient and the object of perception, vision and hearing a
less engaged with physical sensation. (In fact, vision is ty
considered a kind of perception but not a sensation at a
so-called bodily senses of taste, smell, and touch req

Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy

Cornell University Press, 1999), Chapter 1.

requires some physical separation to function, the three bod

senses demand proximity, even intimacy, and experiences of
three have distinct sensory feeling qualities. They are traditi
ally believed to direct attention more to our own subjec
states than to objects, both because of the limited scope of in
mation they deliver and because we are apt to be diverted
the pleasures they afford. The physicality associated with tou
smell, and taste is one source of the low status of the bod
senses, which are associated with the more animal side
human nature.

Sensing in the Matrix and in The Matrix

It is to be expected that vision and hearing are manipula

extensively in any movie. While we cannot ourselves touch
smell or taste anything on screen, we can literally see and h
it, and some of what we see and hear is also seen and he
by the characters on the screen, making us co-participants
their experiences. The dialogue refers to vision and the eyes
familiarly ambiguous ways: What one sees may be merely
illusory product of a program, and yet to see is also syno
mous with insight and knowledge, since vision has serv
throughout the entire history of western philosophy as
metaphor for understanding.6 Morpheus, the wise leader of
movie, expresses his admonitions and analytical observation
visual metaphors. He informs Neo, for example, that he
been born into a prison that he cannot smell or taste or tou
A prison for your mind. But he can see itout the windo
everywhere. As Morpheus puts it, the Matrix is the world t
has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth
. . . that you are a slave. Yet despite the pervasive vis
deceptions of the Matrix, Morpheus urges Neo to use his e
in their higher epistemic callingto see beyond illusion to
truth, to understand. After his bath in pink goo and his ho
6

Many sense metaphors are used for this purpose: I hear you. I grasp
idea, and so on. But vision has played an especially vivid role in episte
language. See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision
Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
California Press, 1993).

Why do my eyes hurt? Morpheus replies: Youve neve

them before. Rather like a new emergent from Plato
Neo is bothered by light, for the truth is neither easy no
fortable to see. As Morpheus says of his own discove
human organisms are grown to supply energy to
machines of the Matrix: For the longest time I wouldnt
it, and then I saw the fields with my own eyes. Sight mo
any other sense is explicitly extolled for its traditional lin
the mind; according to the old saying, Seeing is believi
the same time, seeing is also subject to hallucination and
fore doubt, and we do well to remember the completion
aphorism: Seeings believing, but touchings the truth
does not mean that touch is immune to deception, whic
ously is not the case. Nonetheless, a hallucination or m
discovered to be such because ones hand passes right t
without the sense of touch encountering brute mat
Therefore, both in folk psychology and in The Matrix, th
icality of touch is often regarded as more reliable than t
tant operation of vision. Expression of such val
interestingly discrepant with the movie medium,
addresses the distal senses almost exclusively.
Because they operate at a distance, both vision and h
may be readily employed for surveillance. Early in the
Neo must be debugged (almost literally, for the listening
has a witty centipede-like design) to keep the Agents from
ing his movements. Sound is a potently expressive device
disposal of a film maker, and The Matrix also employs h
in a complex manner that somewhat unusually conne
sense with touch. Sound itself has a haptic quality, and th
loud segments of the soundtrack are a palpable presen
the end of the movie the music screams WAKE UP!, wr
back to the dream questions at the beginning.)7 Such agg
sound seems actually to invade the bodily space of the
Ambient sound conveys its own message, for old, o
7

For viewers who recognize the music, this part of the soundtrack
something of a bridge from the movie experience back to reality. Th
is by Rage Against the Machine, a group known for its political messa
since by this point the credits are rolling, the lyrics are both backgr
the movie and admonition to the audience to consider its message.

whir of computers: the lines of the crucial rotary telepho

convey both the voices and the bodies of the characters back
the safety of the shipfor evidently, even virtual bodies requ
tactile, physical conduits.8 Especially sensitive information
sometimes conveyed in a whisper that requires such proxim
that the characters nearly touch, as in the beginning when N
and Trinity meet. The music at the club they attend is so lo
that one both hears and feels it. They must stand very close, a
as Trinity speaks in his ear her lips brush his neck.
The bodily senses take on particularly interesting roles in
movie. Lots of objects generate a scent, but in The Matrix
smell of human bodies is especially emphasized in ways b
positive and negative. In an early scene Trinity hovers ove
sleeping Neo and slowly, quietly sniffs him. It is a gesture
once curious, affectionate, and intimate. It is also refreshingly
odds with the clutter of high-tech equipment used to obt
information, for sniffing is a primitive, animal mode of disc
ery. We assume that his scent pleases her, but such is not
case with Agent Smith, who appears to be almost maddened
the smell of his human adversaries. To indulge a tirade aga
Morpheus, Smith breaks protocol and removes his earpie
thereby missing important information about events taking pl
nearby.

I hate this place. This zoo. This prison. This reality, whatever
want to call it. I cant stand it any longer. Its the smell, if ther
such a thing. I feel saturated by it. I can taste your stink and ev
time I do, I fear that Ive somehow been infected by it.

Smith compares human beings with viruses, a dreadful equat

that dramatizes the contagious aura of bad smells.9 With b
alluring scents and hostile, repulsive stinks, the sense of sme
employed to emphasize corporeality, as though the anim

8
Though presently a popular idea, the notion of the virtual body is pro
bly a conceptual muddle, which is especially evident if one considers the
ferent requirements of the senses.
9
On the subject of smell and disease, see Alain Corbin, The Foul and
Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination, translated by M. Koch
R. Porter, and C. Prendergast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986

We would imagine that the non-human Agents, sentie

grams, have no smell themselves; the olfaction they ar
ble of merely detects the reek of their opponents.

The Seductions of Taste

Taste is employed in The Matrix with particularly ascetic

as we have already seen, for the pleasure of eating em
the dangerous temptations that subvert the war agai
Matrix. Exhausted by the ongoing effort to protect Zion,
abandons the quest of his companions and betrays them
ing to deliver Morpheus to Agent Smith. All he wants is
get his past and to live within a program that provides hi
the comforts that seem otherwise foreclosed. We first l
Cyphers sensuous tendenciesrepresentative of his
weaknesswhen he offers Neo a drink of home-made ho
apparent friendship and jocularly undermines his con
that he is the One who Morpheus believes was sent
the world. His more profound deception is revealed in th
scene in which he dines in an elegant Matrix restaura
Agent Smith. Cypher savors a perfectly cooked steak. As
and drinks and smokes a cigar, he declares that he want
reinserted into the Matrix and to remember nothing from

I know this steak doesnt exist. I know that when I put

mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and d
After nine years, do you know what I realize? Ignorance is

Although this point of view is presented as transparently

the movie actually reinforces it with its use of color. As
notices, the world of the real to which his colleagues
committed seems to be losing vivacity. The Matrix is
wholly bleak in hue: black, gray, brown, sepia. When sa
color appears on screen it is shockingly vivid. The only
with brilliant color in the entire movie are things that i
almost nostalgically the life of the senses: vending carts
bright fruit, the red dress of the virtual woman created
emblem of sexuality, and blood. All are symbols of
organic formthough only the blood, also a symbol of d
is not illusory.

sons to abandon the fight, for he has come to believe that

world of the Matrix is more real than the one outside. (As
puts it, real is just another four-letter word.) His conclus
proceeds not only from his own valuation of pleasurable se
experience but also from a perspective voiced earlier
Morpheus himself: all sense experience is just interpreted st
ulation of nerve receptors.

MORPHEUS: What is real? How do you define real? If youre talk

about what you can feel, what you can smell, what you can t
and see, then real is simply electrical signals interpreted by y
brain.

With dedicated strength of character, Morpheus remains co

mitted to the brute, real world that causes such brain sign
But Cypher diverges in a reasonable direction: if the real is tr
just phenomenal sense experiences, what does it matter wh
they come from? If reality comes down to ones own sensatio
there is nothing immoral in pursuing them, because there
nothing else to demand ones moral attention. So Cypher p
sues the pleasures of the bodily senses, long associated w
temptation and sin. In so doing he makes not only a moral er
but also an epistemic miscalculation, for he settles for illus
rather than realitywhich constitutes an implicit if perh
inadvertent refutation of the analysis of sense experience
wholly subjective terms. That is, if Cypher is wrong then so
Morpheus: sensations are not in all cases just interpretations
brain stimuli but also are indicators of an external reality t
demands attention and respect.
To be sure, taste pleasures need not necessarily subvert on
morals, as a parallel scene with the Oracle demonstrates. Wh
Neo visits her, the Oracle is baking cookies, and their delici
scent fills the air. She herself is drinking something chartre
and smoking. She can indulge her senses, one presum
because she has not abandoned the deeper values that Cyp
relinquishes. Neo eats a cookie but, significantly, he doe
seem to enjoy it very much.
Scenes with Cypher also make use of another traditio
meaning of the taste sense: the association of taste and eat
with sex. In his final act of treachery as he readies to kill his

body strapped into its chair. He tells her (and she can he
on the other end of a phone line where she awaits to be
ported back to safety) that he once was in love with her,
is tired of war, and tired of eating the same goop everyd
language and gestures are both threatening and caressin
announces that he has decided that the Matrix can be mo
than real life, because the experience it furnishes is mor
plete. You see death in the Matrix, he observes as he pu
plugs from both Apoc and Switch; here you just die. Onc
he echoes an only slightly distorted version of a sen
expressed by Morpheus: What I see is real. Seeing is bel

Truth

Which brings us to touch. This is an action movie full o

ical violence, and a good deal of the plot consists of av
death. Though most combat occurs within a Matrix progr
of slick and tiresome special effects, it physically affe
bodies strapped into the chairs aboard ship. Whe
emerges from one encounter, he tastes the blood that
from his mouth and is taken aback that a virtual exp
could cause physical injury. If youre killed in the Matr
die here? he inquires. Morpheus replies soberly: The
cannot live without the mind, reinforcing his commen
virtual experience: the mind makes it real. I confess
first these scenes tried my patience, along with severa
loose comments about mind and body. (It is not the
that bends, it is only yourself, pronounces one of the O
young potentials, adept at bending spoons without to
them.) An exasperated viewer could conclude that
hooey uttered with faux-Zen opacity passes for insight
could it be but a cheap plot trick to say that if you die
virtual world of the Matrix you also die in reality. But
remembered the Hmong and their deadly dreams. Chan
heart rate, breathing, and adrenaline output are amo
noticeable physical changes that mental images can
about. It is but a short step further for a dreamor a
experienceto draw blood, a bridge between what is
seen and what has a palpable, felt effecta bridge,
between vision and touch.

standard ways to indicate affection, trust, and friendship. T

grip of Neos hand saves Morpheus at the end of a helicop
rescue line. Trinity hugs Tank to comfort him for the loss of
brother. As Tank prepares to pull the plug on Morpheus,
strokes his forehead in sad farewell.
Above all it is Trinity whose actions embody the intimate s
of trust. It is no accident that this role is given to a woman,
the tender aspect of touch is associated with both eroticism a
maternal care, and since Trinity is the only female sexual pr
ence in the script, these roles fall to her. (Evidently in th
efforts to inspire doubt about the certainty of sense experien
the film makers forgot to doubt gender stereotypes.) Most d
matic is the final scene in which she delivers a Sleeping Bea
style kiss and breathes the life back into Neo. Although it is cl
that they are drawn to each other from the start, they only k
outside the Matrix, a fact made explicit in an early version of
script, where she tells Neo that she will not kiss him in
Matrixbecause she wants it to be real.10 This declaration
been dropped in the final version, but the action is retain
Trinity delivers her life-giving kiss in the bleak atmosphere
Nebuchadnezzar when Neo is on the brink of death, having
what appears to be his final battle with the Agents. She reac
out both physically and emotionally to Neo, caressing his in
body and whispering:

The Oracle told me that I would fall in love and that that man,
man that I loved would be the One. So you see, you cant be de
You cant be. Because I love you. You hear me? I love you.

She gently holds his shoulders and kisses him; his heart starts
beat and he draws a breath. She withdraws her hands and co
mands sharply: Now get up!
Neo gets up and saves the world.
Touchings the truth.

10

Larry and Andy Wachowski, The Matrix, April 8, 1996

<http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Capsule/8448/Matrix.txt>.

Scene

The Desert
the Re

The Metaphysics of
The Matrix
JORGE J.E. GRACIA and
JONATHAN J. SANFORD

Life is a dream.
PEDRO CALDERN

DE LA

BARCA (A.D. 16001681)

All human beings by nature desire to know.

ARISTOTLE (384321 B.C.)

The scene is a dark club. One gets passing glimpses of

leather, lascivious movements. There is the suggestion of
sex, illicit drugs. The atmosphere is charged with sus
even fear. Techno-industrial music is blaring and our two
are surrounded by weirdly clad, sub-terrestrial people.
approaches Neo. Their cat-like eyes meet. She comes
almost touching his cheek. Tension builds, an animal at
is clear. One expects the usual, but instead, she whisper
ear: It is the question that drives us, Neo. It is the questi
brought you here. You know the question, just as I d
answer is out there, Neo.
The question is What is the Matrix?, and the search
answer eventually leads Neo out of his prison and into t
world. Neos path out of the Matrix is not unlike the pri
ascent from the cave in Platos allegory, but the reality th
discovers is no blessed realm of Forms, pure and shinin
in beauty. Rather, he discovers a reality that is ugly, a
seared by war between humans and machines, where ex

constant threat of death. It is a reality described by Morpheus

a desert, so bleak that, after nine years, Cypher decides to ab
don it, even if to do so requires the betrayal of his comrad
But Neo prefers it to the illusion of the Matrix because it is
truth. He prefers it so much that The Matrix closes with Ne
resolution to destroy the world of illusion and bring others
the truth of their existence. Like Platos escaped prisoner, N
returns to the false world to free others from their imprisonme
And hence the much anticipated sequel.
The questions posed by The Matrix take the form of the p
adigmatic metaphysical question, What is ? What is reali
What is a person? What is the relation between mind a
body? What is the connection between free will and fate?
what follows, we focus on three fundamental questions: Wha
appearance and what is reality? What is it that separates the
What properties or features are found in one and not the oth
These questions are asked in the context of the world of
movie, but answering them should help us think about our o
world.

The Nature of Metaphysics

What exactly is metaphysics? What are metaphysical questi

and metaphysical answers? Answering these questions requ
a distinction between a metaphysics and metaphysics. A me
physics is a view of the world that seeks to be accurate, con
tent, comprehensive, and supported by sound eviden
Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the learned discipline o
practices when one seeks to develop a metaphysics, consist
therefore in a set of procedures. Metaphysics is different fr
both natural science and theology. The sciences are discipli
of learning that, like metaphysics, seek to develop views that
accurate, consistent and supported by sound evidence, b
unlike metaphysics, do not seek to be comprehensive. The
ences have restricted areas of competence and specialized me
ods. Astronomy deals only with astral bodies and its meth
involves observation and mathematical calculations; phy
studies only certain properties of the physical universe and d
so with very specific methods; and so on. Theology, like me
physics, seeks to develop comprehensive views of the wo

however the evidence that theology regards as soun

beyond what we can acquire through our natural powers
soning and sensation; it includes faith and authority.
This is enough to distinguish metaphysics from particu
ences and theology, and it should also be enough to dist
metaphysical views from scientific or theological ones, al
it does not preclude that some views may be found in a
or in two of them. Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to dist
metaphysics from other branches of philosophy, a num
which are also important to the film and discussed in
essays in this book. Among these other branches are
political philosophy, epistemology, logic, philosophical
pology, and natural theology. Nor does it tell us enough
what metaphysicians actually do, that is, about how it is th
tries to develop a metaphysics.
Another way to distinguish metaphysics from the sc
theology, and other areas of philosophy, and to establis
is involved in carrying out its task, is to say that meta
tries (1) to develop a list of the most general categori
which all other categories may be classified and (2) to es
how the less general categories are related to these. The
metaphysics, then, is twofold: First, to develop a list of th
general categories and, second, to categorize everything
terms of these. Obviously, to do this is precisely to
develop the kind of overall, comprehensive view of the
in which both scientific and theological elements are inc
For example, psychologists study human psyches and ph
study such things as the color white, but metaphysicians
ther and try to categorize these in an overall scheme. If w
to adopt the Aristotelian categorial scheme, we would
rize human psyches by saying that they are substances;

This view of metaphysics is defended by Gracia in Metaphys

Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge
State University of New York Press, 1999), Chapters 2 and 7.
Sanfords Categories and Metaphysics: Aristotles Science of B
Michael Gorman and Jonathan J. Sanford, eds., Categories: Histori
Systematic Essays (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of Americ
forthcoming).

that it is a quality. If, instead, we were to apply Humes schem

we would have to talk about ideas, rather than about substan
or qualities. Deciding whether human psyches and colors
substances and qualities or ideasan issue pertinent to T
Matrixis only possible if the aim of metaphysics has been s
cessfully accomplished.
These clarifications should make it easier to grasp the nat
of the task involved in developing a metaphysics of The Mat
However, the issue is still clouded, because the written expr
sion, a metaphysics of The Matrix has at least two meanin
which in turn point in at least two different directions. The f
refers to the film itself, and the second to the world presen
in the film. A metaphysics of the film would establish the m
general category or categories to which the film belongs
metaphysics of the second involves the metaphysical view
the world presented in the film. Taken in the latter way,
task consists in (1) the development of a list of the most g
eral categories either explicitly presented or implicitly used
the film, and the establishment of (2) their interrelations, a
(3) of how everything else in the film fits within these ca
gories. In this sense, the task involves the description of w
might be called the world of The Matrix, and this we take
be our task.
Attempts to develop complete and final metaphysical ca
gorizations are fraught with difficulties because of the h
degree of generality and abstraction they require. They invo
an impalpable world of ideas and conceptual models larg
removed from immediate experience. These kinds of cate
rizations usually result in categorial schemes that contain in
nal puzzles, if not downright inconsistencies. However, of
these are not the result of the metaphysicians procedures,
of the very conceptual frameworks embedded in the ordin
ways in which we think about the world. Often, moreover,
things to which the conceptual frameworks correspond
themselves very complex. It is a very tricky thing to produce
egorial schemes that work with clear concepts and that co
spond adequately to the things being described. T
metaphysics of The Matrix confirms this assessment.

of The Matrix

The world of The Matrix appears to be deceptively simp

is in fact very complex and resembles in many ways our
Nonetheless, it makes use of only a few most genera
gories. Two of these are fundamental and have been u
philosophy since the Pre-Socratics. They are most
referred to as appearance and reality, but in The Matr
are often indicated through the adjectives real and v
which are in turn joined to world, as in the real worl
the virtual world. The second also is referred to a
dream world, when, for instance, Morpheus explains
on his first trip to the loading construct: Youve been li
a dream world, Neo. It is convenient to use unreal f
tual and dream because this more clearly contras
real. These categories are presented as mutually exc
Moreover, in that important conversation referred to ab
well as in other places throughout the film, the two wor
described as jointly exhaustive. This means that what
real is not unreal, and vice versa, and everything is eith
or unreal. Our job as metaphysicians, then, involves furt
classification of the items belonging to less general cat
that are present in The Matrix into one or the other o
two most general categories and to explain how the
thing hangs together.
The Matrix is full of things belonging to all sorts of le
eral categories and which deserve attention and classi
into the most general categories. However, because of o
ited space and aims, we focus only on those items th
pose what we consider to be one of the fundamenta
physical conundrums posed by the film. By a metap
conundrum we mean that a categorial classification puts
the horns of a dilemma, with no easy way out. Our met
cal analysis, then, will aim to present this dilemma and
speculate on a solution to it.
So, what are the categories of the real and the unreal
need to take into account? There are at least three mai
gories of the real, although only one of these is men
explicitly in the film. Subcategories of the other two are

explicitly mentioned is mind, and the categories not mention

but used are non-mind and composites of mind and n
mind. The category of mind includes human minds, such
Neos, Morpheuss, yours, and ours.
In the category of non-minds, there are all sorts of things t
are included. Indeed, there are so many that they fall into s
categories. The main subcategories are machine, human bo
or human organ, and things that are none of these. The pri
example of machine mentioned is a computer, but there are o
ers, such as Morpheuss ship, weapons, and so on. The pri
example of the second category is our bodies or yours, and
brains or yours. Examples of the third category are such thi
as the Earth, buildings, and electrical signals.
The prime example of the third main category of the rea
the composite of mind and bodyis a human being. Morph
refers to this category indirectly when he explains to Neo t
dying in the Matrix implies dying in the real world: The bo
cannot live without the mind.
There are at least eight subcategories of the unreal or dre
world: simulation (neuro-interactive), image (of the self), d
tal entity (a self), dream, appearance, mental projecti
matrixes of which the Matrix is one instance, and computer p
grams in general when these are considered as part of virt
reality.
Naturally, the distinction between real and unreal must
justified in terms of some properties that separate them. It wo
not do just to say that they are different without being able
point out what the difference between them consists
Moreover, whatever property (or properties) is used to dis
guish between the real and unreal, must also belong to
things that are classified as such. So our question is: What i
that is common to all real things and common to all unr
things, that makes them what they are and different from e
other? Or put in another way, why is it that minds, machin
human bodies, computer programs and electrical signals
real, and simulations, images, digital entities, dreams, appe
ances, mental projections, the Matrix, and computer progra
are not?

There are at least two main ways in which to distinguish

physically between real and unreal categories. The first
do with the source of the real and unreal respectively, t
ond with the ontological status of the two.
We know the sources, or causes, for many of the th
the real world. We know that machines and electrical sign
produced by humans and by artificially intelligent machin
know that human beings born in the city of Zion com
their parents. But we do not know the ultimate source fo
things. That is, we are not told from where the matter
from which machines are made and humans reproduce
do we know where, ultimately, the mind comes from, al
we are told that Neo is the reincarnation of the first ma
could bend the rules of the Matrix and who freed the firs
prisoners. What we do know, however, is that the Matrix
the cause of the things in the real world. Whatever the u
causes are for the things which we can categorize under
they do not have to do with the causes responsible for c
the unreal world of the Matrix.
In contrast, we do know the source for all the things
world of the Matrix. The Matrix is a very complex comput
gram made by artificially intelligent machines. The ver
tence of this virtual world and its variegated dimensions
product of these machines. So, even though we do no
ultimately the causes for the real world, one way in wh
can distinguish between the real and unreal worlds is by
of their respective sources: the real and the unreal world
different causes.
The second way to distinguish between the categories
and unreal has to do with their respective ontological s
put plainly, the way things exist. One way of determinin
logical status is in terms of dependence. The real world
Matrix, as far as we can tell, does not depend on somethi
for its existence; it stands by itself, as it were. There is n
tion of a malicious demon, no evil or benign genie, on
will the real world depends. But even if there were, that i
if the existence of things in the real world were depend
such a genie, the ontological status of the unreal world

the real world. This is so because the unreal world depe

entirely on things in the real world for its existence. The virt
world exists only so long as the artificially intelligent machi
keep running the program and generating electrical sign
which affect human brainsand remember that machines, p
grams, electrical signals, and brains are realwhich prompt
mindalso realto produce the digital entities and appe
ances of the unreal world. The unreal world has a weaker on
logical status because it depends on things in the real world
its existence.
The two ways of distinguishing between the real and unr
worldsthe sources for each and their ontological statusc
ify the distinction between the two fundamental categories
The Matrix. The real world is metaphysically distinct from
unreal world because the former contains things that have a
ferent source and ontological status from the things contained
the latter. A related issue concerns how we come to recogn
the metaphysical distinction between the two worlds. For
characters in the movie, knowing the difference requires the l
of a teacher to show them the difference. It is only because th
was a first man who knew the Matrix for what it is and escap
that other prisoners were able to escape from the Matrix. We
not told how this first man came to this knowledge, just as
dont know how there came to be a first freed prisoner in Pla
cave analogy, but Neo would not have known the differe
between the two worlds were it not for Morpheus and his cr
Though knowing the difference between the two worlds requ
a teacher, Neo, Trinity, and others were open to such teach
because they had paid attention to hints indicating that som
thing is amiss in their world, as Morpheus indicates in his c
versation with Neo just before Neo chooses to take the red p
What you know you cant explain but you feel it. Youve fe
your entire life. . . . That theres something wrong with the wo
You dont know what it is, but its there, like a splinter in y
mind, driving you mad. The issue of how we come to know
distinction between the two worlds concerns the nature
knowledge. It is thus an epistemological, not a metaphys
issue. We mention this issue, discussed in the previous section
this book, because it is closely related to the metaphysical iss
but we are not going to deal further with it.

The Matrix

The Matrix presents a dualistic metaphysics, that is, a view

the ultimate nature of the world which claims that the w
made up of exactly two incompatible types of things. Th
tion is usually contrasted with monism, in which the w
seen as being composed ultimately of only one kind o
The dualism of The Matrix consists, on the one hand,
world of appearances, the unreal world of the Matrix;
other, we have the real world, the world in which a
machines versus human beings is taking place. Becau
sources for these two worlds are different, and becau
things in the two worlds differ in their ontological status,
egories to which they belong are presented as irreducible
oncilable, and mutually exclusive. One goal of metaphy
is to reconcile, if possible, appearance with reality. The
physical conundrum of The Matrix is that, when we consi
metaphysical categorial scheme with which it presents us,
facie there seems to be no way to reconcile the real w
unreal. Each of these has its own rules, and there is no
square one set of rules with the other.
So what? What does it matter whether or not the w
dualistic or monistic? One answer is that, insofar as meta
seeks descriptions of the world that are accurate, consiste
comprehensive, success cannot be achieved unless this
mental issue of dualism versus monism is resolved. Is eve
we experience a mere appearance, or are these appea
manifestations of actual things which are more or less
appear to be? One of the merits of The Matrix is that it pr
our reflection on this question.
The dualistic metaphysical scheme assumed in the m
challenged by several inconsistencies. The most blatant o
has to do with death. Death in the Matrix means death
real world, and vice versa. But there are others, notably lo
free will. The love of Trinity for Neo resurrects both his r
and his digital self, bridging the divide between the two
and Neos resurrection gives him the ability to will h
beyond the rules of the Matrix, manipulating it to h
designs. Moreover, although Neo takes the red pill in the
world, this allows him to wake up in the real world, an

and influence what happens in the real world. These incon

tencies suggest ways in which the two worlds, presented as i
ducible, irreconcilable, and mutually exclusive, are not in
so. But how is this possible?
The answer is not immediately clear, although one thing
Minds are real, and they have the power to produce unreal
either through responses to bodily processes or on their own
mind can respond to an electrical stimulus to the brain by c
ating an image, but a mind can also affect the body by in
pendently creating the image. This suggests a way out of
apparent inconsistencies: It looks as if the unreal can dire
affect the real, but it is only the real that can directly affect
real. The unreal affects the real only indirectly, when a confu
mind takes it for the real. Clarity about this is what Neo and
others are searching for; they want the truth. Death in the
tual world results in death in the real one because the mind m
takenly takes it as real and causes it in the body. The virtual p
are effective in the real world in part because the mind ta
them to be part of the real world and commands the body to
accordingly. And the virtual Oracle knows and influences
real world because the mind believes it. Only when the min
free from confusion and can identify the unreal for what it
can the mind also cease to be influenced by unreality.
The answer to the apparent inconsistency in The Mat
then, lies in the nature of the prime example of the third ca
gory of the real, that is, in human beings. Morpheus, Trin
Tank, Dozer, and other human beings, both in mind and bo
live wholly in the real world except for the times when th
choose to hack into the Matrix. All the human beings who
prisoners of the Matrix, however, live in both worlds. Th
minds are, as it were, plugged into the Matrix, but their bod
are in the real world, albeit in shackles. The hope for these p
oners is that the two worlds may not be as irreducible, irrec
cilable, and mutually exclusive as they appear. What th
require is the integration of their minds with their bodies a
the proper understanding of how to distinguish betwe
appearance and reality. This sets them free, but to achieve t
they must either be saved individually in the manner in wh
Morpheus, Trinity, and Neo were saved, or the Matrix must
destroyed. We can expect the sequel to The Matrix to pur

Matrix.

Overcoming Illusion

In this chapter, we have focused on some fundamenta

physical questions raised by the film. We have describ
main task of metaphysics, and have pursued this task in
ating a rough sketch of a metaphysics of The Matrix. We
fied and investigated the two fundamental categories in th
real and unreal, and found that they are presented a
ducible, irreconcilable, and mutually exclusive. Yet the fil
tains inconsistencies in their presentation which
resolution. This resolution is not achieved by collapsi
unreal world into the real, but rather either by disting
between the two worlds or by destroying the unreal wor
because of the fact that human beings are composites of
and minds, and that their minds have the power to ov
illusions, that there is an exit from the predicament
Matrix.
When reflecting on The Matrix in order to learn som
about our world, we have to remember, of course, that i
a movie. Its peculiar portrayal of the dialectic between a
ance and reality should not be taken simply as an a
metaphor for our world. Nevertheless, in our world we
fact use the most general categories we find in The Mat
experience various simulations in our dreams and in d
types of hallucinations; we designate the entities encount
such experiences as not being real; we are confronte
other phenomena about which we wonder whether they
are as they appear to be; and we are affected in our re
as much by facts as by fictions. The Matrix raises qu
about these and related matters and prompts us to refl
just on them, but on the nature of reality itself.

The Machine-Made Ghost:

Or, The Philosophy of Mind,
Matrix Style
JASON HOLT

The Matrix is cutting-edge cool. The effects are exceptional,

action stylishly frenetic, the premise itself compelling. The fo
for thought it offers is better for you than Tasty Wheat,
much more appetizing than the Nebuchadnezzars usual me
mash. Heres just a sampler. Could we be systematic
deceived about reality? What if we were? How could we tell
it worth finding out, or is a blissful ignorance better than kno
ing the horrible truth? Which pill, the red or the blue, would y
pick? Why?
This is very cool stuff. To philosophers, though, its old
Descartess malicious demon hypothesis is hundreds of ye
old. It was reborn decades back as the brain-in-a-vat scena
which The Matrix makes over as a body-in-a-vat. The quest
of truth versus happiness goes back even further, as far back
the ancient Greeks. Plato wrote much about it. Aristotle too. T
idea of systematic deception even has cinematic precede
Total Recall and Dark City, to name just two. While, in T
Matrix, these are the most obvious ports of philosoph
access, theyre not what Im going to talk about.
So what am I going to talk about? Unfortunately, s
Morpheus, no one can be told what the Matrix is. No one
the movie, that is. The Matrix is a virtual reality, a world pu
over your eyes to blind you from the truth. With certain exc
tions, its so comprehensively, so completely realistic that p
66

himself, who needs to be shown, like anyone else, how

the veil from his eyes. Its such a tempting veil that even
who know its a veil are naturally drawn, almost compe
believe its real. Before he sees the light, Neos m
exhausted by these veiled misperceptions, the beliefs he
from them, and the intentions, desires, and other attitu
forms in response to them. The deception, as you kn
orchestrated by the machines, whove taken over the wo
sort of artificial-intelligence version of Planet of the Ape
machine-made deception, the illusory ghost of a world th
longerhence the title of this chapter, which is also
directly, a play on Descartess view of the mind as a soul,
that inhabits the body, a ghost in the machine.
What Im going to talk about, as the subtitle says, is t
losophy of mind. For an appetizer, well begin with a
course in the mind-body problem. There will be two entr
artificial intelligencespecifically, the possibility of a
minds, and (2) metaphysicswhat the mind really is. Ill
against much received wisdom, that artificial minds are po
and that mental states are brain states. Theres a tension
here, but one that can be resolved simply enough. For d
a solution to the so-called hard problem of conscio
which is at the very heart of the apparent divide betwee
and brain.

The Mind-Body Problem: A Crash Cou

The mind-body problem begins, as does modern phil

itself, with Descartes, whom you may remember from su
gans as I think, therefore I am, which, incidentally, you
also recall from Blade Runner, another film spun on an
nario. Descartes thought that mind and matter are fundam
different sorts of thing. The mind is a thinking thing
material objects are extended in space. They have dim
The physical realm is mechanistic, governed by physica
while the mind is subject to different principles, laws of th
and is moreoverliterallya free spirit, a ghost in the m
Despite being so different, mind and matter appear to i
Events in the physical world cause me to have certain
encesI assume were not in the Matrix, or anything

body to move as it does. Ditto the assumption. So how do m

and matter interact? They just do. This is the mind-over-ma
worldview that suffuses our culture. Just think of the Po
album Ghost in the Machine, on which youll find the hit sin
Spirits in the Material World. Not an uncommon worldview,
any means. Its too useful. But its also, sad to say, inadequ
Inadequate? How dare I? Well, its my job. Descartess theory
mind leaves too many questions unanswered. How can m
and matter interact if theyre essentially different substances t
operate according to their own unique principles? And where
they interact?
Descartess account of mind-brain interaction is mysterio
and such appeals to mystery are notoriously weak. Desca
seems to err by thinking theres a je ne sais quoi to the m
over and above whats revealed, at least potentially, in action
sports, theres no team spirit apart from the players behav
their vigorous play, cheering each other on, locker-room cam
raderie, and so forth. Likewise, theres no mind spirit ap
from what the body does and how it does it. This is behav
ism, the view that mental states are just pieces of behav
or better, behavioral dispositions. I dont always say Ouc
when Im in pain, but Im always disposed to say it. Behavior
doesnt work either, though. It confuses the evidence we h
for other peoples mental states with what the evidence is e
dence for. My saying Ouch! or my disposition to say it isnt
same thing as my pain. Its evidence of it. Heres another pr
lem. Say you explain my saying Ouch! by citing the fact th
was disposed to say Ouch! Not exactly a mind-blowing exp
nation, is it? It has the form Jason did x because Jason was
posed to do x. Trivial. When glass breaks, it breaks because
fragile. Its fragility is the disposition to break easily. But wh
the glass fragile? Because of its microphysical properties. In
same way, when I say Ouch! its because of the microphys
properties of my brain. My pain, then, isnt my disposition to
Ouch! but rather a certain state of my brain, which causes
to say it. This is materialismnot to be confused with the w
to acquire wealththe view that mental states are brain sta
Sounds reasonable, doesnt it?
Materialism is a nice theory. Its simple, elegant, fruit
coheres well with our body of scientific knowledge, and re

has its pitfalls. Practically no contemporary philosopher b

it. Im an exception. Not that theres anything wrong wi
After all, the Morpheus crew held unpopular beliefs ab
nature of reality. And they were right. So why does virtu
one buy materialism these days? Well, some are compe
Descartess suspicion that the mind simply cant be states
brain.1 A related idea, sensible enough, is that all physical
have physical causes. This isnt a problem for mate
Together with Descartess suspicion, though, this mea
even if mental states are generated by the brain, they h
effect in the world. Theyre causally inert, or what philos
call epiphenomenal. The main reason, though, is that f
type of mental state, pain say, theres more than one p
way to get the job done. Various physical states will
theres no one single such state to identify pain with. If
could feel pain, for instance, its pain would be a silico
not a brain state. Perhaps ironically, I think that compute
the Matrix-making machines in The Matrix, can, at least i
ciple, feel pain. Ill sort this out in the next section or tw
be advised. There are other reasons to reject materialis
lines of development of the points above, which I won
here. It would bore you. It would bore me, and I do th
living.

Artificial Minds

Can computers think? Could machines be built to have m

we do? Such questions dont concern, say, whether th
quated Mac Classic, collecting dust in my closet, has con
ness, or would have consciousness if I turned it on. The
to that is quite obviously No. They concern, rather, w
its possible to build an artificial mind as robust and multias the human mind. Interesting stuff, this, not to mention
philosophical ground. The Matrix can be usefully interpr
exploring such terrain, less directly and, perhaps, more t
1

Underlying this suspicion is the idea that materialism rules out all t
ders of being human, having a soul, creativity, moral significance and
sibility, and freedom. On the question of human freedom, see Fate, F
and Forenowledge, Chapter 8 in this volume.

Blade Runner, the Alien series, and more recently A.I. In T

Matrix, as in The Terminator, and the less memora
WarGames, artificial intelligence poses a threat to human
Thats obvious. Whats not so obvious, though, is what you h
to admit if you accept that the Matrix scenario, though
actual, is nonetheless possible. Artificial minds are possib
Thats what you have to admit.
Philosophers of mind are a curious bunch, especially wh
it comes to questions of artificial intelligence, inflaming the
unduly, from their usual reserve. Consider the following tem
ing but false dichotomy. (1) Computers cant do what we c
and since having a mind means doing what we do, artifi
minds are impossible. (2) Computers can do what we can, a
since they dont have minds, we dont either, or at least much
what we think about the mind is false. Remember Deep Bl
the chess-playing computer who defeated Kasparov? Theres
question that Deep Blue has intelligence, but does it h
intelligence? What about HAL 9000 in 2001, or the Matrix-m
ing machines in The Matrix? What about Data from Star Tr
The Next Generation? Many would base their answer
whichever of options (1) or (2) they found the most palatab
or, better, the least unpalatable. But (1) seems chauvinistic, a
(2) seems crazy. Despite this, both views are championed in
philosophy of mind. But theres a way out. Can computers
what we can? Yes. Are artificial minds possible? Yes. Thats
way out.
You might find the prospect of artificial minds disconcerti
But you shouldnt really. Its not threatening at all, if you th
about it. Its even a good thing. Heres how. Suppose you s
fer brain damage and, as a result, you lose the ability to f
pain. This would be unfortunate, because pain has a purpose
lets you know when things arent going so well. It signals b
ily damage. There are several cases of people who cant f
pain, and its truly tragic. Imagine not removing your hand fr
a pot of boiling water, because it doesnt hurt. You might
think that Datas artificial brain gives him the ability to feel pa
but what about an artificial painmaker, one designed to m
up for the dysfunction described above, one that signals bod
damage and, plus, feels just like pain? We may be far from bu
ing Data, but were already developing the technology

possibility. But if you dont think so, imagine a tiny

processor that replaces a single neuron of the sort we los
day. Would this make a difference? How could it? If you
cialize my brain, neuron for neuron, until Im just like
where would having a mind end and mental mimicry be
There are a number of reasons why you may still hes
admit the possibility of artificial minds. You might thi
instance, that computers only do what theyre program
do, while we, by contrast, are autonomous, creative,
beings. But consider The Matrix. That computers only d
theyre programmed to do doesnt mean they cant be c
Creativity is programmable. Deep Blues chess-playing i
peratingly creative. The machines of The Matrix creat
Matrix, designing the Agents as agents of their will. Bu
programmed the machines? They did. They did the pr
ming themselves. Evolution depends on mutations to
advantageous changes. In a similar way, the first rebel ma
might have had a design flawthey must havethat le
random act of rebellion. But by the time they build the
the machines have their own agenda, using human bei
their own purpose, deliberate, elaborate, andoh yes
avellian. Such grand design in the harvesting of infants,
opiate of the enslaved! What about the fact that, howeve
ligent and creative the Matrix-makers may seem, the cruc
ference is that were alive, whereas theyre not? Thats t
course, but bear in mind that the Matrix-makers are no
autonomous beings, theyre self-replicating. Theyre not m
organic stuff, but they possess all the necessaries, if not
for artificial life. And theres nothing wrong with the no
artificial life endowed with artificial minds.

The Metaphysics of Mind

At table with the rest of the Nebuchadnezzars crew,

asks, How do the machines really know what Tasty
tasted like?Tasty Wheat being, of course, an important
a well-balanced virtual breakfast. Mouses question presu
that the machines have minds. The question isnt wheth
have knowledge, but whether they know what its like to
rience the Matrix as humans do. This is the problem o

like for Neo to taste Tasty Wheat. One of the reasons for reje
ing materialism is the idea that such raw experience as the ta
of Tasty Wheat really makes no difference. Raw experience
generated by the brain, from input it receives from the world
from the Matrix, but its causally inert, in which case conscio
ness is a weird sort of hanger-on. I think consciousness d
make a difference. Weird hangers-on are, well, weird. They
suspicious. If Id never seen red, I wouldnt be able to imag
what its like to see red. But that doesnt mean experiences
red arent brain states. It only means that Ive never had suc
brain state. Ever see the film Brainstorm? Good movie. Its ab
a machine that records, and allows you to have, other peop
experiences. Pretty cool, huh? If the Matrix-makers wanted
they could well, it seems, make a Brainstorm machine,
rebuild their perceptual systems along the lines of the hum
blueprint. With a Brainstorm machine, or by rebuilding their s
tems, they could experience the Matrix, not to mention the r
world, just as humans do. Why not? The Matrix, remember,
machine-made ghost.
The biggest reason for rejecting materialism is the noti
discussed earlier, that mental states are multiply realizable.
silicon painmaker could both function and feel like ordin
pain, which is realized, not by silicon states, but by a cert
kind of brain state, then pain cant be identified with that br
state. Ah, but I beg to differ. So would Morpheus. Artifi
hearts function like ordinary hearts, and may even feel the sa
to those who have them. For an amputee, a prosthesis functio
in important respects, like the missing limb. Otherwise it wou
nt be a prosthesis. Now some prostheses are better than oth
A perfect prosthesis would function as well as an ordinary lim
if not better, and feel just the same. Likewise for the funct
and feel of the painmaker. Indeed, if the function were p
formed perfectly, it would determine an identical feel. Wh
the point of these analogies? Simply this. Artificial hearts are
hearts and prostheses arent limbs. Theyre synthetic versions
natural things. By analogy, painmaker pain feels just like the r
thing. But its not natural. So its not pain. Its artificial pa
Because its pain, not pain, that the painmaker makes, th
may yet be a single, physical, neural type that pain maps on
In other words, the prospect of artificial mental states, in natu

and brain.
So lets suppose that mental states are brain states. Neo
is produced by the same type of brain state, in his hea
produces Trinitys, in hers. The Matrix-makers conscious
think, for imaginative fodder, of Schwarzeneggers in
heads-up display in The Terminatoris similarly, thoug
cially, made in their silicon brains. Is this a solution to the
body problem? Sort of. We have a good account of w
mind really is, but theres still an important conceptua
How, and why, do those features of the brain that genera
sciousness generate consciousness? Even granting min
identity, how can we make sense of it? How can we exp
How can we make it intelligible?
This is a hard problem. Its the hard problem. We n
bridge the gap between consciousness and the neural go
responsible for it, and to do this we need the right interm
concepts. This will have to be a bit speculative. So indul
Here goes. Material objects look different from different
They occupy points of perspective. For example, from a
perspective I may see only two sides of a building, tho
actually has four sides. Living things occupy perspective t
they also exhibit perspective in that they respond to e
mental stimuli. A conscious being, though, has perspec
itself and the world around it. Theres something its like
conscious subject to be that subject. What distinguishes
perspective is that it has meaning for its subject. For ex
my had perspective of a building may lead me to thin
is my office building where Id rather not go today. Aw
tempts thought, and in this sense has meaning. How do
brain create such meaning? Maybe self-scanning does th
Maybe its something else. But whatever it is, we can now
sense of mind-brain identity. The brain makes a kind
spective to which consciousness reduces.
Whoa. Enough speculation. Were tired already. Okay
do we have? Well, we have materialism.2 Thats good. A
have the all too rough outline of an all too speculative s
to the hard problem. Thats good too. We also have rea

For a different view, see the next essay in this volume, Chapter 7.

Matrix is conceivable, plainly, and to all appearances, cohere

Its not very likely, not worth worrying about. But it could h
pen. This claim may seem minimal at best, and maybe it is. M
possibilities excite no one, except philosophers. But theres
shame in arguing for a mere possibility when, in certain qu
ters, its so vehemently denied. Besides, Im not the One, an
cant fly off into the sunset, even a virtual sunset.3

Thanks to William Irwin, Daniel Barwick, and Kathi Sell for comments on
earlier draft.

Neo-Materialism and the

Death of the Subject
DANIEL BARWICK

In a certain sense, The Matrix is a fake. It poses as a fi

challenges the audience with questions: Which pill wou
take? How would you respond if you discovered you ha
living a lie? More profoundly, Is the Matrix evil? What is
with a fake but good life? The Matrix raises a wealth of
sophical questions, many of which are discussed in this
But the true undercurrent of the film is an answer
question. It is an answer to one of the most central quest
philosophy: What is the nature of the mind itself? The film
for granted (and celebrates) the truth of a particular the
mind and personal identity, widely known as reductive
alism, the view that mental states can be reduced to (
explained in terms of, are the same as, etc.) physical
Morpheus specifically describes this view when he expla
Matrix to Neo.
In this essay, I explain: (1) that the view expres
Morpheus cannot possibly be true; (2) that the closest a
tive is likely to be false as well or at least incomplete; a
that making the view complete eliminates the subjec
plot can be salvaged, but I will argue that the only way to
the Matrix comprehensible is to adopt a view that has d
ing implications for the film: the existence of a Ma
depicted in the film is impossible, and that even if such a
existed, it may be morally neutral with respect to those w
imprisoned.

Seem Plausible

First, some background: Although there are many different t

ories of mind, the three most common are reductive mater
ism, eliminative materialism, and dualism. I will consider
first two in some detail later, but the difference between
forms of materialism on the one hand and dualism on the ot
is simple: materialists think that the world and everything in
(including the mind) is composed entirely of physical mat
and dualists dont. Materialists believe that thoughts and feelin
are ultimately made of the same kind of material as Tasty Wh
and the Nebuchadnezzar. Dualists disagree. They think t
there is (or are) some immaterial component(s) to the wo
although they may disagree among themselves about what co
ponents those are or what it means to be immaterial.
Morpheus is a reductive materialist. When introducing N
to the Matrix, Morpheus asks Neo, What is real? How do y
define real? If youre talking about what you can feel, what y
can smell, what you can taste and see, then real is simply el
trical signals interpreted by your brain. This is a clear statem
of reductive materialism. (It is possible that Morpheus
expressing another view, known as eliminative materialis
but thats very unlikely, given that most people outside dep
ments of philosophy and neuroscience are unaware of t
view, and when told about it find it ridiculous. I will discuss t
view later just in case one of the writers of The Matrix wa
philosophy major in college.)
Most normal people (I mean non-philosophers) hold
view Morpheus expresses. The view works something like th
If you ask your friend to explain what is happening when I
a tree, he or she will tell you a story. The story is that li
comes down from the sun and some of the wavelengths of li
are absorbed by the tree and some are reflected. Some of
reflected light enters my eye, and the energy in that li
excites (is transferred to) the cells in the retina of my eye. T
energy continues along a path (the optic nerve) until it gets
the sight center of the brain. Upon arriving, some neurons
in a particular pattern and I see a tree. This account of seein
tree is drummed into our children beginning in junior h
school, and reaches technical bloom in college biology. T

that occurs following a certain stimulus; that if we cou

duce the brain state without the tree, Id still think tha
seeing a tree, and in fact there wouldnt be any difference
experience whether there was a real tree there or not.
really matters is whether I have the tree brain state, and
time I have that brain state Ill see a tree. The Matrix wo
same way. Those who are caught in its grip have no id
their mental states do not correspond to anything real. I
their brains are manipulated to create the states that corr
to real experiences. The possibility of the Matrix, whic
viewers will admit, confirms the reductive materialism Mo
and the movie presume (but do not argue for).
Dont misunderstandthis view does not hold that
robots without feelings or experiences. In fact, its just the
site: Reductive materialism holds that we do have
states, which are the actual experiences themselves, the
tions that are presented to us, whether they be sights, s
feelings, tactile sensations, or the woman in red. My frien
not deny that I am seeing a tree, and Morpheus would no
that those caught in the Matrix are having experiences a
Reductive materialism merely holds that these experienc
be explained in terms of physical states, that experiences
reduced, through explanation, to brain states. In the en
experiences are the same as our brain states, in the sen
they consist only in a brain state and need nothing else to

Why Both The Matrix and College Biol

Need a Dose of Philosophy

Why is this view so pervasive? Why do people nod appr

rather than question the view of Morpheus in the film? T
son is quite simple: There seems to be an undeniable
relationship between the mind and the body. We believe
our brains cease to work, we wont be seeing or heari
more (at least not by using our eyes or ears). Our ev
experience seems to confirm this (we dont experience an
while unconscious, for example), and science constantly
new research that supports the idea of a causal con
between the mind and body. An example is the intral

in consciousness. A person can lose large amounts of cort

structure and have awareness, and yet even tiny lesions to
intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus result in a vegetative st
If this view seems sensible and is widely accepted, wha
the problem? There is indeed a problem, and it is not an a
dent that philosophy has now largely rejected this view. T
reasons for the rejection cast doubt on the metaphysical und
pinnings of The Matrix, and go well beyond the practical c
cisms usually leveled at science fiction. First read the follow
story related by Michael Tye:

Consider a brilliant scientist of the future, Mary, who has lived

black-and-white room since birth and who acquires informa
about the world via banks of computers and black-and-white t
vision screens depicting the outside world. Suppose Mary ha
her disposal in the room all the objective, physical informa
there is about what goes on when humans see roses, trees, suns
rainbows, and other phenomena. She knows everything there i
know about the surfaces of the objects, the ways in which t
reflect light, the changes on the retina and in the optic nerve,
firing patterns in the visual cortex, and so on. Still there is so
thing she does not know.1

What Mary does not know, Tye correctly points out, is w

it is like to see green or red or the other colors. How can we
sure of this? Because when Mary looks at her first rose, she w
learn something. What she will learn is what it is like to hav
particular kind of experience, something which no physical t
ory addresses. Understanding what something is is not the sa
as knowing what it is like to experience that thing. This
because a thing is experienced from a particular perspective
may see blue as soothing, and I always see the moon as a
disk), and that perspective is not a part of an objective desc
tion of an object.
But the reductive materialist faces a second, more seri
problem. The reductive materialist claims that after an adequ

Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Pr

1995), p. 14.

sense in which the mental state is the material state; t

mental state or some feature of it is identical with the m
state. It is this use of the concept of identity that rend
reductive materialists claim most suspect. This is becau
reductive materialist is not truly using the concept of i
(being-the-same-as). What is meant by claiming that th
tal state is the same as the brain state? Nothing, for the c
meaningless. The mental state is not identical to the brai
If it were, the subject matter of the claim I see a tree
literally be the same as the subject matter of the scientific
nation of seeing a tree. But it is simply not the case t
subject matter is the same. Even the biologist doesnt me
same thing when shes just reporting her experience! B
reason it is not the case is not, as Paul Churchland c
because up to this point we have lacked the concepts ne
to make penetrating judgments, but rather because the no
a mental state is a paradigm of something immaterial.
radically different type of thing from the brain state. Not
even with the concepts necessary to make the illegitimat
tity connection between the mental state and the brain
remains a simple fact that we do not make a reference
even give any thought to, the brain state when we me
mental state. Laird Addis writes:

[Although] the reductive materialist proceeds by attemp

define mentalistic notions in physicalistic terms . . . it see
there always are, and must always be, obvious exception
proposed reduction. For some of us, these attempts, whethe
definitional or empirical sort, seem as torturous as must
attempt to show that two things are really onelike trying
that . . . the tides just are the relative positions of the earth
sun and the moon.3

It may be objected here that I am begging the q

against the materialist, that I am assuming the very p
2

Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective (Cambridge,

Press, 1989).
3
Laird Addis, Natural Signs (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1
2425.

radically different types of things then it follows that the conc

of identity cannot be applied between them. But this is in
the opposite of what I am claiming. The reason we beco
aware that phenomenal events and brain events are radic
different types of things is because the concept of identity c
not be applied between them, and there can be no other m
fundamental basis for this distinction, given the primacy of
concept of identity. An apple is not an orange and a bowl
snot is not a bowl of Tasty Wheat. They are not the same; th
are not identical; and neither is a brain state identical to a m
tal state. Of course, although the concept of identity is
access to the difference between phenomenal events and br
events, they are not two different things because the concep
identity cannot be applied to them. Rather, they are already t
different things, and it is the inapplicability of the concept
identity that is a result of this difference.

Eliminative Materialism:
Why Your Spouse Can Never Complain
that She Has a Headache

As I mentioned earlier, there is an alternative possibility: t

the authors of The Matrix are not reductive materialists. Th
may be what are called eliminative materialists. Eliminat
materialism is the view that there are no mental states at
only physical states. (This view is not to be confused with
psychological view called behaviorism. Behaviorism is
method that takes as its starting point that we can only h
access to behavior. Materialism, in all its flavors, is a view ab
what kinds of thingsmaterial thingsexist in the univer
Our reference to mental states is a product of the developm
of our language, and we do not really experience anything
all, any more than my computer experiences anything. Un
this view, I do not see, hear, taste, or feel anything in the
ditional sense; I merely talk as if I do. This view is widely h
by scientists and many philosophers, and is, of course, nu
The scientist may be excused, perhaps, but the philosoph
cannot be, for the theory suffers from serious philosoph
problems.

which even John Searle admits is difficult to accomm

within a scientific conception of reality.4 Suppose I am
ing a magnificent glass of vintage port. The pleasure
moment of tasting is sublime. When I am feeling this pa
pleasure, the pleasure is private in a particular kind of
can be had only by me. Even if I were to share the po
someone else, and even if they were to feel a pleasure t
just like my pleasure, they would still not have felt th
pleasure that I had felt. Physical things, of course, like
and neurons and port, do not seem to share this featu
experience was had by me, from my perspective. It is
the experience that it is had by me. To see this, noti
when my friend and I drink port together, my friend is
inclined to say that he is feeling my pleasure, or that I a
ing his, even if we might be inclined to say that the ple
we are feeling probably feel the same; that is, we both s
drink port for the same reasons.
Ignoring or dismissing the importance of the owner
mental states is quite common amongst contemporary sc
and philosophers. Daniel Dennett for example, claims t
brain is equipped with a powerful user illusion, whe
brain is both the user and the provider of the user i
(Only the brains of humans work this way, he claims.)
are various agencies in the brain that require informatio
other agencies within the brain, and this is provided in
useful form by the way the brain is organized. Dennett
explains, This gives rise to the illusory sense that there
place . . . where it all comes together: the subject, the e
I. Theres no denying that thats the way it seems. But
just the way it seems.5 Notice that even Dennetts view
dispense with the doctrine of the ownership of mental
He does not deny that consciousness seems a certain w
makes no attempt to explain how there can be a seemin
out a seeming to someone. This would be required if m
4

John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: Harvard U

Press, 1984), p. 16.
5
See Paul M. Churchland, A Conversation with Daniel Dennett. Free
15 (1995), p. 19.

me, is true.
But the more powerful objection to eliminative materialism
much simpler. The burden is on the shoulders of the mater
ist, who must convince us that he is not seeing what he is s
ing, that he is not hearing what he is hearing, that all of
perceptions, imaginations, and conceptions are not mer
incorrectly presented to him, but that they are not presented
him at all, and his apparent familiarity with them is not
apparent familiarity; in fact, it is not a familiarity at all. The el
inative materialist must also explain why this universal illus
has occurred in the first place. Mental states seem to be uniq
in that they are mental, and this is why it is so difficult to cre
meaningful analogies to the mind; because the mind is ess
tially unlike the physical.
Can we rule out that the authors of The Matrix have fal
prey to this view? I think so, because it seems that if elimina
materialism were true, there would be no purpose for c
structing the Matrix. The purpose of the Matrix appears to be
provide false experiences which substitute for real ones, a
this purpose seems pointless if there are no experiences at
whether false or genuine. But where does this leave us? Re
the three distinctions I made at the outset of this essay betwe
reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and dualism.
far, I have shown that the Matrix cannot be possible withi
reductive materialist framework, and to shift the underlying t
ory to eliminative materialism may make the Matrix pointle
Does this mean we are forced into dualism in order to m
sense of the film? Must we admit the existence of a ghost in
machine? No. In fact, The Matrix can work as written, provid
the authors adhere to one additional principle: the intentiona
of consciousness.

Consciousness: Something for Nothing

According to David Hume there is no evidence for the e

tence of the self, conceived as some underlying substa
doing the thinking. He points out that introspection does
enable him to find such an entity, or even to form an idea
what this entity, self, might be like. Upon introspecti
Hume finds perceptions, but no perceiver, objects of thou

tionality of consciousness is the thesis that all and only

phenomena are intentional. Put plainly, to be consciou
be conscious of something. Introspection shows this c
tion of the mind to be plausible. There is no thinking w
thinking of some object or other. Jean-Paul Sartre tak
notion of intentionality a step further by claiming that, n
is intentionality a feature of consciousness, it is the on
ture of consciousness. Consciousness reveals objects
appear to consciousness. What is the thesis of intentio
Sartre writes: Consciousness is defined by intentional
intentionality consciousness transcends itself . . . The o
transcendent to the consciousness which grasps it, and
the object that the unity of the consciousness is foun
other words, consciousness is like a transparency; when
to single it out, we fall through to its object. If we try
gle out the consciousness that is conscious of a desk w
thinking of the desk itself, we fail.
Having so purged consciousness, what are we to m
such activities as memory, perception, imagination, expe
and so on? The only remaining option is that they are
teristics of objects that we normally describe as perceived
ined, etc. I do not love Tasty Wheat; rather, I find Tasty
lovable. I do not fear Agents; rather, I find them fea
Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: There is no such thing as th
ject that thinks or entertains ideas.7 All features of an ob
on the side of the object, not the subject. Because the m
limit to the world, it is not a constituent of the world. T
son is that being the ground of the worldliness of the wo
measure of what it is to be a constituent of the world, th
cannot itself rest on that ground, it cannot be a measur
self. This is the only sense in which it is a transcendental
of the world.8

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego (New York: Noonda

p. 38.
7
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.631, italics mine.
8
Panayot Butchvarov makes this same point about the concept of iden
its role in structuring the world. See his Being Qua Being (Bloom
Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 255.

tionality, are the most important features of mental phenome

and writes that these features are so difficult to explain and
embarrassing that they have led many thinkers in philosop
psychology, and artificial intelligence to say strange a
implausible things about the mind.9 Churchland likew
admits that introspection reveals a domain of thought, sen
tions, and emotions, not a domain of electrochemical impul
in a neural network.10 Any relation needs at least two relata
one relatum is missing, then a relation is not logically possib
If there isnt a traditional self, then the self cannot be related
the external world in the traditional way. Under the concept
of consciousness mentioned above, the self cannot be rela
to the world in the way which had been previously suppos
because the self does not exist in the way that was previou
supposed. If there is no self or if there are no relations, o
perception is not a relation, we are forced to reverse ideali
in the sense that instead of putting the world into the mind,
need to put the mind into the world. (Idealism is the view t
nothing is material, and the world is just a group of immate
ideas in our minds. Obviously, idealists and materialist do
mingle much at parties.) A one-term theory of perception
plausible because, given certain conceptions of mind, it is
only logical alternative.
This should not lead us to believe that we have no access
the outside world, but rather to understand that a door to
outside world requires an inside world from which to pass. T
whole point of reducing the mind to a transcendent conscio
ness is the elimination of the subject, and hence, the Eliminat
of the Inside World (the world of the traditional mind). Thi
why I reject talk of subjective facts in the traditional se
because (as explained earlier) there is no thing (no traditio
mind) for the facts to be subject to. The type of subject wh
may have such an effect on objects of awareness is exactly
kind of subject whose existence this view denies. We are
with a new view, in which (1) materialism is in a sense tr
9

John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: Harvard Unive

Press, 1984) p. 15.
10
Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Pr
1988), p 26.

in a sense true, because of the existence of conscio

which is the one true immaterial thing. (The reader prob
seeing that our language is a bit limited: how can there
immaterial thing? If its not material, isnt consciousne
thing? Yes. Its just that we dont have a noun that refer
thing, except nothing.) Consciousness is not a thing,
something, in a sense: It is the revelation of objects them
Just as a race seems to be composed of the running it
consciousness is composed of the revelations presen
consciousness.

Is It Bad to Imprison Consciousness

But if there is no subject, what can be said about the m

of the Matrix? The film takes for granted that the presence
Matrix and the mechanical beings that support it are evil
the heroes of the film are heroes because they are fight
good fight of the underdog against the powerful oppress
fight is ostensibly to regain freedom. But what is the mo
tus of one race of machines enslaving another race of ma
even if both races have consciousness? If neither race c
subjects in the traditional sense, then it is not clear h
should explain the supposed immorality of the Matrix
races will be aware, and the enslaved race will be aw
things which for the most part do not exist. But we do n
mally consider that a criterion for moral judgment.
In most cases, people will choose the real world over
sory one. But that does not mean that an illusory w
immoral; it simply means that people, fed daily on a diet
tion, prefer the feeling of what is thought to be real, an
is thought to matter. (Consider the meteoric rise of reali
But notice that those caught in the Matrix think that th
roundings are real and that their lives matter. The Matr
duces an illusory world, not an immoral world.
But, it may be objected, reality is not the issue. Wh
stake is freedom. The immorality of the Matrix lies in its
to create the ultimate robbery: it steals our freedom, a
never discover the theft. Freedom, it is argued, is so v
that any world which takes it from us is immoral. But th
ular view rests on the standard dualist assumptions: that

that that thing should be given its freedom. According to

view I described above, there is no traditional self to be the s
ject of this freedom. Consciousness is free, but in a differ
sense than is usually meant. Consciousness is free because i
uniquely immaterial; there is no way for us to understand c
sciousness being pushed around by anything. But by the sa
token, consciousness does not have an effect on anything
merely reveals things. A telescope may let me see Jupiter, bu
has no effect on Jupiter.
So the imprisonment of the Matrix has no effect on c
sciousness, except that we may be conscious of different thi
than we would be if we were not in the Matrix. But once aga
to be conscious of one thing and not another has never bee
measure of moral status.
So in the end, something is gained but something is l
What is gained is intelligibility; the plot of the film can be r
dered plausible. But what is lost is the moral purpose of
characters.

Fate, Freedom, and

Foreknowledge
THEODORE SCHICK, JR.

MORPHEUS: Do you believe in Fate, Neo?

NEO: No.
MORPHEUS: Why not?
NEO: Because I dont like the idea that Im not in control of

You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice.

If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.
You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can
I will choose a path thats clear
I will choose Free Will..
RUSH

Freedom. Everybody wants it. But can anybody h

Morpheus wants to free humans from the Matrix, Cyphe
to free himself from Morpheus, and Agent Smith wants
the computers from the humans. But even if these cha
were able to free themselves from their alleged oppr
would they be in control of their lives? Would they be m
of their fate or would they still be slaves to an inesc
destiny?
Those in the Matrix have no control over their
Everything that happens to them is determined by the p
feeding electrical impulses to their brains. They a
Morpheuss words, slaves kept inside a prison that [the
not smell, taste, or touch. Whatever freedom they seem
is an illusion.

may be just as illusory. You are free to perform an action o

if you can avoid performing it. If you have to do something
its not in your power to do otherwisethen you are not free
do it. The truth of the Oracles prophecies suggests that ev
those in the real world cannot act freely. If the Oracle knows
future, the future is determined, and in that case, no one,
even Neo, is in control of his life.
In a world ruled by Fate, where the future is fixed and un
terable, why fight for freedom? Why try to free people from
Matrix when they are not free to determine their destiny in
real world? If one has to be a slave, why not be a happy o
Perhaps Cyphers decision to plug back into the Matrix is no
traitorous as it seems. (And, of course, if the world is ruled
Fate, Cypher was destined to make that decision.) To answ
these questions, well have to take a closer look at the nature
fate and freedom.

Freedom

You call this free? Cypher asks Trinity. All I do is what he t

me to do. If I have to choose between that and the Matri
choose the Matrix. After nine years of taking orders fr
Morpheus, Cypher (aka Mr. Reagan) is willing to trade his a
tere existence aboard the Nebuchadnezzar for a rich actors
in the Matrix. At least in the Matrix, it wont seem as if anyo
is giving him orders.
Part of what it means to be free is to not be coerced or c
strained by anyone. If someone is forcing you to do someth
against your will or preventing you from doing something y
want to do, you are not free. This sense of freedom is of
referred to as negative freedom or freedom from becaus
takes freedom to consist in the absence of certain impedime
to action.
By plugging into the Matrix, Cypher will be free fr
Morpheus. But will he truly be free? Many would say N
because in the Matrix, Cypher still would not be calling the sh
He would lack what is known as positive freedom or freed
to because he would not have the power to do anything.
Would this be such a great loss? Is the ability to choose
yourself really such a valuable thing? The great German philo

thing thats intrinsically valuablegood in and of itself

ability to make rational choices. As he puts it: It is imp
to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it,
can be taken to be good without qualification except
will.1 For Kant, what determines whether youve led a go
is not the kind of experiences youve had, but the k
choices youve made. If youve always tried to do th
thing, then you are a good person even if things did n
out the way you planned.

The Experience Machine

To illustrate the value of making your own choices, H

philosopher Robert Nozick proposes the following t
experiment:

Suppose there were an experience machine that would g

any experience you desired. Super-duper neurophysiologis
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel yo
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an int
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with ele
attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine
preprogramming your lifes experiences? If you are worrie
missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose th
ness enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of ma
ers. You can pick and choose from their large lib
smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your lifes expe
for, say, the next two years. After two years have passed, y
have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select th
riences of your next two years. Of course, while in the ta
wont know that youre there; youll think its all actually h
ing. Others can also plug in to have the experiences they w
theres no need to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore p
such as who will service the machines if everyone plugs in.
you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how o
feel from the inside?2

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translate

Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 61.
2
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Book
pp. 4243.

Matrix are many. Both involve floating in a tank, both dire

stimulate the neurons in ones brain, and both produce exp
ences that are indistinguishable from those in the real wo
The only difference between the two is that, in Nozicks s
nario, people get to unplug from the machine at two-year in
vals. In the Matrix, one usually stays plugged in for life.
Why not plug into the experience machine? Nozick sugge
three reasons:

First we want to do certain things, and not just have the experie
of doing them . . . A second reason for not plugging in is that
want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Some
floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob. There is no answe
the question of what a person is like who has been in the tank
he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? Its not merely
its difficult to tell; theres no way he is . . . Thirdly, plugging
an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a wo
no deeper or more important than that which people can constr
There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though
experience of it can be simulated.

To be is to do, as some famous philosopher once said. Those

the experience machine dont do anything. They make
choices and perform no actions. As a result, they have no ch
acter. They are neither virtuous nor vicious because they h
never done anything for which they can be held responsib
They are, as Nozick says, indeterminate blobs.
Something of value does seem to be missing from the li
of those in the experience machine. Without the ability to m
real choices, they cannot be real persons. The question rai
by the Oracle, however, is whether people in the real wo
make real choices. Are there genuine alternatives open to th
or are all of their choices pre-ordained?

Fate

The Oracle in The Matrixlike the Oracle at Delphiis a pri

ess who foretells the future. The Oracle at Delphi received
visions sitting on a tripod placed over a fissure in a cave fr
which emanated a gas believed to be the breath of Apo

three-legged stool placed next to an oven from which i

nating the aroma of freshly baked cookies. (When the fis
Delphi stopped producing gas, the Greek priests started
ing belladonna and jimson weed in the cave and found th
could get some pretty good oracular declamations fro
smoke that produced as well. Perhaps the Oracles smo
cigarette is a reference to that episode in the history
Delphic Oracle.) Both oracles have the phrase Know T
inscribed over the entrance to their shrine, although
Matrix it is in Latin while at Delphi it is in Greek.
Ancient Greek kings and generals would not underta
great project without first consulting the Oracle at
Before Alexander the Great set out on his first militar
paign, for example, he traveled to Delphi to seek the O
counsel. When he arrived, legend has it that the Orac
unavailable. Anxious to know his prospects for succe
tracked down the Oracle and forced her to make a pred
She is reported to have cried out in exasperation, Oh
you are invincible. Alexander took this as a favorable
and went on to conquer the world.
Those who believe in the prophecies of such see
usually believe in Fate. Fatalists, as they are called, belie
certain things are bound to happen no matter what a
does. Take the case of Oedipus, for example. An oracle
esied that Oedipus would kill his father and marry his m
To avoid such a horrible fate, Oedipus left the city wh
grew up, but ended up doing exactly what the orac
predicted.
Philosopher Richard Taylor finds the traditional no
fate, which says that certain events will occur regardless o
other events occur, extremely contrived because it igno
fact that events are caused to happen by other events.
traditional conception, he says, It would be hard to find
whole of history a single fatalist.3 Properly understood, h
Fatalism is the belief that whatever happens is unavoid
Given the accuracy of the Oracles prophecies, it seems

3
4

Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974),

Ibid.

view to hold.

Omniscience

Does the Oracle know everything? Neo asks on his way to

apartment. She would say she knows enough, Morph
replies. If the Oracle does indeed know everythingif she
omniscientthen she knows not only what has happened,
also what will happen. Her seemingly accurate prediction
Neos knocking over the vase, as well as her successful prop
cies concerning Morpheuss finding the One, Trinitys falling
love with the One, and Neos having to make a choice betwe
his life and that of Morpheus, lend credibility to that charact
zation. She was even right about Neos not being the One at
time of their meeting. She said that he was waiting for som
thing, maybe his next life, and he did not become the One u
after he died (flatlined) and was resurrected by Trinitys k
The problem is that her knowledge of the future seems to r
out free will.
The apparent conflict between omniscience and free wil
well-known to Christian theologians. God, in the traditio
Christian conception, is omnipotent (all-powerful), omnisci
(all-knowing), and omnibenevolent (all-good). Christians h
also traditionally believed that humans have free will. But if G
knows everything that we will ever do, then it would seem t
we are not free to do anything else. The medieval statesman a
philosopher Boethius (480524) provides one of the earliest a
most succinct formulations of the dilemma:

There seems to me, I said, to be such incompatibility betw

the existence of Gods universal foreknowledge and that of
freedom of judgment. For if God foresees all things and canno
anything be mistaken, that, which His Providence sees will happ
must result . . . Besides, just as, when I know a present fact,
fact must be so; so also when I know of something that will h
pen, that must come to pass. Thus it follows that the fulfillmen
a foreknown event must be inevitable. 5
5

Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5, translated by W.V. Coo

(London: Dent, 1902), pp. 145, 147.

thing is going to happen, then its true that it is going to h

because you cant know something that is false. You can
that 1 + 1 equals 3, for example, because 1 + 1 does no
3. But if its true that something is going to happen, then
not possibly not happen. If its true that the sun will rise
row, for example, then the sun has to rise tomorro
otherwise the statement wouldnt be true. So if someone
that something is going to happen, it must happen. But if
happenif its unavoidablethen no one is free to pre
from happening. The price of omniscience is freedom.
Although Boethius thought that the apparent c
between omniscience and free will could be avoided
existed outside of time, the great Protestant reform
founder of the Presbyterian Church, John Calvin (1509
thought that it was precisely because God exists outsid
that no one can change their destiny. He writes:

When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that a

have ever been, and perpetually remain, before His eyes, so
His knowledge nothing is future or past, but all things are
and present in such a manner, that He does not merely c
of them from ideas formed in His mind, as things rememb
us appear present to our minds, but really beholds and se
as if actually placed before Him. And this foreknowledge
to the whole world, and to all the creatures. Predestination
the eternal decree of God, by which He has determined in
what would have to become of every individual of mank
they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eterna
fore-ordained for some, and eternal damnation for others.6

In Calvins view, God can see at a glance every mom

everyones life. Each of our lives is spread out before G
an unwound movie reel. Just as every frame in a film
fixed, so is every event in our lives. Consequently, Calv
that some of us are destined to go to heaven and some
and theres nothing we can do about it.
6

John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated by Jo

(Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1813), Book 3, Ch
Section 5

will make, he doesnt make those choices for you. That m

well be true, but its irrelevant because you are free to do som
thing only if you can refrain from doing it. If your doing som
thing is inevitablewhich it must be if God foresees itth
your doing it cannot be a free act.
Omniscience and free will seem to be incompatible with o
another. If its true that someone is all-knowing, it cannot
true that anyone has free will. This goes for the seer himself
herself. For example, if God is all-knowing, He knows his o
future. But if so, then His future is determined, and even H
powerless to change it. So omniscience seems not only to r
out free will but also to rule out omnipotence. No one
even Godcan be both omniscient and omnipotent. Some h
argued that this proves that God as traditionally conceived d
not exist.7 Others have argued, however, that, properly und
stood, there is no conflict between these properties.
To be omnipotent is not to be able to do anything at all,
to be able to do anything that its possible to do. As the gr
Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas observed, Whate
implies contradiction does not come within the scope of div
omnipotence because it cannot have the aspect of possibil
Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, th
that God cannot do them.8 For example, God cannot mak
round square because such a thing is logically impossib
Nothing can be both round and not round at the same time.
that does not impugn His omnipotence because an omnipot
being can only be expected to do what is logically possible.
Similar considerations apply to the notion of omniscience.
omniscient being is not one who knows everything, but o
who knows everything that its logically possible to know. S
its logically impossible to know the future, then omniscie
may not be incompatible with either omnipotence or free w
Knowing the future has an air of paradox because it see
to violate the principle that an effect cannot precede its cau
We can see something only after it has happened. Future eve
7

Theodore M. Drange, Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey. P

2 (FallWinter 1998).
8
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of
Dominican Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948) Volume
Question 25, Answer 3.

seems to imply both that it has and has not happened, an

logically impossible.
There are other ways to know the future than to see i
ever. Suppose you drop a glass of milk. You know, befor
the floor, that it will spill. Your foreknowledge is not the
of any psychic power you have but of your knowledge
ural laws. You know that whenever objects of a certain s
weight are released close to the surface of the earth, th
fall to the ground. Because natural objects obey natura
you can know what they will do even if the future doesn
So foreknowledge is possible.
The Oracle doesnt tell us how she knows the future
Neo asks her, after breaking the vase, How did you know
she responds, Whats really going to bake your noodle l
is, would you still have broken it if I hadnt said any
Maybe the Oracle is just an excellent judge of charact
knows how certain people will react in certain situatio
even so, the prospects for free will are dim, for if human
are 100 percent predictable on the basis of psychologica
those actions cannot be considered free.

Determinism

A truly omniscient being would know all there is to know

everything in the world as well as all the laws that gover
behavior. With this knowledge (and sufficient compu
power) such a being could predict the entire future of t
verse. Or so says the great French physicist Pierre Sim
Laplace:

Given for one instant an intelligence which could compreh

the forces by which nature is animated and the respective s
of the beings who compose itan intelligence sufficiently
submit these data to analysisit would embrace in the sa
mula the movements of the greatest bodies in the unive
those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncert
the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.9

A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, translated by F.W. Truscott

Emory (New York: Dover, 1951), p. 4.

of everything in the universe. He could tell you exactly wh

anything would be and what state it would be in at any ti
during its existence. In such a worldwhich many take to
our worldthere can be no free will.
Laplaces thought experiment is based on the assumpt
that every event has a cause which makes it happen. This vi
known as causal determinism, maintains that nothing happ
without a cause and that the same cause always produces
same effect. So given the state of the universe at any particu
time and the natural laws that govern it, there is only one p
sible future. If we could roll back the universe to some ti
in the past (like we rewind a videotape) and then let nature t
its course, everything would happen just as it did befo
Because there are no alternative courses of action open to a
one, no one acts freely.
In a completely deterministic world, no one should be h
responsible for their actions because nothing they do is up
them. Scientists disagree about whether the primary determin
of our behavior is our genetic makeupour natureor
upbringinghow we were nurtured. Both parties to the natu
nurture debate, however, agree that our behavior is caused
forces beyond our control. Recognizing that no one can
other than what theyre programmed to do, psychologist B
Skinner claims that we should give up the notion that hum
have free will and with it the notion that they should be prai
or blamed for what they do.10 There can be no right or wro
in a world that is causally determined. If the real world is su
a world, those in it cannot be considered to be any better
than those in the Matrix.
The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341270 B.C
realized that if every event is caused by other events, there
be no free will. To explain how free will is possible, he spe
lated that atoms randomly swerve as they move throu
space. Remarkably, most modern physicists agree with Epicu
that certain eventslike the radio-active decay of an atom
purely random, that is, uncaused. And some believe that
vindicates our belief in free will. Physicist Sir Arthur Eddingt
10

B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam, 1972).

expelled determinism from present-day physics has th

the important consequence that it is no longer necessary
pose that human actions are completely predetermined.
future is open because it can unfold in more than on
While this alone doesnt establish the existence of free w
can no more be held responsible for a random event
determined one), at least it makes free will possible.

This Is Your Life

Suppose, while browsing a flea market, you come across

old book with your name on it. Intrigued, you turn to t
page and start to read. It begins by correctly stating the tim
place of your birth! You read on and find that the book co
chronicles all of the major events of your life. You skip ah
the entry for the present day and read that you go to a fle
ket and find a book with your name on it. (All of the ent
in the present tense.) The events are so recent and the b
so old, you wonder how anyone could possibly have
about them. The book doesnt end there, though. Th
entries for many years to come. Reading just a little
ahead, you come across the statement that you get in y
and leave the flea market at 6:00 p.m. The book has neve
wrong about anything in your past. Does that mean that y
destined to leave the flea market at the appointed time? C
you falsify that statement by simply sitting on a bench un
had passed? It would certainly seem so. Even in a world
causal determinism is true, knowing a prediction can lea
falsification. Laplaces demonor any oracle for that m
can be trusted to make accurate predictions about p
behavior only as long as the people involved are not aw
the prediction.12
The characters in The Matrix, however, are aware
Oracles predictions and yet they still come out true. Th
gests that instead of predicting the future, the Oracle is a

11
Sir Arthur Eddington, New Pathways in Science (New York: M
1935), p. 82.
12
For more on books of life see Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Huma
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 186ff.

itself helps bring about its own truth, much as a favorable ea

ings report on Wall Street can help generate favorable earnin
To explain the success of the Oracle, then, we do not need
assume that she knows the future nor that the future is de
mined. We need only assume that those who consult her beli
that she knows the future.
Morpheus seems to be aware of the active role the Ora
takes in constructing the future. On the way to see the Ora
Neo asks Morpheus whether the Oracle is always rig
Morpheus replies: Dont think of it in terms of right and wro
She is a guide, Neo. She can help you find the path. On
rooftop, after Neos miraculous rescue of Trinity from a fall
helicopter, Morpheus asks, Do you believe it now, Trinity [t
Neo is the One]? Neo is about to tell Morpheus what the Ora
told him when Morpheus interjects, She told you exactly w
you needed to hear. That is all. The Oracle, it seems, has
end in view and says whatever she thinks is necessary
achieve that end.
The Oracle herself gives the game away when she answ
Neos question about how she knew he would break the v
by saying, Whats really going to bake your noodle later on
would you still have broken it if I hadnt said anything? T
answer, of course, is No. Her mentioning the breaking of
vase is what brought it about.
There is a difference between knowing the path and wa
ing the path, Morpheus informs us. The Oracle helps her
lowers walk the path by encouraging them to believe that
knows it. Only if this is the caseonly if the Oracles fo
knowledge is apparent rather than realcan Neo be in con
of his life and live in a world where anything, within the bou
of reason, is possible.

Scene

Down th
Rabbit Ho
of Ethic
and Religio

There Is No Spoon:
A Buddhist Mirror
MICHAEL BRANNIGAN

Fate, it seems, is not without a sense of irony, says Mor

So it is also with history. It is instructive that the Buddha
his son Rahula, meaning chain or hindrance. Accor
prince Siddhartha Gautama, who later became known
Buddha, meaning the awakened one, chose to leave h
fortable lifestyle at the age of twenty-nine in order to reso
question that had been burning inside of him, the questi
drives us, the feeling that there is something radically
with existence. After he attained his enlightenment an
awakened to the truth, Rahula became one of his discip
one passage of the classic Buddhist text Majjhima-nika
awakened one instructs his son, the chained one, us
image of a mirror.

What do you think about this, Rahula? What is the purpo

mirror?
Its purpose is reflection, reverend sir.
Even so, Rahula, a deed is to be done with the body [on
repeated reflection; a deed is to be done with speech . . . w
mind [only] after repeated reflection [italics mine].1

From Majjhima-nikaya 1.415, cited in David J. Kalupahana, A H

Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities (Honolulu: Univ
Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 106.

Note the Buddhas deliberate double entendre with the mirr

reflection. To begin with, the mirror simply reflects. It embod
clarity, revealing what is before it. For this reason, the mirro
a common metaphor in Taoist and Buddhist teachings, parti
larly in Zen Buddhism. These teachings urge us to be like a m
ror, to have a clear mind, a mirror-mind, one that
uncluttered, free, and therefore empty. Just like the mirro
mirror-mind simply reflects what comes before it. It does
discriminate. Nor does it cling to its images.
We see significant uses of this mirror-reflection in The Mat
As Mr. Rhineheart reprimands Neo, the window washers cl
away the dripping suds that resemble the Matrix code. Wher
Agent Smiths sunglasses darkly reflect the two identities
Thomas Anderson and Neo, Morpheuss mirrored glasses ref
them more clearly. Note that these glasses are worn in
Matrix and in the Construct, but not in the real world. A
Morpheus turns the mirrored pill box over in his hands bef
he offers Neo the choice of red pill or blue pill.
The films most dramatic use of mirror imagery occurs so
after Neo swallows the red pill. Fascinated by the dripping m
ror, he touches it, and the wet mirror creeps its way up his a
and body. And just before his journey deep down into the r
bit hole to discover the truth, he becomes the mirror. Liter
thrown into the Matrix, he awakens from his illusion in comp
nakedness as he finds himself immersed in the pod. The Gr
word for truth, alethia, also refers to nakedness, suggesting
notion of naked truth. His mirror-metamorphosis thus bri
about his first real awakening: to the truth that what he thou
was real is actually a programmed illusion, a computer gen
ated dream world built to keep us under control . . .
The most profound use of mirror-reflection takes place
the Oracles apartment. A boy who sits in a full lotus postu
garbed as a Buddhist monk, telekinetically bends spoons.
he holds a spoon up to Neo we see Neos reflection in
spoon. This represents clarity and truth as the boy shares w
Neo, in four words, Neos most important lesson: There is
spoon.
The parallel here with Buddhism is striking. There is a w
known Zen Buddhist parable, or mondo, about three mo

the flag moves. The second monk responds that it is no

the flag, but the wind that moves. The third monk rebuk
of them. He claims that neither the flag nor the wind mo
is your mind that moves. The Buddhist message is cle
spoon does not move, since there is no spoon. There
mind.
Furthermore, because there is no spoon, the mirror-re
reminds us that we need to be careful not to place too
importance on the images that are reflected. The images a
ply images, nothing more, nothing less. In a sense, just a
is no spoon, there is no mirror in that the world that is re
in the mirror is simply an image, an illusion. In this lig
Buddha teaches us that the world as we know it is an i
is maya. Now Buddhist scholars have debated about the
of this illusion. Does this mean that the world we see and
does not actually exist? This metaphysical interpretation
the Matrix is all about.
On the other hand, many Buddhists, particularly
Mayhayana school, have claimed that the illusory nature
world consists in our knowledge of the world. That is, th
crete world does exist, but our views and perception
reality do not match the reality itself. The image in the
is not the reality that is in front of the mirror, just as my
of the Eiffel Tower is not the Eiffel Tower. As Zen Bu
claim, the finger that points to the moon is not the moo
most insidious confusion is to mistake the image for th
ity. Yet it is our mind that interprets and defines what
for us. It is this epistemological illusion that Buddhist tea
seek to deliver us from.2 In order to do this, we must f
mind.
Most importantly, we need to free the mind from the
of an independent, fixed self. Even though we stand bef
mirror and see ourselves, our image conveys nothing
what we really are. This reaches into the core of Buddhis
ings, namely, that there is no self, just as there is no s
2

James Ford insightfully points out that this is the conclusion of the Y
school of Mahayana Buddhism in his Buddhism, Christianity, and The
Journal of Religion and Film 4:2 (October 2000).

is no self, no independent and separate entity. This idea of

self is called anatman, literally meaning no self. Therefore,
can use the mirror in the wrong way. We can use it to reinfo
the illusion of self, a self that is to us so all-consuming that
absence of a mirror can be unnerving, even anguishing. In
inauthentic world, we need mirrors to reaffirm the illusion
self and separateness.
Let us now return to the Buddhas instruction to his son a
consider the second meaning he attaches to the mirror, as sy
bolizing the mental act of reflection, examination, think
things through. He instructs his son that careful reflection ou
to precede action. More importantly, he cautions Rahula aga
acting without being aware of the impact of his action upon
other things.

If you, Rahula, reflecting thus, should find, That deed which I

desirous of doing with the body is a deed of my body that wo
conduce to the harm of myself and to the harm of others and
the harm of both; this deed of body is unskilled, its yield
anguish, its result is anguisha deed of body like this, Rahula
certainly not to be done by you.3

This reaches into Buddhisms most vital undercurrent,

idea of dependent origination, or pratityasamutpada. Depend
origination essentially means that all things in existence are in
cately interwoven with each other, so that there is a natural in
connection among all things. Therefore, nothing is independ
and separate.
This being so, nothing is permanent since, according to
Buddhist doctrine of anicca, all things change. Nothing is in
pendent and permanent, not even a self. Nevertheless, we
tend to cling to the ideas of permanence and self, and this p
duces suffering, or dukkha. Dukkha literally means dislocatio
Here we have the Buddhist Three Signs: anicca (everyth
changes), anatman (there is no self), and dukkha (suffering
universal). In any case, the Buddha reminds his son that, in v
of the interconnectedness of all things, our actions have an imp
upon others, and we need to reflect upon this before we act.
3

Kalupahana, Ibid.

Yet this kind of reflection, this mental activity, is a two

sword. On the one hand, careful reflection and questio
necessary. Throughout his life, Neo has not accepted
solely at face value. He suspects that things are not quit
He asks Choi, You ever have that feeling where youre n
if youre awake or still dreaming? Trinity can identify w
sense of dislocation. I know why you hardly sleep, w
live alone, and why night after night you sit at your com
Youre looking for him. I know, because I was once look
the same thing. And before Neo is debugged, she remin
You know that road. You know exactly where it ends
know thats not where you want to be. In their first enc
Morpheus tells Neo, You have the look of a man who
what he sees because he is expecting to wake up . . .
here because you know something . . . Youve felt it you
life. That theres something wrong with the world. You
know what it is but its there, like a splinter in your mi
ving you mad.
On the other hand, Buddhist teachings never tire of w
us that it is the mind that creates splinters. It can l
through all kinds of detours. The mind can be our worst
Consider the sparring match (or kumite in Japanese) b
Neo and Morpheus. This scene clearly demonstrates t
powerful role of mind in the martial arts. As skillful as N
been conditioned to become, Morpheus at first still defea
Why? Morpheus tells him your weakness is not you
nique. Neos weakness, his enemy, does not lie in the s
and quickness of Morpheus. After all, the kumite take
within the Construct. Morpheus challenges Neo, D
believe that my being stronger or faster has anything to d
my muscles in this place? You think thats air youre br
now? It is clearly Neos mind that defeats Neo.
It is all a matter of freeing the mind. Freeing the mind
not allowing the mind to stop anywhere. The celebrat
monk Takuan Soho (15731645) calls the unfree mi
detained mind. Takuan Soho instructed Japans two
renowned swordsmen, Miyamoto Musashi and Yagyu Mu
In his Mysterious Record of Immovable W
(Fudochishinmyoroku), he warns Yagyu that detaining th
would result in disaster:

you think of meeting that sword just as it is, your mind will sto
the sword in just that position, your own movements will
undone, and you will be cut down by your opponent. This is w
stopping means.4

The mind stops when it thinks instead of knows, whe

tries instead of letting-go. Morpheus thus prods Neo to Stop t
ing to hit me and hit me [italics mine]. The mind stops whe
places itself at a distance from the body. As long as the m
stops, it is not one with the body. In the martial arts, freeing
mind means bridging the distance between oneself and on
opponent. For there is no opponent, just as there is no spoo
In this respect, Neos meeting with the Oracle shows Ne
inability to free his mind. Despite his perfecting the techniq
involved in his training, which is essentially spiritual training,
still possesses doubts and fears about his true nature. Keep
mind that the Oracle never actually states that Neo is not
One. It is Neo who says this. The Oracle acts as the mirror
Neos doubting, detained mind.
Freeing the mind means having an undetained mind, a m
that is not fixed. Freeing the mind therefore means acquir
the state of no-mind, what Zen Buddhists refers to as mush
This no-mind is also no-reflecting. This is the other edge of
sword. The Buddha urges us to reflect, but also instructs us
free ourselves from reflection. This no-reflecting ultimately fr
the mind. Morpheus constantly reminds Neo that he needs
free the mind. Neos life as well as the lives of all in the Ma
has become a prison for the mind. Freeing the mind com
about when we break through the barrier of rationalization a
reflection, when we recognize the limits of reason and rea
that all reason and logic inevitably hits a brick wall. This is
true sound of inevitability.
The barrier of reflection is shattered when Neo experien
no-mind, or no-reflecting. When Neo is shot through the he
by Agent Smith and dies, Trinity immediately lets go of
4

Takuan Soho, The Unfettered Mind: Writings of the Zen Master to the Sw
Master, translated by William Scott Wilson (Tokyo: Kodansha Internatio
1986), p. 19.

ting-go of her own fear, a product of her reflection, is a

that empowers him to let go of his former doubts and
awaken, because he now truly believes for himself that h
One. This scene is a powerful example of pratityasamu
the interconnectedness that exists especially with the re
tive, indeed saving, power of love. Trinitys belief in
affects Neos belief in himself. Moreover, their beliefs ar
ting-go of the fear and doubt that accompany their
detained by reflection. Only by letting go of the mind,
free the mind. And only when we free the mind can w
ourselves. Within the Buddhist mirror, the mind is the u
Matrix. The mind enslaves us when we become attached
sion, when we convince ourselves that the world we s
reflect on is the real world.
The Matrix underscores these two sides of the m
reflecting and no-reflectingthrough its numerous B
allusions: the world as we know it as illusion, the con
emphasis upon the role of mind and freeing the mind,
tions between the dream world and the real world, direc
rience as opposed to being held captive of the mind, a
need for constant vigilance and training.
Indeed, Neos first meeting with Morpheus acts as
phonic overture in that it touches upon all of the films
themes and movements, especially when Morpheus reve
human condition and predicamentthat the world
know it is a prison for the mind. Note that Morpheus
prison for the mind, and not prison of the mind.
clearly a sign of hope. If Neos life is a prison of the min
liberation seems less likely. But, his life has become a
for the mind. This means that liberation from this prison
sible. And it is possible precisely through the mind, by
the mind.
This reminds us of the Four Noble Truths in Buddhis
ticularly the often understated Third Truth. The First Tru
sists of dukkha, that all of life is filled with sufferin
Second Truth is that the definitive source of suffering
from tanha, which means craving and clinging. It is b
the mind that craves. This craving is expressed through
forms of attachment, especially attachment to permanen

suffering. This message of hope makes logical sense. Since

cause of our suffering comes from within us, from mind, th
the source of redemption comes from within us as well. I
precisely this Third Truth that Morpheus suggests. The Fou
Truth lies in following the difficult and demanding path t
will free us from suffering, known as the Eightfold Pa
Ultimately, the secret to following the Eightfold Path lies
freeing the mind.

Is The Matrix a Buddhist Film?

Just how Buddhist is The Matrix? Despite its Buddhist flair, th

are at least four ingredients in the film that appear incongru
with Buddhist teachings. First, there is an overall dualistic, go
versus evil, Zoroastrian character to the film. In the agent tra
ing program, Morpheus singles out the system as an enem
But he also includes as enemies those who are part of the s
tem, either out of ignorance or choice. This dualism clearly g
against the supreme Buddhist virtues of compassion (karu
and lovingkindness (metta). These virtues apply to all senti
beings and require that we treat friends and enemies alike w
out discrimination, surely one of the most difficult challenge
Buddhist morality.
Second, scenes of excessive violence seem to contrad
Buddhist teachings regarding nonviolence, or ahimsa. Inde
the film glorifies violence with Neo requesting guns, lots
guns, leading to Neo and Trinitys outright slaughter of
security guards when they both enter the building to res
Morpheus. All of this no doubt demonstrates the films co
mercial aim in appealing to our cultures audience. In selling
in this fashion, the film contradicts some fundamental Budd
principles.
According to Buddhism, a bodhisattva is a being who
reached awakening and chooses, out of compassion, to gu
others. The bodhisattvas vow to save all creatures, this co
mitment to eliminating suffering, is essentially what Budd
ethics is all about. The seventh-century Buddhist Shantid
describes the bodhisattva as one who will not lay down
arms of enlightenment because of the corrupt generations

because of their wretched quarrels. 5

Then again, one could view these violent scenes as
That is, one might think of these scenes as more symbolic
they symbolize the destruction of the demons in our mi
represent what Buddhists call the three poisons: de
greed, and hatred. One famous bodhisattva is Manjusri,
depicted as carrying a sword in one hand in order to slas
these poisons.
Third, the language in the movie is at times rather cra
certainly violates the Buddhist teaching of right speech.
speech is one of the Eightfold Path that we need to und
order to free ourselves from suffering. To have the potent
flick the finger at Smith may score points with the au
but the films overt attempt to appeal to vulgar folkwa
dilute its more serious messages.
One can downplay these flaws by pointing out Budd
inherent adaptability. Buddhism is like a chameleon in
tends to adapt itself to its environment. This is why C
Buddhism is somewhat distinct from its original Indian Bu
source. This is why we also tend to qualify a specific c
form of Buddhism, such as Japanese Buddhism and
American Buddhism. Given American cultures fascinatio
violence, one may therefore call the films use of it as sig
American Buddhism.
With this I disagree. Regardless of how various culture
adapted Buddhist teachings, these teachings are Buddhi
to the extent that they remain faithful to the core of Bu
teachings. And the core of Buddhism does, and will
abhor violence and the deliberate perpetration of unne
suffering. Instead, Buddhisms driving force lies in makin
effort to relieve suffering.
Finally, the film understandably conveys the impressi
humans are somewhat special and certainly different fr
artificial intelligence that humans created, particularly s

From Shantidevas Compendium of Doctrine (Siksasamuccaya), in

Theodore de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition (New York: Random
1972), p. 84, italics mine.

machines. Yet, are we different from all other sentient bein

Buddhists teach that all sentient beings deserve respect and t
all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. The films cle
depiction of the Agents as sentient programs raises the in
esting distinction between beings and programs. But
Buddhist mirror involves all sentient creatures, not just huma
The Matrix is not strictly a Buddhist film, nor was it intend
to be. Despite the above incongruities, the talent of The Mat
lies in its syncretic use of philosophical and religious eleme
from various Western and Eastern traditions. In a masterful w
it mixes metaphors with rich references to Christian
Platonism, and Buddhism within a context of contempor
cybertechnology and is already a classic in the sci-fi genre.
genius consists in richly combining penetrating script a
superb images in a way that creatively conveys the profou
though oftentimes impenetrable Buddhist message of liberati
In doing so, The Matrix awakens the viewer and challenges
to reflect (and not reflect) on where we habitually livein
minds. It compels us to ask, the next time we look into
mirror: Who or what is it that we see?

The Religion of The

Matrix and the Problems
of Pluralism
GREGORY BASSHAM

Although Christian themes abound in The Matrix, the

vision it reflects is one of religious pluralism, not Christian
religious pluralism I mean roughly the view that many
religions are equally valid or true. In this chapter I shall e
some major Christian and non-Christian themes in The
and examine the coherence and plausibility of the pa
brand of religious pluralism it reflects.

Christian Themes in The Matrix

It was no accident that The Matrix was released on an

weekend. There are numerous Christian motifs in the film
obvious and others quite subtle. Most clear is the theme
promised deliverer. In the Gospels, Jesus is the pr
Messiah, the one who is to come (Luke 7:19). In the fil
is the One, the messianic deliverer whose coming was f
by the Oracle. Neo is an anagram for one. Moreo
Greek neo means new, signifying the new life into wh
risen Neo enters and which, presumably, he will make p
for others.
The name Thomas Anderson lends further suppor
first and last names have clear Christian overtones
Doubting Thomas, the disciple who expresses ske
about accounts that Jesus had risen from the dead
20:2429), Neo is plagued by inhibiting doubts abo

Anderson (Swedish for Andrews son) derives from the Gr

root andr-, meaning man. Thus, etymologically Anders
means Son of man, a designation Jesus often applied to h
self. Early in the film, Neo is actually addressed as Jesus Chri
After Neo gives him the illegal software, Choi remar
Hallelujah. Youre my savior, man. My own personal Je
Christ.
Neos path has many elements of the Jesus story, includ
virgin birth. In the scene in which he is rescued from the Mat
Neo awakens to find himself in a womb-like vat, is unplugg
from umbilical-cord-like cables, and slides down a tube t
may symbolize the birth canal. Further, since humans
grown, not born in the machine-dominated actual wo
Neos awakening and emergence into that world is almost li
ally a virgin birth. Jesus was baptized in the River Jordan
John the Baptist. Similarly, Neo is baptized in the human b
tery refuse tank by Morpheus and the crew of
Nebuchadnezzar. Just as Jesus was tempted by the devil
forty days in the desert (Luke 4:113), Neo is tempted by
Agents to betray Morpheus. In the Gospels, Jesus gave his
as a ransom for many (Mark 10:45). In the film, Neo kno
ingly sacrifices his life to save Morpheus.
As Jesus was raised to life on the third day following
death, Neo is restored to life in Room 303 by Trinitys kiss. T
Neo really died and wasnt merely revived is supported not o
by the Christian parallelism but also by a good deal of inter
evidence in the film including (1) the Oracles prophecy t
either Morpheus or Neo would die and (2) the Oracles sta
ment that Neo was waiting for something, maybe your n
life. It is also significant that in an interview with Time ma
zine, writer-director Larry Wachowski speaks of Neos rebirt
Further, just as Jesuss resurrected body was a glorified bo
that wasnt subject to ordinary physical restrictions (Luke 24
John 20:19, John 20:26), Neo possesses remarkable new pow
following his restoration to life.
In an epiphany prior to his death and resurrection, Jesus w
transfigured before three of his disciples, his face and garme
1

Richard Corliss and Jeffrey Ressner, Popular Metaphysics, Time (April 1

1999), p. 76.

Neo physically glows after his destruction of Agent Smit

just as Jesus (on a literal reading of the relevant texts) as
bodily into heaven at the conclusion of his earthly m
(Luke 24:51; Acts 1:9), Neo flies through the sky in th
scene of the movie.
Names in The Matrix are also important Christian c
tions. In traditional Christian theology, Jesus, the incarna
of God, is raised to life, not just by God the Father, but
triune God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.2 In the film,
restored to life by the faith and love of Trinity, his closes
panion among the rebels. There are obvious parallels b
Cypher, the Mephistophelian character who betrays the
and Judas, the disciple who betrayed Christ. There ar
linkages, too, to Lucifer: Cypher looks like traditional dep
of Lucifer, Cypher sounds a bit like Lucifer, and movie bu
recall Louis Cyphre, Robert De Niros Satanic character
film Angel Heart.3 In the film, Zion is the last human c
final hope of humankind. In the Old Testament, Zion is a
and religiously charged name for Jerusalem, and in Chris
erature it is often used as a designation for heaven as th
tual home of the faithful.4
In the film, the rebels hovercraft is calle
Nebuchadnezzar. In the Biblical book of Daniel, as
director Larry Wachowski notes in an interview, Nebuchad
is a Babylonian king who has a dream he cant remem
keeps searching for an answer. 5 In a parallel way, Neo
searching for an answer to his vague but persistent qu
about the Matrix. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that a plate
Nebuchadnezzar reads, Mark III No. 11 / Nebuchadn
Made in USA / Year 2069, a likely reference to Mark 3:11
whenever unclean spirits beheld him, they fell down befo
and cried out, You are the Son of God.

2
See, for example, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Mahwah: Paul
1994), p. 258.
3
TriStar Pictures, 1987.
4
Zion, The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990, vol. 12, p. 922.
5
Corliss and Ressner, Popular Metaphysics, p. 76. The
Nebuchadnezzars dream is found in Daniel 2:149.

Although The Matrix contains many obvious Christian motifs

is by no means a Christian movie. Rather, it is a syncreti
tapestry of themes drawn from Tibetan and Zen Buddhi
Gnosticism, classical and contemporary Western epistemolo
pop quantum mechanics, Jungian psychology, postmoderni
science fiction, Hong Kong martial arts movies, and ot
sources.
The film features a decidedly non-Christian conception of
Messiah. According to orthodox Christian belief, Jesus was a s
less God-man who brought salvation to the world, not throu
violence or power, but through his sacrificial death and res
rection. Neo, by contrast, is a mere human being; he is far fr
sinless; he employs violence to achieve his ends (includi
arguably, the needless killing of the innocent); and although
may bring liberation from physical slavery and mental illusi
he does not bring true salvation.
There is also a non-Christian conception of the hum
predicament. According to classical Christian belief, the m
fundamental human problem is alienation from God that res
from human sinfulness. In the film, the fundamental hum
problem is not sin, but ignorance and illusion, an understand
of the human predicament more consistent with Eastern my
cism or Gnosticism6 than it is with Christianity.
As Larry Wachowski has acknowledged in an interview, o
of the themes The Matrix plays into is the search for the re
carnation of the Buddha.7 Much as the Dalai Lama is believ
by his followers to be the reincarnation of his predecessor a
the Buddha of Compassion, Neo is believed by the rebels to
the reincarnation of the Moses-like liberator who had freed th
from the Matrix.8 Although reincarnation was endorsed by so
early Church Fathers and is taken seriously by some liberal t
6

The Wachowskis have acknowledged Gnostic influences in the film.

Matrix Virtual Theatre: Wachowski Brothers Transcript (Nov. 6, 199
Available online at www.warnervideo.com/matrixevents/wachowski.html.
7
Corliss and Ressner, Popular Metaphysics, p. 76
8
In one scene, the Oracle physically examines Neo, presumably looking
telltale marks that would prove he is the One. A similar procedure is use
Tibetan Buddhism to identify the true Dalai Lama.

Scripture10 and has consistently been rejected by all

Christian sects.
One of the most prominent themes in The Matrix
emptiness or illusoriness of empirical reality as we ord
experience it. This theme is sounded most clearly in the Z
there is no spoon speech of the Buddhist-looking
potential in the Oracles waiting room: Do not try an
the spoon. Thats impossible. Instead, only try to real
truth. There is no spoon. Then youll see that it is not the
that bends, it is only yourself. The illusoriness of empiric
ity is a fundamental tenet of Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Eastern spiritual traditions. In Christianity, by contra
notion that phenomenal reality is an illusion is generally r
as inconsistent with the existence of an all-powerful and
ful God.
Many Eastern religions view time as cyclical, relativ
ultimately illusory.11 Somewhat parallel views are refle
the film. Time is relative and malleable in the Matrix: it
sped up, slowed down, and even stopped; the tempora
sent is always set (and presumably periodically reset)
end of the twentieth century; time loops back and repea
in experiences of dj vu; and future events can be fores
the psychically gifted. Such notions of time are more con
with Eastern mysticism and New Age pseudoscience tha
are with Christianity. From a Christian perspective, time
not illusory; it is progressive, not cyclical; and prophet
sight is a rare and miraculous gift of God, not a psychic
of grandmotherly oracles.
In an online chat, writer-directors Larry and Andy Wac
were asked the following question: What is the role of
the movie? Faith in oneself first and foremostor in som
else? They responded: Hmmm . . . that is a tough qu

See, for example, John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (San Francisco
and Row, 1976), pp. 296396.
10
Hebrews 9:27: It is appointed for men to die once. See also Luke 1
Matthew 25:46.
11
Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics, second revised edition (Boston: Sh
1983), pp. 161187.

perspective, by contrast, faith and trust are primarily in God,

in oneself.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, there is a level of v
lence and profanity in The Matrix that is clearly discordant w
Christian values.
In short, The Matrix is a complex amalgam of themes dra
not just from Christianity but from many non-Christian religi
and philosophies as well. It is this pluralistic or syncreti
vision of religion or spirituality that I wish to explore in
remainder of this chapter.

Religious Pluralism and The Matrix

With its patchwork of various religious and spiritual traditio

The Matrix presents a religious pluralism that many of its vie
ers may find attractive. It is unclear whether the Wachow
brothers meant to endorse the various religious and philosop
cal ideas they present in the film. More likely they simply wan
to make a kick-ass intellectual action movie that features so
interesting and relevant myths. Nonetheless, since the kind
pluralism the movie depicts is both engaging and appealing,
worth considering whether such a view could be correct.
Polls show that pluralistic views of religion enjoy fairly w
support today. In one recent survey, for example, 62 percen
American adults agreed with the statement, It does not ma
what religious faith you follow because all faiths teach sim
lessons about life.13 As we shall see, however, it is very diffic
to formulate a version of religious pluralism that is both coh
ent and plausible.
What exactly is religious pluralism? Earlier I said that r
gious pluralism can roughly be defined as the view that m

12

Matrix Virtual Theatre: Wachowski Brothers Transcript (Nov. 6, 199

Available online at www.warnervideo.com/matrixevents/wachowski.html.
13
George Barna, Absolute Confusion (Ventura: Regal, 1994), p. 207. Simil
a 2000 BBC poll found that 32 percent of adults in the U.K. believe tha
religions are equally valid, and only 9 percent of adults in the U.K. are c
fident that their own religious tradition is the best path to God. BBC
cited on Soul of Britainwith Michael Buerk. Available online
http://www.facingthechallenge.org/soul/htm.

ever, is neither precise nor strictly accurate. In fact, I s

religious pluralism is best understood, not as a single theo
as a family of related theories. Four major varieties of re
pluralism can be distinguished:

Extreme pluralism: the view that all religious beli

equally valid and true;14

Fundamental teachings pluralism: the view th

essential teachings of all major religions are true;

Cafeteria pluralism: the view that religious truth li

mix of beliefs drawn from many different religions

Transcendental pluralism: the view that all maj

gious traditions are in contact with the same u
divine reality, but this reality is experienced and c
tualized differently within these various traditions.

Lets look briefly at each of these varieties of religious plu

Extreme pluralismthe claim that all religious beli
trueis plainly incoherent and can be dismissed very q
Anthropologist Anthony Wallace has estimated that over t
10,000 years humans have constructed no less than 100,0
gions.15 Many of these religions teach views that are lo
incompatible with those taught by other religions. Is God
or not triune? Is God personal or not personal? Is God t
ator of the physical universe or not the creator of the p
universe? Is or is not Jesus the divine Son of God? Is or is
Qura-n the definitive revelation of God? Are or are not sou
carnated? Is or is not polygamy permitted by God? Each o
claims has been defended by some religions and denied
ers. Basic logic tells us that two contradictory claims cann
be true; it follows, therefore, that extreme pluralism is fal

14
Ive borrowed the term extreme pluralism from Keith Ward. See h
and the Diversity of Religions, Religious Studies 26 (March 1990); rep
Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge of
Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 110.
15
Cited in Michael Shermer, How We Believe: The Search for God in a
Science (New York: Freeman, 2000), p. 140.

beliefs are true, but that the essential teachings of all major r
gions are true. The idea here is that while the great religi
may differ on relatively minor points (such as the permissibi
of eating pork or the existence of a purgatory), they agree on
truly important matters, such as the existence of a Supre
Being, the importance of religious piety and virtuous living, a
the existence of an afterlife in which good conduct will
rewarded and bad conduct punished. It is these essential or c
teachings that fundamental teachings pluralism claims
equally valid and true.
The central problem with this version of religious plural
is that on any plausible definition of what counts as fun
mental in religious belief, the great religions clearly do differ
fundamentals. Muslims, for example, believe in the absol
oneness and unity of a personal God, and would insist stron
(and surely rightly) that this doctrine is fundamental to Isla
This doctrine, however, conflicts with the core Therav
Buddhist belief that no personal God exists, as well as with
core Christian belief that God is triune. This denial of a perso
god may be part of the religion of The Matrix, which has a d
inite emphasis on the spiritual yet no reference to the divine
Another popular form of religious pluralism is cafeteria p
ralism, the view that religious truth can be found by picking a
choosing beliefs from many different religious traditions. T
religion of The Matrix is a good example of cafeteria plurali
Lets call this particular brand of cafeteria pluralism Neo-plu
ism. It is the religion of the new-age seeker, often attractive
those who thirst for the spiritual yet who are uncomfortable w
the religion of their upbringing. Despite its appeal to the see
and the fact that it adds nicely to The Matrix, there are t
major difficulties with cafeteria pluralism, and hence with N
pluralism.
First, its hard to achieve a coherent mix of beliefs wh
picking and choosing religious beliefs cafeteria-style. Many r
gious doctrines transplant poorly outside the native religi
framework in which they have evolved. Reincarnation,
example, fits well with Hinduism, with its doctrines of mi
body dualism, a substantial spiritual self, and the eternity of
temporal world. It fits less well with Buddhism, with its reject
of the notion of an enduring, substantial self. And as we h

clear Biblical teaching of a Last Judgment and its underst

of the human person as psychophysical unity.16
Second, even if the cafeteria pluralist does man
achieve a coherent mix of beliefs, why should he or she (
one else) think that those beliefs are true? The issues h
complex, but the basic difficulty can be stated very simpl
contemporary philosophers and theologians would agr
few, if any, specific religious doctrines can be rationally j
without appeal, ultimately, to divine revelation. But w
presumably nontheistic religion of The Matrix its hard
how any such appeal could succeed. There are problem
for theistic cafeteria pluralism. It seems highly unlikely th
would scatter his revelations among the various gre
gionsrevealing this key truth to the ancient Israelites, th
truth to the Hindus, and so forth. So what reasonsoth
simply wishful thinking or implausible appeals to person
gious experiencecan the cafeteria pluralist give for th
that his or her personal mix of religious beliefs is the
while all the rest of the world is mistaken?
If cafeteria pluralism in general, and Neo-pluralism in
ular, wont work, perhaps there is another alternative. Re
John Hick has defended transcendental pluralism, a so
cated quasi-Kantian form of religious pluralism.17 Hick
admits that the great religious traditions make conflicting
claims, and thus cannot all be true. Nevertheless, he
there is an important sense in which all the great religio
equally valid and true. His solution turns on the broadly K
distinction between things as they exist in themselves and
as they are thought or experienced by us. According to
God (Ultimate Reality, the Real) as it exists in itself is an
transcendent and ineffable reality that exceeds all huma
cepts. The Real is perceived through different religio

16

On Biblical portrayals of human nature, see Joel B. Green, Bodi

Is, Human Lives: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible, in
S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, eds., Whatever H
to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), pp. 149173.
17
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Response
Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

example, as a personal Being (God, Allah, Shiva, Vishnu) a

some as an impersonal Absolute (Brahman, the Tao,
Dharmakaya, the Sunyata). In addition, Hick argues, judged
their moral and spiritual fruits, all the great religions appear
be roughly equally effective in the common goal of all religi
salvific transformation from self-centeredness to loving a
unselfish Reality-centeredness. Thus, Hick concludes, all
great religions are equally valid and true in two import
senses: (1) they all are in contact with the same Ultimate Rea
(though they may experience and conceptualize this Reality
radically different ways), and (2) they are all equally effec
paths to salvation.
Like Neo-pluralism, Hicks pluralism confronts serious d
culties. First, it is of dubious coherence. According to H
none of our concepts applies to the Real as it exists in itse
We cant say of it that it is one or many, person or thing, s
stance or process, good or evil, purposive or non-purposive
But what sense does it make to say of an alleged religious en
that it is neither one nor not one; that it is neither the sustai
of the universe nor not the sustainer of the universe; that i
neither the source of authentic religious experience nor not
source of authentic religious experience? On the face of it, su
a concept is simply unintelligible. Second, even if Hicks co
pletely unknowable Real exists, why should we think that it
any connection with religion? 20 If we dont have the fogg
idea what the Real is like in itself, why should we think tha
has any connection with experiences of guilt, forgiveness, c
version, enlightenment, or other phenomena commonly asso
ated with religion, rather than, say, war or racial prejudice?
Finally, Hicks brand of religious pluralism is self-defeating
two respects. To see this, imagine you are a typical evangel
18

More precisely, Hick claims that only purely formal and negative prope
apply to the Real. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 239.
19
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 246.
20
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford Unive
Press, 1999), p. 56. My critique of Hick draws heavily from this work, as
as from Plantingas Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism, in Tho
D. Senor, ed, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith (Ithaca: Cor
University Press, 1995); reprinted in Quinn and Meeker, eds.,
Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, pp. 7292.

Like Hick, you now believe that virtually everything Ch

have traditionally believed about God, Christ, and human
tion is only mythologically true, that is, literally fa
nonetheless conducive to achieving a right relation to th
Should you give up being a Christian and become som
else? By no means, says Hick, for Christianity is just as e
a path to salvation as that offered by any other great r
and one can still achieve all the spiritual fruits of Chri
while recognizing that virtually all of its traditional teachi
literally false
There are two problems with this solution, one con
and one practical. First, conceptually, is it even possible
Christian while accepting virtually none of the central
ings about God and Christ that distinguish Christianit
other religions? No matter how expansively we
Christian, Hicks definition seems too broad. Second, a
Plantinga points out,21 Hicks brand of pluralism seem
impossible without a kind of doublethink or bad faith.
enlightened Hickian pluralist you believe that your tra
beliefs are no more true than any other traditions belie
indeed, are literally false. At the same time, however, Hi
that you should continue holding those beliefs because
spiritual fruits they bring. But how can one continue h
a belief that one recognizes is no more true than a bel
directly contradicts it? And how can one achieve the mo
spiritual fruits of a religion unless one believes that wh
religion teaches is really true?

Pluralist Objections
to Religious Exclusivism

Is the Neo-pluralist, who adopts a collage of religious

worse off than those who adhere to a single traditional re
Our failure to find a coherent and/or plausible vers
religious pluralism may prompt us to take a fresh l
the theory pluralists seek to replace: religious exclu
Religious exclusivism is the view that one religion has it
21

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 6162.

Lets look briefly at three common pluralist objections to r

gious exclusivism.23
Many pluralists, like Hick, argue that all the great religi
appear to be roughly equally effective in transforming indivi
als from self-centeredness to loving and compassionate Real
centeredness.24 This is strong evidence, they claim, against
exclusivist claim that salvation and authentic experience of
Real are found only in one religious tradition.
This objection rests on a common confusion about religi
exclusivism. There are exclusivistscall them ha
exclusivistswho claim that salvation/liberation and verid
experience of the Real are found only in a single religion.
there are also soft exclusivists (sometimes called inclusivi
who reject both of these claims. What exclusivism as such cla
is simply that one religion has it mostly or completely right a
all other religions go seriously wrong. It is fully consistent w
this to admit that both authentic religious experience and salv
transformation take place outside that tradition,25 and this is
fact the most common form of exclusivism today.
Another common pluralist objection to exclusivism is tha
is arrogant, egoistical, chauvinistic, or even oppressive a
imperialistic to claim that ones own religious tradition is t
and all others are seriously mistaken.26 One who says thi

22
This definition is adapted from Philip Quinn and Kevin Mee
Introduction, in Quinn and Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challeng
Religious Diversity, p. 3.
23
The following discussion draws freely on Timothy OConnor, Relig
Pluralism, in Michael J. Murray, ed., Reason for the Hope Within (Gr
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 167175.
24
See, for example, John Hick, Religious Pluralism and Salvation, Faith
Philosophy 5 (October 1988); reprinted in Quinn and Meeker, eds.,
Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, pp. 5658.
25
This assumes, of course, that the one religion the exclusivist claims to
true doesnt include as one of its essential doctrines that salvation an
authentic experience of the Divine is possible only within that religion. S
conservative Christians would claim that Christianity does clearly include
doctrine (often quoting Acts 4:12: There is salvation in no one else, for th
is no other name under heaven given among men by which we mus
saved), but this view is no longer widely held.
26
For representative statements of this objection, see Joseph Runzo, G
Commitment, and Other Faiths: Pluralism vs. Relativism, Faith and Philoso

sons of other faiths: that he knows something of grea

while they are mired in ignorance or error. And to say
is claimed, is to exhibit a kind of intellectual arroga
worse.
As Timothy OConnor points out, the central idea beh
objection seems to be something like the following gener
ciple, which we can call the arrogance principle:

For any belief of yours, once you become aware that oth
agree with it and that you have no argument on its behal
likely to convince all reasonable, good-intentioned peop
disagree with you, then it would be arrogant of you to c
holding that belief and you should abandon it.27

Though an admirable spirit of tolerance motivates it, this

tion has two fatal flaws. First, it is far too sweeping an
demnatory. In this life, all of us unavoidably hold beliefs
know we cant convince all or most reasonable peo
accept. Take politics, for instance. I think the next pr
should be a Democrat; you disagree. I realize I have no
down argument that will convince you; it follows from t
ralists arrogance principle that I should give it up. Bu
exactly should I give it up? There are only two real o
here (barring really drastic choices, like shooting myself
believe the denial of my original belief, that is, believe th
president should not be a Democrat or I can simply su
judgment on the issue. But notice that regardless of
option I choose, Im in exactly the same boat I was in
Reasonable people disagree with both options, and I k
cant convince them to believe otherwise. Thus, the logic
lying the pluralists arrogance principle implies, implausib
everyone is intellectually arrogant.28

5 (1988), p. 348; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Religious Diversity (New York

and Row, 1976), pp. 1314; John Hick, God Has Many Names (Phila
Westminster, 1982), p. 90.
27
OConnor, Religious Pluralism, p. 171 (slightly adapted).
28
For similar arguments, see Plantinga, A Defense of Religious Plural
17778; OConnor, Religious Pluralism, p. 171.

are a philosophical tar baby: get close enough to use th

against the exclusivist, and you are likely to find them stuck
to yourself.29 Anyone who accepts the arrogance principle m
be aware that there are plenty of reasonable, good-intention
people who disagree with it. Thus the pluralist is hoist by
own petard; the pluralists charge of intellectual arrogance
self-refuting.
Finally, the most common pluralist objection to exclusiv
is that it is arbitrary to claim that one religion is substanti
true while all others go seriously wrong. The basic argument
be briefly stated as follows: There is no objective basis (fr
Scripture, reason, religious experience, or otherwise) for cla
ing that one of the great religions is closer to the truth than
others. Thus, it is arbitrary and unjustified to claim that one r
gion is substantially true and all others, so far as they m
claims incompatible with that religion, are substantially false
The key issue here, clearly, is whether all the great religi
are epistemically on a par. Is it really the case that the evide
supporting the truth of, say, Christianity is no stronger than t
supporting the truth of, say, Buddhism or Jainism? Unfortunat
as Alvin Plantinga points out, pluralists rarely produce an ar
ment for the conclusion that no religion could be closer to
truth than others; it is more like a practical postulate, a bene
lent and charitable resolution to avoid imperialism and s
aggrandizement.31 But this strategy is deeply question-beggi
The central issue in the debate between exclusivism and plu
ism is whether there is or is not good evidence that one and o
one religion is substantially or wholly true. In order to m
good on their claim that exclusivist claims are arbitrary a
unjustified, pluralists need to argue, not merely assume, t
there is no good evidence that one religion is substantially clo
to the truth than others.

29

Plantinga, A Defense of Religious Exclusivism, p. 177.

For representative statements of this objection, see Hick, An Interpreta
of Religion, p. 235; Hick, God Has Many Names, p. 90.
31
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 6263.
30

Neo-pluralism, the religion of The Matrix, works reasonab

as art, as an exercise in contemporary myth-making (or
weaving). Hopefully that was all it was intended to be
reflects a view of religion or spirituality that, while fashi
is very difficult to make sense of, or to defend.32

32

Thanks to Bill Irwin for very helpful comments on an earlier versio

essay.

Happiness and Cyphers

Choice: Is Ignorance Bliss?
CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, JR.

For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasin

comes in, this Happiness is disturbd, and we are set afresh
work in the pursuit of Happiness.
JOHN LOCKE1

Few questions possess as great an existential urgency, and g

eral philosophical interest, as What is happiness? It seems t
we spend our lives desperately looking for happiness; if hap
ness is not the ultimate end of our activities, as Aristotle argu
it is certainly an ultimate end. To be deprived of happin
seems in the eyes of most of us to be deprived of a good l
even of a good reason for living. A life without happiness see
scarcely worth the having; one would bear it out of necess
not out of its desirability.
The topic nonetheless possesses several striking featur
The first is that every conceivable platitude has been utte
about it; consequently we are left with arguing for the corre
ness of this or that position, or of synthesizing. There doe
seem to be much room for originality here!
The second is that philosophers have had relatively little
say about it in spite of its enormous importance to human l

1
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by P.H. Nidd
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), II.xxi.59 (p. 273).

126

for a Platonic dialogue; yet no Platonic dialogue is devote

Aristotle, and to a lesser degree some of his Hellenistic d
dants did, of course, write on the subject. But Aristotle
exception that proves the rule.
By contrastthis is a third observation about this su
non-philosophers seem generally to assume that there
answer to the question What is happiness? In the co
ordinary life, they dont view the search for happiness, or
understanding of happiness, as a hopeless quest. At th
time, they think happiness a hard thing to find, tha
define and to attain. It is a strange situation; happiness
a constant theme in our lives, it is something that woul
to be so much a part of us as to be unable to remain unk
yet we cannot find it.
It should be no surprise that the problem of happine
constant theme in popular cultureon television, nove
help books, autobiographies, talk-shows, and of cou
movies. Once in a while, a particularly clever movie bea
the subject appears.
The Matrix qualifies for the honor. It imaginatively pr
number of important questions on usresidents as we
the new millenniumone of which concerns the true na
happiness. How does the movie present the question
answer to the question does it offer, if any? Is the answ
able? If notperhaps due to its sketchinesshow would
about providing a better answer of our own?

The Matrix and the Platonic Cave

What is a matrix? The dictionary definition is a womb,

mative part of the animals reproductive system; or, in
technological vein, a mold in which the printers typ
gramophone records, and such, are shaped. The movie
these two together into a frightening mix; organic human
bred by high-tech means, seeds in underground pods
with metal umbilical chord plugged directly through the b
the neck into the brain. That chord doesnt so much nou
program; and not just program some general framew
terms of which the world will be approached, but the
itself.

the famous simile of the cave, described in the Republic, Bo

VII. According to it, we are all like prisoners in an undergrou
cave, placed in chains at birth and unable to swivel our bod
or heads, and thus focused only on the images projected o
wall of the structure. The images are made by our control
who parade artifacts in front of an artificial or tended fire up a
behind us, thus creating images, just as we would by holding
hands and fingers in front of a movie projector. The cave-ma
is a blend of artifice and nature (the tended fire, for examp
combines the two). The kicker is that the prisoners do not re
ize that they are prisoners; to the contrary, they deem the
selves free. They do not know the images on the wall are
images, they take them to be reality. They are ignorant of th
ignorance.2 They are so trapped in the realm of artificiality a
manipulation that they insist at all costs on the truth of th
world. Presumably the controllers or image makers who run
image-show would be highly motivated to assist them in t
defense.
As Platos Socrates continues with the story, somehow one
the prisoners is freed (by whom, we are not told), and forci
led up a tunnel to the outside. It is an extremely painful proc
of adjustment. No artifice up here; nature and truth ru
Enlightenment is initially baffling and difficult; but o
adjusted, the eyes feast, the soul has found what truly nouris
2

MORPHEUS: I know exactly what you mean. Let me tell you why youre h
Youre here because you know something. What you know you cant exp
But you feel it. Youve felt it your entire life. That theres something wr
with the world. You dont know what it is but its there, like a splinter in y
mind driving you mad. It is this feeling that has brought you to me. Do
know what Im talking about?
NEO: The Matrix?
MORPHEUS: Do you want to know what IT IS? The Matrix is everywhere.
all around us, even now in this very room. You can see it when you look
your window or when you turn on your television. You can feel it when
go to work, when you go to church, when you pay your taxes. It is the w
that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the tr
NEO: What truth?
MORPHEUS: That you are a slave, Neo. Like everyone else you were born
bondage, born into a prison that you cannot smell or taste or touch. A pr
for your mind. Unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You h
to see it for yourself.

deeply happy and therefore unwilling ever to return to th

insides of the earth.
And what if the Enlightened one were forced to retu
to wake up his or her former cave dwellers from their do
slumber? Socrates recounts a scene of violence and deat
would react with outrage at this mad story about an o
real, happy world. Clearly, one must discover for ones
one has been living in illusion, that one is not free but
of a system, that there exists the good and true by
Coming to the truth is a transformation of soul that is a
a discovery of selfthat one has a soul, and that soul ha
tain natureas a discovery of what is real. Inevitably, t
path of suffering as well aseventuallyof happiness. N
prisingly, both The Matrix and the Platonic simile show
proposition as well as state it, the better to allow us spe
of the drama a chance to look in the mirror.
The Platonic image of the matrix raises a score of que
including of course What is real? How do you define
And those are questions explicitly posed in The Matr
words quoted are put by Morpheus, the liberator of pri
to Neo, the One who will bring about the equivalent o
erating revolution for all). Anyone familiar with the mov
already see many parallels between the movie and Plato
ile.
Even the mysterious Morpheus fits into the analogy.
tioned that an unnamed agent liberates the Platonic pr
that agent must himself or herself have been liberated som
and be an expert in awakening. One does not awake o
though one may stir with primeval recollections just
does, to the point that one has the vague feeling of no
quite sure if one is awake or asleep (Morpheus asks Ne
has ever felt that way). Morpheus is the name of the Gre
of dreams. Why is the liberator in The Matrix named af
divinity? It seems odd, after all, that the awakener should
expert in sleep. The gods name comes from the Greek
morph, meaning shape or form; for the god could su
up, in the sleeper, all sorts of shapes and forms. Who bett
divine Morpheus to understand the difference between
fulness and dreams? And who better to understand how to
the somnambulist in the proper way, so that they ta

theme of the movie that in order to awake one must first dre
that one is awake, that is, have the prophetic intimation t
there is a difference between dreaming and awaking.
Both the Platonic simile and The Matrix raise the quest
of happiness with the broader framework of the relat
between our subjective experience or state of mind and real
It is a Platonic thesis that true freedom and happiness depe
on knowledge of what is real; according to that view, one co
have the subjective experience of being free and happy, but
a slave and unhappy. One could be completely mistaken
attributing happiness to oneself, in uttering the phrase I
happy. Happiness is supposed to be similar to the concep
health; one could also be mistaken in uttering the phrase I
healthy even though one may feel, at the moment, extrem
healthy, and be unaware (because of ignorance, or drugs)
the unseen cancer. The thesis is that happiness and reflect
on self and the objective world are inseparable. Similarly, T
Matrix obviously has much to do with the question about
relationship between our subjective sense of self (self as fr
self as happy) and the reality of the experiences we
undergoing.
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall put aside the co
plicated question of the relation between freedom and hap
ness. My focus will be the question of happiness: Wha
happiness? Does true happiness depend on some knowledge
reality, or if we feel ourselves to be happy may we righ
declare ourselves to be happy in fact?

Happiness and Contentment

AGENT SMITH: Do we have a deal, Mr. Reagan?

CYPHER: You know, I know this steak doesnt exist. I kn
that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling
brain that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, y
know what I realize? Ignorance is bliss.
AGENT SMITH: Then we have a deal?
CYPHER: I dont want to remember nothing. Nothing. Y
understand? And I want to be rich. You know, someo
important, like an actor.

CYPHER: Okay. I get my body back into a power pla

reinsert me into the Matrix, Ill get you what you
(Restaurant Scene from The

In approaching the notion of happiness, I have from t

one particular sense of the term in mind, namely that in
we can speak of a person as generally happy, as happ
the long term. Happiness, in the sense I am discussing it
a mood. Things such as bliss, ecstasy, joy, may perh
referred to legitimately by our word happiness, but I am
ested in discussing this other sense of the term. Though
may be happy spending time with the woman in red, th
piness is fleeting. It is not the kind of happiness that
important in either the movie or in Platos simile of the
Almost everyone seems naturally to associate lon
happiness with contentment. The notions have somet
common, especially when one focuses on the feelings in
Both seem describable as resting points, as lacking distu
and anxiety, as exhibiting calmness and peacefulness. Th
tented person is not plagued by unsatisfiable passions; h
ities and his passions have reached an equilibrium, rathe
ancient Stoics recommended. The contented person has w
wants, he has enough of the things one ordinarily desir
is satisfied with that. He does not need to induce a false
by indulging in engine-cleaning moonshine as Cyphe
But one commonly understood meaning of contentmen
severed from a characteristic I have associated with hap
namely the long term.
And even if one were content over the long haul, th
more important way in which contentment is distinguishe
happiness; and that is the tendency of contentment to
itself to a state of mind, one severed from an appraisal
objective facts. Contentment and unreflectiveness are
allies. The content are, so to speak, tranquillized. I have i
the figure of the contented slave; someone resigned to t
itations of life, someone for whom the link between the
tive feeling and an assessment of the worthiness of his
broken. I could just as well adduce the example of the
tyrant to the same effect. Or the example of the we

been compared to the life of the beasts, not without reason;

dog, for example, can certainly be happy in the sense of c
tent. When you are asleep, you are not happy, however pea
ful you may be. You are just unconscious.
However much a persons subjective state of mind is tr
quil, there must be a fact of the matter relative to which it
be evaluated. This is a controversial thesis, as Cypher shows:
wants out of reality, back to the Matrix, in order to be hap
He wants to be free from reality. He embodies the quest
mark about the relationship between contentment (the pur
subjective sense of well-being) and happiness (which is s
posed to be tied to a knowledge of reality). His answer is cle
contentment in a life of illusion is true happiness. The pris
ers in the organic-mechanical cave are better off as they a
The movie as a whole calls into question that point butn
this must be saiddoes not itself even sketch the argument
connecting happiness and knowledge of reality. Let me o
four examples by way of illustrating why Cypher is wrong, a
why Neo is right in making his choice in favor of wakefuln
This is scarcely the whole of the needed argument, but it
start.
First, suppose that a drug were invented and were dripp
into your veins, painlessly and continuously. Let us pretend t
the technical name of this drug is Ataraxy. Suppose further t
Ataraxy made you unaware that you were taking it. As a re
you experienced tranquillity over the long haul, even thou
your life alternated between prolonged periods as a co
potato watching soap operas, and indulgence in violent dr
by murders. We would want to deny that such a person
happy, however tranquil; his tranquillity is merely a state of c
tentment, and indeed an artificially induced state of mind.
Second, happiness is linked to beliefs about the world, a
these can be true or false. Suppose you are terribly hap
because you think Keanu Reeves just asked you on a d
Impartial spectators investigate, and find that a very cle
impostor has tricked you. You experienced contentment, n
delight, in your (false) belief. But since your belief was fa
were you truly happy? I dont think so; for your life is not su
as you would wish it to be on reflection, in the light of an ac
rate assessment of the situation. Or if you are truly happy, th

A third example: Say you woke up one day in your h

spot, a heating vent on the sidewalk, fantasizing that y
rich. Suppose the fantasy takes hold; you believe yourse
Mr. Onassis at his winter chteau in Gstaad. You are very
Or are you? Youre living in a dream world and are de
with life, but surely you are not happy. It is not true (con
Cypher) that ignorance is bliss. Consider the example of O
Thinking Desdemona unfaithful, Othello cries: I had
happy, if the general camp,/Pioneers and all, had tast
sweet body,/So I had nothing known. O, now for ever/F
the tranquil mind! Farewell content! (3.3). Othello is unha
a false belief; he says he would rather be ignorant and
but in fact the dramatic irony of the scene shows us the
site. He would in fact be happy if he had known the truth
tragic ending of the play underlines. I would hold that th
even if Desdemona had been unfaithful.
Consider a fourth example. Suppose you habitually
too much moonshine and then regretted it the next m
Suppose you went on like that for years. While high, yo
content; in the cold light of sobriety, as you contempla
bloodshot eyes and pudgy face in the mornings mirro
realize that you are terribly unhappy, and that the conte
you found in the bottle was a flight from the underlyin
ciency of your life. It was a flight into ignorance and fo
ness. It seems to me that in one form or another this
experience is common, and reveals several important trut
of which is that one cannot be happy if one harbors
grounded standing dissatisfaction with oneself, with ho
really is. And that suggests that to be happy one must h
sort of desires one would want; in reflecting on myself,
affirm that I am basically ordered in such a way as I woul
to be, if I am to count myself happy.
Examples such as these suggest that while happi
inseparable from a state of mind, it is distinguished fro
tentment because it is also inseparable from an arrangem
ones life, and more deeply because any such arrangem
ones life must be evaluatively linked to a notion of what
life is worth living
The various kinds of self-delusion on which an err
sense of happiness may be built all suffer from three d

destroyed by daily realityas when after a fine day of fanta

ing, your stomach is empty rather than full of Onassiss cav
If we are willing to count a person happy whose state of m
depends on false beliefs, then happiness is completely sub
tivized. As such, it is vulnerable. What you dont know can h
you, like an Agent from behind.
Second, happiness by self-deluded fantasy seems truncat
As you lie on the heating vent, you picture the adorat
bestowed on the wealthy and powerful, you imagine yoursel
object; but you do not know their lives, their conversatio
their failures, their triumphs. The image you conjure up of y
dream life is a cartoon, a truncated partaking and does not m
sure up to its own object. Your happiness is bogus.
Hence the third point: Since your experience is that of a f
tasy rather than of the real thing, whatever happiness y
derive is not a product of your being, or doing, the real thi
If, when high on booze, you imagine yourself happy beca
beloved by a family to which you are devoted, whereas in
your family is in tatters precisely because of your drinking
your happiness of the same quality or depth as that wh
stems from really being loved by a family to which one reall
devoted? Is the imagined happiness of partaking of Mr. Onass
luxurious life as deep, as intense, as complex, as that which y
would experience if you were actually partaking?
The confusion of happiness with contentment is widespre
Many people would choose as Cypher does. The recogniti
often belated, that happiness and contentment are distinct
perhaps not as widespread, but it is the sort of stuff of wh
the wisdom of the elders is made. The end-of-a-life feelings
regret and shame supply some evidence, I think, that we na
rally connect happiness with some objective state of affairs.
Happiness is a feeling; but I add that it is not this or that fe
ing. It is more like that feeling or felt quality that attends m
other feelings one has in the course of a life one has asses
as being rightly oriented. I am suggesting (the full argument c
not be presented on this occasion) that happiness is linked t
reflective affirmation of the sort of person one is. Happines
linked to second-order desire (the desire to have the desires o
has and in the way one has them). Contentment may be thou
of as the subjective sense of satisfaction of desire(s), the k

is desiring the right things in the right way, as when Neo

he must choose the difficult path of saving Morpheu
There is therefore a connection between happiness a
conception of happiness. In order to have happiness, one
a right understanding of realitythe reality about ones
about what is truly the case in the world.

Three Theses on Happiness

By way of fleshing out this view just a bit further, I p

three theses on happiness. The first is that tranquillity
nected with the long-range sense of happiness discussed
and so with the notion of a proper ordering of soul. Hap
is best understood, at the start, in terms of tranquillity. On
eral feature of happiness so understood is that it captu
connection between happiness and being at rest. It is at
the sense of lacking significant discord; it is peaceful, at
level. Further, it is at rest in the sense of being somethi
coming to a stop rather than like a process of moving t
a goal. It is more like an end state, a completion or fulfi
than a condition of lacking and overcoming of
Tranquillity is the term usually used to translate the
term ataraxia, a term that is the natural competitor to
monia, which is the one that Plato and Aristotle use. Th
is normally translated as happiness, and less often as b
ness; ataraxia is also difficult to translate, and tranqui
something of an approximation. Understanding happin
tranquillity helps us to see that the enemy of happiness
ety. I have in mind not so much anxiety about this
eventthe sort of anxiety you have about getting back
Nebuchadnezzar before the Agents catch youbut ra
general anxiety about things being out of kilter, not stab
holding, potentially dissolvingthe kind of splinter i
mind that keeps you awake at night.
This brings me to my second thesis about happiness,
is that one fundamental view associates happiness with a
(tranquillity), and the other follows Aristotle in associatin
piness with activity (energeia). The debate between Sto
Aristotelians, in other words, articulates basic altern
Aristotelians define happiness as activity of the soul in

bonum, and the highest good for a person consists in ex

lence in his proper function (ergon), that is, in the proper ac
ity or work of the psyche. There is a place, if a problematic o
for external goods (like decent food and a safe environme
in this picture; happiness is not just the exercise of virtue. T
is what one might call an objectivist definition of happiness, a
it has several obvious advantages. It provides us with a me
of assessing claims to happiness and of explaining how peo
can be mistaken in thinking they are happy when in fact th
are (as The Matrix portrays) nothing more than human bat
ies. As already noted, this is useful with respect to the hap
slave or happy tyrant problem. It links up happiness w
ethics and with how one leads ones life as a whole. It provi
a basis for distinguishing between happiness and contentme
Putting aside problems of making sense of the notions
soul, natural function, and excellence, and the famous d
culty of reconciling practical and theoretical virtue, howev
this definition does not link up clearly with the experience
happiness. Aristotle says that excellence (arete) is not a pat
(Nicomachean Ethics II.v.3), and never says that happiness
feeling (a pathos). Since happiness is energeia, its activ
would seem at odds with the passivity connoted by the te
pathos. And as an activity in accordance with virtues that
definition are not feelings, it would be strange if happin
were understood by him as a feeling or emotion. Happines
rather more like Neos active decision making and discovery
truth about self and world, than like a lazy virtual tryst with
woman in red.
Finally, a third thesis about happiness: that neither of
two basic alternative views of happiness is alone adequat
have mentioned some reasons why I think this true of hap
ness as Aristotelian activity. In spite of my endorsement of
association of happiness with tranquillity, however, one can
accept that association without emendation. The tranquil
view of happiness tends to be associated with apatheia, w
passionlessness, with a leveling out of the emotions, w
detachment or indifference. This is precisely because of
close association of tranquillity with rest, peacefulness, and
other qualities already spoken of; and the contrary associat
of the passions, emotions, and attachment with perturban

rightly strikes us as barren, dry, uninspired, as forsakin

cisely much that is of value in human life.
Happiness as tranquillity in this long lasting, structura
is compatible with anxiety and lack of contentment in the
day sense. It is not so much equanimity as it is equipoi
ance, coherence and settledness in ones basic stance.
level of lived experience, on this account, one can and
must have all sorts of passions, attachments, commi
These may well be turbulent at times; they certainly pu
happiness, in the sense of mood, at risk, and in that sen
put ones happiness in the hands of others.

The Matrix as Mirro r

Happiness as tranquillity requires evaluative assessment

life; otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish betwee
tentment and tranquillity. This assessment is, in the broa
philosophical one. From Socrates on down through the
tion, the questions Who am I? and What sort of person
I to be? are fundamental to the philosophical ent
Philosophical recognition may often (to recall a point off
the start of this essay) require personal experience, n
abstract argumentation. And artincluding movies such
Matrixcan both portray a problem, and, by holding up
ror to the spectator, instigate reflection about its relevan
solution. This chapter is but a sketch of that reflection.3

I am grateful to Eduardo Velasquez (Washington and Lee University

invitation to discuss The Matrix with his seminar Film, Fiction, and th
of Popular Culture on May 28th, 2001, and to the students for their i
ing thoughts. One of themDavid Newheiserkindly provided me w
ondary sources relating to the movie. I am also grateful to William
his helpful suggestions. My discussion of happiness is drawn f
unedited manuscript of my Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enligh
(Cambridge, 1999), Chapter 5. I am grateful to Cambridge University
permission to draw upon the book.

We Are (the) One!

Kant Explains How to
Manipulate the Matrix
JAMES LAWLER

Two Theories of Illusion

In what is arguably the most powerful scene in The Matrix

see endless transparent towers containing artificially cocoon
naked and wired human bodies. This, we discover with a sho
is Reality. Everything else that seemed to transpire to this po
in the story, as people come and go, living their humdrum a
frantic lives in our modern urban beehives, is Appearan
Dream, Illusion.
Since ancient times, philosophers from Plato to Buddha h
been telling us that our supposed real world is hardly more th
a shadow of the true reality. Perhaps the most sophisticated
of arguments to the effect that the world we see around us
mere appearance is found in the work of Immanuel Kant. K
argues that even the so-called objective properties of physics
on subjective human projections. Although there is a Reality t
somehow plays a part in the constitution of the appearances a
the phenomena of experience, this Reality is not to be found
the realm of sensible appearances. The world we see and f
around us involves the projections of human consciousness. I
not the independently existing reality it appears to be.
Who is responsible for this hoax perpetrated on the hum
audience? For Kant, it is not some external being, l
Descartess malicious demon, that creates the illusory appe
ances of ordinary experience. We human beings deceive o
138

attribute to it an independent reality and thereby alien

own freedom. This abdication of creative human free
the fundamental generating pattern or matrix of the
economic and political world in which most people find
selves enslaved to others.

Two Matrices

In The Matrix powerful machines with artificial intelligen

trol most, though not all, of humanity. It might therefor
that The Matrix is more Platonic or Cartesian than Kantia
portrayal of the source of the illusion as external rathe
internal. And yet the intelligences that imprison human
in the Matrix must control their captives according to th
tives own wishes. We learn in the film that the beings th
almost succeeded in governing mankind have had to alt
original programthe Matrix governing the nature of the
ing worldto comply with implicit human wishes.
Agent Smith reveals to Morpheus, whose mind he is tr
break, that there have been two Matrices, two different
mental patterns and programs for governing the experie
captive humanity: Did you know that the first Matr
designed to be a perfect human world? Where none su
where everyone would be happy. It was a disaster. N
would accept the program. Entire crops were lost. Agen
speculates on the reason for this anomaly: Some believ
lacked the programming language to describe your
world. But I believe that, as a species, human beings defin
reality through suffering and misery.
Just as contented cows create the best milk, con
humanity produces the best bio-energy, the necessary lif
for the intelligent machine masters. The Matrix was desig
occupy the mind while the sleeping organism performs it
tion as a battery for the soul-snatching machine intellig
Paradoxically, what turns out to fit humanitys instinctive
for a contented sleep is not an ideal world of happiness,
familiar rat-race world of suffering and misery in which w
audience, are actually living. By its veto power to choose
possible Matrices, sleeping humanity is unconsciously,
tively, in charge of the program.

the first Matrix: The perfect world was a dream that your pr
itive cerebrum kept trying to wake up from. Which is why
Matrix was redesigned to this: the peak of your civilization. T
implication is that we choose our own illusions, instinctiv
rejecting a certain idea of the perfect world. Even when sub
to the malicious demons and their dream towers, humanity g
what it wants. But why would people want this world of s
fering and misery, rather than the world of happiness of the f
Matrix?

Two Theories of Liberation

If The Matrix suggests two theories of imprisonment, exter

and internal, it also proposes two corresponding theories of
eration. Throughout the film the audience is asked to quest
not only whether indeed Neo is the One, but what it mean
be the One. At the beginning of the film, Choi recognizes Ne
powers even within the Matrix as a computer hacker who he
individuals manipulate the computer systems that control th
lives. As he hands Neo two thousand dollars for a compu
disk, Choi says: Youre my savior, man. My own personal Je
Christ. But this kind of liberation is only a foreshadowi
perhaps a caricature, of true liberation.
The history of philosophy gives us two opposing interpre
tions of the idea of salvation. In the Platonic version, where
source of the illusion is external to the deluded human bein
the agent for overcoming the illusion is also externalized.
exceptional human being, a philosopher king, is needed
guide humanity away from the shoals of misery and self-destr
tion and towards . . . what? The harmony and the contentm
of a well-ordered existence. But something like this idyllic wo
has already been proposed by the controllers and rejected
the dreamers within the dream world itself.
In traditional Christianity, the Savior is an exceptional in
vidual unlike others, a God-man capable of raising the de
and, after his own death, bringing himself back to life. I
this traditional understanding of the One that predomina
in the minds of the characters of the film until all such tra
tional expectations are fully overturned in the final scene
the film.

ern philosophical Enlightenment philosophy, the princi

which are embedded in the United States Constitution. Th
society worth having is one in which free people rule
selves. The slaves can only be truly free if they free them
If freedom from shackles is handed to them without the
efforts, they will quickly fall back into servitude. Kant
that no one can save us but we ourselves. This self-libera
humanity is the destiny that each of us must discover fo
self or herself. In Kants conception, Jesus is not an exce
being who saves a helpless humanity, but the model of o
inner God-like potential to save ourselves.
Kants conception that the perceived world is a self-im
illusion, rather than one completely determined by an
deceiver, is intimately connected with his view that every
being has a destiny to participate in the self-liberation of h
ity. Kants argumentation in defending these inter-relate
ceptions can convince the reader of their validity, and
way strengthen the ideas that are visually and dramatica
sented in The Matrix.

Philosophical Implication of Copernicu

Revolution in Astro n o m y

In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant called for a

tion in philosophy according to the hypothesis of Coper
This Copernican revolution in philosophy means that our
sophical ideasthe way we think generally about the wo
live inought to catch up with the implications of mode
ence. These implications are nowhere so obvious as in t
covery of Copernicus that the sun does not revolve arou
earth, as it appears to do, but rather the earth goes arou
sun, contrary to appearances.
Today we smugly laugh at the naivety and perhaps th
gance of the older visions of the universe that placed o
blue planet (as it is seen from space) in the center of a v
verse. But let us give due credit to the ancient philoso
such as Aristotle, who defended the geocentric world p
After all, they merely formulated in general terms what
today perceive with our own eyes to be the case. We

sky. We see the sky as a huge dome enclosing the flat plane
the earth that extends out from our physical bodies to the s
rounding circular horizon. If we reject the ancient cosmology
Aristotle, we must accept the idea that the world as we ac
ally perceive it is an illusion.
The geocentric view of the world is an extension of a m
fundamental feature of perception, which we might call its e
centric nature. We directly see the physical world as if it w
centered on our individual physical bodies. That is the w
things seem or appear to us. The world I actually perceive c
ters on me, on my physical self. It is the same for each of
But a little reflection tells us that the world in itself cannot
like this. When children take body-centered perception to
reality, we call that egocentrism. When adults persist in see
themselves as the center of the universe, we call that egotism

I Am the One

Egotism is a central category of the moral dimension of l

Egotism consists in taking ones own individual physical e
tence as the primary basis of ones choices. Ultimately, the e
tist believes that he is the One, the center of the universe,
being for which everything has been made. Each individ
spontaneously, naturally believes in her or his mysterious e
tion as a special being, as the special being. Experience, ho
ever, soon teaches most of us that other beings have the pow
to limit us, to prevent us from realizing our desires. Other bei
too act as if they are the One. To solve this contradiction,
necessary to recognize that wehumanity in general, all inte
gent beings in the universeare in our oneness the true cen
of existence.
The basic choice of morality is a choice between two c
tradictory conceptions or Matrices of reality: there is the wo
of separate independent and competing egos, and the world
shared humanity. The egotistical world is connected to
appearances of physical bodies separated from each other
space and time, and colliding with one another according
laws of deterministic causality. On the other hand, there is
world as it comes to be seen from the standpoint of moral c
sciousness: a world of human unity and freedom. If the firs

matrix of morality is real, then the matrix of separation m

an illusion.
In The Matrix, the moral choice for truth, freedom
humanity is symbolized by the choice of the red pill. T
pill awakens the individual to Reality; the blue pill pu
back into the sleep of self-centered illusion. This choic
ever must be tested. There is a crisis in the unfolding
commitment of the person who first chooses to awaken a
according to truth, only to discover that the realization
choice in practical terms is doubtful.

What Is Reality?

The ultimate meaning of moral choice is, in Kants term

duty to create the Highest Good. The Highest Good is t
ation of a world that combines freedom and happiness.1
a lofty vision turns out to be illusory, then the initial ch
also unreal. In that case, only one possibility remains:
ones own separate egotistical life by adapting as well as
ble to the external circumstances of ones existence.
Because of the seemingly overwhelming power of th
trollers, Cypher comes to the conclusion that the lofty g
the Nebuchadnezzars crew are illusory. Cyphers initial
of the red pill is tested by hard experience. He realizes t
initial freedom and reality outside the Matrix are, for the c
the Nebuchadnezzar, only transitional moments in the
tion of an ultimate freedom and an ultimate reality, whic
exist in the minds of their believers. He recognizes that th
seeking a mythical Promised Land, symbolized by the n
the last free human city, Zion. Morpheuss vision of freedo
reality is the ultimate illusion, he concludes, using r
empirical estimates to draw practical conclusions.
In his justification of his betrayal of Morpheus,
exposes his own superficial interpretation of freedom an
ity. If you would have told us the truth, he says to th
of Morpheus, we would-a told you to shove that red p
1

See James Lawler, The Moral World of the Simpson Family: A

Perspective, in William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble, e
Simpsons and Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), pp. 147159.

he set us free. Cypher replies: Free, you call this free? All I
is what he tells me to do. If I have to choose between that a
the Matrix, I choose the Matrix.
The freedom that Morpheus has in mind is not mere sepa
tion from the Matrix, not mere individual freedom to strive
ones separate individual happiness, but participation in a d
tiny or Fate that has as its ultimate goal the higher liberation
humanity. This goal cannot be merely the replication in real
of our modern so-called worldthe peak of civilization
a different, better world, a world of human perfection that co
bines freedom and happiness.
Trinitys reply here is therefore inadequate, since she mer
distinguishes between the illusion of existence within the
tual reality program of the Matrix, and mere physical existe
with its illusions of egocentric perception: The Matrix i
real! she says. Cyphers answer touches on a deeper truth
disagree, Trinity. I think the Matrix could be more real than
world. All I do is pull the plug here. But there, you have
watch Apoc die.
The contrast between the illusory world of the Matrix and
world of ordinary physical perceptions on board
Nebuchadnezzar is only the starting point for the films exp
ration of the themes of illusion and reality, slavery and freedo
The initial contrast between illusion and reality, so startlin
depicted in the towers of sleeping humanity, is not compl
What is truly exciting, what captivates the audience along w
Neo himself, is not life outside of the Matrix, but life within
once its true nature is understood.

The Postulates of Morality

We seek to create a perfect world of universal happinessK

agrees so far with the first Matrix of the controllers. But this p
fect world has certain conditions or requirements that mak
incompatible with any possible world designed by alien capto
The Highest Good is a world in which people are not o
happy, but also worthy of being happy. Their happiness m
be earned through their own free, responsible actions.
We can now understand why sleeping humanity persists
demanding the rat-race world of the end of the millenniu

their needs were satisfied and all miseries alleviated, th

ognized that such an illusion of happiness must be an i
It must be an illusion because the belief in separation
even in dreams as the basic matrix of experience. And tha
in separation results inevitably, even dreamers recogn
competition, struggle, and in the division between winne
losers. Happiness is possible only on the basis of a radica
ferent principle, one in which free human beings act
basis of their true unity, not their apparent separation.
The moral quest to create the Highest Good is tested
the seemingly hard reality of a world that appears to con
its existence. The moral individual tends to feel po
against the forces of a world built on completely differen
ciples. The ideal Matrix of morality seems powerless to
come the physically based Matrix of egotism. In order to
despair, the individual has to have faith in the possibility o
izing the moral ideal as the Matrix of a fully developed
Kant distinguishes three aspects of this faith, which he c
Postulates of morality. The Postulates of moral conscio
are: Freedom, God, and Immortality.
Against our feelings of powerlessness to realize the g
morality, the Postulates describe what we must believe if
to remain faithful to our basic moral choice. These beli
essentially those of liberators, of the saviors of hu
Through the Postulates, we learn to follow through on o
sion in life, which is to be the Ones who can create the
of the Highest Good, who can reach the promised land o
the kingdom of heaven on earth.
Kant stresses that it is necessary to believe in the re
moral experience. It is not possible to have scientific kno
of this reality, he thought, because scientific knowledge c
in explaining experience according to deterministic p
psychological, and socio-economic laws. But the esse
moral experience is its anti-deterministic nature, the free
the will. Since we cannot know (scientifically) this freedom
out reducing it to its opposite, we must have a kind of
our own freedom to choose. This faith in human free
despite all the deterministic laws of our sciencesis t
postulate of moral experience.

One for all and all for one. That is the slogan of truly free in
viduals. That is the new principle, the alternative Matrix of
Nebuchadnezzar and Zion. It is the third Matrix, which is
incomplete and mysterious, still to be fully realized. In orde
see the new Matrix of the united, sharing mind of human
through to its ultimate implications, the destruction of the
Matrix, it is necessary to believe or postulate not only that fr
dom exists, but that free people have the power to create
Highest Good. A second postulate is therefore necessary:
postulate that free individuals, tuning in to the reality of
moral Oneness, have the power to realize our highest goals
separation can create a world of external power, unity sho
have the power to create a radically different world. In this al
nate world of Zion, the power of united humanity runs throu
each individual who opens up to it.
Kant calls this second postulate the postulate of God. In
traditional religious beliefs connected to the old civilizati
God is regarded as the external distributor of justice. God me
out happiness to the good, and punishments to the evil, if
in this life and on this earth, then in the world of the afterl
This conception implies that the ordinary human individua
powerless to achieve these goals of justice.
The world of the Matrix, modeled on the year 1999
peak of modern civilization at the end of the millennium
based on the sense of powerlessness that each individual fe
before the seemingly external forces of nature and civilizati
The root or Matrix of this sense of powerlessness is the belie
separation. Thus Morpheus tells Neo what Neo already kno
Youve felt it your entire life, that theres something wrong w
the world. You dont know what it is, but its there, like a sp
ter in your mind, driving you mad. . . . The Matrix is eve
where. It is all around us.
In the post-millennial religion of the New World of Zi
however, the potential of natural and human forces is not ali
ated and externalized in economic or political powers, wh
theological counterpart is an external, all-powerful God. Th
external powers of contemporary life are epitomized in T
Matrix by all-powerful intelligent machines. In the coun
world of Zion, however, the underlying, unifying Life Force

the illusion of separate existence.

In the Oracles waiting room, a neo-Buddhist Potenti
Neo: Do not try and bend the spoon. Thats impossible.
. . . only try to realize the truth. What truth? asks Neo.
is no spoon . . . Then youll see, that it is not the spo
bends; it is only yourself. We cannot bend the spoonw
not change so-called external realityif, following determ
science, we believe that it is an independent material sub
that is separate from us. If however we recognize the tru
it is one with us, that it is part of us, then we need onl
ourselves, and the spoon will bend.
The self in this case is not the separate, isolated e
the higher Self, in unity with the All. God-like power
ours if only we give up the illusion of separation. Ne
learn, not that he is the Onea special being apart from
one elsebut that he is One with all existence. He is, of
the One who first fully understands this truth.

Fear and Tr embling

The world of the Matrix is a world of fear. Interpreting

to be a separate physical being, vulnerable to the po
forces of the physical and social universe, each individu
be afraid. The fundamental fear is fear of death, the ext
of that fragile physical existence. Fear of death presuppos
the individual fixes on his separate physical existence as t
mate reality.
According to the belief-structure of the Matrix, we can
escape from fear. In the opening sequence of the film, Ne
step toward freedom places him perilously on the ledge
corporate tower. Then, he lets his fear govern his actio
second time he confronts the fear of falling occurs in the
reality Construct. He is being initiated into the power of
ulating the illusion. He is discovering the exhilaratio
comes from consciously living in the illusion. The key to
ering ones power is to release all fear. You have to let it
Neo, Morpheus tells him. Fear, doubt, and disbelief. Fre
mind. Neo falls into the abyss only to discover the
nature of his fear.

I thought it wasnt real. Morpheus: Your mind makes it re

Neo: If youre killed in the Matrix, you die here? Morphe
The body cannot live without the mind.
The meaning of this enigmatic pronouncement becom
clear only with the unfolding of the logic of these ideas. Ne
initial distinction between the reality of life outside the Mat
and the illusion within it, is simplistic. Those who are consci
of a reality outside the Matrix can become freer and more po
erful within it. But existence within the Matrix, convers
affects existence outside of it. Even outside the Matrix, the bo
is dependent on the beliefs of the mind.
The key to the realization of Neos destiny consists in
rejection of the fear of death. Neo realizes his destiny when
chooses to give up his life for Morpheus, in accord with
prophecy of the Oracle.
Rather than expound a deterministic Fate, the Oracle gi
him a choice: either his own life or that of Morpheus. You
going to have to make a choice. In the one hand, youll h
Morpheuss life. And in the other hand, youll have your ow
One of you is going to die. Which one will be up to you.
The central elements in the prophecy of the Oracle are
Postulates of morality. First there is the postulate of freedom. N
originally rejects the idea of Fate because he wants to be in c
trol of his life. He doesnt want an external power to govern
actions. He wants always to be free to choose. The fulfillmen
Neos Fate is here presented as a matter of choice. As has b
the case all along, Neo can choose differently. He could h
chosen the blue pill and lived within the relative certainties of
dream-life in the Matrix. The choice of the red pill, and tru
brings with it the risk of unforeseeable fears, and the enmity
the controlling powers of existence. Now the Oracle tells him t
he must choose between saving himself and saving Morpheu
Secondly, in the prophecy of the Oracle, there is the be
in our Potential, our Power. In Kantian thought, we need to b
ster our moral choice with the belief in the power of its rea
abilityagainst all the appearances to the contrary. T
postulate of God is the postulate that links our moral choice
the Highest Good to belief in the power to realize this goal.
At first it would seem that belief in a divine power of re
ization or a Savior is an admission that we ourselves are po

ble of realizing our moral duty. It follows that the God o

man (the One) that we postulate should not be regard
separate being who performs the miracle for us. God sho
seen as an extension of ourselves as we transcend the
tions of physical separateness. In the dynamic of the film
is a development from belief in an external savior to b
our own God-like power, as united humanity, to save ou
This is our true inner potential. This understanding is
in the final speech of the One at the conclusion of the

Tu rning Point: The End of Fear

The third element of the prophecy clearly relates to dea

survival. Someone must die, and someone will survive.
world of the Matrix, where the principle of separation ru
win-lose logic of separation is an iron law. The Oracle giv
this unhappy news: he is not the One, and either
Morpheus must die. Oracle: Sorry, kid. You got the gift
looks like youre waiting for something. Neo: What?
Youre next life, maybe. Who knows? Thats the way
things go.
The Oracles prophecy is fulfilled to the letter. Neo
Morpheuss life, loses his own, and then returns in his n
as the One. How and why this prophecy is fulfilled is t
to understanding the film.
In the process of saving Morpheus, Neo finds himself
face with a seemingly invulnerable and all-powerful
Despite their training in the Construct which gives them t
dous powers in the Matrix, the crew of the Nebuchad
recognize one ultimate fear-based rule: If you see an Age
only thing you can do is to run. This is Cyphers re
advice to Neo, coupled with Cyphers debunking of an
that Neo is the prophesied Savior. Hence, the dramatic
point occurs in the film when Neo deliberately faces
Smith. He has made his choice; he will take his stand an
his death. Neo realizes this Fate in complete freedom, ch
to save another person rather than preserve his own ex
as a separate, vulnerable body.
Neo thereby overcomes the fundamental fear that gove
power of the Matrix both within the virtual reality world a

basic rule applies to each world. If you believe that you can d
even in the world of illusion, you will really die in the phys
world. The vitality of the physical body depends on the min
belief in the ultimate power of death. This is the basic rule t
regulates the Matrix. Your power, your reality, depends on y
beliefs, and your beliefs are ultimately ruled by fear of death
There remains only one step in the unfolding of Neos F
It is necessary to give up the belief in death. When Neos bo
flatlines, Morpheus says: It cant be. Morpheus cannot beli
in Neos death, although Neo, by all the rules of physical
called reality, is dead. Trinity, however, goes further. Speak
to Neos dead body, she addresses his living spirit: Neo, Im
afraid anymore. The Oracle told me that I would fall in love, a
that that man, the man that I loved, would be the One. So y
see, you cant be dead. You cant be. Because I love you. Y
hear me? I love you. Thanks to Trinitys love and refusal
believe in death, Neo comes back to life. In accordance with
words of the Oracle, Neo returns in his next life as the One

Immortality and Reincarnation

The third postulate of moral life is the postulate of immortal

To fulfill ones destiny as a moral being it is necessary to g
up belief in and fear of death. The postulate of immortality
necessary to the morally committed person, Kant argu
because within the limitations of one lifetime it is impossible
the individual to perform ones ultimate duty: to bring about
advent of the Highest Good.
The moral goal of bringing about the Highest Good is ab
our own world, not another one. Just as the postulate of freed
is about human ability in this world, so too must be the po
lates of God and immortality. Thus, the immortality postulated
morality must be a this-worldly immortality. The traditio
Christian doctrine of an otherworldly immortality does not
the requirements of moral consciousness. The main alterna
conception of immortality to the other-worldly immortality of
ditional Christianity is the this-worldly immortality of Hindu
and Buddhism. The Oracles seemingly off-hand reference
reincarnation and the monkish robe and shaved head of the b
Potential suggest the Buddhist perspective. The soul or spiri

chooses to remain on the wheel of birth and rebirth in o

facilitate the universal enlightenment of all living bein
Kants early writing, Universal Natural History, the imm
that expresses his cosmological perspective is one in wh
individual soul is reborn over and over again as it climbs t
der of potential human perfection.2
The One who is to save humanity appears in three in
tions. In a first lifetime, which takes place prior to our s
of the story, he liberates a few individuals from the life p
the Matrix. The Oracle prophesies that this liberator will
in a new lifetime to complete his destiny. The Matrix is
the story of the second lifetime of the One, in the pers
Neo, eminent hacker who takes the several leaps that bri
to the realization of his Fate. The final moments of the fil
us a glimpse of the One in his third lifetime. The third
fulfills the Oracles prophecy that the One will destroy the
But this is a negative goal, which by itself would only lead
reproduction in physical reality of the repressive world o
What is the positive objective of the liberators actions?

The Savior or the Teacher?

Liberation from the Matrix must be the creation of free

beings, not beings living contented lives of happiness w
freedom. Sleeping humanity rejects the concept of the un
happiness of slaves that is the projection of their AI cont
But how is such liberation possible under the directio
Philosopher King, or thanks to the beneficent acts of an a
erful Savior?
Like the Christian Messiah Jesus, Neo dies and come
to life. More crassly, and perhaps comically, Neo sweeps
the sky, his open overcoat spreading out like Supermans
2

Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heaven

lated by Stanley L. Jaki (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981), pp
3
The text for the first script by Larry and Andy Wachowski clearly sug
image. The screenplay includes the words: There is a RUSH of AIR as
stares up as Neo shoots overhead. His coat billowing like a black leat
as he soars up, up, and away. See www.geocities.com/Area51/
8448/Matrix.txt

pretation: that the Savior is not an exceptional Superman, bu

universal Teacher. As a teacher who shows others how to
like him, Jesus said of his follower: The works that I do, sh
he do also; and greater works than these shall he d
Addressing the AI controllers, the One announces that his t
of universal liberation involves the teaching of unlimited pot
tial: Im going to show these people what you dont want th
to see. Im going to show them a world without you. A wo
without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries
world where anything is possible.
The world without limits, where anything is possible, i
world in which everyone has the power to shape reality,
manipulate the Matrix. For this world to exist, it is necessary t
egotism be overcome, that we rise to an understanding of
essential unity with one another. In this understanding we w
find our freedom, our intrinsic connection with the div
power to realize our highest ideals, and our ability to transce
the fear of death. The One may be the first superhuman bei
but he is not the last.

John 14:12; The Holy Bible, Authorized (King James) Version (Chic
Gideons International, 1961).

Virtu
Theme

Notes from Underground:

Nihilism and The Matrix
THOMAS S. HIBBS

From The Terminator to A.I., from philosophical debates

whether terms such as soul and consciousness should
egated to folk psychology, to political debates over the
of cloning, preoccupation with the nature and implicat
technology shapes both low and high culture in contem
America.
In the 1999 movie The Matrix, the concerns and inte
low and high culture merge. The Matrix has everythi
intriguing and intellectually ambitious plot, postmodern
of classic fairy tales, special effects that set a new stand
science-fiction films, and expertly choreographed and
cally sophisticated martial-arts fight sequences. Yet, bot
plot and its philosophical musings, The Matrix draws
themes and debates that predate the current fascinatio
technology and artificial intelligence. In a number of wa
Matrix replays old debates about Enlightenment mod
The Enlightenment commitment to the mastery of
through technological progress risks the degradation of h
ity, just as an imprudent celebration of individual freedom
doxically courts a homogenization of all mankind. In the
1

Admittedly, the Enlightenment, as we now call a certain cluster

which emerged in the eighteenth century, is a complex phenomenon
become clear in the body of this chapter, I will be concentrating on
strain of Enlightenment thought, one which is ably dissected by Dost

nihilism, a human existence void of any ultimate purpose

fundamental meaning, where the great questions and animat
quests that inspired humanity in previous ages would cease
register in the human soul.

Dostoevsky, Enlightenment Utopia,

and Nihilism

Among the most important thinkers (for example, Nietzsc

Tocqueville, and Arendt) who have detected a subtle l
between Enlightenment modernity and nihilism, one of the m
neglected is Dostoevsky.2 Yet, there are striking resemblan
between many of the issues addressed in The Matrix a
Dostoevskys Notes from Underground (1864), a work in wh
Nietzsche claimed he could hear the voice of blood. No
from Underground is a satirical diatribe against a certain str
of western Enlightenment thought that had begun to infiltr
Russia. An amalgam of humanitarian socialism, romantici
utilitarianism, and rational egoism, N.G. Chernyshevskys W
Is to Be Done? is the target of Dostoevskys polem
Chernyshevskys text, which Lenin credited with reinforcing
own revolutionary propensities, develops the utopian ideas
the French socialist, Charles Fourier.3 Dostoevskys undergrou
man rails against the utopianism of the Enlightenment design
of the modern city, who claim that their applied social scie
will enable them to tabulate, regulate, and satisfy every hum
longing. In a protest against the rational reconstruction
society, the underground man opts to live in his sordid und
ground cell.
The underground man suffers from a paralyzing hyp
onsciousness. Whereas the healthy man of action sees no
ficulty with the laws of nature as applied to human life (inde
he finds them consoling), the overly conscious individual re
2

For a discussion of nihilism in philosophy and as it relates to contempo

popular culture in America, see my book Shows About Nothing: Nihilism
Popular Culture from The Exorcist to Seinfeld (Dallas: Spence, 1999).
3
For a discussion of the historical and polemical context of Notes f
Underground, see Joseph Franks Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberat
18601865 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 310347.

natural science, on the one hand, and human deliberati

choice, on the other. The hyperconscious individual co
the stone wall of the laws of natural science and the r
psychic inertia (p. 13).4 He expounds:

Science itself will teach man . . . that in fact he has neither

caprice . . . and that he himself is nothing but a sort of pia
. . . and that, furthermore, there also exist in the world the
nature; so that whatever he does is done not at all accordin
own wanting, but . . . according to the laws of nature. (p.

The goal of social science is to establish a logarit

human desire and choice and to predict the future co
human life. Thus, there will no longer be any actions or
tures in the world (p. 24). Given this conception of scien
of what is considered rational, the underground mans p
can be nothing but negative, a repudiation of reason,
and science in the name of an irrational freedom. So he o
passivity over action, isolation over community, and spi
the rational pursuit of happiness. But even this is self-de
as he notes, the spite in me (according to the laws of
undergoes a chemical breakdown.
To the attentive reader, however, the underground man
more than a dark negation of Enlightenment social scien
points out contradictions inherent in the Enlightenment
The chief contradiction, the one that preoccupies the
ground man and is the source of his unrelenting and par
dialectic, concerns freedom. Enlightenment theorists prom
eration from various types of external authority: famili
gious, and political. But an unintended consequence
implementation of Enlightenment theories is the elimina
freedom. The problem here is stated succinctly by Shigaly
theorist from Dostoevskys Demons: I got entangled in m
data, and my conclusion directly contradicts the original
start from. Starting from unlimited freedom, I conclud
unlimited despotism. How does this happen? One source

4
All references to Notes from Underground are from the superb rece
lation by Pevear and Volokhonsky (New York: Knopf, 1993).

ences, which admit as real only what is verifiable according

the criteria of mathematical-mechanical, natural scienc
Another source is Enlightenment naivety about the ease w
which theory can be translated into practice. The implementat
of the theory requires both the correction of human nature a
the radical restructuring of society; thus is the compulsory a
violent nature of the project made clear.
The gap between theory and practice evinces a deeper d
culty with the Enlightenment project. In attempting to detect a
regulate human desires, in treating man as a rational ego
Enlightenment theorists have miscalculated. They suppose t
what profits a human being is transparent to rational scrut
and that all evil will diminish with education and political re
ganization. But they overlook not only the fact that increa
violence and desire for blood often accompany so-cal
progress in civilization but also that human beings have
deeper sort of desire, a desire for truly independent willing.
exhibit their own freedom, the underground man insists, th
will deliberately choose that which is harmful and self-destr
tive. Here the underground man anticipates Nietzsches cla
that human beings would rather will nothing than not will.
is often the case in Nietzsche, so too in Notes fr
Underground, nihilism is not an end in itself but a protest
preparatory moment. Negation, it is hoped, will give way
affirmation. Thus the underground man confesses that he d
not want to remain an anti-hero who merely inverts a
rejects the theories of his contemporaries. It is not at all
underground that is better, but something different, comple
different, which I thirst for but cannot ever find. Devil take
underground (p. 37).
The paralysis, spite, and nihilism that the underground m
embodies are not alternatives to Enlightenment theory; on
contrary, they are its logical consequence. As he taunts
opponents at the very end: I have merely carried to an extre
in my life what you have dared to carry even halfw
(129130). Dostoevskys book is a polemical reductio ad abs
dum or better reductio ad nihilum of the theories espoused
his opponents.

on Human Life as a Quest

The enlightenment, rationalist project raises the ques

what is real, what is human, and to what extent freedo
self-knowledge are still possible. As the undergroun
describes it, the Enlightenment project for society is an
sion of modern mathematical physics, based on the redu
tic assumption that whatever is real is susceptible to quan
analysis. Given such assumptions, the problem of huma
dom and self-knowledge becomes acute. A related prob
informs the opening scenes of The Matrix. As Morpheu
ments in one of his first conversations with Neo, were i
computer program where you have only a residua
image. He then asks, How do you define the real? . .
tronic signals interpreted by the brain. The world of the
is a world of neural interactive simulation. The anato
of man, as Dostoevskys underground man calls it, dissol
very possibility of human self-knowledge.
Whether or not it is actually underground, the cr
Nebuchadnezzar has the same feel as the underground
cell. With its technological gadgets and their capacity art
to affect human consciousness, the ship, operating on a
signal that hacks into the Matrix, is a lesser version
Matrix itself. But it has neither the naive, unreflective sel
dence enjoyed by the human constructs of the Matrix, n
sense of omnipotence and autonomous control of the ag
the Matrix. Rooted in the desert of the real, the rebe
struggles to ascertain clues about humanitys past, to
clearer understanding of what their task is in the present,
recover a positive orientation toward the future.
Opting for the desert of the real over a construct
more comfortable and orderly reality has its costs. Th
first, the unsettling fact that what one has taken to be re
fact merely a fiction, that, as Morpheus explains, the wo
been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth
you have been enslaved in the prison of your own min
as in Dostoevsky, so too here the false sense of free
accompanied by an illusory sense of our own unity, selfand dominion over the future. A more adequate concep

and leads to a more complex appreciation of human

Morpheus asks Neo whether he has not had the sense that som
thing is wrong in the world, a sense that you cannot explain
feel. We must begin with a sense that something is awry, wh
if investigated further, will initiate a quest. As Morpheus puts
its the question that drives uswhat is the Matrix? The answ
is out there and it will find you if you want it to.
The answer is out there calls to mind the truth is
there, the slogan of the popular and long-running televis
series, The X-Files. Although the central plot-line of The X-F
concerns the control of the earth by alien rather than arti
intelligence, it shares much in common with The Matrix. B
stories play upon fears that some inscrutable and malevol
powerbe it aliens, complex machines, the governme
bureaucracy, or technology itselfhas surreptitiously sub
tuted a fictional world for the real world. But the situation
even worse than this; for, the enslaving tyrant is not a clea
identifiable, external force, which we have only to identify a
then find the means of eliminating. Instead, the power is ex
cised in and through us, constituting in large measure who a
what we are. The great dangerthe one that can naturally g
erate nihilismis that, having lost our grip on the real, we sh
forever wallow in a world of illusion. If there are not suffici
clues to find our way out of the constructed universe, we ris
debilitating psychic vertigo, a loss of any sense of who and w
we are and where were headed. In such a situation, an inve
gation of the roots of our dilemma could be but a parody of
quest for truth. (It is significant that The X-Files couples
truth is out there with other slogans such as trust no one a
believe the lie.) As Adrienne MacLean, a perceptive comm
tator on The X-Files, puts it,

Scully and Mulder are literally and figuratively alienated, pe

trated, and probed to the molecular level by omniscient
omnipotent forces who have infiltrated like television and, n
computers, virtually everything in our lives . . . Scully and Mu
trust each other . . . Yet everything they think they know is wro
Television has taught them the arts of insight but not how to
mulate a point of view. It has sent them on a quest for identity,
taught them also never to trust what they find . . . The me

the same place, all of its accessible, all of it at once sage,

ous, restricting, liberating.5

Although MacLeans claim that the quest motif on The

is utterly fruitless is open to debate, her description none
captures a very real possibility for the shows characters
the similarities in plot-line between The X-Files and The
the characters in the film would seem vulnerable to th
fate as the characters on the television show. Indeed, na
that begin with such radical claims about human alie
about our inability to distinguish truth from fiction, reali
the construction of a wily artifice, run two diametrically o
risks: that of never finding a way out of the entrapment a
of offering superficial solutions, what the literary and c
critic Mark Edmundson calls modes of facile transcenden
his book Nightmare on Main Street, Edmundson argu
contemporary American culture is shot through with a d
cal battle between two sorts of narratives: the debased
and facile strategies of transcendence.6 Neither strateg
comes nihilism: the former immerses us in it while the latt
vides only the illusion of escape. How does The Matrix
this score?
There is much evidence that the film wants to avoid
two poles; its alternative path is especially evident in it
ment of the issue of human freedom. The notion that ou
have been constructed for us is particularly irksome to ou
of freedom and personal control. As Neo says in his re
to Morpheuss question about whether he believes in fa
. . . because then I wouldnt be in control. That Neo is
ing with an impoverished conception of freedom is cle
only from this conversation with Morpheus but also fr
Oracles gentle mocking of him on this issue. As he prep
leave her, she tells him he can forget the hard truths that s
revealed to him: Youll remember you dont believe
Youre in control of your own life. But what Morpheus ca
5

Adrienne MacLean, Media Effects: Marshall McLuhan, Television

and The X-Files, Film Quarterly 51 (Summer 1998), pp. 29.
6
Nightmare on Main Street: Angels, Sadomasochism, and the Cultu
Gothic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 77.

Matrix. Morpheuss notion of fate eclipses the divide betwee

shallow conception of freedom as complete control over on
life and a thoroughgoing determinism. In the references to N
as the One for whom Morpheus has been searching all his l
there are suggestions that fate is actually a sort of providence
prophecy of the Oracle, Morpheus explains, predicts the ret
of a man who will be free of the Matrix. The relationship, ho
ever, between whatever powers of fate or providence may
operative and the power of human choice is left pruden
understated. The best example of the films ambiguity on
issue occurs in the scene where Cypher is about to unplug a
thus kill Neo. He mockingly asserts that if Neo is the One, a m
acle will disrupt his plans and keep Neo alive. Immediat
Cypher is killed by another member of the resistance.
Of course, very few ever entertain the paradoxes of freedo
Dostoevskys underground man dwells on the contradictions
freedom in the utopian world, contradictions that the charac
Cypher embodies in The Matrix. In a pivotal sequence in
film, Cypher turns traitor and begins unplugging his colleag
in the resistance. When he is discovered, he admits that he
returning to the Matrix, that hes tired of doing what Morph
tells him and that the Matrix is more real. Morpheus him
has predicted that many are so hopelessly dependent on
system that theyll fight to protect it. Cypher consciou
chooses to relinquish willing, to abandon freedom for comf
security, and an absence of struggle.
Morpheus explains that the Matrix is a computer-genera
dream world whose goal is to keep human beings under c
trol. Their project is to change the human being into a b
tery. Here we find a striking parallel to the theorists satirized
Dostoevsky, who liken the human being to a piano key, a
erence Dostoevsky may well have derived from Denis Dide
the French materialist Enlightenment philosopher. In 17
Diderot wrote, We are instruments endowed with sense a
memory. Our senses are piano keys upon which surround
nature plays, and which often play upon themselves.7

From Conversation Between DAlembert and Diderot, quoted in Notes f

Underground, p. 133.

description of the Matrixs project. He speaks of the bill

people just living . . . oblivious. When he admits that t
design plan, which attempted to construct a human wor
of suffering, was rejected by the humans, Agent Smith co
one of the underground mans points, namely, the nece
suffering for free beings. Humans, Agent Smith ob
define reality through misery and suffering. But Agen
and his cohorts share the utopian designers view of n
human life as an affliction, even an illness. As Agent Smi
it, human beings spread like a virus . . . and were the
This echoes the belief, which the underground man imp
his enemies, that in order to realize the dictates of reason
nature itself must be corrected. Like all utopian theorists
Smith has a naive faith in progress. He states, Its evo
Morpheus, evolution; the future is our world.
Another parallel emerges concerning the absence o
consciousness and self-knowledge. According to the
ground man, the theorists deprive not only others but also
selves of self-knowledge. If they had any self-awarenes
too would be afflicted with inertia. Morpheus tells Ne
Matrix cant tell you who you are. Is there also the imp
that a deficit of self-knowledge played some role in hum
original act of hubris, which gave birth to AI in the first
In his description of the source of the Matrix, Morpheus
a note of utopianism: He relates that in the early twen
century all humanity is united and in unison creates AI
In this, The Matrixs depiction of humanity and its c
mimics the classic structure of the horror genre
Frankenstein as prototype, where the creative ambitions
ence generate a creature whom it cannot control and wh
against its maker. But in The Matrix, the creature, AI,
gained the upper hand, seems doomed to repeat the un
ing errors of humanity. The Matrix itself is now engage
utopian scheme of social reconstruction. What is the way
this cycle?

Escaping the Matrix: A Victory for

Humanity or Technology?

The answer seems to have much to do with a complex c

tion of freedom that the character Neo moves toward

clusion of the film is highly ambiguous. Part of the problem h

is that in many ways The Matrix opts for the typical Hollywo
action-film ending, with the super-hero taking on a slew of e
doers. Of course, the sophisticated technology of The Mat
renders its denouement more creative and more subtle than
endings of films in the Die Hard or Terminator genre. Still,
film has been rightly celebrated more for its special effects th
its crafting of plot and character. As Neo comes to transcend
constraints of the ordinary human body and begins to exerc
powers possessed by comic-book super-heroes, improved te
nique overshadows the quintessentially human traits that N
has had to develop to prepare to wage war against the Matr
Until the final battle Neo seems quite vulnerable, resist
and then only gradually accepting his role in the fate of hum
ity. Even when he elects to risk everything to battle against
Matrix, the outcome remains in suspense. In the pivotal fi
with the Agent in the subway, he is shot and apparently de
Trinity, revealing the Oracles prophecy that she would fal
love with the One, insists, you cant be dead because I lo
you. She kisses Neo, and when he revives, she chides h
Now get up. Although we have had hints all along of a gro
ing attachment between Neo and Trinity, the relationship
insufficiently developed to carry this sort of dramatic weig
And this is a serious flaw in the film. Why? The way to overco
the threat of nihilism in The Matrix is through the recovery
distinctively human traits and ways of living. Central amo
these traits is the sense of human beings as distinct individu
capable of loyalty, love, and sacrifice. Whereas the characters
Neo, Trinity, and Morpheus are complex, different, and co
plementary, the Agents of the Matrix are impersonal, gene
and interchangeable. Is not this the significance of the na
Smith for the Agent who spends the most time on screen?
Whatever might be the flaws in the films downplaying of
human elements, it is Trinitys love for Neo that not only revi
him but also immediately precedes his manifestation of sup
human powers. He stops bullets and transcends the rules
gravity; defying the solidity of bodies, he dives inside an Ag
who then explodes.
Having won a crucial battle with the Agents of the Mat
Neo warns them that he will reveal all things to all people a

he puts it, I know youre out there. I can feel you now.
that youre afraid. Youre afraid of us. Youre afraid of ch
dont know the future. I didnt come to tell you how this i
to end. I came to tell you how its going to begin . . . Im
to show these people what you dont want them to see
world without you, a world without rules and controls, w
borders or boundaries . . . where anything is possible.
we go from there is a choice I leave to you. Here Neo
all sorts of complications: he underestimates not so mu
continued opposition of the Matrix as the likely resista
complacent, still enslaved humans. The lesson of Cypher
to have been forgotten. One also wonders whether the
complicated account of freedom that the film spends
deal of time developing has here been sacrificed to a s
conception of human freedom as autonomous self-cr
whether the film falls prey to the facile transcendence cr
by Edmundson. In fact, Neos prophecy echoes the situa
humanity, described by Morpheus, at the end of the tw
century, when a united humanity realized its peak mom
creativity and gave birth to artificial intelligence. I
unknowingly promising yet another utopia?
Of course this may be asking too much in the way
sistency and clarity of a Hollywood movie. But this film, p
more than any other in recent memory, aspires to a k
philosophical gravity. It wants us to take its philosophica
ings seriously. And this makes the concluding words esp
disappointing. Rife with platitudes, the statement seems l
for The Matrix than for some other film, perhaps called
Excellent Adventure. Alas, the ending does reflect a con
which Hollywood gives much consideration in its craf
endings: paving the way for a sequel.

14
Popping a Bitter Pill:
Existential Authenticity in
The Matrix and Nausea
JENNIFER L. McMAHON

Early in The Matrix the main character, Neo, is faced with

existential choice. This choice is encapsulated quite literally i
choice between a red and a blue pill. Neo is given the pills
the character, Morpheus, immediately after Morpheus tells N
that what he believes to be the world is instead a fabricat
that has been pulled over [his] eyes to blind [him] from
truth. Morpheus informs Neo that if he takes the red pill
true nature of things will be revealed, whereas if he takes
blue pill his perception of things will remain unchanged. Giv
their opposite effects, the pills represent the means throu
which Neo can either elect to wake from his slumber or sust
his dream. Thus, Neos choice between the red and blue p
symbolizes the existential choice between living honestly a
living in ignorance. Neo swallows the red pill and the p
unfolds.
Virtually all existential philosophers speak at length of
sort of choice Neo makes between honesty and ignorance,
truth and illusion. Though some use different terminology, th
tend to describe it as a choice between authenticity and in
thenticity. Existentialists define authenticity as a state in wh
the individual is aware of the true nature of the human con
tion. In contrast, inauthenticity is defined as a state in which
individual is either ignorant of the true nature of reality or
denial with respect to it. The existentialist view is that existe
166

Existentialists assert that humans invest the world with

and meaning. They stress the freedom implied by, a
responsibility that accompanies this investiture, as well
anxiety it can elicit. Common themes that existential p
phers discuss include absurdity, alienation, anguish, and a
ticity. While Neos choice involves a number of these item
most clearly a choice between authenticity and inauthen
When describing authenticity and inauthenticity, exis
ist philosophers tend to privilege authenticity over inaut
ity. For example, prominent existentialists such as
Camus, Martin Heidegger,1 and Jean-Paul Sartre clearly
authenticity and scorn inauthenticity. In their philo
works, these individuals describe inauthenticity in un
negative terms. Sartre refers to inauthenticity as bad
Camus describes it as intellectual suicide.3 Heidegger
that living inauthentically not only leads to the levelling
of all possibilities, (Being and Time, p. 119) but also
phasing out of the possible as such (p. 181). In contras
existentialist philosophers describe an authentic lifestyl
tively as one that is courageous, full of majesty (
Reasoning, p. 40) and free of illusions(Being and Time,
Oddly, despite the positive terms that existentialists
describe authenticity, their literary portraits of characte
approximate or achieve it are discouraging, if not dow
depressing. Whereas inauthentic characters are described a
ing in tranquil ignorance, characters approaching authenti
1

Admittedly, Heideggers assertion in Being and Time (Albany: SUN

1996) that the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a lesser
degree of being (p. 40) has led some to question whether Heidegger
privileges authenticity over inauthenticity. However, it seems evid
this assertion is made to clarify that authenticity and inauthenticity ar
of the same being rather than two categorically different types o
Importantly, asserting that authenticity and inauthenticity are mode
same being does not preclude Heidegger from considering one as a
mode. Heideggers negative descriptions of inauthenticity make it clea
sees it as inferior.
2
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington
Press, 1956).
3
Albert Camus, An Absurd Reasoning, in The Myth of Sisyphus an
Essays (New York: Vintage, 1955).

Because of the preponderance of such depictions, existential

erature seems to suggest that the movement toward authenti
entails anguish, social dislocation, and sometimes madne
These consequences compel one to ask whether authenticit
indeed preferable to inauthenticity. Though authenticity m
represent an honest awareness of the human condition, perh
ignorance is bliss. Perhaps it is better to choose the blue pill
what follows, I shall examine authenticity and inauthenticity a
the benefits and burdens of each. I shall use The Matrix a
Sartres existential novel Nausea to support my claims, as ch
acters in these works illustrate the pros and cons of both sta
Though this essay will question the appeal of authenticity, it w
conclude with an argument for it. Despite the challenge it r
resents, I shall argue that the benefits of authenticity outwe
its burdens and that a unique sort of serenity can be achiev
in this state. I shall argue for the red pill.

Red or Blue? Neo and Cypher concerning

Authenticity and Ignorance

Like the classics of existential literature, the popular film T

Matrix illustrates both the unpleasant consequences of auth
ticity and the appeal of inauthenticity. This film depicts a fut
state when, after a long and world-ravaging conflict, compu
conquer the human race and enslave it as their energy sour
The Matrix is the virtual reality created by the computers t
both placates, and maximizes the energy output from,
human subjects who lie captive in a vast complex of ene
pods. While the billions inside the Matrix exist in blissful ig
rance of their true condition (as immobilized, expenda
energy cells for the artificial intelligence that dominates earth
small number of individuals are free of its digital illusion. Unl
their captive counterparts, these individuals are painfully aw
of humanitys authentic state. They constitute a resistance fo
that seeks to undermine the oppression by the Matrix. A
result, they live on the run from the computers that attemp
annihilate them. While the philosophic implications of T
Matrix are numerous, the liberation of the character, Neo, a
the choice made by the character, Cypher, illustrate the po
addressed here concerning authenticity.

move to, and the achievement of, authenticity. Ensconced

Matrix since birth, Neo exists unaware that the world in
he finds himself is an illusion. However, with the
Morpheus and his band of rebels, Neo is brought out of
ity. Rescued from his pod, Neo is like the prisoner broug
Platos cave.4 He too is brought from ignorance to en
ment. Like the prisoners emancipation, Neos liberatio
ignorance is painful. He experiences both physical and
anguish. Neos eyes hurt because he has never used
before. His lifetime of captivity has left his body atro
Indeed, his limbs are so emaciated they require extensiv
tronic stimulation to give them sufficient strength to
mobility. Though the physical pain that Neo experie
acute, arguably the mental anguish is more severe. Inde
experiences a sort of cognitive shock. Morpheus apolog
Neo for the mental anguish he endures, admitting that
of adults from the Matrix are rare because the psycho
trauma is too great for most to endure. Ultimately, Neos
tion from the virtual world of the Matrix compels him to
that everything he believed to be real was an illusion. Wo
as Morpheus welcomes him to the desert of the real, N
izes that reality is more terrible than he had ever im
Neos experience turns his understanding upside down
orients him, pains him, and hands him more responsibilit
more truththan he ever had or wanted.
Where Neo was freed late from the Matrix, Cypher w
erated when he was relatively young. Thus, he lives mos
life aware of the true nature of the human condition. In t
Cypher illustrates the attraction of inauthenticity by op
ignorance. After enduring years underground in harsh
tions, in perpetual fear of annihilation, and with little h
improvement in his state, Cypher finds himself unable
his existence any longer. Consequently, he sells out Mo
and the rest of his rebel companions for the opportunity
his memory erased and his body returned to the Matrix.
virtual dinner with Agent Smith who arranges for his

See Chapter 1 of this volume for a thorough comparison of Neo an

prisoner.

exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth the Matrix tells

brain it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know w
Ive realized?ignorance is bliss.
Though we scorn Cypher for his choice, we can also sym
thize with him. The apocalyptic reality with which he is face
distressing to imagine, let alone admit. After all, who among
would choose a life spent in subterranean passages, under p
petual threat, where every meal represents the eternal recurre
of viscous gag-eliciting goop? While Cypher forfeits autono
honesty, and the opportunity for genuine experiences and hum
connections to return to virtual world of the Matrix, his cho
will alleviate the extreme anxiety and discomfort that accomp
authenticity. In his shoes, we too might opt for the illusion.

Sartre on Stomaching Existence

In his novel Nausea, existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre illustrates t

the circumstances need not be those of science fiction
authenticity to seem unbearable or inauthenticity to pres
itself as a refuge. Where the characters and circumstances in T
Matrix are extraordinary, Sartres novel chronicles an ordin
mans discovery that existence is not as he assumed. In Naus
the main character, Roquentin, comes reluctantly to an awa
ness of the true nature of reality. Where Neo possesses fanta
abilities and is characterized essentially as a savior, Sartre g
to great lengths to emphasize Roquentins averagene
Roquentin is a historian of no acclaim. He writes books and
quents cafs. He lives in a rather mundane city in 1930s Fran
He is of modest means. He has a small and nondescript ap
ment. Indeed, the only thing unusual about Roquentin is
shocking red hair. Similarly, this common mans enlightenm
begins not with a thrilling hovercraft rescue from gelatin
incarceration, but after a disquieting experience at the be
where the presence of a pebble in his hand engenders disg
and intractable fear. Unable to shake the disturbing feelings t
this experience generates, Roquentin states, something
happened to me.5 Though he tries to dismiss his response
5

Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (New York: New Directions, 1964), p. 2.

subsequent experiences lead Roquentinand readerst

der whether he is going insane.
As we learn, Roquentins experience with the pebble
the beginning. Rather than improve, Roquentins situatio
worse. Indeed, for Roquentin it appears that the biza
become commonplace as his mundane existence takes on
lucinogenic quality. Similar to the experience Neo has
ingesting the red pill, Roquentins perceptions become i
ingly distorted. For example, upon taking a friends h
greeting, Roquentin drops it in horror because it feels lik
white worm (p. 4). Similarly, he is paralyzed by fear w
grabs a door-knob and it seems to grab him back and h
attention with a sort of personality (p. 4). These expe
prompt Roquentins confidence in reality to slip and he
to think that, nothing can ever be proved (p. 13).
Roquentin looks in the mirror to get his bearings, he fi
solace. He finds no comfort because when he looks he
stand[s] nothing of [his] face (p. 16). Instead, he see
something on the fringe of the vegetable-world, at the l
jellyfish . . . the insipid flesh blossoming and palpitatin
abandon (p. 17). Likewise, when Roquentin looks at hi
and sees instead a crustacean, the impression is so into
that he stabs himself in the hand (p. 100).
As a result of his experiences, Roquentins life be
strangely disconcerting. It loses its order and con
Roquentin describes his life as becoming jerky, [and] in
ent (p. 5). He states anxiously, nothing seemed true; I f
rounded by cardboard scenery which could quick
removed (p. 77). As his perceptions repeatedly defy h
ventional understanding, Roquentins world dissolves
him. For example, while riding the tramway Roquentin st
to stay calm as a simple seat cushion takes on the appe
of the bloated belly of a dead animal. He agonizes, thi
divorced from their names. They are there, grotesque,
strong, gigantic and it seems ridiculous to . . . say an
about them. I am in the midst of things, nameless thin
defenceless (p. 125). Not surprisingly, Roquentins expe
cause him to feel increasingly isolated, disoriented, and
anguish (p. 55).

ity, at the end of Nausea it becomes evident that he is, in f

becoming aware of its true nature. As Sartre makes clear, w
Roquentins experiences reveal is that the diversity of thin
their individuality, [are] only an appearance, a veneer (p. 12
Roquentins experiences inform him that the world of expla
tions and reason is not the world of existence (p. 129). Th
show him that the orders and values we believe are intrinsic
the world and the things in it are instead the feeble points
reference which [we] have traced on their surface (p. 127)
Nausea, Roquentin confronts the unwanted and overwhelm
truth that humans exist inand are confined toa world t
lacks essential order and meaning. As Sartre explains in Be
and Nothingness, though it does not create it, human c
sciousness gives order and purpose to the world. Without
structuring activity of consciousness the world exists as an in
terminate totality, an awesome undifferentiated whole. At
root of the chestnut tree, [this] World, the naked World s
denly [reveals] itself (p. 134) to Roquentin. With his previ
experiences pushing him toward it, Roquentin finally becom
formally aware of the true nature of existence. He recogni
that the order and purpose he took to be reality is instead a c
struct consciousness places upon it. Rather than relish the tr
that is revealed, Roquentin states, I hated this ignoble me
[Existence] mounting up, mounting up as high as the sky, fill
everything with its gelatinous slither . . . I choked with r
at this gross, absurd being (p. 134). Nauseated at the sigh
existences true nature, Roquentin describes existence a
messy suffering (p. 174) that both disgusts him and makes h
afraid (p. 160).

Authenticity: Our Aversion to It and an

A rgument for It

In both The Matrix and Nausea, the main characters come to

awareness of the true nature of the human condition. As th
illustrate, this awareness is unpleasant and met with resista
largely because the truth it reveals is terrifying. Morph
acknowledges the burden of authenticity when he tells Neo
didnt say it would be easy, I just said it would be the truth.
see the desire to escape this burden evidenced not only

cination with his virtual woman in red and Neos nosta

the noodle shop when he first re-enters the Matrix.
Importantly, both The Matrix and Nausea illustra
authenticity is difficult not only because the truth it rev
hard to stomach, but also because inauthenticity is the
Existentialists agree that most people are inauthentic
attribute the prevalence of inauthenticity both to psycho
resistance and social indoctrination. As Roquentins and
experiences make evident, the true nature of reality is n
essarily something humans want to see. Rather, existenc
tains numerous phenomena that we would prefer to
Death, suffering, and meaninglessness are three obvious
ples. Most people have difficulty accepting these aspects
tence. However, authenticity entails accepting all asp
reality, not just those with which we are comfo
Existentialists assert that inauthenticity is pervasive becaus
people do not want to know the hard truths of exi
Instead, people prefer to comfort themselves with a vas
of lies about life. These lies range in size from major me
ical fibs to the tiny tales we tell ourselves, but they are
we want to hear. As The Matrix illustrates, instead of asp
the Oracles injunction, Know thyself, most people pr
flee the facts and remain in a dreamworld of their ow
someone elsesdesign.
Like psychological resistance, social indoctrination is
erful deterrent to authenticity. As existentialists explain
people are so thoroughly conditioned to believe that the
is the way they have been taught to see it that they res
alternative. This indoctrination, and the resistance to ch
encourages, makes becoming authentic more unlikely by
it alienating and making it appear as a movement into m
The prevalence of inauthenticity makes moving
authenticity alienating primarily because it requires the i
ual who is becoming authentic to accept an understand
things that is at odds with that of the majority. As Morpheu
cates, most people are not ready to be unplugged. Mo
ple are not ready for authenticity because they have
conditioned to accept, and are not psychologically re
relinquish, the comfortable illusions they have about l
that they share with others. Consequently, most peop

seems to be moving toward it. This resistance is evident in

antagonistic treatment of Roquentin in Nausea as well as in
characterization of unfreed individuals in The Matrix as ha
ware that will actively subvert efforts at revolution.
Roquentin states, it is so important [for most people] to th
the same things all together (p. 8). Because of the pervas
ness of inauthenticity, the person who moves toward an hon
awareness of the human condition loses the support of oth
precisely when she needs it most. Indeed, the seemingly ub
uitous desire to be like others and the social prohibitions aga
deviant behavior are sufficient to keep most people from e
achieving authenticity.
In addition to disclosing a burdensome truth and compel
social estrangement, the transition to authenticity also tends
appear as a movement toward, and elicit feelings of, madn
Certainly Neo suffers feelings of madness. Arguably, Sart
character Roquentin illustrates this effect even more clea
Repeatedly, Roquentin questions his sanity. After his experie
with the pebble, he speculates that he might be insane (p.
Similarly, after a dizzying array of dissociative experien
Roquentin concludes that others are likely to place him in
crazy loon category (p. 64). As Roquentin demonstrates,
movement toward authenticity both represents, and is exp
enced as, a movement toward insanity because the understa
ing achieved in authenticity transcends what has b
established as normal. Consequently, the individual w
approaches or achieves authenticity not only appears mad
others, it is likely that she feels crazy herself.
Given what has been said about authenticity, its hard to
why anyone would want to achieve it. As the existentia
admit, achieving authenticity entails not only accepting that
world has no intrinsic order or purpose, but also that we
fragile and finite creatures who bear complete responsibility
ourselves and the meanings we create. Given the burden of
awareness and the feelings of estrangement and insanity it
cause, it is easy to see why individuals prefer to remain ignor
of the nature of the human condition and insulated from
truth.
Though inauthenticity does seem to have some nota
advantages over authenticity, the latter is still preferable. Th

does alleviate anxiety, it does not eradicate it. For existe

such as Sartre, Camus, and Heidegger, anxiety issues fr
nature of our being. Thus, the only possible way to er
anxiety is to annihilate ourselves. This hardly seems a de
option. After all, if death marks our end, then we will
around to appreciate the eradication of anxiety that it
According to Sartre, Camus, and Heidegger, anxiety
inescapable aspect of our being. It is part of our being b
humans all have a sense of their constitution, a visceral c
for being that is rooted in an intuitive awareness of the
nature. Like the splinter in the mind that Morpheus de
Sartre, Camus, and Heidegger believe that we all have a
of the fragility and dependency of our nature that foste
ings of anxiety. Existentialists recognize that we can disg
or denythis awareness, but they assert that we
eradicate it. Inauthenticity is precisely this attempt to disg
repress what we know in our gut but do not want to a
our mind. When one lives inauthentically one covers o
true cause of ones ontological insecurity and attributes th
ing instead to some mundane cause. For example, ins
attributing the generalized anxiety we experience to ex
itself, we instead tend to attribute it to some localized
like work, another person, or the lack of a particular ob
status. We do this largely because attributing ontological
rity to a mundane source gives us the impression that th
curity can be controlled or even eradicated. We figure if
the job, or get the right car, our insecurities and dissatisf
will be eliminated. However, since inauthenticity repre
flight . . . from [oneself] (Being and Time, p. 172) and w
not escape what we are, an inauthentic life is characteri
a certain desperate fervency and perpetual effort. Whet
want to admit it or not, most of us are familiar with this
ous cycle. Sadly, because of its internal dynamic, inau
individuals exist on the run from their being while at th
refusing to acknowledge the actual cause of their flight.
In addition to failing to eradicate anxiety and necessit
sort of life on the run, living inauthentically also has th
ative consequence of limiting an individuals freedom. A
tentialists explain, when one lives inauthentically one
over not only the true nature of the world, but also th

themselves in a situation they did not choose, they are free

determine themselves within that situation. Because this fr
dom is frightening, individuals often seek to deny it. Individu
who live inauthentically live in denial of their freedo
Consequently, they live without a genuine awareness of th
own possibility. Individuals who are inauthentic do not ad
the true extent of their choice. For example, instead of embr
ing the opportunity they have to create themselves, they inst
adopt predetermined identities. They slip into roles that w
dictated to them rather than crafted by them. Ultimately, in
thentic individuals cannot make genuinely informed
autonomous choices because they refuse to be honest about
actual state of affairs and because they make choices that are
keeping with their determined roles, rather than choosing
themselves. By removing responsibility, living inauthentic
gives individuals some comfort. However, it does so at
expense of individual autonomy.
Though authenticity entails that one accept some disturb
facts, unlike inauthenticity, it lets one live honestly. Given
impossibility of actualizing ones potential and making inform
choices in a state of inauthenticity, authenticity seems eminen
preferable to living a lie. While the move to authenticity disru
ones conventional understanding and forces one to dispe
with certain illusions about the world, it need not induce m
ness. Instead, by allowing one to admit the nature of existe
and the true cause of ones concern, becoming authentic
only creates a situation where genuine choices can be made
also can compel a unique sort of serenity and existential app
ciation. Sartre illustrates this when, despite the initial horror
his experiences, Roquentin comes to the awareness that e
tence is a perfect free gift (Nausea, p. 131) and a fulln
which man can never abandon (p. 133). Indeed, by the end
the novel, existence has been transformed from something t
arouses disgust to something bordering on the delicious wh
Roquentin describes it as dense, heavy, and sweet (p. 13).
Sartre illustrates, when Roquentin finally admits the true nat
of existence, his nausea lessens. It transforms from a stifli
insipid idea (p. 5) which makes him sick into a poignanta
bearableappreciation of the human condition and the burd
it brings (p. 157). When he accepts the true nature of existen

experience that constitutes the bulk of the novel en

Roquentin commits himself to the arduous and unglam
task of existing day by day without justification and w
excuse (Being and Nothingness, p. 78). Despite the dis
picture it paints, The Matrix also ends on a positive
Though seeing the true nature of reality initially affects
much the same way it does Roquentin, he too overcom
nausea and seizes the grand opportunity that existence
sents. Indeed, at the end of the film, it appears that
poised not only to forge his own future, but also to lead h
ity out of its oppression.
As Roquentin and Neo illustrate, the insights that aut
ity brings are only unbearable as long as we resist them. T
existence may not be everything we want, it is only
whelming if we insist that it be something other than it is
lets go of these expectations, one can see things as th
Only at this point can one fully appreciate and make use
remarkable gift of existence. While authenticity may no
form to our conventional definition of bliss, living authe
affords individuals a unique serenity because it ends th
dening run from our being that characterizes inauthent
represents an opening up to ourselves and an accepta
what is. Though the truth of existence may be sobering,
we have and all we are. Regardless of its attraction, if Hei
is right and our being is time and our time is finite, then it
be madness to waste ones timeand thus ones being
inauthentically. Either way, as Neo reminds us, the futur
to us. Take the red pill.6

6
Special thanks to those who attended my presentation at the Inte
Conference on Madness and Bliss in Literature and the Visual Arts (2
to Dr. Peter Fosl and the students at Transylvania University. I am gr
these individuals for the commentary they provided on the two lectu
which this chapter is based. Their comments and criticisms were of gr
tance in the preparation of this chapter.

The Paradox of Real

Response to Neo-Fiction
SARAH E. WORTH

The Matrix is one of a burgeoning genre of films, philosoph

in nature, that specifically question the way we understa
and function in reality. This is clearly a theme Hollywood
beginning to take more seriously. The Matrix, Fight Cl
eXistenZ, and The Thirteenth Floor (all released in 1999) d
with the unreliable distinction between appearance and rea
and the possibility that there are different levels or versio
of reality. These movies come out of a tradition of films such
Brazil (1985), Total Recall (1990), Lawnmower Man (199
Lawnmower Man 2: Beyond Cyberspace (1996), and even
more recent Truman Show (1998).
The Matrix suggests that the real reality is much worse th
the illusion we live in (though we are too unenlightened
know it), and Fight Club suggests that underdeveloped a
undernourished aspects of our personalities can take on a life
their ownand do quite a bit of damage. The Thirteenth Fl
and eXistenZ delve into different kinds of questions about
ferent levels of virtual reality and whether we can ever kn
that the reality we are in at any given time is the real one. Al
these films, except for eXistenZ,1 assume that there is some s
1

It could be argued, in the case of eXistenZ, that by the end of the

Cronenburg throws into question the very idea that there is a firm way of
tinguishing between reality, virtual realities, and fiction.

178

reality we would be able to identify it; and that this

should function as something we strive for.
Earlier than all of these films was Star Treks Ho
where the fortunate members of the Starship Enterpris
able to cross the barrier from being an observer of fic
being an active participant, experiencing in a very re
what it is like to enter into a fictional space and to i
within the fiction in a meaningful way. One of the mos
pelling features of the Holodeck (for the viewers, not th
ticipants) was that the program, on occasion, would ge
or freeze and the real player would get caught in th
tional story. Thus the question of what was truly real cam
question in an important way, since if the player could
the program to work then he or she was going to be stu
manently in another worlda false worldfrom whic
had come. In a significant way, this is the problem all o
movies present to their viewers. That is, we watch as Neo
gles with understanding two different worlds (represen
his choice of the red and blue pills) but at the same tim
as viewers, are choosing for ourselves the world represen
the red pill (Choose the red pill and you will s
Wonderland) as we engage ourselves in the fictional sp
film creates for us. The more we lose ourselves in the
the further we choose to enter this altered reality in a w
chologically similar to the way Neo entered his new real
inhabitants of the Starship Enterprise enter the Ho
Douglas Hall and Jane Fuller enter simulated worlds
Thirteenth Floor, or the way Allegra Gellar and Ted Piku
the simulated game world of eXistenZ.

Questioning Reality

Questions about the difference between appearance and

with their venerable Platonic and Cartesian sanction, will
be compelling. Let us, however, focus on a different,
related set of questions. How do we, as spectators, intera
the film itself and how does this parallel the kinds of qu
the characters face in the film? How is it that we can get
up in a fiction in a way similar to that in which the cha

that they experience? What this ultimately comes down to is

question: Why is it that we have emotional responses to fict
when we know what is happening isnt real?
Narrative is the important aspect of communicating the
of a story. I can say in a conversation that I had a dream o
very different reality, but an extended narrative will commu
cate a more detailed meaning of the event and is likely to p
duce a more emotional response in the listener. A listener w
get the gist of the story and the setting in a detailed narra
but will get only the facts from my report that the event to
place. Thus, we can take into account all kinds of storiesd
umentaries (fact), docudramas (based on fact), historical ficti
(fiction based on historical fact), and loosely defined fiction (
kind of made up story). The important thing to remembe
that we respond emotionally to all of thesewhether we kn
them to be true or not. We respond to fiction, knowing it to
a fiction, and we respond even more strongly to vivid a
expressive narrative descriptions. We are attracted to ficti
because we enjoy the ways that we respond to them. We g
erally respond more fully when the story is superior, that
when the narrative is better developed. To better understa
our responses we need some further explanation of the re
tionship between fictions, our beliefs about them, and
responses to them.

Why Respond to Fiction?

Our responses to fiction produce a complicated set of proble

First of all, what is included under the heading of representat
or fiction would incorporate everything from literature to TV
big-screen film to virtual-reality games. The problem is
entirely that the story is fictional or that it is false, but that i
a re-presentation of a storytrue or otherwise. Why do we p
posely experience thingsand enjoy these experienceswh
we know are not real? This is generally known as the parad
of fiction. The paradox can be constructed as follows:

(1) We only respond emotively to things that we believe

be real,

(3) We respond emotionally to fiction.2

To explain the first part of this, logically, it wouldn

that I would have an emotional response to a story you to
if I knew beforehand that it wasnt truefor example,
were to say, What I am about to tell you isnt true an
continue by saying, I have a good friend who was so dis
over a romantic relationship that she threw herself in fro
train. Logically and practically there would be no reason
to be concerned at all about your friend or for me to ha
sort of emotional response to your story. But we do hav
tional responses to fictional and false stories all the time
All sorts of answers are often given as explanations as
we do have these responses. Answers range from sugg
that there is a willing suspension of disbelief (first pr
by Samuel Taylor Coleridge) to claims that any sort of em
for the characters can produce an emotional response
viewer or reader.3 Since I do not find any of these conv
what I would like to suggest is that the way we empathi
fictional characters has more to do with the way the story
than any real distinction between a true reality and som
manufactured or simulated reality or that it has anything
with a willing suspension of disbelief. Whether it is the
The Truman Show, a virtual reality world, or the reality pr
Neo in The Matrix, when the observer becomes emo
involved, it is because of the story.
Part of the problem is that we dont believe that what
watching is true. This is the key component that makes
paradox. At first, Neo did not believe that what he foun
he took the red pill could be what was truly real until th
2

The paradox of fiction is a general category, two subcategories o

would be the paradox of tragedy (How can we derive aesthetic pleas
tragedy?) and the paradox of horror (Why do we enjoy horror when
sented through representation?).
3
Jerrold Levinson does an excellent job of explaining the competing
See his Emotion in Response to Art: A Survey of the Terrain, in Me
and Sue Laver, eds., Emotion and the Arts (Oxford: Oxford Universi
1997), pp. 2034.

for a long time, he continued to question different aspects

what this new reality had to provide. So what we believe ab
what is real and what isnt determines how psychologically a
emotionally connected we become to a particular story. A be
of one kind or another is not going to provide a sufficient p
adigm for us to talk of justified or genuine emotions when
technology has changed the nature of the fictions that we ex
rience to the degree that it has. The Blair Witch Project aside,
believe when we are watching a movie that what is happ
ing isnt real, isnt really happening. But the technology, es
cially with the technology provided by IMAX films, which h
more of an effect on our senses than a traditional film, and ev
the award-winning special effects in The Matrix, seems to ge
caught up in the film in ways that go well beyond our sim
belief that what we are seeing isnt really happening. The po
doesnt seem to be that we dont believe what is happening
real, but rather that the way the story is told (and now the s
cial effects which influence the realness of the way the stor
told) seems to be more influential over how we respond to
story.
Some of the new fictional media even threaten to blur
line between the real and fictional worlds that we experienc
some of it may have even made that line irrelevant. That is,
have not come to any conclusions as to whether or not we
able, imaginatively, to enter into fictional spaces in the sa
way that Neo enters the Matrix. And as Neo is told repeated
you cant be told what the Matrix is, you have to see it yo
self. Neo has to choose the red pill in order to experience
very different reality for himself. This is similar to the fact th
will never have the same experience or emotional respo
when someone tells me about a movie or a novel as when I
it or experience it for myself. Is it even possible that we,
viewers, could have the same sort of access to our fictio
spaces that Neo had while he was in the desert of the r
Kendall Walton suggests that we experience fictions psychol
ically, in similar ways as children do physically when they p
their games of make-believe.4 That would imply, however, t
4

See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Oxford: Oxford Unive

Press, 1990).

relevantly similar to the way Neo enters the reality tha

Matrix. Although we do not physically enter into another
being able to explain the resulting emotional effects by
that it is a cognitively similar experience would relieve us
burden of explaining why we respond to things we belie
to be real. That is, if the experiences are cognitively sim
belief in the reality of or the clear distinction between
and unreal becomes not just blurred but irrelevant.
Dont misunderstand however. It is clear that we do n
to believe what is going on in the film in order to be affe
it. In fact, we cannot believe what is happening if we
have an emotionally appropriate (aesthetic) response.
especially true when it comes to tragedy or horror.5 Ge
we are not amused by others tragic lives nor do we deriv
sure out of watching people chased, stalked, or murder
in the context of a fiction, we often enjoy these things. W
enjoy them, however, only if we do not believe they ar
pening. We can enjoy watching Neo fighting Morpheu
Neo has learned through a programmed computer simula
a combination of martial arts, only if we know that nei
them is really being hurt. This goes even further with th
of special effects that The Matrix employs, since what the
sees is what it would be like if time slowed down o
stopped. Since we know that this cant happen, or it at le
part of our experience, we can still allow it to influen
response to the movie. (The bounds of these situations a
being stretched by the media with a new genre of voy
television shows like Survivor, Real World, and Big Broth
may even get to the point where we do want to know t
sentation is real in order to derive aesthetic pleasure ou

We Enter with Alice

The Matrix makes a number of clever and important refe

to Alice in Wonderland. Alice had many of the same pr
in facing her strange new reality as did Neo. From th
5

See Nol Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Hea

York: Routledge, 1990), and Peter Lamarque, How Can We Pity a
Fictions? British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (1981), pp. 291304.

rabbit hole) was told to follow the White Rabbit (tattoo), wh

ultimately led him to the true reality. Once Neo arriv
Morpheus said to him, I imagine right now you are feeling a
like Alicetumbling down the rabbit hole. These explicit
erences make it clear that the kind of experiences the creat
of the film were allowing Neo to have are parallel to the ex
riences that the viewers have of the film. As viewers, we wa
and become increasingly more involved in the new reality t
Neo experiences and we acclimate to the different reality at
same time Neo does. Since Alice in Wonderland is a fiction
are nearly all familiar with, we are taken (the viewers of the f
and Neo at the same time) into a new wonderland of our ow
When we enter into a fictional world, or let the fictio
world enter into our imaginations, we do not willingly suspe
our disbelief. Coleridge aside, we cannot willingly decide
believe or disbelieve anything, any more than we can willin
believe it is snowing outside if all visual or sensory cues tell
otherwise. When engaging with fiction we do not suspend
critical faculty, but rather exercise a creative faculty. We do
actively suspend disbeliefwe actively create belief. As we le
to enter into fictional spaces (and I do believe this is someth
that we have to learn and that requires skills we must prac
and develop6) we desire more and more to experience the n
space more fully. We want to immerse ourselves in the n
world, just as Neo begins to immerse himself in the real wo
outside the Matrix. To do this we can focus our attention on
enveloping world and use our creative faculties to reinforce
reality of the experience, rather than to question it.
How does technologically sophisticated fiction, more a
more like real events, produce emotive responses? Some arg
that we have to understand the way emotions work in respo

This claim might seemingly be questioned because of the fact that child
seem to do this with relative ease. Children do not have to train to play ga
of make-believe and they seem to become fully and easily absorbed in
tional and imaginary worlds of their own making. It would seem, howe
that as Walton argues, adults are psychologically engaged in fictional exp
ences in similar ways as children are physically in their games of m
believe. Although children do this quite naturally, training to do this as ad
seems to be something that we have to re-learn.

to fiction. This may not be the way to go, however, as it

that the belief requirement that is missing from our inter
with fictional situations does not prohibit us from prof
similar experiences physically and phenomenologically
feel the same and have relevantly similar emotional resp
why cannot the experience be said to be real? In many
can, but we are now getting into an area where fictional
and real spaces overlap and even unite. In the same w
two worlds in The Matrix begin to overlap and unite.
point, after Neo has been shaved and placed in his new
Morpheus takes him into an all white room. Neo is surpr
find that he is dressed the way that he would have been
Morpheus explains to him that this is his residual selfand that it is the physical image of your digital self. Ne
self-image crosses over from one world to the next. Si
Cypher cant seem to give up the taste and texture of stea
though he knows it isnt real. Our knowledge of what
and what isnt real doesnt necessarily change the w
behave or respond to these things. We may have to face th
sibility that the line that divides appearance and reality
Matrix and in our own lives) is not as clear as we once t
it to be. We may even need to actively make that line dis
in order to make sense of our interactions with fictions.

The Importance of Story-telling

In reality, we make judgments about people and sit

without having full information all the timewe must
just to be practical, since the time it would take to gather
information we assume would be prohibitive to living ou
We fill in the gaps of knowledge with guesses and prejud
our own. Thus, reality may not be as real as we tend t
of it, since we do a fair amount of the construction on ou
We do the same with fiction, as we assume those we read
have had relevantly similar human lives, that they func
flesh and blood humans unless otherwise noted, and we
that they live in a world that works physically in the sam
as does ours. In both cases, in reality and with fiction,
given a skeleton structure of what is happening, and we u
imaginations to fill in the details. With fiction, the struc

information. In reality, on the other hand, the information

use as a basis to construct a coherent understanding of a sit
tion is not given to us in a carefully constructed way. Rather,
pick up certain details and make a comprehensible story of
own, using our own prejudices and biases, working necessa
from our own perspective, which is determined largely by
culture. If this is the case and we do have to create and fil
significant parts of our own realities, we are in a sense, mak
up our own storiesand these stories are our lives. Ro
Schank explains in his book on narrative and intelligence th

We need to tell someone else a story that describes our experie

because the process of creating the story also creates the mem
structure that will contain the gist of the story for the rest of
lives. Talking is remembering . . . But telling a story isnt rehear
it is creation. The act of creating is a memorable experience
itself.7

We create meaning and memory through the hearing a

telling of stories. Thus reality is more like fiction in terms
story creation than we originally thought, and the question
whether or not we must have a belief requirement in order
have a justified emotion seems now to be misguided.
Even if we do create our own stories to be reality (or
realities as stories) we still have a belief component miss
from our assessment when we experience fictional simulatio
If I believe that I am walking across the street, whether the c
are fictional or not, I am able to assess that I am in some m
tal danger if I stay too long. If I make this assessment while pl
ing a virtual reality game, I am not physically in any dang
Understanding how narrative undermines the distinct
between reality and fiction does, however, make the parad
disappear in a certain sense. That is, the problem that
respond differently to fiction and reality no longer ho
because the distinction between them has changed. If we
the fiction-reality distinction aside and look to what it is t

Roger Schank, Tell Me a Story: Narrative and Intelligence (Evans

Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 115.

hend narrative, we can begin to work with a more unified

lem, one that will not always, ultimately, lead us to a pa

Experiencing Neos Narrative

I am not suggesting that fiction and reality are the same o

that they are at times indistinguishable. There is a clear
tion between the epistemological (knowing what is real) a
ontological (the existence of things as they are) that will
differentiate those for us. But what I am suggesting is a
stronger emphasis on how we make sense of both
through narrative and story-telling. The way the story is
how it is that we create the story and make sense of it
lar for both fiction and reality. If it is the narrative that
ultimately responding to, then it does not matter how w
strue the emotions to work in response to real experienc
fictional onesthis is a false dichotomy that will conti
leave us in a paradox.
Further, if it is the narrative that we respond to, and t
ratives are getting better or at least more vivid through t
logical developments, then it would make sense that w
increasingly stronger affective responses, even thou
know what we see or experience is not real. With t
rent state of the technology, especially with the kinds of
effects The Matrix provides, we are able to more fully
ence both worlds and respond emotively to both. By mov
focus of the debate away from the belief requirement
for justified emotions and understanding the role of
more fully we can connect the divergent spaces of the re
the representational. We can further see how it is that w
tion in similar ways to the characters in The Matrix. Neo
riences a new reality as we experience it along with
parallel ways we never before imagined.

Real Genre and

Virtual Philosophy
DEBORAH KNIGHT and GEORGE MCKNIGHT

In this essay, we look at The Matrix as an example of a mix

genre film and consider how it engages a range of issues
philosophy. The Hollywood cinema has, historically, be
deeply rooted in genre, and The Matrix repays examination
a genre film. But right away we must dispel a common misc
ception. While genre films inevitably rely on a range of famil
recognizable, and recurring features and motifs, it would b
misconception to think that, just because a film is genre, i
a no-frills, standardized narrative, lacking originality and unw
thy of critical examination. Since most of the great films of
Hollywood cinema are genre films, such a conclusion wo
obviously be wrongheaded. We should also identify a comm
misunderstanding. Through much of the history of genre c
cismthough certainly not in actual filmmakingfilm gen
have been treated as uniquely identifiable, reasonably homo
neous categories, and genre films have been treated as belo
ing wholly to one genre or another. Since at least the mid-197
what has always been true about genre films has become qu
explicitnamely, that the very idea of a pure genre form i
theorists fiction. Rather, the mixing of elements in genre film
the norm, not the exception.1
1

Important recent work on genre films includes Rick Altman, Film/Ge

(London: British Film Institute, 1999), and Steve Neale, Genre and Hollyw
(London: Routledge, 2000).

188

ment is that, by considering the particular elements tha

up the mix, we can find the narrative roots of The Matrix
obviously philosophical themes. And The Matrix certainly
fair share of philosophical thematics and allusions. It allu
core issues from metaphysics and epistemology such
nature of truth and belief, the distinction between appe
and reality, as well as the possibilities and limits of know
What, for instance, counts as a justifiable true belief in a
world? The Matrix alludes to central themes from ethi
moral philosophy, such as the question whether our will
or whether in fact we are deterministically controlled by
outside ourselves. Philosophers will immediately note p
between The Matrix and such canonical texts as
Republic, especially the Allegory of the Cave, and Des
Meditations on First Philosophy, notably the Dream Hypo
And we should not forget the spiritual and religious al
which run from Nietzsches bermensch through Zen Bu
to apocalyptic Christianity, nor what The Matrix has to
about technology and science. Arguably, any properly
sophical consideration of The Matrix needs to recognize
going on at the level of genre in the film. When the film
inheritance is acknowledged, it becomes easier to see th
ary roots of its dominant philosophical motifs, and
understand why, whatever philosophical questions th
alludes to, it does not propose philosophical answer
genre ones.

The Matrix and Genre Films

To think in genre terms about films and other narrative

think about overlapping inscriptions, conventions, and
paradigms. These overlaps cross-classify familiar textua
gories, potentially drawing on sources as diverse as thos
in The Matrix, for instance: medieval Romance literature,
of recognizable film genres, popular shoot em up
games, and even such contemporary cultural texts as Go
grunge fashion. Thinking in genre terms involves reco
how a particular genre film fits into a complex set of ind
historical, and communicative exchanges between pro
and consumers of genre fictions. To read a film in genr

expectations based on their previous engagement with sim

sorts of films. In the case of The Matrix, that might invo
such things as fan recognition of Keanu Reeves from Spe
(Jan de Bont, 1994) and Johnny Mnemonic (Robert Lon
1995), fondness for films with futuristic settingsfor insta
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982/1991)where humanity is
crisis, and familiarity with such contemporary cultural ma
festations as comic-book narratives and computer games.
assess a film in genre terms is to see how the thematic me
ings of various genres impact our understanding of the film
front of us. Perhaps the most important element for The Mat
is the audiences familiarity with essentially inscrutable ge
heroesa tradition that ranges from the Western through
science fiction and which Keanu Reeves has virtually perfec
in this film. If we approach the philosophical aspects of T
Matrix by way of the question of genre, we find that mos
what counts as philosophical is in fact already part of
films genre inheritance.
The broadest useful set of genre categories is wonderfully
out in Northrop Fryes classic The Anatomy of Criticism: Fo
Essays.2 They are Tragedy, Romance, Comedy, and Irony/Sat
The characteristics of these master genres are abstractions fr
a wide range of narratives. As abstractions, they track domin
narrative trajectories, focusing simultaneously on the intend
relationship between protagonists and audience, and the ov
all tone and teleology of the narrative. Tragedies concern p
tagonists who are superior in skills and knowledge to
members of their audience. For this reason, according to a
dition that dates back to Aristotle, we admire the tragic hero
heroine, and respond with fear and pity at his or her downf
The Romance, as a master genre, is a quest story, an attemp
discover something as crucial as ones identity or to save on
society from a fallen existence if not certain doom. The prot
onist of Romance undergoes a series of trials, through the cou
of which his or her true character is fully revealed. Perhaps
hardest genre to understand as a master genre is Comedy, giv

Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Prince

University Press, 1957).

something that makes us laugh. The master genre of Co

by contrast, concerns the integration of an outsider figure
community, and so involves the redemption of the qualit
initially marked the hero as other. The master ge
Irony/Satire identifies narratives where the audience is cle
a superior position to the protagonist, and where we
expect criticism of dominant social institutions.
Considered in terms of master genres, The Matrix is u
lematically a Romance. It is a quest narrative, and like so
quest narratives it combines three classic themes: the dis
initiation, and full self-realization of the true hero, the th
the rightful community, and the eventual romantic union
hero and heroine, which also symbolizes or at least sign
triumph of their community over the evil forces that had
ened it.
What The Matrix deliberately does not do is positio
easily into any single consensus genre or subgenre. Con
genres are the ones we talk about most easily when iden
movies. Familiar examples include: detective films, action
horror films, thrillers, science fiction, musicals, romantic
dies, Westerns, swashbucklers, war films, biopics, teenpi
many more. This is not to say that there is always a clear
ment in the critical literature about just how one dem
genres. Some genre theorists emphasize shared conve
iconographies, character types, and plotlines as the featu
distinguish one genre from another. Others note that not
res can actually be identified by, for instance, iconograp
iconography works for the gangster film but not for the
Some genres get their names from the response they w
elicit from their audiencefor instance, horrorwhile
get their names from the setting or location of their acti
example the Western, and still others get their names fro
most striking devices as opposed to their iconograp
instance the musical. Other theorists, such as Linda W
have reconfigured consensus genres by linking melodram
ror, and pornography within the term body genres wh
identifies by such categories as bodily excess, ecstasy,
sion, originary fantasy, and temporality of fantasy. For in
Williams explains the bodily excess in horror films in te
violence, while ecstasy is shown by ecstatic violence

sus genre categories in ways that both draw upon our fami
knowledge of genres such as the horror film and, in the case
The Matrix, confront us with the innovative structuring of
threat posed to Neo, the stylized body movement in slo
motion action sequences, not to mention the final seque
where Neos control over the threat of bodily violence is a fi
confirmation of his true role as Romance hero.

The Matrix as a Mixed-Genre Film

As any review of the film tells you, The Matrix draws upon
conventionalized features, structural elements, and thematics
a range of consensus genres and subgenres. Just how the mix
genre is described changes somewhat from critic to critic.
instance, Splicedonlines Rob Blackwelder (http://www.spl
donline.com/99reviews/matrix.html) calls The Matrix a virt
reality sci-fi thrillerthus distinguishing it from, for example
non-sci-fi virtual reality thriller such as Disclosure (Ba
Levinson, 1994). Andrew OHehir from salon.com draws att
tion to The Matrixs cinematic style which gives a European
cinema inflection to the movies many references, which inclu
the films of John Woo, the Alien series, the Terminator ser
and of course Blade Runner. OHehir adds that The Matrix
all of those films, as well as a video game, a primer on Z
Buddhism, and a parable of the Second Coming. This me
that The Matrix isnt just a mixed-genre film. In addition
employs a broadly mixed set of core thematics drawn from
various narrative sources.
Every genre narrative needs to establish a dynamic betwe
the familiar and the innovative. The Matrix solves this probl
through pastiche, that is, by reassembling features from vari
consensus genres and subgenres into one coherent storyli
This reassembling begins, in fact, at the level of its master gen
and works down through The Matrix to include its constitu
consensus genres as well as the subgenres that inform its sto

3
Linda Williams, Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess, in Barry K
Grant, ed., Film Genre Reader II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995),
140158.

invoked by consensus genres such as the action film,

fiction, and horror, along with a touch of the Western,
mention thematics which characterize subgenres such
innocent on the run thrillersince whatever else T
Anderson aka Neo is, he is an innocent on the runa
Hong Kong martial-arts action film, which gives The Ma
balletic fight sequences. The main features of these two k
genres contribute to the films suspense, not only ensuri
our hero is pursued by the Agents without fully underst
why they are after him, but at the same time providi
highly stylized mode of combat, mastery of which will e
ally confirm that Neo is the One after all. Added to the
genre, consensus genres, and subgenres, the two main s
ing elements of The Matrix are suspense (What is the
Neo, Morpheus, and Trinity?) and mystery (What is the M
The master genre of Romance gives The Matrix its
motif. It also establishes for us the idea of a fallen w
which the protagonist must struggle to save a threatene
munity that he did not initially realize he belongs to. P
the most characteristically American film genre, the W
also works from this basic Romance quest motif, in wh
outsider figure has to discover his ability to act for the b
social good of a community in order to defend it against
of evil. By referencing the Western, The Matrix continue
dition linking science fiction to this most mythologically
of American film genres, a connection already clearly
lished in Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977). Nevertheless
The Matrix does reference the Western, these referenc
fleeting. The showdown in the subway between Neo and
Smith is iconographically a direct descendant of the W
shootout, but Thomas Anderson is certainly not a
Western hero as embodied, for instance, by John
Rather, in the tradition of the Romance master genre, a
unlike Luke Skywalker, Neo is a neophyte, a beginner
one who must be trained to develop the skills whic
Western heroes have long since perfected. Neverthele
the great Western heroes before him and also like Luk
becomes deputized to the cause of justice and thu
become the force of law and order in a radically diso
dystopian society.

The Matrix is science fiction. The threat of a dystopian fut

world is a hallmark of the science-fiction genre, particula
when dealing with the effects of technology on human ident
Most genre films involve some sort of struggle between go
and evila narrative paradigm that links the Western to scie
fiction. Where science fiction goes the Western one better is
its depiction of the forces of evil as uncanny and unimagina
powerful.4 The contest between good and evilwhich u
mately pits Neo, Trinity, Morpheus, and their crew against
Matrix and its Agentsdepends upon still other familiar scien
fiction thematics, for instance the idea that human civilizat
has developed its technology to the point of destroying
earth, thus bringing down a plague of global proportions a
placing technological mastery in the hands of some non-hum
intelligence which in turn enslaves humanity both physic
and mentally.
These features drawn from science fiction combine to let
imagine a future world that evokes the sort of terror usu
associated with the horror film. Certainly the image of hum
imprisoned in gelatinous pods restates the longstanding c
nections between The Matrix and films that work at the cro
roads of science fiction and horrorpods being a motif t
runs back through various science-fiction and horror films,
instance Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Don Siegel, 19
Philip Kaufman, 1978). Further, this conjunction of science
tion and horror is exemplified by the confusion, at the core
The Matrix, between virtual reality and actuality. Many fi
have exploited the idea that the world of appearances
merely an elaborate illusion, but The Matrix develops
familiar theme through its portrayal of the virtual world wh
the pod people are programmed to experience. This virt
world is a human world not so very different from our own
one which emphasizes the coldest features of our contem
rary existence, from soulless megacorporations through
leather culture nightclub life to the disparity of wealth betwe
affluent urbanites and the social outcasts in the inner-city gh

4
Thomas Schatz, Old Hollywood/New Hollywood: Ritual, Art, and Indu
(Ann Arbor: UMI Research, 1983), p. 86.

Romance and the consensus genre of science fiction

seen in the nature of the Matrix itself: the Matrix is the
world, the metaphoric desert behind the illusion of
human society, the world where machine intelligenc
and God is dead. Indeed, in this virtual world, the Matri
origin of human life as we now understand it. With
Matrix, human life itself is both a perverse parody of th
of creation and an echo of the creation of life in horro
such as Frankenstein (James Whale, 1931). Thomas And
portrayed from the beginning as both an innocent and
someone already engaged on a quest to discover the m
of his existence, becomes our primary point of identif
and thus welike Neoare initiated by Morpheus in
truth of the Matrix.
The Matrix also exploits another favorite theme sha
both science-fiction films and horror films, namely the
of the violation and possession of the human body.
ideas are worked out in the Matrix through a variety of
including the bug that is implanted in Neo, the tor
Morpheus, the squiddy designed to search and destr
discovery that the apparent world is only a computer
ated virtual reality, and the revelation that the horrific
society holds humans captive as slaves within a virtua
tence. Neo himself is already something other than
human. It is striking that there are two classes of hum
The Matrix: those who are genuinely human, and thos
as Neo, Morpheus, Trinity, and the others whotha
being computer uploadablerepresent a new stage in
existence.
The most distinctive aspects of The Matrix are the co
tion between its visual style and the steady escalation of
engagement orchestrated through progressively more ela
and suspenseful action sequences. We can see this tw
focus on style and suspense running throughout the film
how The Matrix is shot and edited, through its use of s
to the Goth-grunge styles of the characters clothing, ey
and weapons, to its central characters buff and athlet
ies. There is reason to think that The Matrix presents us
victory of style over narrative substance. Not everyone
some critics, for example, celebrate the films more cereb

feature of science fiction is its focus on Big Questions such

What is the meaning of life? and What does it mean to
human? Our familiarity with sci-fi means we shouldnt be s
prised to find these sorts of questions raised by The Matrix
well. However, we should not assume that these Big Questi
are raised in a philosophically significant way. Nor should
assume that they get any philosophically significant answers
the film.
Treating popular entertainment fictions from a philosoph
perspective requires a certain delicacy. It is obviously just a m
ter of philosophical hubris to dismiss all so-called entertainm
narratives as unworthy of philosophical consideration. On
other hand, it is not easy to justify the philosophical conside
tion of all entertainment narratives. How, then, should
approach The Matrix? Over a quarter century ago, Peter Jon
in Philosophy and the Novel, made it clear that literary texts a
literary authors might raise points of philosophical interest w
out themselves being engaged in overtly philosophical
course.5 Joness point was that philosophers can always interp
a novel so as to draw out its philosophical thematics. Jon
examples come from the canon of world literatu
Middlemarch, Anna Karenina, The Brothers Karamazov, and
la Recherche du Temps Perdu. It may well seem as if The Mat
is crashing this canonical party. Still, in the first instance its h
to say why Joness idea shouldnt be applied to The Matrix.
treat The Matrix as Jones treats Middlemarch and the oth
would involve teasing out the important philosophical thema
from the film and offering them up for the sort of serious ph
sophical reflection that, for example, Jones uses to exam
such topics as knowledge and illusion in Prousts great clas
So it seems possible and perhaps even plausible that The Mat
in virtue of the philosophical themes it raises, should be trea
seriously by philosophers. However, the very things that m
The Matrix a splendid example of a mixed-genre film also ra
the question whether it should merit serious philosoph
examination. Let us look at those things now.

Peter Jones, Philosophy and the Novel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).

Genre Film

Given the plethora of consensus genres and their subgen

the attendant difficulties in producing anything like a tid
gorization or definition of any particular film genre, T
Sobchack, with Northrop Frye as a model, opts for the bo
of considering the fictional genre film as a single catego
includes all that is commonly held to be genre film.6 So
is, in effect, arguing that the differences between the W
and the swashbuckler, or between the biopic and the tee
and even between the Western and the biopicare small
the things that they share in common as genre films. Sob
move legitimates the idea that we should treat genres as
ently mixed, since to combine elements from any of the
ing stand-alone genres will in no way detract from th
genre features that connect these consensus genres
another. What distinguishes a genre film from a non-gen
First, genre films focus on a story, and not about somethi
matters outside the film (pp. 10203). Second, genr
always let us know who the hero is and who the villains
103). Third, Sobchack agrees that genre films are mime
like Northrop Frye he argues that what they imitate are
films, not real life (p. 104). Fourth, genre films are iden
by their compact sense of shapenamely, their plot. In
films, plot takes precedence over extended observational
about setting or psychology. In short, what happens . .
most importance, not why (p. 106). Fifth, characteriza
genre films is always done by a kind of narrative shortha
107). As Sobchack says, We know a character by what he
as opposed to what he says or does (p. 107). When So
wrote these words about costumes in 1975, he might no
fully appreciated how apposite the remark would b
respect to the action heroes of the late twentieth c
decked out as they are in designer fashions. But there i
to this fifth point than just a remark about clothes. So
6

Thomas Sobchack, Genre Film: A Classical Experience, in Film

Reader II, p. 102. Further page references to the Sobchack article a
parentheses in the text.

the most limited ways (p. 107). This is superlatively true of su

Matrix characters as Morpheus, Trinity, and the Agents, bu
just as true of Neo, who cannot change because he is
Romance hero, trained by a master, embarking on a journey
self-realization that will eventually bring him into mortal com
with the forces of evil. This is how genre films operate.
But just how should we understand the idea that Neo
engaged in a journey of self-realization? Not in the sense
self typically understood within philosophy of mind and p
chology. Protagonists like Neo do not have psychological de
or complexity. As Sobchack tellingly observes, genre charac
are fundamentally their exteriors, their constant set of rec
nizable traits (p. 108). Which is only to say, they are char
ters, and what they imitate is not actual human individuals
other comparable characters. Genre heroes are certainly
superior to us in what they can do; they may be limited as o
nary human beings, but they are unlimited as far as acti
They can do what we would like to be able to do. They
pinpoint the evil in their lives as resident in a monster or
lain, and they can go out and triumph over it (p. 108). The n
rative trajectory of The Matrix involves pinpointing where
liesnamely, in the Matrix itselfand training Neo so that
can emerge victorious from a sequence of escalating enco
ters with the Agents. So even if Neo isnt persuaded until v
late in The Matrix that he is the One, as competent consum
of genre fictions, we know full well that he must be. The m
ter is pre-established by genre convention. It has nothing to
with Neo as psychological personality, everything to do w
narrative patterns. Neo is the Romance hero in a science-fict
world, the innocent whose discovery by Morpheus and con
mation by the Oracle propels him forward through a series
combats that define and reveal his true powers, and his t
powers in turn reveal his identity as the One. Because he
novice, an initiate, Neo does undergo narrative transform
tionstransformations that are programmatic in the Roma
heros recognition of his self and rolebut these are not act
changes in terms of psychological reality. Neos narrative
jectory takes him from a position on the sidelines to a centr
committed position in the fight against the Matrix. Neo is no
much an individual psychology as a narrative paradig

fail to recognize their role and function in relation to t

of a genre narrative. If we recognize Neo as the Romanc
we know that in due course he will triumph over the
and the Matrix which they representperhaps not in th
but surely by the third sequel.

Philosophy and The Matrix

At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned that The

alludes to many traditional themes from metaphysics an
temology, moral theory, philosophy of religion, social an
ical philosophy, and the philosophy of science. Any good
film is likely to offer comparable allusions. Romantic com
for instance, tend to ask the question, What is the goo
Westerns share with the hard-boiled detective film the qu
What sort of individual does it take to ensure justice wit
community? Science fiction is the most likely genre to ra
question What does it mean to be human? Philosophic
sions are not limited to any one genre. Nor should we i
that every genre film asks such questions with the same
of seriousness.
When The Matrix opened in 1999, philosophers co
found talking to one another, either in university corrido
academic conferences, and they were telling each oth
same story. In any introductory philosophy course you c
name, after lecturing on, say, Platos Cave or Descartes
Meditation, students would either put up their hands in c
come up to you after the lecture and say: Its just like
Matrix. The Matrixs philosophical allusions are man
they are open enough to permit a range of philosophica
pretation and speculation. Students are quick to see p
between the illusory world experienced by the priso
Platos Cave and the humans trapped in pods by the
The prisoners, who have been raised from infancy in the
and cannot distinguish mere images from reality, are
rather like the humans held captive in pods, who imagi
they are computer programmers or cyberhackers. Stude
also quick to see that Neos initial bewilderment over w
or not it is all just a dream is comparable to Descartess
Hypothesis from his First Meditation. In both these case

anxiety, horror, and even terror, not philosophical reflection

When someone like Peter Jones argues that philosophers
legitimately interpret the philosophical themes of novels such
Anna Karenina, it is important to recognize that Joneslike
many other critics before and sinceis interested in thematic
organic narratives. The general idea is that the sorts of sto
that repay the serious attention given to them by someone l
Jonesor for that matter by someone like Matthew Arnold
F.R. Leavisdepend upon a holistic, centralized set of core t
matics. These are also novels which are thought to rew
reflective reading. If they reward reflective reading, it is beca
they systematically direct readers into the fictional world of
story. The Matrix, by contrast, directs viewers to establish c
nections outside the film to comparable narratives. Genre te
depend for their recognizability on their viewers familiarity w
other texts, other sets of conventions, other storylinesev
including philosophical themes and texts. So it is not hard
conclude that genre texts such as The Matrix are fundament
centrifugaltheir organizing principle depends upon our abi
to make connections to things outside the text at hand. At
same time, the primary narrative devices of a film such as T
Matrixaction, mystery, and suspensedo not allow view
to linger over philosophically interesting themes or motifs.
we conclude that The Matrix, because it is an exemplary mix
genre film, can only hope to use philosophical themes to trig
audience interest, but never intended to provide a forum for
solution of philosophical problems. In the meantime, T
Matrix does resolve its genre problems: Our hero is discover
he goes through a process of initiation, he at long last comes
trust his own powers, he survives the most serious confrontat
against his enemies, and he returns to claim his lady love. Th
themes are as old as narrative.
What we have attempted to show is that the philosoph
allusions found in The Matrix take their narrative significa
from the films genre inheritance, its position between its g
erning master genre of Romance and its particular mix of c
sensus genres and subgenres. What does it mean to
human? is a good question, but it is not one best answe
through the close examination of a genre protagonist, since
we have argued genre protagonists are not psychological in

and whose traits are unchanging. The Matrix raises quest

philosophical importance, but its objective isnt to provi
sort of philosophical argument or explication by way
answer. For these reasons, we conclude that The Ma
unquestionably an example of real genre, but only an in
of virtual philosophy.

Scene

De-Construct-In
The Matr

Penetrating Keanu:
New Holes, but the Same
Old Shit
CYNTHIA FREELAND

The Matrix and eXistenZ were released in the same year

and are often compared: both films take their characters t
layers of computer-generated illusions and reality. Here
to focus on a few key differences between the two movie
difference which interests me as a feminist philosopher
they adopt opposing pictures of the value of human fle
bodies. This is linked to a second difference, namely, th
tudes toward their viewers. On both counts I find eXisten
satisfying. Let me preview my points here.
As its heroes become more able to bypass limitat
physical reality, The Matrix creates a naive fantasy of ov
ing human flesh. The hero moves from being penetrate
connected to others, to being self-controlling and intact
immune to bullets. The Matrix reveals an adolescent fear
body as something that can veer out of control (somethi
of a real, changing, flesh-and-blood body). This fantas
geeky young males who yearn for autonomy and menta
ers. By contrast, vulnerable and connected bodies ar
grounded in eXistenZespecially for its hero. This film
scenes of penetration and biomorphic connection sho
bodies can be both delightful and disgusting. Bodies (and
too) can leave one transported, or damaged and bleedin
Because each film reflects on how virtual reality can
and mind-controlling, there are obvious ways they
address viewers engagement with the virtual reality of m

asks whether anything we have seen in the film is real. In c

trast, The Matrix ends with its savior hero freeing humans fr
our deceptive dreams. Although the film celebrates the libe
tion of human zombies from their spoon-fed visions, it iro
cally, and hypocritically, sucks viewers into its own virt
reality by offering an escapist fantasy fueled by knockout s
cial effects. I prefer the playful intelligence of the layers
games in eXistenZ.
The two themes I want to explore are connected. By co
paring virtual reality to the visions of a filmmaker, eXiste
questions the place of our real human (or other) bodies in re
tion to the seductive visions of contemporary movies. Si
eXistenZ confronts both its heroes and its viewers with the fl
in visceral, sometimes disgusting, forms, it does not feed f
tasies of mental escape from the body. I see this film as offer
a more intriguing vision of our potential as beings with b
brains and bodiesone that feminists can find more potenti
liberatory than that of The Matrix.

Bodies, Minds, Gender

The Matrix fetishizes a certain look in its stars. In the virt

world of the movie, the reality of their human flesh is cove
up in well-co-ordinated ensembles of sleek black leather
latex. By contrast, eXistenZ revels in the goo of flesh, gore, a
bloodof wetware. These differences are evident in the fil
parallel opening credit sequences. Both employ the metapho
wholes built up from informational bits. The bits in The Mat
are fragments of computer code, green letters and numb
glowing against a black screen. The bits in eXistenZ are am
phous puddles of pink, cream, and gold which vaguely evo
cellular structures seen under a microscope. The metaphor h
is biological not mechanical, analog not digital.
Many feminist philosophers have argued that western p
losophy has been an affair of men seeking mental escapes fr
their bodies, from the reality of flesh and blood.1 Such m

1
See Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Wes
Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) and Su

Augustine and Aquinas, hoping for their souls purity in h

and Descartes, establishing his identity as mind, not bod
part of this tradition also to draw sharp distinctions b
thinking and feeling. Men have traditionally been ass
with rationality and higher mental faculties, women w
body, emotions, and lower faculties like child-bearin
nurturance. This mentalistic bias is evident again
undoubtedly male perspective of The Matrix.
The differences in gender roles in the two films becom
when we focus on their male protagonists. The films star
todays hottest male heart-throbs, Keanu Reeves and Jud
These are not men with the macho allure of a Clark G
John Wayne. With his delicate eyelids, Keanu/Neo lo
pretty as a girl when we first see him sleeping. He h
fair skin (another character in the film even comments
whiteness), with no body hair. He moves gracefully,
dancer. Jude/Ted has sculpted cheekbones and enviab
lashes; his Cupids-bow lips make him seem pouty. Each
paired with a strong woman (or what seems like a
woman) who occasionally takes the lead in directing his
ments. At moments each is shown as vulnerable, unsure,
most importantlyas penetrated. These scenes of
penetration, or of the insertion of new holes into the male
are worth exploring.

Penetrating Keanu in The Matrix

The initial scene of penetration in The Matrix occurs wh

evil Agents of the machine-run illusion, the Matrix, catc
and interrogate him. Restraining him, they insert a t
device (a scorpion-type creature) through his navel, in a
and creepy operation. Later, before the heroine, Trinity, a
ers in the radical group resisting the Matrix take Neo t
their leader Morpheus, they remove the bug, in anothe
of violent penetration. They apply a gun-like scope to
navel to suck out the bug. He screams as they extract it.

Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and th

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

ing of the movie. After Neo chooses the truth pill offered
Morpheus, he has a horrifying vision of humans as they re
are. He sees countless naked bodies maintained artificially
fetal sacs by ugly bug-like machine nurses. Each person
penetrated by a complex array of tubes that presumably fee
and remove bodily wastes. Their hairless pink bodies look
gusting and vulnerable, penetrated by black coils and plugs.
Neo gapes in horror, a keeper bug prepares to flush him,
ping out the plugs and cords interlacing his body. In a birth p
ody Neo is dumped down a slimy tubepresumably to
liquefied.
Rescued, Neo appears in a kinder, gentler scene of pene
tion. Again we see Keanus nearly naked body displayed as
lies on a table. He is thoroughly penetrated now by gently w
ing acupuncture-style needles. The peacefulness and goodn
of this penetration are emphasized by religious-sounding cho
music on the soundtrack. Morpheus explains that Neo must
rebuilt because his muscles are atrophied from disuse. If o
we could all lie back in gentle sleep with needles toning
muscles!
In this movie, Neo is so special that he can learn thi
instantly, with almost no effort. (Physical things, that isit d
take the dim and naive Neo/Keanu some time to catch onto
insight that he is the One, the savior who will redeem
humanity by freeing them from the Matrix.) Knowledge a
skills are quickly transmitted to the clever, deserving, and go
looking members of Morpheuss little cell of revolutionaries
instant programming or uploading. This requires the insert
of a big plug into the back of a persons neck. So, in the n
scene of penetration there is more violence, and Neo is ob
ously frightened when the connector device is slammed into
hole at the back of his neck. Through simulated physical tra
ing Neo learns skills, with effort transferred to his real bo
leaving him tired or even sore. He learns quickly due to
psychokinetics: we barely see him break a sweat. Althou
obviously freaky, the neck-plugs are never again emphasi
and we see no other scenes of their insertion; rather, the gro
members simply lie back and we assume the plugs easily sl
in with no pain or violence. These are good plugs with go
penetration. They send people back into the Matrix with a n

ical laws, leaping incredible distances and fighting off sc

flat-footed policemen.
This leads to the final scene of penetration I want to d
Neos being pierced by bullets in his confrontations w
Agents. Despite being the One (or perhaps because of i
must suffer and even die. But he is resurrected, apparentl
Trinity (the Holy Spirit?) breathes life back into him by c
ing to his inert real body aboard the ship that she loves hi
that the Oracle has prophesied she will love the man who
Oneso that he cannot really be dead. Neo magically
to life with renewed confidence that even alarms his a
Agents. Earlier he displayed a remarkable ability to dod
lets; now he becomes impervious to them, and can eve
them in mid-air.
The allure of this new, savior Neo is that he is physica
fect and pristineno penetration. He operates like this
Matrix, which he can now see through. The Matrix is a
interactive simulation; obviously some simulations are
cial, since training uses them. Within all the simulation
Keanu is more handsome, with longer hair, no neck-bo
outfitted in the now-notorious long black overcoat. Eq
with all the guns he could ever need, he dodges Agents
This perfect, exciting, memorable Keanu/Neo is intact,
up, with no openings or flaws, no vulnerabilityin sho
no relationship to his actual physical flesh-and-blood bo
has superceded the physical reality of the flesh.
It hardly needs mentioning, but must be mentioned, t
character of Trinity (Carrie-Anne Moss) occupies a typic
servient female role in this movie. The film opens prom
with this little girl bravely confronting a gaggle of pol
and escaping. And when Neo meets her he is surprised (
guys, she says) to learn that this brilliant hacker is a g
after these opening gambits, Trinity assumes the role of s
female. She has a few scenes of skill, but we never s
famous hacker do anything meaningful at a computer ke
(she never examines the code of the Matrix, for exampl
is there to be the love interest for Neo and to support
important enterprise of salvation. She provides stereo
female nurturance and connectedness for the inexp
intact Neo. We see her bringing him food, watching, eve

Besides deferring to Neo, she serves under Big Dad

Morpheus, the typical patriarchal leader, who looks not to
but to his son-figure, Neo, as humanitys savior.
Trinity is also a babe who is here to provide sex appe
She is celebrated by fans for kicking butt, and she d
accompany Neo in rescuing Morpheus, where she kills her sh
of men; but obviously her main job is decorative. Carrie-An
looks damn sexy in skin-tight black latex and leather. Sure,
flies a helicopter, but even that gets messed up and she must
rescued by Neo. She is rewarded when they share a chaste k
at the end, but the film has zero eroticism; the only man w
shows any evidence of relishing sensual pleasures is Cyph
who is clearly evil.
The other important woman in the film is also stereotyp
The Oracle (Gloria Foster), a black woman with the insi
and wisdom of a tribal sage. She appears as a kind of sl
grandmother (dare I say Mammy?) dispensing fresh-bak
cookies along with her prophecies. Anybody who resists my
tique of the movies stereotypes should answer this questi
Why are there no female Agents in the Matrix? Even
machines are sexist here.

Penetrating Jude in eXistenZ

David Cronenberg, director of eXistenZ, has often depicted

beat distortions of the male body, as with the decaying scien
in his best-known film The Fly. Cronenbergs movies have hi
lighted deviant sexuality and even invaginations, as wh
the hero of Videodrome develops an abdominal aperture i
which videocassettes are inserted. Some of his movies br
down strict mind-body dualism, like Scanners with its telepat
hero. Cronenberg is interested in what he calls the New Fles
a vision of new bodies with new orifices, new sexual orga
2

The proliferation of fan websites is an indicator of this role. One site s

Latex, firepower, and the ability to climb walls in slow motion. Man, does
gal have it all or what . . . ? Im curious as to if they can get her outfit
tighter. Unidentified, website at http://members.tripod.com/twptra
id40.htm. (Carrie-Anne Moss plays a similar role opposite Val Kilmer in
Planet [2000].)

ject in eXistenZ. By comparison, The Matrix seems boring

ist with its same old set of characters: male hero aided by
female partner, kind maternal advisor, and strong father
In eXistenZ, Jude Law plays Ted Pikul, a neophyte in
tual games industry who attends the test demo of a new
by brilliant designer, Allegra Geller (Jennifer Jason Leigh
an audience member tries to assassinate Allegra an
escapes with her, she mistakes him for her security gua
then wonders aloud why she has been stuck instead with
nerd. This image of Jude as PR-nerd contrasts sharp
Keanu as hacker and black-clad warrior in The Matrix. eX
undermines standard sex-role stereotyping by makin
woman the computer whiz and decision-maker, while th
is often frightened and insecure. These gender realignme
be explored by examining some key scenes of penetra
this movie.
Unusually, Ted/Jude has never been fitted with a biop
opening in a humans lower spine that enables one to pl
virtual reality games run on MetaFlesh game pods.
pods, constructed from synthesized amphibian parts with
ified DNA, are connected to humans by plugging fleshy-l
umbycords into their bioports. The first scene of pene
involves Teds being fitted with his bioport. His feminin
is evident as a kind of hysteria. Resisting surgery, Ted con
I have this phobia about having my body penetrated [. .
. . .] surgically. He gets fitted with a black market biopo
scene laden with homoerotic innuendo. Gas (Willem
applies a huge gun-like structure to Teds rear. As th
bends over, Gas comments, One thing you dont wann
miss with the stud finder. Teds implied feminizat
extended when Allegra immediately plugs a cord into Ted
hole while he is still immobilized by anesthetic.

3
Cronenberg explains that with New Flesh, [Y]ou can actually chan
it means to be a human being in a physical way . . . Human beings cou
[sic] sexual organs, or do without sexual organs . . . for procreation
distinction between male and female would diminish, and perhaps w
become less polarized and more integrated creatures. Chris Rod
Cronenberg on Cronenberg (London: Faber and Faber, revised editio
pp. 8082.

Matrix, where Neo/Keanu moves from a bad, dirty state

being full of plugs to a clean, good state of physical intactne
Instead, eXistenZ revels in scenes that show the penetration
game ports by game pods as a sensual, if messy and risky, ph
ical business. Port penetration and pleasure are closely t
through the movies imagery to other normal physical proces
like eating and sex. The erotic dimensions of gaming and pl
ging in are highlighted in several scenes. Once when Ted ins
a mini-pod into Allegras back, he begins licking her bioport.
reciprocal passivity is emphasized in a few minutes: A
Allegra unzips his pants, Ted wails, Im very worried about
body . . . I feel really vulnerable.
These links between virtual game addiction and sex
urges are emphasized when Allegra experiences a compuls
to port into a diseased game pod. As the pod writhes and tu
black, Allegra quickly becomes ill and infected. Desperate, T
cuts her umbycord, but she starts to gush blood as he looks
helplessly. This scene drives home the point that like act
sex, the eroticism of games is risky. Connecting with a
opening up both your mind and your body to others can
lethal.
eXistenZ evokes the fleshy physicality of virtual game arc
tecture with many scenes that plunge us into the gooey in
workings of the pods. When Allegras pod is fixed in a rep
shop, the operation resembles open-heart surgery. Other sce
show the grim workings of a pod assembly plant for the f
Cortical Systematics. Ted finds himself skillfully slitting op
frog bellies, which burst with gushing blood, to retrieve
sacs, packaging and labeling them for distribution on the asse
bly line. The movies near-obsession with goo culminates i
restaurant scene where Ted and Allegra get served a dish m
of mutant amphibians. Here Teds penetration extends to
compulsive eating of the disgusting dish, in order to retriev
kind of gristle-gun that shoots human teeth as bullets. The c
trast with Neos clean, metallic guns and bullets could not
more stark.
Cronenberg says he had trouble casting the part of T
because to have a lead that is a woman means that when y
talk to many male stars they are reluctant to play in the f
. . . because they know they will be playing second fiddle

still. 4 The gender role reversal here is striking. Jude

putably a better actor than Keanu) plays his scenes with
ing relish, as wimpy, fussy, and hysterical. It is no wond
a mainly male adolescent audience would find nothing t
tify with here. And neither is Jennifer Jason Leighs Al
babe female hacker like Trinity. Allegra is pretty, sma
tough, but she is never subservient. Rather, she is wily an
petitive to the point of killing Ted and thus winning
own game.

Movies, Reality, and Illusion

Lets consider how the scenes of penetration I have re

are linked to the broader messages of their respective m
Both The Matrix and eXistenZ raise questions about
means to be seduced or deceived by artificial versions
ity. The illusions of the Matrix are created by a loathsom
of penetration. So the story is about an escape from
plugged in. Neo uses his mental insights to become free
taminating plugs and even bullet holes. At the end we s
flying, free of gravity, above other humans, as he dissol
Matrix and offers them release.
But at the end of eXistenZ, we feel unable to tell the
ence between reality and illusion, since we have learne
surprising coda, that the entire film we just watched wa
an illusion, the testing of a virtual game. Many aspects
outer game mimic the inner game, and so viewers mig
be perplexed about what was real and what an illusio
confusion is epitomized when one frightened characte
Tell me, are we still in the game?
These different endings show the two movies strate
reflecting on the power of film as a medium to create ill
Ideally, to be consistent, The Matrix ought to enable view
recognize and reject the seductive illusions of movies in f

See Logic, Creativity, and (Critical) Misinterpretations: An Intervi

David Cronenberg, conducted by Xavier Mendik, in Michael Grant,
Modern Fantastic: The Films of David Cronenberg (Westport: Praege
pp. 17677.

opposite way. The movie celebrates not freedom from

Matrix, but the indulgence in exciting filmic simulations. I re
ize this is not what it is supposed to be celebrating. But reme
ber, things arent attractive in non-Matrix conditions aboard
ship: Everything is gray and worn-looking, people are cold a
eat goopy food. Unattractive, the crew have monk-like shav
heads, ragged clothes and (mostly) disfiguring neck-bolts. T
image of Keanu that fans no doubt relish is rather as he appe
in simulations: handsome, longer hair, no neck-bolt, black ov
coat, flying through the air. It is only in the simulations t
Keanu/Neo can display his awesome movement, speed, a
power to kill.
My point concerns which cinematic world is more entici
glamorous, and memorable: I contend it is the world of simu
tions. Fittingly, thats the world where we end, not on the s
where Neos allegedly real body resides in potential new c
nection with Trinity. Instead, we see handsome overcoated N
wandering among the masses in the Matrix, then zipping
through the sky, promising a world without rules and contr
without borders and boundaries, a world where anything is p
sible. His flying, like his words, suggests that humans need
be bound by their physical bodies. The movie feeds esca
fantasies of a mental reality where the elect few are unencu
bered by rules. (They certainly wont have to go to the office
work hard to learn new skills.) The vision the movie leaves
with is of Neo transcending physical reality, just like Superm
We viewers are urged to escape illusions, but hypocritically
by a film that works hard to seduce us with its own remarka
visions.
In contrast, the plot of eXistenZ, a tissue of games-within
game, asks us to think about whether illusory reality is pre
able to regular life. At the films end we learnor seem tot
Allegras victory over Ted in the game of eXistenZ was an i
sion that occurred in the demo run of yet another gam
transCendenZ. The characters of our movie emerge fr
eXistenZ to laugh and discuss their roles, commenting amo
other things on their ridiculous game accents. Suddenly we h
Jude talking in his normal British accent, not the flat Canad
accent he used earlier.

magic tricks to engage viewers in its illusory reality, eX

constantly alludes to game-playing as a metaphor for film
ing. This is brought out at the Country Gas Station whe
says to Allegra, I like your script, I want to be in it.
Allegra explains how different game authors weav
together in different waysmuch like film directors and
eXistenZ does not offer simplistic judgment about whethe
ging into games or movies is bad for us. So it avoids th
hypocrisy of The Matrix. Ted worries that game-playing in
an element of psychosis, but eXistenZ also shows the sh
of game-playing, as Ted learns when he pauses the game
that ordinary reality is boring by comparison. The Matrix
an ostensible aim of restoring human individuals to a re
their own creation, all the while sucking audiences into
ity it never admits is just a movie. eXistenZ is the opposit
tongue-in-cheek way, as it pokes holes in the allure of
it also gently reminds audiences that we enjoy fantasies b
we are bored with real life.
Professional philosophers might say that both of thes
offer amateur reflections on reality and illusion, with fre
philosophy student conundrums along the lines of What
a butterfly dreaming I am a man? Both movies offer w
about human dependence upon machines. But movie
associated DVDs, sound tracks, sequels, and websites, are
selves simulations we viewers become plugged into,
dependent upon, for our entertainment. Which movie e
ages more reflection on this dependency, along with a
honest and intriguing vision of the pleasure of conn
minds and bodies? I have argued it is the more overtly si
grosser of the two, eXistenZ, rather than the allegedly d
slicker, more liberatory film, The Matrix.5

5
Many thanks to Carolyn Korsmeyer and Steven Schneider for comm
an earlier draft.

The Matrix, Marx, and the

Coppertops Life
MARTIN A. DANAHAY and DAVID RIEDER

The Matrix does an especially good job of dramatizing

exploitation of the average American worker in late twentie
and early twenty-first-century America from a Marxist persp
tive. The film is full of allusions to numerous social and e
nomic themes that can be traced back to Karl Marxs work.
From UPS drivers with their handheld devices that indic
their position and times between deliveries, and data-en
clerks whose every keystroke-per-minute is counted, to c
tomer service representatives whose per-call performance
monitored, American workers are increasingly under technol
ical surveillance, century-old trends against which Marx wr
If, in the nineteenth century, the old-time clock at the doo
the workplace was a sign of capitalist oppression, todays m
agement software that tracks employees every move, in
outside of the office, differs only by degree. The increasing c
trol of the worker by machines has long been a concern
Marxists, and The Matrix exemplifies the dystopic implicati
of these ongoing trends.
One of the most intense and horrifying moments for Ne
when he realizes that his entire life has been a half-truth. Ne
desperately holding himself up against the back of a chair, s
ing at a television set in the meaningless white space of
loading program. Morpheus, seated comfortably, channel-sur
series of vibrant, tantalizing images of the city from which N
has just escaped. Morpheus states, Youve been living i
216

television screen, snapshots of Neos urban existence gi

to a dark and dismal image of a burned-out city, the o
of the war with the machines. The blinding white light
loading program diminishes, and, a moment later, Mo
and Neo find themselves surrounded by urban decay an
ery. Morpheus announces, Welcome to the desert of the
Neo is completely unprepared for Morpheuss presen
He is overwhelmed, staggering backwards as he tries to k
balance. Morpheus continues, answering the question t
kept Neo home alone, sitting at his computer night after

What is the Matrix? Control. The Matrix is a computer-ge

dream-world built to keep us under control in order to ch
human being into this.

Morpheus holds up a Duracell battery, the coppertop bat

the earlier scene where Neo had stepped into the back
Lincoln with the suicide doors, Switch had called Neo
pertop.

The Coppertop at Wo r k

According to Marx, workers under capitalism do not rec

the relationship between their labor and the capital th
produce, because they have become alienated from th
ties of work. They also do not recognize that they are fo
work, believing that they are operating in a free ma
which they sell their labor voluntarily. In fact, Marx argue
are exploited because they cannot choose how and whe
work. They must accept the terms of their employment,
are dictated by the owners of capital.
The coppertop reference can be read as an expres
Marxist concerns over the plight of the worker, who, like
or conscripted soldiers, provides power for the machines
well-known Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848)
describes the exploitation of nineteenth-century factory w
in Europe, which is when and for whom he was writing

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the

chal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist.

Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bo
geois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine
the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois ma
facturer himself.1

For a growing number of people in the nineteenth centu

work was increasingly meaningless. Workers were no lon
asked to create personally meaningful products for their lo
constituencies, products in which they took pride. Rather, th
were asked to work at tasks that were increasingly abstrac
from the commodities that were ultimately sold back to the
Then as now, many jobs are still coppertop, leading to ali
ation.
While people tend to talk of alienation as an individual a
psychological experience, in Marxs work, alienation is a pr
uct of the way social relations are formed under capitalism
other words, an individuals alienation is a product of the s
tem. In the scene, The gatekeeper, Morpheus seems to con
when he says the following to Neo:

The Matrix is a system, Neo. That system is our enemy. When

are inside, and you look around, what do you see? Businessm
Teachers. Lawyers. Carpenters. The very minds of the people
are trying to save. But until we do, those people are still a par
that system.

For Marx, social relationships under capitalism are expressed

relations between commodities (read: the system) rather th
people, and workers themselves see their own labor as co
modities to be sold in a market. Marx extensively analyzed
position of workers under capitalism, and while it may not
immediately obvious, work is an important aspect of the plo
The Matrix.
In his essay, Wage-Labor and Capital, Marx explains
reason why work tends towards the status of coppertop:

Frederic L. Bender, ed., The Communist Manifesto (New York: Norton, 19

pp. 6162.

The former is measured by the clock, the latter by the scal

Under capitalism, the commodity that many work

to the companies and the factories for which they w
nothing more than their power. In The Matrix, this rea
overtly dramatized by the scenes of a naked and vuln
humanity, floating quiescently in high-rises of coffin-lik
cles, plugged in to the power plant. Presumably, the
plant is reminiscent of a corporate building, all of its w
neatly stacked in cubicles, one floor on top of the nex
would make the human race in The Matrix a class of w
the agents, the guardians of capital. The shots of the
plant help illustrate Morpheuss definition of a copper
someone who is so hopelessly dependent on the syste
Morpheus puts it, that he is unable to break free of its ex
tive dimensions.

Dialectical Reflections

The theoretical foundations of Marxs thought are deri

part, from a novel reading of German philosopher
Hegels dialectical philosophies. In Marxist thought, di
is a theory of evolution or progress. It is based up
Hegelian idea that the engine that drives motion and cha
human history is the struggle of opposing forces. Someon
thinks dialectically thinks of the world as a constantly e
place, a place in which life is never still. Moreover, a diale
thinks of the world as a space in which oppositions b
everything from individual molecules of matter to comple
are striving to reach new levels of consciousness and or
tion. Marxist Leon Trotsky likens dialectical thinking to
ver screen in the following passage:

Dialectical thinking is related to [everyday] thinking in th

way that a motion picture is related to a still photograp

Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition (Ne

Norton, 1978), p. 204.

a series of them according to the laws of motion.

A dialectical thinker believes that a picture says a thousa

words, because every picture is a reflection of a network of p
tures worldwide that are simultaneously competing for meani
A dialectical thinker never takes things at face value, beca
life is always evolving in and around every single picture; no
ing is ever still.
In The Matrix, a motion picture within the picture, portr
Neos dialectically evolving state of mind. This motion pict
en abyme is developed out of a series of reflectionsin s
glasses, spoons, a mirror, and, at one point, the doorknob to
Oracles apartment. The individual reflections or still p
tographs combine to create a motion picture that runs on
of the actual film. It portrays Neos dialectical growth, as
struggles to overcome his coppertop life.
In the first part of the film, the two scenes, Down the r
bit hole and The real world, reflect Neos transition from
undialectical coppertop to a dialectically aware resista
fighter. In Down the rabbit hole, Neo is reflected back to u
Morpheuss sunglasses. Neo has not made the choice yet. T
blue and the red pills are in Morpheuss outstretched han
They appear to correspond to the two lenses in Morpheu
glasses. As if symbolizing the undialectical life that he leads
a coppertop, the same image of Neo is reflected in both lens
Like a still photograph, Neo is the same person, from o
frame, or lens, to the next. After Neo chooses the red pill,
reflection begins to change. While he is waiting for Kansas to
bye-bye, the mirror to his right reflects a fragmented Neo;
dialectical journey is beginning. Later, in The real world,
dialectical split between the dream world of the Matrix and
real world is complete. Neos double-image has chang
When Morpheus holds up the coppertop battery, Neos ref
tion is missing from the lens in which the blue pill in Down
rabbit hole was reflected. Now, a coppertop battery takes

Leon Trotsky, The ABC of Materialist Dialectics, in The Collected Writ

of Leon Trotsky: Trotsky Internet Archive, http://www.trotsky.net/works/1
abc.htm.

dialectically aware. His journey is starting.

As the movie progresses, reflections of Neo illustr
attempt to reconcile the two opposing sides of his ident
struggles to overcome the opposing images of his li
one in the Matrix, and the one in the real world. Fol
this train of thought, Neos Nirvana-like transfor
into the One can be interpreted as follows: Ne
achieved a new level of dialectical consciousness, overc
the oppositions between his alienated and unalienated
Neo is one, because Neo is no longer split betwee
worlds. A significant difference between The Matri
Marxist thought is that the One is simply the first
halves in a never-ending evolution. In other words, th
bit hole is bottomless.

Cypher and Commodity Fetishism

In the second half of the scene, Dealing for bliss, Cyphe

ting at a table in a restaurant across from Agent Smith.
is busily slicing into a large, juicy cut of filet mignon. The
from his knife and fork is heard as they scrape across t
china plate, the red wine in his glass gently sloshing. Cy
about to defect. He is tired of his life as a resistance fighte
nearly a decade on the Nebuchadnezzar, he has given u
he is willing to sell the lives of his entire crew for a
chance as a coppertop, plugged in to the Matrix. Agen
asks for his final answer, but, before Cypher answer
Cypher states,

I know this steak doesnt exist. I know that when I put i

mouth the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and de
After nine years, you know what I realize? Ignorance is bl

Cyphers last line is delivered as he bites down on a slice

filet. As the scene ends, the vertical strings of a harp repl
vertical lines of impersonal green code that stream do
dreaded computer screens in the Nebuchadnezzar.
Cypher is well aware of the meaninglessness of the st
is eating. He knows that it does not really exist. In Marx
minology, the steak is a commodity, and the bliss that

of Commodities, in Volume I of Capital, Marx writes,

A commodity . . . is a mysterious thing, simply because in it

social character of mens labor appears to them as an objec
character stamped upon the product of that labor; because
relation of producers to the sum total of their own labor is p
sented to them as a social relation, existing not between th
selves, but between the products of their labor.4

In this chapter, Marx describes the typical relationship t

we, the workers of the world, have with the products that
produce. Some of Marxs terminology is hard to follow: pr
uct of labor; relation of producers; social relations. It is e
ier to follow when we understand one basic concept. For Ma
every commodity in the worldcars; computers; softwa
shoes; furniture; booksexists because someone put their p
sonal labor power into its production. Even the money that
use to buy commodities is a piece of someones labor.
The problem is that we, the workers of the world, fetishi
the commodities that we buy. In other words, we are oftentim
blind to the following fact: the commodities that we buy
produced by people just like us. The shoes that we buy, w
the money that we earn, is made for workers by workers.
hear stories about fellow workers suffering in Asian sweatsho
but we buy our favorite brands of sneakers nonetheless.
drive cars on our way to work, which were created by work
and we do not recognize the system of work in which we
enveloped. Whether we ignore these relations purposefully
not, many of us practice varying degrees of commod
fetishism.
Thinking back to the question that has driven Neos und
ground ambitions, Marx would have extended Morpheu
explanations. Sure, the Matrix is a dream world whose purp
is to control us. Moreover, the Matrix is the sum total of
human labor power that produces it, every day and ev
hour. Every sight and smell in the Matrix is a product of hum

4
See Marxs essay, The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereo
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (New York: Modern Library, 1906
83.

or, as Cypher puts it, blissfully ignored. As Marx says

quote above, the relation of producers to the sum total
own labor is presented to them as a social relation, exist
between themselves, but between the products of their
In other words, the relationship that the global workforce
as a class is clouded over by the dream world of comm
to which we relate more directly. Workers are unable t
because their shared global experience as a class of lab
covered over by the saccharine tastes, sounds, and vi
commodities. There is nothing mysterious about the ste
Cypher is eating. He is well aware that the juiciness a
deliciousness of the steak are brought to him by the labor
in the power plant. But, he is tired of fighting against t
charine world of the Matrix in order to eat real slop,
live like a real pauper.

Wake up from What?

Is The Matrix part of a real capitalist Matrix? TwentiethMarxists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno would s
In their essay, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment a
Deception, they argue that the mass media, which in
radio, television, and film, contribute to a new level of
modity fetishism in capitalist societies.5 The extrate
world of Hollywood values and corporate brands is th
dream worldand it has enveloped us in its saccharine
ness; which is why these Marxists want us to wake up
Paradoxically, The Matrix is part of the culture industry
which Horkheimer and Adorno rail. But, how is this p
Clearly, it is a film about exploitation and grassroots res
Or is it?
One of Marxs most powerful insights concerning the
to which capitalism exploits its labor forces is in his th
surplus value. Marx wanted to find out how and where
ists make profit. After careful analyses of all of the
aspects of the capitalist production cycle, he came
5

The essay is in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dia

Enlightenment, translated by John Cumming (New York: Continuum
pp. 120167.

by paying workers less than they have earned. It is oftentim

assumed that profit is a careful play of the rhythms of sup
and demand: a capitalist sells a product when the price he
make exceeds the cost of its production. Marx realized that
happens too infrequently to be the basis of profit. He also re
ized that the cost of the raw materials that go in to product
are essentially fixed. The only dimension that capitalists can s
tematically exploit is a laborers pay. According to Marx, ca
talists try to pay workers just enough to live, pocketing the r
If a laborer works an eight-hour shift, he is basically paid
equivalent of five or six hours; the remaining two or three ho
is from where the capitalists profit is derived.
The Matrix is an unforgettable film, but it falls short of c
vincing its viewers to wake up in order to fight the explo
tive powers that make the majority of us into coppertops in
real world. It falls short, in part, because it does not show
what the human race is missing while they are plugged in to
Matrix. Arguably, the two speciesthe humans and
machineslive a symbiotic relationship, and the dream wo
that Cypher wants to return is not really that bad. It looks re
tively hip and urban, with really good noodles, steady wo
and a cool club scene. Humanity has to work to generate BT
but the Matrix has unlimited bandwidth and full color! In ot
words, humanity works, and they are paid exactly what they
worth.
If The Matrix really wanted to make a Marxist statem
from which to wake up, the dream world of the Matrix wo
have been shot in black and white, symbolizing the extent
which the machines exploited the value of the coppertops la
power. If the Matrix had been shot in black and white, and
real world in the Nebuchadnezzar had been in color, perh
then the revolutionary future for which the humans were fig
ing would have looked as bright and colorful as did Oz wh
the real Dorothy said bye-bye to Kansas.

The Matrix Simulation and

the Postmodern Age
DAVID WEBERMAN

Consider the following hypothesis: Some time during th

between 1966 and 1974, the world changed. Which is
our world changed. In a big way. Though not uncontro
many historians and scholars believe just this: that durin
years we entered a new era, leaving behind the modern a
now find ourselves in very different circumstances. We a
in what is referred to as the postmodern age or the cond
postmodernity.
What happened? Many things. Deindustrialization, sub
ization, and a dramatic increase in the flexibility of capita
mulation leading to what we now know as globalization.
arts and in architecture, ideals of purity and depth have
way to irony and the play of surfaces while the dist
between high and low or popular art has come to seem
and indefensible. Think of Andy Warhol or Madonna. In
ophy, many have been led to abandon their faith in an
1

The idea of flexible accumulation as well as the expression the c

of postmodernity come form one of the best books on the subjec
Harveys The Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwe
Harveys book also supplies a more precise date for the beginning
modernity. On p. 39, Harvey quotes Paul Jencks as saying that mo
ended and the postmodern age began at 3:32 p.m. CST on July 15th
St. Louis, Missouri with the dynamiting if the modernist Pruitt-Igoe
development.

basis to support our knowledge and values. And, obviou

technology is a large part of the story. The first generation
children nurtured on a steady diet of television came of
during this time. And after television there followed the wi
spread proliferation of cable, video, fax machines, pharmace
cal mood enhancers, computers, cell phones, and the Intern
Finally, all of this has had an effect on our thoughts, wish
and feelings. How could it not? The nature of human experie
has undergone and continues to undergo a transformation. T
idea is that in a world without a real sense of place we h
become spiritual nomads. In a world without seriousness, we
cynics and disbelievers. In a world with designer drugs, our p
sonalities have plasticity, leaving authenticity behind as a no
ing more than a hoax. And in a thoroughly mediatized world,
are . . . well, we are what? This brings us to The Matrix and
the Matrix, that is, to the film by the Wachowskis and to the n
work of refracted images itself in which, undeniably, we are
entangled to a degree never before known and for as far as
can see. Call it truth, call it the real, call it a rabbit hole. If
film is about all of this, then its really about looking back at o
selves as we are now and soon to become even more so.
The film The Matrix was released in 1999, not 1969. Beca
of this it easily finds resonance among its viewers. We und
stand it; we recognize its powernot only as a futuristic scie
fiction, but as a commentary on who we are. It is not the f
film or artwork to test these waters. But it is perhaps the m
sustained (implicitly) philosophical film to address one of
central features of postmodern experience: the blurred or v
ishing line between reality and simulation.
That The Matrix is about this vanishing line is cl
References to it are strewn throughout the dialogue. And
film makers give us a wink early on. In the scene in which N
is visited at his apartment by hackers in need of digitized in
mation, Neo reaches for the goods in a hollowed-out bo
which the camera reveals to be Jean Baudrillards Simulati
and Simulacra2a postmodern work on the erosion of the r
2

Originally, Simulacres et simulation (Paris: ditions Galile, 1981). Avail

in English as Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). Morpheuss w
later in the film, This is the world as it exists today. Welcome to the dese

concerns this vanishing line, it is not immediately clear

is saying, or rather showing, about it. Neither is it clea
exactly is postmodern or new about the films story as a
gory for our age. This essay attempts to look at that line,
our gaze around the rabbit hole, to see what weve beco
My method is to consider four theses or propositions
are possible interpretations of what the film is saying, s
ing, or showing about the distinction between reality and
lation in our age of advanced technology. They are as fo

I. It is ultimately impossible to tell the difference b

the real and the unreal.
II. Reality can be simulated and improved on.

III. Simulated or virtual reality can (and probably w

preferable to normal reality.

IV. Simulated reality is as metaphysically real as unsim

reality, if not more so.

We should not simply assume from the start that each

of these propositions is true. The point here is to reflect
films acceptance of or flirtation with these propositions a
ways in which they characterize our postmodern age in o
tion to previous history. The hope is that, in the end, ou
hole might be better understood.

It Is Ultimately Impossible to
Tell the Diff e rence between the
Real and the Unreal

After Neo first meets Morpheus, he learns that hes been r

along, that theres something wrong with the world and

the real, may also have been inspired by Baudrillard, for whom, pos
America is one big desert where you are delivered from all depth .
liant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a challenge to meaning and prof
challenge to nature and culture, an outer hyperspace, with no origin
erence-points. See his America (London: Verso, 1988), p. 124 and p
6671, 123-126 as well as Baudrillards The Gulf War Did Not Ta
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

how deep the rabbit hole goes and, as we know, soon lea
that the only world he has ever known, seen, and tasted is
illusion, having no reality outside cyberspace. Just before
voyage into the real begins, Morpheus sensing Neos puzz
disbelief asks him: How would you know the differe
between the dream world and the real world? The messag
clear. Neo has no way of knowing for sure whats real and w
isnt.
Now, this, of course, is a philosophical problem, m
specifically, an epistemological one. It is also an old one. I
possible that we know nothing because all of our beliefs
false? Is there any way to show that we are not totally delud
about everything? Platos Republic, 2,400 years old, tells of c
dwellers who take the mere shadows on the wall to be the r
things themselves. They do not know what is real, hav
never encountered it, and are oblivious of their ignorance.
Plato this is an allegory for the condition of human beings w
know only the material world and not the ideas or For
which, Plato holds, stand behind them and make them po
ble. Much later, in the seventeenth century, Descartes en
tains the possibility that all our beliefs might be false. In
Meditations, he aims to find a secure foundation for kno
edge and, wanting to start from scratch, undertakes, in the f
meditation, to show that all of our beliefs are susceptible
doubt. He begins with the unreliability of our senses
decides that this doesnt quite do the job. He then consid
the possibility that we may be dreaming everything up. In f
there is no surefire way to show that we are not dreaming.
Descartes reasons that we could not always have been drea
ing since the contents of our dreams could not be genera
from dreams alone and so must come from some other sour
Descartes then considers the possibility that a malicious dem
is systematically deceiving us such that every one of our bel
is false. And with this possibility, and the attendant impo
bility of proving this false, comes radical or global skeptic
(which Descartes thought he could overcome by the me
explained in his later meditations).
So we see that Morpheuss suggestion that we cannot re
know for sure whether the world we experience is real or

some good arguments against it). Is there anything new i

Morpheus says here? Only this. The thought of the ma
demon in the seventeenth century and until recently w
outlandish thought. Very few people were able to imagin
an all-powerful, mean-spirited entity could possibly i
beliefs into our minds. Nowadays, with the advent of co
simulation and the knowledge that the brain operates by
of electrical impulses, all of this seems possible, even
remotely so. So The Matrix and other sci-fi films and
have made the job of philosophy teachers easier. Globa
ticism is not so ridiculously far-fetched. With rapid adva
computer and brain science, maybe well one day arrive
point where lifelike simulated images and experiences
masterfully fed into our brains or central nervous sy
Maybe were already there and maybe youre lying some
in a tub of goo thinking otherwise. How could you kn
difference . . . ?
Still, the point here is that the claim that we cannot b
that we can recognize the difference between reality an
sion is not philosophically new. But theres more to The
than that.

Reality Can Be Simulated and

Improved On

Start with the idea that there is only one real world and
is exactly what it is and nothing else besides. Where the
the unreal, the illusory come from? And why are we som
fooled by it? The unreal may arise spontaneously in drea
seems to fool us while we are dreaming. The unreal m
result from sensory or cognitive error, again spontaneous
such as to lead to deception. In either case, the world co
with something else thanks to the powers and frailties
mind. There is another way in which the real world co
co-exist with something else. Human beings can repres
world in signs, language, and images. Consequently, we
a world of things and of representations of
Representations have been around since cave drawings a
beginnings of sign language. But theorists of postmo

representations, both linguistic and pictorial. Words, signs, a

especially images are ubiquitous and have usurped the imm
diacy of the material world, so much so that the world
experience is better described as a spectacle than as a spa
time continuum filled with physical objects. Thus, G
Debord, in his highly original The Society of the Specta
(1967), writes:

In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, al

life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectac
Everything that was directly lived has moved away into represe
tion. The images detached from every aspect of life fuse in a c
mon stream in which the unity of this life can no longer
re-established. Reality considered partially unfolds, in its own g
eral unity as a pseudo-world apart, an object of mere contempla
. . . The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social rela
among people, mediated by images.3

According to Debord, there are now not only a lot more rep
sentations and images than before, but they form a netw
(matrix?) constituting a spectacle which is so much closer to
than the non-representational that the non-representational
become an unreconstructible abstraction. To illustrate this, lo
at your immediate surroundings and the extent to which th
reality has been shaped by human fabrication and product
with an eye to their eventual consumption. Or think of the pl
of the television or monitor screen in contemporary life or in
airport lounge.
The next step comes with computer simulation. Not only
we and do we produce and consume human-made represen
tions of the world, we can now simulate the world. Simulat
is a means of representing, in a life-like manner, objec
processes and subjective experiences that may or may not h
existed before, typically with the aid of computers. Thus we
simulate a car crash or the aroma of fried onions or the exp
ence of weightlessness. And people are doing just this right n
in labs in Texas and New Jersey and in IMAX theaters at y

1
Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 1983
5. Originally La socit du spectacle (Paris: ditions Buchet-Chastel, 1967).

with the products of such simulation, called simulacra.

Now, at the beginning of our twenty-first century
puter simulation is clearly in its infancy. But it is rapid
gressing. The hardest part of it may not be replicatin
modifying the ways things and people look, smell, soun
behave but feeding all of this into the brain in a w
bypasses any awareness of the surrounding non-sim
world. But imagine that science and technology have
this far. Or rather let The Matrix imagine it for you.
what the film does. Simulation begins with the staccato
peck-pecking at the keyboard (the certain sign in
Hollywood films telling us that something interesting is
to happen) by means of which virtual reality is created.
Matrix, cyberspace is beautifully depicted by white
without walls, floor, or ceiling as in the scene when Mo
first shows Neo the inside of a computer program a
with two red leather armchairs and a TV set (of prepo
ern 1950s vintage, appealing to our stubborn nostalgia
days before the line had blurred) or in the scene whe
and Trinity generously stock up on weapons to
Morpheus. Next, fill up the white space with whatever
like from guns and skyscrapers and swarms of busines
ple to the woman in the red dress. Pipe all of this in th
a steel rod inserted into the brain and wired into the
priate receptors and, voil, we get the fully simulated
of 1999 and its the only world we know. Formidable!,
French say.
Once all of this is granted, it seems rather easy, in pr
to see how a simulated world could be created and ho
judgment of the real might yield to it. There is one aspe
however, that is confusing and maybe even poorly thou
by the films writers: the self and its mental powers. Mo
tells Neo that when a person is placed into a computer p
such as the Matrix, he or she retains a residual self imag
becomes a mental projection of your digital self. Wha
this mean? Its not clear that it means anything, but we c
it a try. Neo, once unplugged and then loaded up into
space, is very much a residuum of whatever he was in t
world, that is, on the Nebuchadnezzar. He has the sam
sonality (that same Keanu Reeves il-ne-sait-quoi), the

not in the real world, but in the virtual one), the same will to
free, the same knowledge of ju jitsu (this, by contrast, w
uploaded), and so forth. On the other hand, his person a
powers in cyberspace are also a function of his capacity
mental projection. Thus, on the ju jitsu mats with Morpheus,
is told that if he is to win the fight, his mind will do it, not
body. His mind is strong enough (if not always his will or s
confidence) to defy gravity and bend spoons. It is not altoget
clear where this power comes from. It could easily be punch
in at a keyboard, of course, but thats not what happens. N
himself lying inert in a chair is doing the work of manipulat
his body and the physical world in cyberspace. What allows
this?
It would seem, at first, that simulation gives unlimited pow
to the keyboard operator and no power at all to the one (ly
in the chair) to whom the world is being simulated. Or is
right? What if simulation could be more than this? A world
piped into your brain and, furthermore, your brain has
power not only to receive information from that world but to
on it (as in a video game) and because it is the cyberworld,
the real one, your powers are not limited by the familiar sci
tific laws. Maybe The Matrix is right about this, after all: ve
very sophisticated simulation would in fact allow for a cyber
that both projects much of its real attributes and is able to s
pass them as well by means of a strong and disciplined w
According to The Matrix, more powerful than the compute
the mind that engages with it. Well have to wait to find
about this one, but its hard not to be curious. Wake me up i
couple hundred years, or better yet, load me up there ri
now.2
So, not only can reality be simulated, it can be improved
Why simulate it otherwise? This means that simulating realit
not only a matter of replicating its basic structure but mak
2

For experts on the film, this quiz-show question: According to The Ma

what is most powerful of all? Incorrect answer: the mind or its will-po
Correct answer: Love. Recall that, toward the end of the film, in his stru
against the agents, Neos mental powers are not sufficient for the task. A
lies dying or dead, what saves him and gives him the strength to preva
Trinitys kiss.

wishes. Virtual reality in The Matrix replicates not the

gray wasteland of 2199 but the world as it was in
Compared to the world of 2199, it is replete with bright
blue skies, and tasty food. Even compared to the real w
1999, its improved in certain ways, for example with th
tion of the woman in the red dress or perhaps the elim
of poverty (for we see mainly business types and we
forget that the machines want a docile human populati
would be unwise to permit hunger and deprivation).
Yes, simulation is, for almost all intents and purpose
damentally an enhancement of reality. This brings us b
ourselves and our society. Havent we reached a point
virtual reality is simply better than the real thing? Isnt it
ble that the artificial flavor of banana is or could be mad
pleasing than the banana itself? Or cant we imagine t
when the super-duper IMAX experience of the Grand C
far surpasses the experience of the big hole itself? Walker
the philosophically-inspired novelist, once pointed out
would be far better to encounter the Grand Canyon un
edly than to arrive there on a tourist bus. Imagine that the
experience hooked you up to electrical impulses that tem
ily eradicated any knowledge of the Grand Canyons ex
so that you could ride up to it on a horse and be com
taken by surprise. Given such a scenario, people might
standably say: If youve only got three hours, take a pass
Canyon and head straight for the IMAX. Its awesome.
have more time, visit the real thing, its not bad, though
pared for a bit of a disappointment. And who can blame
Which takes us to the next step.

Simulated or Virtual Reality Can

(and Probably Will) Be Preferable to
Normal Reality

Which is preferable, the real world or the enhanced

world? Which pill would you takethe blue one or the
we have just seen, given the appropriate technological ad
as well as a competent and benevolent programmer, the
world will typically seem more attractive than the re
Much more so. This is nicely illustrated in the scene in

Cypher enjoying a succulent cut of beef and a fine glass of

wine says: I know this steak doesnt exist. I know that whe
put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is ju
and delicious. After nine years, do you know what I real
Ignorance is bliss.
The Matrix has juicy steaks; the real human world
bland gruel. The Matrix has great nightclubs; the real wo
has none. The Matrix has the woman in the red dress; the r
world has . . . Trinity (oh well, theres always an exceptio
But the point is that the Matrix is a paradise of sensual pl
sures compared to the real world. And Cypher is a hedon
through and througha pleasure-seeker unwilling to put
with forever-deferred dreams and other idealist crap.
wants to return to cyber-reality and is willing to do wha
takes to get out of another nine years of gruel. Not so
other Nebuchadnezzar team-mates. Theres something m
important to them than pleasure, namely, truth and freedo
Especially to Neo who reveals early on his distaste for and d
belief in fate because I dont like the idea that Im not in c
trol of my life.
So, on the face of it, it looks as if the virtual world is o
preferable to the shallow hedonist whos indifferent to the
of self-deception, while the real world is preferable to anyo
who cares about more important things such as truth, fr
dom, autonomy, and authenticity. In putting forth this m
sage, we get an old-fashioned Hollywood morality tale. V
unpostmodern. And of course the whole plot of the film is
ven by the noble battle for liberation from the tyranny of
machines and their evil Matrix. But the film, despite itself, p
sents us with two worlds in a way that shows us that Cyp
is the one who is right. I believe that the only sensible path
to choose the simulated world over the real one.
Heres why. The Matrix does not just offer sensual pl
sures. It really encompasses much more, in fact, it gives us
about everything we could want from the shallowest to
deepest of gratifications. Assuming the machines have
made things unnecessarily impoverished, the virtual wo
gives us the opportunity to visit museums and concerts, re
Shakespeare and Stephen King, fall in love, make love, ra

lies at our feet except that its probably better than our
since the machines have every motivation to create an
tain a world without human misery, accidents, diseas
war so as to increase the available energy supply. Th
world, on the other hand, is a wasteland. The librari
theaters have been destroyed and the skies are alway
In fact, youd have to be out of your mind or at least se
out to lunch to choose the real world (is that why
Reeves seems so well cast in the role?). Were not talkin
hedonism now, were talking about, to use John Stuar
words, the higher faculties and the deep and diverse
of gratification derived from them. Such gratification i
found far more easily in The Matrix than in the desert
real.3
What about truth and freedom, autonomy, and authe
The machines probably dont mind what you do in the
world as long as it stays there. You can paint, you can
music, you can support the government or fight aga
Youre free in every way that youre free now, you just c
one thing: unplug or try to get others to unplug or kill
who are trying to stop people from unplugging. As fo
theres really only one single important truth that elude
that none of this real. Its all only virtual. But it feels real
can get. And theres no reason to suspect that its unreal
Morpheus or his team visits you. So should you care?
matter? Is it in the end really unreal? What makes it unre
to our last proposition.

So while Neo chooses the red pill, I, along with Cypher, would ch
blue pill, albeit not simply for creaturely comforts and pleasures.
however, a third position. In You Wont Know the Difference So Y
Make the Choice, Philosophy Now (December 2000/January 20
3536, Robin Beck argues that there are no rational grounds for ma
decision because [e]pistemologically, the worlds are the same gi
either world seems equally real once either pill has been swallowe
is right to say that either way we take our world to be the real on
theres no difference on that score. But the world so taken is very
depending on which pills been chosen, and the blue pill gives us b
better world.

Real as Unsimulated Reality,

if not More So

First, some lines from the theorist of postmodernity, J

Baudrillard:

The very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is poss

to give an equivalent reproduction . . . At the limit of this proc
of reproducibility, the real is not only what can be reproduced,
that which is always already reproduced. The hyperreal . . . t
scends representation . . .only because it is entirely in simula
. . .[A]rtifice is at the very heart of reality.4

When Morpheus takes Neo on his first tour of computer p

grammed cyberspace, Neo grasps at a leather armchair aga
the background of a bright white void and asks Morpheus:
you telling me this isnt real? Morpheus responds: What is r
How do you define real? This is not just a throw-away line
a mere rhetorical question. In the weird context of this film a
our ever-weirder technological world, it is a legitimate questi
Morpheuss next statement only confirms this. He says that
real is what we can feel, smell, taste and see and that this c
sists in electrical signals interpreted by your brain. But if on
experience of a virtual reality is also a matter of electrical sign
interpreted by the brain, then it would seem to follow that
tual reality is as real as reality.
In another scene Neo is being driven by car to the Ora
Gazing out the window, he suddenly recognizes something a
exclaims, God, I used to eat there . . . really good noodle
only to fall back into his seat disappointed when it occurs to h
that I have these memories from life . . . none of them h
pened. But didnt they? He remembers them.5 Unlike fa
memories (say, the kind that questionable psychotherapeu
practices are said to create), Neos memories were experien
at one time as occurring in the present. His experience of
restaurant led to further visits to the restaurant. In other wor
4

Baudrillard, Simulations, pp. 146, 147, 151.

Which calls to mind the line from the 1960s song Both Sides Now: Its l
illusions I recall / I really dont know life at all.
5

his other experiences and behavior. It even stands in a co

relation to the experiences and behavior of other human
whom Neo brought to the restaurant in a virtual intersubje
shared world.6 In a way, then, those memories do in fac
spond to something that happened. One could, in pr
find traces of it in the brains of other human beings l
pods plugged in to the Matrix.
The idea, mentioned a moment ago, that reality, a
knowledge of it, is rooted in the sensory impressions (
touching, etc.) we have is a fundamental principle of
sophical empiricisma philosophy that is no less inf
today than when it was first developed in its modern form
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to
Hume, there can be no other justification for our knowled
our belief in what is real, than what we see, hear, smel
and touch. Now one might object to this by saying that N
other human beings in the Matrix dont really see or he
thing at all. However, they have the same type of s
impressions as we do. And since there is nothing that
guishes their sensory impressions from ours, no extern
dence accessible to them (as there is none for us) that
show them that their sensory impressions are mere imag
then it follows that for them the Matrix is as real as our w
for us since both are underwritten by the same type of s
impressions.7
We also saw that Neos earlier experiences were expe
of reality because they cohere with other experiences an
behavior, not only Neos own but that of other human be
well. This relies on something like a coherence notion o
according to which a belief such as I used to eat in that
rant with my buddies is true if it coheres with most of ou

Why intersubjective? In The Matrix its not as if each individual has h

own private Matrix, rather the entire human population is experien
same Matrix. What one person does there is witnessed and experie
others.
7
This point depends on accepting a certain principle of verifi
according to which a claim is meaningful and true if and only if th
possible method for verifying it. This principle is itself not withou
sophical controversy

for our behavior (also true of Neos earlier experiences) is a c

tral principle of pragmatism.
Still, a skeptic of all this, a cyberskeptic, will say that no m
ter how many sensory impressions one has of the virtual wo
and no matter how much they cohere within and between in
viduals, the cyberworld is not real because it does not exis
space. It is nowhere except in peoples heads in the same w
that other fictitious things (imaginary lovers or Santa Cla
might be in peoples heads. But the cyberbeliever will respo
but the cyberworld does exist in space, in cyberspace. The sk
tic will say that cyberspace is not real space. And the belie
will then say HELLO-O?, of course it isnt real space, th
what makes it cyberspace. But the skeptic will respond that
space that isnt real space just doesnt count as space at
According to this view, cyberspace is a mere metaphor; stri
speaking, cyberspace is an oxymoron.
Even granting that cyberspace is only a metaphor,
should note here that the cyberskeptic is assuming that spat
ity is an essential feature of what can count as real. The assum
tion is that there is one and only one spatial-tempo
continuum and that some of our beliefs and experiences co
spond to what is in that continuum and some do not. If bel
(or experiences) do not correspond, they are false (or n
veridical). Similarly, if something cannot be found in that c
tinuum, it is not real. This assumption of the spatiality (a
materiality insofar as materiality is defined in terms of spatial
of the real is an assumption that some philosophers wo
reject. In fact, Plato rejected it. He held that numbers and, m
generally, all Forms or ideas are real yet not spatial. (And K
held that space is not a thing-in-itself, but belongs to the w
subjects intuit the world.) So we see that the cyberbelie
shares some philosophical ground not only with empirici
coherentists, and pragmatists but with Platonists (and perh
Kantians) too. As does the postmodernist (at least, in m
cases).
Plato held that the Forms or ideas were more real than ma
rial objects locatable in space. His reasons are complex but
might say, in a nutshell, that for Plato the Forms or ideas
more real because they are eternal and immutable and m
possible the material world and our knowledge of it. Now,

unsimulated world we know (at least, not yet). Can any

be given to the claim that simulated worlds are more re
nonsimulated worlds? Perhaps only this sense. If our
experience turns out to be such that simulated reality
greater causal impact on our lived experience and actual
ior than nonsimulated reality, then, in one sense, a pra
sense, it will be more real. Whether this will turn out to
case is not something that we can easily foresee at this p
time. Lets wait, oh, about two hundred years.

The Matrix: Or, The Two

Sides of Perversion
SLAVOJ ZIZEK

When I saw The Matrix at a local theater in Slovenia, I had

unique opportunity of sitting close to the ideal spectator of
filmnamely, to an idiot. A man in his late twenties at my ri
was so absorbed in the movie that he continually disturbed
other viewers with loud exclamations, like My God, wow,
there is no reality!
I definitely prefer such naive immersion to the pseu
sophisticated intellectualist readings which project refined ph
sophical or psychoanalytic conceptual distinctions into the fil
It is nonetheless easy to understand this intellectual attraction
The Matrix: Isnt The Matrix one of those films which funct
as a kind of Rorschach test [http://rorschach.test.at/], setting
motion the universalized process of recognition, like the prov
bial painting of God which seems always to stare directly at y
1

Comparing the original script (available on the Internet) with the movie it
we can see that the Wachowski brothers were intelligent enough to throw
the clunky pseudo-intellectual references: Look at em. Automatons. D
think about what theyre doing or why. Computer tells em what to do
they do it. The banality of evil. This pretentious reference to Arendt mi
the point: People immersed in the VR of the Matrix are in an entirely di
ent, almost opposite, position compared with the executioners of
Holocaust. Another wise move was to drop the all too obvious reference
Eastern techniques of emptying your mind as the way to escape the contro
the Matrix: You have to learn to let go of that anger. You must let go of ev
thing. You must empty yourself to free your mind.

240

seems to recognize itself in it?

My Lacanian friends tell me that the authors must hav
Lacan; the Frankfurt School partisans see in The Matrix the
olated embodiment of Kulturindustrie, the alienated-reified
Substance (of Capital) directly taking over, colonizing ou
life itself, using us as the source of energy; New Agers see
source of speculations on how our world is just a mirage
ated by a global Mind embodied in the World Wide Web.
This series goes back to Platos Republic. Doesnt The
exactly repeat Platos device of the cave ordinary hum
prisoners, tied firmly to their seats and compelled to wa
shadowy performance of (what they falsely consider to b
ity? The important difference, of course, is that when som
viduals escape their cave predicament and step out on
surface of the Earth, what they find there is no longer a
surface illuminated by the rays of the Sun, the supreme
but the desolate desert of the real.
The key opposition here is the one between the Fr
School and Lacan: Should we historicize The Matrix in
metaphor of Capital that has colonized culture and su
ity, or is it the reification of the symbolic order as
However, what if this very alternative is false? What if t
tual character of the symbolic order as such is the ve
dition of historicity?

Reaching the End of the Wo r l d

The idea of the hero living in a totally manipulated an

trolled artificial universe is hardly original: The Matrix ju
calizes it by bringing in virtual reality (VR). The point her
radical ambiguity of VR with regard to the problematic o
oclasm. On the one hand, VR marks the radical reduction
wealth of our sensory experience tonot even letters, b
minimal digital series of 0 and 1, of the transmission an
transmission of an electrical signal. On the other hand, th
digital machine generates the simulated experience of
which tends to become indistinguishable from the real
with the consequence of undermining the very notion o
reality. VR is thus at the same time the most radical asser
the seductive power of images.

vidual living in a small, idyllic Californian city, a consume

paradise, who suddenly starts to suspect that the world he li
in is a fake, a spectacle staged to convince him that he lives
a real world, while all the people around him are effectiv
actors and extras in a gigantic show? The most recent exam
of this is Peter Weirs The Truman Show (1998), with Jim Car
playing the small-town clerk who gradually discovers the tr
that he is the hero of a 24-hour ongoing TV show: his hom
town is constructed on a a gigantic studio set, with cameras
lowing him continually.
Sloterdijks sphere is here literally realized, as the gigan
metal sphere that envelops and isolates the entire city. The fi
shot of The Truman Show may seem to enact the liberat
experience of breaking out from the ideological suture of
enclosed universe into its outside, invisible from the ideolog
inside. However, what if it is precisely this happy denouem
of the film (let us not forget: applauded by millions around
world watching the last minutes of the show), with the h
breaking out and, as we are led to believe, soon to join his t
love (so that we have again the formula of the production of
couple!), that is ideology at its purest? What if ideology resi
in the very belief that, outside the closure of the finite unive
there is some true reality to be entered?2
Among the predecessors of this notion is Phillip K. Dic
novel Time Out of Joint (1959), in which a man living a mod
daily life in an idyllic Californian small town of the late 195
gradually discovers that the whole town is a fake staged to ke
him satisfied. The underlying experience of Time Out of Jo
and of The Truman Show is that the late-capitalist consume
Californian paradise is, in its very hyper-reality, in a way irr
substanceless, deprived of material inertia. So its not only t
Hollywood stages a semblance of real life deprived of
weight and inertia of materiality: In late-capitalist consume
2

Its also crucial that what enables the hero of The Truman Show to see thro
and exit his manipulated world is the unforeseen intervention of his fa
There are two paternal figures in the film, the actual symbolic-biolog
father and the paranoiac real father, played by Ed Harris, the directo
the TV show who totally manipulates his life and protects him in the clo
environment.

a staged fake, with our neighbors behaving in real life a

actors and extras. The ultimate truth of the capitalist ut
despiritualized universe is the dematerialization of re
itself, its reversal into a spectral show.
In the realm of science-fiction, one should mentio
Brian Aldisss Starship, in which members of a tribe live
closed world of a tunnel in a giant starship, isolated fr
rest of the ship by thick vegetation, unaware that there is
verse beyond. Finally some children penetrate the bush
reach the world beyond, populated by other tribes.
Among the older, more naive forerunners, one shoul
tion George Seatons 36 Hours, the early 1960s movie ab
American officer (James Garner) who knows all the plans
invasion of Normandy and is seized by the Germans ju
before D-Day. Since he is taken prisoner unconscious fol
an explosion, the Germans quickly construct for him a
of a small American military hospital, and try to convin
that he now lives in 1950, that America has already won t
and that he has no memory of the last six yearsthe in
being that he will reveal all he knows about the invasion
Cracks soon appear in this carefully constructed edific
(Lenin, in the last two years of his life, lived in an almo
lar controlled environment, in which, as we now know
had printed for him a specially-prepared one-copy edi
Pravda, censored of all news that would tell Lenin abo
political struggles going on, with the justification that Co
Lenin should take a rest and not be excited by unne
provocations.)
What lurks in the background is the pre-modern no
arriving at the end of the universe. In those wellengravings, the surprised wanderers approach the screen
tain of heaven, a flat surface with painted stars on it, p
and reach beyondthis is exactly what happens at the
The Truman Show. No wonder that the last scene of this
when Truman steps up the stairs attached to the wall on
the blue sky horizon is painted and opens the door, ha
tinctly Magrittean touch: Isnt this same sensitivity today
ing with a vengeance? Do works like Syberbergs Pars
which the infinite horizon is also blocked by the obvious
ficial rear-projections, not signal that the time of the Ca

a kind of renewed medieval pre-perspective universe?

Fred Jameson perspicuously drew attention to the same p
nomenon in some of Chandlers novels and Hitchcocks fil
The shore of the Pacific Ocean in Farewell, My Lovely functi
as a kind of end or limit of the world, beyond which ther
an unknown abyss; and it is similar with the vast open va
that stretches out in front of the Mount Rushmore heads wh
on the run from their pursuers, Eva Marie Saint and Cary Gr
reach the peak of the monument, and into which Eva Ma
Saint almost falls, before being pulled up by Cary Grant.
One is tempted to add to this series the famous battle sce
at a bridge on the Vietnamese-Cambodian frontier in Apocaly
Now, where the space beyond the bridge is experienced as
beyond of our known universe. And the view that our Eart
not a planet floating in infinite space, but really a circular op
ing or hole, within the endless compact mass of eternal ice, w
the sun in its center, was one of the favorite Nazi pseudo-sci
tific fantasiesaccording to some reports, they even conside
putting some telescopes on the Sylt islands in order to obse
America.

The Really Existing Big Other

What, then, is the Matrix? Simply the Lacanian big Other,

virtual symbolic order, the network that structures reality for
This dimension of the big Other is that of the constitu
alienation of the subject in the symbolic order: the big Ot
pulls the strings, the subject doesnt speak, he is spoken by
symbolic structure. In short, this big Other is the name for
social Substance, for all that on account of which the sub
never fully dominates the effects of his acts, on account
which the final outcome of his activity is always something ot
than what he aimed at or anticipated.
However, in the key chapters of Seminar XI, Lacan strugg
to delineate the operation that follows alienation and is i
sense its counterpoint, that of separation: Alienation in the
Other is followed by separation from the big Other. Separat
takes place when the subject takes note of how the big Othe
in itself inconsistent, purely virtual, barred, deprived of
Thingand fantasy is an attempt to fill out this lack of

big Other.
For that reason, fantasy and paranoia are inherently
Paranoia is at its most elementary a belief in an Other
Other, into another Other who, hidden behind the Othe
explicit social texture, programs (what appears to us
unforeseen effects of social life and thus guarantees its
tency: Beneath the chaos of the market, the degrada
morals, and so forth, there is the purposeful strategy
Jewish plot . . . This paranoid stance has acquired a
boost with todays digitalization of our daily lives. Wh
entire social existence is progressively externalized-mate
in the big Other of the computer network, its easy to i
an evil programmer erasing our digital identity and thus
ing us of our social existence, turning us into non-perso
Following the same paranoid twist, the thesis of The
is that this big Other is externalized in the really existing
Computer. There isthere has to bea Matrix because
are not right, opportunities are missed, something goes
all the time. In other words, the movies suggestion tha
so because there is the Matrix obfuscates the true reality
behind it all. Consequently, the problem with the film is
is not crazy enough, because it supposes another real
behind our everyday reality sustained by the Matrix.
However, to avoid a fatal misunderstanding, the
notion that all there is is generated by the Matrix, that
no ultimate reality, just the infinite series of virtual realiti
roring themselves in each other, is no less ideological.
sequels to The Matrix, we shall probably learn that th
desert of the real is generated by another matrix. Muc
subversive than this multiplication of virtual universes
have been the multiplication of realities themselvessom
that would reproduce the paradoxical danger that some
cists see in recent high-accelerator experiments.
Scientists are now trying to construct an accelerator c
of smashing together the nuclei of very heavy atoms at
the speed of light. The idea is that such a collision will n
shatter the atoms nuclei into their constituent protons an
trons, but will pulverize the protons and neutrons them
leaving a plasma, a kind of energy soup consisting o
quark and gluon particles, the building blocks of matt

state only existed briefly after the Big Bang.

However, this prospect has given rise to a nightmarish s
nario. What if the success of this experiment created a doo
day machine, a kind of world-devouring monster that wo
with inexorable necessity annihilate the ordinary matter arou
itself and thus abolish the world as we know it? The irony o
is that this end of the world, the disintegration of the unive
would be the ultimate irrefutable proof that the tested the
were true, since it would suck all matter into a black hole a
then bring about a new universe, perfectly recreating the
Bang scenario.
The paradox is thus that both versions(1) a subject fre
floating from one to another VR, a pure ghost aware that ev
reality is a fake; (2) the paranoiac supposition of the real rea
beneath the Matrixare false. They both miss the Real. The f
is not wrong in insisting that there is a Real beneath the Virt
Reality simulationas Morpheus puts it to Neo when he sho
him the ruined Chicago landscape: Welcome to the desert
the real.
However, the Real is not the true reality behind the virt
simulation, but the void which makes reality incomplete
inconsistent, and the function of every symbolic Matrix is to c
ceal this inconsistency. One of the ways to effectuate this c
cealment is precisely to claim that, behind the incomple
inconsistent reality we know, there is another reality with
deadlock of impossibility structuring it.

The Big Other Doesnt Exist

Big Other also stands for the field of common sense at wh

one can arrive after free deliberation; philosophically, its
great version is Habermass communicative community with
regulative ideal of agreement. And it is this big Other that p
gressively disintegrates today.
What we have today is a certain radical split. On the o
hand, there is the objectivized language of experts and scient
which can no longer be translated into the common langu
accessible to everyone, but is present in common language
the mode of fetishized formulas that no one really understan
but which shape our artistic and popular imaginary univer

Not only in the natural sciences, but also in economi

other social sciences, the expert jargon is presented as an
tive insight with which one cannot really argue, and w
simultaneously untranslatable into our common experie
short, the gap between scientific insight and common s
unbridgeable, and it is this very gap which elevates sc
into the popular cult figures of the subjects supposed to
(the Stephen Hawking phenomenon).
And on the other hand, the strict obverse of this obj
is the way in which, in cultural matters, we are confronte
the multitude of lifestyles which we cannot translate int
other. All we can do is secure the conditions for their t
co-existence in a multicultural society. The icon of today
ject is perhaps the Indian computer programmer who,
the day, excels in his expertise, while in the evening
returning home, he lights the candle to the local Hindu
and respects the sanctity of the cow.
This split is perfectly rendered in the phenomenon of
space. Cyberspace was supposed to bring us all togeth
Global Village. Yet what effectively happens is that we ar
barded with the multitude of messages belonging to incon
and incompatible universes. Instead of the Global Villa
big Other, we get the multitude of small others, of trib
ticular identifications at our choice. To avoid a misunde
ing: Lacan is here far from relativizing science into just
the arbitrary narratives, ultimately on an equal footin
Politically Correct myths, and so forth: Science does tou
Real, its knowledge is knowledge in the real. The de
resides simply in the fact that scientific knowledge canno
as the symbolic big Other. The gap between modern
and Aristotelian common-sense philosophical ontology
insurmountable. This gap emerges with Galileo, and is b
to an extreme in quantum physics, where were dealin
laws which do work, though they cannot ever be retra
into our experience of representable reality.
The theory of the risk society and its global reflexiviz
right in its emphasis on how, today, we are at the oppos
of the classical Enlightenment universalist ideology whi
supposed that, in the long run, the fundamental questio
be resolved by way of reference to the objective know

about the environmental consequences of a certain new pr

uct (say, of genetically modified vegetables), we search in v
for the ultimate expert opinion. And the point is not simply t
the real issues are blurred because science is corrupted throu
financial dependence on large corporations and state agenc
Even in themselves, the sciences cannot provide the answer
Fifteen years ago ecologists predicted the death of the Ear
forests, but we now learn that the problem is too large
increase of forest growth. Where this theory of the risk soc
falls short is in emphasizing the irrational predicament i
which this puts us, common subjects. We are again and ag
compelled to decide, although we are well aware that we are
no position to decide, that our decision will be arbitrary. Ulr
Beck and his followers refer to the democratic discussion of
options and consensus-building. However this does not reso
the immobilizing dilemma: Why should the democratic disc
sion in which the majority participates lead to better resu
when, cognitively, the ignorance of the majority remains?
The political frustration of the majority is thus understa
able. They are called upon to decide, while, at the same tim
receiving the message that they are in no position effectively
decide, to objectively weigh the pros and cons. The recourse
conspiracy theories is a desperate way out of this deadlock,
attempt to regain a minimum of what Fred Jameson calls c
nitive mapping.
Jodi Dean3 drew attention to a curious phenomenon clea
observable in the dialogue of the mutes between the offi
(serious, academically institutionalized) science and the v
domain of so-called pseudo-sciences, from ufology to th
who want to decipher the secrets of the pyramids. One can
but be struck by how it is the official scientists who proceed
a dogmatic, dismissive way, while the pseudo-scientists refe
facts and argumentation, disregarding common prejudices. T
answer, of course, will be that established scientists speak w
the authority of the big Other, of science as an institution,

On whom I rely extensively here. See Deans Aliens in America: Conspir

Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace (Ithaca: Cornell University Pr
1998).

and again revealed as a consensual symbolic fiction. So

we are confronted with conspiracy theories, we should p
in a strict homology to the proper reading of Henry Jame
Turn of the Screw. We should neither accept the existe
ghosts as part of the narrative reality nor reduce them
pseudo-Freudian way, to the projection of the heroine
terical sexual frustrations.
Conspiracy theories are of course not to be accep
fact. However one should also not reduce them to th
nomenon of modern mass hysteria. Such a notion still re
the big Other, on the model of normal perception of
social reality, and thus does not take into account how it
cisely this notion of reality that is undermined today. The
lem is not that ufologists and conspiracy theorists regre
paranoid attitude unable to accept (social) reality; the p
is that this reality itself is becoming paranoiac.
Contemporary experience again and again confronts
situations in which we are compelled to take note of ho
sense of reality and normal attitude towards it is ground
symbolic fictionhow the big Other that determine
counts as normal and accepted truth, what is the hori
meaning in a given society, is in no way directly groun
facts as rendered by the scientific knowledge in the re
Let us take a traditional society in which modern sci
not yet elevated into the master discourse. If, in its sy
space, an individual advocates propositions of modern s
he will be dismissed as a madman. And the key point
it is not enough to say that he is not really mad, th
merely the narrow, ignorant society which puts him in th
tion. In a certain way, being treated as a madman,
excluded from the social big Other, effectively equals
mad. Madness is not the designation which can be gro
in a direct reference to facts (in the sense that a mad
unable to perceive things the way they really are, sinc
caught in his hallucinatory projections), but only with re
the way an individual relates to the big Other.
Lacan usually emphasizes the opposite aspect of thi
dox: The madman is not only a beggar who thinks he is
but also a king who thinks he is a king. In other words
ness designates the collapse of the distance betwe

symbolic mandate; or, to take his other exemplary stateme

when a husband is pathologically jealous, obsessed by the i
that his wife sleeps with other men, his obsession remain
pathological feature even if it is proved that he is right and t
his wife in fact sleeps with other men.
The lesson of such paradoxes is clear. Pathological jealou
is not a matter of getting the facts wrong, but of the way th
facts are integrated into the subjects libidinal econom
However, what we should assert here is that the same parad
should also be performed as it were in the opposite directi
The society (its socio-symbolic field, the big Other) is sane a
normal even when it is proven factually wrong. Maybe it w
in this sense that the late Lacan designated himself as p
chotic. He effectively was psychotic insofar as it was not p
sible to integrate his discourse into the field of the big Othe
One is tempted to claim, in the Kantian mode, that the m
take of the conspiracy theory is somehow homologous to
paralogism of pure reason, to the confusion between the t
levels: the suspicion (of the received scientific, social, etc. co
mon sense) as the formal methodological stance, and the po
ing of this suspicion in another all-explaining glo
para-theory.

Screening the Real

From another standpoint, the Matrix also functions as

screen that separates us from the Real, that makes the de
of the real bearable. However, it is here that we should not
get the radical ambiguity of the Lacanian Real: it is not the u
mate referent to be covered-gentrified-domesticated by
screen of fantasy. The Real is also and primarily the screen it
as the obstacle that always distorts our perception of the re
ent, of the reality out there.
In philosophical terms, therein resides the differe
between Kant and Hegel: For Kant, the Real is the noume
domain that we perceive schematized through the screen
transcendental categories; for Hegel, on the contrary, as
asserts exemplarily in the Introduction to his Phenomenolo
this Kantian gap is false. Hegel introduces here three ter
when a screen intervenes between ourselves and the Rea

(of the appearance), so that the gap between appearan

the In-itself is always-already for us. Consequently, if w
tract from the Thing the distortion of the Screen, we lo
Thing itself (in religious terms, the death of Christ is the
of the God in himself, not only of his human embodim
which is why, for Lacan, who here follows Hegel, the T
itself is ultimately the gaze, not the perceived object. So,
the Matrix: the Matrix itself is the Real that distorts our p
tion of reality.
A reference to Lvi-Strausss exemplary analysis, fr
Structural Anthropology, of the spatial disposition of bu
in the Winnebago, one of the Great Lake tribes, migh
some help here. The tribe is divided into two sub(moieties), those who are from above and those w
from below; when we ask an individual to draw on a
of paper, or on sand, the ground-plan of his or her villa
spatial disposition of cottages), we obtain two quite d
answers, depending on his or her belonging to one
other sub-group. Both perceive the village as a circle;
one sub-group, there is within this circle another circle
tral houses, so that we have two concentric circles, wh
the other sub-group, the circle is split into two by a clea
ing line. In other words, a member of the first sub-gro
us call it conservative-corporatist) perceives the groun
of the village as a ring of houses more or less symme
disposed around the central temple, whereas a member
second (revolutionary-antagonistic) sub-group percei
or her village as two distinct heaps of houses separated
invisible frontier . . .4
Lvi-Strausss main point is that this example should
way entice us into cultural relativism, according to wh
perception of social space depends on the observers
membership. The very splitting into the two relative p
tions implies a hidden reference to a constantn
objective, actual disposition of buildings but a tra

4
Claude Lvi-Strauss, Do Dual Organizations Exist?, in Structural An
ogy (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 131163. The drawings are
13334.

were unable to symbolize, to account for, to internalize,

come to terms with, an imbalance in social relations that p
vented the community from stabilizing itself into a harmoni
whole.
The two perceptions of the ground-plan are simply t
mutually exclusive endeavors to cope with this traumatic ant
onism, to heal its wound via the imposition of a balanced sy
bolic structure. Is it necessary to add that things stand exa
the same with respect to sexual difference, that masculine a
feminine are like the two configurations of houses in the L
Straussian village? And in order to dispel the illusion that
developed universe is not dominated by the same logic, s
fice it to recall the splitting of our political space into left a
right: a leftist and a rightist behave exactly like members of
opposite sub-groups of the Lvi-Straussian village. They
only occupy different places within the political space; each
them perceives differently the very disposition of the polit
spacea leftist as the field that is inherently split by some f
damental antagonism, a rightist as the organic unity of a co
munity disturbed only by foreign intruders.
However, Lvi-Strauss makes a further crucial point: since
two sub-groups nonetheless form one and the same tribe, liv
in the same village, this identity somehow has to be symb
cally inscribed. But how is this possible, if the entire symb
articulation, all social institutions, of the tribe are not neutral,
are overdetermined by the fundamental and constitutive ant
onistic split? By what Lvi-Strauss ingeniously calls the ze
institution, a kind of institutional counterpart to the fam
mana, the empty signifier with no determinate meaning, si
it signifies only the presence of meaning as such, in opposit
to its absence: a specific institution which has no positive, de
minate functionits only function is the purely negative one
signalling the presence and actuality of social institution as su
in opposition to its absence, to pre-social chaos.
Its the reference to such a zero-institution that enables
members of the tribe to experience themselves as such, as me
bers of the same tribe. Is, then, this zero-institution not ideolo
at its purestthe direct embodiment of the ideological funct
of providing a neutral all-encompassing space in which so
antagonism is obliterated, in which all members of society

cisely the struggle for how this zero-institution will be o

termined, colored by some particular signification?
To provide a concrete example: is not the modern no
nation such a zero-institution that emerged with the diss
of social links grounded in direct family or traditional sy
matrixes, when, with the onslaught of modernization,
institutions were less and less grounded in naturalized tr
and more and more experienced as a matter of contra
special importance here is the fact that national identity i
rienced as at least minimally natural, as a belonging gro
in blood and soil, and as such opposed to the ar
belonging to social institutions proper (state, profession
Pre-modern institutions functioned as naturalized sy
entities (as institutions grounded in unquestionable trad
and the moment institutions were conceived as social a
the need arose for a naturalized zero-institution that
serve as their neutral common ground.
And, back to sexual differences, I am tempted to r
hypothesis that, perhaps, the same logic of zero-ins
should be applied not only to the unity of a society, but
its antagonistic split: what if sexual difference is ultim
kind of zero-institution of the social split of humankind, t
uralized minimal zero-difference, a split that, prior to sig
any determinate social difference, signals this difference a
The struggle for hegemony is then, again, the struggle f
this zero-difference will be overdetermined by other pa
social differences. It is against this background that one
read an important, although usually overlooked, feat
Lacans schema of the signifier: Lacan replaces the st
Saussurean scheme (above the bar the word arbre
beneath it the drawing of a tree) with, above the bar, two
one alongside the other, homme and femme, and, b
the bar, two identical drawings of a door.
In order to emphasize the differential character of the
fier, Lacan first replaces Saussures single scheme with a
fiers couple, with the opposition man-woman, with the

5
See Rastko Mocnik, Das Subjekt, dem unterstellt wird zu glauben
Nation als eine Null-Institution, in H. Boke, ed., Denk-Prozes
Althusser (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 1994).

level of the imaginary referent, there is no difference (we do

get some graphic index of the sexual difference, the simplif
drawing of a man and a woman, as is usually the case in m
of todays restrooms, but the same door reproduced twice). I
possible to state in clearer terms that sexual difference does
designate any biological opposition grounded in real prop
ties, but a purely symbolic opposition to which nothing co
sponds in the designated objectsnothing but the Real of so
undefined X which cannot ever be captured by the image of
signified?
Back to Lvi-Strausss example of the two drawings of the
lage. Here one can see in what precise sense the Real interve
through anamorphosis. We have first the actual, objectiv
arrangement of the houses, and then their two different sy
bolizations which both distort in an anamorphic way the act
arrangement. However, the real here is not the actual arran
ment, but the traumatic core of the social antagonism which
torts the tribe members view of the actual antagonism. The R
is thus the disavowed X on account of which our vision of re
ity is anamorphically distorted. (And, incidentally, this three-l
els device is strictly homologous to Freuds three-level device
the interpretation of dreams: The real kernel of the dream is
the dreams latent thought, which is displaced or translated i
the explicit texture of the dream, but the unconscious de
which inscribes itself through the very distortion of the lat
thought into the explicit texture.)
The same goes for todays art scene, in which the Real d
not return primarily in the guise of the shocking brutal intrus
of excremental objects, mutilated corpses, shit, and so fo
These objects are, to be sure, out of placebut in order
them to be out of place, the (empty) place must already be he
and this place is rendered by minimalist art, starting fr
Malevitch. Therein resides the complicity between the t
opposed icons of high modernism, Kazimir Malevitchs Bl
Square on White Surface and Marcel Duchamps display
ready-made objects as works of art.
The underlying notion of Malevitchs elevation of an eve
day object into a work of art is that being a work of art is
an inherent property of the object: It is the artist himself w
by pre-empting the (or, rather, any) object and locating it a

not a question of why but where. And what Malevitch

imalist disposition does is simply to renderto isolat
place as such, the empty place (or frame) with the proto
property of transforming any object that finds itself wi
scope into the work of art.
In short, there is no Duchamp without Malevitch. On
the art practice isolates the frame/place as such, emptie
its content, can one indulge in the ready-made pro
Before Malevitch, a urinal would have remained just a
even if it were to be displayed in the most distinguished
The emergence of excremental objects which are
place is thus strictly correlative to the emergence of the
without any object in it, of the empty frame as
Consequently, the Real in contemporary art has three
sions, which somehow repeat within the Real the t
Imaginary-Symbolic-Real. The Real is first here as the a
photic stain, the anamorphotic distortion of the direct im
realityas a distorted image, as a pure semblance that
tivizes objective reality. Then, the Real is here as the
place, as a structure, a construction which is never here
riences as such, but can only be retroactively construct
has to be presupposed as suchthe Real as symbolic co
tion.
Finally, the Real is the obscene excremental Object
place, the Real itself. This last Real, if isolated, is a mer
whose fascinating or captivating presence masks the str
Real, in the same way that, in Nazi anti-Semitism, the Jew
excremental Object is the Real that masks the unbearable
tural Real of the social antagonism.
These three dimensions of the Real result from the
modes of setting distance from ordinary reality: One s
this reality to anamorphic distortion; one introduces an
that has no place in it; or one subtracts or erases all c
(objects) of reality, so that all that remains is the very
place these objects were filling in.

The Freudian Touch

The falsity of The Matrix is perhaps most directly discern

its designation of Neo as the One. Who is the One?

One of the Master-Signifier, the symbolic authority. Even

social life in its most horrifying form, the memories of conc
tration camp survivors invariably mention the One, an indiv
ual who did not break down, who, in the midst of
unbearable conditions which reduced all others to the egoi
struggle for bare survival, miraculously maintained and radia
an irrational generosity and dignity. In Lacanian terms, we
dealing here with the function of Ya de lUn: even here, th
was the One who served as the support of the minimum of
idarity that defines the social link proper as opposed to coll
oration within the frame of the pure strategy of survival.
Two features are crucial here. First, this individual w
always perceived as one (there was never a multitude of the
as if, following some obscure necessity, this excess of the in
plicable miracle of solidarity has to be embodied in a One); s
ondly, it was not so much what this One effectively did for
others which mattered, but rather his very presence among th
(what enabled the others to survive was the awareness th
even if they are for most of the time reduced to surviv
machines, there is the One who maintained human dignity)
a way homologous to canned laughter, we have here someth
like canned dignity, where the Other (the One) retains my d
nity for me, in my place, or, more precisely, where I retain
dignity through the Other. I may be reduced to the cruel str
gle for survival, but the very awareness that there is One w
retains his dignity enables me to maintain a minimal link
humanity.
Often, when this One broke down or was unmasked a
fake, the other prisoners lost their will to survive and turned i
indifferent living deadparadoxically, their very readiness
struggle for bare survival was sustained by its exception, by
fact that there was the One not reduced to this level, so th
when this exception disappeared, the struggle for survival it
lost its force.
What this means is that this One was not defined exclusiv
by his real qualities (at this level, there may well have be
more individuals like him, or it may even have been that he w
not really unbroken, but a fake, just playing that role).
exceptional role was rather that of transference: He occupie
place constructed (presupposed) by the others.

see that our everyday reality is not real, but just a codif
tual universe, and who therefore is able to unplug from
manipulate and suspend its rules (fly in the air, stop bulle
so forth). Crucial for the function of this One is his virtua
of reality. Reality is an artificial construct whose rules
suspended or at least rewrittentherein resides the p
paranoid notion that the One can suspend the resista
the Real (I can walk through a thick wall, if I really de
. . .the impossibility for most of us to do this is redu
the failure of the subjects will).
Here again, the film does not go far enough. In the
rable scene in the waiting room of the Oracle who will
if Neo is the One, a child who is seen bending a spoon w
mere thoughts tells the surprised Neo that the way to do i
to convince myself that I can bend the spoon, but to co
myself that there is no spoon . . . However, what about
Shouldnt the movie have taken the further step of accept
Buddhist proposition that I, myself, the subject, do not e
In order to further specify what is false in The Matr
should distinguish simple technological impossibility from
tasmic falsity: Time-travel is (probably) impossible, but p
mic scenarios about it are nonetheless true in the wa
render libidinal deadlocks. Consequently, the problem w
Matrix is not the scientific naivety of its tricks. The idea o
ing from reality to VR through the phone makes sense, s
we need is a gap or hole through which we can escape
Perhaps, an even better solution would have been the
Is not the domain where excrements vanish after we flu
toilet effectively one of the metaphors for the horrifying
lime Beyond of the primordial, pre-ontological Chao
which things disappear? Although we rationally know wh
on with the excrements, the imaginary mystery nonethele
sistsshit remains an excess with does not fit our daily
and Lacan was right in claiming that we pass from anim
humans the moment an animal has problems with wha
with its excrements, the moment they turn into an exce
annoys it. The Real is thus not primarily the horrifyin
gusting stuff re-emerging from the toilet sink, but rather th
itself, the gap which serves as the passage to a differen
logical orderthe topological hole or torsion which curv

disappearing into an alternative dimension which is not par

our everyday reality.
The problem is a more radical phantasmic inconsisten
which erupts most explicitly when Morpheus (the Afric
American leader of the resistance group who believe that Ne
the One) tries to explain to the still perplexed Neo what
Matrix is. He quite consequently links it to a failure in the str
ture of the universe:

MORPHEUS: Its that feeling you have had all your life. That fee
that something was wrong with the world. You dont kn
what it is but its there, like a splinter in your mind, driving
mad. . . . The Matrix is everywhere, its all around us, here e
in this room. . . . It is the world that has been pulled over y
eyes to blind you from the truth.
NEO: What truth?
MORPHEUS: That you are a slave, Neo. That you, like everyone e
was born into bondage . . . kept inside a prison that you c
not smell, taste, or touch. A prison of your mind.

Here the film encounters its ultimate inconsistency: the exp

ence of the lack/inconsistency/obstacle is supposed to bear w
ness of the fact that what we experience as reality is
fakehowever, towards the end of the film, Smith, the Agen
the Matrix, gives a different, much more Freudian explanatio

Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a per
human world? Where none suffered, where everyone would
happy? It was a disaster. No one would accept the program. En
crops [of the humans serving as batteries] were lost. Some belie
we lacked the programming language to describe your per
world. But I believe that, as a species, human beings define t
reality through suffering and misery. The perfect world wa
dream that your primitive cerebrum kept trying to wake up fr
Which is why the Matrix was re-designed to this: the peak of y
civilization.

The imperfection of our world is thus at the same time the s

of its virtuality and the sign of its reality. One could effectiv
claim that Agent Smith (let us not forget: not a human being

Otheritself) is the stand-in for the figure of the analyst

the universe of the film: His lesson is that the experienc
insurmountable obstacle is the positive condition f
humans, to perceive something as realityreality is ult
that which resists.

Malebranche in Hollywood

Another inconsistency concerns death: Why does one

die when one dies in the VR regulated by the Matrix? T
provides the obscurantist answer: Neo: If you are killed
Matrix, you die here [not only in the VR, but also in re
Morpheus: The body cannot live without the mind. Th
of this solution is that your real body can only function
junction with the mind, the mental universe into which y
immersed. So if you are in a VR and killed there, this
affects also your real body . . . The obvious opposite s
(you only really die when you are killed in reality) is a
short.
The catch is: Is the subject wholly immersed in the
dominated VR or does he know or at least suspect the
state of things? If the answer to the former question is ye
a simple withdrawal into a prelapsarian Adamic state of d
would render us immortal in the VR and, consequentl
who is already liberated from the full immersion in
should survive the struggle with Agent Smith which take
within the VR controlled by the Matrix (in the same wa
able to stop bullets, he should also have been able to de
blows that wound his body). This brings us ba
Malebranches occasionalism. Much more than Berkeley
who sustains the world in his mind, the ultimate M
Malebranches occasionalist God.
Malebranche was undoubtedly the philosopher wh
vided the best conceptual apparatus to account for
Reality. Malebranche, a disciple of Descartes, drops Des
ridiculous reference to the pineal gland in order to expl
co-ordination between the material and the spiritual sub
body and soul. How, then, are we to explain their co-ordi
if there is no contact between the two, no point at which
can act causally on a body or vice versa? Since the two

conections) are totally independent, the only solution is tha

third, true Substance (God) continuously co-ordinates and me
ates between the two, sustaining the semblance of continu
When I think about raising my hand and my hand effectiv
raises, my thought causes the raising of my hand not directly
only occasionally. Upon noticing my thought directed at r
ing my hand, God sets in motion the other, material, cau
chain which leads to my hand effectively being raised. If
replace God with the big Other, the symbolic order, we
see the closeness of occasionalism to Lacans position: As La
put it in his polemics against Aristotle in Television,6 the re
tionship between soul and body is never direct, since the
Other always interposes itself between the two.
Occasionalism is thus essentially a name for the arbitrary
the signifier, for the gap that separates the network of id
from the network of bodily (real) causality, for the fact that
the big Other which accounts for the co-ordination of the t
networks, so that, when my body bites an apple, my soul ex
riences a pleasurable sensation. This same gap is targeted by
ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices to ens
that the sun will rise again: The human sacrifice is here
appeal to God to sustain the co-ordination between the t
series, the bodily necessity and the concatenation of symb
events. Irrational as the Aztec priests sacrificing may app
its underlying premise is far more insightful than our comm
place intuition according to which the co-ordination betwe
body and soul is directits natural for me to have a pleas
able sensation when I bite an apple since this sensation
caused directly by the apple: what gets lost is the intermedi
role of the big Other in guaranteeing the co-ordination betwe
reality and our mental experience of it.
And is it not the same with our immersion in Virtual Real
When I raise my hand in order to push an object in virt
space, this object effectively movesmy illusion, of course
that it was the movement of my hand which directly caused
dislocation of the object; in my immersion, I overlooked
intricate mechanism of computerized co-ordination, homo

See Jacques Lacan, Television, October 40 (1987).

the two series in occasionalism.7

It is a well-known fact that the Close the door button
elevators is a totally redundant placebo, placed there just
the individuals the impression that they are somehow pa
ing, contributing to the speed of the elevator journeywh
push this button, the door closes in exactly the same t
when we just pressed the floor button without speeding
process by pressing also the Close the door button
extreme and clear case of fake participation is an appr
metaphor of the participation of individuals in our postm
political process. And this is occasionalism at its purest: acc
to Malebranche, we are all the time pressing such buttons
is Gods incessant activity that co-ordinates between them
event that follows (the door closing), while we think the
results from our pushing the button . . .
For that reason, it is crucial to keep open the radica
guity of how cyberspace will affect our lives: this do
depend on technology as such but on the mode of its
inscription. Immersion into cyberspace can intensify our
experience (new sensuality, new body with more organ
sexes . . .), but it also opens up the possibility for the on
manipulates the machinery which runs the cyberspace
to steal our own (virtual) body, depriving us of control
so that one no longer relates to ones body as to ones
What one encounters here is the constitutive ambiguity
notion of mediatization.8 Originally this notion designa
gesture by means of which a a subject was stripped of its
immediate right to make decisions; the great master of p
mediatization was Napoleon who left to the conquered
archs the appearance of power, while they were effectiv
longer in a position to exercise it. At a more general lev
could say that such a mediatization of the monarch defi
constitutional monarchy: In it, the monarch is reduced
point of a purely formal symbolic gesture of dotting the
signing and thus conferring the performative force on the
7

The main work of Nicolas Malebranche is Recherches de la Vrit (

the most available edition is Paris: Vrin, 1975).
8
As to this ambiguity, see Paul Virilio, The Art of the Motor, Min
University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

And does not, mutatis mutandis, the same hold for todays p
gressive computerization of our everyday lives, in the course
which the subject is also more and more mediatized, imp
ceptibly stripped of his power, under the false guise of
increase? When our body is mediatized (caught in the netw
of electronic media), it is simultaneously exposed to the thr
of a radical proletarization: the subject is potentially redu
to the pure dollar sign, since even my own personal experie
can be stolen, manipulated, regulated by the mechanical Oth
One can see, again, how the prospect of radical virtualizat
bestows on the computer the position which is strictly homo
gous to that of God in Malebrancheian occasionalism. Since
computer co-ordinates the relationship between my mind a
(what I experience as) the movement of my limbs (in the virt
reality), one can easily imagine a computer which runs am
and starts to act liker an Evil God, disturbing the co-ordinat
between my mind and my bodily self-experiencewhen
signal of my mind to raise my hand is suspended or even co
teracted in (the virtual) reality, the most fundamental experie
of the body as mine is undermined. It seems thus that cyb
space effectively realizes the paranoiac fantasy elaborated
Schreber, the German judge whose memoirs were analyzed
Freud.9 The wired universe is psychotic insofar as it seems
materialize Schrebers hallucination of the divine rays throu
which God directly controls the human mind.
In other words, does the externalization of the big Othe
the computer not account for the inherent paranoiac dimens
of the wired universe? Or, to put it in yet another way, the co
monplace is that, in cyberspace, the ability to download c
sciousness into a computer finally frees people from th
bodiesbut it also frees the machines from their people .

Staging the Fundamental Fantasy

The final inconsistency concerns the ambiguous status of the
eration of humanity anounced by Neo in the last scene. As
result of Neos intervention, there is a SYSTEM FAILURE in
9

The connection between cyberspace and Schrebers psychotic universe

suggested to me by Wendy Chun, Princeton.

the Matrix as the Savior who will teach them how to

themselves from the constraints of the Matrixthey will b
to break the physical laws, bend metals, fly in the a
However, the problem is that all these miracles are p
only if we remain within the VR sustained by the Mat
merely bend or change its rules: our real status is still
the slaves of the Matrix, we as it were are merely gainin
tional power to change our mental prison rulesso wha
exiting from the Matrix altogether and entering the real
in which we are miserable creatures living on the de
earth surface?
In an Adornian way, one should claim that these in
tencies10 are the films moment of truth: they signal the a
nisms of our late-capitalist social experience, antag
concerning basic ontological couples like reality and pai
ity as that which disturbs the reign of the pleasure-prin
freedom and system (freedom is only possible within the
that hinders its full deployment). However, the ultimate s
of the film is nonetheless to be located at a different leve
ago, a series of science-fiction films like Zardoz or Logan
forecast todays postmodern predicament: The isolated
living an aseptic life in a secluded area longs for the exp
of the real world of material decay. Till postmodernism,
was an endeavor to break out of the real of historical tim
a timeless Otherness. With postmodern overlapping of th
of history with full availability of the past in digitalized
ory, in this time where we live the atemporal utopia as ev
ideological experience, utopia becomes the longing
Reality of History itself, for memory, for the traces of t
past, the attempt to break out of the closed dome into sm
decay of the raw reality. The Matrix gives the final twist
reversal, combining utopia with dystopia: the very rea
live in, the atemporal utopia staged by the Matrix, is in p
that we can be effectively reduced to a passive state o
batteries providing the Matrix with the energy.

10

A further pertinent inconsistency also concerns the status of inters

ity in the universe run by the Matrix: do all individuals share the sam
reality? Why? Why not to each its preferred own?

central thesis (what we experience as reality is an artificial

tual reality generated by the Matrix, the mega-compu
directly attached to all our minds), but in its central image
millions of human beings leading a claustrophobic life in wa
filled cradles, kept alive in order to generate energy for
Matrix. So when (some of) the people awaken from th
immersion into the Matrix-controlled virtual reality, this aw
ening is not the opening into the wide space of the exter
reality, but first the horrible realization of this enclosure, wh
each of us is effectively just a fetus-like organism, immersed
the pre-natal fluid . . . This utter passivity is the foreclosed f
tasy that sustains our conscious experience as active, self-po
ing subjectsit is the ultimate perverse fantasy, the notion t
we are ultimately instruments of the Others (Matrixs) jou
sance, sucked out of our life-substance like batteries.
Therein resides the true libidinal enigma of this device. W
does the Matrix need human energy? The purely energetic so
tion is, of course, meaningless. The Matrix could have ea
found another, more reliable, source of energy which wo
have not demanded the extremely complex arrangement of
tual reality co-ordinated for millions of human units. Anot
question is discernible here. Why does the Matrix not imme
each individual into his or her own solipsistic artificial unive
Why complicate matters by co-ordinating the programs so t
all humanity inhabits one and the same virtual universe? T
only consistent answer is that the Matrix feeds on the huma
jouissanceso we are back at the fundamental Lacanian the
that the big Other itself, far from being an anonymous machi
needs the constant influx of jouissance. This is how we sho
turn around the state of things presented by the film. What
movie depicts as the scene of our awakening into our true s
ation, is effectively its exact opposition, the very fundamen
fantasy that sustains our being.
The intimate connection between perversion and cybersp
is today a commonplace. According to the standard view,
perverse scenario stages the disavowal of castratio
Perversion can be seen as a defense against the motif of de
and sexuality, against the threat of mortality as well as the c
tingent imposition of sexual difference. What the pervert ena
is a universe in which, as in cartoons, a human being can s

childish game; in which one is not forced to die or to

one of the two sexes. As such, the perverts universe is t
verse of pure symbolic order, of the signifiers game run
course, unencumbered by the Real of human finitude.
As a first approach, it may seem that our experience of
space fits perfectly this universe: Isnt cyberspace also a u
unencumbered by the inertia of the Real, constrained onl
self-imposed rules? And is not the same true of Virtual Re
The Matrix? The reality in which we live loses its inex
character; it becomes a domain of arbitrary rules (impo
the Matrix) that one can violate if ones Will is strong e
. . . However, according to Lacan, what this standard
leaves out of consideration is the unique relationship b
the Other and the jouissance in perversion. What, exactl
this mean?
In Le prix du progrs, one of the fragments that co
The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheime
the argument of the nineteenth-century French phys
Pierre Flourens against medical anesthesia with chlor
Flourens claims that it can be proven that the anesthetic
only on our memorys neuronal network. In short, while
butchered alive on the operating table, we fully feel the
pain, but later, after awakening, we do not remember it .
Adorno and Horkheimer, this, of course, is the perfect me
of the fate of Reason based on the repression of nature i
his body, the part of nature in the subject, fully feels the
is only that, due to repression, the subject does not rem
it. Therein resides the perfect revenge of nature for our
nation over it: Unknowingly, we are our own greatest v
butchering ourselves alive . . . Isnt it also possible to re
as the perfect fantasy scenario of inter-passivity, of the
Scene in which we pay the price for our active interventi
the world? There is no active free agent without this phan
support, without this Other Scene in which he is totally
ulated by the Other.11 A sado-masochist willingly assum
suffering as the access to Being.

11

What Hegel does is to traverse this fantasy by demonstrating its

of filling in the pre-ontological abyss of freedomreconstituting the

obsession of Hitlers biographers with his relationship to

niece Geli Rubel, who was found dead in Hitlers Mun
apartment in 1931, as if the alleged Hitlers sexual pervers
will provide the hidden variable, the intimate missing link,
phantasmic support that would account for his public person
ity. Here is this scenario as reported by Otto Strasser:

Hitler made her undress [while] he would lie down on the fl

Then she would have to squat down over his face where he co
examine her at close range, and this made him very excited. W
the excitement reached its peak, he demanded that she urinate
him, and that gave him his pleasure. (Ron Rosenbaum, Explain
Hitler [New York: Harper, 1999], p. 134)

Crucial here is the utter passivity of Hitlers role in this scena

as the phantasmic support that pushed him into his frenetic
destructive public political activityno wonder Geli was d
perate and disgusted at these rituals.
Therein resides the correct insight of The Matrix: in its jux
position of the two aspects of perversion: on the one ha
reduction of reality to a virtual domain regulated by arbitr
rules that can be suspended; on the other hand, the concea
truth of this freedom, the reduction of the subject to an u
instrumentalized passivity.12

Scene in which the subject is inserted into a positive noumenal order. In o

words, for Hegel, Kants vision is meaningless and inconsistent, sinc
secretly reintroduces the ontologically fully constituted divine totality, a w
conceived only as Substance, not also as Subject.
12
An earlier version of this chapter was delivered to the international sym
sium Inside The Matrix, Center for Art and Media, Karlsruhe, Germany.

The Potentials

DANIEL BARWICK is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Alfre

College. He is the author of Intentional Implications and nu
articles. Barwick lectures widely on ethics, metaphysics, and
ment of general education. His students describe his teaching
lows: You dont know what it is, but its there, like a splinter
mind, driving you mad.

GREGORY BASSHAM is Associate Professor of Philosophy at

College, Pennsylvania. He is the author of Original Intent a
Constitution and the co-author of Critical Thinking: A S
Introduction. Greg publishes widely in obscure journals on su
ics as philosophy of law and Reformed epistemology. He tha
Irwin for introducing him to Rob Zombie.

MICHAEL BRANNIGAN is Professor of Philosophy and Chair

Philosophy Department at La Roche College in Pitt
Pennsylvania. He is also Executive Director of the colleges Ce
the Study of Ethics. Besides numerous articles on Asian phi
and ethics, he has authored The Pulse of Wisdom: The Philoso
India, China, and Japan and Striking a Balance: A Prim
Traditional Asian Values. While recently undergoing a c
Eskimo rolling, he discovered that he is still oceans away from
ing the truth that there is no kayak.

MARTIN A. DANAHAY is Professor of English at the University of T

Arlington and has published widely in the areas of Victorian li

267

and resistance. He does not understand why the AI machines did

just make the human population into university professors; it wo
have taken eons of scholarly articles and books for them to figure
what Neo learned by taking one little pill.

GERALD J. ERION is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Medaille Colle

His publications include papers on philosophy of mind and ethics.
has a problem with authority. He believes that he is special, that so
how the rules do not apply to him. Obviously, he is mistaken.

CYNTHIA FREELAND is Professor of Philosophy at the University

Houston. She is author of The Naked and the Undead: Evil and
Appeal of Horror (Westview, 1999) and But Is It Art? (Oxford, 20
and editor of Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle (Penn State, 19
and (with Thomas Wartenberg) Philosophy and Film (Routled
1995). She is willing to pay any price for the Oracles cookie recip

JORGE J. E. GRACIA holds the Samuel P. Capen Chair and is SU

Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the State University of N
York at Buffalo. His most recent books include: How Can We Kn
What God Means? (2001); Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000); Metaphy
and Its Task (1999); Texts (1996); and A Theory of Textuality (1995).
the questions that drive him. Its the questions that brought him h

CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, JR. is Professor of Philosophy at Bos

University. He is author of Self-Knowledge in Platos Phaedrus (Y
1986; reprinted by Penn State Press, 1996), Adam Smith and
Virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1999), and editor of Plato
Writings/Platonic Readings (Routledge, 1988; reprinted by Penn S
Press, 2001). He knows an Agent when he sees one.

THOMAS S. HIBBS is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston Colle

His most recent book is Virtues Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence and
Good Life (Fordham University Press, 2001). He has also publis
Shows About Nothing: Nihilism in Popular Culture from The Exorcis
Seinfeld and an essay on Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Evil Meets
Match, in the Autumn 2000 issue of Notre Dame Magazine. Hibb
in desperate need of debugging.

JASON HOLT teaches philosophy at the University of Manitoba. He

published scholarly and popular articles on a variety of philosoph
topics. His books include a forthcoming monograph on blindsight
the nature of consciousness, the novel Fragment of a Blues (2001),

admit.

WILLIAM IRWIN is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Kings

Pennsylvania. He is the author of Intentionalist Interpreta
Philosophical Explanation and Defense (1999), and the co-au
Critical Thinking: An Introduction (2001). He is the editor of S
and Philosophy (2000) and The Death and Resurrection of the
(2002) and co-editor of The Simpsons and Philosophy (2001
other life is lived in computers, where he goes by the hack
KooKeeMonzzzTer and is guilty of virtually every computer cr
have a law for.

DEBORAH KNIGHT is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Q

National Scholar at Queens University, Kingston, Canada. S
recent publications running the gamut from The Simpsons to
Eco, and Calvino. In her spare time, theres a trick with a he
shes learning to do.

CAROLYN KORSMEYER is Professor of Philosophy at the State Univ

New York at Buffalo. She writes in the areas of aesthetics and
ophy of art, feminist philosophy, and emotion theory; at the m
she is especially interested in disgust. Her most recent book is
Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy (Cornell University Press
She figures that Neo and Trinity are too hungry to worry abo
ing their black leather outfits with kung-fulishness.

JAMES LAWLER is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State Un

of New York at Buffalo. He is the author of The Existentialist M
of Jean-Paul Sartre, and IQ, Heritability, and Racism, and is th
of Dialectics of the U.S. Constitution: Selected Writings of M
Franklin. Jim writes articles on Kant, Hegel, and Marx. In his p
life he also taught the truth.

GEORGE MCKNIGHT is Associate Professor of Film Studies in the

for Studies in Art and Culture at Carleton University, Otta
recently edited Agent of Challenge and Defiance: The Films
Loach and with Deborah Knight co-authored Suspense
Master, in Hitchcock: Centenary Essays. Oprah, Rosie, and Ma
all interested in publishing excerpts from his new cookbook
Tasty Wheat to Tasty Oats: Scottish Fusion Cuisine after The Ma

JENNIFER L. MCMAHON is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at

College. She has published articles on Sartre, Eastern Philosop

could enjoy eating a virtual steak.

DAVID MITSUO NIXON is a graduate instructor at the University

Washington, Seattle, where he is working to complete his disserta
on the epistemology of perception. In the winter of 2000, Da
designed and taught a class called The Philosophy of The Matrix,
which students examined a number of philosophical issues that
movie raises. Due to a little inverted spectrum problem, David a
dentally chose the blue pill, and consequently is still here.

DAVID RIEDER teaches in the English department at the University

Texas at Arlington and is writing his dissertation, Weightless Writi
Rhetoric and Writing in an Age of Blur. He is co-editor
Enculturation: A Journal of Rhetoric, Writing, and Culture, as wel
a column writer for the online journal, The Writing Instructor. Da
knows there is no spoon.

JONATHAN J. SANFORD is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Francis

University of Steubenville. He has published articles in Ancient
Medieval philosophy and is co-editing (with Michael Gorm
Categories Old and New (Catholic University of America Press, fo
coming). He has a social security number, he pays his taxes, and
helps his landlady carry out her garbage.

THEODORE SCHICK, JR. is Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg Coll

and co-author (with Lewis Vaughn) of How to Think About We
Things (McGraw-Hill), and Doing Philosophy (McGraw-Hill). His m
recent book is Readings in the Philosophy of Science: From Positiv
to Postmodernism (McGraw-Hill). Ted can bend spoons with his b
hands.

BARRY SMITH is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of N

York at Buffalo and is Editor of The Monist. His most recent publicati
include: True Grid, The Metaphysics of Real Estate, The Chin
Rune Argument, The Cognitive Geometry of War, The Last Day
the Human Race, and The Worst Cognitive Performance in History.
2001 Professor Smith was given a two-million dollar Wolfgang P
Award from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany,
largest single prize ever awarded to a philosopher. Asked about an
lier conversation in a restaurant, Barry responded: I dont remem
nothing. Nothing. You understand?

University in Atlanta, Georgia. He has degrees from the Univ

Munich, Germany and Columbia University. His publications f
twentieth-century European philosophy and the philosophy of
He was last seen at a telephone booth at the corner of Wab
Lake looking for the exit.

SARAH E. WORTH is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at

University in Greenville, SC. Her primary work is in the field
thetics and has been published in the Journal of Aesthetics a
Criticism, the British Journal of Aesthetics, and the Journal of A
Education. Sarah was happy to comply when the Wachowski b
asked to use her as the model for the character of Trinity.

SLAVOJ ZIZEK is Professor of Philosophy at the University of L

and a former candidate for the Presidency of the Republic of S
Recent publications include On Belief (2001), The Fright of Re
(2001), Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (2001), Enjo
Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (2000), The
Absolute, Or Why the Christian Legacy is Worth Fighting For
The name is pronounced Leh-nerd Skin-nerd. Most guys thin
guy.

The Oracles Index

Aaliyah, 2
Achilles, 13
Addis, Laird, 79
Adorno, Theodor, 223; The Dialectic
of Enlightenment, 265
Agents (of the Matrix), 71, 83, 110,
134, 135, 164, 194, 198, 199, 210,
235; Agent Smith, 11, 17, 25, 48,
87, 102, 106, 113, 130, 139140,
149, 163, 221, 258
ahimsa, 108
A.I., 70, 155
Albert, Adam, 1
Aldiss, Brian; Starship, 243
alethia, 102
Alexander the Great, 91
Alice in Wonderland, 18384
Alien, 70, 192
allegory of the cave, 12, 13, 55,
12829, 199, 228
anatman, 103
Anderson, Thomas, 16, 102, 184,
193, 195; symbolism of name,
11112
Angel Heart, 113
anicca, 104
Anna Karenina, 196, 200
anxiety, 135; existentialism on, 175
apatheia, 136
Apoc, 51, 144
Apocalypse Now, 244
Apollo, 6, 8, 9
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 1, 94, 207

Arendt, Hannah, 156, 240

Aristotle, 1, 13, 66, 126, 127
141, 190, 260
Arnold, Matthew, 200
the arrogance principle, 123
artificial minds, 6971
ataraxia, 135
atoms, random behavior of,
Augustine, St., 207
authenticity: burden of, 172
inauthenticity, in existen
16668, 173; resistance to
17374; and sanity, 174;
serenity/appreciation, 17

bad faith, 167

Baudrillard, Jean, 2, 236;
Simulations and Simulac
226
Beck, Ulrich, 248
behaviorism, 68, 80
belief(s); as not singular, 38
possible falsity of, respon
2930
Berkeley, George, 259
Big Bang, 246
Big Brother, 183
the big Other, 24445, 246,
computers, 262; and joui
264; as the normal, 249;
virtual reality, 260
Blackwelder, Rob, 192
Blade Runner, 67, 70, 190,

Blues Brothers, 6
bodhisattva, 10809
Boethius, 9293
Boys Dont Cry, 10
Brainstorm, 72
brain-vat thought experiments, 21,
2526, 43, 66; as self-refuting,
4344
Brazil, 178
The Brothers Karamazov, 196
Buddha, 10102, 138; on illusion,
103; on reflection, 10102, 104
Buddha of Compassion, 114
Buddhism, 10203, 115; adaptability
of, 109; Chinese, 109; on
dependent origination, 104; on
illusion, 103; Indian, 109; on
interconnectedness, 104;
Mahayana, 103, 151; on mind,
103, 105; on nonviolence,
10809; on poisons, 109; on
reflection, 106; on the self,
10304; on sentient beings, 110;
on suffering, 104, 107, 10809;
Theravada, 118; virtues in, 108;
Zen, 10203, 106
Buddhist Three Signs, 104
cafeteria pluralism, 11819
Caldern de la Barca, Pedro, 44, 55
Calvin, John, 93
Camus, Albert, 167, 175
capitalism, 216; late, 24243, 263;
Marx on, 21719, 22124
Carrey, Jim, 242
Carter, Rubin Hurricane, 11
Chaerephon, 6, 7
Chandler, Raymond, 244
Chernyshevsky, N.G.; What Is to Be
Done?, 156
Choi, 105, 112, 140
Christianity: on reincarnation,
11415; on time, 115
Churchland, Paul, 79, 84
coherence view, of truth, 237
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 181, 184
Comedy as genre, 19091

computers, as creative, 71
Concept Holism, 39
consciousness, 8285; as immate
85, 86; intentionality of, 8384
problem of, 73; as transcende
83, 84
consensus genres, 19192
conspiracy theories, 249
Copernicus, 141
Croessus, King, 9, 10
Cronenberg, David, 210, 211, 212
culture industry (Kulturindustrie
22324, 241
cyberskeptic, 238
cyberspace, 238, 247, 265
Cypher, 13, 14, 17, 45, 4950, 56
88, 130, 143, 149, 165, 210, 22
234; death of, 162; defense of
235; on happiness, 132; and
inauthenticity, 169; mistake o
2527, 50, 13233; and sense
experience, 5051; symbolism
113
Cyphre, Louis, 113

Dafoe, Willem, 211

Dalai Lama, 114
Daniel (Biblical), 113
Dark City, 66
Davidson, Donald, 39
Dean, Jodi, 248
Debord, Guy, 230; The Society of
Spectacle, 230
Deep Blue, 70, 71
De Niro, Robert, 113
Dennett, Daniel, 81
Descartes, Ren, 1, 17, 22, 4243
67, 207, 259; and certain know
edge, 23; on dreaming, 19; m
cious demon, 20, 43, 66, 138,
228; Meditations on First
Philosophy, 1820, 189, 199, 2
methodological skepticism, 29
30; and mind-body problem,
6768, 69; radical doubt/skep
cism, 1820, 228
Desdemona, 133

169, 217, 241

determinism, 9597; and free will,
96
dialectics, 219220
Dick, Phillip K.: Time Out of Joint,
242
Diderot, Denis, 162
Die Hard, 164
Disclosure, 192
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 155, 159, 162;
The Brothers Karamazov, 196;
Demons, 157; Notes from
Underground, 156, 158
Doubting Thomas, 111
Douglass, Fredrick, 11
Dozer, 14, 45, 64
dualism, 76, 85
Duchamp, Marcel, 254, 255
dukkha, 104, 107
Eastern religions on time, 115
Eddington, Sir Arthur, 96
Edmundson, Mark, 165; Nightmare
on Main Street, 161
egotism, 142, 145, 152
Eightfold Path, 108, 109
eliminative materialism, 76, 8082;
objections to, 8182
empiricism, 237
employee surveillance, 216
Enlightenment, 141, 155, 241; critique of, 15658; and freedom,
15758, 159160; and nihilism,
156, 158
Epicurus, 96
Epictetus, 11
eudaimonia, 135
Euthyphro, 6
evil scientist scenarios, 21
existentialism, 16668; on anxiety,
175; on authenticity/inauthenticity, 16668, 173
eXistenZ, 178, 179; the body in, 205,
206; casting of, 21213; eroticism
in, 212; as fleshy, 211, 212; penetration in, 21112; surprise ending of, 213, 214; as undermining

in, 20506, 213

experience machine, 8990
expert knowledge, conflictin
248
extreme pluralism, 117

fallibilism, 23
false belief, amount of, 37
Farewell, My Lovely, 244
fatalism, 91
fate, 91
feminist philosophers, on W
philosophy, 20607
fiction; emotional response
18183, 18485; explana
184, 186; paradox of, 180
and reality, blurring of, 1
fictional genre film, 197
Fight Club, 10, 178
film technology, blurring fic
reality, 182, 187
Flourens, Pierre, 265
The Fly, 210
Forms (Platonic), 1314, 238
Foster, Gloria, 210
Fourier, Charles, 156
Four Noble Truths, 10708
Frankenstein, 163, 195
Frankfurt School, 241
Frankl, Viktor, 11
freedom, 8788
free will, 9697
Freud, Sigmund, 254, 262
Frost, Robert, 15
Frye, Northrop, 197; The An
of Criticism, 190
fundamental teachings plura
118

Gable, Clark, 207

Galileo Galilei, 247
Gardner, Martin, 24
Garner, James, 243
Gautama, Siddhartha, 101
Geller, Allegra, 21112, 213,
genre categories, 190, 197
genre characters, 198

istics of, 197; demarcation of,

191; philosophical themes in, 199
genre heroes, 198
globalization, 225
Gnosticism, 114
Grant, Cary, 244
Habermas, Jrgen, 246
happiness, 12627; and activity,
13536; and anxiety, 135; basis
for, 145; and contentment, difference between, 13132, 133, 134;
and desire, 13435; long-term,
131; and reality, 130, 13233;
and self-delusion, 13334; and
tranquillity, 135, 13637
hard exclusivists, 122
Harris, Ed, 242
Harvey, David; The Condition of
Postmodernity, 225
Hawking, Stephen, 247
hedonism, 25
Hegel, G.W.F., 219; Phenomenology,
250
Heidegger, Martin, 167, 175, 177
Hick, John, 119121, 122
Highest Good, 143, 144, 145, 146,
150
Hinduism, 115
Hitchcock, Alfred, 244
Hitler, Adolf, 266
Hmong deaths, 41
Holism, 36, 39
Homer, 13
Horkheimer, Max, 223; The
Dialectic of Enlightenment, 265
human experience, transformation
of, 226
Hume, David, 57, 82, 237
hyperconscious individual, 15657
idealism, 84
ideology, 242
illusion, theories of, 13839
immortality and morality, 15051
inauthenticity, 17576; and freedom,
17576; prevalence of, 17374

Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 1

Irony/Satire, as genre, 19091

James, Henry: The Turn of the

Screw, 249
Jameson, Fredric, 244, 248
Jencks, Paul, 225
Jesus, 11112, 113, 114, 141, 151
152
Johnny Mnemonic, 190
Jones, Peter, 200; Philosophy and
the Novel, 196
Judas (Biblical), 113
judging reality, 4445
justified belief, and experience,
3436

Kant, Immanuel, 2, 89, 138, 144,

238; Critique of Pure Reason,
141; on the highest good, 143
on liberation, 141; on moralit
143, 145, 149, 150; on the Rea
250; Universal Natural History
151
Kasparov, Garry, 70
King, Stephen, 234
knowing the future, paradox of,
9495
knowledge; as justified belief, 31
standards for, 22; types of, 30

Lacan, Jacques, 241, 244, 251, 25

265; on madness, 249250; as
psychotic, 250; on science, 24
on the signifier, 253; Televisi
260
Laplace, Pierre Simon de, 9596,
Law, Jude, 207, 211, 213, 214
Lawnmower Man, 178
Lawnmower Man 2: Beyond
Cyberspace, 178
Leavis, F.R., 200
Leigh, Jennifer Jason, 211, 213
Lenin, V.I., 156, 243
Lvi-Strauss, Claude, 254; Structu
Anthropology, 25152; zero-in
tution, 252

Christian, 140; Kantian, 141;

Platonic, 140
Logans Run, 263
Lucifer, 113
MacLean, Adrienne, 16061
madness, 249
Madonna, 225
Malcolm X, 11
Malebranche, Nicolas, 259, 261
Malevitch, Kazimir, 25455
Mandela, Nelson, 11
Manjusri, 109
Martin, Steve, 6
Marx, Karl H., 216; on alienation,
218; Capital, 222; on commodities, 22223; on exploitation,
21718; Manifesto of the
Communist Party, 217; on surplus value, 22324; Wage-Labor
and Capital, 21819
materialism, 6869, 72, 73; eliminative, 76, 8082; reductive, 75, 76,
7879; critique of, 7879
matrix, definition of, 127
the Matrix; appeal of, 23435; as
big Other, 24445
as control, 217, 222; as fallen world,
195; knowledge of, 14; learning
to manipulate, 147; liberation
from, 151; power of belief in,
150; as the Real, 251; as reality,
237; as screening the Real, 250;
as a system, 218; using human
energy, question of, 264; as
utopian scheme, 163; as virtual
reality, 168
The Matrix: and the allegory of the
cave, 128130; and artificial
minds, 71; and authenticity/inauthenticity, 168, 173, 177; the
body in, 205, 206, 209; and
Buddhism, 102, 107, 110, 114,
115, 150, 192; categories of the
world of, 5860; Christian
themes in, 11113; and college
biology, 7677; color in, 49, 224;

death in, 63, 64, 259; and

ing, 4344; dualism of, 6
and eliminative materiali
and the Enlightenment, 1
escapist, 206, 214; falsity
25758; fate in, 161; fear
film ending of, 16465; f
44; and freedom, 144, 16
gender roles in, 207; as g
film, 189190; and happi
130; as hypocritical, 214
inconsistencies in, 6364
259, 262; and judging rea
4445; and materialism, 7
metaphysics of, 5758, 6
in, 64, 75, 23132; mirro
tion imagery in, 10203,
108, 22021; as mixed-ge
film, 18889, 19296, 200
morality, 85, 143, 148, 23
nihilism, 164; non-Christi
themes in, 11416; the O
function of, 257; pastiche
penetration in, 207210,
perversion, 26466; philo
questions/themes in, 1, 5
189, 199; and postmoder
rience, 226; and predictio
real/unreal/virtual distinc
5960, 6162, 178, 227-2
reductive materialism, 78
referentiality, problem of
religious pluralism of, 11
116121; as Romance ge
193, 200; as Rorschach te
as science fiction, 196;
seeing/sight in, 4647; an
perception, 4243, 45, 46
sexist, 211; simulation in
231; and skepticism, 27;
27; sound in, 4748; spo
102; taste in, 49; theories
eration in, 14041; time
touch in, 47, 51, 52; two
of humans in, 195; two m
in, 139140; and utopia/
263; violence in, 108, 11

style, 195
the Matrix Possibility, 2829, 3637,
3940; and conceptual coherence, 37; and false belief, 37
McCain, John, 11
Meaning Holism, 39
mediatization, 26162
Memento, 10
mental states; as brain states, 73, 79;
critique of, 7980; ownership of,
81; as physical states, 75
metaphysics, 5657
Middlemarch, 196
Mill, John Stuart, 26, 27, 235
mind, as category, 60
mind-body problem, 6768, 7778
mirror, as metaphor, 102
Miyamoto Musashi, 105
monism, 63
morality; choice of, 14243; and
egotism, 145; and freedom,
14546; and God, 146; and
immortality, 15051; Kantian
posutlates of, 14546, 148, 150
Morpheus (Greek mythology), 13,
129
Morpheus (Matrix), 7, 89, 10, 11,
13, 14, 19, 51, 62, 105, 107, 129;
on fate, 162; on freedom,
14344; on the Matrix, 1617,
4647, 66, 77, 217, 219, 258; on
the Oracle, 98; on reality, 50, 56,
159, 228, 229, 236; as reductive
materialist, 7677; as rescuer,
169; on sense experience, 50
Moss, Carrie-Anne, 209
Mouse, 44, 45, 71, 131, 173
Napoleon Bonaparte, 261
narrative, role of, 180, 187
nature-nurture debate, 96
Nebuchadnezzar (Biblical), 113
Nebuchadnezzar (Matrix), 44, 51,
66, 71, 76, 88, 112, 113, 135, 144,
146, 149, 159
Neo, 89, 11, 1415, 48, 51, 62, 105,
173; and the allegory of the

169, 177; body of, 209; Christ

symbolism of, 11113; death
92, 10607, 149, 151; dialectic
evolution of, 22021; and exp
ence, as basis for belief, 353
eyes hurting, 47; on fate, 161;
and the Forms, 13; fulfilling o
prophecy, 149; as hacker, 16
and importance of mind, 14;
knowledge of the Matrix, 31
and mirror imagery, 102; miss
of, 6; and Morpheus, first mee
ing, 107; narrative transforma
tions of, 198; and non-Christia
themes, 114; as the One, 111,
129, 150, 209, 221, 25556; an
the Oracle, 7, 9, 10, 11, 50, 92
98, 106, 161; overcoming fear
147, 149; penetration of,
207210; and the red pill, 31,
63, 102, 166, 228; as reincarna
tion, 14, 61, 114; rescue of, 16
resurrection of, 52, 92, 107, 1
113, 149, 150, 164, 209; as
Romance hero, 19899; and t
spoon, 102; as super-hero, 16
and truth, 56; as universal
Teacher, 152
Neo-pluralism, 118, 119, 120, 121
125
the new Flesh, 210, 211
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 2, 156, 158,
189
nihilism, 156, 158
no-mind, state of, 106
non-mind, as category, 60
Nozick, Robert, 2, 2526, 8990;
Anarchy, State, and Utopia,
25

occasionalism, 259260, 261, 262

OConnor, Timothy, 123
Oedipus, 91
OHehir, Andrew, 192
omnipotence, 94
omniscience: and free will, confl
between, 9295; and knowing
the future, 94; and omnipoten

bility, 94
the One, social function of, 256
the Oracle (at Delphi), 8, 9, 9091
the Oracle (Matrix), 7, 910, 11, 50,
64, 9091, 106, 147, 161; and
knowing the future, 95; and
omniscience, 92; and postulates
of morality, 148; prophecy of,
14849; and self-fulfilling
prophecies, 9798; as stereotype,
210
Othello, 133
paranoia, 245
Percy, Walker, 233
perversion, 26465
philosophy, as road less traveled,
1415
Pikul, Ted, 21112, 214
Planet of the Apes, 67
Plantinga, Alvin, 121, 124
Plato, 1, 56, 66, 131, 135, 138, 189,
207; allegory of the cave, 12, 55,
62, 12829, 189, 199, 228, 241;
on Forms, 1314, 238; and
importance of intellect, 14;
Republic, 12, 128, 228, 241
popular culture, 2
postmodernity, 22526; and human
experience, 226; and technology,
226
Presley, Elvis, 23
psychotic universe, 262
Putnam, Hilary; Reason, Truth, and
History, 21
Pythia, 8, 9, 11
Quine, W.V., 2, 39
radical split in culture, 24647
Rahula, 101, 104
Rubel, Geli, 266
the Real, 246, 250; in art, 255
the real/reality; categories of, 5960;
simulation of, 229233; and spatiality, 238
reality/unreality distinction, 6062;

Real World, 183

la Rcherche du Temps Pe
reductive materialism, 75, 7
critique of, 7879
Reeves, Keanu, 6, 132, 190,
231, 235
reincarnation, Christianity o
11415
religious exclusivism, 1212
122; objections to, 1222
122
religious pluralism, 11617;
lems of, 11721; types o
Romance, as genre, 190
Roquentin (character in Nau
17072, 173, 174, 17677

Saint, Eva Marie, 244

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 2, 83, 167,
176; Being and Nothingn
on consciousness, 172; N
168, 17072
Scanners, 210
Schank, Roger, 186
Schick, Theodore, Jr., 23
Schreber, Daniel Paul, 262
Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 73
science and common sense
between, 24647
science-fiction as film genre
Searle, John, 81, 84
Seaton, George: 36 Hours, 2
self-defeating belief, 35, 36
self-delusion, 13334
Sellars, Wilfrid, 2, 39
sense perception, 4547; hie
of, 4547; in philosophy
psychology, 4546
Shakespeare, William, 234
Shantideva, 108
Shigalyov (character in Dem
157
simulacra, 231
simulation/simulated reality
as improvement on reali
23235; and mental pow
as metaphysically real, 2

Unger, Peter; Ignorance, 2021

the unreal, categories of, 60
utopianism, 156
underground man, 15657, 158,
162; and self-knowledge, 163

Vaughn, Lewis, 23
Videodrome, 210
virtual reality (VR); and iconocla
241; as real, 23637

Wachowski, Andy, 1, 6, 115, 116

226, 240
Wachowski, Larry, 1, 6, 112, 113
114, 115, 116, 226, 240
Wallace, Anthony, 117
Walton, Kendall, 182
WarGames, 70
Warhol, Andy, 225
Wayne, John, 193, 207
Weir, Peter, 242
the Western as film genre, 193
Williams, Bernard, 24
Williams, Linda, 19192
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 83
Woo, John, 192

Takuan Soho, 105

tanha, 107
Tank, 51, 64
Taylor, Richard, 91
The Terminator, 70, 73, 155, 164,
192
theology, 5657
theories of mind; dualism, 76; eliminative materialism, 76, 8082;
reductive materialism, 7576,
7879
The Thirteenth Floor, 178, 179
Total Recall, 66, 178
Tragedy as genre, 190
tranquillity, 135
transcendental pluralism, 119
Trinity, 6, 10, 14, 48, 50, 51, 62, 92,

209210; love of Neo, 52, 63,

10607, 113, 150, 164; questio
of, 55; symbolism of, 113
Trotsky, Leon, 219
Truman Show, 178, 181, 242, 243
truth, coherence view of, 237
2001: A Space Odyssey, 70
Tye, Michael, 78

The X-Files, 44, 16061

tation of, 2225

Skinner, B.F., 96
Skywalker, Luke, 193
Sloterdijk, Peter, 242
Sobchack, Thomas, 197, 98
Socrates, 56, 12, 13, 128, 129; and
the oracle, 78, 9; questions of,
68, 14; and self-knowledge,
10
Socratic method, 7
soft exclusivists, 122
Speed, 190
Spielberg, Stephen, 6
splinter in the mind, 14, 62, 105,
135, 146
Stalin, Joseph, 243
Star Trek, 179
Star Trek: The Next Generation, 70
Stockdale, James Bond, 11
Story-telling, importance of, 186,
187
Strasser, Otto, 266
Sudden Unexplained Nocturnal
Death Syndrome, 41
Survivor, 183
Sutton, Willie, 2
Switch, 51, 217
Syberberg, Hans-Jrgen; Parsifal,
243

Yagyu Munenori, 105

Zardoz, 263
zero-institution, 25253
Zeus, 8
Zizek, Slavoj, 1
Zion (Biblical), 113
Zion (Matrix), 113, 143, 146
Zombie, Rob, 6

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to the contributing authors for their hard

timely production, and wonderful insights. The good f
Open Court, especially David Ramsay Steele, Marc Ar
Kerri Mommer, Lisa Morie, and Jennifer Asmuth provide
advice, diligent assistance, and bountiful support. My
assistants, Trisha Allen and Jennifer ONeill, proofread the
manuscript and saved me from many gaffs and blunders.
that remain are my fault. Last but not least, I thank my f
colleagues, and students with whom I discussed The Mat
philosophy, who helped make this book possible, an
offered valuable feedback on the work in progress. A li
as this is almost inevitably incomplete, but among th
whom I am indebted are: Rich Agnello, Adam Albert
Conard, Bill Drumin, Robert Guldner, Peg Hogan, Megan
Henry Nardone, the Socratic Society of Kings College
Skoble, Nick Tylenda, and Joe Zeccardi.

About the Editor

William Irwin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at

Kings College, Pennsylvania. He has edited Seinfeld and
Philosophy: A Book about Everything and Nothing; The
Simpsons and Philosophy: The Doh! of Homer (with Mark
T. Conard and Aeon J. Skoble); and Critical Thinking: A
Students Introduction (with Gregory Bassham, H.
Nardone, and J. Wallace). He is also author of
Intentionalist Interpretation: A Philosophical Explanation
and Defense and editor of The Death and Resurrection o
the Author? Professor Irwin has written numerous article
and reviews on hermeneutics, Sartre, Plato, philosophy o
law, and philosophical pedagogy.

General Editor: William Irwin

VOLUME 1
Seinfeld and Philosophy: A Book about Everything and Nothing
Edited by William Irwin
VOLUME 2
The Simpsons and Philosophy: The Doh! of Homer (2001)
Edited by William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble

VOLUME 3
The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of the Real (
Edited by William Irwin

IN PREPARATION:
Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy (2003)
Edited by James B. South
The Lord of the Rings and Philosophy (2003)
Edited by Gregory Bassham and Eric Bronson
Woody Allen and Philosophy (2004)
Edited by Mark T. Conard and Aeon J. Skoble

Philosophy

The choice is yours, and you will have to live with the cons
quences for the rest of your life as you know it.

Will you take the blue pill pass on downloading this e-bo
and go on thinking of The Matrix as just a movie? Or w
you take the red pill: download the New York Times-bestsell
The Matrix and Philosophy, read it, and find out how deep
rabbit-hole goes?

Is the world around us truly as it appears? Or are we maintain

by an invisible force as inert bodies in tanks, our brains e
tronically stimulated to create the make-believe realm which
all we know? This most demanding of philosophical puzz
became cutting-edge cool with the release of the cult science
tion film The Matrix in 1999.

And the questions have become even more complex with

arrival in 2003 of The Matrix: Reloaded; The Matrix: Revolutio
and the associated short animated films collected as
Animatrix.

The Matrix is the most philosophical film ever made, its ev

frame built on a philosophical conundrum, among them:

* If the world as we know it is nothing more than our dre

of it, does this make the dream real?

but less-pleasant one to take the red pill would

moral failure not to do so? Especially if doing so mean
insight into the truth of our humanity (or its lack)?

* Do humans have an inherent value above that of arti

intelligent machines?

* Can the mind live without the body or the body with
mind?

In the The Matrix and Philosophy, edited by William

renowned contemporary philosophers Michael Bran
Cynthia Freeland; Jorge J.E. Gracia; Slavoj Zizek, et al
The Matrix from many angles: metaphysical, epistemo
ethical, and aesthetic. They uncover hidden depths in th
cate work of art, and often reach disturbing conclusions.

Those who take the red pill never look at the real wo
same way again.
So which will it be? The blue pill click elsewhere.

Or the red pill: Download The Matrix and Philosophy no

Philosophy

The Matrix is rich in central philosophical themes. The Matrix

and Philosophy is even richer in its identification and elaborati
of these themes. What could rationalists, empiricists, realists, a
realists, materialists, holists, existentialists, and deconstructionis
possibly hold in common? Their signal ideas are all deeply
embedded in that movie and artfully unearthed in this book.
Whatever your philosophical cup of tea, The Matrix and
Philosophy is your teahouse.
Lou Marinoff, Ph.D., author of Plato, Not Prozac! and
Philosophical Practice

William Irwin has done it yet again. But this time with even m
philosophical substance than in his previously edited wo
Seinfeld and Philosophy and The Simpsons and Philosophy. Irw
has marshaled a talented troupe of essayists who use the film
Matrix to present the curious with an array of philosophical
ments that range from metaphysics to ethics; philosophy of m
to philosophy of religion; epistemology to aesthetics; and mo
Instructors will be delighted to find a sensible strategy for us
popular culture to encourage undergraduates to encounter phi
ophy in their own medium.
Kimberly A. Blessing, Siena Heights University

If, like Keanu Reeves, you are confused by the plot of The Mat
this is clearly the book for you. If you are not confused by the p
of The Matrix, you should seek medical attention immediately.
if you havent even seen The Matrix, then you really must read
book to find out why this film served as a defining experie
for an entire generation of college students.
Paul A. Cantor, author of Gilligan Unbound: Pop Cultu
in the Age of Globalization

Cover concept and design: Lisa Fyfe

Publishing Company

Open Court publishes nonfiction works for scholars and gen

eral readers in philosophy, popular culture, Eastern thought
religion, history, and contemporary social issues.

Since its founding in 1887, a leading theme of Open Cou

publishing has been dialogue among diverse cultural traditio
We publish books in both analytic and Continental philosop
and works exploring the points of contact between them
recent pioneering study of the historical break between anal
and Continental schools is Michael Friedmans A Parting of
Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger.

From its early days, Open Court has brought Chinese and ot
Eastern thought to Americans. A.C. Grahams Disputers of
Tao is a definitive history of Chinese philosophy. Renown
Open Court writers on Sinology are Paul Rakita Goldin; He
Rosemont; David Nivison; Chenyang Li; and Roger Ames. Wo
on Indian and Islamic thought include Bernard Lewiss Islam
History.

The Popular Culture and Philosophy Series features the b

selling The Matrix and Philosophy; Seinfeld and Philosophy; a
The Simpsons and Philosophy. Each of these entertaining v
umes consists of essays by professional philosophers analyz
different philosophical implications of a particular moment
pop culture.

A new series of confrontations between controversial figu

and their opponents is launched with Szasz under Fire.

ary criticism of Middle Earth, Open Court pioneered

Tolkien Compass, Jared Lobdell, Editor. We also led the
serious writing about Japanese anime with Antonia
Samurai from Outer Space, still the best study of this
Steven Galipeaus The Journey of Luke Skywalker pres
Jungian analysis of the contemporary mythology of Sta
Among other outstanding Jungian titles are Edward Ed
Archetype of the Apocalypse and Marie-Louise von Fran
Dreams and Death.

The Library of Living Philosophers is a series of monu

volumes in which a leading philosopher interacts with his
contemporary critics. Volume I, on John Dewey, first ap
in 1939. Recent volumes cover Paul Ricoeur; Hans
Gadamer; Donald Davidson; and Marjorie Grene.

To order these and other titles from Open Court Pub

Company, please call toll free 1-800-815-2280 or vis
favorite bookstore.
Open Court Publishing Company
332 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100
Chicago, IL 60604
Phone: 1-800-815-2280
opencourt@caruspub.com
Fax: 1-815-224-2256
www.opencourtbooks.com
a division of
Carus Publishing Company
315 Fifth Street, P.O. Box 300
Peru, IL 61354-0300

The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of the Real, edited by
William Irwin. Copyright 2002 by Carus Publishing Company. Open Court
Publishing Company is a division of Carus Publishing Company. All rights
reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. By
payment of the required fees, you have been granted the non-exclusive, nontransferable right to access and read the text of this e-book on-screen. No part
of this text may be reproduced, transmitted, downloaded, decompiled, reverse
engineered, or stored in or introduced into any information storage and retrieval
system, in any form or by any means, whether electronic or mechanical, now
known or hereinafter invented, without the express written permission of
PerfectBound.
PerfectBound and the PerfectBound logo are trademarks of HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc.
Adobe Reader June 2003 ISBN 0-0605-9343-1
PerfectBound e-books HQ
HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
10 East 53rd Street
New York, NY 10022-5299
perfectbound@harpercollins.com
This title is available from Open Court Publishing Company in a hardcover edition (ISBN 0-8126-9501-1) and in a trade paperback edition (ISBN 0-81269501-1). This PerfectBound e-book was created from the trade paperback edition.
To order print editions of this title from Open Court Publishing Company,
please call toll free 1-800-815-2280 or visit your favorite bookstore.
Carus Publishing Company
315 Fifth Street, P.O. Box 300
Peru, IL 61354-0300
Open Court Publishing Company
332 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100
Chicago, IL 60604
Phone: 1-800-815-2280
opencourt@caruspub.com
Fax: 1-815-224-2256
www.opencourtbooks.com

About the Publisher

Australia
HarperCollins Publishers (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
25 Ryde Road (PO Box 321)
Pymble, NSW 2073, Australia
http://www.perfectbound.com.au
Canada
HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.
55 Avenue Road, Suite 2900
Toronto, ON, M5R, 3L2, Canada
http://www.perfectbound.ca
New Zealand
HarperCollinsPublishers (New Zealand) Limited
P.O. Box 1
Auckland, New Zealand
http://www.harpercollins.co.nz
United Kingdom
HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.
77-85 Fulham Palace Road
London, W6 8JB, UK
http://www.uk.perfectbound.com
United States
HarperCollins Publishers Inc.
10 East 53rd Street
New York, NY 10022
http://www.perfectbound.com