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Cement at the bottom of the borehole didn't create a seal, so the gas and oil was able to escape. Crew should've been able to spot the leak 50 minutes before the explosion. Crew had the option of diverting the mud and gas away from the rig. Instead, the flow was diverted to a device on board the rig designed to separate small amounts of gas from a flow of mud.
Cement at the bottom of the borehole didn't create a seal, so the gas and oil was able to escape. Crew should've been able to spot the leak 50 minutes before the explosion. Crew had the option of diverting the mud and gas away from the rig. Instead, the flow was diverted to a device on board the rig designed to separate small amounts of gas from a flow of mud.
Cement at the bottom of the borehole didn't create a seal, so the gas and oil was able to escape. Crew should've been able to spot the leak 50 minutes before the explosion. Crew had the option of diverting the mud and gas away from the rig. Instead, the flow was diverted to a device on board the rig designed to separate small amounts of gas from a flow of mud.
Dodgy cement: the cement at the bottom of the borehole
didnt create a seal, so the gas and oil was able to escape to the surface. 2. Misinterpretation of pressure test: a test to tell if the well was sealed or not. 3. Didnt spot the leak: The crew shouldve been able to determine the leak 50 minutes before the explosion, because of an unexpected increase in pressure, but they didnt interpret it as a leak. 4. No gas alarm: The rig has an alarm that triggers the ventilation fans to close, stopping the gas from reaching an engine that would cause it to ignite. 5. Overwhelmed Separator: The crew had the option of diverting the mud and gas away from the rig, venting it safely through pipes over the side. Instead, the flow was diverted to a device on board the rig designed to separate small amounts of gas from a flow of mud. The so-called mud-gas separator was quickly overwhelmed and flammable gas began to engulf the rig. 6.No Battery for BOP(Blowout Preventer): The explosion destroyed the control lines the crew were using to attempt to close safety valves in the blowout preventer. However, the blowout preventer has its own safety mechanism in which two separate systems should have shut the valves automatically when it lost contact with the surface. One system seems to have had a flat battery and the other a defective switch. Consequently, the blowout preventer did not close. 7. Valve Failure: The bottom of the pipe to the surface was sealed in two ways. It too was filled with cement, and it also contained two mechanical valves designed to stop the flow of oil and gas. All of these failed, allowing oil and gas to travel up the pipe towards the surface.
8. Valve Failure #2: About 8 minutes before the explosion, a
mixture of mud and gas began pouring onto the floor of the rig. The crew immediately attempted to close a valve in a device called the blowout preventer, which sits on the ocean floor over the top of the well borehole. It did not work properly.