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THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE:

Reducing the Aisne-Marne Salient

Presented to
2nd Lieutenant Brett Grantham
Department of Military Science and Leadership
University of Mississippi
MSL 340

By
Todd Sheffield

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World War I was a very unique war for many reasons. New technologies were introduced
that would impact warfare henceforth, and the tactics used by both sides resulted in mass
casualties when faced with these new or improved weapon systems. With the eventual stalemate
on the western front that divided Europe, great advances rarely occurred and were often isolated
events that formed salients. An example of this was the Aisne-Marne Salient which resulted in
the Second Battle of the Marne. This battle would ultimately end all offensive efforts for the
German forces in World War I. The following paper examines the events that took place along
the Aisne-Marne Salient and how Marshal Foch, the commander of all Allied forces in Europe,
planned to crush the salient in the Marne Campaign by exploiting his enemys weakened flank.
To understand how Marshal Foch planned to destroy the salient, the events that took
place along the perimeter of the bulge, which measured approximately forty-five kilometers on
each of its three sides, must be examined because of the impact that each unit had upon one
another was significant. The Salient was created by the third German offensive in 1918 whose
goal was to break the Allied lines and make a hole to either take their political goal of Paris or
roll the line to the south and east to achieve their military goal of defeating the French Army.
Between the towns of Soissons and Reims, the French were not expecting an attack and felt
relatively secure in their position because they believed that they outnumbered the Germans in
the area. 1 The Germans attacked on 27 May as part of the KaiserschlacktSpring Offensive
and managed to advance over 19 kilometers within 24 hours; during this time the French could

Wise, Jennings C. The Turn of the Tide: American Operations at Cantigny, Chteau Thierry,
and the Second Battle of the Marne. New York: H. Holt, 1920. Print. Pg 40.

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not get an organized defense to repel the attack.2 Four days into the attack, the same German
soldiers that initiated the offensive and were still leading the charge with great success, adhering
to the principle of offense and maneuver by staying on their enemys heels. Logistical issues
plagued the Germans during the attack. With every mile they advanced, the German militarys
ability to supply the front decreased.3
Although supply was an issue, the Germans took advantage of the offensive; they pressed
southwest down the road toward the political target of Paris. To get there, the Germans had to
take Chateau Thierry and the roads connecting it to Soissons which would give them an upper
hand in resupply and communication. On 30 May, the Third U.S. Division was called to assist in
halting the Germans at Chateau Thierry. The divisions machine gun battalions slowed the
German advance and many crews fought to the last man before ultimately being forced to the
south bank on 2 June. To reorganize and supply the soldiers, German forces held their advance
at the Marne and lost the offensive while obtaining their short term objectives of Chateau Thierry
and the roads and railroads connecting all the strategic points north of the Marne, west of Reims,
and southeast of Soissons.4 With the time it took to resupply, the Allied forces were able to set
up a defensive line south of the Marne and along the rest of the German position, halting the
enemys advance entirely for a number of weeks.
Marshal Foch had the opportunity to place his reserves in the path of the German advance
while it was still active but chose not to; this allowed for flexibility with maneuvering his forces
2Ibid,

42

Ibid, 43

Ibid, 45

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later. It was noted that Foch thought the German success as indecisive, and perhaps he felt
relieved that the enemy had expanded the subsistence of his gathered strength upon the
achievement of a result so indecisive.5 While the advance displaced the Allies from their
position along the Aisne, the ground they lost had no major strategic implications that would
negatively impact the Allies war effort. Marshal Foch was often heard saying Let the victory
come where it will!6 Therefore he simply waited for the right time to mass his reserves and
strike a decisive blow to the enemy when the opportunity presented itself.
Over a month after the new line along the Marne Salient stabilized, the Allies and the
Central Powers realized that each held a stressful position. The Allies felt that the Germans were
too close to Paris and that they must eventually attack the salient. The Germans felt the pressure
from maintaining a position that was surrounded on three sides.7 Both sides began to plan
offensives that would violently end the stalemate.
Since the town of Soissonspositioned in the northwest corner of the salientwas an
important supply hub for the troops positioned along front, Foch wanted to attack the town,
keeping the roads and railways under constant bombardment from artillery.8 Foch had a clear
understanding of Germanys plan around 10 July. He believed that the Germans would mass on
the eastern portion of the salient in hopes of driving a wedge into the French line. If the line
broke, then the Germans could roll the Allied flank further east and possibly win the war by
5

Ibid, 47

Ibid, 128

Ibid, 112

Ibid, 115

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defeating the opposing army, instead of capturing Paris. Foch came to this conclusion after
observing the lack of regular offensive probes by the Germans on the western salient; the logical
explanation was an attack on the eastern portion of the salient. Failing in the element of surprise,
Germany would advance against a force that was prepared to suppress the attack. On the 14th,
Foch wrote, The battle about to be engaged will comprise two phases, the first defensive, the
second counter-offensive. The Fourth Army (east of Reims) must at all costs prevent the enemy
from gaining ground.9 Foch allocated an extra four divisions comprising the Army of Paris to
the Fourth Army to prevent the lines from faltering. Additional measures were taken to reinforce
all groups east of Chateau Thierry and to simultaneously mass on the western salient to prepare
for the counter-offensive to follow the defense.10 To do this, Foch pulled reserves from every unit
that could spare them.
The German assault started just east of Chateau Thierry and extended further east to
Reims. One focal point was on the Third U.S. Division. The area located fifteen kilometers East
of Chateau Thierry was naturally defendable due to the hills that the allies occupied. Although
the Third Division was unable to properly build fighting positions because of hostile fire, the
constant shifting of unites, and the lack of engineering personnel.11 Germanys intent at
Chateau Thierry was to drive a wedge into a small valley and use maneuver to turn a flank to
gain a foothold on the south bank of the Marne. The Allied troops occupying this area were

Ibid, 116

10

Ibid, 117

11

Ibid, 121

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organized in depth placing one platoon from each battalion on the river bank with the rest of the
battalion behind them.
Anticipating the attack, the Allied batteries began firing shortly after the German batteries
commenced the attack with a barrage hours before the Infantry would attempt a crossing. The
Allies reconnoitered the German assembly areas prior to the attack and began effectively firing
on preplanned targets that inflicted heavy casualties before the infantry assault. The level of
resistance put forth by the Allies surprised the Germans. An example of such resistance was the
38th Infantry Regiment under the Third Division just east of Chateau Thierry on the south bank
of the Marne. Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander, after observing the lack of defensive
preparations of the regiments to his left and right, designed a defense that would secure his
regiments place in military history. He had three battalions placed in a four layer defense
running parallel to the river with companies organized in depth along the flank for when the
French 131st and U.S. 30th fell back.12 Under orders to hold a vital intersection, the 38th held
against two attacking divisions for three days and received twenty percent casualties. Their will
to hold the position against such great opposition earned McAlexander and the 38th the title of
The Rock of the Marne. 13 Out of the two German divisions that were able to cross the Marne,
only small groups were able to penetrate the defenses, but the line still remained intact.14 The

12Mead,

Gary. The Doughboys: America and the First World War. New York: Overlook, 2000.
Print. pg 254-255.
13

Ibid.

14

Wise, The Turn of the Tide. 123-124

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end result of the German 15-17 July offensive was a small salient that was quickly contained on
the southeast portion of the Marne occupied by the Third French Corps.
With the Germans beaten back and their mass concentrated in the East, Marshal Foch
issued last minute orders for all spare divisions to move to locations behind the line west of the
salient. Having waited for the opportunity to attack, the Allied command could see the
opportunity to strike deep into the salient and regain the offensive. Four British divisions came
from the Northern front and most of the American divisionsapart of the American
Expeditionary Forcewere placed on the line to spearhead the counter-offensive.15 Their main
objective was to crush in the west face of the salient and cut the main lines of communication
leading south from Soissons.16 Their first plan of action was to use the Fifth and Sixth Armies
to exert sufficient pressure upon von Boehns (the commander of the German Seventh Army)
center and left to hold them in place and prevent the reinforcement of his right. Simultaneously,
the Tenth Army was thrust deep eastward to not only take Soissons, but to also keep the Germans
to the south from evading envelopment. If the plan did not meet expectations, all armies were to
apply pressure to collapse the buldge. 17
With the imminent counter-attack just hours away, and many units receiving orders
within a day of the attack, quick maneuvering was crucial. The Tenth Army, on the Northern
most part of the salient, had twenty-three divisions available on the morning of the attack versus
the six smaller divisions the Germans had on the front with four in reserve. The Sixth Army,
15

Ibid, 127

16

Ibid, 128

17

Ibid, 128

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adjoined to the Tenths right and connecting it to the Marne at Chateau Thierry, had eighteen
divisions with twelve on the front; Germany too had twelve on the front. 18
On the morning of 18 July at 04:30, the 10th Army launched its attack with the Third U.S.
Corps, composed of the First and Second Divisions along with other Allied divisions, leading the
attack. General Mangin, Commander of the Tenth Army, did not plan effective use of artillery
assistance with the infantry assualt. There would be no preliminary bombardment which
typically characterized attacks at the time; instead a rolling barrage was used.19 The idea was for
the infantry to follow the artillery at a rate averaging one hundred meters every three to four
minutes.20 This slow speed made the infantry vulnerable to German machine guns and artillery,
especially after the first day when the Germans had time to prepare a hasty defense. Terrain in
the region was also rough, with many ravines in the plateau that the U.S. and French troops had
to climb to proceed, which slowed the advance. The first day the Tenth Army reached its main
objective relatively easily, at some places within just one hour.21 Upon reaching each
intermediate objective, a defensive line was set up to maintain security in case of a counterattack.22 Moral was high, and the U.S. troops did not see defeat as an option. 23 The biggest

18

Ibid, 129, 135

Grotelueschen, Mark E. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War
I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print. Pg 85.
19

20

Wise, The Turn of the Tide. 143

21

Ibid, 156

22

Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 87

23

Wise, The Turn of the Tide. 141

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struggle for the Allies was keeping the line organized and even.24 Some units would advance
faster than others, exposing their flanks, resulting in many casualties and others would
intermingle with neighboring units by mistake because of changes in the direction of advance.
Despite some difficulties, the advance went as far as eight kilometers by the end of the first
day. 25
Most of the principles of war applied throughout the battle are most easily identified from
15-18 July during the Allied defense. The principle of maneuver was challenging for the Allies
in the time leading up to the counter-offensive due to the risk of exposing the French right to a
brutal assault. With some of the units receiving their orders so late, many soldiers endured a
forced march through the rain and mud to get to their assigned position on the line. The
reasoning behind the last minute orders was to preserve the element of surprise. Great measures
were taken to maintain this element that was to constitute a great portion of the Allied advantage.
The divisions and independent regiments that arrived early were held far back from the line and,
within a couple hours of execution, hurried to the line to carry out its orders. With the Western
Front in World War I literally dividing the continent, it was difficult to flank the enemy outright.
Therefore mass was equally important in the counter-offensive to force the enemy from their
defenses established over the previous month. Conflicting demands of speed and secrecy, of
time and space made the movement challenging for many divisions and smaller units.26

24

Ibid, 164

25

Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, 96

26

Wise, The Turn of the Tide, 134

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Up to this point, Foch effectively utilized economy of force to handle the German push
on the eastern portion of the salient. Instead of committing the majority of his force to the
known location of the attack, he allocated the amount of force that he knew would effectively
withstand an assault. That allowed the Allied forces to prepare for the decisive strike against the
enemys weakened flank. It could also be said that Foch completely disregarded the imminent
threat of his lines breaking with the intent of striking deep at a far away weak location.27 This
disregard for security was decidedly a gamble.
As a result of the Second Battle of the Marne, casualties were high, more so among the
German forces than the Allies. France suffered 95,000 casualties, Germany 168,000, with
Britain incurring 13,000 losses and the U.S. 12,000. 28 The casualty rates were so high for this
operation simply because the Allies could afford for them to be. They were expecting hundreds
of thousands of American reinforcements to show up within a short period of time. By the end
of the month, over a million Americans were operating in France. 29 Although the advance
slowed after 22 July, Allied forces were able to beat the Germans back to the original line that
existed before 27 May.
The Aisne-Marne Campaign was significant because it was disabled the Germans from
making another major offensive for the duration of the war. With the number of German dead
and over 18,000 men and 700 guns captured, the capacity to wage an effective offense was

27

Ibid, 132

28

Duffy, Michael. "Firstworldwar.com." First World War.com. N.p., 22 Aug. 2009. Web. 30 Nov.
2015. <http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/marne2.htm>.
29

Mead, The Doughboys, 264

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diminished.30 Germanys failure to maintain security and economy of force on the western face
of the salient essentially cost them the already lost war.

30

Ibid, 266

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Bibliography
Duffy, Michael. "Firstworldwar.com." First World War.com. N.p., 22 Aug. 2009. Web. 30 Nov.
2015. <http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/marne2.htm>.
Grotelueschen, Mark E. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.
Mead, Gary. The Doughboys: America and the First World War. New York: Overlook, 2000.
Print.
Wise, Jennings C. The Turn of the Tide: American Operations at Cantigny, Chteau Thierry, and
the Second Battle of the Marne. New York: H. Holt, 1920. Print.