LEO Y. QUERUBIN, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,

REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON J. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, AND
JOINT VENTURE OF SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION,
VELASCO JR., J.:
FACTS:
On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc, through its Resolution
No. 14-0715, released the bidding documents for the "Two-Stage
Competitive Bidding for the Lease of Election Management System (EMS)
and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN)
System." Specified in the published Invitation to Bid are the details for the
lease with option to purchase, through competitive public bidding, of twentythree thousand (23,000) new units of precinct-based OMRs or OP-SCAN
Systems, with a total Approved Budget for Contract of P2,503,518,000, 4 to be
used in the 2016 National and Local Elections. The joint venture of
Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V.,
and Jarltech International Corporation responded to the call and submitted
bid for the project on the scheduled date. Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra) and
MIRU Systems Co. Ltd. likewise signified their interest in the project, but only
Indra,
aside
from
Smartmatic
JV,
submitted
its
bid.
During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a sworn
certification, informed the BAC that one of its partner corporations, SMTC,
has a pending application with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to amend its Articles of Incorporation (AOI), attaching therein all
pending documents. The amendments adopted as early as November 12,
2014 were approved by the SEC on December 10, 2014. On even date,
Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-end testing of their initial
technical proposals for the procurement project before the BAC.
Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its Resolution
No. 1 dated December 15, 2014, declared Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible
to participate in the second stage of the bidding process. The BAC then
issued a Notice requiring them to submit their Final Revised Technical
Tenders and Price proposals on February 25, 2015, to which the eligible
participants complied. Finding that the joint venture satisfied the
requirements in the published Invitation to Bid, Smartmatic JV, on March 26,
2015, was declared to have tendered a complete and responsive Overall
Summary of the Financial Proposal. Meanwhile, Indra was disqualified for
submitting
a
non-responsive
bid.
After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, through Resolution No. 9
dated May 5, 2015, disqualified Smartmatic JV on two grounds, viz: 1.
Failure to submit valid AOI; and 2. The demo unit failed to meet the technical
requirement that the system shall be capable of writing all data/files, audit

log, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least two (2) data
storages.
The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration. In
denying the motion, the BAC, through Resolution No. 10 dated May 15, 2015,
declared that Smartmatic JV complied with the requirements of Sec. 23.1(b)
of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 (GPRA
IRR), including the submission of a valid AOI, but was nevertheless
disqualified as it still failed to comply with the technical requirements of the
project
ISSUE:
Smartmatic JV is, indeed, eligible to participate in the bidding
process.
RESOLUTION:
Anent the nationality of the other joint venture partners, the Court
defers to the findings of the COMELEC and the BAC, and finds sufficient
their declaration that Smartmatic JV is, indeed, eligible to participate in the
bidding process, and is in fact the bidder with the lowest calculated
responsive bid.122 If petitioners would insist otherwise by reason of
Smartmatic JV's nationality, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove that
the aggregate Filipino equity of the joint venture partnersSMTC, Total
Information Management Corporation, Smartmatic International Holding B.V.,
and Jarltech International Corporationdoes not comply with the 60%
Filipino equity requirement, following the oft-cited doctrine that he who
alleges must prove.123 Regrettably, one fatal flaw in petitioners' posture is that
they challenged the nationality of SMTC alone, which, after utilizing the
control test, turned out to be a Philippine corporation as defined under RA
7042. There was no iota of evidence presented or, at the very least, even a
claim advanced that the remaining partners are foreign-owned. There are, in
fact, no other submissions whence - this Court can inquire as to the
nationalities of the other joint venture partners. Hence, there is no other
alternative for this Court other than to adopt the findings of the COMELEC
and the BAC upholding Smartmatic JV's eligibility to participate in the bidding
process, subsumed in which is the joint venture and its individual partners'
compliance with the nationality requirement.

G.R.No. 163271, January 15, 2010

SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES v. HEIRS OF JULIAN
SAMBAAN
DEL CATILLO, J.
FACTS
Spouses Julian and Guillerma Sambaan were the registered owner
of a property located in Bulua, Cagayan de oro City. The respondents and
the petitioner Myrna Bernales are the children of Julian and Guillerma.
Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner and possessor
of
the
property
in
question.
Julian died in an ambush in 1975. Before he died, he requested that
the property in question be redeemed from Myrna and her husband Patricio
Bernales. Thus, in 1982 one of Julians siblings offered to redeem the
property but the petitioners refused because they were allegedly using the
property as tethering place for their cattle.
In January 1991, respondents received an information that the
subject property was already transferred to Myrna Bernales. The Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 bore the forged signatures of their
parents, Julian and Guillerma.
On April 1993, the respondents, together with their mother Guillerma,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and cancellation of
TCT No. T-14204 alleging that their parents signatures were forged. The trial
court rendered a decision on August 2, 2001 cancelling the TCT and ordering
another title to be ISSUEd in the name of the late Julian Sambaan.
Petitioners went to the CA and appealed the decision. The CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for reconsideration of the
decision was, likewise, denied in 2004. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,

might conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on the
correctness of the assailed RULING, we have carefully perused the records
and, nonetheless, arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is
substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial
courts conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the. Deed of
Absolute Sale were forged. Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact
of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.
Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if
accompanied by the owners duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner
did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged
deed acquire any right or title to the said property.

Liwagon v. liwagon

ISSUE
the

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is authentic as to prove

ownership of the petitioners over the subject property?

RESOLUTION
It is a question of fact rather than of law. Well-settled is the rule that
the Supreme Court is not a trier of FACTS. Factual findings of the lower
courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

LA BUGAAL-BLAAN vs RAMOS

December 1, 2004

for it.Being grossly disadvantageous to government and

detrimental to the Filipino people, as well as violative of
public policy, Section 7.9 must therefore be stricken off as
invalid.

The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court

challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA]
7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative
Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30,
1995, executed by the government with Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA likewise is invalid,

since by allowing the sums spent by government for the
benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State's
share in net mining revenues, it results in benefiting the
contractor twice over. This constitutes unjust enrichment on
the part of the contractor, at the expense of government. For
being grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial to government
and contrary to public policy, Section 7.8(e) must also be
declared without effect. It may likewise be stricken off
without affecting the rest of the FTAA.

FACTS:

On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its

Decision
granting
the
Petition
and
declaring
the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 9640, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the
government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are
service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor it is a void contract.

RULING:

Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA has effectively given

away the State's share without anything in exchange.
Moreover, it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the
local and foreign stockholders in WMCP, because by the mere
act of divestment, the local and foreign stockholders get a
windfall, as their share in the net mining revenues of WMCP
is automatically increased, without having to pay anything

AGAN vs. PIATCO

January 21, 2004
FACTS:
Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited
proposal to the Philippine Government through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) for the construction and development of
the NAIA IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement
pursuant to R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718 (BOT Law).
The DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT III project to
the Paircargo Consortium, which later organized into herein
respondent PIATCO.
Various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements and to
prohibit the public respondents DOTC and MIAA from implementing
them.
In a decision dated May 5, 2003, this Court granted the said
petitions and declared the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA
and the Supplements null and void.
Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and respondentsintervenors now seek the reversal of the May 5, 2003 decision and
pray that the petitions be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is valid.
RULING:
Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
State prohibit or regulate monopolies when public interest so
requires. Monopolies are not per se prohibited. Given its
susceptibility to abuse, however, the State has the bounden duty to
regulate monopolies to protect public interest. Such regulation may
be called for, especially in sensitive areas such as the operation of
the countrys premier international airport, considering the public
interest at stake.
By virtue of the PIATCO contracts, NAIA IPT III would be the only
international passenger airport operating in the Island of Luzon,

with the exception of those already operating in Subic Bay Freeport

Special Economic Zone ("SBFSEZ"), Clark Special Economic Zone
("CSEZ") and in Laoag City. Undeniably, the contracts would create
a monopoly in the operation of an international commercial
passenger airport at the NAIA in favor of PIATCO.
[ G.R. No. 179743, August 02, 2010 ]
HADJA FATIMA GAGUIL MAGOYAG, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, HADJI
HASAN MADLAWI MAGOYAG, PETITIONERS, VS. HADJI ABUBACAR
MARUHOM, RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Respondent Hadji Abubakar Marahum sold to Petitioner Hadji Fatima
Magoyag a certain two-storey market stall located in the public market
of Marawi City. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment
which also stated that although there was a sale, possession will
remain with the seller Hadji Maruhom and that he will pay a monthly
rental. However, after several years Hadji Maruhom suddenly stopped
paying rentals. Petitioner demanded payment but respondent failed to
fulfill his promise and refused to vacate the premises. On August 22,
1994 petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages with the RTC of Marawi City.
ISSUE: Did the Deed of Assignment prove the existence of a sale?
Is the sale valid?
Decision: The Deed of Assignment is a clear indication that the
transaction was really of a sale and not of a loan with an equitable
mortgage. The language in the document is crystal clear, unambiguous
and needs no further interpretation.
However, the validity of the sale lies not with the interpretation of the
contract. The sale was ultimately declared as invalid because the
respondent, Hadji Maruhom is not the owner of the property. Records
show that it is the city of Marawi who owned the property and as a
mere grantee, he was expressly prohibited from selling, donating or
otherwise alienating the said property without the consent of the city
government. Violation of the condition shall automatically render the

sale, null and void. One cannot give what one does not have. Nemo
dat qoud non habet.

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, a Petition for
Mandamus praying for payment.
ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to payment?

EPG Construction vs Vigilar

GR No. 131544.
2001

March 16,

FACTS:
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of Public Works
and Highways, where the latter undertook to develop a housing
project by the ministry and on the site construct thereon 145
housing units.
By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways forged individual contracts with herein petitioners EPG
Construction Co., Ciper Electrical and Engineering, Septa
Construction Co., Phil. Plumbing Co., Home Construction Inc., World
Builders Inc., Glass World Inc., Performance Builders Development
Co. and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the construction of
the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction
and funding therefor covered only around 2/3 of each housing
unit. After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by
reason of the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH
Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be
available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and
perform additional constructions for the completion of the
housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written
contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the additional
constructions.
Petitioners received payment for what was originally
stipulated. However, petitioners demanded payment for the unpaid
balance of P5,918,315.63 constituting payment for the additional
constructions which petitioners argued formed an implied contract.
They claimed that payment should be based on the principle of
quantum meruit. DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the
subject money claims prompting herein petitioners to file before

RULING:
Although the Court agreed with respondents postulation
that the implied contracts, which covered the additional
constructions, are void, in view of violation of applicable laws,
auditing rules and lack of legal requirements, it nonetheless find
the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of
substantial justice, petitioners-contractors right to be compensated
for the "additional constructions" on the public works housing
project, applying the principle of quantum meruit.

RURAL BANK OF PARAQUE VS REMOLADO

GR No. L-62051.
March 18, 1985
FACTS:
This case is about the repurchase of mortgage property
after the period of redemption and had expired. Isidra Remolado,
64, a widow, and resident of Makati, Rizal, owned a lot with an area
of 308 square meters, with a bungalow thereon, which was leased
to Beatriz Cabagnot. On April 17, 1971 she mortgaged it again to
petitioner. She eventually secured loans totalling P18,000 (Exh. At
D). the loans become overdue. The bank foreclosed the mortagage
on July 21, 1972 and bought the property at the foreclosure sale for
P22,192.70. The one-year period of redemption was to expire on
August 21, 1973.
On August 9, 1973 or 14 days before the expiration of the
one-year redemption period, the bank gave her a statement
showing that she should pay P25,491.96 for the redemption of the
property on August 23. No redemption was made on that date. On
September 3, 1973 the bank consolidated its ownership over the
property. Remolado's title was cancelled. Remolado was offered a
period until October 31, 1973 from which she could repurchase the
lot. She only exercised that option on November 5. Remolado then
filed an action for reconveyance which the lower courts granted
her.

ISSUE: Is Remolado entitled to reconveyance?

RULING:
There was no binding agreement for its repurchase. Even on
the assumption that the bank should be bound by its commitment
to allow repurchase on or before October 31, 1973, s
ptill Remolado had no cause of action because she did not
repurchase the property on that date.

Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity

follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often
regarded
as
an
equitable
consideration
(meaning

compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the

action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves
commiseration or sympathy.
In the instant case, the bank acted within its legal
rights when it refused to give Remolado any extension to
repurchase after October 31, 1973. It had given her about
two years to liquidate her obligation. She failed to do so. The
decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC was
reversed.