HSC

STUDY BUDDY 1

Modern History Conflict in Europe (1935-1945) Contents

Page

Growth of European Tensions.2-11

- Dictatorships in Germany and Italy..2-4
- League of Nations and Collapse of Collective security: Abyssinia, the
Spanish Civil War....5-7

- Britain, France and the policy of appeasement: an assessment.7-8

- Significance of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.....8-11

Course of the European War.11-18
- German advances: the fall of Poland, the Low Countries and
France...............................................................................................................................11-13
- The air war and its effects: the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the
bombing of Germany..13-14
- Operation Barbarossa, the Battle of Stalingrad and the significance of the
Russian campaign.15-16
- Battle of El Alamein and the significance of the conflict in North Africa to
the European War....16-18

Civilians at War..19-25
- Social and economic effects of the war on civilians in Britain and
Germany.....19-23
- Nazi racial policies: the Holocaust and the persecution of
minorities..23-25
End of the Conflict.25-34

- D Day and the liberation of France...25-27

- Russian counter offensives 1944.27-28

- Final defeat 1944-1945..28-30

- Nuremburg War Crimes trials...30-34

Essay plans for Different Questions....34-36

Speech on Causes of Conflict in Europe.36-37

Growth of European Tensions

DICTATORSHIPS IN GERMANY AND ITALY

GERMANY
BACKG early 1930s- depths of depression. Horrors of WWI, TOV hyper inflation, Ruhr occupation.
Hitler & Nazi Party thrive. Hitler came to power by backroom deal. June 1934 through combination
ruthlessness & quasi-legal proceduresrule absolute. Hindenburg died Aug 1934by mid-1930s
position unassailable.
NAZI IDEOLOGY Essence of purpose of Nazism: Lebensraum, race.
1. Lebensraum means living space
Hitler believed Aryan Race grow to population 250mil by end century. This dynamic,
fertile race needed land into which to expand. Land found in Eastern Europe & vastness
of Russia war w/ SU thus inevitable.
2. All Nazi thinking ultimately based on race
Survival of the fittestHitler applied Darwinian idea: inferior races eventually
overcome by Aryan races. Much of Nazi domestic policy e.g. desire achieve
Volksgemeinschaft firmly grounded on this notion. Slavs of Eastern Europe & SU would
become slaves of master race. Jews at bottomracial pile. Need be separated from master
race or eliminated
NAZI FOREIGN POLICY product of Nazi ideology. Not every FP action direct result. Reasons:
1. Pragmatist: pursue policy that totally contradicted long-term goals if suit short-term
objective
2. Opportunist: no clearly worked-out blueprint. Situation presented- take adv
3. Difference betw the ends & the means
Stages (the means) of Nazi Foreign Policy:
1. Revisionism: Tearing up TOV by ending reparations, restoring Germ military power
(rearmament & conscription), recovering territories
2. Creation of Grossdeutschland: Bringing back into Reich all Germs e.g. uniting Germ & Austria
(Anschluss), bringing home Germs forced to live w/ untermenschen eg in Poland,
Czechoslovakia
3. Autarky: If TOV revised & lost territories restore, Germ would move closer to eco self-
sufficiency. Assist future expansion
4. France: In MK, Hitler said France would never allow Germ to dominate Europe. A reckoning
w/ France inevitable. Once dealt w/ could turn eastwards
FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION Hitler master of international diplomacy. Utterances throughout 1930s
consistent though lacking honesty: charade
DATE
NAZI ACTION
SIGNIFICANCE
1933 Oct
Germ leaves League
Covenant of LON part TOV ending membership wins Hitler
of Nations
plaudits at home freedom of action abroad
1934
Germ & Pol: 10yr
No intention of honouring. Benefits inc highlighting Germs
January
Non-Aggression Pact
peaceful intentions, lulls Poles into false sense of security,
precludes any possible Polish-Soviet pact
July
Abort coup in Austria Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss assassinated. Nazi fail takeover
March
Germ brings in
Announces plans for 500 000 army & major rearmament.
conscription
Against TOV. B&F no action. Confidence boosted
June
Anglo-German Naval
Germ navy 35% size Brits & equal no# submarines.
Agreement
1936
Remilitarisation of the H orders troops into Rhineland. Risky, orders w/draw if F acts.
March
Rhineland
B&F no protests, strategic position strengthened. Prop victory
July
Outbreak of Spanish
Open support provisions for Francos fascist forces. Troops &
Civil War
air force gain valuable practice
November Axis Agreement
Germ

& Italy announce creation Rome-Berlin Axis
Anti-Comintern Pact
Germ & Jap, aimed vs. SU
1937 Nov
Anti-Comintern Pact
Italy accedes to Anti-Comintern PactRome-Berlin-Tokyo
Axis
1938
Anschluss
B&F no action

HSC STUDY BUDDY 3

March
September
1939
March

May
August
September

Munich Conference
Given Sudetenland (pan-nationalism); Czechs not consulted
Germ invasion of
Hitler ripped up Munich Agreement, Bs policy of app ends.
Czechoslovakia
Guarantees for Poland B guarantees Poland assistance if attacked by Germ.
Supremely confident/disdainful of B&F, Hitler cont w/
demands
Pact of Steel
Germ & Italy sign 10yr military & political alliance
Nazi-Soviet Pact
Gives H green light to invade Poland w/out Russian
interference
Poland
1 Sep Germ invades Poland
3 Sep Britain declares war on Germ

ITALY
24 Oct 1922: 25000 highly propagandized fascists march on Rome (Muss in Milan for safety). 30000
th
police & soldiers tell Blackshirts to surrender. Majority stood ground. 29 - King proclaimed martial
law wouldnt take place, PM resigned & Muss invited to form new gov. By 1928, control over Italy
complete; selected all 400 members of Italys Chamber of Deputies (became politically redundant).
King Victor Emmanuel III remained nations monarch, Muss called arrangement a diarchy- lie
BACKG Nation beset w/ major social, eco, polit problems post-WWI. High unemployment & civil
disorder. Fascist Party leader, Mussolini grab power in 1922 w/ march on Rome. App PM, given full
powers & 1924 fixed electoral laws to ensure Fascist Party dominate parliament. By 1929 set up
Corporate State. Penal code tightened, secret police created & no opp allowed. Fascist rule in Italy
never took on brutality & cruelty of Hitlers Germ & Stalins Russia. A clich about Mussolini at least
he made the trains run on time. During 1920s, Italy sig improvements in socio-economic matters:
e.g. major expansion in education
MUSSOLINIS FOREIGN POLICY emphasized importance of Italian nationalism, strength & military
glory. Used word virility. Made much of his own virility; encouraged Italian men to prove theirs in
battle for population. Italian nation must prove itself to world
FOREIGN POLICY AIMS Similar objectives to H though lacked fanatical, ideological elements. In short-
term:
Sought revision of the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement- Italy had entered WWI 1915 following
Treaty of London in which promised various lands following Central Powers Defeat. Not
kept. Anger.
Mussolini knew respect in Europe meant development of Italian military power- Pursued
rearmament, conscription & military strength similar manner to Hitler
In the longer term:
th
Grandiose ideas of creating an Italian Empire- During 19 Italy late in European colonialism;
colonies limited to barren desert in Libya & the horn of Africa. Want revive Roman Empires
glory
Wanted Italy be taken seriously as major European power
Turning of Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake
FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION
1923 July
Take ownership of
Comes from Treaty of Lausanne w/ Turkey & Italianisation
Rhodes & Dodecanese
of Rhodes begin
islands from Turkey
August
The Corfu Incident
Italian border commissioners murdered on Greco-Albanian
border. Italy demands apology & indemnity from Greece
who appeals to LON. Italy bombards Corfu. Greece pays up
& Italy leaves. Prop victory
1925
The Locarno Treaty
Mussolini plays the statesman. LT guarantees west
October
European frontiers & seen as major step cementing peace
1928
Abyssinian affairs
Signs Friendship Treaty. Also sends arms & troops to
adjacent Italian colonies of Eritrea & Somalia
1934 July
Dolfuss assassination
Raises fears Germ about to move into Austria to support
local Nazi Party. Muss moves troops to Brenner Pass &
indicates will not allow takeover. Persuades Hitler to keep

1935 April
October

The Stresa Front

Abyssinian invasion

November
December

League Sanctions
Hoare-Laval Pact

1936 July
November
1937
February
November
1938
September
May

Spanish Civil War

Rome-Berlin Axis
Italy leaves LON

September

Germ invades Poland

Anti-Comintern Pact
Munich Conference
Pact of Steel

out.
B,F,I form common front to stand vs Germ aggression
Muss triumphantly declares new Roman Empire, Stresa
Front collapse
LON imposes half-hearted sanctions vs. Italy
B&F offer to carve up Abyssinia. Plan causes outrage &
both men resign
Muss joins Hitler supporting Gen Franco.

Condemned by LON for Abyssinian actions & now key
partner of Hitler. Sees no pt. in future membership

Muss intervenes at last minute to bring on a conference to
settle Czech crisis
Doesnt commit Italy to fight w/ Germ. Real sig= remove
perceived inferiority of Italy that marked Axis relationship
Italy doesnt go to war w/ Germ. Foreign Minister Ciano
fails attempt organise Munich-style conference over
Poland. Italy join Germ when declares war on B&F June
1940.

HISTORIANS
MEDLICOTT Hitler never wavered in long-term aims, rather opportunist. Consistency in his thinking.
Throughout, the days of Mein Kampf until 1944, the objective was the black-soil region of Russia &
east Europe generally, as living space for German colonists
KERSHAW H never gave up long-term expansion goals. Each action directed to this end.
AJP TAYLOR Tackles lebensraum from non-racial standpt. In economics, lebensraum offer Hitler
nothing. At best offered space. Lebensraum, in short, did not drive Germany to war. Rather war, or
warlike policy, produced the demand for Lebensraum
MACK SMITH Muss attitude to war & methods acceptable in conflict. In unsigned articles Muss wrote
fascist belief in fighting & view that Italians needed have their character forged in battle.
SIMILARITIES OF DICTATORSHIPS/TOTALITARIAN REGIMES
As dictators, H&M promoted:
Jingoism, or ultra nationalism
Xenophobia
The concept that the state was an almighty entity: individuality & human emotions
subordinate to state priorities
Ethnic superiority
The elimination of state enemies
Struggle & violence: activities that would purify the state
Common enemies:
The concepts of democracy, liberalism & open elections
Communism
The concept of Fascism was more a radical attitude than a precise philosophy. Fascist ideologies of
M&H concentrate on glory, radical change, power & conquest
ROLE OF THE DICTATORSHIPS IN THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN TENSIONS
Superficially, blame clearly lies w/ dictators for causing tensions that led to war. No aggressive F=no
war.
Long-term aims- tearing up 1919 Paris Peace Settlement; no intentions of respecting the
status quo
Hitlers actions inc Rhineland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, bent on European domination steady
rearmament & threat of war kept tensions high
Mussolinis actions in Abyssinia & Spain did much to destroy principle of collective security
However, war actually results coz of failure of others to stand up to dictators
Appeasement encouraged dictators in their aggression
Failure to rearm little alternative to appeasement
Soviet decision Aug 1939 to deal w/ H rather than stand up to war inevitable

HSC STUDY BUDDY 5

LEAGUE OF NATIONS & COLLAPSE OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY: Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War
BACKG Woodrow Wilson Fourteen Points 1918. 14th pt. called for creation of a general
association of nations. Preventative approach as nations meet & discuss differences. LON prime
purpose= prevention of international conflicts. 4 primary goals:
Disarmament
Collective security
A policy of negotiation & diplomacy to settle international disputes
A series of humanitarian commissions to deal w/ issues e.g. global poverty
LONSTRUCTURE THE COUNCIL THE ASSEMBLY THE SECRETARIAT LEGAL-POLITICAL
STRUCTURES eg Council for Protection of Minorities/SOCIO ECONOMIC STRUCTURES eg Health
Organisation
1920s some successes e.g. major clash betw Greece & Bulgaria in 1935 end coz League
intervention when Greece accepted it was wrong, paid indemnity. Also serious failures.
Highlighted fundamental weaknesses of League & contributed to ultimate failures e.g.
Attempts to achieve disarmament failed
No military/security force
Dramatic example of Leagues impotence 1931 when Jap invade Manchuria
o LON condemned JAP, ordered it to w/drawLytton Commission, didnt call for
return to status quo, called upon China & Jap to have talks. Jap left league 1933.
Demonstrated League had no power to stop major powers defying it
Fundamental principle behind League collective security: if 1 member attacked others would
rally round in defence of that member & force back down of aggressor. Jap show inadequacy of
this principle
OTHER REASONS FOR FAILURE
Rested on principle of internationalism (notion that nations sacrifice national gain for
common good). Basic flaw: Europe inter-war period= rise of aggressive nationalist
regimes. LON structure based on nationalism- each state in Assembly equal vote; votes
need be unanimous: Unworkable
Aim of disarmament rested on fatal contradiction. Article 8 called for reduction of
national armaments to the lowest pt consistent w/ national safety. Level interpreted just
a bit stronger than my neighbour. Disarmament logically impossible.
LON never reflected true reality of world balance of power. Only as strong as its
membership. US never member; Germ left 1934; Jap 1933; Italy 1937. SU only member
1934-39. Relied on B&F who after 1919 2nd rate powers in eco & military terms
Success rely upon Anglo-French cooperation. Their interests were divergently
opposed F want strong League ensure European security; B want flexible League as
interests outside Europe.
Feb 1932 convened 60-nation conference on disarmament. Germ demanded parity w/
other nations in naval tonnage & size of army. Didnt occur largely due to Fs lobbying. 14
Oct, left & resigned from LONMar 1935 formally denounced terms of TOV when begun
rearmament
MANCHURIA Sep 1931 Jap armies invade Manchuria. LON response: diplomatic appeals &
condemnations but no peaceful solution as troops remained. 2yrs later resigned from LON. 1937
Imperial Jap Army attacked southern China. League responded w/ verbal condemnations &
sanctions but Jap forces remained. Enforce need for standing army to enforce policies.
ABYSSINIA Oct 1935 Italy invade Abyssinia
Italy maintained cordial relations w/ B&F & neighbour Austria. Jul 1934 when Austrian
Nazis attempt coup sent 2 divisions to borders coup failed. F&I respond creating
alliance Jan 1935.
Germ rearming: Apr 1935 B, F, I est. Stresa Front. H temp back off from territorial
ambitions
June 1935 M found faith in B unjustified w/ Anglo-German Naval Agreement. B didnt
inform F or I of intentions & Bs appeasement of Nazi Germ at this pt compromised
ideals of SF.

BACKG Muss want imperial expansion- victory in Abyssinia resurgence of New Roman Empire.
Other encouragements:
Rich in resources. Provide Italy w/ food & export markets
Italy humiliated by Ab at Battle of Adowa 1896. Victory restore Italian honour
Convenience as Ab flanked by 2 Italian colonies & apart from Liberia, nowhere else to
colonise
ITALIAN INVASION Oct 1935 Italian armies moved into Ab. Italian strength & its willingness to
use modern weapons, inc gas, quickly wore down Abyssinians. April 1936: Abyssinian capital
captured. 9 May 1936- Italian King Victor Emmanuel III crowned emperor.
IMPACT ON LON & PRINCIPLE OF CS League app arbitrators who sought to persuade Ab to
accept border changes w/ Italys colonies. Clear League not give much assistance. B&F couldve
taken strong action vs Italy as had colonies next to Italys colonies & B couldve denied Italy use
of Suez Canal. But, Apr 1935 had formed Stresa Front w/ Italy, which aimed to keep Germ in
check. Feared strong action vs. Italy would destroy SF & drive Italy to Germ. LON imposed half-
hearted & ineffective sanction
Oil & coal not inc (key resources for nation at war)
Austria, Albania, Switzerland & Hungary refused to endorse sanctions
G & SU helped Italy
Sanctions did nothing to assist Ab. Weak nature evidenced League useless. Carr The Italian
victory was a grave blow to the League & an acute embarrassment for Great Britain. AJP Taylor
This was the death-blow to the League as well as to Abyssinia. Sanctions imposition destroyed
SF. By Nov 1936 axis partner of Germ; Feb 1937 left LON. Dec 1935 publication Hoare-Laval
Plan. B&F politicians had attempted to buy of Muss to maintain favour. Italy would keep 60% of
Abyssinian territory & new nation of Ab would be reduced to a corridor for camels. Never
materialized after scandal which infuriated M.
Compounded Manchurias assertion that LON dead esp concept of CS
Hoare-Laval Plan evidenced B&F prefer to do deals w/ dictators rather than stand up to
them.
Transformed Italy: nation willing to stand up to H (Austria 34) willing become its
partner
Encouraged H to believe he could get away w/ acts of aggression. March 1936 marched
troops into Rhineland
BELL: key result Ab crisis= effect on Anglo-French relations. Hoare-Laval Plan exampled hard-
edged politics (realpolitik). B believed F led them down w/ publication of Plans details. F
angered at Bs sentimental fit of Leagueomania & morality- had done nothing for Ab rather
result in loss of valuable Italian alliance. There was enough realpolitik to undermine the League, &
enough League sentiment to nullify the realpolitik Anglo-French relations collapsed at a time
when their solidity was sorely needed
ROSS: major impact of Abyssinian Crisis on growth of Italian-Germ relationship. Muss deeply
angered by Anglo-French behaviour over Ab. Annoyance at sanctions, also French bad faith &
inept handling of Hoare-Laval Plan. Turn to Germ
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1st occasion on which H&M combine resources to challenge
democracies. Nationalist victory synonymous w/ fascist victory. LON unable directly intervene;
peace appeals fail
BACKG 1923-29 military dictatorship. Overthrown w/ est of democratic republic. Spain deeply
divided betw Republicans & Nationalists. SCW start July 36. Gen Franco championed those
seeking destroy repub.
SIGNIFICANCE Spain important sev. Reasons:
Further consolidated divisions w/in Europe: Germ & Italy gave solid backing to
Nationalists whilst B&F, though supporting non-intervention, generally sympathetic to
Republicans
G & Is backing of Nationalists cemented their relationship
B&F championed non-intervention in Spain; discouraging citizens from joining fighting.
Actively attempt prevent arms getting in while G&I no qualms ignoring non-intervention
Further highlighted LONs incapacity. Spain largely perceived at time as a rehearsal for
bigger conflict many believed inevitable
EVANS: Intervention= military practice w/ new weaponry. [Spain] was one more example of the
supine pusillanimity of Britain & France, & thus an encouragement to move faster in the fulfilment
of his own intentions More immediately, however, it cemented the alliance betw. H & Muss.

HSC STUDY BUDDY 7

ROLE IN GROWTH OF EUROPEAN TENSIONS Collapse of CS major factor in outbreak war in
1939. Fail coz:
Failure of internationalism in world beset w/ aggressive nationalism
Failure of League to reflect true balance of power
Lack of any coercive machinery, so nations e.g. Jap, could act w/ impunity
Absence of great powers from LON & Anglo-French weakness
Principle of CS= great idealistic hope of inter-war period. Collapsed unable to handle realities of
European politics. Collapse meant no means to stop aggressionforced B&F into policy of app. It
failed war

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT: AN
ASSESSMENT
ORIGINS Policy of app reference attempts by B&F to grant concessions to Germ in attempt to
preserve peace. Hindsight can bedevil an understanding of the past. Distance= increase criticism
though at time logical.
1. Appeasement was not new to Britain: make concessions so pursue worldwide
ambitions: trade, naval power, development of empire. Only intervene when interests
under direct threat
2. Appeasement had been in operation since 1919: LG sought to moderate TOV.
Contented Germ= stronger bulwark vs. communism. Churchill (1921) The aim is to get
an appeasement of the fearful hatreds & antagonisms which exist in Europe & to enable the
world to settle down.
3. Appeasement in 1930s seen differently: In 1920s Germ weak, & app-style concessions
e.g. Dawes Plan, made from position of strength. Factors e.g. GD, dread of warapp
logical policy option
FACTORS BEHIND APPEASEMENT
H admired in Bs ruling circles: brought stability & discipline & provide defence vs comm.
Actions viewed sympathetically. March into Rhineland= going into ones backyard
Popular dread of war. New technology- WWII more horrific. Baldwin The bomber will
always get through Public opinion overwhelmingly pacifist
B preoccupied w/ domestic matters e.g. depression & unemploymentmoney on health
not defence
International reality of times point to logic of appeasement:
o LON & principle of CS dead, Bs armed forces had been allowed to run down
(Military conflict=suicidal, therefore appeasement= opp to rearm)
APPEASEMENT IN ACTION 1930s- became key element of policy manifesting in active & passive
ways.
Oct
Germ rearmament
Accepted as inevitable consequence of failure of Disarmament
1933
Conference; G only seeking equality
Mar
Germ introduces
Against TOV but Bs only action= mild protest
1935
conscription
Jun
Anglo-Germ Naval
Directly contravened TOV & B acted w/out consulting F
1935
Agreement
weakened SF
Mar
Remilitarisation of
Directly contravened 1925 Locarno Pact which guaranteed western
1936
Rhineland
European frontiers. Beyond protest note, B&F did nothing
1936SCW
B&F avoided involvement, pushing for non-intervention
39
G&I fully backed Nationalists- no action vs them
Mar
Austria
Shock/bewilderment at Hs aggression became resignation &
1938
Anschluss accepted as inevitable
CZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS High watermark of Appeasement= Munich Conference Sep 1938.
Today politicians avoid being labelled appeasers. Though at time Chamberlain welcomed home
as peacemaker.
BACKG important to Germ- 3mil Germ speaking people in western border regions (Sudetenland).
H made clear intend use force. It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military
action in the near future Operation Green 1st Oct. Chamberlain didnt wish B go to war over
obscure issue in central Europe deciding to deal w/ H directly. Several personal meetings
before...

MUNICH CONFERENCE Main players H, Muss, Chamberlain, French PM Daladier. Hs demands

granted, Sudetenland ceded to Germ. Czech informed if didnt accept= face Germ alone. Loss
considerable as lost much of industry & mineral resources & border defences. Before leaving,
Chamberlain & H meet whereby sign document in which both promised to seek peaceful
resolutions for future issues betw. 2.
Chamberlain believed had gained peace w/ honour & assured Europe peace in our
time
H overheard labelling it a scrap of paper
Churchill to parliament Do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the
reckoning
APPEASEMENTS END In months following- notable easing of tension. However, Churchill
compared Germ to boa constrictor- after eaten, needs time to rest/digest before hunts again. 15
Mar 1939 Germ troops marched into rest of Czechoslovakia. Week later seize port of Memel &
surrounding district. Apr: Muss annexed Albania.
Munich agreement had been ripped up. 31 Mar, B formally guaranteed independence of Poland.
H now knew if attacked Poland, B would go to war. Similar guarantees for Romania, Greece,
Turkey. France followed.
HISTORIANS
CATO: 3 journalists- Howard, Owen, Foot- wrote under pseudonym, blisteringly attacking
appeasers. Baldwin & Chamberlain accused of being blind to the purposes of the criminal new
Nazi war power. Assumes British policy makers had option to choose alternative policies of
resistance & confrontation rather than conciliation... the essence of their culpability lies in the fact
that they could & should have acted differently
CHURCHILL: shows failure, ineptitude & naivety of appeasers. Witnessed impact of WWII. Anti-
Chamberlain
Believes app originated coz of Chamberlains cowardice & unwillingness to confront H
militarily
Attacks his polit opponents
States if he PM in 1936, H wouldve stopped dead in Rhineland; overzealousness &
obvious bias
AJP TAYLOR: Taylors writing style & line of argument often idiosyncratic, flamboyant,
confronting.
Describes Chamberlain & Daladier as hopeful & genuine men of peace who attempted to
deal w/ v. real problem in meaningful way
Chamberlain failed coz didnt pursue appeasement after Munich failing to recog H a
man of peace
H opportunistic & dedicated statesmen w/ no preconceived notions of aggression & no
long-term policies except preserve Germs integrity. H didnt make plans- for world
conquest of for anything else. He assumed that others would provide opportunities & that
he would seize them.
H not demoniacal figure of popular imagination
Conflict in Europe began 1939 due to bungling diplomacy of involved statesmen
Munich pivotal but more vigorous app shouldve been pursued in 1939. Chamberlain
embarked on new aggressive policy geared for war which prompted H to respond in
similar fashion. Mutual misunderstandings
CHARMLEY: Believed Chamberlain achieved what was best for B at time. Argues few liberals in
west believed in moral validity of Versailles nor in keeping up military force needed to enforce its
terms & that This was Chamberlains inheritance, along w/ a shaky economy, a strategically over-
extended empire & a France suffering from terminal loss of nerve

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NAZI-SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACT

BACKG TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY F.P. something of an enigma to western observers since SU est.
Purpose: spread international revolution or promotion of national interest? GD welcomed in Moscow:
evidence of the collapse of capitalism?- SU only nation free of eco depression?
Stalin ordered brother comm parties not to cooperate w/ others; allowed fascist parties to
come to power believing would worsen social tensions socialist revolution. Disastrous e.g.
SPD + KPD failure to work together allow for Nazi consolidation

HSC STUDY BUDDY 9

Mid 1930s Stalin encouraged comm parties to participate in anti-Fascist Popular Front govs
e.g. intervened in SCW on Republicans side
Alarmed by Hitlers advances as lebensraum req destruction of SU. No state for military
confrontation; Soviet countryside in state of virtual civil war as Stalin sought to collectivise
agriculture; politically SU tore itself apart during 1930s w/ series of purges.
F.P. IN 1930s
early 1930s non-aggression pacts w/ neighbours e.g. Poland, Finland
1934- join LON + est diplomatic relations w/ US
Germ threat grew 1936 e.g. rearmament cont, moved into Rhineland, Anschluss. Western
democracies= appeasement but some suggested joining SU vs. Hitler.
West had profound distrust of Russia
Stalin distrustful of west, suspecting B+F pushing Hitler to confront Russia
B offered Poland guarantee March 1939, Hitler renounced German-Polish Non-Aggression
Pact + Anglo-German Naval Agreement chance of Anglo-Soviet agreement; B negotiators
sent lacking in authority, half-hearted. Deutscher if the western governments had wanted to
drive him [Stalin] into Hitlers arms, they could not have set about doing so more effectively
than they did
Stalin distrustful of west, Hitler realised attack on Poland 2 front war. Signals:
H announce intention of dealing w/ Poland in major speech- no anti-Soviet references
August- Ribbentrop recog. Soviet interests in Poland + the Baltic would be respected
NAZI-SOVIET NON-AGRESSION PACKED 23 AUG 1939
STALIN signed because
Bs guarantee to Poland made war in west inevitable; hopefully H exhaust B+F
West couldnt be trusted
Deal w/ Hitler share of Poland + security buffer betw. Germ + Russia
w/ Hitler busy in west, Russia have time to consolidate/strengthen forces
HITLER signed because
2-front war dangerous; deal Poland quickly defeated then deal w/ west
SU could be dealt w/ once west defeated
Neutralizing SU avoid mess as seen July/Aug 1914
10-year pact giving green light to Germ invasion of Poland.
rd
Article 2 if Germ/Russia became involved in war w/ 3 power, other wouldnt intervene
Secret protocols which created Germ + SU spheres of influence i.e. Germ receive western
Poland + Lithuania; SU- Estonia, Latvia, Finland + Bessarabia
HISTORIANS
BELL: blames Bs hesitancy, lack of seriousness, distrust of Stalin for why chose Germ over B+F. H
offered immediately what S wanted. [the Germans] could offer certain neutralityspheres of
influence[and were] ready to carve up Polandwhereas the British and the French could deliver
nothing
EVANS: neither H or S expected pact to last full 10 years; suitable for dictators at time to drop mutual
distrust/detestation. Short-term but also From Stalins perspective, it provided a respite and
opened up the enticing prospect of Europes capitalist powers, Germany, France and Britain, fighting a
war of mutual destruction between themselves.


CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Varying explanations of contd. debate:
Wars outbreak entirely the fault of Hitler &, to a lesser extent, Mussolini
Result of Nazi aggression & no respect for international agreements. E.g. discard TOV armament
clauses w/ intro conscription, built army, create air force. Aggressive intentions in remilitarizing
Rhineland, Anschluss, Czechoslovakia. To fight vs. H= fight for international law, justice, morality,
spirit of CS.
The outbreak of war was the fault of B+F
Hs aggression unquestionable but war result from lack of resistance. Germ rearmament allowed in
name of equality + justified by comm fear. Hs territorial claims justified on basis TOV unfair.
Chamberlains obstinate refusal to seriously consider working w/ SU gave Stalin no choice but sign
Nazi-Soviet Pact.
Circumstances of the 1930s gave western leaders no alternative to the policies they pursued

Condemning appeasement= simplistic, taking no account of strategic, economic + political limitations

of time. Baldwin, Chamberlain etc. should be credited for attempts to maintain peace.
Bs strategic burden inter-war enormous, commitments far-reaching (North Sea- Palestine-
Singapore)
Military leaders warned couldnt take on 3 enemies simultaneously (G, I, Jap)- appeasement
logical- reduce no# enemies
BELL: In F both left + right desire for pacifism almost irresistible. Impact of losses of WWI
greater than in other nations F willing to follow B line of appeasement in 1930s. A
profound longing for peace... exercised a pervasive influence in F during the 1920s + 1930s.
Variation- Bs govs behaviour in 1930s in keeping w/ trad B f.p. from time immemorial, only enter
into European affairs when balance of power threatened. Forced into war by dominative Germ
War resulted from the failure of the principle of CS + operation of LON; optimism misplaced
Principle of internationalism never had chance: Death + destruction of war bred desire for
security/revenge- notions not conducive to idealistic internationalism
Rise of far right nationalistic thinking + demise of democracy + appearance of right wing
nationalistic dictatorships: Poland, Austria, Hungary had dictators. Fascist parties in Romania,
Spain= regimes antithetic to internationalism
LON shown to be increasingly powerless + irrelevant. Aggression not checked by LON +
failure of CS new system of alliances. W/ Abyssinia, LON intervened but failed to save
sovereignty.
International relations is a branch of politics which is intensely personal. War came in 1939 due to
the failings of individual statesmen (REVISIONIST-OPPORTUNISTS)
GR Elton history is about the activities of people not abstractions. Of course people make decisions
within a context but this context does not act as some directing or determining force.
Dishonest, lying, duplicitous nature of men e.g. Hitler/Muss. Their penchant for opportunism
poisoned international environment
B needed strong leaders, had pacifists e.g. Baldwin, Chamberlain
o Baldwin admitted not pushing rearmament in 1935 election- public opinion not
accept it
o Chamberlains naivety + obstinacy allowed no alternatives to appeasement
More recent critic- Parker
accepts that Chamberlain was competent + far-sighted
Variety of policy options Chamberlain skilfully hid; pursued appeasement w/ great
obstinacy ignored expert advice + suggestions from critics; [believed] he could march H on
the yellow brick road to peace when in reality H was marching v firmly on the road to war.
To place responsibility for the outbreak of war on the shoulders of individuals is too simplistic
EH Carr Everything that happens has a cause or causes, and could not have happened differently
unless something in the cause or causes had also been different.
Strength of inter-war pacifism, growth of nationalistic right-wing polit movements, failure of principle
internationalism. Argued direct link betw depression + wars eventual outbreak:
Onset of GD in Germ= demise of Weimar + Nazi opportunity.
Jap suffered enormously from GD; reliance on export markets unemployment as
protectionism grew. Domestic hardship expansionist policies. Jap aggression served as an
example to H&M + destroyed principle of collective security- highlighting LONs failure
GD majorly impact Bs eco which determined policies tying Bs hands in dealings w/ H
Helped H gain power. Contributed to weaknesses in B+F. Most countries concerned w/
rebuilding own economies; fuelled fires of radical polit. movements desiring change +
reform.
OVERY: International system during inter-war period didnt reflect reality of international power
international enviro unstable, H took advantage of this. US isolationism, SU concentration on
developing its revolution fate of Europe in B+Fs hands. Dominated LON + European diplomacy:
nd
B 2 rate military + eco power: defences run down, preoccupied w/ imperial matters
F left to uphold post-war settlement: demographically, economically + militarily, F couldnt
match Germ
o Overburdening of F= key factor in balance of power shift in favour of Axis powers
o 1930s F steadily decayed

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there was a growing contradiction betw the existing international system + the reality of power made
more dangerous by restless political forces released by economic modernisation + the rise of mass
politics.
The source of the outbreak of war in 1939 can be found in the Paris Peace Settlement of 1919
Compromise pleased no one- too harsh for Americans, too weak for French, humiliating for Germs. H
come to power by exploiting hostility to TOV. Germ angry but unbroken. Taylor: TOV failed to deal w/
issue of Germ power. Less onerous for Germ than domestic prop made out: .
Geographically Germ intact, apart from losing small border areas, only lost 13% of territory
1919 population 65mil, dwarfing Fs 40mil
Economy still potentially strongest in Europe
Taylor pts out even harsher measures of treaty could only be implemented w/ Germ
cooperation; Germ to be disarmed but had to do so itself. Germany had only to secure a
modification of the treaty, or to shake it off altogether, + she would emerge as strong, or
almost as strong as she had been in 1914.
OTHER CAUSES
Disarmament During 1920s/30s LON supported or convened no fewer than 8 international
conferences on disarmament; realistic solutions never found.
Militarism: e.g. Germ rearmed 1933; Jap had militarist gov. Disarmament conferences failed
increased suspicion + distrust
Growth of International Alliances: e.g. Germ + Jap 1936, Germ + Italy 1937, Axis Powers 1939, B+F
1938 treaties made outside the LON helped to weaken it + increased fear
Lack of Traditional Balance: e.g. Russian revolution, F weak, B unprepared trad relationships
changed
Ideological conflict Totalitarianism opposed to demo but democracies slow to act coz totalitarianism
had hatred of communism. H+M both supported Nationalists in SCW. Victory represent fascist
success + further challenged concept of democracy

DID HITLER PLAN WWII? Intentionalists argue Hs expansionist policy result of preconception. Master
plan consistently pursued up to + beyond start of war. Evidence:
FP in Mein Kampf
th
Hossbach Memorandum 5 Nov 1937, foreign minister, war minister + other leading military
chiefs told to prep Germ for conquests in east whilst militarily superior to B. Inc. plans to
seize Austria + Czechoslovakia.
Examination of crises e.g. Czechoslovakia.
Taylor criticises this orthodox view (Intentionalist). Claimed H hadnt followed pre-determined master
plan: Mein Kampf + Hossbach Memorandum nothing more than polit daydreaming not historical
evidence. Argued Hs FP essentially improvised according to opps. Stressed Hs desire to overturn TOV
+ restore Germ greatness= aim shared by all German politicians.
Division over whether Germ FP post1933 more aggressive continuation of previous policies of
expansion or distinctive break arising from Hs personal priorities. Most historians stress continuity in
policy.

Course of the European War
GERMAN ADVANCES: the Fall of Poland, the Low Countries and
France
BLITZKRIEG H want victory w/ short, sharp attacks Blitzkrieg or lightning war, involved:
Offensive weapons concentrated on targeted narrow area; e.g. Luftwaffe obliterated
predetermined targets w/ ongoing sweeps of saturation bombing
Tanks (panzers) close off all road networks leading to the target, trapping anyone inside
Wehrmacht & airborne troops work in conjunction w/ panzer units to capture enemy,
soldiers, civilians
V. effective as caused maximum damage, casualties & chaos in short period of time.

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rd

FALL OF POLAND Germ invasion began 1 Sep. B&F declare war on Germ 3 Sep. Germ numerical adv
in no# men, tanks, artillery e.g. Poles 370 000 troops whereas Wehrmacht 1.25 mil men.
Germ forces overall command Gen von Brauchitsch. Gen Kuchler led forces from East
Prussia, von Rundstedts forces attacked across south of Poland
Luftwaffe had destroyed most of Polish air force w/in few days
Polish armies attacked & surrounded in blitzkrieg style
17 Sep Soviet troops invade from east meeting minor resistance as many Poles thought they
were coming to help. (Stalin had intervened prompted by rapidity of Germ success)
th
28 Sep Warsaw, fell & by 5 Oct Polish resistance ended (less than month to capture capital)
German had 10 500 killed. Poland had 66 000 dead. 28 Sep, Germ Foreign Minister Ribbentrop finalise
details joint Nazi-Soviet carve up of Poland. Lithuania Russia. Germ consolidate hold on western
Poland.
30 Nov, Soviets attacked Finland attempt to consolidate control over Baltic Sea. By years end, forces
bogged. Winter war ended Mar 1940. Fins kept independence but surrendered 10% of territory.
Hs strike force in Poland consumed 75% of his armed forces Germ vulnerable.
FALL OF DENMARK & NORWAY following Poland= quiet period; formally at war, no fighting.
Americans called Oct 1939-Apr 1940 the phoney war; Germ sitzkrieg- sitting war. Still, minor
skirmishes occurred along Maginot Line betw. F&G, Finnian-Soviet war contd, SS busy reorganizing
Poland.
B considering plans to cut off Swedish iron ore supplies to Germ (major impact war production).
Swedish iron ore reached Germ via Norwegian port Narvik. 9 Apr H launched Operation Weserubung,
direct attack on Denmark & Norway; Denmarks king surrendered next day. Allied troops had
toeholds in central Norway & pounded Germ positions in Narvik. W/ Frances collapse allied troops
w/drew. Norway surrender 10 June. Part of Nazi empire for wars duration
FALL OF LOW COUNTRIES 10 May, attacked Low Countries- Belgium & Netherlands- Operation Fall
Gelb
Germs quickly cut through Netherlands. Rotterdam heavily bombed 14 May, w/in days
Netherland surrendered
10 May, Luftwaffe bombed Belgian airfields. Belgian fort of Eban Emael captured by glider
troops. Belgian army surrendered late May
B&F believed attack on F take similar form to 1914 Schlieffen Plan. Believed Germ mechanized
advance couldnt penetrate heavily forested Ardennes region of southern Belgium & Luxembourg;
believe Maginot Line on Fs common border w/ G unable to be breached. But, Gen von Bock adv
through Belgium w/ massive force. Allied Gens Gamelin & Gort order forces deal w/ threat. Move a
diversion. 11 May, Gen von Leeb attack Maginot Line. In centre, von Rundstedt prepping mass
breakthrough w/ 46 divisions, masses of tanks, artillery, aircraft, 100s of bulldozers11 day campaign
Battle for France
Von Rundstedts thrust into F so dramatic/decisive called sichelschnitt (sickle cut)
Allied forces in Belgium & around Maginot Line completely separated
Advance rapid. Germ panzer (tank) units pushed deeper into F & towards Channel coast. Port
of Boulogne taken 27 May, Calais surrounded.
24 May H ordered forces to halt & consolidate positions
DUNKIRK B forces ordered back towards Dunkirk. Churchill ordered evacuation of all allied troops to
England. Arguably greatest naval rescue exercise. Some 850 vessels used to bring out of F almost 340
000 allied troops & civilians. Amazing feat or catastrophic?
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg had been lost, F about to fall
Evacuation largely only possible coz H inexplicably decided not to destroy troops as
evacuated. View= war w/ B was over & peace terms soon could be discussed
27 May Calais captured, Dunkirk 4 June
BEF over 68 000 killed, wounded, taken prisoner; left in F 2472 guns, 90 000 rifles, 63
879vehicles
THE FALL OF FRANCE Target Paris & areas to east of capital begin 5 June. Von Bocks & Rundstedts
forces soon surrounding Paris. By 9 June, F army in headlong retreat. 10 June, Muss declared war on
th.
F. Italian forces struggle make any headway through F. Germs enter Paris 14 Germ forces fanned out
west, south & east, encircling final remnants of F army;

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PM Reynaud want fight on. Gen Weygand insisted on armistice. Reynaud resigned replaced by aging
Marshal Petain who eager to sign armistice. F forced to sign armistice w/ Germ in same railway
carriage as 1918, then destroyed. Terms:
F divided into 2 zones, Germs occupied north & western seaboard
Rest of F administered by French regime based at Vichy; collaborate loyally w/ Germ. Vichy
regime hated by most Frenchmen: supporters seen as traitors. Free French Resistance
movement
HISTORIANS
TAYLOR: H had over-extended himself in Poland; Germ had used 75% of supplies. If F had launched
offensive in west, little forces to resist. Hitler, far from preparing for a great war, operated on a
narrow margin & counted in quick victories achieved at little cost.
LIDDELL HART: Czechoslovakia crises had left Poland encircled by Germs. Invasion of P provided
demonstration & proof... P was all too well suited for a demonstration of Blitzkrieg
CHURCHILL: as early as 1 Oct glimpse of light for P. SU always acted in national self-interest & cannot
be in SUs interest to have Nazi Germ overrunning south east Europe. [it] cannot be in accordance w/
the interest of Russia that Germ should plant herself upon the shores of the Black Sea.
MAJOR GENERAL BARRY: Allied strategy in F & Low Countries essentially defensive. Allied command
slow & unimaginative. Germ plan bold & risky. The Germans staked everything on the success of the
methods which had brought them victory in Poland. Problematic if Rundstedts central thrust failed
or allies reacted more quickly.
COLONEL GOUTARD: Attacks F military leaders for clinging to outmoded tactics & of being incapable
of adapting to the innovative tactics of the enemy. When new unexpected tactics of enemy
experienced, F resigned themselves to defeat. Germ not overwhelmingly powerful. allow itself to be
constantly outmanoeuvred by the enemy w/out attempting the least counter-stroke.

THE AIR WAR AND ITS EFFECTS: The Battle of Britain and the
Blitz, the Bombing of Germany
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN June October 1940
AIM: Germ attempt to defeat RAF & est air superiority prior to invasion of B
RESULT: B victory end Germ invasion plans
Historians debate Hs intentions. B were Aryans, his goal was expansion in east & Bs contd opp was a
major irritant. Wouldve preferred not fight. After Dunkirk & Fall of France assumed B would reach
agreement w/ him; offered terms thought wouldnt resist. Churchill opposed to making peace w/ aim
victory in spite of all terror. Bs refusal to see sense forced H to attack. Invasion plans Operation
Sea Lion, however, impossible w/out control of air/sea. Battle of Britain= summer of 1940; Luftwaffe
attempt overcome RAF & gain control of skies over Channel & South East England. Air Marshal
Dowdings Fighter Command: 650 fighters; Goering 2800 aircraft, 900 fighters, 300 bombers
Early July Germ fighters engaged in probing raids on coastal targets & shipping in Channel
Betw 8-18 Aug, attacks concentrated on airfields used by RAF front line groups
By late Aug, Fighter Command running out of aircraft & pilots
Evening 25/26, RAF bombers launch minor attack on Berlin. H ordered Luftwaffe switch
attack from airfields & control centres to London
Germ failed gain air superiority. Aug/Sep, Luftwaffe lose 1244 planes & crews, RAF 688. 15 Sep lost 58
th
planes 17 Operation Sea Lion called off indefinitely.
BRITISH VICTORY IN BATTLE DUE TO
-
Radar detect & track Germ fighters before reach B. By 1940, 51 tracking stations
-
B aircraft production increased dramatically
-
Dowding System provided RAF w/ sophisticated detection & command system
-
Luftwaffes lacked specific aims & operated independently of Germ military
-
Bs basic strats- to survive & retaliate. Psychological victory. RAF pilots display skill & courage
-
RAF was fighting over home territory; planes could land & refuel easily & spend more time in
air. Fallen aircraft might be repaired, downed pilots could be rescued
Battle ensued a kind of stalemate. Survival of B major implications:
If surrendered Germ wouldnt have 2 (later 3) front war
Invasion of Russia wouldve had much greater chance of success

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 I&G wouldve taken North Africa & gained control of Middle East oil supplies & Suez Canal
US unable to later base itself in Bno invasion of Normandy nor constant bombing of G
Churchill Never in the field of human conflict, was so much owed by so many to so few.
THE BLITZ September 1940 May 1941
AIM: Germ attack switched to B cities in order to damage economy & morale
RESULT: Great damage & loss of life but morale sustained & B undefeated as Germ attention turned
to SU
th
15 Sep, Germ launch massive daylight bombing raid on London. Lasted til 30 , then attacked at night.
Attention on Bs towns & cities & centres of production. London main target, 7-13 bombed every
night.
Main force of Blitz occurred betw. Sep 1940 & May 1941. In 9 mnths of Blitz 40 000 civilians died, over
2mil houses damaged (60% in London). However, industrial production not drastically hurt.
The worse the bombing the more British resolve hardened. Persistence. We can take it
th
Worst night for London 29 Dec 1940. 1 building to survive= St Pauls Cathedral. Immortal
photograph of St Pauls standing amidst the smoke/flames symbol of Bs will to resist
Longer-term sig= reporting of American journalist Murrow. Radio broadcastssympathy &
admiration in US for B.
By May, H need air force for plans in Russia though B contd be bombed intermittently throughout
war.
BOMBING OF GERMANY Architect of allied bombing campaign was Bomber Harris. Later criticised
for area bombing- attacking entire cities rather than specific targets. Early attempts mixed at best:
15/16 May 1940, 96 strong force attacked Ruhr. Only claimed to find target area
Night bombing 1940 inaccurate & ineffective. However, attacks on Germ cities angered H
ordered switch to Blitzhelp B win Battle of B
1941 report ineffectiveness of Bomber Command. 1034 bomber aircraft lost facing difficulty
in replacing aircraft...By the last months of 1941 the bombing offensive was petering out
Overy
Harris took over realising concentration of force important. 1942 & 43 sev developments:
Aircraft production increase, by 1942s end, Harris had 1000 bombers at disposal
Improvements in navigation equip
Improved flying techniques, inc adding bomb-aimers to crews & pioneered pathfinder
crews who led bombing groups to targets
From Aug 1942 American Air Force joined RAF widened bombing options
Tech improvements; Bomber Command device known as window- 100s of strips of
aluminium foil dropped & on Germ radar simulated a Lancaster bomber. 1000s dropped
radar ineffective
Jan 1943 Churchill met US Pres Roosevelt: decide bombing campaign priority. Over 5 days in Jul,
Hamburg pulverised by concentrated attack city became alight, 40 000 died & 1mil homeless. By
1943 end bombing raids suffering massive losses e.g. Schweinfurt- out of US force of 220 bombers,
198 destroyed or damaged. Innovation put balance back in allies favour. System of disposable fuel
tanks developed to give fighters greater range & allow accompany bombers on long missions.
Early 1944 Germ fighter losses enormous & hard replace. Front-line fighter aircraft w/drawn to
protect Germ weakening Germ military position on EF vs. Russia. When Allies invade F June 1944
12000 aircraft, G 300. By mid 1944, Overy suggests defeat of Germ air force accomplished fact.
Bombing gradually destroyed Germs eco base. Oil supplies reduced, chemical production cut, railway
system weakened. Industry relied on stockpiles & desperate underground production employing slave
labour
HISTORIANS
RICHARDS: Fighter pilots & presence of navy in Channel halted Hs path of conquest; saved more than
B. By earning B a great breathing space in which the future progress of events was to bring her the
mighty alliance of Russia & the US, they made possible the final victory & the liberation of Europe from
the Nazi terror.
OVERY: revisionists in recent years sought to minimise Bs achievements in WWII, Overy doesnt do so
but interesting insights. Churchills few were not few- 2 sides prob evenly matched. B had adv inc
better org air defences & equipment. Suggests debate over morality of allied bombing turned focus
away from its success. Always seemed implausible to him that nation, whose industry stretched &
people war-weary, would not be affected by dropping of 2.5mil tons of bombs.

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OPERATION BARBAROSSA, THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD AND

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
OPERATION BARBAROSSA
22 June 1941, Germ invade SU. Invasion not surprise, Hs motives ideological, racial, strategic &
economic:
Lebensraum long-term aim. Clarified would be found in vastness of Russia
Slavs of Russia racial inferiors future slave force of master race. Racial purity ensured by
dealing w/ 5mil Jews living in Russia
Russia provide land, grain, oil, & slave labour
Defeat of Russia would totally isolate B
THE ATTACK Stalin warned by B intelligence & own sources invasion imminent, didnt believe. Germ
attack of monumental proportions: 3.2 mil men. Needed quick victory: Russian resources limitless &
virulent Russian winter hazardous. Blitzkrieg tactics.
SU totally unprepared. Took hours for Soviet forces realize under attack Germ spectacular progress:
st
By noon 1 day, 1200 Soviet aircraft destroyed
By Julys end, captured Bialystol, Minsk, Uman, Smolensk
By mid-July, Army Group North w/in 100kms of Leningrad but H ordered pause while infantry
forces mopped up in Baltic states
W/in month, Wehrmacht taken area twice size of Germ. Seps end- Soviet forces lost 3mil
men
Army Group Centre stalled on Hs orders. Insisted tank divisions should assist in capture of
Kiev to secure food supplies of the Ukraine. 19 Sep Kiev captured
In south, Odessa, Kharkov & Rostov fell in Oct/Nov
Momentum had slowed. Leningrad not captured & both sides settled in for a horrific 3 yr siege. Oct- H
launch Operation Typhoon, attack on Moscow. W/in days Red Army defeated around Vyazma &
Bryansk w/ 650 000 prisoners. Change: Autumn rains= Russias poor roads quagmires progress
slowed. Russian winter as temperatures plummeted advance ground to halt. Inadequate
clothing/lack of supplies hypothermia, frostbite &trench foot. Luftwaffe failed maintain army
supplies. Couldnt land in freezing conditions parachute drops Soviet anti-aircraft guns forced
Germ aircraft fly high supplies lost or to Soviets.
Briefly mid-Oct, Moscow in state of panic. Chance of Germ army faded. Unlike H, Stalin willing to
listen to generals, partic Zhukov who organized anti-tank defences around Moscow to slow Germ
advance. Organisational skills & weaponry appropriate to Russian conditions turn tide vs. Wehrmacht.
Stalin learned from intelligence Jap planning attack on US so moved Siberian Army Corps of 750 000
men west to face Germs. Appearance lowered Germ morale. Using Sib troops Zhukov counter-attack
5 Dec. Germ forced back 300 km in places. Though not defeated- Moscow saved. H face drawn-out
campaign.
WHY DID BARBAROSSA FAIL
GEOGRAPHY: vastness of Russia disorientation, made difficult keep forces supplied. SU
followed scorched-earth policy. As retreated, anything of value destroyed e.g. Dnieper Dam
CLIMATE: Russian winter, minus 40 degree temps, Germs unprepared for; Russians natural
enviro. Russian rasputitza (the time of no roads) start in Nov. Rain, hail, snow rapidly turned
Moscow & its environs into a frozen, muddy quagmire. Russians accustomed.
HITLERS INTERFERENCE: didnt allow generals to run things. Direct intervention arguably
prevent capture of Leningrad. Decision take Kiev before Moscow prepared. Slowed Germ
progress
ROLE OF STALIN: Decision stay in Moscow raised Soviet morale. Use of nationalist & relig
prop sustained morale. Interfered far less in military affairs than H. Trust of Zhukov= factor in
survival.
JAPANS DECISION TO EXPAND SOUTHWARD: w/ no threat of Jap attack in east Stalin
move well-trained & well-equipped Siberian forces. w/ these forces, Zhukov able bring out
new tanks.
st
CHRISTIAN: failure of Barbarossa crucial, 1 major failure of war & evidenced Blitzkriegs failure. Start
of what Churchill phrases tore the guts out of the German army. A longer, more savage war

15

enabled Russia to exploit to the full its huge reserves of raw materials & labour. In this sense, the
battle of Moscow was a turning point.
THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD
BACKG April= H decided on major thrust into south of Russia Operation Blue. Involved dividing
Army Group South & launching two-pronged attack. Von Kleist army attempt capture oil wells in
Caucasus region. Gen Paulus cut off River Volga by capturing Stalingrad (city not strategically
important & Volga couldve been more easily cut further south. Seems H mesmerized by name.
BATTLE When Paulus began attack, Soviets outnumbered 4 to 1. Aug- massive 2-day aerial
bombardment destroyed city. One stage occupied 90% city. Fighting involve bitter street fighting.
Snipers key figures.
Zhukov launch Operation Uranus 19 Nov. Paulus army bogged down. Luftwaffe finding almost
impossible supply his forces, north-eastern flank exposed, winter arrived.
Zhukov order forces not give up inch of territory
th
23 Nov- 2 Soviet forces met at Kalach Bridge trapping Paulus 6 army inside city
Paulus sought permission from H to surrender; refused & ordered to fight on, promoted to
Field Marshal (no Germ Field Marshal had ever been surrendered).
Surrendered late Jan 1943- freezing, starving, disease-ridden, no ammunition. Germ force
almost 300 000 lost. Over 200 000 Axis soldiers dead, 91 000 marched off to Soviet
imprisonment
HISTORIANS
McCAULEY: Defeat owed much to Hs stubbornness, refusal to face reality, long lines of
communication, climate. Red army morale boosted. Germanys greatest defeat was a turning-point.
From now on it was not a matter of how the war would end, but when.
OVERY: Stalin came increasingly to accept gens arguments, partic Zhukov. H increasingly misplaced
self-confidence crucial.
SIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN As 1943 wore on, Soviet forces began gain real edge in
quantity & quality of equip; Soviet production greatly rationalized so that only small no# diff types
aircraft produced but on mass scale; American supplies granted to Russia through Lend-Lease scheme
felt.
th
Mid 1943 H committed forces to massive contest at Kursk salient Operation Citadel, 5-12 July.
Russians now superior in no# & equipment
By early July defence lines comprising mines, tank defences & masses of heavy guns
stretched for 50 miles. No weak spot in Russian line
5 July Germ forces attack salient. Germ tanks use technique Panzerkeil- attacking by means
of an armoured wedge vs. equally powerful force. W/ tanks fighting there was no room for
the infantry... Instead of a breakthrough there was a slogging match. Taylor
H broke off engagement 12 July to deal w/ Anglo-American landings in Sicily
Losses both side colossal but Red Army could make up its losses, Wehrmacht couldnt
Turning pt as never again Germ launch great offensives on Eastern Front initiative passed to Red
Army. Soviet forces began to multiply.
5 Aug Red Army captured Belgorod
23 Aug Kharkov retaken
6 Nov Kiev captured
Taylor Attrition not strategic penetration, was the Russian method, & it was succeeding.
HISTORIANS
OVERY: Kursk decisive defeat, losses couldnt be easily replaced. Soviet success at Kursk was the
most important single victory of the war. It was the point at which the initiative passed to the Soviet
side.
LIDDELL HART: highlighted 1 of major flaws of Germ command structure: Hs refusal to allow retreats
w/out his permission. Commanders threatened w/ court-martial, junior officers became paralysed.
Inflexibility continued & cramped the essential flexibility needed by commanders.

BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN & THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICT
IN NORTH AFRICA TO THE EUROPEAN WAR
WHY NORTH AFRICA THEATRE OF WAR IMPORTANT?

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Strategically important. B relatively weak in Mediterranean. Once Russia in war, Axis success
in NA could see their forces linking up w/ Germ forces in Southern Russia
B controlled Egypt + thus Suez Canal which provided quick route to India, the Far East, the
Empire + the Persian Gulf
Failure to hold on to NA could see Middle East oil supplies falling into Axis hands
BACKG TO NORTH AFRICA CONFLICT
ITALY ENTERS WAR 10 June 1940 eager to capitalize on Germs defeat of F.
Italys 32 divisions struggled vs. Fs 6 divisions June 1940. small advance into F only achieved
w/ help Germ forces attacking F rear
June 1940, Italian base at Tobruk attacked by British naval forces
Oct 1940, Italian forces attack Greece
o Muss hope emulate Hs success; instead army bogged down in mountains of
northern Greece + 1000s die from winter cold; Driven back into Albania by Dec
Nov 1940 B naval forces sank 3 Italian battleships at base in Taranto
By May 1941, B had taken Italys East African Empire
EARLY ACTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA
Since 1911, Italy possess colony of Libya in NA west of Egypt, at this time under B control. Sep 1940-
Italian force invade Egypt + set up fortified camps. B launch attack vs. camps:
10 Dec 1940, Sidi Barrani captured + 34 000 Italian prisoners
th
Early Jan 1941, Aus 6 Division led attack into Libya. Bardia captured + 70 000 Italian
prisoners
22 Jan, B + Aus capture Tobruk. Port facilities, large stores of supplies, 30 000 prisoners
W/in 2 months, numerically stronger Italians defeated. B advanced 500 miles, over 130 000 prisoners,
st
400 tanks, 1290 guns. H decided Feb 1941 send 1 detachments of Gen Erwin Rommels Afrika Korps
to Libya
ROMMEL IN NA
Mar 1941, Rommel launch counter-attack against B, drive them back towards Tobruk. April- Rommels
joint Germ-Italian forces launch 3-pronged attack vs. B forces. Italians retook Benghazi. 7 Apr,
Rommel captured town of Derna + B Generals Neame + OConnor. B position weakened as many
troops now in Greece. Mid Apr, Rommel began siege of Tobruk
Tobruk important coz only base in allied hands betw. Alexandria in Egypt + Sfax in Tunisia
(distance 1600kms); strategic value
Next 8 mths allied troops resist constant Axis air, sea, land attacks. Germ described
defenders as rats term rats of Tobruk mark of honour for North African veterans
June- Operation Battleaxe attempt relive Tobruk. Failed, Gen Wavell lost 90/190 tanks;
replaced
th
Mid-Nov, British 8 Army Operation Crusader to relieve Tobruk. Light tanks great losses.
Rommel counter-attack- heavy casualties + w/drew forces 7 Dec.
Dec allied forces evacuate troops from Tobruk
nd
Jan 1942, Rommel began 2 desert offensive; drove B back w/ Benghazi falling again 29 Jan.
June, Tobruk fell to Germs, 30 000 prisoners
July 1942, Rommel pushed Afrika Korps deeper into Egypt + threatened Cairo First Battle
of El Alamein
o Auchinleck set up 60km defensive line stretching El Alamein on coast to impassable
Quattara Depression
o Conditions atrocious: heat, flies, sandstorms, dysentery, disease
o By Aug 1942, stalemate
Churchill change military leadership in Egypt
BACKG TO BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN
Rommel had fortified position west of El Alamein w/ masses of anti-personnel + anti-tank mines,
Germ reference the devils garden. Rommel known for desire take offensive + no intention of sitting
tight. Position in NA deteriorating + longer delay less chance success. Reasons:
late Aug, B + Axis tank strength about equal, balance moved in favour of B
Rommels long lines of communication= vulnerability to B air attacks
Rommels attempt outflank B position at El Alamein late Aug 1942 failed as forces faced
dense minefields, strong resistance, repeated air attacks

17

Reinforced by men + material, B Gen Montgomerys position steadily strengthening By Oct

195 000 men, 1000 tanks, 900 guns, 1500 anti-tank guns; Rommel outnumbered 2:1. more
than armour comprised worn out Italian vehicles
Tank battles relied on plentiful supplies of fuel. Rommels Afrika Korps critically short
BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN Montgomery attempt mislead enemy. Oct: various ruses to confuse enemy
reconnaissance e.g. est. positions + then abandon. Battle plan reminiscent of Great War: launch
massive frontal attack vs. Rommels central, most strongly defended position infantry advance
while tanks defend flanks. Battle of El Alamein open w/ massive artillery bombardment along 10km
front late evening 23 Oct. 900 B guns. Masses of incendiary + explosive shells. Rommel in Germ when
began, returned 25 to find commander had died of heart attack.
Battle raged for 10 days. Horrific w/ tank duels, mass infantry advances, hand-to-hand
fighting
By 2 Nov, Rommel tank strength dangerously low. Lost over 350 tanks +15 000 men. B
casualties 24 000 dead/wounded, 500 tanks.
Sought Hs permission w/draw; refused. Realizing hopelessness Rommel w/drew.
THE END OF CONFLICT IN NA Rommel had cope w/ Hs fury at disobeying order + learned on 8 Nov,
120 000 strong Anglo-American force under Generals Eisenhower + Patton had landed in Morocco +
Algeria as part of Operation Torch possibility being trapped betw. Allied forces moving east + west
across NA. Retreated towards Tunisia. Poor planning, slow movement, torrential rain slowed
movement of Allied troops while Axis reinforcements arriving daily. By Jan 1943 stalemate.
late Jan Rommel disobey orders retreated to Mareth, southern Tunisia
in Feb Rommels forces attacked US at Battle of Kasserine Pass. Lost 2000 men; US lost 10
000
March: Montgomery defeated German attack at Medenine. Rommel left NA
Late March Montgomer succeed in driving Axis forces north from Mareth Line
13 May Axis surrendered: vastly outnumbered, short of fuel, food + other supplies. 130 000 prisoner.
Alles control all NA
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFLICT IN NA TO EUROPEAN WAR
Battle of El Alamein= t.p. Linked w/ Germs defeat at Stalingrad + allied control of Atlantic-
wars end nearing
Control of NA direct attack on Italy possible; by mid-1944 H facing 3 fronts
STRATEGIC IMPACT:
Suez Canal remained in allied hands + Bs links to wider world intact.
Middle Eastern oil supplies denied to Axis powers. Germs shortage of resources final
defeat
No possibility Axis forces in NA sweeping up through Middle East to link up w/ Hs Russian
armies
Allies dominated Mediterranean Sea
BOOST BRITISH MORALE
prior not much to drive morale: US not a factor, Russia appeared troubled, Singapore lost
Churchill on impact of El Alamein It is not the end; it is not even the beginning of the end;
but it is perhaps the end of the beginning.
HISTORIANS
THOMSON: NA campaign great strategic importance. Did little to ease pressure on Eastern Front,
didnt satisfy Stalins demands for western front. Churchill says it exposed the soft under-belly of the
Axis powers. It made possible the next steps- an attack upon the Balkans + upon Italy, + immediately
it exposed these areas to bombing attack
SHIRER discusses Battle of Stalingrad + Battle of El Alamein in chapter The Great Turning Point. Nazi
success no longer: ineffective blitzkrieg. Temporary local thrusts e.g. Ardennes 1944 really examples
of tenacious defence. The initiative had passed from Hitlers hands, never to return. It was his
enemies who seized it now, + held it.
KNOWLES recollects on victory in personal way: boost national British morale; occurred at time when
Bs fortunes low e.g. Germs conquered Balkans, making progress in Russia, bombers had attacked
British cities. Churchill [wrote] Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein, we never had a
defeat. At that time, at home, everyone was of course delighted by the news.

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Civilians at War
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON CIVILIANS IN
BRITAIN & GERMANY
BRITAIN
REACTION TO WARS OUTBREAK
Went to war in 1939 w/ sense of weary resignation. War expected since Munichs failure.
o No recruitment campaigns, conscription had been intro Apr 1939.
Sense of relief when war came + illusions of appeasement over. Relief tempered strongly by
fear.
o Baldwin earlier stated the bomber will always get through deep sense of
foreboding about nature of coming war: believed Nazi Germany= formidable enemy
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR since Munich, air raid shelters built. Nov 1938 Anderson put in charge of
Air Raid Precautions Bureau:
the Anderson shelter- small backyard shelter topped w/ metal sheets: shield families from
falling debris
1941 Morrison shelter- strong metal cage for use indoors
London city tube stations eventually used as public air raid shelters; sleep 200 000 each night
Believed gas would be widely used since 1938 civilians issued w/ gas masks, during war not allowed
leave home w/out 1. gas never used as weapon vs. civilian populations.
W/in days of start of war, 1.5mil+ children evacuated from cities. phoney war set in many return.
Sev precautions to deal w/ expected air attacks. Blackout make difficult for Germ bombers. Air
raid siren street lights off, car headlights dimmer, windows covered w/ thick curtains to conceal
internal lighting. Heavy fines for disobeying. Barrage balloons made Germ dive-bombing more difficult
as made bombers fly higher reduce accuracy. Buildings sandbagged. Pillboxes set up in southern
England, signposts removed to confuse enemy.
st
THE BLITZ Early Sep 1940- May 1941. 1 bombed during day, from early Oct at night. Later in war,
smaller scale attacks + from 19944 the V1 + V2. Germ V rockets not very effective but caused
enormous fear. Not only London bombed, 14 Nov massive raid vs. Coventry. Cities/towns of eco value
attacked. 1941- ports main targets (bombing try assist Germ in Battle of the Atlantic). Aims of Germ
air attacks:
soften up country for poss Germ invasion
Destroy Bs ability to produce war needs
Break morale of civilian pop
Germ bombing failed:
Luftwaffes failure in Battle of Britain ended prospect of Germ invasion
Did great damage partic to working class housing but eco production never srsly threatened
Prob increased morale. Fashionable in revisionist circles to mock Londoners we can take it
attitude but B faced enemy w/ resilience/determination.
GOVERNMENT CONTROLS
The National Service (Armed Forces) Act
o Men added 18-40 liable to conscription. 1941- age lifted to 51.
Security Measures
o Emergency Powers Act gave gov power to direct workers
o National Registration Act forced people to carry identity papers
o Treacheries Act used to imprison, watch, ban people of organizations considered
threat to security
o Many people of Germ or Italian descent were interned or sent overseas
1941 Minister of Labour Bevin brought in Essential Works Order
o Placed essential workers e.g. railway employers, under gov control
PROPAGANDA, CENSORSHIP & THE MEDIA Ministry of Information est. under Reith who control
amount & nature of info British allowed to gave e.g. censoring soldiers letters home, pushing anti-

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Germ msg. Churchill believed better to tell truth + speeches peppered w/ exhortations to face wars
realities of blood, toil, tears + sweat. BBCs tv service closed down 1 Sep 1939. radio= key
st
disseminator of gov info/ prop. At 1 radio broadcasts= somber music + dour news bulletins but
people need entertainment (humour, music, shows):
Tommy Hanleys show Its that man again. Catchphrases became part Eng language e.g.
Ta, ta for now.
BBC produced shows e.g. Workers Playtime+ Music while you work.
Armed Forces Radio Network est. major artists performed. Vera Lynn became known as the
forces sweetheart- songs cont. strong element of affection for Europe + well received by
overseas soldiers e.g. Well meet again. Therell always be an England.
Cinema popular escape e.g. Gone w/ the Wind, Walt Disney classics.
RATIONING Battle of the Atlantic posed greatest threat to Bs survival during war. Churchill It is in
the shipping + in the power to transport across the oceans that the crunch of the whole war will be
found. Overy The Axis knew how much the oceans mattered, which is why they made such strenuous
efforts to sever the arteries one way or another.
B imported much of food so from start, gov paid great attention to food rationing. Petrol rationing
1939.
Food rationing began Jan 1940 for butter, bacon, sugar; meat added March, tea in July,
margarine, fats + jam Mar 1941.
o Dec 1941 a pts system intro which gave person 16 pts to spend at any shop
Ministry of Food exhorted people to try subs e.g. carrot rat, American spam, whalemeat
Eggs rare, average egg ration= 1 egg/fortnight.
Full cream National Dried Milk became available for small children.
Minister of Food, Lord Woolton initiated sev schemes deal w/ food crises
o People exhorted to grow bed in victory gardens
o BBC program The Kitchen Front- producing nutritious food w/ limited resources
o Prop encourage economy + to rely on home grown veg
Exotic products like chocolate became highly valued. Tobacco/alcohol not rationed but
trading hours limited.
Clothes rationed. Lacked pre-war frills + extravagances. People encouraged to make own clothes,
recycle.
Thriving black market for goods in short supply. Many survive by bartering goods.
THE HEALTH OF THE NATION 4.6+mil born during war. Most healthy generations of Britons yet born.
Betw. 1939-1945 infant mortality fell 10%, maternal mortality fell by 40%.
Diphtheria immunization was intro. Deaths fell 75% bet 38 + 45
Sep 1941- school children receive free milk
By 1945 half all school children receiving school meals
Emergency Hospital Service widened availability of medical services
THE HOME GUARD created May 1940, then known as Local Defence Volunteers, comprised motley
collection boys/old men, often armed only w/ sticks + pikes. Name change July 1940. 1.5mil members
by 1942. By wars end= decently trained + armed organization.
WOMEN DURING WAR Fill gaps left by men:
many joined armed services
o WAAF: Womens Auxiliary Air Force
o Service jobs involved communications, repair work, clerical jobs
o WRNS: Womens Royal Naval Service
Many served in civil defence jobs e.g. Air Raid wardens
Served in WVS (Womens Voluntary Service): set up workers canteens, helped civil defence,
organized evacuations
Many worked in industry
o Munitions industry
o Over 2 mil in various forms of industrial jobs
o Transport: drivers, conductors
Nursing at home + overseas
80 000 in Womens Land Army in basic farming work which freed up ag workers to fight
SOCIAL TRENDS Home Office figures
dramatic fall in crime

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1
o 1939- 787 000 offences, 1945- 467 000. increased surveillance?
o Drunkenness in 1945 was 40% 39 level. Cause of gov restrictions on pub opening hrs
Concern about moral standards
o Increase in promiscuity + pre-marital sex
o 1939- 9970 divorce petitions filed; 45- 24 857.
o Last year of war- over 70 000 illegitimate children born
Mils of American troops based in B
o Gratitude felt as believed American war presence defeat of Nazi Germ
o Deep resentment that Americans had more money, smarter uniform, were taking
our women violence not uncommon
o By wars end 15 000 British women had married American servicemen
LONG-TERM SOCIAL & ECONOMIC EFFECTS Churchill took over Chamberlain as PM 10 May 1940 as
latter lost confidence in parliament/country. Churchills cabinet + ministry contain Labour +
Conservative members. During war often more support from Labour members than own Conserv
Party.
Churchill also Minister of Defence= want keep control of military policy. Eden Foreign Minister from
Nov 1940. poor heath + fervent admiration of Churchill allowed Churchill to dominate f.p. + defence
policy
during war, Churchill almost totally occupied w/ military + diplomatic aspects of war
meant that domestic affairs- social + eco policy, industrial relations, post-war planning-
became domain of Labour ministers
Labour members Attlee, Morrison + Bevin came to dominate domestic affairs
Labour Party seen as party for post-war reconstruction + reform
General Election 1945- Churchill thrown out
Bs wartime gov put in place a series of blue-prints for future direction Bs society + economy
1936, Keynes General Theory of Employment, Money + Interest. Thesis that govs could
manipulate national eco + thus avoid repeat of depression
1944 Butlers Education Act. School leaving age raised to 15, free milk, school meals +
medical services became part of work of Local Education Authorities. 11 plus examination
offer working class children chance to enter grammar schools
HISTORIANS
COLE & POSTGATE: working class perspective. Approached tasks in united manner. Public interest
tended to override private interest. In the period that began w/ May 10, the history of the British
common people cannot be separated from that of all the nation. The unity so frequently promised or
appealed to in polticians speeches was for some time a reality.
MARWICK: war brought about social + eco revolution. Existing institutions challenged by needs of war
+ were shown to be inadequate changed. War needed participation of lower classes who benefited
from having services improved e.g. steady betterment of factory conditions. War produced demand
that post-war B have no unemployment/depression The struggle for civilian survival at home
initiated lasting social changes. Experience of the Blitz, food shortages, + lack of clothing ensure that
GB emerged from this war a v. different type of society, w/ a new emphasis on social equality.
JENKINS: ordinary people coped e.g. w/ demands they carry gas mask + seeing children evacuated.
People seemed willing to put up w/ tribulations of war in typically, uncomplaining British manner.
On life in air raids: The shelter life now was normal for thousands of people the word togetherness
had not yet been invented, but this was it.

GERMANY
EARLY WAR YEARS feeling of foreboding. F.p. success, Munich expect not have to fight. Believe
would be another Munich over Poland. Early Blitzkrieg successes warmly welcomed, Hs popularity at
its zenith July 1940. Relief, not desire for further conquest.
H believed stabbed in the back in WWI coz of Home Fronts collapse close attention:
determined to maintain Home Front morale + normality of Germ life. Few basic rationing
measures but v. much business as usual.
o No switch to total war production
o Women not rushed into factories as Nazi ideology believed in separate spheres for
men/women- women belonged in the home

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Sep 1939 decrees remove paid holidays + time + a pay for overtime + Sundays. Oct- wage
freeze opposition removed by Dec (Eager to please Home Front)
People didnt suffer on HF til late in war. 35% Germs food needs came from occupied areas +
domestic ag benefit from good weather + use of foreign labourers.
Morale not early concern. Swift defeat of Pol w/ relatively light casualties convinced of Hs genius +
armed forces strengths. Life unaffected by phoney war. Prop involve newsreel films showing
Wehrmacht marching through Warsaw or Paris, war heroes paraded through streets. Germs
Blitzkrieg successes not good for HF or longer term war effort. Convinced Nazis no need for stringency
at home. Survive of resources of conquered nations laxity on the HF when shouldve intro total
war.
TOTAL WAR By end 1942, war not in Germ favour Germ belatedly reverted to total war:
18 Feb 1943, Goebbels announced switch Total war means a shorter war. Policy in all areas
Prop became more strident:
o Imagery used more extreme + contained crude Jewish/Slav/Bolshevik caricatures
o Link betw. Jews + comms emphasized
o Atrocity spread through Germ media about Russians
o Apr 1943 Goebbels made much of news that Soviets had massacred 1000s of Polish
officers at Katyn Wood in 1940
Jan 1943 Casablanca Conference betw. Churchill + US President Roosevelt called for
unconditional surrender of Germ before any peace talks could occur. Goebbels argued this
showed allies intended treat Ger worse than 1919 + Germ no chance but to fight to bitter
end
Feb, Albert Speer app. As new Armaments Minister. Some historians suggest his efforts added 2 yrs to
length of war.
IMPACT OF ALBERT SPEER
conditions of workers in Germ
o in book Inside the Third Reich, Speer claims he tried improve workers conditions.
Claims disobeyed Hs order to lay waste to Western Germ in 1945
o Speer had no problem of using 1000s of imported slave workers from occupied
territories that were often worked to death
Genius at organization. Revamped Germ production by intro principles of mass production +
improvisation. Efficiency of production greatly increased
o Rationalization seen in sev areas:
42 aircraft remodels reduced to 5
151 truck types reduced to 23
12 anti-tank weapons to 1
o 1944- Germ producing 1000 Messerschmitt 109 Fighters from 3 plants instead of
previous 180 coming from 7 plants
Overy A remarkable amount was achieved in three years The shift to mass production, though far
from universal, brought an instant increase in efficiency Industrialists now reveled in the freedom to
work w/out the constant fear of military interference.
Despite Speers efforts, wartime Nazi Germ plagued w/ what he called an arthritic organisational
system. Red-tape + layers of bureaucracy hindered production. Incredibly decentralized nature of
regime: many centres of power, each trying to maximize power + build own empire. centres of
power inc.:
SS empire. Ran concentration camps, had own schools, factories, legal + judicial system, +
army (Waffen SS)
32 Gauleiters (regional Nazi governor) in Germ. Powerful, had access to H, endeavoured
build up own power
Goering tried hang on to aircraft product long after limitations revealed
Eichmann had job of organizing Final Solution, for this commandeered railway stock even
when needed by army
Vs. this rivalry + power play, Speer tried direct economy while Wehrmacht tried fight war
THE ALLIED BOMBING OF GERM After war discussion about morality of allied bombing of Germ.
Bombed entire towns civilian casualties high. Effectively weakened Germ war effort

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3
Blitz B civilian casualties- 43 000. late July 1943 Bomber Command launch Operation Gomorrha vs.
Hamburg. Betw 30-40 000 died. Over 500 000 homeless. 50% city gutted. Similar attacks vs. other
Germ cities e.g. Dresden Feb 1945, Soviet attacks on Berlin Apr/May 1945.
Much of eco activity had to be dispersed from major cities or forced underground definite limits on
potential Germ output. Also, oil supplies reached critically low lvls, chemical production drastically
reduced, railway system was greatly disrupted.
Germ morale seem survive in most places as realize no choice but stick it out. Burleigh suggests
distance betw. Leadership + people had become so great- simply tried to survive. Story of the HF=
story of the progressive isolation of a leadership determined to go down in flames from an
increasingly atomized civilian + military mass increasingly bent on personal survival. The latter literally
lost faith, + had to confront a terrible inner emptiness.
REPRESSION & OPPOSITION Germ HF in WWII didnt suffer opposition or industrial disruption like
WWI. Critical difference= Nazi Germ= police-terror state. War strengthened power of security forces
Sep 1939, est. Reich Central Security Office. Coordinate all police forces + increase efficiency
Sep 1941 the Night + Fog Decree gave regime power to arrest anyone + detain w/out trial +
deny knowledge of such action people disappear.
Never hid reality of concentration camps. 1933-45 Nazi records show 3mil+ Germs spent
time in camps. By 1945, 714 000 Germs in camps for polit crimes
All pretence at judicial procedure disappeared. Gestapo + SS free to act as saw fit.
Reports of SD revealed from 1943 many Germs unhappy w/ regime disillusioned + saw war
as disaster; disquiet at anti-Semitic policies; Goebbels no longer trusted, listened to foreign
broadcasts
Open opposition to regime limited to small no# brave individs e.g. Hans + Sophie Scholl who
or White Rose resistance movement, left-wing Red Chapel group
Army opposition to regime seen during unsuccessful July 1944 bomb plot on Hs life.
Conspirators rounded + shot stiffer repression
HISTORIANS
OVERY: argues women had always made up key part of Germ labour force; in 1939 comprised 37%
workforce or 14mil workers. By end war 51% + in ag 65%. Foreign female labourers helped to swell
figure. Believes women played a major part in keeping the war effort going.
BROSZAT: due legal process totally disappeared. Up til 1942 Justice Dept run by Gurtner of DNVP +
then his state secretary Schlegelberger. Both try maintain semblance of justice. Thierack app. Aug
1942 who determined the sell-out of the legal system. Examples his readiness to transfer 10 000
state prisoners to concentration camps
BURLEIGH: war almost complete breakdown of family system. Fathers away wives looked
elsewhere for sexual satisfaction while fatherless children ran wild. Men sent to 1 district to work,
children sent to rural district, women relocated. This atomisation of the population into even smaller
communities of fate cont. beyond the end of the war, as did the progressive redefinition of the
family, w/ neither wives nor adolescent children prepared to subordinate themselves to the returning
father.

NAZI RACIAL POLICIES: the Holocaust & the persecution of
minorities
Term Holocaust denotes systematic attempt by Nazis to exterminate Jewish race. Hs war= a
racial war; had deep ideological aims.
NAZI THINKING To succeed historical mission, Aryan blood must be pure from impurities inc
non-Aryan racial types, e.g. Slavic people & gypsies, handicapped & mentally ill, homosexuals &
other social deviants, the Jew

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The
Intentionalists
Hitler never
diverge from
intention to
exterminate Jews.
Evidence includes:
*H's thought in MK
*consistency of H's
utterances vs. Jews
*steadily increasing
pressure placed on Jews
*1939 speech threatening
the end of the Jews

The
Structuralists
Not Hitler's intention from start to
destroy Jews. As time went on, Nazi
regime became more radicalised +
spun out of control-->Holocaust
Evidence includes:
*Attempts at Jewish emigration late 1930s
*Problem of what to do w/ so many Jews after
early victories in Eastern Europe
*Desire of Nazi leaders to 'work towards the
Fuhrer'

DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SEMITIC POLICIES IN PRE-WAR GERM Anti-Semitism= irrational &
often violent hatred of Jews & Jewish things. Not a new phenomenon. Reasons for development:
Jews were Christ-killers which justified Christian persecution of them
Roman expulsion of Jews from Palestine AD70 Jews sought refuge across Europe,
Middle East, NA
o Some gradually assimilated. Some retained geographical, relig, cultural
separateness
Jewish separateness made them easy scapegoats.
Rise of Nazi Party attributed to hope offered. Once in power began intro anti-Semitic measures.
At 1st inconvenient & humiliating rather than life-threatening e.g. gradually excluded from
professions inc medicine, education. 1935 Nuremburg Laws denied Jews Germ citizenship &
forbade marital/sexual relations betw Aryans & Jews. Nov 1938 Jews attacked in gov organised
pogrom- Kristallnacht. Jan 1939 H openly threatened Jews succeed in plunging the nations into a
world war... then the result will (be)... the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.
MOVING TOWARDS THE HOLOCAUST Conquest of P what do w/ Ps 3mil Jews:
Nov 1939 made compulsory for Polish Jews to wear yellow Star of David. Failure
punished
1940- ghettos set up in Polish cities e.g. Lodz/Warsaw to separate Jews from non-Jews
o Atrocious conditions. Overcrowded. 1943 Jewish protest in Warsaw Ghetto
brutally suppressed concentration camps
o Living conditions & food supplies poor, medical facilities non-existent,
starvation/disease
o Warsaw Ghetto- 15 in room made for 6; periodic violent demonstrations vs Nazi
rulers
o Never tried in court; simply arrested by Gestapo as enemies of the state. Night &
Fog Decree 1941 allow SS to exercise any option in order to protect the Third
Reich from its enemies
June 1941 invade Russia. Germ army followed by SS units Einsatzgruppen w/ purpose to seek
out Jews & kill them. However shooting activities of squads inefficient, time consuming &
distressing for participants. 31 Jul 1941 Goering requested Heydrich present plan which would
bring about a complete solution of the Jewish question. Before 1941s end, Nazi had begun
experimenting w/ gassing techniques e.g. sealed trucks w/ prisoners filled w/ carbon monoxide.
Jan 1942, top party & civil officials met Heydrich in Wannsee. Decided on final solution: gas all
Jews. Blueprints for design of gas chambers & crematoria, lists drawn of how many Jews
exterminated in each country. Jews to be deported to new & larger camps in east e.g. Auschwitz &
Treblinka in Poland. resettlement
FINAL SOLUTION Jews from all over Europe shipped to death camps 1943-44. Jews from
occupied western Europe sometimes paid for fares to east believing were being resettled.

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5
However, normally herded onto cattle trucks. On arrival lined up, would receive cursory
examination from SS doctor:
If believed could work- young, strong, healthy- gestured to 1 side & worked to death
Deemed unable to work- old, sick, lame, preg- gassed immediately
Forced undress, lined up & delousing shower. Herded into shower 100s at time, door sealed.
Through small metal grill in roof dropped pellets of Zyklon B gas (prussic acid). After about 15
min Jewish volunteer prisoners extract bodies (often tangled mass as tried to escape). Taken to
crematoria where incinerated.
Once apparent war lost, SS stepped up process. May-June 1944- 1/2mil Hungarian Jews
deported. By wars end, murdered 6mil. Camps run in v. efficient, businesslike manner. Nothing
allowed go to waste- recycling.
Gold fillings & remaining jewellery extracted from bodies
Human hair shaved off & kept
Possessions kept for reuse. e.g. suitcases, spectacles, prosthetic limbs
In camps in east perverted medical science given free rein as doctors e.g. Josef Mengele, known
as angel of death, performed medical experiments on prisoners. e.g. injected w/ disease to trace
progress of infection, subjected to intense cold. Mengele selected twins & would experiment on 1
while leaving other alone.
CAMP SYSTEM uniform badges or insignias identified a prisoners crime: red insignias for polit
prisoners, brown for gypsies, pink homosexuals. Himmlers Death Head units ran the camps,
supported by Gestapo officers & Wehrmacht troops. Many prison guards had sadistic
personalities & suffered psychological disorders. Convicted murderers & those w/ extensive
criminal records employed from among prisoners. Called kapos they ensured prisoners fulfilled
daily work quotas. Torture common. Many had limbs disjointed. Sick left to die. In 1944
Auschwitz-Birkenau was eliminating 8000 people a day.
PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES
Gypsies viewed v. poorly by Nazis as asocials. Itinerant lifestyle was unproductive & anti-
socialseen as a socio-cultural nuisance & were targeted for extinction as didnt fit into Nazi
ideal of Peoples Community. By 1945 Nazis had murdered 200 000 Gypsies
Nazis put much effort into identifying homosexuals & criminal code contained sev penalties for
being homosexual. Over 15 000 Germ homosexuals sent to camps. Forced to wear pink triangle.
Guards & inmates targeted them. Ironically many Nazis themselves homosexual inc. Ernst Rohm
& many of SA leadership. Burleigh suggests 1 reason for antagonistic attitude= biology-
homosexuals dont breed.
Mentally ill & handicapped targeted from 1939 in what known as euthanasia program.
Extermination program for these referred to as Operation T4. T-4 Euthanasion Hospital in Berlin
as well as regional clinics. Gassed using pure carbon monoxide gas. By wars end, 275 000
handicapped/mentally ill killed
HISTORIANS
SHIRER: The Jews & the Slavic peoples were the untermenschen- subhumans. To H they had no
right to live, except as some of them, among the Slavs, might be needed to toil in the fields & the
mines as slaves of their Germ masters.
GUTMAN: on arrival of prisoner stripped of possessions but also identity. All body hair removed,
no# tattooed onto left arm.
GOLDHAGEN: tries explain how Holocaust could happen. 4 things needed: Hs decision, Germ
control over Jews, organisation & resources had to be allocated to the operation, large no#
people willing to do it. Caused controversy. Argues no Germans, no Holocaust. Pt is Germ polit
culture had developed to pt where masses of ordinary Germs happy go along w/ Holocaust. The
inescapable truth is that... an enormous number of ordinary, representative Germans became... Hs
willing executioners.

End of the Conflict
D DAY & THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE

Teheran Conference Sep 1943 Stalin, Roosevelt & Churchill. Stalin rightly accused Roosevelt &
nd
Churchill of procrastination coz hadnt fulfilled previous promise to create a 2 front in F. Axis

25

powers defeated in NA & Russia & Musss regime deposed. Privately Roosevelt & Churchill didnt trust
st
Stalin, but agreed Allied invasion of F be major priority during 1944. Agreed on 2 strategies. 1 allied
nd
task force invade F. 2 , Russian forces launch offensives to liberate Finland & Poland. Long-term
Allied goal= to destroy Germs military resources, to liberate its occupied territories & to occupy
Berlin.
BACKG By mid-1943 war favoured Allied powers
Rommel had been driven out of NA after defeats at El Alamein & in Tunisia
Allies had taken Sicily & beginning march through Italy
Germs had lost the initiative on the Eastern Front after Soviet success at Kursk
Allies gained upper hand in Battle of the Atlantic
Allied bombing soon devastate Germ industry
Victory req attack on Germ-occupied F to drive Wehrmacht back into Germ. Decision to invade F
made at Washington Conference of May 1943, plans accepted at Quebec Conference in Aug. By years
end, US Gen Eisenhower app Supreme Allied Commander of Operation Overlord. Didnt satisfy
Russians as Stalin suspected western powers want Comms & Nazis destroy each other in war of
attrition. Promised Stalin open another front in F by May 1944. Roosevelt want work w/ Stalin & keen
for Soviet intervention vs. Japan in Pacific War. Danger that Soviet Red Army able to march into Germ
alone. Decide invade F 1944.
ATLANTIC WALL Enormous series of military installations that extended 2700 km from Norway to
Spain. In F protected by local terrain called the bocage (network of high sandbanks that contained
dense hedges, roots & hard-packed clay). Strong enough to resist bullets & vehicles & made excellent
defensive shelters.
PREPARATIONS. By late 1943 Germs expecting allied attack, didnt know where.
Attack on Norway considered possible. Allied bogus intelligence try fool Germ believe
Operation Bodyguard. False info leaked which allies knew Germ would be able to pick up
Most likely location= near port of Calais 35kms from British coast
rd
3 possibility= Normandy
Hs hunch, backed by Rommel, was that Allies would attack in Normandy. Hs hesitancy & caution
stopped him fortifying Normandy at expense of Calais. Secrecy maintained:
Allies leaked false intelligence which knew Germs would be able to decipher
Allied commanders e.g. Gen Montgomery, were given look-alikes who would pointedly
make appearances far from where real person was. Hoped Germ spies in England relay this
Phoney armies & air squadrons gathered in locations well away from real embarkation pts
Preps took months. 100s of scientific & tech innovations for D-Day e.g.:
Allies constructed giant floating harbours- mulberries which were towed across Channel to
be used to disembark troops, tanks, supplies
Flexible pipelines laid beneath Channel which would eventually give allied forces 1.5m L
oil/day
By mid-1944, B= giant aircraft carrier. Over 1.5mil US & Canadian troops, 10s of 1000s of trucks,
tanks. Largest amphibious invasion in history. After securing a beachhead Allied forces move inland &
capture selected towns & military bases controlled by Germ. Involve air, sea, land & support units in
12 sub-operations
OPERATION BODYGUARD Operation Bodyguard= an attempt to keep D-Day invasion secret by
creating false fronts & distributing misleading info in bid to convince the Abwehr, Wehrmachts
intelligence bureau, that an Allied attack would occur in Norway or Calais
D DAY: 6 JUNE 1944 Initial assault onto Normandy beaches involve 50 000 men. Over 2mil shipped to
F in entire operation. 12 000 aircraft. inside F 100 000 French Resistance members assist w/ guerrilla
attacks on Germ positions. Target area extended approx 110kms along beaches. Allocated specific
landing areas which were divided into 5 sections. Sword (B), Juno (Canadian & B), Gold (B), Omaha
th
(US) & Utah (US). By nightfall 156 000 troops landed. By 12 , 326 000 & bridgehead 50miles wide
gained.
By 18 June US trapped Germ garrison in Cherbourg
By Junes end Americans captured port of Cherbourg & 30 000 Germ prisoners
B captured Caen 9 July
Mid-July US took St Lo & B clear area around Caen despite losing 100 tanks
SIGNIFICANCE OF NORMANDY INVASIONS

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7
Human & material losses extensive. Germ exceed 400 000 killed, injured, captured, Allies 200
000
1943 Muss regime ended & Italian gov surrendered to Allies. In response, H ordered armies
to invade I. On 5 June 1944 Allied forces enter Rome. Hs bid to maintain southern front in I
failed.
Hs armies numerically reduced, overextended, undersupplied & vulnerable but remained
resolute & refused to accept concept of defeat
LIBERATION OF FRANCE Commenced breakout from Normandy late July. W/in 6 weeks Paris
liberated, Germs driven out of F & allies reached Belgium
25 July Operation Cobra- move out of Normandy- began. Americans capture Avranches by 1
Aug
F resistance forces gain control of Brittany
Canadians launch Operation Totalise aim trap Germs near Falaise. Called off 11 Aug.
Americans moved eastwards & cornered Germ in what known as Falaise pocket.
15 Aug workers in Paris went on strike & joined by police. H ordered that Paris be leveled but
Germ governor, von Choltitz refused
nd
o Von Choltitz surrendered the city to French 2 Armoured Division 25 Aug
o Paris liberated
o By Oct Vichy appointees replaced w/ Resistance leaders & Resistance forces
disarmed or merged into French army
At same time, B forces to north had crossed River Seine heading eastwards
By late Aug US close to River Meuse while B gained control of all bridges over River Somme
near Amiens
By 3 Sep allied forces moved into Belgium & captured Brussels. Antwerp liberated 4
September
Campaign to retake F taken about 7 weeks
HISTORIANS
LIDDELL HART: Objectives achieved but took longer than expected. Breakout from bridgehead that
had been achieved by mid-June slow in coming but worked to allies adv. Germ able to get tank
armour across to Normandy but not in mass numbers. When arrived provided stiff opposition to
allied forces but were ground down Germ lacked tanks when battle resume in open country.
blessing in disguise ensured them a clear path through F once they broke out.
THOMPSON: Poor air reconnaissance, blocked radar & dislocated communications hindered the
Germs, even worse was Hs interference. Decisive action on Germ part couldve turned things other
way. The 1 Panzer Corps west of River Seine didnt move, awaiting Hs orders. Uncertainty inhibited
the violent counterblows which alone could have driven the British & Americans back into the sea.

RUSSIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVES 1944

From Kursk to wars end war in east= story of Russian sledgehammer, as Zhukov referred to his
forces, gradually pushing back Germ & its allies.
SOVIET OFFENSIVES: January- December 1944
Siege of Leningrad broke 27 Jan
End Feb: Army Group North routed. 3 Germ divisions wiped out, others gravely weakened.
By mid-March Soviets split Germs Army Group South & poised to advance on Romania
Early June Soviets attack Finish forces. Finns make peace on 2 September
22 June 1944, Gen Zhukov commence Operation Bagration
o All out assault on Hs strongest force: Army Group Centre
o Advance across Belorussia towards Poland rapid & strong
11 July Red Army forces capture Minsk
17 July, Soviets enter Poland. W/in less than fortnight Lvov is liberated & Soviets reach
Vistula
12 Aug- coup vs. pro-German govt of Romania. 12 Sep Romania surrenders to SU
Sep- SU declares war on Bulgaria, invades, quickly takes control. 8 Sep, new Bulgarian regime
declares war on Germ
B occupy Athens in Oct & Germ forces leave

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 Yugoslavia captures Belgrade

Baltic states fall under Soviet control & by early Oct Russians are in East Prussia
By end 1944, Hs empire in central & eastern Europe greatly diminished.
OPERATION BAGRATION Teheran Conference- Stalin agreed to launch new offensive to support
Allied powers after invasion of Normandy commenced. Designed to support Allied operations in F,
liberate Russian territory &break the back of the Wehrmacht. Red Army reach Vistula river &
Warsaw w/in striking distance of Berlin. Began on 22 June 1944 (3 years exactly after Germ invade
nd
SU). June & July- sledgehammer steamrolled path of destruction towards Poland. 2 phase of
Bagration involved operations most sig objective: retaking of Minsk, capital of Belorussian SSR.
Would complete the large-scale encirclement destruction of Army Group Centre. Minsks liberation
possible greatest single defeat of Wehrmacht. In 12 days AGC lost 300 000 men (inc 31 generals), 670
000 total casualties.. Never recovered from material & manpower losses, lost about of EF
manpower. At stage of war, couldnt replace. By end of operation, most of western SU recovered &
Red Army achieved footholds in Romania & Poland. Operation Bagration effectively destroyed Army
Group Centre which now ceased to exist.
WARSAW RISING: August-October 1944 Russian agents urged Polands 2 anti-Nazi resistance groups
to launch uprising vs Wehrmacht when Zhukovs armies reached Warsaw. Stalin guaranteed the
Polish Underground his total support. Main Polish objectives were to drive the German occupiers
from the city & help w/ the larger fight vs Germ & Axis Powers. 1 Aug 150 000 Polish freedom fighters
revolted Wehrmacht retaliate. Stalin ordered Zhukov create a neutral perimeter 16km outside
Warsaw & wait. Had lied, rather intended to eliminate 2 problems- the Poles & Germs- by allowing to
kill each other. Taylor alternative explanation: Red Army had so stretched its lines of
communication no position to assist Poles. Not widely accepted.
By late Aug Germ superiority in air power & artillery proving too much for Polish resistance forces.
Mid-Sep Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky attack eastern quarter of Warsaw. By 14 Sep, Germs driven out
of that area & Soviet-backed Polish army moved in to take control of bridgeheads in Warsaw. Warsaw
rising end early Oct when Poles appealed for armistice. Germs evacuated, send over 200 000 Poles
into concentration camps & destroyed everything in their path. 66-day Warsaw uprising claimed lives
of 130 000 Poles & 25 000 Germs
HISTORIANS
ALTGOVZEN: Soviet writer. Explains as Soviets made way through Belorussia & across Polish border=
exhausted. In no position to assist any Polish action vs. Germ.
JORDAN: Bagration far greater than Overlord & largest allied operation of WWII. Demolished 3 Germ
armies & Wehrmachts position on EF totally opened up. the offensive lacked a single, dramatic focal
point, such as at StalingradNevertheless, Bagrationdramatically turned the tide of war against the
Third Reich

FINAL DEFEAT 1944-1945

By autumn 1944, allies close to victory. Germ almost totally driven out of F. Rome captured in
June. Red Army had thrown Germs out + poised to move on Germ. Allied bombing devastating
Germ eco.
THE WAR IN THE WEST: SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1944
OPERATION MARKET GARDEN Mont aim outflank Germ defences in Netherlands by seizing the
bridgeheads over the Rhine behind old Siegfried Line- prelude adv. across River Rhine into Germ.
Hopes too optimistic:
Wehrmacht had strong military profile in Holland. Reconnaissance photographed large
no# Germ tanks + artillery yet photographs downplayed/ignored
B not able to use Enigma machine to decipher Germ communications coz Germ army
using diff radio frequencies in these region. Intelligence poor. Mont couldnt identify
Germs movements/intentions
Maps outdated; discrepancies in map distances varied bet 1-2.5km infantry
movements + targets could only be estimated RISK.
In event operation failed, precise plan to evacuate Allied troops from Holland was
essential. No realistic plan developed coz Mont confident operation succeed
Initial success disaster.
Force at Arnhem sposed to hold out for 2 days 10

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9
Poor weather, Germ forces far stronger than expected, inability of allied forces to get
supplies + reinforcements to Arnhem, Germ discovery of allied battle plans
2200 men evacuated, almost 18 000 killed, captured, wounded.
Germ forces in west organise strong defensive line along the West Wall Allied progress slow +
costly
Pattons forces attacked Metz early Oct
Hodges 1st Army took Aachen in Nov. Bradleys forces tried expand success at Aachen at
Hurtgen Forest w/ little success
THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE Allies not united in aims
Stalin deeply distrusted by western allies, esp Churchill. Relations w/ SU poor since
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Perhaps H able to deal w/ western powers?
Relations betw. allied commanders in west strained.
H launch Operation Watch on the Rhine, the Ardennes offensive. Aim to drive wedge into Allied
line, capture Antwerp cripple allied supply base. Maybe force a negotiated peace? Offensive
began 16 Dec. Germ force of 24 divs, 10 armed w/ Tiger II tanks.
B + Americans taken by surprise
Gen Manteuffels V Panzer Army almost destroyed 2 American infantry divisions
Completely successful 1st 3 days- bulge/wedge, 75km wide + 50km deep divided Monts
forces from Pattons
Germ pushed through Ardennes region of Belgium + Luxembourg. 24 Dec leading Panzer
units ran out of fuel near Meuse River effectively ended Germs forward assault
Germ attack began to fizzle late Dec + allied air power became decisive.
Ardennes offensive extremely costly to both sides. Put back plans for allied plans for moving into
Germ but also weakened Germs fighting capacity. Germs had lost manpower, over 600 tanks +
assault guns, over 1000 aircraft + 6000 vehicles. US equipment losses high but could replace, H
couldnt. Taylor This was Hs last gamble- brilliant in conception, impossible to execute. The God of
War does not love cleverness; he loves the Big Battalions
THE WAR IN THE WEST: JANUARY-MAY 1945 March into Germ early 1945 fairly smooth. Over
60 000 Germs killed fighting in Rhineland + 250 000 prisoner. Allied losses under 20 000. Contd.
push into Germ
22 March Pattons forces crossed Rhine betw. Mainz + Worms + moved into northern
Bavaria
Monts forces crossed into Germ in north + defeated final Germ stand 28 March
Gen Bradleys forces moved into central Germ + capture Leipzig
British forces moved across northern Germ; captured Bremen 27 April + Lubeck 2 May;
Hamburg fell 3 May w/out fight
US 7th army was resisted strongly at Nuremburg. Crossed the Danube, captured
Berchtesgaden + met some of US 5th Army
Over next few days, various Germ units surrendered in Italy, Holland + F. Germs agreed to
unconditional surrender 7th May. By midnight on 8th war in Europe over
THE WAR IN THE EAST: JANUARY-MAY 1945 final Russian offensive begun 12 January
Russian forces struck on sev fronts across a distance of 1200 kms from Baltic to
Carpathian Mtns.
Germs totally overwhelmed + no chance but to fall back apart from odd pockets of
resistance
Soviet advance was irresistible:
o Zhukov + Konev had both reached Oder River by mid-Feb before turning nrth to
pin down Germ forces in tight corners of East Prussia + Latvia
o Some of Zhukovs forces only 65km from Berlin but lines of communication
were stretched + strength of Germ forces on either flank unknown. Stalin
ordered pause + regroup
o Adv on sthern part slowed as Red Army took a mnth to capture Hungarian
capital Budapest
o Soviets reached Austrian frontier 20 March + took Vienna 14 April
Soviet attack on Berlin climaxed in April
o Scale of attack enormous: 2.5mil men, 6000 tanks, 7500 aircraft, 42 000 artillery
guns

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Outskirts of Berlin reached 19 April, by 25th city encircled + reduced to ruins +

Soviet guns pounded city
o Germ defence led by the old men + 14 yr old boys of the German style Home
Guard called Volkssturm
1st May Red Flag flying over Reichstag building
HISTORIANS
COLE: Ardennes Offensive. Scathing of Hs decision, suggesting purpose of offensive not so much
to achieve a better bargaining position for Germ rather case of pursuing offensive for its own
sake. there is a strong possibility that H [was] motivated by the same impulse which triggered so
many of the bloody + useless offensives of WWI- to seize the initiative for its own sake w/out a viable
strategic objective in view.
DOROTHEA von SCHWANENFLUEGEL: (a 20yr old trying to survive bombed out Berlin as Red
Army attempt take city Apr/May 1945). Horror of Germ civilians. Accounts of looting, rape,
random violence. When Germ commander of troops surrendered unreal silence. Our
nightmare had become a reality...the last days of savage house to house fighting + street battles had
been a human slaughter, w/ no prisoners being taken on either side. These final days were hell... we
were a city in ruins.
o

NUREMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIALS

Leading Nazis placed on trial in front of International Military Tribunal. Allied leaders had agreed
to idea of such trials at Teheran Conference Nov 1943. Terms of trials agreed to by Roosevelt,
Stalin, Churchill London Charter of Aug 1945. Concept of war crimes trials not new but in 1945
need make examples of Nazis:
Atrocities occur in all wars however usually actions of individs or junior officers.
o Actions of Germs were different; atrocities were part of official gov policy
Felt necessary to ensure Germ people realised what had happened & culprits were
people whom had supported Brought home to those Germs who claimed ignorance of
the camps the enormity of committed crimes
Idealistic hope in exampling Nazis- barbarism not be repeated
United Nations Organisation in its infancy; trials aim show a body willing to ensure
international peace & morality
24 leading Nazi were to be tried but only 21 eventually stand trial.
Germ Labour Front leader Robert Ley committed suicide
Gustav Krupp was too ill to stand trial
Martin Bormann was never captured & so was tried in absentia
Heinrich Himmler & Josef Goebbels committed suicide
Defendants were charged w/ 1 or more of the following offences:
War crimes
Crimes against humanity
Conspiracy i.e. a willingness to commit crime vs. peace, humanity or norms of war
Crimes against peace
Hans Frank
Governor of Germ occupied Poland
Death by hanging
Hermann Goering
Head of the Luftwaffe
Sentenced to death; committed
suicide
Ernst Kaltenbrunner
Security Police Chief
Death by hanging
Joachim von
Foreign Minister
Death by hanging
Ribbentrop
Alfred Rosenberg
Minister for Occupied Eastern Europe
Death by hanging
Arthur Seyss-Inquart Governor of Austria & later Governor of the Death by hanging
Netherlands
Julius Streicher
Editor of Der Sturmer, Governor of Germ
Death by hanging
Martin Bormann
Head of Reich Chancellery
Sentenced to death in absentia
Walter Funk
President of the Reichsbank
Life imprisonment
Rudolf Hess
Deputy Fuhrer
Life imprisonment
Erich Raeder
Naval Supreme Commander
Life imprisonment
Karl Doenitz
Navy Commander
10yrs imprisonment
Baldur von Schirach
Hitler Youth Leader
20yrs imprisonment
Franz von Papen
Vice-Chancellor under Hitler
Acquitted

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HSC STUDY BUDDY 3

1
On 16th Oct 1946, those men sentenced to death were hanged, bodies cremated at Dachau
Concentration Camp & ashes scattered. Frizsche, von Papen & Schacht were later sentenced by
Germ courts but only brief imprisonment. Trial of Nazi war crimes didnt end 1946. Nuremburg
Trials created controversial legal precedent. In future yrs more Nazi officials, prison camp guards
& military officers were arrested & brought to trial. Senior Allied officers escaped any form of
public trial. Those officers whose conduct may have been unprofessional were censored. The
role of the Allied Bombing Command was never legally disputed.
HISTORIANS
TOLAND: suggests Goering lapped up his role at trial & attention. He was defiant, defended his
Fuhrer & attacked co-defendants who tried to protest his innocence. he never put blame on
others or hid behind the figure of H.
MAN: attempts deal w/ doubts raised about proceedings in Nuremburg trials. How could a nation
be tried for aggression or breaking treaty as there was no legal framework for this? Charge of
aggression structured so as not to embarrass SU over 1939 Finland attack. No Italians trialled.
Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 examples inconsistency of trials: Germs accused of conspiracy in plans to
invade Poland- part of this was the pact but was ignored.

REASONS FOR ALLIED VICTORY
Main reason usually advanced for Germ defeat= Allies had vastly superior eco + human
resources. Combined strength of British Empire, SU + US far outweighed that of Germ + her allies.
Other reasons
Red Army put up unexpected resistance. Major defeat of Germ army was on EF. Soviets
destroyed/ disabled an estimated 607 Germ divisions betw. 1941-5
Vast supply of American armaments + equipment not only supplied + sustained the war
on the WF but also provided vital aid for Russia. Most of Soviet rail network supplied w/
locomotives, wagons, rails made in US
Success of Allied air power decisively distorted Germ strat betw. 1943-5
o Bombing forced Germ air force to divert most of its fighters to defence of Germ +
to reduce sharply the production of bomber aircraft. Denude Germ frontline of
much-needed aircraft. By Sep 1944, 80% fighter force based in Germ on anti-
bombing missions. Allied forces enjoyed superiority of 70:1 in invasion of F
o Bombing limited ability of Germ to produce armaments
o Bombing forced H + generals to think of radical ways to hit back. Too much faith
placed in role of new weapons e.g. V-1 flying bomb + v-2 rocket: expensive w/
limited impact
o Germ lacked allies who were capable of offering real assistance. I= relatively
weak + proved more a liability as war cont. Jap fought own separate war
o Organisation of Germs war effort was poor. Failed to make best possible use of
available resources. Different sections of Nazi state made decisions bout war +
wartime eco, often overlapping or contradicting each other
1. The glad-bag interpretation
Greater allied production of war materials
Germs over-extended lines of communication
Germs empire too big to control
Hostility of peoples in occupied countries
Russian eco miracle
Germs failure to take adv of unpopularity of Stalins regime amongst various
nationalities
Liability of Italy as an ally
Superior allied polit + military leadership
Superior allied intelligence
Defeat at Stalingrad= turning pt
Becoming bogged down on Eastern Front
Failure to take Moscow in 1941
Failure to knock B out of war 1940
Failure to gain control of NA, Suez + Middle East oil
Allied control of seas + victory in Battle of the Atlantic

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 Allied bombing of Germ

Allied control of air
Germ inefficient eco
No 1 single factor which accounts for victory.
2. Allied victory was owed to them gaining control of the air
This made it impossible for Germ to achieve long-term military objectives + did much to weaken
Germ eco.
Luftwaffe failed in Battle of B + the Blitz
o Meant any poss Germ invasion of B had to be postponed indefinitely H always
face 2 front war if moved east
o Germ bombing didnt damage B morale rather increased their determination
o Made possible later intervention of US
o Germ bombing didnt have debilitating effect on B economy
Allied bombing had major impact on Germs ability to sustain war
o Became imposs for industry to be geographically concentrated + so impossible
to maximise production
o Factories were dispersed across country or forced underground
o Germs railway network was greatly disrupted, chemical + oil production badly
affected munitions production problematical
o Germ cities were pulverised humanitarian + social problems
Ability of allies to escort long-range bombers w/ fighters later= major effect on war
o Early bombing raids over Germ dangerous coz long-distance planes lacked
fighter protection vulnerable to attack bomber losses high early in war
o By late 1943 system perfected to enable fighters to fly distances as great as the
bombers forced Germs to divert many of its fighters to HF weakened Germ
tactical aerial strength on Eastern Front + in Normandygave aerial superiority
to Soviets + later allies at Normandy
o Germ forced to put more effort into producing anti-aircraft guns. 33% of
artillery production by 1944.
o Later battles: allies air superiority telling factor. D-Day: allies had 12 000
aircraft, Germs less than 500
o Eventual allied success in Battle of the Bulge owed much to air power
3. Allied victory due to fact allies had control of the sea
Roosevelt +Churchill extremely worried about dominance of Axis forces in Atlantic. Both
commented that war would be won/lost at sea
Allied losses at sea reached catastrophic levels during 1st 3 yrs
o 1940: 1000 allied ships sunk by Germ subs (a of Bs merchant marine)
o Bet Jan + Apr 1941 2mil tons of shipping sunk
o 1942: 1662 allied ships sunk
o By early 1943 B had 2mnths oil supply left
Failure to gain control of sea would be disastrous for allied war effort
o B could be starved out coz relied on imported food
o Its links to the empire + Middle East oil would be cut
o Would be impossible to import badly needed munitions + war equipment from
North America
o Impossible for Americans to ship over mils of men who were needed to take on
G + I in F
Necessity had inspired allied technological innovation by end 1943 to wrest control of
Atlantic from Germ submarine packs
o E.g. development of long-range aerial surveillance, improved convoy systems +
centimetric radar
o Allied control of sea made massive American contribution to Germs defeat
possible
4. The war was lost on the Eastern Front
Hs failure to defeat the SU dragged Germ into long drawn-out war of attrition on EF
1941 Germs close to defeating SU
Operation Barbarossa achieved enormous success at beginning
o SU lost 100s of 1000s of men killed or captured, Wehrmacht took city after city
o Luftwaffe decimated SU air force during 1st few days

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3
By autumn 1941 western Russia in Germ hands, Leningrad under siege, Kiev
taken, about to attack Moscow
Moscow survived Dec 1941 coz of:
o Gen Zhukovs military skills
o Transfer of 750 000 Siberian forces westwards
o Errors on Germ side in timing + supplies, Russian scorched earth policy,
inadequate + inappropriate Germ equipment
o The winter
Russias survival in 1941 meant had chance to mobilise enormous eco + human
resources
o Industries were moved east beyond the Urals to escape Germ bombing. Soon
achieved unbelievable feats of production e.g. 108000 aircraft + 95 000 tanks
produced during war
o Soviet wartime production noted for its simplicity + rationalisation
o Surge of patriotic + religious fervour amongst Russian people superhuman
efforts
o SU was a centralised police state which made rapid mobilisation of nation easy
SU able to gradually grind down Germ forces even though human + eco costs enormous
o Stalingrad= tp. For EF
o Kursk saw initiative slip away from the Wehrmacht
o From 1944 giant Russian sledgehammer able push Germs back towards
Germany
Churchill said it was the Russians who tore the guts out of the German army.
5. Allied victory was result of intervention of US
Before US entry, had done much to sustain B war effort. Sheer magnitude of US human, eco +
military resources too much for Germs to counter. Their business acumen brought wartime
production levels to a height
Before Dec 1941, Americans assisting B
o Churchill did deals w/ Roosevelt on gaining extra destroyers
o US + B est. moral high ground in conflict w/ signing of Atlantic Charter
o Lend-Lease system did much to assist B + SU
US military power was key factor in grinding Germ down
o much of bombing of Germ carried out by Americans
o US navy= crucial in getting supplies across Atlantic
o From 1944, main military engagements in Western Europe were dominated by
the American army + led by American generals. Allied supreme commander,
Eisenhower, was American
American eco couldnt be matched in its efficiency + ability to produce
o In 4yrs the Americans produced 8800 naval vessels + 87 000 landing craft
o In 1944, the Ford plant at Willow Bend south of Detroit was producing a bomber
aircraft every 63 mins
o Productivity in shipbuilding increased by 25% a year during the war
In long drawn-out war Germ couldnt survive vs. such eco + military power


6. Allied victory a result of the weakness of Germ system
o

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The
Intentionalists
Defeat of Nazi Germ + collapse of
Nazism= direct result of war, which
was product of H's intention all along
to pursue lebensraum in the east.
--> poor preparation
--> failure to defeat Britain
--> failure to defeat Russia
--> the extensiveness of the war which
stretched Germ's limited resources

The
Structuralists
Intentionalists' pts are valid but Germ's
defeat + collapse of Nazism were result
of structure of Nazi regime + its inner
workings.
--> lack of centralised control led to
rivalry + gross eco inefuiciency
--> failure to immediately go to total war
--> as regime radicalised + spiralled out
of control, the obsession w/ racial issues
diverted resources + manpower from the
main job of uighting the war

Essay Plans For Different Questions
Assess the success of German strategies during the course of the European War in the
period from September 1939 to June 1941
Germ strategies mixed success in period to June 1941; gained measure of success coz weakness
of opponents
Hs strategy vs. Poland in 1939 seems to have been extremely successful
o Use of blitzkrieg tactics effective w/ Poland defeated inside a month w/ light
Germ casualties
o Ps quick defeat meant not face 2 front war
Success of campaign shouldnt be exaggerated
o Ps defences were clearly no match for German offensive forces & quick demise
helped by Soviet invasion from east
o Germ could not fight on as needed to replenish war supplies
Victory in west was spectacular as Germ overran Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries
& France
o Swedish iron ore supplies were secured
o Control of Norwegian & Low Countries coasts gave Germ strategic advantage
over B
o B remained in war but greatly weakened & isolated
However, results of campaigns in west revealed limits on Germ strategy
o Llarge occupation forces req to control these lands
o Poor F leadership, low morale & a willingness to deal w/ H greatly eased these
campaigns
o Failure to knock B out of war revealed sev probs w/ Germ strategy: weaknesses
of Luftwaffe, Hs interference; contd presence ensured 2 front war if H decided
attack Russia
Axis success in Balkans & NA suggested a continuation of successful Germ strategy
o Yugoslavia & Greece had been easily defeated & allied troops forced out of
Greece & Crete
o Rommels presence in NA had re-established the Axis advantage in NA
However, situation not as good as seemed
o Germ presence in Greece & NA was result of Italian failures; Italy not useful ally
o Commitment in NA meant Germ having to fight on another front
To what extent was the Russian campaign a turning point if the European War?
a) The Russian campaign was clearly important but to argue it was a TP is unhistorical;
shouldnt be considered in isolation from other events

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5
b) The Russian campaign was clearly a TP until then Germ had had virtual non-stop
military success. Failure to gain quick success in Russia revealed the flaws in blitzkrieg &
a long drawn-out war would always benefit Russia due to its resources & huge
population compared to Germs limited strength
Germ in almost invincible position in June 1941, early part of Russian campaign further proved
pt. However Barbarossa failed to achieve its goals in 1941. Stalingrad 1942 some success but
then failures. Failure at Kursk ensured Germ had lost the initiative on the EF. Germ had lost opp
for victory in war w/ defeat in Russia (coincided w/ defeat in NA, growing presence of America &
growing Anglo-American control of Atlantic).
Assess the social and economic impact of WWII on civilians in Britain and Germany
In short term war minor effect on German civilians as Nazis tried to mitigate the impact of
conflict & took adv of their control of conquered masses. By early 1943 Germ forced into total
war. Devastating impact on social & eco life. B didnt suffer as much as Germ through civilians
affected by the Blitz, shortages & fear. Main long term effect on B civilians was consensus that life
after war had to be different to life before war
Early on social & eco effects of war on Germ minor
o Hs concern about HF morale & business as usual approach
o Germs ability to use resources of conquered nations lessened need to tighten up
at home
By early 1943 situation different; El Alamein, Stalingrad, bombing need to change
domestic policy
Social & eco life for Germ civilians became more extreme
o Nazi policies a cause: Changes in prop & increases in SS-police repression
o Allied actions a cause e.g. bombing of Germ devastation, affect ordinary Germs
Impact of total war on Germ: Intro Speer & impact on eco; how women affected; By 1945
old men & boys being conscripted in the Volkssturm to defend country
By 1945 regime destroyed, country occupied. Civilian loss of life enormous
B didnt suffer as much as Germ partic in terms of air warfare (B morale not devastated by
bombing)
Social effects of war inc. ARP measures, evacuees, domestic security, the Home Guard
Food shortages major concern; Battle of the Atlantic, rationing, measures encouraged by
gov to deal
Presence of Labour ministers in Churchills gov & influence on domestic policy
o Hopes for future & expectation of improvement for ordinary people
o The Keynesian idea, the Butler Education Act
Despite short-term suffering, for B long-term effects of war led to sig social & eco
improvement
Assess the importance of the air war in the eventual victory of the allied powers over the
Axis
Important factor however, it alone wouldnt have led to Germs defeat. The crucial factor was the
success of the Red Army on the Eastern Front.
Air power made possible the survival of B in 1940. Catastrophic effect on Germ war production.
Indirectly, but crucially, air power weakened Germ military position in the east & later
Normandy.
The Luftwaffe failed to win the Battle of Britain & to cow the B people during the Blitz
o Skill & courage on part of RAF, use of radar & Germ errors allowed B survival
o Hs decision to bomb London & other cities gave Fighter Command a breathing
space & failed to break the will of B people
Failure to defeat B was of crucial long-term sig
o H was destined to fight a 2-front war
o Bs survival meant NA would not fall to Axis powers
o Made possible later involvement of US & invasion of F; made possible the
bombing of Germ
Bombing of Germany far worse than anything B experienced. Majorly weakened Germ
war effort
o A ceiling was put on production despite Speers efforts
o Railway network was disrupted
o Chemical & oil production suffered

35

o Major social disruption

Allies success in developing long-range fighter-escorts for its bomber force meant
Germs had to switch fighter aircraft to the home front & produce far more anti-aircraft
guns
o Weakened Germs military tactical air strength on the Eastern Front & later in
Normandy
o Instead of producing offensive weaponry, the Germs had to use scarce resources
to defend its cities & economy
However it was on the EF that the guts were torn out of the German army.
o Wehrmacht became bogged down
o Failure to defeat Red Army in 1941 allowed Russia to take adv of its enormous
human & eco resources which led to major defeats: Stalingrad, Kursk, Operation
Bagration
o Germ losses on EF enormous & Germ simply couldnt replace them
o Part reason for inability to replace losses= impact of allied bombing campaign
vs. Germ HF

Speech on Cause of Conflict in Europe
The conflict in Europe was rooted in the differences of the authoritarian dictatorships and
passive Britain and France. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy undermined the idealism of the
inter-war period in pursuing aggressive revisionism of the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement
without regards for European conventions. The powerlessness of the League of Nations in
dealing with this aggression and revisionism exacerbated crises whilst the internationalism
upon which collective security was based was shown to be irrelevant. These failures led
Britain and France to a policy of appeasement which, instead of containing the dictatorships
aggression and revisionism, led to their increasingly war-like policies. The various crises
surrounding these issues exacerbated tensions of the inter-war period and were latent
causes of European conflict.

European conflict was grounded in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italys debasement of the
idealism of inter-war European affairs, particularly the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement. Rather
than providing for European stability, the settlement, according to Kitchen, was a
Carthaginian peace, devoid of moral validity. As this implication gave rise to nationalist
regimes bent on aggressive revisionism, the Paris Peace Settlement was vital in bringing
about conflict. Kershaw argues the intentionalist line that Hitler sought revision of the
settlement without diversion from long-term aims of lebensraum and race. These ends,
exampled by conscriptions 1935 introduction in Germany despite its prohibition by the
Versailles Treaty, were sought with disregard for European conventions. Mussolini likewise
emphasised Italian nationalism and military glory in seeking to transform the Mediterranean
Sea into an Italian Lake. Ultimately, both dictatorships exalted wars nobility and
demonstrated amorality in signing treaties only to purposely repudiate them. Bell is largely
justified in arguing the war as a conflict of values and ideas. Indeed, with war the Allied
powers aimed to reinforce notions of liberalism and international law set in the Paris Peace
Settlement. To an important degree, the conflict in Europe arose from the ideological
differences of the authoritarian dictatorships and the policies of Britain and France.

Because the impotence of the League of Nations in resolving conflicts and enforcing
sanctions and collective securitys collapse exacerbated such tensions, both were
fundamental in the onset of European conflict. Taylor argues that the Manchurian affair
assumed mythical importance as the Leagues first betrayal. The continued occupation of
Japanese troops in Manchuria, despite the Leagues diplomatic appeals and criticism,
supports Kitchens claim of its powerlessness to deal with states that despised its ideals. In
addition, Fascist Italys invasion of Abyssinia did much to cause conflict by demonstrating the

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Leagues foundation on internationalism as irrelevant in a world beset by aggressive
nationalism. According to Churchill, the Leagues ineptitude was paramount in its imposition
of sanctions that were half-hearted and tolerable rather than capable of paralysing the
aggressor. The subsequent Hoare-Laval Plan, Kitchen argues, discredited British and French
support for collective security in that they were shown to give way to aggression. By
December 1935 the League and principle of collective security were moribund. The Leagues
infirmity and the collapse of collective security, to a large extent, gave rise to European
conflict in failing to resolve crises which led to war.

The policy of appeasement was vital in causing European conflict due to its failure to contain
the aggression and revisionism of the dictatorships. The crux of criticisms of appeasement is
its causation of an unnecessary war as a result of cowardly diplomacy. Bell argues the lost
opportunities tenet that aggression, such as Hitlers 1935 remilitarisation of the Rhineland,
could have been thwarted by threat or use of force. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty
contributed to appeasements failure, Churchill attests, in ridding naval clauses of the Paris
Peace Settlement which the League had adversely been directed to uphold. In failing to
consult their allies, Churchill believes that Britain expressed to Mussolini their cynicism of
alliances, which culminated in the collapse of the Stresa Front. At Munich, Hitlers tendency
to renounce agreements was overlooked, justifying Cato in accusing Chamberlain and
Baldwin of being blind to the purposes of the criminal new Nazi war power. Munich was
pivotal in causing conflict as it demonstrated to Hitler the inertia of Britain and France so
that now, Churchill relates, [German] aggression was backed by force. The Sudetenland
was ceded to Germany, Bell argues, because the British acknowledged their legitimate
grievances against territorial clauses of Versailles. However, he continues that appeasement
had limits and with the invasion of Poland these limits were exceeded, making war
inevitable. The failure of appeasement to resist aggression and revisionism contributed
largely to the dictatorships increasingly war-like policies and thus, the conflict in Europe.

European conflict was given impetus by the contradiction the aggressive revisionism of Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy offered to the idealism of Britain and France. The dictatorships
debased accepted European conventions in renouncing clauses of the Paris Peace
Settlement and repudiating the Munich Conference. In turn, this aggression and revisionism
showed the League of Nations to be inept to deal with Powers that disregarded its ideals
and the irrelevancy of the principle of collective security. The policy of appeasement
highlighted Allied weakness in their failure to redress these issues. As a result, tensions of
the inter-war period were heightened and ultimately culminated in European conflict.

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