MANANTAN vs CA

FACTS:
The petitioner Manantan was charged by the Provincial Fiscal
of Isabela with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The
alleged crime occurred on or about the 25th day of September 1982
in the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The provincial fiscal
filed this information on June 1, 1983 within the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela. The accused was the driver and person-incharge of an automobile with the Plate No. NGA-816. Manantan
willfully and recklessly drove the vehicle in a negligent manner
which ended up sideswiping a passenger jeepney. Which caused the
Jeepney to turn turtle twice that ultimately ended with the death
of Ruben Nicolas, a passenger of the jeepney. On a decision dated
June 30, 1938 which was later promulgated on August 4, 1988, the
trial court reached a decision in favor of Manantan. With the
subsequent turn of events the private respondent spouses Nicolas
filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial
courts judgment. The spouses Nicolas prayed that the decision
appealed from be modified and that the appellee be ordered to pay
indemnity and damages. The court reached a decision wherein the
Court of Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents.
With regards to the civil liability the court a quo stated that
during the time that the accident occurred. Manantan was in a
state of heavily inebriated after consuming at least twelve
bottles of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner opted
for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it vehemently.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquittal

extinguished his civil liability.

of

the

accused

also

RULING:
No, it is quite evident that the law recognizes two different
kinds of acquittal, with entirely different effects regarding the
civil liability of the accused. First and foremost, the grounds
pertaining to the acquittal of the accused is not the main reason for
the act or omission complained of as a felony. In this particular
instance this relinquish the civil liability for a person who has been
found not to be the perpetrator of any act or omission shall not be
and should never be held liable for such an act or omission. This
surmise that there is no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
entirely out of the question and therefore the civil action if there
is any. Which will be instituted should be based on the grounds other
the delict that was complained of.
The secondary instance is an acquittal that was based on
reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused has not been duly
established. In this case at hand the acquittal was primarily based on
reasonable doubt. It was clearly stated that the accused was
recklessly imprudent or negligent. Which evidently prompted the court
to acquit him on the main contention of a reasonable doubt. Since
civil liability is not extinguished in a criminal case if the accused
is acquitted on reasonable doubt. The decision of the Court of Appeals
states that the defendant is civilly liable for negligent and reckless
of driving his automobile which was the proximate cause of the

vehicular accident and to indemnify the plaintiff for a sum of money

due to the death of Ruben Nicolas.

POTOT vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
On December 12, 1999 the appellant Potot was charged with
homicide before the RTC for assaulting and stabbing Rodolfo Dapulag
with a deadly weapon in the form of a knife which ultimately led to
the dead of the latter. During the arraignment, Potot pleaded guilty
and invoked the mitigating circumstances of the plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender. He was later on convicted of homicide with the
above stated mitigating circumstances. Potot filed a manifestation
with motion informing that he is not appealing from the Decision and
praying that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately
serve his sentence. Rosalie Dapulag (the wife of the victim) with the
approval of the public prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration
or retrial hoping that the decision be set aside and that the case be
heard again due to several irregularities that were done before the
trial. She alleged that there were 2 other persons involved in
committing the crime and that the eyewitness opted not to include this
information in his sworn statement. This was mainly due upon a
solicitation by a certain person and also due to the belief of the
witness that it would further complicate the case. The petitioner
vehemently opposed this motion, stating that the case can no longer be
modified or set aside once it has become final when he formally waived
his right to appeal. On May 3, 2000 the motion of Rosalie Dapulag was
granted by the trial court and set aside the previous decision. While
also ordering that the records of the case be remanded to the office
of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and
filing of the corresponding charge. Hence, the petitioner filed an MFR
contending that the trial court jurisdiction to issue the order since
the decision has already become final and that the said order would
place him in a Double Jeopardy. On May 26, 2000 the MFR was denied by
the trial court on the contention that the State is not bound by the
error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence the jeopardy
shall not attach. The petitioner assailed the decisions with the
Solictor General. With the February 1 decision reinstated and the
other court orders be set aside.

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court based on a motion by a private
complainant can set aside a previous judgment of conviction and
have records remanded of case to the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for re-evaluation of evidence and the filing of the
corresponding charges.
HELD:
No, it is only the accused that can modify or have the
judgment of conviction set aside. Although he must do this before
the judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. This
duly based on Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment
of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)

before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea
has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.

ROBERTO ALMARIO vs COURT of APPEALS

FACTS:
The petitioner was among the accused of 2 separate cases of
estafa through falsification of public documents and criminal
case with respondent RCBC as the aggrieved party for both cases.
Due to a lack of notice to the accused the hearing was reset
several times and also due to the fact that the trial judge was
elevated to a higher court. On October 1992 the hearing of the
case was commenced but on September 1995 the complainant failed
to appear in court even though there was a notice. The case was
in consideration to be dismissed for failure to prosecute and
considering that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
The motion was granted by the RTC and a motion for
reconsideration was filed which the court granted. Reversing the
its first decision on dismissing the case against the accused
Robert P. Almario.
A motion for reconsideration was raised by the defendant but
it was rejected. Upon rejection they sought for a certiorari in
the Court of Appeals and they contend that the reversal of the
decision was a clear violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
W/N the rights of the accused against double jeopardy have
been violated.
RULING:
Jeopardy only attaches upon a valid indictment before a
competent court after a valid plea has been entered and when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, if the case was also
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused. In this particular case at hand, the dismissal of
the case was based on a violation of the right to speedy trial
was made upon a motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial
court. The dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal
made with the express consent of the accused will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. His right to a speedy trial was not
compromised.
As provided on Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a

conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.

FELICIANO vs People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On December 8. 1994 in Quezon City Philippines. The accused
Feliciano along with several other persons whose identities are
concealed. Conspired willfully and confederating with intent to kill
with premeditated treachery and premeditation. While wearing masks and
other methods to conceal their identities armed with baseball bats,
lead pipes and cutters. They willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assaulted Dennis F. Venturina in a savagely brutal way by hitting him
on the head and several other party of his body. Inflicting serious
bodily harm and mortally wounded him that ultimately led to his death.
The persons involved were later on identified to be members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decisionwith
the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr.,
Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were
sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo
Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag.
The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court
until his apprehension.
The trial court, after evaluating the voluminous evidence at
hand, concluded that: After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the
Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some were
sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out
of the amorphous images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered
victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching
an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the
prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the attackers
rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead
pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their hapless
victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the
scene of the crime during the assault. Although each victim had a very
strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars,
not one. of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on
convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have
easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the
atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else would
escape conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on
the basis of the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.

HELD:

In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the
presumption is always in favor of innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty
only of slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the
swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only
Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang,
and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accusedappellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill

LETICIA MERCIALES vs CA

FACTS:
On August 12, 1993 a criminal case for rape with homicide was filed in
connection to the death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales against Joselito Nuada, Edwin
Moral, Adonis Nieves, Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol" Flores,
before the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legaspi City. During the trial,
after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the
discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state
witness. However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already
been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice.
Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for failure of
the prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion
for reconsideration, instead of presenting further evidence. The respondent Judge
postponed the hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994. On August 9, 1994,
again the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking its pending
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The private respondents, thru
counsel, objected to any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of
their right to a speedy trial. The respondent judge called for a recess so as to let the
prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present,
to prove the due execution of the accused Nuada's extrajudicial confession. In due
time the accused filed their demurer to evidence which later on October 21, 1994
the trial court issued the assailed order. Duly for lack of sufficient evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, henceforth all the accused and
the cases that were filed against them were DISMISSED. Mainly on the contention
that the evidence presented was not sufficient to convict the accused, the ensuing
demurer to evidence was also granted by the trial court. When the case accused
were acquitted the petitioner tried to elevate the case and have it reopened through
the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. All the while the accused moved to
set the case hearing invoking their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court
granted the motion in favor of the accused. Although the court denied the same
motion by the prosecution on the contention in lieu of the objection by the
prosecution.

ISSUE:
W/N reopening of the Criminal case will not violate the
accuseds right to Double Jeopardy.

HELD:
NO, it does not violate the right of the accused to Double Jeopardy.
Since the dismissal of the case was invalid for lack of fundamental essential
requisite which is due process. In rendering the judgment of dismissal the
trial judge acted in excess of jurisdiction which ultimately makes the
judgment void for lack of due process. Based on the contention that the
assailed decision is void for having been issued with grave abused of
discretion the petition does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
The elements of Double Jeopardy are as follows: The accused are charged under a
complaint information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2)
the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded;
and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their
consent.

In the case at hand, the public prosecutor knew that he had not
presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated
moves by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he
deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the
court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he
was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties.
Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done
without regard .to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if
there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for
double jeopardy.