Speech Etluca tion

R. R. ALLEN (Ph.D., Ilniversity of Wisconsi~i, 1960) is assistant professor of speech.

curl-iculum and i~lstruction at the Uni\ersitv of M:isc<~nsin. He was co-author
of Co1lte~rporary A1nei-icrr17 Speeches and a contributor to T h e C o m m u l ~ i c a l i r ~,4rts
e
( ~ n ( i.Scie11rrs
'
o f Speech. Currentl!, he is vice-president of the Wisconsin Speech Asso
tiation. and a member of thr steering committee of the I2'isconsin English-Language
.\rts Curriculum Committee.
C m . DAL.LISGCR
(Ph.D.. State t'niversity of Iowa. 19.52) is professor of speech at
Northern Illinois University. His articles have appeared in Sprecl~ Afonographs, T h e
Jourirrrl of C O I ~ L I I ~ I ~ ~College
I ~ C ~ Composition
I.~O~I,
a i ~ d C o ~ n r n ~ i n i r o t i o i7'he
~,
Speecl~
Teacher, and in the Ceiltrnl States Speech Journal. He has been active in a
variety of research projects concerni~igmethods in speech education, and has been
co-author of a number of reports of these p~ojects.

Speech Pathology and ..\udiology

DONALD
C. DAVIS(Ph.D., Northwestern t'niversity, 1951) is professor of speech and
chairman of the Department of Speech at Augustana College. Rock Island, Illinois. He
serves as director of the Speech and Hearing Center at Augustaua C:ollege and is
director of the Rock Island County Foundation for Crippled Children and Adl~lts.He
is the curreut presitlent of the Illinois Speech and Hearing Association.
KEITH ST. ONCE (Ph.D., L'ni\-ersity of Wiscorisin, 1952) is professor of speech and
clinic director at Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville. He is the author of
Creative Speech, and his articles have al~pearedin the Quarterly Journal of Speech
and in Speech Moilogrofihs.

Theatre and Interpretation

TURXER
IW. ELK..E (Ph.D., University of Illinois. 1964) is associate professor of drama
at the University of Oklahoma. He serves as a director and as business manager of
the u~li\ersitytheatre at the University of Oklahoma. He has published in the Quai-tel-I? Journal of SPeeclr. His major interest is in theatre and his minor area of i!~terest
is rhetoric and public address.
ROBERTC. WHITLATCH(,Ph.D.: Uni~ersityof Illi~lois, 1962) is assistant pl-ofessor of
speech ant1 theatre arts and director of the theatre a t Kllox College. He is active in
a ~rariety of professional organizations in hoth speech and theatre and c~lrrently
serves as chairman of region eight of the .\merican Educational Theatre ;lssociatioli.

ON VIEWING RHETORIC
AS EPISTEMIC
rates' answ-er has had a way of
echoing through history.
At best good men grant rhetoric
a slight role b u t grudgingly. A few
years ago, Arthur Larson, cast in
the role of rhetorician by virtue of
his appointment as Director of the
United States Information Agency,
found himself trying t o explain the
imoortance
of his mission to a Sen-,
ate subcommittee. There creeps
throughout the testimony the feeling t h a t undertaking to persuade
others is not quite right. Recall
t h a t Socrates remarks in responding t o Polus t h a t Gorgias has not
-.made his orofession altogether
clear,\nd
c'onsider Senator FulEver) beginning is against nature: the
bright's statement to Larson:
beginning is a leap and natule does not
"Well, this is a very interesting
make leaps.
Pierre ThPlenazl
subject. I would not want to minimize the difficulty, either, by
Rhetoric is among the oldest of simply saying that you have not
the arts of Western civilization. As made it clear. Certainly all memthe familiar tradition informs us, bers of Congress have struegled
it sprung u p in the fifth century with it. . . . It is a very difficult
thing t o sit here in peacetime and
B.C. during t h e aftermath of democratic revolts in several Greek feel t h a t it is constructive.""
poleis on the island of Sicily. But
Fulbright's remark goes t o the
professing rhetoric seems always heart of the matter. Invoking those
eventually t o lead to embarrass- well known arguments of Aristotle's
ment. I n Plato's dialogue, Socrates' from t h e opening chapter of his
questions soon silen-e G o r ~ i a s R h e t o r i c do no good for clearly
leaving young Polus to inquire, the art of ~ e r s u a s i o n is granted
"Then what do you think rhetoric sufferance only on t h e grounds t h a t
is?" I n one way or another Soc- men are not as they ought t o be.
Were all men able as some men
.\I?.. Scott (PIr.D., Unirwrsitg of Illinois,
are to reason soundly from true

T h e c o m m o n justification o f rlteturic as " m a k i n g t h e t r u t h e f e c t i z ~ e "

courts a n a t t i t u d e w h i c h h a s nearly
always viewed rhetoric as t h e harlot
of the arts. "Truth," o f course,
c a n b e t a k e n in several senses. If
o n e t a k e s i t as prior a n d immrrtable, t h p n one has n o use for
rh etoric except t o address inferiors.
If one t a k e s i t as contingent, t h e n
perhaps one o u g h t avoid t h e t e r m
ultogether or at least re-exantine
t h ~familiar justification, since i t
implies t r u t h as s o m e h o w pxirting
prior t o persuasion.

is n Professor in the D r p r r ~ t r ~ ~ 01
znt
Sl~eech and Thecitre Art.\, Cnirleisity of
Alli~lnesota.
1 "The Question of the Radical Point
Departure in Descartes ancl H~lsserl,"
in W h a t Is Plreno~nenology? nnd O t h e r
E.,~nys, edited with an introduction hy
James M. Edie, trans. by James M. Edie,
(;llarles Courtney, and Paul Brockelma~l
(C:llicago, 1962), 13. 96.

Iqjj)

Plato, (,o~gin.s469
He(rring Ilefore the Snbco~~lrlrittre
of
the Co~nrtritleeon Applopriatiolrs ITt1itc.d
States Se~rrrte,Eiqhty-fifth Congress, Fitst
Sessio11 011 H . R . 6 8 j r , Making A p p r o p l i a t i o ~ ~ sfoi the Departtnents of Slnte
(rnd ] ~ i s t i c e , / h e [udicirrry a n d Relrrtvd
Agefrcirs for tlte Fiscnl Year Endiiig J i i 1 1 ~
j'0, 1958, 17. 330.
2
3

premises, then rhetoric would be

superfluous.
The
assumption
that
has
spanned t h e centuries from t h a t
dialogue in Athens t o the one in
Washington, D. C., is t h a t men
can possess truth. If indeed one
can, in the sense t h a t "truth" is
ordinarily taken, then rhetoric is
of limited value. If some men can
possess truth, and others unders t a n d t r u t h , then what need the
former do b u t present t r u t h t o the
latter? Only in unusual circumstances, for example, as Fulbright's
statement implies, in time of war,
or for those incapable of responding t o right reason, may rhetoric
be sanctioned.
Accepting t h e notion t h a t t r u t h
exists, may be known, and communicated leads logically t o the
position t h a t there should be only
two modes of discourse: a neutral
presenting of d a t a among equals
and a persuasive leading of inferiors b y the capable. T h e attitude
with which this position m a y be
espoused can vary from benevolent
t o cynical, but it is certainly Llndemocratic. Still the contemporary
rhetorician is prone to accept th:.
assumption, t o say, in effect, "My
a r t is simply one which is useful
in making t h e t r u t h effective in
practical affairs," scarcelv conscio~ls
of t h e irony inherent in his
statement.
I t is absurd, of course, to typify
in a few paragraphs the attitude
t h a t has dominated rhetoric. B u t
inasmuch as my purpose is to set
forth a different position as a starting point for rhetoric, a longer consideration would be inappropriate.
M y undertaking can be described
as philosophizing about rhetoric.
T h e result will n o t be t h e discover!
of a fresh starting point; I merelv
hope to clarify through a fresh
analysis a way which has always
been open and sometimes chosen,
b u t seldom in a clear, incisive
manner.

Obviously I take as a sufficient

meanlng for "philosophy" t h a t indicated by Maurice Natanson who
sees ~t as a s t u d y of beginnings,
which is t o say t h a t every discipline
starts with some assumptions and
t h a t it is t h e business of philosophy
to discover those a s s u m ~ t i o n sand
t o study their meaning^.^
M y point of departure will be
drawn from the work of Stephen
Toulmin. Interestingly, Toulmin's
book, T h e U s e s o f A r g u m e n t , has
had a remarkably potent influence
on rhetorical theory and teaching
in this decade, b u t rhetoricians have
borrowed from the third chapter of
t h a t book, "The Layout of Arpuments," tendinq t o ignore thc
larger concern of which t h a t analysis is a part.

Plato's
Socrates
confronted
Gorgias with a choice: "Shall we,
then, assume t w o kinds of persuasion, the one producing belief
without certainty, the other knowledge?"5 T h e choice seems simple
enough, b u t t h e grounds involved
need examining.
T h e terms "certainty"
and
"knowledge" confront one with
what has become known as epistemology. I t is t o a fundamental
inquiry about epistemology t h a t
Stephen Toulmin directs his analvsis in t h e book mentioned. He
argues t h a t the question "How do
I k n o u ? " is an ambiguous one. I n
one sense it seems t o ask, "How do
my, senses work?" and is a physiopsychological question. As such, it
requires t h e compilation of data
which can be analyzed in an empirical fashion-a posteriori. This is
not, however, t h e fashion in which
epistemologists have worked. Their
methods have been speculative 01
4 "Rhctoric and Philosophical Asgume~itation."Qunrterly J o l r r i ~ o l of S t ~ r r r l r .
XLVIII (Fehr~~ary,
I 962), 28.
Go~gitrs 134.

a t least abstract and a priori. 'The

goal has been t o obtain some standard o r standards t o satisfy the
question, "How can I be certain
of m y conclusions?"
Toulmin suggests t h a t we can
set aside the psychological aspects
of the central question, "How do 1
know?" This is not t o say t h a t
these aspects are unimportant; it
s ~ m p l yis a maneuver to allow us t o
concentrate on t h e philosophical
aspects; he sees these as logical.
T h e quest for certainty presents
a question which is often begged
simply by entering into epistemological discussion. T h e question
,
d o you mean
may be ~ o s e d "What
by certain?" T o say, " I am certain
that t h e sun will rise tomorrow,"
may be to make a common statement which will probably not elicit
argument, unless one is engaged in
an epistemological discussion. ( T h e
fact t h a t this example is often used
in logic textbooks is evidence supporting Toulmin's disposition to see
epistemology, considered philosophically, as basically an inquiry into
logic.) Rut to say, "The sun will
not rise tomorrow," does not contradict the grounds on which most
people feel certain t h a t the sun will
rise. Our conclusion, based on exnerience, does not follow necessarily
from true premises. T h i s is to say
that we are not certain by the
standard required.
T h e only sort of arguments which
will answer t h e demands of certainty made in epistemological
speculation are those arguments
which T o l ~ l m i ncalls analytic. I t is
questionable (although Toulmin
does not put t h e matter in this
fashion) whether or not a n a l y t ~ c
arguments should be called arguments a t all since the word "argument" suggests the drawing of conclusions which are somehow fresh,
new, unknown o r unaccepted otherwise. Consider Toulmin's model
analytic argument:

.4nne is Jack's sistcs;

A11 Jack's sistrss hate rcd hais;
So .4nne has red liai1.1;

T h e conclusion of this argument,

Toulmin says quite rightly, might
better be introduced with the
phrase "in other words" rather than
"so" or "therefore." If the argument is t o be analytic, the premise,
"All Jack's sisters have red hair,"
can only be asserted in the presence
of his sisters, including- Anne.
I'oulmin contrasts analytic arguments with arguments he calls substantial. H e claims that analytic
arguments, which have been taken
t o be the model t o which philosophic arguments ought be held,
are rare. I am inclined t o believe
t h a t they are non-existent, t h a t is,
t h a t they can be indicated only
with special sorts of notational systems which can never make existential claims. I n terms of Toulmin's example, if one is not in the
presence of Anne, then the conclusion makes a claim about a
present condition on the basis of
past experience, i.e., all Jack's
sisters h a d red hair when last we
saw them. T o deny the conclusion
is not t o contradict t h e truth of the
premises. If one is in Anne's presence, then no argument is necessary.
T h e famous illustrative syllogism
concerning Socrates' mortality is
ambiguous. If the major premise,
",411 men are mortal," is taken as
a statement about our past experience, then the argument is not
analytic; as a matter of fact, the
argument turns o u t to be quite
like t h a t one from which we conclude t h a t t h e sun will rise tomorrow. On the other hand, if we
take the premise t o be one defining
what we mean in p a r t b y "man,"
then I would have t o say t h a t we
have no argument; Toulmin would
sav, a t least, t h a t we have no
substantial argument. I n the case

CENTRAL STATES SPEECH JOURNAL

of taking the premise t o be a definition, we could define men as

being purple, and our argument is
as good analytically. T h e rejoinder,
"But men are not purple," appeals
t o a non-analytic criterion.
As Toulmin sees them, substantial arguments involve some sort
of type shift, t h a t is, the conclusion contains an element not present in the premises, e.g., "cause" or
"other minds." T h e type shift
Toulmin concentrates on, and one
which in m y opinion is crucial, is
the shift in time. I n substantial
arguments a shift in time always
occurs. If a shift in time does not
occur, then one is simply reporting
what is present, not arguing. T h a t
one is able t o report, t h a t is, share
his perceptions with others, may
be called into question if the anaIvtic ideal is taken as the criterion
for knowing.7
T h e observations thus far made
lead us t o believe t h a t analytic
arguments must, be tenseless; they
cannot exist in t ~ m eT. h~e certainty
demanded must arise from what
has been true, is true, and shall be
true, which is t o say t h a t it must
be settled once and for all-immutable, changeless. Can there be substantial truths, t h a t is, statements
with content, not empty, which
can be used in analytic argument?
If so, then thev must be stated in
time and cannot be stated in time.
Technically this is the conclusion
of a reductio ad absurdurn. T h e
possibility of such truths can be
rejected on formal grounds.
Although the possibility may be
rejected formally, one may accept
the conclusion labeled as invalid.
One may not follow the reasoning
7 "If a gcnuine claim to knowledgr
must be backed by an analytic argument,
then therc can he no authentic claim to
knowlcdgc in such fields as thesc. T h e
future, the past, other minds, ethics, even
material objects: about all of these we
ought, strictly spcaking, to admit that ur7c
ktroir~ nothing." Ibid., p. 231.
8 Cf. ibid., p . 235.

or not accept the grounds. These

possible responses underscore the
use of the word "truth" in the foregoing paragraph. Once might argue
t h a t "truth" is not coincident with
the analytic ideal. I t is possible but
difficult t o use the word without the
freight of the analytic ideal. This
strong tendency t o associate one
with the other should make us
suspicious of a rhetoric which
claims to be based on truth.
By "truth" one may mean some
set of generally accepted social
norms, experience, or even matters
of faith as reference points in working out t h e contingencies in which
men find themselves. I n such cases
the word might be better avoided,
for in it t h e breath of the fanatic
hangs threatening to transmute the
term t o one of crushing certainty.
If truth is somehow both ~ r i o rand
substantial, then problems need not
be worked o u t but only classified
and disposed of. Unwittingly, one
may commit himself t o a rhetoric
which tolerates only equals, that is,
those who understand his "truths"
and consequently the conclusions
drawn from them; such a r h e t o r ~ c
approaches those who are not able
t o take its "truths" at face value
as inferiors t o be treated as such.
T h e attractiveness of the analytic ideal, ordinarily only dimly
grasped but nonetheless powerfully
active in the rhetoric of those who
deem truth as prior and enabling,
lies in the smuggling of the sense
of certainty into human affairs.

In order t o press further into the

possibilities resented by rejecting
prior and enabling truth as the
epistemological basis for a rhetoric,
I shall make several observatlpns
about the adaptations of Toulmln's
concepts by contemporary rhetorical theorists. T h e earliest and
most thorough use of his concepts
has been made by Douglas Ehn-

which I began this essay, t o embark

on any genuine enterprise of cooperative critical inquiry. Of course
these statements do not mean t h a t
Ehninger and Brockriede reject investigation before speaking or the
use b y speakers of experience, references t o social norms, or even t o
articles of faith. W h a t these statements do suggest is t h a t truth is
not prior and immutable but is
contingent. Insofar as we can say
t h a t there is t r u t h in human affairs,
it is in time; i t can be the result
of a process of interaction a t a
given moment. T h u s rhetoric may
be viewed not as a matter of giving
effectiveness t o t r u t h but of creating truth.
Ehninger and Brockriede's debate-as-cooperative-critical-inquiry
is one vantage point from which t o
see rhetoric as epistemic. l'his
notion is most coherent when it is
taken as normative rather than as
descriptive. When so taken, it calls
for a commitment t o a standard and
several matters become clear: one
may be committed and, being human, fall short of the standard;
further, one may make use of the
attributes associated with the standard without a t all being committed
t o it.
I have already suggested that
Ehninger and Brockriede may err
in not examining their philosophic
position in light of the disclosures
toward which Stephen Toulmin
leads. I am now arguing t h a t they
err in presenting their fundamental
position as descriptive of debate.
A confusion arises from their attempt t o describe the process of
debate ( t h e title of their secQ Decision by Debate (h'ew York, 1963).
ond chapter is "The Process of
Also Wayne Brockricdc and Doilglas
Debate") as the "rationale of deEhninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An
bate as an instrument for settling
Interpretation and Application," Q u a r
terly Journal o f Speech, XLVI (Fcbru- inferential questions critically.""
ary. 1 9 6 0 ) ~44-53.
As a description this statement is
10 See Decisiott by Debote, preface and
plainly contrary t o much of our exchapter two. See also, Douglas Ehningcr,
"Decision by Debate: A Re-Examination," perience; we commonly use the

inger and Wayne B r o ~ k r i e d eThey

.~
have adapted Toulmin's form for
"laying out" argument, holding it
t o be a more clear and complete
pattern than the traditional svllogism, without pushing further into
the philosophic issues for which
Toulmin's scheme of analysis is
preparatory. In this respect, Ehninger and Brockriede do not differ
from others who have used Toulmin's "layoutn in speech textbooks.
One might argue that these further issues are irrelevant t o the
interests of rhetorical theorists, although one of the purposes of this
paper is t o show t h a t such a position is untenable. Furthermore,
Ehninger and Brockriede take care
t o indicate a point of view toward
debate which might be well described as a philosophical foundation for their treatment of rhetorical concepts. Althouqh there is
no evidence t h a t their tfeatment
owes anything t o Toulmln, their
description of debate as cooperative
critical inqulry1 is nonetheless congruent with some of the ~mplications of his criticism of analytic
argument as he appl~esit t o epistemology.
When Ehninger and Brockriede
describe debate as cooperative crltical inquiry, they may be internreted as taking a radical departure
from t h e typical point of view. If
debate is critical inquiry, then it
is not simply an effort t o make a
preconceived position effective. I t
would be absurd for anyone who
begins with the attitude t h a t he
possesses truth, in the sense in

Quarterly Journal of Spreclr, XLV (Octo

bcr. 1g5g), 282-287.

11

~ e c i s i o nby Debate, p.

15.

'1

\vord "debate" t o refer to situations

in tvhirh a n y t h i n g h u t cooperative
critical i n q u i r ~ is occurring. T h e
cc~~nfusion
m a y b e cleared a w a y if
we recognize t h a t Ehninger a n d
Brockriedc's ideal is clnt, of t h e uses
of t h e process of d e b a t e t o which
men m a s h e c o m m i t t e d . T h e y d o
argue t h a t t h e process. tends t o
assure this use, b u t t h a t it t c n d i
t o u ~ a r dr a t h e r t h a n drztcrtninrs such
a use is clear. 4 s a m a t t e r of fact,
t h e authors motlify their s t a t e m e n t s
a t times, e.g., "the highest tradition of debate."'? and are driven
finally t o exl)lai~l t h a t "an). control, internal o r external, may, of
course, b e circumvented, !,r d e b a t e
m a y be so ineptly p r a c t ~ c e d t h a t
much of its effectiveness is lost.
Such failure, bowever, is h u m a n
ant1 is not t o he charged against
d e b a t r :IS a method."':' B u t just
;I?, t h e failure is n o t t o be charged
;iRainst t h e m e t h o d neither should
tile success, i.e., d e b a t e a t its
"highrst tr;~dition," he attril)uted
t o t h e 111-ocessitself rather t h a n t h ?
h u m a n c o n l m i t m r n t a n d the energy
a n d skill t o n i ; ~ k et h a t c o m n l i t n ~ e n t
~neaningful.
T h c direction o f analysis, from
'foulmin t h r o u g h E h n i ~ i g e r and
R~.ockrirde,leads t o t h e conclusion
t h a t there is n o possibility in m a t ters relevant t o h u m a n interaction
t o determine t r u t h in , a n y a priori
way, t h a t t r u t h can arlse only from
cooperative critical incluiry. M e n
m a y h a v e recourse t o sonle universal itleas in which they are willing t o affirm their faith. b u t these
m u s t e n t e r i n t o t h e continge~icies
of t i m e and place a n d will n o t give
rise t o products which are certain.

T h i s analysis has led toward t h e

tragic view nf life: m a n w h o desires c e r t a i n t y u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t h e
c a n n o t he certain a n d , moreovel-,

CENTR.4L ST.\TES SPEECH JOl'RS.\L

t h a t h e m u s t a c t in dissonant circumstances. O n e of t h e g r e a t symhols of m a n , F a u s t , sits in his
c h a m b e r a t t h e point of suicide
early in Goethe's d r a m a . H e is
vastly learned in all four of t h e
g r e a t ],rofessions, b u t he is certain only t h a t h c c a n n o t b e certain.I4
L a t e r F a u s t sits translating t h e
Bible. H e is working on t h e beginning of t h e Gospel according t o S t .
J o h n . T h e trouhlesonle word is
logo,-, which he renders as "word,"
t h e n "mind," then "power," then

1
iI

I
!

'
:

L'aCt,)'13

I h e word l r ~ g c ~and
s its deri\,ativcs
h a v e long h a d a suggestion of divinity a b o u t t h e m . F o r t h e ancient
Greeks, it was often a n expression
f o r "uni\~ersal mind"; and it retains
s o m e t h i n g of t h i s sense in P l a t o .
M a n could k n o w because he was
identified with t h e s u b s t a n c e of
G o d , t h a t is, t h e universal m i n d .
F r o m t h e universal mind (1ogo.r).
man's mind (l(1~r1.r
) can reason
( l o g o s ) t o bring forth speech
( 1 ~ ~ 0 sT
) .h e wonderful ambiguity
of logos retains t h e identity, t h a t is.
truth.
,411 of this m a y h e q u i t e right.
t h e G r e e k Sophist Protagoras said
in effect, h ~ l t 1 b;rve n o w a y of
knowing t h a t it is.'" ,411 I h a v e is
experiences, a n d m y experiences.
being finite, c a n n o t reveal t h e infinite t o m e . T h e a r g u ~ n e n t of t h e
7

1 4 M y pam]>hrasr is i ~ ~ t e t ~ d
10r dulldri
score tile argumcnt I Ilaxc 1>c.c11~nakillg.
1Valtc1 Ka~llnlar~llr~arlslatrs:
C:;llla.d Mastel- o f .41ts, anti I)octo~ t o
11oot .
For tcrl yea)-s almrst I collfrlrr
41x1 111, ant1 down. \r-here~el-ir gors.
I drag m) s t u d e ~ ~ t1)s
s tllr tlosrAnd src. t l r a t for all our sciencr ;III(I
;1rt
M:c can kllo~c notiling. I t IIIII-ns to\
11(.;11.t.
(Goethe's Frrlrst, H. gGo-gti3. Gardcn Cit\
Xcwr YOI-h, 1q62).
1.7 Lf'ort! . . , . , S ~ I I I I !. , . . Kruft! . . . .
7'fit!
(11. 1225 12~5.)
See hfa~ioV n I r ~ ~ s ~ e iT11~
~ ~ r.Tri)~l~i.\l~.
r,
trams. hath11~t.nF1-reman (,Oxford, 1954'.
pl>, 27-28.

Greek sophist Gorgias for his famous t h r e e propositions ( n o t h i n g

is; if a n y t h i n g is, it c a n n o t b e
known; if a n y t h i n g is a n d c a n b e
known, it c a n n o t h e communic a t e d ) " m a y be interpreted as an
a t t e m p t t o show t h a t m a n can b e
certain of n o absolute s t a n d a r d .
W e m a y be a w a r e of t h e a t t r i b u t e s
of our experiences, h u t there is n o
\vav for us t o recognize a n y attrib u t e which is essential a m o n g experiences. ( G o r g i a s ' inquirl- was int o t h e reality of t h a t primar). a t tribute, being itself.) T h e r e m ; ~ y
b e some q u a l i t y ( v a l u e , n o r m ,
s t a n d a r d ) which identifies all experiences with all others, o r some
with some others, b u t we c a n n o t
m a k e such identifications with ahsolute certaintv.
I n h u m a n affairs, ours is a world
of conflicting claims. N o t only m a y
one person contradict a n o t h e r , h u t
a single person m a y find himself
called upon t o believe o r a c t when
his knowledge gives rise t o directives which are dissonant. I-le m a y
be c a u g h t , for e x a m l ~ l e , in a conflict of d u t y toward his family a n d
his c o u n t r y . As a f a t h e r , h e m a y
reason t h a t he o u g h t keep a wellpaying job t o provide for rht, material necessities of his children a n d
b y his presellce help guide t h e m
during their i n l m a t u r i t y . As a citizen, he m a y reason t h a t h e is obligated t o lower his illcome ant1 remove his presence from his home
to serve in t h e armed forces. H e
m a y decide t h a t his d u t y t o country
must t a k e precedence a n d cven t h a t
in following t h e d e m a n d s r:f t h a t
d u t y he will in man! naq-s serve
his family. h u t although h e is able
t o m a k c such a decision, t h e rightness of t h e decision does n o t obviate
the responsibilities generated b y
the rejected claim.
'The illustrative example can he
easily modified i n t o o t h e r quite
common sets of circumstances: a
(11-aft board considering a partic-

u l a r case, a r g u m e n t s concerning t h e
policy of t h e draft, or even w a r as
a particular o r general policy. All
these questions m u s t b e settled b y
specific m e n in specific circrlmstances. E v e n t a k i n g uncritically
t h e d i c t a t e s of some past solution
is t o t a k e t h a t solution in a particu l a r circumstance.
'The s o l ~ h i s t sfacing their experiences found consistently n o t logos
( i n this context we might read "a
simple exl)lanation" or "a solitarv
rnoral imperative" ) b u t dtrsoi loRni,
t h a t is, contradictorv c l a i n ~ s . ' ~
F r o m a n o t h e r point of virw, Stephen Torllmin gives a similar suggestion: "Practice forces us t o recognize t h a t general ethical trrjths
can aspire a t best t o hold good in
t h e al,sence of effective counterclaims: conflicts of d u t y a r e a n inescanahle f e a t u r e ( I F t h e moral
life."'"
.~
M v a r g u m e n t is n o t t h a t one h a s
t h e choice t o act o n prior t r u t h o r
t o a c t t o create t r u t h . O n e m a y act
assuming t h a t t h e t r u t h is fixed a n d
t h a t his persuasion, for example, is
simply carrying o u t t h e d i c t a t e s of
t h a t t r u t h , I ~ u the will be deceiving
himself. Pierre T h e v e n a z ' s t a t e m e n t
s ~ ~ r n n l a r i z e sthis point of view:
"TIle p h e n o r n ~ ~ l o ~ofl expression
c a n n o t be retlucetl t o logor: it is
b o t h more f u n d a m e n t a l a n d more
~ e n c r a l .M a n acts and speaks br,f o r r hi. k n o w . O r , better, it is b y
cl,.ti~ic anrl it1 action t h a t h e is enabled t o k ? ~ o . i o . ' ' ? ~
~

T h e attracti\-eness of t h e notion
t h a t first o n e m u s t know t h e t r u t h
a n d t h a t persuasion a t i t s best is
simply m a k i n g tlie t r u t h effective
rests in large p a r t on man's desire
to he ethical. "How can I assure
myself t h a t m v actions a r e g o o d ? "
is t h e question with which he nags

( : E S T R A L ST.4TES SPEECH J O L ' R S . \ I .

himself. T h e question is a good

one. T h e position I have argued is
not one t h a t sets it aside b u t one
t h a t holds t h a t t h e question cannot
be answered in t h e abstract and
t h a t whatever principles one holds
are only p i d e s in acting consistently with moral demarids.
T h e point of view t h a t holds t h a t
man cannot be certain b u t must
a c t in the face of uncertainty t o
create situational t r u t h entails three
ethical guidelines: toleration, will,
and r e ~ ~ o n s l b i l i t yI. shall suggest
why these principles follow from
t h e point of view set forth.
If one can be certain, then one
needs no commands or urgings
(either from oneself or from others
t o act. F ~ ~ l u rt oe act can only be
a sign of a momentary misunderstanding or of a flawed intellect. 111
either case, there is no good reason
to tolerate disagreement. As a niatter of fact, if one can be certain,
tolerating deviatior~s from t h e demands of c e r t a i n t y may itself be
deemed e v ~ l .
O n t h e other hand, uncertainty,
taking truth as a toehold t o cli~nl)
into the yet-to-l~e-created rather
than as a program to unfold regardless of the circu~nstances,demands
toleration. I t would be inconsistent
with one's starting point and one's
quest t o act otherwise. When one's
undertaking involves the I~eliefand
action of others, one spoils his own
potentiality, for know-lng, b y Th6venaz' criterton a t least, if one fails
t o respect t h e integrity of t h e espression and action of others.
T h i s demand, t h e sine qua non
of a democratic s t a t e , is called hy
Karl Popper one of "the most important principles of humanitarian
and equalitarian ethics." His phrasing of t h e principle is "tolerance
towards all who are not intolerant
and who d o not propagate intolerance.'"'

If one cannot he certain, however, then one must either withd r a w from t h e conflicts of life or
find some way t o act in t h e face I
of these conflicts. H e must say with t
Gorgias, "1 know t h e irreconcilable j
conflicts, a n d yet I act."?' T h a t i
:
m a n can so act, he knows from ex- i
perience. W h a t is true for t h a t man
i
does n o t exist prior t o b u t in t h e ;
working o u t of its own expressio~i.
Although this working out m a y not
always involve attcnipts t o cotnmunicate with others, such att e m p t s are comnlonly in\-olved, and
t h u s w e disclose again the potentiality for rhetoric t o be cpistemic.
Inaction, f a i l u r e to take on t h e
burden of p a r t i c ~ p a t i n gin t h c developmcnt of conringent t r u t h ,
o u g h t be considered ethical failurv.

If one can act with certainty of

t r u t h then a n v effects of t h a t action can I)e viewed as inevitahle,
t h a t is, determined bt. the principles for which t h e individual is
sirnply t h e instrunlent; the individual actirrR is n o t responsible for
t h e pain, for example, t h a t his
actions m a y b r i ~ i gt o himself o r 10
others. T h e man who views himself
;IS t h e instrument of t h e state, or
of history, or of certain t r u t h of
a n v sort puts himself beyond
ethical demands, for he savs, in
effect, "It is n o t I who a m resl>onsihle."
O n t h e contrary, o n e who a c t s
without certainty must embrace t h e
2 2 L'nterstri~ier, p11. 181-1
8 2 . "If Go1 gias speaks of the In;lliy \ i r t l r t ~ sa r ~ d not
of abso111le virl~rc,he t l i t l lrot drn) ' ~ h r
fol-ma1 co~icept o I a srlprrlne cthical
law'; rather. Gorgias' ethical (.onrrl>t \\.as
intcr~dcd csl>ccia11)~t o ovcxcome thr I-igidity of an absolute concel,t which his.
torical rspcriencr also Iiad shown to br
contradicto~). To make jil-tur 1)ossil)lr
in ~ h cactive tul-moil of life, Gorgias tletaches i t from the empyrean of an allstraction overruled by tlie ir~rcssant I-c
production of tlre ar~litheses,and makvs
i t relali\e. 111 t h c face of a11 idralis~ic
dogmatism I)c stands for thr inner turmoil of a ti-agic drr.ision whir11 gives so
~>rofou~id
n meaning to life."

FERRV;\RY, 1967

responsibility for making his acts hiding. R a t h e r t h a n reporting a.1t h e best possible. I l e must recogriizr der t h e bed," t h e children lied. T h e
t h e conflicts of the rircumstanies prirst was upset, for lying was cont h a t he is ;n, maximizing t h e p o t . c ~ ~ -t r a r y t o the precepts lie had taught
tial good and accepting responsibil- them. His demands for t r u t h were
i t y for t h e inevitable h a r m . If the not met. "Rut," t h e children properson acts in circumstances in tested, "the t r u t h is t h a t there was
whicl, harm is n o t a n ever-present the devil o n one side and a child
potential, then he is not confronted on the other. W e wanted to help
by ethical questions. Such circuni- the child."
stances are a p t t o be rare in h u m a n
At best ( o r least) t r u t h niust be
interaction. Looking t o the future in seen as d u a l : t h e demands of t h e
making ethical decisions, we must precepts one adheres t o and the
he prepared t o look t o the past. demands of the circumstances in
"Ct.rtainly nothing can justify or which one must act. T h e children
condemn means except results," had t o act and acted to maximize
J o h n Dewey has argued. "Rut we t h e good I,otential in the situation.
must include consequences Impar- I n chastising tlie childrcn, as he did,
tially. . . . I t is willful folly to fas- t h e priest had to act also. H c also
ten upon some single end or conse- hat1 t o rnake what lie could of the
quence l o r intention1 which is liked situation as well as of his precepts.
and t o permit t h e view of t h a t t o Chie m a y doirht t h a t insisting rehlot from perception all other un- peatedly onlv t h a t "a lie is always
tle~ired a n d undvsirahle consc- a lie," in t h e fare of the children's
quencrs."':' T o act with intentions ouestion, "Ought we to have told
for good consequences, b u t t o ac- t h e devil where the child was hidcept the responsibilities for all t h e ing, yes or n o ? " as Silone reports,
consequences in so far as thev can the priest did make niaximu~n tht.
be known is p a r t of what being ~ o o dand minimum the harm poethical must mean. " ' T h a t which tential in the sitcration.
was' is t h e n a m e of the stone he
M a n mrlst consider t r u t h not as
cannot move," T h e Sooths;~yer soniething fixed a n d final b u t as
tells Zaratliustra of m a n . T o re- something t o be created moment
deem the past, man must learn "to b y moment in t h e circumstances in
recreate. all 'it was' into 'thus I which he finds himself and with
willed it.' "24
which he m u s t cope. h l a n m a y plot
Perhaps a final example is nec- his course by fixed stars b u t he
essary. Consider a story from his does not possess those stars; hc.
youth told by t h e Italian novelist only proceeds, more or less effecIgnazio Silone.2"~iefly,
he and tively, o n his course. Furthermore.
other village boys were taken to a m a n has 1e;irned t h a t his stars are
pllppet show by their parish priest. fixed only in a rrlative sensr.
During t h e
a devilIn h u r n a ~ i affairs, then, rhetoric.
puppet suddenly turned t o ask t h e perceived ill the frame herein dischildrcn where a child-puppet was cussed, is a - way of knowing; it is
epistemic. T h e uncertainty of this
wav m a y seem too threatening tc;
many. Rut t h e other way of look.
ing a t t h e world offers n o legitimate
Farrfmann (Ncw Yol-k. 1954). 11. '51.
role t o rhetoric; if one would accept
?:'See ?'/re (;od / / , a t F i ~ i l v d ,ell. Richard C:~ossman (Sew York, 1 y j 2 ) , I)I). 84- t h a t way, then one m a y he called
86.
upon t o act consistently with it.
~~