DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE

SUBJECT
INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC)

NAME OF THE FACULTY

Dr. NANDINI.C.P

DEEN DAYAL
20140152, 3RD Semester

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ABSTRACT
2. AIMS & OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
3. SIGNIFICANCE & BENEFIT OF THE STUDY
4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
5. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
6. INTRODUCTION
7. CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION- S. 503
8. PROVOCATION AND INSULT- S. 504 AND S. 509
9. OFFENCE OF PUBLIC MISCHIEF- S. 505
10. ANNOYANCE
11. EXCEPTIONS
12. JURISDICTION OF INDIAN COURTS
13. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
14. BIBILIOGRAPHY

CERTIFICATE

TITLE OF SUBJECT: INDIAN PENAL CODE

NAME OF FACULTY: Dr. NANDINI C.P

I A.MAMATHA DEEN DAYAL hereby declare that this project case study:
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION INSULT AND ANNOYANCE. Submitted by
me is an original work undertaken by me. I have duly acknowledged all the
sources from which the ideas and extracts have been taken. The project is free
from any plagiarism issue.
PLACE: Vishakhapatnam.

(Signature of the student)

Roll no: 2014016
Semester-3
Section-A

ABSTRACT
The law relating to certain specific sections of the Indian Penal Code- namely, Ss. 503, 504,
505 and 509. These sections occur, along with certain others which are outside the scope of
this paper, in Chapter XXII of the Code, which is entitled Of Criminal Intimidation, Insult
and Annoyance. The chapter is intended to deal with those acts which are aimed at
intimidating or insulting others, or are intended to be provocative, or which serve to foment
public disorder and mischief. As such, their importance in the regulation of social interactions
is indisputable.
In addition to criminal intimidation, the two offences concerning intentional insults- S. 504
and S. 509. These are sections which regulate the every-day interactions between people, and
impose certain requirements of decent behavior. The first of these sections is aimed at
punishing those who intentionally give provocation to others, either to breach the peace, or to
commit any other offence. The second, which punishes those who intentionally insult a
womans modesty, is of particular importance in the Indian societal context, where instances
of eve-teasing and molestation are rampant. The interpretation of these two sections will be
studied, using the decisions of Indian Courts, and in relation to the equivalent English law.
The last section that will be analyzed in this paper is S. 505. This is a provision that was
absent in the Indian Penal Code when it was first drafted, was added in 1898, and then further
added to in 1969. The section aims at punishing those who spread false news and rumours
with a view to causing mutiny and spreading disaffection, or inciting one community to
violence against another, or with the intention of promoting hatred and enmity on any
grounds between different groups of people. Clearly, this is a provision that assumes immense
relevance in light not only of the fact that India is a land of diverse cultures and peoples, but
also in the context of the communal tensions that are at hand today. At the same time, the
section is a definite restriction on the fundamental right under 19 (1) (a)- accordingly, the
interpretation which the Courts have given it, in order to prevent it from being misused, will
be studied in this paper.

Aims and Objectives

the project studying the law relating to certain sections of Chapter XXII of the IPC. This has
been done by analyzing the Courts interpretation of these sections, so as to appreciate the
essential

features

of

the

offences

they

punish.

At

certain

points,

important

strengths/shortcomings of these provisions have also been studied, in relation to the

equivalent law in England.
Scope and Limitations
The scope of the project deals with the Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance of the
judgment of the other countries
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.

How have Indian Courts interpreted S. 503 of the IPC?

2.

In relation to English law on intimidation, what are the strengths and weaknesses of
this section?

3.

How have Indian Courts interpreted the sections relating to insults in Chapter XXIIi.e. Ss. 504 and 509?

LITERATURE REVIEW
CITATION :

The Law of Liability for Civil Injuries 439 1907

AUTHORS:

JOHN W.SALMOND

ARTICLES: :

1 John W. Salmond The Law of Torts a Treatise criminal intimidation

SUMMARY
In certain cases it is an actionable wrong to intimidate of other persons with the intent and
effect of compelling them persons to the injury of to act in a manner which causes loss to the
plaintiff. We the plaintiff, leave out of account in this connection all cases in which the act so
procured to be done by the third person is itself a wrongful act as against the plaintiff : as
when A by threats coerces B into committing a tort against C, or into breaking a contract with

him. For the liability of A in such a case does not depend specifically on the fact of
intimidation, but generically on the fact of procurement in whatsoever fashion. To procure the
commission of a tort or the breach of a contract is itself a tort, apart from any question as to
intimidation. We are here concerned with intimidation which constrains third persons to do
acts against the plaintiff which they themselves have a legal right to do: for example, the
intimidation of the plaintiff's customers, whereby they are compelled to withdraw their
custom from him, or the intimidation of an employer, whereby he is compelled to discharge
his servant, the plaintiff. Intimidation of this sort is actionable, as we have said, in certain
classes of cases ; for it does not follow that, because a plaintiff's customers have a right to
cease to deal with him if they please, other persons have a right as against the plaintiff to
compel his customers to do so. There are at least two cases in which such intimidation is
certainly a cause of action :
(a) When the intimidation consists in a threat to do or procure an illegal act;
(b) When the intimidation is the act not of a single person, but of two or more persons acting
together in pursuance of a common intention :

CITATION:

12 Bench & B. n.s. 242 1917-1918

AUTHORS:

WILLIAM .L PROSSER

ARTICLE:

"ANNOYANCE" OF ANOTHER AS.A CRIME.

SUMMARY
The articles tell about the annoyance of the crime A person who knowing the contents there
sends, delivers, or in any manner causes to be sent or received any letter or other writing
threatening to do any unlawful injury to the person or property of another, or any person who
shall knowingly send or deliver or shall make and for the purpose of being delivered or sent,
shall part with the possession of any letter, postal card or writing with or without a name
subscribed thereto or signed with a fictitious name or with any letter, mark or other
designation, with intent thereby to cause annoyance to any person, or any person who shall
send, deliver, mail, or in any manner cause to be sent, delivered or mailed any paper or
document simulating or intended to simulate a summons, complaint, writ or court process of

any kind, is guilty of a misdemeanor." in article 1 section 8 of constitution provides every

citizen can speak and writes freely and publish their sentiments on all the subject being
responsible of their abuse of that right and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press."

To define and punish crimes is peculiarly within the province of the legislature, not of the
courts, and it is therefore the well settled rule that where the terms of a penal statute are so
general and indefinite that the courts, when called upon to enforce it, cannot, after applying
the general rules of construction, ascertain with reasonable certainty what was intended, they
must pronounce the enactment void for uncertainty. They cannot resort to conjecture as to the
legislative intent under the guise of interpretation for the purpose of upholding and enforcing
a statute which is so uncertain that it does not of itself, after a resort to the settled canons of
construction, show what acts the legislature intended to prohibit and punish.
CASE LAWS
Abraham v. State AIR 1960 Ker 236.
Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabhagana Behera 1995 CRI L.J. 3559
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955
S.S. Sanyal and another v. K.V.R Nair and others 1987 CRI L.J. 2074
Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 129
J Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch 255, Ca
R. v. Court [1988] 2 All ER 221.

INTRODUCTION
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION- S. 503
The offence of criminal intimidation is defined in S. 503, and the punishment for its
commission is provided in S. 506, of the IPC. Furthermore, S. 507 acts as a corollary for S.
506, by providing for an additional punishment when the person committing criminal
intimidation does so via an anonymous communication, or otherwise conceals his identity.
This is in view of the greater alarm caused by such a communication.
Section 503 reads: Criminal IntimidationThis definition has two parts- The first part refers to the act of threatening another with
injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom
that person is interested; the second part refers to the intent with which the threatening is
done and it is of two categories: one is intent to cause alarm to the person threatened, and the
second is to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to
do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution
of such threat. This implies that there are two essential ingredients to the section1.

There must be a threat of injury to a person, either

i) To his person, reputation or property; or

ii) To the person, reputation or property of anyone in whom that person is interested.
2. The threat must be made with the intent
i)

To cause alarm to that person; or

ii)

To cause that person to do an act which he is not legally bound to do or

iii) To cause that person to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat.

INTERPRETATION OF S. 503
1. Targeting of the Threat
Communication of the threat need not be direct, and in the presence of the complainant- it is
sufficient even if addressed to a third party, so long as it is intended to reach the victim. This
was the case in Romesh Chandra v. State1, where the accused had sent letters to a person X,
threatening to make public nude photographs of his daughter, and thereby injure the
reputations of both of them, unless he was paid hush money. He was charged and found
guilty of criminal intimidation against both X and his daughter, although the threat had been
directly communicated only to X.
In addition, the threat made need not be targeted at any one person in particular. The offence
under this section is made out if the threat is addressed to a class or group of persons.
However, it must be aimed at a defined and ascertained body of individuals
In Re A.K. Gopalan2, the accused delivered a speech at a cinema shed, wherein he made
several vulgar comments, strongly critical of the police force. His defense was that these
comments pertained to the police force in general, and were not threats towards any particular
group. This argument was not accepted, and the Court convicted him of criminal
intimidation, holding that he had intended to frighten by threats members of the police force
of Malabar, and especially those stationed at Badagara, where he had made the speech. In a
case before the Bombay High Court, the facts were that a meeting of lady teachers was
interrupted by the accused shouting that the teachers should leave the hall, and that they
should be caught by the hair, kicked on the waist, and pulled out. To the charge of criminal
intimidation, the defense he adopted was that these words were general, and not targeted at a

AIR 1960 SC 154, at 157.

2 AIR 1949 Mad 233, at 234.

specific individual or group. The Court struck down this argument, holding that the threats
had been addressed to all the ladies in the hall.
To conclude, the section envisages that the threat be targeted at either a particular person, or a
definite group of persons, and that it be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to such
person or group.

Abraham v State and Another

Kerala High Court
18 January 1960

In this case The accused is a jeweller at Thirunakkara, Kottayam and the complainant, the
Resident Engineer of the Kottayam Electricity Agency. The current charges due from the
accused to the Electric Co. amounted to more than Rs. 1000/- on 16-11-1957. The amount
was not paid in spite of repeated demands. The complainant therefore took steps to stop the
supply of current. He sent his men to the accuser's shop to remove the fuse placed inside the
building. The men had to return due to the accuser's resistance. On 16-11-1957 at about 10-30
A. M. they cut the aerial fuse outside the shop and disconnected the current supply. At about
2 P. M. the complainant went to the accuser's shop and told him that his conduct in having
obstructed the removal of the indoor fuse was not proper. The prosecution case is that at
about 4-30 P. M. the same day the accused trespassed into the complainant's office attached to
the power house with the object of insulting and annoying him and actually insulted him by
the use of obscene language. The accused is alleged to have told the complainant "Neither
your master nor you nor your father will be able to remove the fuse from my building. All
this is mere 'foul gas' to me".
"When the charge is an insult by words, the words must amount to something more than
what in English law is called 'mere vulgar abuse'. It abusive language is used in such
circumstances that the court comes to the conclusion that it cannot possibly have been
intended, and cannot have been understood by those to whom it was addressed to have been
intended, to be taken literally, the language cannot be held to amount to an intentional insult."
.

An analysis of the accused's words would show that the first portion of his remark is mere
tall-talk. Though couched in uncultured language, the remark seems to be nothing more than
a pompous boast that no one in this wide world could enter the accused's shop without his
permission. The latter portion of the sentence comparing the attempts made by the
complainant to remove the fuse to "foul gas" would at worst amount to vulgarity indicating
want of good manners on the part of the accused, but could hardly be characterised as an
insult. Even if the words used by the accused can be considered to be insulting in the sense
that they were derogatory to the dignity of the person to whom they were addressed, the
circumstances under which they were uttered indicate that the accused's intention was
nothing more than to strike a note on which to make a triumphant exit or to have the
satisfaction of having had the last word in a conversation that was not going to his liking.
The further question is whether the accused intended or knew it to be likely that the
provocation given by the insult would cause the complainant to break the public peace or
commit some other offence. The complainant no doubt has given evidence that on hearing the
accused's words he was provoked to resort to some action which he refrained from doing as
he wanted to avoid a breach of the peace. However what is material is not the reaction of the
complainant which might vary according to the sensitiveness of the individual insulted but
the intention of the offender to provoke or his knowledge that he is likely to provoke the
person insulted to commit an offence. In this case it cannot be held that the accused had the
necessary intention. Neither can he be fixed with the knowledge that the insult was likely to
provoke the complainant to commit an offence, because the circumstances under which the
alleged insulting language was used and the nature of the remark were such that the reaction
reasonably to be expected from any ordinary man and more so from a man of culture and
learning like the complainant, can be nothing stronger than a retort "Talk decently or clear out
of my room".
In any view it cannot be held that all the ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under
S. 504 have been made out. The conviction therefore cannot be sustained.

2. INJURY TO PERSON, REPUTATION OR PROPERTY

Injury
The section requires that the threat be of injury to person, reputation or property. The term
injury is defined in S. 44 of the IPC as denoting any harm whatever illegally caused to any
person in body, mind, reputation or property Therefore, to attract liability under S. 503, the
harm threatened must be illegal. In Priyanath Gupta v. Lal Jhi Chowkidar,3 the President of
a self-constituted Arbitration Court served a notice to the complainant requesting him to be
present at a certain time and place for the settlement of a claim, and stating that if he did not
attend, the suit would be decreed ex parte. It was held that the threat of decree so made was
covered by the section, since by no legal process or means could make or give effect to such
a decree
In a subsequent decision, the Calcutta High Court stated categorically that S. 503 is a section
which deals with illegal threats.The requirement of illegal harm has been considered by the
Madras High Court in relation to a threat of social boycott. In that case, the petitioners were a
group of labourers who were trying to improve their conditions of work by going on a strike.
They had been convicted under S. 506 of the IPC for threatening to enforce a social boycott
3 AIR 1923 Cal 590

against those of their colleagues who refused to strike, and also of threatening to deprive
them of the services of the barber and the washer man. The Court set aside the conviction,
ruling that these were not threats of injury within the meaning of S. 44, and that if it is not
illegal, then the threat [to do it] is not punishable under S. 506
However, in an earlier case before the Allahabad High Court, a threat of picketing (which was
not an offence at the time) was held to fall under the definition of criminal intimidation. The
accused had issued a notice and an agreement to the complainant, a shopkeeper. The notice
held out a threat that the complainants shop would be picketed unless he executed the
agreement, under which he would be barred from importing foreign cloth. According to the
above interpretation, this could not amount to criminal intimidation, because the threat of
picketing was not one of illegal harm. However, the Court held that the notice and the
agreement should be taken jointly On the basis of the fact that the shopkeepers business
would suffer if he were to cease the import of foreign cloth, it ruled that the accused had been
correctly convicted under S. 506
II) PERSON, REPUTATION, PROPERTY
the section, the threat in the offence of criminal intimidation must be directed against
person, reputation or property. These terms have not been precisely defined by the Courts,
but their meaning can be gauged through the following examples.
In Muhammad Ahmad Khan v. Emperor4, a constable served a notice on the accused and
asked hi
m to make an endorsement at the back of the notice, acknowledging its receipt. The accused
proceeded to write something on the back of the notice, and when the constable told him that
nothing but a signature in acknowledgement was to be written, he reacted by throwing the
notice at the constable, and shouting Go away, otherwise I will break your hands and feet.
This was held to be an offence under S. 503, as it involved a threat to the person of the
officer. Person implies simply the individuality of a human beingbodily form or
substance
3. Threats to persons in whom target is interested
According to S. 503, a threat of injury to the person or reputation of anyone in whom the
target of the threat is interested can amount to criminal intimidation, provided that the rest of
the ingredients are satisfied. This portion of the definition excludes property, so a threat to
4 AIR 1936 All 171.

the property of a third party is not within the purview of the section. A threat to the reputation
of a deceased person is specifically included in the section, under the Explanation, provided
that the deceased be someone in whom the target of the threat is interested.
In Q.E. v. Mangesh Jivaji5, an ex-clerk of the Forest Department sent a petition to the
Revenue Commissioner, purportedly written by the inhabitants of certain villages, threatening
to kill a Forest Officer unless he was transferred to another area. It was held that this was not
an offence under S. 503, as the Revenue Commissioner had neither personal nor official
interest in the Forest Officer. A threat of suicide is also not within the section, unless the
target of the threat is interested in the person making it.6

4. Intention of the Offender

The second essential ingredient of the section is that the threat must be made with intent,
either to cause alarm, or to cause the victim to do an act which he is not legally bound to do,
or to abstain from an act he is entitled to perform. The question of whether or not the target of
the threat was in fact alarmed, or whether he or she actually performed or abstained from
performing any act, to avoid the execution of the threat, is immaterial. It is the intention of
the speaker that has to be considered in deciding whether what he stated comes within the
mischief of S. 503 The Orissa High Court has held that the gist of the offence is the effect,
which the threat is intended to have upon the mind of the person threatened. 7 In the case
before it, the Court also stated that intention is a mental contention, which has to be gathered
from the circumstances of the case. If the threat is such as would overcome the ordinary free
will of a firm and prudent man, or if, irrespective of the nature of the threat, it is made with
the intention mentioned in the section, then the offence will be made out. Practically,
5 (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom 377 cited from K.D. Gaur
6 Nubi Buksh v. Must. Oomra (1866) PR No. 109 of 1866 cited from R. Ranchhodas and

D.K. Takore, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals The Indian Penal Code, 28th ed., (Agra: Wadhwa and
Company Law Publishers, 1997), 711
7 Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabhagana Behera 1995 CRI L.J. 3559. Also see In re A.K.

Gopalan AIR 1949 Mad 233, at 234

however, the intention must be gauged from the facts of the case In the case before it, the
Court also stated that intention is a mental contention, which has to be gathered from the
circumstances of the case. If the threat is such as would overcome the ordinary free will of a
firm and prudent man, or if, irrespective of the nature of the threat, it is made with the
intention mentioned in the section, then the offence will be made out. Practically, however,
the intention must be gauged from the facts of the case. In Amulya Kumar
Behera v. Nabhagana Behera, the accused was acquitted on the grounds that a mere
expression of words without any intent to cause alarm would not invite punishment under the
section. An example of how intent is determined from surrounding circumstances is the case
of S.S. Sanyal and another v. K.V.R Nair and others, where the President of a company
threatened his employee, saying your days are numbered The Calcutta High Court decided
that there was no criminal intimidation here, 8 as the words are to be understood in the
context of the circumstances in which they were uttered, and under such an interpretation
the Presidents words meant simply that the service of the complainant under the company
may be terminated.
Although the meaning of the expressions any act which he is not legally bound to do and
any act which that person is legally entitled to do is clear, the meaning of alarm was
investigated in Amulya Kumars Case, where the Court held that though the degree of alarm
could vary, it's essential nature was to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates
and take away from his acts the elements of free voluntary action which alone constitute
consent
AVOIDING THE EXECUTION OF SUCH THREAT
In Re Doraiswamy Aiyar9 the Madras High Court took the view that the words as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat in S. 503 implied that the threat must be one, which
can be put into execution by the person threatening. In that case, the accused was sought to
be punished under S. 507 of the IPC, which imposes an additional punishment for criminal
intimidation by an anonymous communication, for sending anonymous letters to the
complainant which read if you dont pay me the money demanded from you, God is going
8 ] 1987 CRI L.J. 2074
9 AIR 1925 Mad 480

to punish you and your family with ruin and death.Since a punishment by God was not one
which the accused could inflict, or cause to be inflicted, he was not convicted. It is submitted
that this decision is incorrect, as S. 503 does not require that the accused have the capacity to
fulfil his threat. It only requires that there be a threat of a particular kind, backed by a
particular intention. If capacity to execute the threat were a requisite for the offence, then a
person who forced another to do something, by pointing an unloaded gun at him, would not
be guilty of criminal intimidation.
Therefore, it is submitted that S. 503 does not require a capacity to execute the threat on the
part of the person making it, just as it does not require that the threat be successful. The
words as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat only constitute part of the
required intention of the offender- i.e. he must intend that the victim act, or abstain from
acting, so as to avoid the threat.

PROVOCATION AND INSULT- S. 504 AND S. 509

The Indian Penal Code contains two provisions relating to insults aimed at people other than
public servants. These are S. 504, which deals with provocation of offences, and S. 509,
which defines a specific crime against women, and deals with insults to the modesty of
women.

SECTION 504
Section 504 of the IPC reads: Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to
any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break
the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The purpose of this section is to punish those who intentionally use insulting language, with
the object of provoking a breach of the peace. The section has three essential ingredients1.

The offender must intentionally insult the complainant.

2.

The insult must be such as to provoke the complainant.

The offender must intend, or know it to be likely, that this provocation will cause the
complainant to break the public peace, or commit any other offence
Interpretation of S. 504

1. Intentional Insult
The first ingredient of the offence is that there must be an intentional insult. The insult
referred to in the section need not be in the form of spoken words- it may be written, or it
may arise from the conduct and actions of the accused. 10 However, irrespective of its form,
not every kind of abusive language can be classed as an intentional insult. In Philip
Rangel v. Emperor11, the accused was a shareholder of the Central Telegraph Office Credit
Co-operative Bank Limited, who muttered the words -you bloody bastards and cads, upon
being expelled from a shareholders meeting. In considering whether this was an intentional
insult, Beaumont C.J. held that when the charge is an insult by words, the words must
amount to something more than what in English law is called mere vulgar abuse. If abusive
language is used in such circumstances that the Court comes to the conclusion that it cannot
possibly have been intended, and cannot have been understood by those to whom it was
addressed to have been intended to be taken literally, the language cannot be held to amount
to an intentional insult.
2. The Manner of Insult
The manner of insult covered in the section extends to words, sounds, gestures, the exhibition
of objects and the intrusion upon the womans privacy. Of these, the two types of insult that
will be considered here are the exhibition of objects, and the intrusion upon privacy 12. The
words exhibits any object do not imply that the object must be displayed to the complainant,
in the presence of the accused. The meaning of this phrase was gone into by the Bombay
High Court in Emperor v. Tarak Das Gupta13. The accused had been convicted by the trial
court under S. 509 for sending a letter containing indecent overtures to an English nurse. On
appeal to the High Court, he pleaded that his act did not come under the words exhibits any
10 See Habib Khan v. Mazharul Haque AIR 1917 Pat 658.
11 AIR 1932 Bom 193
12 For an example of a case involving insult by words, by a Managing Director to an

employee, see Rear Admiral (Retd.) Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v. Vandana

Jhingan MANU/DE/0204/2002
13 AIR 1926 Bom 159.

object. The Court rejected this argument, and held that just because the accused had not
personally shown the nurse the letter did not mean he had not exhibited it to her. Fawcett J.
also held that, while the word exhibit does ordinarily express the idea of actually showing
a thing to a personsuch showing need not be immediatea thing can be exposed or
exhibited to a person, although at first sight it may be wrapped in something which prevents
that person from actually seeing the object contained in the wrapper.

OFFENCE OF PUBLIC MISCHIEF- S. 505

Section 505 of the IPC is meant to check and punish the spreading of false and mischievous
news intended to upset the public tranquility. It was inserted by the Amendment Act 4 of
1898. Sub clauses (2) and (3) were put in by Act 35 of 1969. The section reads:
Statement conducing to public mischief- (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any
statement, rumour or reporta) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the
Army, Navy or Air Force of India to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such;
or
b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any
section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the
State or against the public tranquility; or
c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to
commit any offence against any other class or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.
(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes- Whoever
makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news
with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground
whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine or with both.
(3) Offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship etc.- Whoever commits
an offence specified in sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in

the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with

imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception: It does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this section, when the
person making, publishing or circulating any such statement, rumour or report, has
reasonable grounds for believing that such statement, rumour or report is true and makes,
publishes or circulates it in good faith and without any such intent as aforesaid.14
This section can be divided into two parts, based on the effect of the news spread1.

1. Where the publication is intended to, or is likely to cause mutiny amongst soldiers,
army men and navy persons

2.

2. Where the publication is intended to, or is likely to cause commotion amongst the
public, or induce someone to commit an offence against the state or public tranquility.

Subsections (2) and (3) were added on the recommendation of the National Integration
Council, to widen the scope of the section, in order to prevent the fomenting of communal
and religious tensions.
In the case of Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar15, the Supreme Court considered whether S. 505
was violative of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution.
The Court ruled that that each one of the constituent elements of the offence under S. 505
has reference to, and a direct effe3ct on the security of the State or public order, and
accordingly that these provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on
the freedom of speech and expression16Therefore, the constitutionality of S. 505 has been
upheld under Clause 2 of Art. 19(1)(a).

14 http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;ident=0d218ab6-6cdf4a5e-9e50-a625a43804f6;page=0;query=DocId%3A%22025e7646-947b-462cb557-60aa55dc7b42%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0
15 AIR 1962 SC 955

Sticks and Stones can put you in jail but can words increase your sentence? Constitutional
and policy dilemmas of ethnic intimidation laws in 1991 UCLALR 333.
16

Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar

Supreme Court of India
20 January 1962

AIR 1962 SC 955

In Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957, the appellant is one Kedar nath Singh, who was prosecuted
before a Magistrate, 1st Class, at Begusarai, in the district of Monghyr, in Bihar. He framed
the following charges against the accused person, which are set out in extenso in order to
bring out the gravamen of the charge against him.
"First. That you on 26th day of May, 1953 at village Barauni, P. S. Taghra (Monghyr) by
speaking the words, to wit,
(a) To-day the dogs of the C. I. D are loitering round Barauni. Many official dogs are sitting
even in this meeting. The people of India drove out the Britishers from this country and
elected these Congress goondas to the gaddi and seated them on it. Today these Congress
goondas are sitting on the gaddi due to mistake of the people. When we drove out the
Britishers, we shall strike and turn out these Congress goondas as well. These official dogs
will also be liquidated along with these Congress goondas. These Congress goondas are
banking upon the American dollars and imposing various kinds of taxes on the people to-day.
The blood of our brothers- mazdoors and Kishanas is being sucked. The capitalists and the
zamindars of this country help these Congress goondas. These zamindars and capitalists will
also have to be brought before the peoples court along with these Congress goondas.
(b) On the strength of the organisation and unity of Kisans and mazdoors the Forward
Communists Party will expose the black deeds of the Congress goondas, who are just like the
Britishers. Only the colour of the body has changed. They have to-day established a rule of
lathis and bullets in the country. The Britishers had to go away from this land. They had
aeroplanes, guns, bombs and other weapons with them.
(c) The Forward Communist Party does not believe in the doctrine of vote itself. The party
had always been believing in revolution and does so even at present. We believe in that
revolution, which will come and in the flames of which the capitalists, zamindars and the
Congress leaders of India, who have made it their profession to loot the country, will be

reduced to ashes and on their ashes will be established a Government of the poor and the
downtrodden people of India.

After recording a substantial volume of oral evidence, the learned Trial Magistrate convicted
the accused person both under ss. 124A and 505(b) of the ipc, and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year. No separate sentence was passed in respect of the
conviction under the latter section.
The convicted persons preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which
was heard by the late Mr. Justice Naqui Imam, sitting singly. By this judgment and order
dated April 9, 1956, he upheld the convictions and the sentence and dismissed the appeal. In
the course of his judgment, the learned Judge observed that the Judge observed of the charge
against the appellant was nothing but a vilification of the Government; that it was full of
incitements to revolution and that the speech taken as a whole was certainly seditions. It is
not a speech critising any of is measures. He held that the offences both under ss. 124A
505(b) of the ipc had been made out.
In that case, the Court had to choose between a definition of the expression 'Prize
Competitions' as limited to those competitions which were of a gambling character and those
which were not. The Court chose the former interpretation which made the rest of the
provisions of the Act, Prize Competitions Act , with particular reference to ss. 4 and 5 of the
Act and Rules 11 and 12 framed thereunder, valid. The Court held that the penalty attached
only to those competitions which involved the element of gambling and those competitions in
which success depended to a substantial degree on skill were held to be out of the purview of
the Act. The ratio decidendi in that case, in our opinion, applied to the case in hand in so far
as we propose to limit its operation only to such activities as come within the ambit of the
observations of the Federal Court, that is to say, activities involving incitement to violence or
intention or tendency to create public disorder or cause disturbance of public peace.
It is manifest that each one of the constituent elements of the offence under s. 505 has
reference to, and a direct effect on, the security of the State or public order. Hence, these
provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of

speech and expression. It is clear, therefore, that cl. (2) of Art. 19 clearly save the section
from the vice of unconstitutionality.
It has not been contended before us on behalf of the appellant in C.A. 169 of 1957 or on
behalf of the respondents in the other appeals (No. 124- 126 of 1958) that the words used by
them did not come within the purview of the definition of sedition as interpreted by us. No
arguments were advanced before us to show that even on the interpretation given by us their
cases did not come within the mischief of the one or the other section, as the case may be. It
follows, therefore, that the Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957 has to be dismissed. Criminal
Appeals 124-126 of 1958 will be remanded to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks
fit and proper in the light of the interpretation given by us.

Interpretation of S. 505
1.

Interpretation of makes, publishes or circulates

The words makes, publishes or circulates in S. 505 have, in the context of S. 505(2), been
interpreted as supplementary to each other. The Supreme Court ruled that in order to prevent
redundancy with S. 153-A, which also punishes statements that promote ill-will between
communities, this phrase could not be interpreted disjunctively, because then a mere
statement would invite punishment under both sections. Therefore, S. 505 is interpreted as
requiring that the statement should have been made, published and circulated, so as to give
effect to the intent of the legislature.
Strict construction in favour of defense
The Orissa High Court, in Kalicharan Mohapatra v. Srinivas Sahu17 held that S. 505 must be
construed strictly in favour of the defense, in view of the fact that it deals with the liberty of
the subject. In that case, the accused were charged under S. 505(c) for the publication of a
pamphlet which was critical of the administration of Talcher Town. The Court held that the
contents of the pamphlet did not fall under S. 505 (c), as it did not incite any offence, and that
in a democratic setup a citizen has a right, subject to certain restrictions, to point out, either
by means of a pamphlet or by holding public meetings, what he considers to be the
commission and omission on the part of the officialsin consequence of which the public of
17 AIR 1960 Orissa 65.

that place are suffering.The Court also held that under the exception to S. 505, a person is
granted immunity from prosecution if he has reasonable grounds for believing the allegations
to be true, and if he lacks the intent required by the section.
Mens Rea
The offence under S. 505(2) has been held to require mens rea by the Supreme Court, in Bilal
Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh18. The Court held that the words with intent to
create or promote or which is likely to create or promote inserted a requirement of mens rea.
Since these phrases occur in every clause of S. 505, mens rea is an essential ingredient of the
section. In a recent case before the Madras High Court, K.P.S. Sathyamoorthy v. State of
Tamil Nadu19, it was alleged that the accused had committed an offence under S. 505(2) for
publishing a circular in a Tamil daily wherein he had criticized Christians for converting to
Hinduism, so as to enjoy job opportunities. The Court rejected this allegation, holding that,
firstly, the statement was a fact, and secondly, that intention is the pre-condition for the
commission of the offence under S. 505(2), which intention had not been made out on the
facts.
By interpreting S. 505 so as to require intention as a pre-condition, the Courts have again
sought to ensure that it is not used against those who, in the exercise of their constitutional
right to free speech, innocently cause public disorder.20
It is evident from the interpretation given by the Courts that S. 505 is to be construed in the
defiance's favour, and applied sparingly. At the same time, its constitutionality in the face of
Art. 19(1)(a) has been upheld by the Supreme Court- this makes it a valuable tool in the fight
against communalism, among other evils. It is submitted that the Courts have been successful
in striking a balance between the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and public order.

18 (1997) 7 SCC 431.

19 MANU/TN/0216/2003
20 http://www.shareyouressays.com/115791/speech-on-criminal-intimidationinsult-and-annoyance

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Section. 503, it was based on the interpretation given to the section by the Courts, the
essential features of the offence are a threat of a certain kind, coupled with an intention of
either causing the target of the threat to do, or abstain from doing, something he was not
legally bound to do, or had a legal right to do, or of causing him alarm. In connection with
this interpretation, it was noted that although the Indian law is adequate in most respects, the
inclusion of alarm in this section, as opposed to a section punishing insult, is incongruous
and regrettable. This is because alarm can be caused very often, not by a threat, but simply by
abuses and insults.
Section. 504 and 509, varying conclusions regarding the efficacy of these provisions were
arrived at. As regards S. 504, the interpretation of the section requires three ingredients- an
intentional insult, a provocation due to that insult, and an intention that the person insulted be
provoked to breach the peace, or commit any other offence. In comparing these requirements
with those under the English law on the point, it was noted that the third ingredient of S. 504
appears to be detrimental to achieving the purpose of preventing provocative insults. This is
because, once someone has intentionally insulted another in such a manner as to give him
provocation, and if that insult is objectively likely to provoke him to breach the peace, then
the subjective test of whether the person who made the insult intended not just the insult, but
also the particular provocation, only serves to complicate the application of the section.
Finally, in the project S. 505, the point that emerged very clearly was that the Courts have
endeavored to construct the section so as to favour the defense as much as possible, without
endangering its utility, in order to prevent its misuse. To that end, the Courts interpretation
has been very successful in balancing the right under 19 (1)(a) with the purpose of S. 505.

The section as it stands is a valuable instrument in the hands of the law-enforcement

agencies, in combating the threats that communal and other divisive forces pose, to the goal
of national integration

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Indian Penal Code, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, 32nd edition, 2014.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and The Indian

Evidence Act, 1872, .

Commentaries on the Indian Penal Code, K.D.Gaur, with a foreword by Justice
P.V.Reddi, 2nd edition, 2013.

A. Reed and P. Seago, Criminal Law, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1999).

J.C Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th ed., (London: Butterworths, 1988).

Justice C.K. Thakker, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, Vol. 2, 26th ed., (New
Delhi: Bharat Law House, 2002.