A Culture of Fascism Ideology as a Motive Force Behind German Support for the Nazi Regime

http://themendenhall.com/2013/05/07/a-culture-of-fascism-ideology-as-a-motive-force-behindgerman-support-for-the-nazi-regime/
Existence or nonexistence (Fritzsche 265), belonging to a Nazi society, or giving up on
organizational life altogether (Stephenson 107) these were common dichotomies with which
average Germans felt confronted throughout World War II and the twelve-year rule of the Nazi
Party. With bitter memories of 1918 and Germanys humiliating defeat in World War I lingering
heavily in the air, the German people faced many choices when it came to responding to Nazi
rule, though historians frequently disagree on the feasibility or even existence of some of these
alternatives. As Dr. Peter Fritzsche argues in his book Life and Death in the Third Reich, the
decision ultimately boiled down to two primary options: reliving the destruction of Germanys
national pride and identity or complying with Nazi rule in the defense of them. Even in the face
of criticism offered by other sources and historians, Fritzsche makes a compelling case which
suggests that most Germans chose the latter of the two options they complied with Nazi rule
and policies through their own volition, not through the overbearing nature of the totalitarian
regime.
Modern academia tends to marginalize idealist explanations of human motivation, particularly in
political affairs. Adopting Marxist-inspired social theory in which mans mind is inert matter
shaped by the conditions of his existence, paying little attention to mans ideology not to
mention philosophy as a motive force. In examining a case so extreme as Nazism, it provides
an opportunity to see the intense role Nazi ideology (and the culture which spawned, nourished,
and institutionalized it) played in the political events in Germany from the late nineteenth century
through World War II. Thus, Peter Fritzsches book is a rather fantastic exception to the
aforementioned determinist academic dogma, tracing the Nazis successful rise to power
through available historical sources to its ultimate source: a German culture which already
believed in the central ideals of Nazism and needed only a group of convicted ideologues to
pursue and actualize those ideals.

Early in the book, Fritzsche admits that Germans supported Nazi policies for a number of
reasons, including fear, opportunism, and careerism, as well as varying degrees of ideological
conviction. The list can be extended: citizens were also lazy, indifferent, and ignorant (Fritzsche
8). It is ideological conviction, however, that Fritzsche believes was the most commonplace
reason. Fritzsche notes (and his sources later corroborate) that the diaries of average Germans
did not leave behind traces of a terrorized society (11), discounting fear as a primary motive for
compliance with Nazi policies. Moreover, Fritzsches sources demonstrate his point that
Nazism, the Jews, and the war were frequent subjects of conversation (12), rejecting the
notion that compliance with Nazi policies was the result of mere ignorance or mental laziness.
Contrary to popular notions that average Germans were simply harangued into a hypnotic
acquiescence toward National Socialism, Fritzsche asserts that it was Germanys acceptance of
the underlying premises of Nazism, not Hitlers charisma (11), that allowed the regime to
continue with very little resistance.

Part of the allure of Nazism, according to Fritzsche, rested on the idea of the
Volksgemeinschaft, or peoples community (38). Collectivism and exclusivity, ideas which later
led to German resistance against the Allied invasion of Germany until the very fall of the
Reichstag in Berlin, existed long before the Nazis achieved control in 1933. Summed up by
simple dichotomous relations such as friend or foe, me or you (277), the drive for German
national and ethnic unity was one of the fundamental similarities between the desires of average
Germans and the policy goals of the Nazis. Because the Nazis infiltrated the political machinery
and the informal, vibrant social and cultural life of German towns and cities (49), they were able
to bring to life a new national narrative about the pride and achievements of the German people.
The fact that so many Germans flocked to radio programs like Wunschkonzert by the
Propaganda Ministry and that Nazi initiatives like the Strength through Joy and Volkswagen
campaigns received high levels of support demonstrates a general acceptance and even
appreciation of Nazi policies among average Germans. As Fritzsche puts it, the Nazis simply
dared to implement preconceived ideas (7).

Quite basically, many Germans had long-accepted many of the underlying premises of Nazism,
even as early as the First World War. The chief premise collectivism and the individuals duty
to serve the collective, that is, the Fatherland existed as a motivation for young men to go to
war in World War I as much as it did later in World War II. For example, Robert Otto Marcus, a
medical candidate from Munich, lamented the thought of being home from the front in World
War I while his comrades out here were ready to give their lives for the Fatherland at any
moment (Witkop 79). Ernst Gnter Schallert, a student of philosophy from Berlin, expressed
collective nationalism more explicitly than Marcus, stating that Germans must all do our duty to
the Fatherland. And we offer our sacrifice willingly and gladly (100). He even went so far as to
tell his parents to rejoice that [they] have been permitted to give two sons for the Fatherland
(Witkop 103).
Yet another student, this time a student of architecture named Herbert Weisser, exhibited the
same nationalistic pride in German culture along with the notion that German culture is under
attack and in need of defense. These premises were later shared by the Nazis, garnering them
support from a population who already possessed that same philosophic framework.
Specifically, Weisser stated that it was the goal of German soldiers to defend all that which
German culture has built up through a thousand years of work, in toil and sweat and blood
(Witkop 105). Even in the face of their own mortality, German soldiers sense of nationalistic
devotion did not falter. In a note delivered to his parents upon his death in battle, Heinz
Pohlmann urges his parents to bear his loss bravely because, though they gave what they
value most, they gave it for that which is of most value our glorious Fatherland (Witkop
195). The Nazis did not need to inculcate such sentiments in let alone force them upon the
German population; the Nazi Party merely served as the most consistent, most explicit
mouthpiece of the philosophical fundamentals that were at the core of German culture at the
time, and they ascended to power as a result.

Decades later in the midst of World War II, the intellectual steps required to move from
Weissers belief that German culture and national identity were under attack to the sentiments of

Private Alfred G. who wrote that its either us or the Jews (Fritzsche 276) were slight at best
and virtually nonexistent at worst. After all, it was, in the words of another German soldier in
World War II named Walter Kassler, a matter of existence or nonexistence for the German
people (Fritzsche 276). As such, Fritzsches use of his source material to assert that widespread
German support for Nazi concepts like the Volksgemeinschaft is validated across the broader
context of German history in the twentieth century, as is his notion that these ideological
foundations later led to complicity with Nazi policies throughout the Third Reich.
As Jill Stephenson correctly points out, however, The creation of a national community,
orVolksgemeinschaft, was an aspiration of the Nazi leadership that remained at best only
partially fulfilled (Stephenson 99). Despite the best efforts by the Nazis, there remained stark
regional differences and contrasts between life in towns and life in the countryside (103).
She admits that the concept of theVolksgemeinschaft had considerable appeal in the early
1930s (99), but perhaps her suggestion that it was mere cosmetic propaganda for the Nazis
to assert that they had overcome traditional divisions within German society by creating an
inclusive national community is going a step too far (105).
Dr. Peter Fritzsche
Fritzsches argument is not that Nazism eliminated geographic and social differences within the
Volksgemeinschaft. Instead, Fritzsche merely argues that the notion of the Volksgemeinschaft
allowed Germans to transcend those differences. In this sense, the Nazis usage of the
Volksgemeinschaft as a unifying national principle did achieve its goal: providing a national
narrative around which average Germans could rally, whatever their regional allegiance or
social station, and Adolf Hitler was its embodiment. Hitler represented the myth of infallibility
and invincibility so desired by the German people following their defeat in World War I, which
(along with the bloody internal purges of dissidents within the party) explains why there was
little criticism of Hitler (Stephenson 101). The massive outpouring of national pride following the
failed July 20 assassination plot in 1944 (Fritzsche 290) again confirms that Germans were, by
and large, supportive of the Volksgemeinschaft ideal and the man they thought represented it.
Nikolaus Wachsmann echoes this notion, arguing that the promise of national rebirth resonated

particularly strongly in the early 1930s when the Republic was shaken to the core by economic
and political crisis, thus generating an ideal Germany that was the complete opposite of the
conflict-ridden Weimar society (Wachsmann 122).
But which Germans belonged in the Volksgemeinschaft? According to Victor Klemperer, this
new national community was meant for the German Aryan people, not the population at large
(Fritzsche 69). Even if one belonged to the national community according to ones racial
ancestry, membership was not free. Inclusion brought responsibilities and duties which one
was expected to perform for the good of the community, not just benefits and status for being
an Aryan (Stephenson 100).
But in order for there to be an in group, there must necessarily be an out group as well.
Determining who belonged to which group began as early as 1933, a year which saw the start
of a comprehensive policy of exclusion, aimed at remaking the German nation in the Nazis
image (Wachsmann 124). A few Germans disagreed with the exclusionary aspect of the
Volksgemeinschaft to the point of being ashamed to identify themselves as Aryans. When
interrogated by an SA patrol, Sebastian Haffner even went so far as to consider it a humiliation,
to have answered the unjustified question as to whether [he] was Aryan so easily, even if the
fact was of no importance to him, as he was an Aryan by Nazi standards (Haffner 151).
Though the very fact that he used his status as an Aryan to maintain his privilege to use the
library deeply troubled Haffner, so much so that he eventually fled Germany for that and many
other reasons.
Still, Haffner is not an example of most Germans at the time, despite his desire for his audience
to consider [his] case as typical (5). As Stephenson notes, It quickly became clear that the
mass of valuable Germans were prepared to accept Hitlers regime and the undoubted benefits
that it brought many of them in peacetime, at least (100). Numerical evidence suggests that
millions of German volunteersparticipated in the National Socialist Peoples Welfare (a raciallyoriented charitable organization) and that eight million enrolled in the Reich Air Defense League,
demonstrating a high level of support for Nazi principles and the ideal new Germany
constructed by the Nazis (Fritzsche 51). By 1939, 82 per cent of eligible young people between

10 and 18 years of age were members of the various divisions of the Hitler Youth (Stephenson
114). If not outright support, these numbers demonstrate, at the very least, complicity with Nazi
policies. Though Stephenson argues that the Nazis remained encumbered by a dead weight of
those who paid their subscription but took no further part in Nazi activities (109), one must
differentiate between active participation in activities that specifically relate to the NDSP and
those which can be viewed relevant in the broader conception of the German national
community. The high numbers of individuals who did participate in Volksgemeinschaft-esque
organizations like the Hitler Youth, the NSPW, and the RADL do not corroborate Stephensons
notion that most were merely passively acquiescent toward Nazi policies (114), but instead
suggest that complicity toward policies of this sort was quite high.
The origin of that complicity is highly contentious. So far, the accounts agree that complicity (or,
at the very least, complacence) toward Nazi policies was not the result of the spectacles of
enthusiasm and dynamism that took place in 1933 (Fritzsche 41), though the Germans like
being intoxicated by patriotic celebrations (Haffner 134). Instead, there were three primary
reasons that explain why the average German not the diehard party enthusiast nor the active
anti-Nazi dissident was complicit with Nazism: fear, social pressure, and ideological
agreement. Fritzsche, though he acknowledges other reasons, believes ideological agreement
is the primary reason average Germans supported Nazi policies, including the Reichs antiSemitic policies. Wachsmann supports the notion that German support for Nazism was the
result of Nazi terror tactics, Stephenson appears to believe support (to the extent that she
addresses this support) came from social pressures within the Third Reich, and Haffner defends
a fairly even mix of all three though he points to fear as the most basic reason (134).

Fritzsches argument centers around the high number of German diaries and letters expressing
support for Nazi policies without active coercion on the part of the government. Take, for
example, the Nazis stance on the Jewish question. The Nazis, who believed that the
existence [of Jews] was incompatible with Germanys revival (Fritzsche 186-187) enacted
portions of their Final Solution before the very eyes of the German people who cannot claim to

have been unaware of them. In fact, the primary sources provide a strong indication that many
Germans accepted the same premises promoted by Nazi minister of aviation and chief of the
Luftwaffe Herman Gring that World War II was about whether the German prevails here, or
whether the Jew rules the world (187). While Germans may have suffered some moral qualms
regarding the deportation of their neighbors, general support for the relocation of the Jews was
notably high. As one historian recorded after visiting some local German taverns in December
1941, Most of the drinkers at the bar completely support this measure (253). These sentiments
were echoed by German soldiers throughout World War II on killing those considered
ethnically inferior, Kasslers acceptance of the idea that doing so was a matter of existence and
nonexistence for the German people has already been noted (276), as has Private Alfred G.s
frank remark, its either us or the Jews (276). The presence of such accounts written without
coercion and in the absence of totalitarian oversight strengthen Fritzsches case that average
Germans accepted much of Nazi philosophy despite that [s]oldiers wanted an end to the war,
just as civilians expressed dismay with many aspects of Nazi rule (267).
Stephensons argument from social pressure must be predicated with a note on the fact that she
discusses resistance far more than Fritzsche. She spends a great deal of time discussing
various kinds of active resistance against Nazi policies, such as disbanded groups gathering to
drink coffee [producing] a source of frustration to Gestapo agents (108) or of young Catholic
groups that resisted the formation of Hitler Youth organizations in their towns (111). Others still
tried to express their opposition to Nazism through clandestine publications (117). Whereas
Fritzsche simply acknowledges that there were certain kinds of resistance, it appears that
Stephenson overemphasizes opposition movements, given the previously addressed statistics.

Because of this, it is difficult to identify Stephensons explanation for the Germans who did
support Nazi policies it was simply not the focal point of her examination. Even so, she does
explain support for Nazism in several places. She accepts the fact that adults had a choice
about whether to join a party formation or affiliate or to withstand pressure to do so, though she
quickly follows by insisting that an insistent local leader could be hard to resist (110). Local

leaders, peers, and pressure from teachers who were NSDAP members or officers in the Hitler
Youth supposedly account for those Germans who did not support Nazi policies yet went along
with them anyway (110), though this seems insufficient as an answer. As such, she adds the
social benefits offered by the Nazis in exchange for acquiescence, benefits which would
disappear should one oppose the party or not work toward nationalist goals. Average Germans
accepted the benefits [the regime] brought, such as full employment and family allowances
along with the privileges one received for being an Aryan such as those recorded by
Wachsmann (114). Still, because Stephenson is more concerned with resistance, her notion of
the motivation behind supporting Nazi policies can only be gleaned from a few places within her
essay.

Wachsmann, however, makes no secret of why he thinks Germans complied with Nazi rule:
fear. He speaks a great deal on how Communist organizations were ripped apart and often
brutally maltreated in temporary torture chambers (123). Additionally, regulations [that] lent
an appearance of legality to Nazi terror allowed the Nazis to breed fear amongst the populace
but in a way the average German would find difficult to oppose (126). There is a slight
recognition of the ideological motivation behind the exclusionary, racially-motivated acts
committed by the Nazis at the outset of the regime in Wachsmanns essay. Wachsmann notes
that the jumble of ideas that led to the policy of exclusion had been around since the
nineteenth century (127), and that many Nazi actions were based on deep-seated social
prejudice (133). Regardless, he appeals to fear as a motivation for complying with Nazi
policies.
In this sense, Wachsmann appears to have largely accepted the narrative of the Third Reich as
an all-powerful totalitarian regime, frightening dissidents into remaining silent. However, this
narrative is misguided for several reasons. For one, cases of successful measures of resistance
have already been noted by Stephenson, however ultimately innocuous the resistance of
leftist/Communist groups gathering informally over coffee might have been. Though these cases
were not representative of most Germans, they do demonstrate that the regime was not as all-

powerful as propaganda films like Triumph of the Willwould have one believe. Second, many
Germans enthusiastically accepted the benefits the new regime had to offer. Last, and most
compelling, is Fritzsches point that the private writings of individual Germans did not leave
behind traces of a terrorized society (11). Certainly, there were terrorized groups within the
Third Reich, namely those considered racially impure and Communist sympathizers, but for the
average German who was considered part of the Volksgemeinschaft, the terror was not so great
that one would have felt in danger if one did not attend local NDSAP meetings or sign their
children up for the Hitler Youth. The sense of fear was, in fact, so underwhelming for average
Germans in the later years of Nazi rule that men (however few) like Hugo B., a tailor in Berlin,
would record sharply anti-government thoughts in their private writings, such as, Every day the
same shit. Nothing to eat, nothing proper to drink (268).
Haffners argument is quite similar to Fritzsches in many ways. Namely, he notes the large role
ideology played in the rise of Nazism, blaming the fact that Germans had never learned to live
from within themselves how to make an ordinary private life great, beautiful, and worthwhile,
how to enjoy it and make it interesting for people turning to the Nazis for answers (Haffner 6869). He also recorded general public support for anti-Semitic policies in Germany, noting how
discrimination against the Jews was treated as a joke, even among intellectuals, such as an
instance in which the SA drove Jews from the public library (149). Moreover, he admits that
there are a plethora of reasons for which individuals became Nazis, and that there was not a
single solid, positive, durable reason among them (134).

Regardless, the reason for joining the Nazis that Haffner finds the most compelling is fear: Join
the thugs to avoid being beaten up (134). This was possibly true with the casualties of March
(Stephenson considers them opportunists (Stephenson 108)) who joined the party when the
political situation was still tenuous in 1933 (Haffner 134), but afterwards, Haffners argument is
open to the same criticisms as Wachsmanns.

As such, Fritzsches appeal to ideology remains the most compelling. Though Stephenson
focuses too intensely on resistance movements within the Reich, her examples coupled with
Fritzsches sources paint a picture of a German people that did not live in a state of perpetual
fear. Instead, those that did partake in Nazi activities did so largely of their own volition for
ideological reasons. Stephensons notion of societal pressure presupposes the existence of a
society in which there is enough of a consensus on a given policy or group policies that
individual members would feel compelled to agree. This certainly explains latecomers, but not
the origin of the societal consensus itself; this is what Fritzsche explains, and this is why his
conception of German motivation is stronger than Stephensons.

In a way, though, Fritzsche would probably not disagree with the notion that fear was a key
component of individual motivation to support Nazi policies. No, this fear was not that of an
individual against the state, but it was something much more fundamental more philosophic.
The average German did act on fear, but it was a fear of identity death, not of the Nazis. It was a
fear that was found at the very heart of theVolksgemeinschaft and German collectivism; it was a
fear of repeating the results of WWI; it was a fear of losing ones misplaced, nationalistic pride; it
was a fear of losing ones national identity. Quite simply, so synonymous was each Nazis
existence, for him, with the Reich as a whole that the ideological fear driving the Germans who
complied with Nazi policies was the fear of nonexistence. To be was to be Nazi, and nothing
else.
The events of Nazi Germany were not the result of the material conditions of German existence.
They were, first and foremost, ideologically motivated, driven by a collectivist culture and a
political regime that embodied it. Even so, culture should not be treated as an overbearing,
deterministic force any more than other deterministic alternatives. Rather, culture is merely the
sum of ideas and values in a given society, along with the individuals who shape them. It is not
a primary, but a secondary entity the collection of ideals already most prevalent in a given
society, not the originator of those ideals. The originators, as they always are, are individuals
the people who produce, transmit, and reproduce ideological value systems. It was through the

production, transmission, and reproduction of a collectivist, socialist, nativist, racist ideology

which eventually produced its political corollary, the Nazi Party. The need for a new idealist
paradigm in the social sciences is apparent in academias general rejection of this conclusion in
favor of determinist explanations of the same event. Only when man understands the role of
mans philosophy in his actions can he begin to address the problems of his social existence at
a philosophical level only when he understands the importance of ideas can he work to
shape a rational culture of rational ideas.