PNB, petitioner vs. CFI Iloilo Judge Midpantao Adil and Angelina Lobaton Vda.

De
Melliza as administratix of estate of Teodoro Uy Melliza, respondents (G.R. No. L-52823,
2 November 1982, 203 Phil 492)
Type of Appeal/Action: Special civil action for certiorari which sought to annul the
several injunctive orders issued by Hon. CFI Iloilo Judge Midpantao Adil. Petitioner PNB
prayed a writ of possession be issued in its favor as purchaser in the foreclosure sale
dated 20 April 1979.
Issues: W/N Hon. CFI Judge Adil committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued
the restraining orders dated 8 May 1979, 1 June 1979, 5 July 1979 and 13 August 1979,
which prevented the writ of possession issued in favor of PNB from being enforced?
Facts: Angelina Lobaton Melliza, for herself and as judicial administratrix of Teodoro Uy
Melliza's estate, obtained PhP80,000.00 loan secured by real-property mortgage over two
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 8266 and T-8267 on 2 August 1974 from PNB. She
failed to pay the loan and thus, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed on 16
February 1976. PNB purchased the properties for P97,923.73 at the foreclosure sale.
Since Melliza and her co-heirs failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the
redemption period (1 year after foreclosure sale, under sec. 6-7 of Act. No. 3135 or ExtraJudicial Foreclosure Law), title over the properties were consolidated and TCT Nos. T50422 and T-50423 were issued in in PNB's name on 26 June 1978.
PNB filed on 19 April 1979 before CFI Iloilo Branch II an exparte petition that a writ of
possession issued in its favor, which was granted by an order dated 20 April 1979. The
Deputy Sheriff, upon the writ's issuance, served it to Melliza. She and her co-heirs
requested for seven-day grace period to vacate the premises which the Sheriff agreed.
Later, the Sheriff returned on 8 May 1979 and found that Melliza were still in the
properties' premises and thus, ordered them to immediately vacate. However, before the
ejectment was completed, the Sheriff received an order issued by Judge Adil dated May 8,
1979 suspending the implementation of the writ of possession for 15 days due to
humanitarian reasons.
Melliza and her co-heirs, before the suspension order's expiration, filed complaint on 14
May 1979 to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure, writ of possession and consolidation of
ownership to PNB on ground that the properties were foreclosed without their personal
notice.
In the proceeding for the writ of possession, Melliza and her co-heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of possession, while PNB filed motion to
declare them in contempt for their refusal to vacate the foreclosed properties' premises.
Judge Adil issued on 1 June 1979 an order restraining PNB from disturbing the status
quo, after granting Melliza's prayer for injunction. He issued an order on 5 July 1979
granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
HeldbytheCourt: The Supreme Court granted PNB's petition and it set aside the
restraining orders issued by Judge Adil dated 8 May 1979, 1 June 1979, 5 July 1979 and
13 August 1979. The Court also held that PNB be given possession of the purchased
/archie.manansala
Archibald Jose T. Manansala
CEU School of Law, A.Y. 2015-2016

property without delay.

The Court held that after redemption period for a foreclosed property has expired, its
purchaser (in the present case, PNB) has the right to be placed in possession. It is the
Sheriff's inescapable duty to enforce the writ of possession, especially in this case, a new
title has already been issued in PNB's name. Thus, its right of possession of the property
is clearly unassailable.
Melliza and her co-heirs cannot claim that the writ of possession was suspended under
the authority - the order was issued motuproprio and without giving PNB the right to
present its side. The trial court did not act within the bounds of the law when Judge Adil
reasoned in issuing the suspension order humanitarian reasons without giving specific
reasons for writ's issuance.
The Court said that a (suspension) order which suspends implementation of an earlier
order is like an injunction, which must be issued always with circumspection, and upon
proper motion of the party concerned. Moreover, such suspension order has a far-reaching
effect. It enabled the respondents to withhold the possession from petitioner and file the
complaint where an injunction was sought. Also, prohibitory injunction cannot be issued
when the act sought to be enjoined has already been committed. Neither can a mandatory
injunction issue, for it is a well-settled rule that injunction will not lie to take the
property out of control of the party in possession.
In the present case, Melliza and her co-heirs' right to relief via injunctive order is, at
least, doubtful. The applicant's right or title must be clear and unquestioned. The ground
they relied upon is not indubitable, while the foreclosure proceeding has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.

/archie.manansala
Archibald Jose T. Manansala
CEU School of Law, A.Y. 2015-2016