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Figure B.1 to Figure B.5 are reprinted with permission from CEATI, Report T023700-3022,
2005.
Abstract: Guidance is provided to substation engineers in determining the design, equipment,
and practices deemed necessary for the fire protection of substations.
Keywords: fire, fire protection, hazard, IEEE 979TM, risk, safety, substation design, substations
ISBN 978-0-7381-7311-5
ISBN 978-0-7381-7326-9
STD97286
STDPD97286
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Participants
At the time this guide was completed, the E3 Working Group had the following membership:
Don Delcourt, Chair
Hanna Abdallah
Radoslav Barac
Scott Bryant
Randall Clelland
Gary Engmann
Brian Farmer
Ajay Garg
Raj Ghai
Joseph Gravelle
Matt Hulcher
Thomas La Rose
Debra Longtin
Patrick McShane
Bob Panero
Steven Shelton
Boris Shvartsberg
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this guide. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
Hanna Abdallah
William Ackerman
Ali Al Awazi
Steven Alexanderson
Stan Arnot
Peter Balma
Thomas Barnes
Michael Bayer
George Becker
W. (Bill) J. Bergman
Steven Bezner
Thomas Blackburn
Daniel Blaydon
William Bloethe
Chris Brooks
Steven Brown
Gustavo Brunello
Scott Bryant
William Byrd
Thomas Callsen
Robert Carruth
Michael Champagne
Robert Christman
Randall Clelland
Kurt Clemente
Jerry Corkran
Don Delcourt
Gary Donner
Michael Dood
Randall Dotson
Fred Elliott
Gary Engmann
Brian Farmer
Jorge Fernandez Daher
Patrick Fitzgerald
Marcel Fortin
Rostyslaw Fostiak
Ajay Garg
George Gela
David Gilmer
Jalal Gohari
Edwin Goodwin
Joseph Gravelle
Randall Groves
Charles Haahr
David Harris
Gary Heuston
Scott Hietpas
Werner Hoelzl
Robert Hoerauf
Philip Hopkinson
David Horvath
R. Jackson
Gael Kennedy
Yuri Khersonsky
James Kinney
Hermann Koch
Robert Konnik
Jim Kulchisky
Donald Laird
Chung-Yiu Lam
Thomas La Rose
Debra Longtin
Federico Lopez
William McBride
Patrick McShane
Daleep Mohla
Anne Morgan
Mark Morgan
Jerry Murphy
Arthur Neubauer
Michael S. Newman
David Nichols
Gary Nissen
Robert Olen
Lorraine Padden
Bansi Patel
Christopher Petrola
Alvaro Portillo
Jean-Christophe Riboud
Michael Roberts
Edward Rowe
Thomas Rozek
Anne-Ma Sahazizian
Daniel Sauer
Bartien Sayogo
Devki Sharma
Gil Shultz
James Smith
Jeremy Smith
Jerry Smith
John Spare
Gary Stoedter
Brian Story
David Tepen
Malcolm Thaden
Wayne Timm
Eric Udren
John Vergis
Loren Wagenaar
David Wallach
Barry Ward
Joe Watson
Yingli Wen
Donald Wengerter
Kenneth White
Alexander Wong
Roland Youngberg
Luis Zambrano
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When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 30 August 2012, it had the following
membership:
Richard H. Hulett, Chair
John Kulick, Vice Chair
Robert Grow, Past Chair
Konstantinos Karachalios, Secretary
Satish Aggarwal
Masayuki Ariyoshi
Peter Balma
William Bartley
Ted Burse
Clint Chaplin
Wael Diab
Jean-Philippe Faure
Alexander Gelman
Paul Houz
Jim Hughes
Young Kyun Kim
Joseph L. Koepfinger*
David J. Law
Thomas Lee
Hung Ling
Oleg Logvinov
Ted Olsen
Gary Robinson
Jon Walter Rosdahl
Mike Seavey
Yatin Trivedi
Phil Winston
Yu Yuan
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative
Michael Janezic, NIST Representative
Don Messina
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development
Malia Zaman
IEEE Client Services Manager, Professional Services
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Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 979-2012, IEEE Guide for Substation Fire Protection.
Since the original edition of IEEE Std 979 (issued in 1994 and reaffirmed in 2004) was prepared, the body
of knowledge on fire protection has increased significantly. This revision captures much of this knowledge
and presents it for use by both the substation designer and the fire protection professional.
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Contents
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.3 General ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2. Normative references.................................................................................................................................. 3
3. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................. 3
3.1 General terms ....................................................................................................................................... 4
3.2 Fire-suppression system terms ............................................................................................................. 4
3.3 Fire detection system terms ................................................................................................................. 5
4. Fire hazards ................................................................................................................................................ 6
4.1 General ................................................................................................................................................ 6
4.2 Combustible oil hazards ...................................................................................................................... 6
4.3 Flammable and combustible liquid and gas hazards ............................................................................ 7
4.4 Fire exposure hazards .......................................................................................................................... 7
4.5 Indoor substation hazards .................................................................................................................... 8
4.6 Critical loss assets ................................................................................................................................ 8
4.7 Maintenance and construction ............................................................................................................. 9
5. Fire protection considerations for substation sites ...................................................................................... 9
5.1 General ................................................................................................................................................ 9
5.2 External exposures ............................................................................................................................... 9
5.3 Site grading ........................................................................................................................................ 10
5.4 Prevailing winds ................................................................................................................................ 11
5.5 Fire emergency response capability ................................................................................................... 11
5.6 Available firefighting water supplies ................................................................................................. 11
5.7 Emergency access to the substation ................................................................................................... 11
6. Fire protection for substation buildings .................................................................................................... 12
6.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 12
6.2 Use and occupancy ............................................................................................................................ 12
6.3 Underground substations ................................................................................................................... 13
6.4 High-rise substations ......................................................................................................................... 13
6.5 Indoor substations .............................................................................................................................. 14
6.6 Construction ...................................................................................................................................... 14
6.7 Fire alarm and detection systems ....................................................................................................... 18
6.8 Fire suppression ................................................................................................................................. 18
6.9 Life safety .......................................................................................................................................... 19
6.10 Combustible materials ..................................................................................................................... 20
7. Fire protection for substations .................................................................................................................. 20
7.1 Spatial separation of outdoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment ......................................................... 20
7.2 Prescriptive separation requirements ................................................................................................. 21
7.3 Calculated separation requirements ................................................................................................... 23
7.4 Ground surface material .................................................................................................................... 23
7.5 Cable raceway systems ...................................................................................................................... 23
7.6 Water supply ...................................................................................................................................... 25
7.7 Fire extinguishers .............................................................................................................................. 25
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1. Overview
1.1 Scope
The original guide (1994) was developed to identify substation fire protection practices that generally have
been accepted by industry. This revision includes changes in industry practices for substation fire
protection. New clauses on fire hazard assessment and pre-fire planning have been added.
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of the original guide (1994) was to give design guidance, fire hazard assessment, and pre-fire
planning in the area of fire protection to substation engineers. Existing fire protection standards, guides,
and so on that may aid in the design of specific substations or substation components are listed in Annex F.
This revision updates that guidance.
1.3 General
The guide outlines substation fire protection practices based on industry standards and good practices. It
incorporates lessons learned from substation fires, substation fire protection research and testing,
advancements in fire protection engineering practices, and changes in fire protection due to risk and
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environmental concerns. The guide provides design guidance in the area of fire protection for substation
engineers and others involved in substation fire safety and protection.
The predominant dielectric insulating fluid for transformers is mineral oil, and mineral oil constitutes one
of the primary fire hazards in the substation. Consequently, much of this guide addresses hazards and
protection measures based on mineral oil fires. There are several alternative fluids with improved fire
safety properties (higher flash and fire points), known as less-flammable dielectric fluids, which have
been introduced. Many of these fluids have been recognized as reducing the hazard and the risk of a fire
occurring relative to mineral oil. Use of a less flammable fluid is one means to reduce the risk of fire at a
substation. See 8.4.2 and A.21 for additional information on these fluids.
It is the intent of this guide that the analysis and decisions made may require the use of a team approach
comprising various specialists. These specialists will be able to provide specific guidance on their areas of
expertise; provide interpretation of the related codes, standards, and practices; and help formulate fire
protection solutions. The following are some of the specialists that could be involved:
Substation design engineers (civil, electrical, mechanical, and structural)
Substation operation and maintenance staff
Fire protection engineers and specialists
The local fire department
The authority having jurisdiction over the substation
Architects and code consultants
This guide provides fire protection guidance for the following types of substations that have the principal
power delivery functions accomplished with alternating current (ac) or direct current (dc) power and are
operated at voltages of 1 kV and above:
Generating plant switchyards
Customer substations
Switching substations
Transmission substations
Distribution substations
Capacitor substations
Converter station switchyards
The types of substations listed can be designed in a number of different configurations and layouts as
follows:
Outdoor substations
Indoor substations
Multistory above-grade substations
Multistory below-grade substations
Substations in mixed-use buildings including high-rise (>22.9 m) buildings
Substations in conjunction with other related operations (e.g., offices, maintenance facilities,
and control centers)
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This guide provides electric power engineers and fire protection professionals with fire protection and
safety guidelines for application in the planning, design, and operation of substations. Guidelines are
outlined in the following critical areas of application:
The identification of substation fire hazards
The fire protection aspects for substation sites, buildings, and switchyards
Issues to be considered when selecting the various types and levels of fire protection
Recommended typical fire protection applications
Fire planning and incident management
This guide is not intended to be the primary standard for the minimum levels of fire protection required for
new and existing substations. The minimum required level of substation fire safety and protection is based
on the minimum requirements of governing authorities and on the level of risk the asset owner is willing to
accept. This guide provides design options and strategies for the mitigation of substation fire hazards once
the minimum required level of substation fire safety and protection is determined.
The application of this guide is not meant to take precedence over local building, fire, safety, and electrical
codes. It is intended to be used in conjunction with these governing codes and standards for the purpose of
providing specialized substation fire protection guidance for asset protection and customer service
reliability. This document does not necessarily cover aspects of life safety covered by local building, fire,
safety, and electrical codes.
Refer to A.1 for additional information.
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document (i.e., they must
be understood and used, so each referenced document is cited in text and its relationship to this document is
explained). For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of
the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
IEEE Std 980TM, IEEE Guide for Containment and Control of Oil Spills in Substations.1, 2
NFPA 850, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage
Direct Current Converter Stations.3
NFPA 851, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Hydroelectric Generating Plants.
When exploring the additional information in NFPA 850 and NFPA 851, keep in mind that these
documents were developed for generating facilities that have different hazards and risks than transmission
and distribution substations.
3. Definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The IEEE Standards
Dictionary Online should be consulted for terms not defined in this clause.4
1
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IEEE publications are available from The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (http://standards.ieee.org/).
3
NFPA publications are available from the National Fire Protection Association (http://www.nfpa.org/).
2
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sprinklers are attached in a systematic pattern. Each system has a control valve located in the system riser
or its supply piping. Each sprinkler system includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in
operation. The installation includes at least one automatic water supply that supplies one or more systems.
The system is usually activated by heat from a fire and discharges water over the fire area.
single interlock preaction sprinkler system: A single interlock system is a Preaction system that admits
water-to-sprinkler piping upon operation of detection devices and discharges out only the opened
sprinklers. This type of arrangement reduces the probability of accidental sprinkler discharge by requiring
the activation of a detection device prior to admitting water to the sprinkler piping and then requiring a
sprinkler head to open prior to water flow.
water mist system: A distribution system connected to a water supply or water and atomizing media
supplies that is equipped with one or more nozzles capable of delivering water mist intended to control,
suppress, or extinguish fires. Water mist systems must only be used for applications that they are listed for
or where specific research and testing has validated the application.
water-oscillating monitor: Typically a supplement to an overhead sprinkler or foam system, they provide
additional delivery of the liquid suppression agent to areas shadowed from the overhead sprinkler system.
wet pipe sprinkler system: A sprinkler system utilizing automatic sprinklers attached to a piping system
containing water and connected to a water supply so that water discharges immediately from sprinklers
opened by heat from a fire.
video image detection: The principle of using automatic analysis of real-time video images to detect the
presence of smoke or flame.
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smoke aspirating system: The principle of using an air sample drawn from the protected area into a highhumidity chamber combined with a lowering of chamber pressure to create an environment in which the
resultant moisture in the air condenses on any smoke particles present, forming a cloud. The cloud density
is measured by a photoelectric principle. The density signal is processed and used to convey an alarm
condition when it meets preset criteria.
spot-type ionization detector: The principle of using a small amount of radioactive material to ionize the
air between two differentially charged electrodes to sense the presence of smoke particles. Smoke particles
entering the ionization volume decrease the conductance of the air by reducing ion mobility. The reduced
conductance signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets preset criteria. This
type of smoke detection is best applied to flaming or incipient fires in which small particulate matter is
produced.
spot-type photoelectric detector: The principle of using a light source and a photosensitive sensor onto
which the principal portion of the source emissions is focused. When smoke particles enter the light path,
some of the light is scattered and some is absorbed, thereby reducing the light reaching the receiving
sensor. The light reduction signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets preset
criteria. This type of smoke detection is best applied to fires in which larger particulate matter is produced.
wet-pilot line detector: A system of heat detection employing automatic sprinklers on a pressurized wet
pipe network. The activation of a sprinkler causes a loss in system pressure, which is annunciated as an
alarm signal.
4. Fire hazards
4.1 General
The impact of fire hazards on health, safety, continuity of operations, and asset preservation is a reason to
provide fire prevention, fire protection, and other fire safety measures. Fire hazards are the conditions that
create the potential for a fire. Fire hazards have at least the following attributes:
The magnitude of a possible fire
The consequence of the potential loss
The probability of an occurrence over a period of time (i.e., risk)
Subclauses 4.2 through 4.7 present recognized fire hazards found in substations.
Refer to A.2 for additional information.
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4) Conservator tanks
5) Tap changers
6) Cooling pumps
b) Instrument transformers
c)
Voltage regulators
d) Circuit breakers
e)
Cables
1) Oil insulated
2) Pipe type
3) Potheads
4) Transition joints
f)
Capacitors
Battery rooms
1) Heat from short circuits or thermal runaway
2) Hydrogen gas generated by battery charging
f)
Auxiliary structures
1) Office areas
2) Warehouse areas
3) Oil storage areas
4) Shop areas
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b) Cable spreading areas, cable trenches, cable tunnels, and cable vaults
c)
Power transformers
f)
Circuit breakers
g) Bus structures
h) Auxiliary equipment
The annexes provide more information on fire hazards and their potential impacts.
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Oil-processing equipment
b) Mobile transformers
c)
Painting
Maintenance activities
f)
5.1 General
The following should be considered during new site selection or existing site analysis:
External exposures
Site grades
Available firefighting water supplies
Emergency access to the substation
Fire emergency response capability
Prevailing winds
Environmental consideration
Refer to A.3 for additional information.
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Risks involved
Additional fire protection features required to create an acceptable level of risk
Subclauses 5.2.1 through 5.2.3 discuss some typical external hazards. ANSI/NFPA 80A-2012 [B30]5
provides a method for the analysis and mitigation of external radiant heat threats from these types of
exposures.
5.2.1 Forested or grassland areas
Forest and grass fires can expose the substation to conductive smoke, fire plumes, radiant heat, and soot.
Generally, unplanned landscaping, trees, and vegetation should be removed for a minimum of 9.1 m (30 ft)
beyond critical buildings, structures, and equipment. In addition, vertical vegetation (i.e., trees) heights
should be analyzed to minimize fall potentials that exist within 9.1 m (30 ft) of operational critical
buildings and equipment.
Refer to A.4 for additional information.
5.2.2 Hazardous industries or operations
Chemical plants, petroleum refineries, liquefied natural gas plants, and compressed gas tank farms are
examples of neighboring facilities that could pose an external threat to substation operations should an
emergency or fire occur at the neighboring site. Spatial separation or other fire protection methods should
be used to protect the substation from these types of external threats.
5.2.3 Combustible buildings
Nearby combustible buildings and warehouses often represent substantial fuel loads that can expose the
substation to conductive smoke, fire plumes, radiant heat, and soot. Spatial separation or other fire
protection methods should be used to protect the substation from these types of external threats. Refer to
7.2.4 for additional information and other reference documents such as ANSI/NFPA 80A-2012 [B30].
Temporary enclosures made of combustible materials and temporary heating for construction activities
require special considerations for fire prevention. Issues include providing safe heating sources and
isolation of combustible materials from hot work.
Wherever possible, buildings used to support the operation of a substation (e.g., offices and warehouses)
should be located outside the substation fence.
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6.1 General
Substation buildings should be designed in accordance with applicable local building codes. In the absence
of applicable building code requirements, the following recommendations may be followed for the design
and construction of substation buildings.
Fire protection may be applied to substation buildings that meet one or more of the following criteria or
where fire protection is required by local codes:
The building area is greater than 1000 m2 (10 000 ft2).
The building is multistory.
The building contains mineral-oil-insulated equipment.
As a minimum, all new substation buildings should be of noncombustible construction and should include
the life safety recommendations in 6.9.
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hydrogen and oxygen gases that evolve on battery charging. The maintenance should be to clean and/or
replace the flash arresters so the dissipation of gases can be accomplished without an appreciable pressure
buildup inside the battery cell jar.
Battery rooms and areas should be designed based on the requirements of the applicable safety and
electrical codes. Further guidance may be obtained from IEEE Std 484TM-2002 [B67].
6.2.3 Support buildings and separated areas
Office facilities for functions not directly related to substation control should be housed in buildings
separate from the substation control building or in areas separated by fire-rated construction provided in
accordance with the separation provisions of A.11. Maintenance buildings may incorporate indoor storage
of substation equipment and supplies.
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6.6 Construction
Refer to A.10 for additional information.
6.6.1 Building materials
Materials used in the construction of substation buildings should be noncombustible or limited combustible
(e.g., gypsum wallboard).
High-rise building areas containing mineral-oil-insulated equipment or cables should incorporate
performance-based fire and blast resistance to protect structural elements.
6.6.2 Fire separation
Fire separations should be installed between adjacent occupancies with different uses within the same
building. Required minimum fire-resistance ratings for fire separation should be obtained from applicable
building codes.
Exception:
Self-contained modular substation packages consisting of buildings with switchgear (metal-clad or
gas-insulated switchgear), control equipment, and auxiliary equipment may be treated as single use.
Fire separation may be eliminated between the different areas provided there is a realization that the
entire module may be lost if a fire were to occur.
Refer to A.11 for additional information.
6.6.3 Floor and roof
Flooring should be noncombustible such as steel or concrete (with or without floor trenches) or raised
flooring.
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Roof covering should be constructed in accordance with ANSI/NFPA 256-2003 [B38]: Class A rated
requirements for a high-resistance ignition and burning. The roof supporting structural assembly should be
of noncombustible construction. Blast pressure venting devices on the roof should be considered when the
power transformer is located in a full enclosure (i.e., four walls and a roof).
Roof assemblies using foam plastic roof insulation should be constructed in accordance with Factory
Mutual Class 1 requirements. These requirements are designed to provide roof assemblies that will not
contribute materially to flame spread on the underside of a roof when exposed to an interior fire exposure.
Refer to A.12 for additional information.
6.6.4 Cable trays
Cable trays should be constructed of noncombustible materials.
Vertical tray routings not protected by automatic sprinklers and 6.1 m (20 ft) or greater in height, but less
than 9.1 m (30 ft) in height, should have fire breaks installed at mid-height and for runs 9.1 m (30 ft) or
greater height, at 4.6 m (15 ft) intervals. Fire break designs should prevent the propagation of fire for a
minimum of 30 min when tested for the largest number of cable routings and cable density.
Penetrations of cable trays through firewalls, floors, and ceilings should be provided with fire breaks, seals,
or fire stops conforming to requirements of ANSI/IEEE 634-2004 [B6] and should have an equal or greater
fire-resistance rating than the wall or floor being penetrated.
The cable trays should be separated by a distance sufficient to minimize the propagation of a fire from one
tray to another. If flame-retardant cables are utilized, then the recommended separation distances are given
in IEEE Std 384TM-2008 [B65] and ANSI/IEEE 525-1992 [B4]. If cables are not flame retardant or the
proper separation cannot be achieved, then a fire-resistive barrier or shield can be used between the trays or
a fire-retardant coating may be applied to the cables. Fire hazards can also be minimized by utilizing fire
stops. The possible ampacity derating due to the thermal insulating properties of the fire break or fire stop
material should be taken into account.
6.6.5 Conduits and cables
Conduits should be made of noncombustible materials. Penetrations of conduits and cables through
firewalls should be provided with a fire break or seal conforming to requirements of the applicable codes
and ANSI/IEEE 634-2004 [B6] at ceiling, wall, and floor penetrations. Fire stopping used should have an
equal or greater fire-resistance rating than the wall or floor being penetrated.
Conduit and cable penetrations through building dividing walls, fire separations, smoke separations, and
firewalls should be sealed to prevent the spread of smoke and fire from a potential fire area to other areas.
The use of fire-retardant cable, such as those passing the flame propagation test of ANSI/IEEE 383-1974
[B3], is recommended.
Grouped electrical cables should be routed away from exposure hazards (major switchgear and sources of
flammable and combustible liquids) or provided with suitable fire protection measures to offset the risk.
Where possible, high-voltage cable trays should be located above or remote from low-voltage cable trays to
lessen the exposure hazard to the lower voltage cables.
Care should be taken in the selection of fire-retardant coatings, wraps, or tapes as they may derate the cable
ampacity, and this needs to be considered in the design.
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Use of mineral-oil-insulated cables within buildings should be discouraged or protected with an automatic
fire-suppression system.
6.6.6 Building openings
Guidance on the installation and maintenance of assemblies and devices used to protect openings in walls,
floors, and ceilings against the spread of fire and smoke within, into, or out of buildings can be found in
ANSI/NFPA 80-2013 [B29] and local building codes.
All doors and windows installed in rated separations should have a minimum fire-resistance rating equal to
that of the separation. Protected openings (doors and windows) in 2 h fire separations may have a reduced
rating of 1.5 h.
All doors should be equipped with self-closing devices. Fire-resistance-rated fire shutters should be
installed on operable windows installed in rated walls unless no exposure hazard exists (i.e., does not open
to another room, building, or piece of equipment). Shutters should have a minimum fire-resistance rating
equal to that of the wall.
Refer to A.13 for additional information.
6.6.7 Interior finish
Guidance on interior finishes can be found in Section 10.2 of ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34] and local
building and fire codes.
Interior finish in substation buildings should have a low flame spread and smoke development
characteristics as required by local codes and standards.
Cellular and foam plastic materials (as defined in Annex A of ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34]) are not
recommended as interior finishes. If used, these types of wall coverings should be covered with a minimum
13 mm (0.5 in) fire-resistance-rated gypsum wallboard on the fire-exposed side. Plywood used as a wall
backing for securing panels or equipment should be fire retardant or painted with fire retardant paint.
6.6.8 Lightning protection
Lightning strikes to substations can ignite flammable materials and damage equipment that can lead to
fires. Lightning protection may be provided in accordance with IEEE Std 998TM-1996 [B69] or
ANSI/NFPA 780-2011 [B42] as applicable.
6.6.9 Furnishings
The use of combustible materials should be avoided in the selection of desks, chairs, filing cabinets, storage
boxes, display boards, and so on. Guidance on contents and furnishings can be found in Section 10.2 of
ANSI/NFPA 101-2011 [B34].
6.6.10 Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems
The design of HVAC systems should be based on the fire hazards of the specific areas serviced by these
systems. In general, the HVAC systems should be designed to shut down in the event of a fire to prevent
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the spread of smoke throughout the building. Guidance on HVAC shutdown can be found in
ANSI/NFPA 90B-2012 [B32].
HVAC systems may incorporate a means for fire department or brigade personnel to control (shutdown,
startup, or override the controls) the HVAC systems manually during a fire incident. The fire department or
brigade should be contacted for guidance as to whether such controls would be useful on the HVAC system
in question. Where provided, these controls should be located in an area that is expected to be accessible
during a fire event.
The fresh air supply intakes for HVAC systems should be located to minimize the possibility of drawing
smoke into the system. Where this is not possible, the intakes should be installed with automatic smoke
dampers.
All ductwork should be of noncombustible construction.
Where the HVAC system penetrates fire-resistance-rated separations (i.e., rated walls and floors), fire
dampers with a minimum fire protection rating equal to the penetrated fire separation should be installed.
Where the HVAC system traverses areas where smoke could create fire safety or protection problems,
suitable smoke dampers should be installed.
Refer to A.14 for additional information
6.6.11 Smoke and heat management
A smoke and heat management scheme should be incorporated into the design of underground, high-rise,
and indoor substations. Venting heat and smoke creates more tenable conditions for responding fire
department personnel and occupants that are trapped or trying to exit the building safely.
Smoke and heat vents are one option to achieve more tenable firefighting conditions. Additional guidance
on the design of smoke and heat vents can be obtained in ANSI/NFPA 204M-1991 [B36]. Mechanical
smoke control pressurization systems are another option in achieving more tenable fire conditions in the
protected space. Additional guidance on the design of smoke control can be found in ANSI/NFPA 92A2009 [B33].
In control rooms, relay rooms, and computer rooms where a dedicated HVAC system serves these spaces, it
may be appropriate during fire conditions to continue to run the HVAC in the 100% fresh air and relief air
mode to reduce the impact of heat and smoke on the critical electrical and electronic components.
Refer to A.15 for additional information.
6.6.12 Drainage
Provisions around indoor mineral-oil-insulated equipment should be made in each building for removal of
liquids directly to safe areas or for containment in the fire area without endangering other areas. These
provisions should include piping systems that can withstand the high ignition temperatures of burning
insulating oils. Where sprinkler or water spray deluge systems are used, the drainage storage is designed for
these combined flow rates and volumes.
If the dielectric fluid is a less flammable fluid, then the fluid may be retained in the containment area of the
equipment.
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If not required by code or standard, then consideration should be given to the containment of electrolyte
within battery rooms or areas. Door sills or curbing may be effective techniques in containing battery
electrolyte.
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Fire extinguishers for the protection of Class B hazards should be sized and distributed in accordance with
ANSI/NFPA 10-2012 [B7] for a hazard classification of extra (high).
Example: rating of 80B:C with 15 m (50 ft) travel distances.
Refer to A.18 for additional information.
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7.6 (25)
15.2 (50)
Determining the type of physical separation to be used for mineral oil volumes
less than 1890 L (500 gal) should be based on consideration of the following:
Type and quantity of oil in the equipment
Size of a postulated oil spill (surface area and depth)
Construction of adjacent structures
Rating and bushing type
Fire-suppression systems provided
Protection clearing time
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Cable trenches within oil-containment areas should be constructed entirely from noncombustible materials
with a 3 h fire-resistance rating and all penetrations fire stopped to maintain the 3 h fire-resistance rating.
Only liquid-tight covers should be used on the trench.
Fire stops should be installed within the trenches to prevent the spread of a cable fire or oil fire. These fire
stops can be constructed of concrete, fire stopping material, sandbags, or by filling the cable trench with
sand. Fire stops should be installed adjacent to cable trench intersections, adjacent to any major pieces of
oil-insulated equipment and before the entry into any substation building. The following conditions must be
met:
a)
Fire stops should be installed in cable trenches in order to prevent fire from spreading to other
parts of the cable system.
b) Fire stops should be installed at each junction where cables run in two or more directions.
c)
Fire stops should be installed prior to cable trench connections to any substation building.
Exception:
The requirements for liquid-tight wall construction and internal trench fire stops (intermediate fire stops
within the trench) may be excluded where all of the following conditions exist:
Cables present are limited to control cables that meet the requirements of ANSI/IEEE 383-1974
[B3].
Cable trenches are not located within the anticipated oil spill area of any mineral-oil-insulated
equipment present.
Cable trenches are not entering any substation buildings.
The requirements for noncombustible, liquid-tight covers as described above are met.
Notwithstanding that this exception allows for the exclusion of internal trench fire stops, it is
recommended that a fire stop be installed at each buildingtrench interface so that fires do not spread
beyond these interfaces. This recommendation is made regardless of other safeguards that may be in
place, which could lead a designer to believe this buildingtrench interface fire stop may not be
necessary.
7.5.2 Conduits
Electrical cables serving major pieces of mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment (>1890 L or 500 gal)
should be installed in conduit wherever possible. In switchyards, conduits are commonly used to enclose
cables going to equipment. Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit is commonly used. For mineral-oil-filled
equipment, the conduit may become a path for burning oil to flow away from the equipment and out of any
oil containment. The use of noncombustible materials and fire stops will minimize this problem. Conduits
should be sealed with a fire-resistive seal to keep moisture, dirt, and debris out of the conduit.
Refer to 6.6.4 for considerations when conduits are used in buildings.
7.5.3 Tunnels
Walk-through cable tunnels (galleries) are used where there are a large number of cables. The cable trays in
these areas should be separated by a distance sufficient so that a fire in one tray will not propagate to an
adjacent tray. If flame-retardant cables are used, the recommended separation distances are given in
IEEE Std 384-2008 [B65] and ANSI/IEEE 525-1992 [B4]. If cables are not flame retardant or the proper
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separation cannot be achieved, then a fire-resistive barrier or shield can be used between the trays or a fireretardant coating may be applied to the cables. Fire hazards can also be minimized by utilizing fire stops.
Consideration should also be given to the installation of 2 h fire-rated separation, a fire-detection system, a
fixed extinguishing system, locating firefighting equipment at the tunnel entrances, and keeping air flows
through the tunnels to a minimum. Restricting air flow in a cable tunnel will result in a reduction in the
ampacity of the cables in it. This must be considered in planning the use of fire barriers.
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25-year storm density), automatic fire-suppression systems (refer to ANSI/NFPA 15-2012 [B16] for
guidance), and manual firefighting activities, as applicable.
Oil-containment systems should be designed to survive exposure to a minimum 3 h fire occurring within
the bounds of the containment system. This minimum fire-resistance time may be reduced to a 2 h exposure
with the installation of automatic suppression systems.
The perimeter of the spill containment should generally be located between 2 m and 3 m (6.6 ft and 9.8 ft)
beyond the portions of the electrical equipment containing oil, based on the height of typical bushings and
conservators.
Stone is frequently used in oil-containment pits. Refer to 8.2 for recommendations.
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Stone should be maintained on a regular basis to remove foreign debris such as sand, dirt, and
weeds that accumulate between the stones and reduce its effectiveness.
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9.1 General
A fire risk evaluation should be initiated as early in the design process as practical so that the fire
prevention and fire protection recommendations as described in this document have been evaluated in view
of the substation-specific considerations regarding design, layout, and anticipated operating requirements.
The evaluation should result in a list of recommended fire prevention features to be provided based on
acceptable means for separation or control of common and special hazards, decrease the probability of
ignition, and the suppression of fires. The fire risk evaluation should be approved by the owner prior to
final drawings and installation.
Many factors are used in the selection of the most appropriate type of fire protection for substation hazards.
There is no one best solution for each of the individual hazards that substations have, but there are a
number of alternatives that can be used based on the needs of the owner, insurance company, and regulator.
The following are a number of commonly used methods for selecting fire protection measures.
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The various fire protection systems available provide differing levels for these criteria.
B/C =
benefit p ( F ) e( RM ) [ RC + LR + SB + OC ]
=
cost
RM
(1)
where
benefit
cost
e(RM)
LR
OC
p(F)
RC
RM
SB
is the value associated with lost revenue, operation, and building replacements that are
avoided if a major fire is prevented (benefit of avoided loss)
is the cost to protect against damage due to major fire
is the effectiveness of remedial measure
is the lost revenue (in $) due to fire (lost load mill rate)
is the operating cost associated with manning the station due to fire damage of
supervisory equipment or additional testing and switching costs associated with restoring
service
is the probability of major fire (probability of an outage due to a fire)
is the replacement cost of facility and equipment lost due to fire
is the cost of remedial measure
is the societal benefit (in $) lost due to customer outages created by fire
Once the potential financial loss due to a fire has been calculated, the designer should input costs and
effectiveness of any proposed fire protection measure into the benefit/cost equation and determine the B/C
ratio. If the B/C ratio is less than 1, then the provision of the fire protection measure is not an acceptable
investment.
Normally, the B/C ratio should be greater than 1 and preferably greater than 2. A B/C ratio of 2 means that
the avoided fire loss cost or benefit is twice that of the cost of the fire protection measure. Therefore it is a
good investment.
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Any fire insurance coverage can also be included in this type of calculation. The insurance premiums can
be included as a fire protection cost, and an insurance payout will reduce the fire costs.
It should be noted that insurers will generally reduce the insurance costs for specific types of fire protection
installed. Companies should review the possible premium savings with their insurers and factor any savings
into the calculation.
Refer to C.6 for additional information and an example calculation.
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Annex A
(normative)
Additional information to main body clauses
A.1 Purpose
This clause provides additional information to 1.2.
Fire protection measures reduce the fire risks to the public in the vicinity of the substation and to
emergency response personnel. These measures can also decrease the risk to operating personnel.
Fire protection should be integral to the planning, design, and operation of substations. In many instances,
fire protection is not considered. Too often, fire protection decisions are made after the planning and design
of the substation, which can lead to costly changes late in the project.
Although common cause events are considered, substation fires generally have not been considered in
assessing the reliability of the electric system. However, substation fire events have occurred, with
significant challenges to system reliability.
Careful consideration of the consequences of a substation fire, and alleviating those consequences
throughout the planning and design process, will help to mitigate the consequences of a fire in a substation.
Properly designed substation fire protection can minimize the effect of component failure during a fire on
overall reliability of the system supply. Having fire protection systems and processes will minimize the
asset and revenue losses from any fire.
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other hand may not have the same level of equipment and personnel to deal with large-scale fires.
Discussions with the fire departments should be held to determine the following:
The maximum number of personnel the fire department has available
The type of equipment available such as pumper trucks, tanker trucks, aerial ladder trucks, foam
supplies, and other special equipment
The number and type of equipment and personnel that would be dispatched to a fire at the
substation
The expected response time
The designer could then review probable types of fires (design fires) that would be expected at the
substation and work with the emergency services to determine whether they have sufficient resources to
deal with a specific incident. If the local fire department does not have sufficient resources to deal with the
design fires at the station, then the designer should work with the local fire department and determine
whether there are adjacent fire departments or fire resources that could be used during an incident. Several
high-profile substation fires have been successfully suppressed using crash rescue firefighting vehicles
from adjacent airports. If such resources are not available, then consideration should be given to including
increased substation fire protection features or the possible purchase of required resources for the local fire
department.
If the substation designer finds that the local fire emergency resources and water supply are inadequate for
manual firefighting, then passive or active automatic fire protection measures should be considered as part
of the overall substation fire protection scheme. Some examples of passive measures that could be used in
the substation design are providing adequate spacing between oil-filled equipment, provision of firewalls
between closely spaced equipment, the use of noncombustible construction for the control building, and the
provision of stone-filled pits or other oil containment means around all oil-filled equipment. Possible active
automatic fire protection measures include water spray, sprinkler, and inert gas systems.
Fire department personnel responding to substation fires can be exposed to significant fire and electrical
safety hazards that they may not be trained to deal with. The types of fire hazards found in indoor and
outdoor substations are significantly different from the typical hazards to which public firefighters are
normally exposed. As such, they may be putting their own safety at risk.
The most significant hazards that fire department personnel are exposed to are the electrical safety hazards
of the substation. Fire department personnel are trained to take an active role and aggressively suppress
fires. In the case of a fire in an electrical substation, there may be long delays until substation operating
personnel can arrive onsite and make the station electrically safe. In some cases, it may take up to an hour
for operating personnel to arrive onsite to make the station electrically safe. Therefore, the fire department
personnel want to enter the facility and suppress the fire, before it is safe to do so.
Delays of this type create additional pressures on the responding fire departments because they are
concerned that while they are waiting to gain access to the substation fire, they cannot respond to other
alarms received. These tensions can create situations where responding personnel take serious risks of
electrical contacts and exposures.
The type of equipment and facilities found in the substation are foreign to most of the operating
environments to which the fire department personnel are exposed. Therefore, the installation of fire
protection in a substation will help control or suppress fires and allow the fire department to access the
facility safely.
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In the event of a fire in the station buildings or mineral-oil-insulated equipment, water is the most
commonly used fire extinguishing agent both directly and as part of fire extinguishing agent mixtures such
as foam. As part of the design process, the available firefighting water supplies should be reviewed for any
station that has a responding fire department or fire brigade. If there is no responding fire department or fire
brigade, then the designer may incorporate passive measures (i.e., greater spacing of mineral-oil-insulated
electrical equipment) into the stations design.
The designer should also determine the requirement for firefighting water supplies, based on governing
codes, regulations, and bylaws. The following are some of the common standards for firefighting water
supplies:
a)
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When the substation designer is laying out the station or changing an existing station, he or she may
consider emergency vehicle access to all major buildings or major banks of oil-insulated equipment.
In most cases, the normal operating access for bucket trucks and crane trucks will be quite similar to that
required by the emergency services. Normally, fire department vehicles do not need to get within 150 m
(500 ft) of major risk areas. If the distances are greater than 150 m (500 ft), then consideration should be
made to ensuring adequate access is available.
When laying out the overall site plan, the designer should make provisions for emergency access at a
minimum of two locations around the switchyard.
Typically, the emergency services vehicles require access roads with a minimum width of 6.1 m (20 ft),
centerline minimum turning radius of 12 m (40 ft), overhead clearances of 5 m, and roadbeds that will
support the expected load imposed by firefighting vehicles in the various seasonal conditions.
The access points to the station should have a minimum width of 6.1 m (20 ft). These access points should
not be located should beneath overhead power lines or adjacent to critical fire hazards that could cause
them to be blocked during an incident. The access points should also be remotely located such that the
minimum distance between them is no less than 1/2 the overall diagonal distance of the switchyard.
If the access roads throughout the station yard are dead-ended, then provision should be made for a suitable
turnaround facility.
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The various performance fire modeling (zone or computational fluid dynamics) techniques provide varying
degrees of fire details and simulation results. For an indoor mineral-oil-insulated transformer, target criteria
can be as simple as preventing a fire from taking out of service a second transformer, or it can be as
complex as radiant heat flux to the building structure or carbon monoxide exposures to building occupants.
The following are some of the recognized performance-based fire safety and protection documents that can
be used for a performance-based analysis:
SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection [B78]
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79]
British Standards Institute, Fire Safety Engineering in buildings (Part 1 Guide to the application
of fire safety engineering principles) [B51]
Australian Building Codes Board, Fire Safety Engineering Guidelines [B49]
The Canadian National Building Code (objective-based) [B73]
AICHE Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis [B2]
EPRI TR-100443-1992 [B56]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG) documents
A.10 Construction
This clause provides additional information to 6.6.
See NFPA 850 for further discussion on construction requirements. When exploring the additional
information available in NFPA 850, keep in mind that the information and requirements presented may be
overly conservative for direct application to substations because they are developed for generation
facilities, which involve different hazards and threats.
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7
An analysis with input from a fire protection engineer, substation designer, and building official(s) should be performed to determine
the appropriate level of fire separation on indoor transformer and mineral-oil-insulated circuit breaker vaults. This analysis should take
into consideration the type of substation building involved (underground, multistory, or located in a high-rise building), fire-resistance
rating of the overall structure, calculated blast pressure of the room boundaries and structure, blast venting, type of transformer or
circuit breaker used, electrical failure characteristics (arc tension, short-circuit current, and arc duration time), active fire protection
systems present, company response time, and fire department response adequacy.
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d) General substation building areas including shops, office, and warehouse areas
1) Spot-type photoelectric detection
e)
8
Notes in text, tables, and figures of a standard are given for information only and do not contain requirements needed to implement
this standard.
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A fire department with adequate personnel and equipment is available for emergency response
in a timely fashion.
b) An automatic detection system is arranged to dispatch automatically the fire department upon
receipt of any alarm signal.
c)
Equipment present is limited to enclosed metal clad switchgear cubicles, relay and
communication panels, battery systems, miscellaneous electric panels, and associated conduit
and wiring. This type of equipment consists of minimal combustible material and is unlikely to
contribute to a deenergized fire scenario.
Where the provisions of this clause are not all met, a double-interlock preaction sprinkler system should be
installed throughout the control and relay room(s).
Exception to preaction sprinkler recommendation:
Total flooding gaseous agent systems (e.g., clean agent) should be considered where extenuating
circumstances preclude the use of water (i.e., adjacent equipment areas with sensitive equipment
in drainage path and draining water poses an unacceptable threat to equipment). Such systems
should be designed in accordance with the appropriate NFPA standard and manufacturer design
guidance.
A.17.3 Gas-insulated switchgear (GIS) areas
Sprinkler systems are not installed throughout all GIS areas except where there is mineral oil cable, mineral
oil potheads, or any other high fire hazards.
Automatic sprinkler systems should be the wet pipe, closed-head type unless extenuating circumstances
prohibit this type (i.e., use dry pipe systems in unheated areas subject to freezing).
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1890 L
(500+ gal)
Required type of
suppression system
Overhead sprinkler
(wet pipe, closed head)
Design standard
ANSI/NFPA 13-2011 [B14]
Overhead sprinkler
(wet pipe, closed head)
Total flooding
Gaseous system
Total flooding
Gaseous system
Less than 1890 L (500 gal) of mineral oil is present; the designer may have a qualified fire protection engineer
conduct a benefit/cost analysis to determine the added benefit of installing suppression in the vault. This
analysis may demonstrate that sufficient benefit is not gained to warrant the cost of the suppression system. See
C.6 for additional discussion on benefit/cost analysis.
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One of the greatest difficulties is to estimate the frequency of fire for the specific hazards. Some companies
have extensive fire loss histories and loss databases. These databases can be used to estimate specific fire
frequencies, but the results may be poor because of the small statistical sample size based on the
companies records. There are a number of other databases and reports that are in the public domain that
provide useful data (i.e., NFPA data shop, EPRI Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation Methodology, and
IEEE 979 Transformer Fire Survey). The IEEE Std 979 Working Group, 1994 Transformer Fire Survey
estimated probability of fire is given in Table A.2.
Table A.2IEEE 979Working Group 1994 transformer survey
Transformer voltage (kV)
69
115 to 180
230 to 350
500
Additional examples of a simplified economic risk analysis can be found in CEATI Report No. T0237003022 [B52], and the book by Berry [B50] provides further examples of economic risk analyses of
processes.
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Annex B
(informative)
Quantitative methods for analysis of hazards
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50 to 99
30 to 49
5 to 29
<5
<7570
(<2000)
138
69
If the estimated critical heat flux from the calculation will indicate that damage or a failure will occur, then
mitigating measures should be considered if the equipment spacing cannot be changed. Two of the most
common methods of protecting electrical equipment that has been spaced too closely are firewalls/heat
shields, and the installation of water spray deluge systems. Water spray deluge systems are discussed in the
fire-suppression system terms in 3.2 of this guide.
Where there is a fire exposure risk to structures outside the substation, the mineral-oil-insulated electrical
equipment containing greater than 1890 L (500 gal) of oil should be separated from the adjacent property
line and the edge of the transformer tank by a minimum distance of 16 m (50 ft), and there should be spill
containment with flame-suppressing stone.
The control building should be located away from high fire hazard equipment such as mineral-oil-insulated
transformers or reactors. This should reduce the probability of fire from transferring to the control building.
If physical separation between the control building and the electric equipment is not possible, then other
means of protecting the control building should be employed, such as firewalls or heat shields, as well as
the installation of water spray deluge systems at the transformer.
Damage to adjacent equipment and structure because of the heat transfer from the exposing flame is a
function of the materials they are made from. As an example, the critical element of most transformers is
the ceramic bushing. Studies indicate that a heat flux as low as 5 kW/m2 will cause a ceramic bushing to
fail. Table B.3 lists critical heat flux values for substation equipment and structures. The design critical heat
flux at the property line should not exceed 20 kW/m2.
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The heat flux nomographs in B.2 provide a graphic method of estimating the radiated heat flux at the
adjacent equipment.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG) Fire Dynamics Tools spreadsheet can also be used to
estimate the radiated heat flux. Two spreadsheets are available, one ignores wind9 and one considers
wind.10 Documentation11 for the spreadsheets is also available.
Figure B.1 to Figure B.4 depict the heat flux isograms for the 50 m through 300 m (540 ft
through 3200 ft) transformer oil pool fire exposure sources. The 5 kW/m (0.44 Btu/s-ft)
isoflux line, the heat flux that may damage bushings, is bolded for ease of identification. Note
the symmetry about the horizontal axis passing through the mid-height of the source fire.
Using these nomographs:
1) Determine the height of the bushing and draw a line horizontally from the height scale
on the left.
2) Where it intersects the 5 kW/m2 vertical curve, draw a vertical line down to where it
intersects the target distance from the pool fire edge scale.
3) This result can then be used to determine the spacing from the edge of the postulated
pool fire to the nearest adjacent bushing.
9
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/05.1_Heat_Fluxx_Calculations_
Wind_Free.xxls.
10
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/05.2_heat_flux_calculations_
wind_rev1.xls.
11
This document is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1805/final-report/.
12
Figure B.1 to Figure B.5 are reprinted with permission from CEATI, Report T023700-3022, 2005.
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b) The nomograph in Figure B.5 is provided to allow a rough estimate of either the maximum
transformer curbed area or the minimum distance between the curbed transformer edge and the
nearest ceramic bushing when the transformer is insulated with mineral oil.
1) To determine the maximum transformer curbed area, draw a horizontal line from the
known distance on the vertical, maximum 5 kW/m2 isogram distance scale, from the
intersection with the vertical or horizontal target curve; then, draw a vertical line to
intersect the horizontal, area enclosed by curbs scale. This intersection will provide an
estimate of the maximum transformer curbed area.
2) To determine minimum distance to the nearest ceramic bushing, draw a vertical line
from the known area on the horizontal, area enclosed by curbs scale, from the
intersection with the vertical or horizontal target curve; then, draw a horizontal line to
intersect the vertical, maximum 5 kW/m2 isogram distance scale. This intersection will
provide an estimate of the distance to the nearest ceramic bushing.
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9.8
29.5
26.2
23.0
13.1
9.8
1 kW/m
5 kW/m
3 kW/m
2
2 kW/m
30 kW/m
40 kW/m
50 kW/m
60 kW/m
70 kW/m
6
80 kW/m
16.4
25 kW/m2
2
20 kW/m
15 kW/m2
10 kW/m2
4 kW/m2
90 kW/m
19.7
32.8
4
3
6.6
3.3
0.0
0
0.4
10
100
10
100
328
Figure B.1Incident heat flux on a vertical target versus distance for a 50 m2 (540 ft2) pool
fire area exposure source [B52]
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42.6
13
39.4
12.2
36.1
11
32.8
10
29.5
16.4
13.1
2 kW/m
1 kW/m
5 kW/m
30 kW/m
40 kW/m
50 kW/m
60 kW/m
8
70 kW/m
19.7
25 kW/m
20 kW/m2
15 kW/m2
10 kW/m2
4 kW/m2
2
3 kW/m
80 kW/m
23.0
85 kW/m
26.2
5
4
9.8
6.6
3.3
0.0
0
0.5
10
100
10
100
328
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Figure B.3Incident heat flux on a vertical target versus distance for a 150 m2 (1600 ft2)
pool fire area exposure source [B52]
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25 kW /m
2
20 k W/m
16.8
16
52.5
15 k W/m
10 k W/m
2
2
5 kW/m
2 kW /m
1 kW/m
30 kW/m
0.0
6.6
13.1
40 kW/m
19.7
50 kW/m
26.2
60 kW/m
10
32.8
70 kW/m
12
39.4
4 k W/m
2
3 k W/m
75 kW/m
14
45.9
2
0
0.5
10
100
10
100
328
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Figure B.5Maximum distance allowable for 5 kW/m2 allowable heat flux for various fire
pool areas [B52]
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Annex C
(informative)
Selection of fire protection systems and substation design
C.1 Compliance
Some substation owners operate in jurisdictions with mandated fire protection requirements for electrical
substations. In these cases, the mandatory compliance with the appropriate codes and standards is a critical
fire protection performance objective. JEAG 4607-1999 [B72] adopted in Japan is one such mandatory
compliance code.
There are a number of other quasi-compliance objectives that the substation owner may have to use for the
design of a new substation or changes to an existing one. Specifically, recommended practices or guidelines
in the industry set out good engineering practice. Therefore, a substation owner can be exposed to some
pressure to meet these practice standards or guidelines. If an incident occurred and it was found that the
substation owner did not comply with the general guidelines or recommended practices within the industry,
then such information may be used in any litigation based on the incident. Also, the failure to be duly
diligent may also create political or customer satisfaction related issues. The information in this guide,
along with the NFPA and CIGRE substation fire protection documents, should be considered in the design
of a new substation or changes to an existing one to show diligence with regard to fire protection
objectives.
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possible revenue loss from a fire in a critical structure or piece of equipment, automatic fire protection
systems may be justifiable.
Fires in electrical substations can have a very large impact on the station operating assets. A fire in a
substation control building can have a significant long-term impact on the ability of the station to operate.
Therefore, assets such as substation control buildings are very critical and should be reviewed to determine
the adequacy of the planned fire protection. Another example of significant substation assets would be
grouped transformers. There are very few fire-protection-related systems that can prevent a failure or fire in
a transformer, but systems such as water spray deluge systems can suppress a fire in the transformer that
has failed and likely can prevent it from spreading to adjacent transformers.
All utilities operate in regulated political environments. A major substation fire and accompanying outage
may create a number of political issues that can affect a utilitys revenue. The utility regulators can review
the utilitys operation and impose fines or directed actions to improve deficiencies. In government-owned
utilities, pressure can be imposed on the operating personnel to change their practices and philosophies to
address the risk of major outages. The utility or owner shareholders can also apply pressure to the
management of its substations to improve reliability. Customers can cause changes to be made in the level
of overall operational reliability through political, regulatory, or organizational channels. And in special
cases, the customers can show their dissatisfaction with the utilitys operational reliability by using another
utility supplier.
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cause the failure of ceramic bushings on adjacent electrical equipment, damage adjacent buildings, and
even injure substation staff or the public.
The flames and fire plume from a transformer oil fire can cause the failure of overhead bus structures,
transmission lines, and feeder lines. The flaming portion of the fire can rise to a height approximately 2.5
times the diameter of the spill fire. This region can have sufficiently high temperatures to cause the failure
of steel structures and buswork.
The resulting oil-fueled fire plume can result in soot contamination downwind of the fire. The high
concentration of carbon particles that gives the smoke its characteristic color will also conduct electricity
and initiate flashovers. Furthermore, any firefighting operations will add to the conductivity by providing a
steam component in the plume. Even dry chemical particles have been known to become conductive in
high humidity environments by absorbing moisture and therefore acting like airborne mud. Typically,
this effect is seen between high-energy points such as exposed conductors or bushings on transformers.
When soot contamination impacts public structures, it becomes a major concern for the operator. The
specific exposure of the downwind contamination is based on the wind speed and direction during the
actual fire event. See the discussion on incident management in D.3 for further information on dealing with
soot contamination.
Mineral oil spills can be expected to pool and/or run with the effect of exposing adjacent equipment or
structures to fire. Oil may form a large pool fire depending on the volume of oil, spill containment, slope of
the surrounding area, and type of the surrounding ground cover (i.e., stone or soil).
Any mineral-oil spill fire can create significant radiant heat exposures to adjacent structures, buildings, or
equipment. The footprint of the spill fire and the distance between the edge of the spill fire and the
exposure are the key factors in determining whether a fire will damage or ignite the adjacent exposure.
Equipment such as adjacent phases of transformers, spares, or banks can also be heated to a point of case
failure and provide additional fuel to the incident. One major concern with spill fires is that these fires can
spread to other areas of the station and possibly outside of the station. A thorough analysis of the station
grades and containment provisions around mineral-oil-insulated equipment needs to be completed to
determine where a possible spill fire can spread. Containment provisions can then be designed to minimize
oil spread in the event of a spill.
Oil has been known to enter grade-level cable trenches and flow into control buildings, creating significant
damage to the buildings and equipment, as well as compromising the operational control of the station.
In addition to mineral oil, other insulating mediums are used for certain types of electrical equipment in
place of oil that are noncombustible or of limited combustibility such as synthetic oils or sulfur
hexafluoride gas.
The high heat environment of a fire may result in potentially toxic by-products such as dioxin and other
chemicals. Smoke and soot from such fires cause widespread contamination and require extensive
decontamination operations. This is of most significance when the equipment of origin is located in a
building or an underground vault.
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also reference specific design, installation, and testing standards for fire alarm systems. Some codes only
require fire alarm and detection systems when the building occupancy exceeds certain levels.
Smaller substation facilities should be analyzed by the substation designer to determine whether the early
detection of a fire in a substation building will provide benefits in the protection of the assets and station
operation.
For example, if the substation building is unmanned but the company personnel and fire department (or fire
brigade) personnel have sufficient time to respond to an event before the building has major damage, then a
fire alarm and detection system should be considered. For stations where the companys response is greater
than an hour, or where there are no responding fire personnel, the value of the provision of a fire alarm and
detection system may not warrant the expenditure.
Some companies have a policy of providing fire alarm and detection systems for all major unmanned
remote stations so that they have some remote indication of the incident and do not simply rely on the
station operational telemetry trip signals. Some companies have a policy of providing spot type smoke or
heat detectors tied to the substation building security system in order to give them rudimentary remote
indication of a fire occurrence.
The substation designer has to evaluate and select the three major components (fire detection, fire alarm
control panel, and signaling system) of any fire alarm system and determine the type of equipment most
suitable to the specific application. This analysis should be done in conjunction with the fire protection
engineer and/or a fire alarm manufacturer or specialist.
C.5.2 Fire detection equipment selection criteria
The following key criteria should be considered when selecting the appropriate type of fire detection
equipment:
Emergency personnel response time: If the station is unattended, personnel are present
infrequently, and company personnel or fire emergency personnel cannot respond for hours,
then it may not be cost-effective to install an air-sampling detection system that can detect a fire
in the smoldering stage.
Expected fire growth: Some fires will grow very quickly (transformer explosion or cable highenergy arc fault), and others will grow more slowly (control panel relay failure and fire). The
analysis should look at the specific type of detector to detect this fire. Specifically, it may not be
appropriate to use a very sensitive detector like an air-sampling system to detect a high-energy,
arc fault fire. Slower detectors such as thermal detectors will be able to pick this up within
seconds of the initiation of the fire.
Type of fire signature: Each fire has a specific fire signature that will have different
characteristics of heat release, smoke production, smoke density, and smoke particulate size.
One common example is the type of fire detection for a control room facility with exposed
control and power cable. The cable jacketing combustion products produce a fire signature with
large-size smoke particles. Ionization detectors have greater difficulty detecting these larger size
particles than photoelectric detectors.
Operational success: Care should be taken in specifying the type of detection that will not cause
false alarms due to the existing substation processes. A simple example would be the use of
sensitive smoke detectors in lunch rooms where a toaster or microwave oven would be used.
Ceiling and building configuration: The height of the ceiling and whether the ceiling has deep
beam pockets can significantly influence the type of detector used and the spacing of the
particular detector to provide the required response time.
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Some addressable systems have a degrade mode that when a signal or indication occurs on the system that
is not known to the microprocessor, the fire alarm panel will operate all signaling devices and initiating
circuits. If the panel is operating initiating systems for gaseous-preaction systems or deluge systems, then
the degrade mode will cause them to operate. Many companies avoid these problems by only initiating
circuits for gaseous, preaction, and deluge systems with relay-based fire alarm panels.
In order to minimize problems with electrical interference of computer-based addressable systems, many
companies have specific test criteria that require systems be designed and constructed with an acceptable
level of electrical interference immunity. The following is a list of specific electrical interference tests used:
Conducted transient voltage tests: The equipment is tested for surge withstand capability in
accordance with IEEE Std C37.90.1TM-2002 [B61].
Radiated transient voltage (JAWS) test: This test simulates a worst-case industrial noise
environment consisting of high-voltage relays operating in close proximity to solid state
equipment. It is similar to subclause 5.3.1 of ANSI/IEEE 518-1982 [B4]. This standard is
withdrawn, but the test is still valuable.
100 kHz Ring wave and combination wave surge tests for low-voltage ac power circuits: These
tests are based on IEEE Std C62.41 TM-1991 [B63].
Radiated high-frequency continuous wave tests: These tests look at the equipments
susceptibility to radiated waves from radios and cellular phones. Although there are no standard
tests, the following may be used as a guide in establishing tests.
The equipment shall be tested to determine the sensitivity of the equipment to radiated highfrequency wave interference coupled from nearby radio transmitters.
The equipment shall be subjected to transmission from each of the following output frequencies:
1) 15 W in the 47 MHz through 48 MHz band
2) 10 W in the 158 MHz through 173 MHz band
3) 5 W in the 450 MHz through 470 MHz band
4) 0.6 W, 832 MHz (cellular phone region)
For the tests, the equipment enclosure (chassis) that acts to shield the solid-state portions of the equipment
shall be in the normal in service (closed) condition and in the open condition.
When the cabinet door is open, the radio antenna shall be brought to within 300 mm of the exposed
operating circuits. The radio transmitter shall be operated both continuously and interrupted once per
second. Each test shall be performed with the radio antenna oriented in each of the X, Y, and Z planes with
respect to the exposed operating circuits.
C.5.4 Signaling systems
The two key objectives of signaling systems are to warn the building occupants of a fire and to provide a
remote signal to initiate an emergency response to the facility. There are various codes that require that
signaling devices be installed within the building or station so that occupants in any area of the building are
informed of a fire situation.
The initial layout of the signaling appliances can be done based on audibility calculations contained in the
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79]. Once the installation is complete, it should be tested
using sound meters to determine the audibility in all areas of the station. In some areas of the station, the
ambient noise levels may be too high to allow the installation of audible signaling devices without
exceeding the allowable noise limits. The codes normally require that the signaling devices have a sound
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level 15 dB above the normal ambient levels. If the normal ambient levels are above 85 dB, then the
required resultant sound level would have to be 100 dB, which is in excess of normal safe limits for
personnel. The alternative solution in areas with high ambient noise levels is to install signaling devices
with visual strobe lights.
The fire alarm signaling system may also be designed to send a signal to the local fire department. Fire
detection signals should be sent to a central location (e.g., a utilitys control center).
The newer addressable systems provide a new level of information in the event of an alarm condition.
These systems can send out digital e-mail indications of alarm or trouble conditions to wireless phones or
other communication devices, they can send e-mail to specific e-mail accounts, and the systems can be
accessed and controlled remotely over a local area network or Internet system.
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adjacent transformers. In this case, the probability of the adjacent transformers being saved is
assumed to be 90%. The effectiveness of the deluge system protecting the adjacent transformers
is then as follows: e(RM) = 0.9.
The estimated station outage period for this scenario is the difference between the outage time to
replace all three transformers (a fire in the center transformer could destroy all three
transformers) and the outage time to replace the center transformer (assuming the deluge system
will protect the adjacent transformers). The outage time to replace a single unit is 5 days and to
replace three units is 40 days. Therefore, the expected net outage loss period is 35 days.
The expected lost revenue is 35 days 24 h per day 25 MW/h $25/MW = $525 000.
Because this is a simplified analysis, the societal benefits and operating costs will not be
considered. These costs could be significant. Examples include societal costs, loss of reputation,
or possible litigation costs.
It is not known when a transformer fire may occur over the 25 year period. To help analyze the
problem, the net present value (NPV) of the annual revenue and equipment losses will be used
based on the costs being equally divided over the 25 year period. This simplified approach
ignores inflation, depreciation, and other factors. The NPV of a series of equal payments is
calculated using the following formula13:
1 1 n
NPV = R (1i+ i )
(C.1)
where
NPV
R
n
i
The yearly amount for the annual revenue loss is $21 000 ($525 000/25). The NPV over
25 years with a discount rate of 10% is $190 618.
The yearly amount for the equipment loss is $24 000 (2 $300 000/25). The NPV over 25 years
with a discount rate of 10% is $217 849.
The benefit/cost ratio is calculated using Equation (1) of 9.6 given as follows:
B/C =
benefit p ( F ) e( RM ) [ RC + LR + SB + OC ]
=
cost
RM
where
benefit
cost
p(F)
e(RM)
RC
LR
SB
13
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RM
OC
B/C =
B/C =
Value
0.00075
0.9
$190 618
$217 849
$0
$0
$60 000
Conclusion
The calculated benefit/cost ratio of 0.005 is considerably less than the minimum required ratio of 2. The
proposal to install deluge protection should be rejected because it does not provide a large benefit given the
small risk involved. Other fire-protection measures could be considered or the risk could be transferred by
purchasing insurance to cover the possible loss of the assets (transformers) and the revenue. These other
measures can also be analyzed using this economic risk analysis methodology.
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Annex D
(informative)
Fire emergency plan, incident management, and recovery
D.1 Purpose
The purpose of this annex is to provide substation asset owners information to manage substation fire
incidents effectively with private or public emergency responders. This annex is not intended to be
inclusive of all the issues and considerations of a complete emergency response plan but to be an overview
of the basic elements that need to be addressed. To complete an actual plan, the asset owner should obtain
the services of a qualified emergency planning professional.
A written and accessible fire preplan consisting of the following elements is required to assist
emergency responders in their incident management activities and to assure their safety. This
cannot be done during the emergency and should include drawings that include the following:
1) Site drawings
2) Access routes
3) Building locations
4) Floor plans
5) Ventilation capabilities
6) Identification of major hazards
7) Locations of energized oil-filled equipment
8) Description of the nature and location of electrical hazards
9) Location of detection/fixed protection (if any)
10) Location of water supplies (if any)
11) Electrical single line drawings
b) The fire preplan should include the organization and responsibilities of the incident management
team including:
1) Preestablish lines of communication.
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soil or water pollution whose effects far outweigh the damage to the atmosphere. As previously mentioned,
the smoke itself may be conductive because of the presence of carbon particles and steam.
If a fixed fire-suppression system is present, then the responders should identify the type and supplement
the water supply through fire department connections. Fixed water systems are installed for exposure
protection from adjacent fires, as well as to suppress the fire on the equipment of origin. However, unless
properly designed and installed, the fire-suppression system on the equipment of origin may be destroyed
or damaged in the initial event.
Exposure consideration will be critical with oil-insulated electrical equipment. Fire exposure to surrounding
structures and buildings maybe of longer duration where oil-insulated electrical equipment is involved
because of the time required to deenergize the electrical equipment for firefighter safety. Additional time
may have to be considered where it is necessary to have a qualified electrical equipment operator respond
to the scene to deenergize the equipment involved.
Establish what is needed to extinguish a fire involving oil-filled electrical equipment.
Mineral-oil-insulated electrical equipment typically uses a mineral oil with a high flash point in the range
of 150 C (300 F). High-flash-point oils can be extinguished using water hose streams alone. However,
unless there is total spray impingement over the spill surface and any metals objects are cooled, the fire
may not be extinguished.
Successful extinguishment of oil-filled electrical equipment fires has been achieved by the use of waterbased extinguishing agents, such as firefighting foams and surfactants. These agents have achieved
excellent results when employed in sufficient quantity with water and at the proper application rate. The
enhancements are faster fire knock down, prevention of reflash, and use of less water, which reduces the
amount of runoff, in turn, lessening the environmental impact.
Each of these agents brings a set of advantages and disadvantages with it, and it is up to the fire service to
decide which will provide it with the best combination for its operation. For example, most public fire
service agencies use aqueous film forming foams (AFFFs) due to their superior knockdown capabilities and
good record on aircraft rescue applications. However, with large oil-filled equipment, there may be a fire in
depth, associated with highly preheated metal components of significant mass. Industry experience has
shown that more conventional protein or fluoroprotein foams may be more appropriate in these cases.
There are other extinguishing options available including dry chemical and gaseous agents such as carbon
dioxide. These agents can achieve extinguishment when the equipment is deenergized, and the fire is small
and/or confined by location indoors. However, they may not be successful on large outdoor fires due to
their limited cooling abilities and susceptibility to wind and thermal drafts.
Plan for what is needed to control and capture oil and water runoff.
Environmental exposure will involve the containment of oil runoff from the equipment involved. The
runoff can involve burning oil from the fire as well as oil floating on top of the water that is used to
suppress the fire. This will need to be contained and prevented from running into nearby streams, rivers,
lakes, and so on. The following should be considered in developing spill mitigation plans:
Slope of site
Drainage
Cable trenches and control building
Oil containment
Value of station stone
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D.4 Recovery
The primary purpose of a post-fire recovery plan is to put in place procedures to promote the continued
safety of emergency responders as well as owner personnel responsible for damage assessment and
equipment restoration. The secondary purpose is to expedite the restoration of service to customers and to
manage the potential ongoing environmental exposure of oily/contaminated water and fire-suppression
agents. Issues for consideration include the following:
Air quality must be investigated, particularly in buildings that may be contaminated with PCBs
and asbestos.
Qualified personnel need to conduct air quality assessments; public fire departments do not
normally provide this service.
If air quality is not acceptable and restoration has to be expedited, then owner personnel will be
required to wear self-contained breathing apparatus or respirators depending on what
contaminate is present.
Fire protection systems that have operated should be restored to service. Discharged fire
extinguishers should be recharged.
A detailed damage assessment needs to be conducted to establish what needs to isolated prior to
restoration of service.
Percentage of total
14%
14%
9.3%
9.3%
7.8%
7.0%
6.3%
6.0%
4.7%
3.1%
1.6%
15.8%
The miscellaneous fires category above covers a wide range of fires from grass fires to a plastic wall clock
failing and catching fire. It is impossible to predict all of the different types of fires that can occur.
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Annex E
(informative)
Examples
The following examples show the various methods for analyzing and applying the fire protection concepts
and principles presented in this guide. The information used is from a typical substation that a substation
engineer may encounter. The example follows the steps that would be commonly used to carry out the fire
protection analysis.
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8 in) on the short sides of the transformer and 3.8 m (12 ft, 4 in). The distances are consistent with the
distances discussed in E.1.1.
Without stone in the containment, the flame front may extend to the edge of the walls. The perimeter size
of the flame front will be 11.5 m (37 ft, 8 in) 13.5 m (44 ft, 4 in) when the wall thickness of 15 cm (6 in)
is taken into account. When evaluating fire separations, distances should be measured from the perimeter of
the flame front or spill containment.
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Equipment information:
69 kV Circuit breaker: The 69 kV circuit breakers are SF6 type with polymer bushings and rated
2000 A, 650 kV BIL. No oil is used in these circuit breakers.
230 kV Circuit breaker: The 230 kV circuit breakers are SF6 type with polymer bushings and
rated 2000 A, 900 kV BIL. No oil is used in these circuit breakers.
Control building: 15.2 m (50 ft) long 9.1 m (30 ft) wide 4.6 m (15 ft) high, metal with 2 h
fire rating walls and ceiling; door locations are as shown.
Power transformer: Two 180 MVA, 230 kV through 69 kV transformers are used in the
substation. Mineral oil is used in the tank, high-voltage bushings, and low-voltage bushings. The
following information is given for the transformers.
Transformer data
Metric units
7.6 m
6.1 m
7.0 m
49 210 L
4540 L
1890 L
55 650 L
American system
units
25 ft
20 ft
23 ft
13 000 gal
1200 gal
500 gal
14 700 gal
Transformer foundation and spill containment: The proposed layout is shown in Figure E.1. The
containment wall is not the same distance from the transformer foundation on all sides. This
often occurs due to physical constraints of the installation or to provide additional storage
volume (extending the size may not be possible on all sides). In this case, the spill containment
walls are 2.6 m (8 ft, 8 in) from the foundation on the short sides of the transformer and 3.8 m
(12 ft, 4 in) from the long sides.
Without stone in the containment, the flame front will extend to the edge of the walls. The
perimeter size of the flame front will be 11.5 m (37 ft, 8 in) 13.5 m (44 ft, 4 in) when the wall
thickness of 15 cm (6 in) is taken into account. When evaluating fire separations, distances will
be measured from the perimeter of the flame front or spill containment.
Station service transformer: Two station service power transformers are used. Both are pad
mount, dry type, rated 12.47 kV to 480 V, 150 kVA.
Voltage transformer: Each of the voltage transformers contains 57 L (15 gal) of oil.
The substation area is graded with a 2% slope.
E.2.3 Fire sources in the substation
The following is a list of the significant fire sources in the station:
a)
b) Voltage transformers
c)
Control building
1) Control panels
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2) Heating system
3) Smoking
4) Refuse
5) Hot work
The fire sources in the substation are summarized in Table E.1.
Table E.1Fire sources
Source
Power transformer
Voltage transformers (VTs)
Station service transformers
Control building
Number of items
2
6
2
1
Multiple
Material
Mineral oil
Mineral oil
Dry insulation
Walls and roof
Wire and cable
The power transformers are the most hazardous fire sources in the substation. The spacing of the
transformers to each other and to the control building is critical and will be examined as follows.
E.2.4 Fire protection assessments
E.2.4.1 Switchyard fire protection assessment
Items
Risk assessment
Electric equipment layout and equipment types.
Criticality of the various pieces of equipment.
Insulating fluids used and their flammability.
Historical frequency of fire for the various types
of equipment.
Comments
See Figure E.2.
See E.2.2.
Mineral oil.
T1 and T2: f = 0.0006/year/unit.
Station service transformer: f < 0.0001/year/unit.
Voltage transformer: f < 0.0001/year/unit.
No response is available.
The closest water source is 500 m away.
NA
See E.2.5 for a detailed analysis.
See E.2.6 for details.
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Items
Comments
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Comments
The layout shows an outward swinging door and a large
double equipment door. However, both doors are at one
end of the control building. The large equipment doors
are usually closed and secured with pins.
Confirm the locations of the doors are at opposite ends of
the building to provide shorter travel distances. Also
ensure that all doors will not be secured such that they
can still be used as an exit at all times.
Travel distance is less than 30 m (100 ft).
No information on compliance.
Yes.
One story.
None.
No fire department response.
No water supply available.
None is provided other than portable fire extinguishers.
The control building is critical to the substations
reliability. Early detection of fires is critical to prevent
extensive damage. Fire detection is required, but fire
suppression is considered too costly.
Photoelectric smoke detectors will provide early detection
of fires that typically occur in control buildings. The
alarm will be sent to the utilitys control center to allow
quick dispatching of staff and fire personnel.
None provided.
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Item
Interior surface finishes in the control building.
Comments
All interior surfaces have low flame spread. The interior
walls are surfaced with 0.5 in drywall. Specific areas have
0.75 in plywood to allow mounting of equipment panels.
All walls surfaces are painted with two coats of latex
paint.
Cables are routed in ventilated cable tray. Cables have a
FT1 rating in accordance with IEEE Std 1202-2006
[B70].
No other occupancies.
Metric units
0.15 m
American system
units
6 in
13.8 m
45 ft, 3 5/8 in
2.6 m
8 ft, 8 in
0.35 m
1 ft, 2 in
16.95 m
55 ft, 7 5/8 in
T2 fire: In this case, the transformers are symmetrical so the distances are the same as for T1>T2 or 16.95 m.
The distance between transformers is 16.95 m, whereas the prescriptive distance is 15.2 m. The proposed
layout meets the prescriptive spacing requirements for T1 and T2.
E.2.5.2 Heat flux calculations
These calculations are based on two fire scenarios of a bushing failure and core failure. The assumptions
used for the calculations are as follows:
Mineral oil insulating fluid is used.
Transformers are conservator pressurized, not gas pressurized.
Transformer bushings are porcelain.
Transformer tank is 4.9 m (16 ft) high and the top is flat.
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Scenario
Bushing failure (i)
Bushing failure (ii)
Tank failure
b) Pool fire radius:
In this case, the pool will be noncircular. Assume a circle with the same area as the pool fire.
Bushing (i):
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c)
Bushing (ii):
Tank:
Description
Value
Mass loss rate for mineral oil per Table 3-1.2 in SFPE or
NUREG spreadsheet
0.039 kg/m2s
Hc
46.4 MJ/kg
0.7 m1
Bushing (i):
Bushing (ii):
Tank:
NOTEThe calculations can be been simplified in most cases by setting the factor (1 ekD)
to 1.
Description
Fraction of total energy radiated
Heat release rate (kW)
Bushing (i):
Bushing (ii):
Tank:
Value
0.3
Bushing (i): 280 900 kW
Bushing (ii): 393 400 kW
Tank: 214 800 kW
Bushing (i): 7.0 + 16.95 m
Bushing (ii): 8.3 + 16.95 m
Tank: 6.1 + 16.95 m
The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [B79] recommends multiplying the calculated
heat flux by a factor of two to account for variations between calculated and actual values. The
heat flux can then be taken to be within these ranges.
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f)
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Distance
Metric units
0.15 m
American system
units
0 ft, 6 in
12.68 m
41 ft, 7 11/32 in
12.8 m
42 ft, 1 11/32 in
From 7.2.3, the transformers need to be separated from the control building by a 2 h fire-rated wall.
Because the control building has 2 h fire-rated walls, the spacing as proposed is suitable.
E.2.6.2 Heat flux calculations
These calculations are based on two scenarios of a bushing failure or a tank failure with both resulting in a
fire. The following assumptions are used for the calculations:
Mineral-oil-insulating fluid is used.
The transformers are conservator pressurized, not gas pressurized.
The transformer bushings are porcelain.
The transformer tank top is flat.
No flame-suppressing stone has been installed in the oil-spill containment.
The calculations follow the same process as those in E.2.5.2 and use many of the same values. For this
example, the NUREG spreadsheet without wind (see B.1) will be used to complete the calculations. The
values used and results are summarized in Table E.2.
Table E.2Summary of heat flux calculations
Type of fire
Bushing (i)
Bushing (ii)
Tank
12.8 (42.11)
12.8 (42.11)
12.8 (42.22)
16.8
20.8
14.1
The critical heat flux for the control building is 30 kW/m2 per Table B.3 (unprotected metal).
Without the safety factor, the heat flux at the control building for either a bushing or a tank fire is below the
critical heat flux for unprotected metal. When the safety factor is considered, the heat flux at the control
building for either a bushing or a tank fire is near or above the critical heat flux for unprotected metal.
Because the exterior wall of the control building has a 2 h rating, the control building wall will be able to
withstand the fire exposure for approximately 2 h.
Although acceptable as is, adding flame suppression stone in the spill containment will reduce the heat flux
at the control building.
E.2.7 Transformer to property line spacing
The distance of the right transformer to the right property line is approximately 20 m (66 ft).
For this example, the NUREG spreadsheet without wind (see B.1) will be used to complete the
calculations. The values used and results are summarized in Table E.3.
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Bushing (i)
Bushing (ii)
Tank
20 (66)
20 (66)
20 (66)
9.0
11.5
7.4
Bushing (ii) fire is considered an extreme case and will not be considered. Assuming a fire were to occur in
the right-hand side transformer, the radiant heat flux at the right property line would be 7.4 kW/m2 to
9.0 kW/m2. Table 5.3.3.2 of NFPA 59A [B73] recommends maximum heat flux levels at the property line.
Assuming there is a building at or near the property line at the time the substation is built, the maximum
heat flux exposure recommendation is 9 kW/m2. The heat flux at the property line for Bushing (i) and Tank
fires does not exceed the recommendation and the spacing could be considered acceptable.
The heat flux could be reduced by increasing the distance, installing a fire barrier, reducing the spill fire
size, changing the insulating fluid, or installing fire protection.
E.2.8 Power transformers to adjacent equipment
The cost, importance, and difficulty to replace should be considered when evaluating the location of
adjacent equipment. The closest equipment to the transformers is the 230 kV circuit breakers. The
minimum separation distance between the flame front and the circuit breaker is 10.9 m (35.8 ft). In
accordance with 7.2.6, the minimum recommended separation distance for a transformer with oil
containment is 10.7 m (35 ft). The spacing is acceptable.
Bus support structures, surge arresters, and disconnect switches are relatively easy to replace and low
cost compared to major equipment like transformers and circuit breakers. Also, to achieve the required
separation distances for this type of equipment would typically increase the size and therefore the cost of a
substation. For these reasons, the separation distances in 7.2.6 are typically considered optional for this type
of equipment.
E.2.9 Station service transformers location
There is no spacing requirement for equipment with less than 1890 L (500 gal) of oil. Footnote a of Table 1
provides some items for consideration by the designer.
The transformers are located adjacent to each other and the control building. A minimum spacing of 1 m
(3.3 ft) is considered adequate given the transformers do not have oil, there is a low fire risk, and the
control building has 2 h fire-rated walls. The spacing as planned is acceptable.
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The spill containment has 116% of the required storage volume and meets the requirements for this design.
E.2.11 Other considerations
E.2.11.1 Gate location
Entrance gates should be located at opposite ends of the site and away from high-fire-risk equipment and
transmission and distribution lines. The most realistic locations would be in the lower left and right corners
of the site against the road and as shown in Figure E.2.
E.2.11.2 Surface grade
The slope for this substation is not critical because the two large power transformers have suitable oil-spill
containment. The volume of oil in the VTs is small and is not a significant fire hazard.
E.2.11.3 Fire stops
Fire stops should be installed in the trench at the highway-rated trench cover and at the penetrations into the
control building. This will stop fires from spreading in the trench between the 69 kV and 230 kV
switchyards and a trench fire from spreading into the control building.
E.2.11.4 Water supply
There is no nearby water supply and there is no fire department that serves the area. Both of these create a
major risk. The following are some options that could be considered to reduce this risk:
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a)
Arrange mutual aid with a local airport to have a crash rescue truck respond.
b) Have a least two 125 L (33 gal) AFFF wheeled units and three 160 kg (350 lb) dry chemical
wheeled units, and have the responding crews trained in their use.
c)
Arrange mutual aid with a local fire department to respond with tankers and provide firefighting
foam.
d) Arrange mutual aid with forest firefighting organizations to provide tanker and firefighting
crews under the direction of the station crews.
e)
Install flame-suppressing stone in the spill containment or use an IEC style grate and gravel
system.
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Annex F
(informative)
Bibliography
Bibliographical references are resources that provide additional or helpful material but do not need to be
understood or used to implement this standard. Reference to these resources is made for informational use
only.
[B1] Accredited Standards Committee C-2, National Electrical Safety Code (NESC).
[B2] AICHE Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis.14
[B3] ANSI/IEEE Std 383-1974, IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices,
and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
[B4] ANSI/IEEE 518-1982, IEEE Guide for the Installation of Electrical Equipment to Minimize
Electrical Noise Inputs to Controllers from External Sources.
[B5] ANSI/IEEE 525-1992, IEEE Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Substations.
[B6] ANSI/IEEE 634-2004, IEEE Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test.
[B7] ANSI/NFPA 10-2012, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.15,16
[B8] ANSI/NFPA 11-2010, Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam.
[B9] ANSI/NFPA 11A-1999, Standard for Medium- and High-Expansion Foam Systems.
[B10] ANSI/NFPA 11C-1995, Standard for Mobile Foam Apparatus.
[B11] ANSI/NFPA 12-2011, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.
[B12] ANSI/NFPA 12A-2009, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems.
[B13] ANSI/NFPA 12B-1990, Standard on Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishing Systems.
[B14] ANSI/NFPA 13-2011, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems.
[B15] ANSI/NFPA 14-2010, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems.
[B16] ANSI/NFPA 15-2012, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection.
[B17] ANSI/NFPA 16-2011, Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray
Systems.
[B18] ANSI/NFPA 17-2009, Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.
[B19] ANSI/NFPA 20-2011, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection.
[B20] ANSI/NFPA 22-2012, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection.
[B21] ANSI/NFPA 24-2013, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their
Appurtenances.
[B22] ANSI/NFPA 25-2011, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire
Protection Systems.
[B23] ANSI/NFPA 30-2011, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
14
AIChE publications are available from the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (http://www.aiche.org/).
ANSI publications are available from the American National Standards Institute (http://www.ansi.org/).
16
NFPA publications are available from the National Fire Protection Association (http://www.nfpa.org/).
15
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[B24] ANSI/NFPA 37-2009, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and
Gas Turbines.
[B25] ANSI/NFPA 58-2012, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code.
[B26] ANSI/NFPA 68-1998, Guide for Venting of Deflagrations.
[B27] ANSI/NFPA 70E-2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
[B28] ANSI/NFPA 72-2010, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code.
[B29] ANSI/NFPA 80-2013, Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives.
[B30] ANSI/NFPA 80A-2012, Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire
Exposures.
[B31] ANSI/NFPA 90A-2012, Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems.
[B32] ANSI/NFPA 90B-2012, Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning
Systems.
[B33] ANSI/NFPA 92A-2009, Standard For Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure
Differences.
[B34] ANSI/NFPA 101-2011, Life Safety Code.
[B35] ANSI/NFPA 101A-2010, Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety.
[B36] ANSI/NFPA 204M-1991, Guide for Smoke and Heat Venting.
[B37] ANSI/NFPA 255-2006, Standard Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building
Materials.
[B38] ANSI/NFPA 256-2003, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Roof Coverings.
[B39] ANSI/NFPA 450-2013, Guide for Emergency Medical Services and Systems.
[B40] ANSI/NFPA 550-2012, Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree.
[B41] ANSI/NFPA 750-2010, Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems.
[B42] ANSI/NFPA 780-2011, Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems.
[B43] ANSI/NFPA 1142-2012, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting.
[B44] ANSI/NFPA 1144-2013, Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards from Wildland Fire.
[B45] ANSI/NFPA 2001-2012, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems.
[B46] ANSI/NFPA Industrial Fire Hazards Handbook, 3rd ed.
[B47] ASTM D5222-2008, Standard Specification for High Fire-Point Mineral Electrical Insulating Oils. 17
[B48] ASTM E-84-81a-2000, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building
Materials.
[B49] Australian Building Codes Board, Fire Safety Engineering Guidelines. Canberra, Australia:
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[B51] British Standards Institute, DD 240-1:1997, Fire safety engineering in buildingsGuide to the
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[B52] CEATI International Inc., Report No.T023700-3022, Transmission Stations and TransformersFire
Protection and Prevention, August 2005.18
17
ASTM publications are available from the American Society for Testing and Materials (http://www.astm.org/).
85
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[B53] CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), Title 40 (Environmental Protection Agency), Part 300 (1988
Revision).19
[B54] CIGRE TF 14.01.04-1999, Report on Fire Aspects of HVDC Valves and Valve Halls.
[B55] Cote, A. E., J. L. Linville, and NFPA, Fire Protection Handbook, MY-FPH 1791, 17th ed. Norwood,
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[B56] EPRI TR-100443-1992, Methods of Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis.
[B57] FM Data Sheet 5-4, Recommended Good Practice for Transformer and Switchgear Installations,
July 2012.
[B58] FM Data Sheet 5-19, Loss Prevention, Switchgear and Circuit Breakers, Jan. 2006.
[B59] FM Data Sheet 5-31, Loss Prevention, Cable and Bus Bar, Apr. 2012.
[B60] IEC 61936-1-2011, Power Installations Exceeding 1 kV a.c.Part 1: Common Rules.20
[B61] IEEE Std C37.90.1TM-2002, IEEE Standard for Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Tests for Relays
and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus.21, 22
[B62] IEEE Std C37.122.1TM-1993, IEEE Guide for Gas-Insulated Substations.
[B63] IEEE Std C62.41TM-1991, IEEE Recommended Practice on Surge Voltages in Low-Voltage AC
Power Circuits.
[B64] IEEE Std 80TM-2000, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding.
[B65] IEEE Std 384TM-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.
[B66] IEEE Std 420TM-2001, IEEE Standard for the Design and Qualification of Class 1E Control Boards,
Panels, and Racks Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
[B67] IEEE Std 484TM-2002, IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of
Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications.
[B68] IEEE Std 817TM-1993, IEEE Standard Test Procedure for Flame-Retardant Coatings Applied to
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[B69] IEEE Std 998TM-1996, Guide for Direct Lightning Stroke Shielding of Substations.
[B70] IEEE Std 1202TM-2006, IEEE Standard for Flame-Propagation Testing of Wire and Cable.
[B71] ISO 23932-2009, Fire Safety EngineeringGeneral Principles.23
[B72] JEAG 4607-1999, Guidelines for Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants.24
[B73] NBC 2010, National Building Code of Canada (objective-based).25
[B74] NFPA 59A-2012, Standard For The Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG).
[B75] NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC).
18
Material is reprinted in this guide with the permission of CEATI and the support of Hydro One Networks Inc. CEATI publications
are available from CEATI International (http://www.ceati.com/).
19
CFR publications are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office (http://www.gpo.gov/).
20
IEC publications are available from the International Electrotechnical Commission (http://www.iec.ch/). IEC publications are also
available in the United States from the American National Standards Institute (http://www.ansi.org/).
21
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc.
22
IEEE publications are available from The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (http://standards.ieee.org/).
23
ISO publications are available from the ISO Central Secretariat (http://www.iso.org/). ISO publications are also available in the
United States from the American National Standards Institute (http://www.ansi.org/).
24
JEAG publications are available from the Japan Electric Association (http://www.denki.or.jp/pub/jeacjeag.html/).
25
NBC documents are available from the Government of Canada (http://www.nationalcodes.nrc.gc.ca).
86
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[B76] Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center, EPRI, EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance
Optimization and Maintenance Guide, TR-1006756. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute,
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[B77] SFPE Engineering Guide Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires, June
1999.
[B78] SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection.26
[B79] SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering.
[B80] SMACNA Fire Damper and Heat Stop Guide for Air Handling Systems, 2nd Edition, 1981.27
[B81] Zalosh, R., and W. H. Lin, Effects of a Gravel Bed on the Burning Rate and Extinguishment of High
Flash Point Hydrocarbon Pool Fires, 1995.
26
SFPE publications are available from the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (http://www.sfpe.org).
SMACNA publications are available from the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association
(http://www.smacnawpa.org).
27
87
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