IGNACIOV.

DIRECTOROFLANDSANDVALERIANO
108SCRA335

FACTS
FaustinoIgnaciofiledanapplicationtoregisteraparcelofland(mangrove)whichhe
allegedheacquiredbyrightofaccretionsinceitadjoinsaparceloflandownedbythe
Ignacio.HisapplicationisopposedbytheDirectorofLands,LaureanoValeriano,
contendingthatsaidlandformspartofthepublicdomain.TheTrialCourtdismissedthe
applicationholdingthatsaidlandformedpartofthepublicdomain.Thusthecaseatbar.

ISSUE:
Whetherornotthelandformspartofthepublicdomain
HELD:YES
1.ThelawonaccretioncitedbyIgnacioininapplicableinthepresentcasebecauseit
referstoaccretionordepositsonthebanksofriverswhilethisreferstoactioninthe
ManilaBay,whichisheldtobepartofthesea
2.AlthoughitisprovidedforbytheLawofWatersthatlandsaddedtoshoresby
accretionscausedbyactionsoftheseaformpartofthepubicdomainwhentheyareno
longernecessaryforpurposesofpublicutility,onlytheexecutiveandthelegislative
departmentshavetheauthorityandthepowertomakethedeclarationthatanysaid
landisnolongernecessaryforpublicuse.Untilsuchdeclarationismadebysaid
departments,thelotinquestionformspartofthepublicdomain,notavailableforprivate
appropriationorownership.

IGNACIOVS.DIRECTOROFLANDSANDVALERIANO:
CaseDoctrine:Article457oftheNewCivilCode(Article366,OldCivilCode),whichprovidesthat:To
theownersoflandsadjoiningthebanksofriversbelongtheaccretionwhichtheygraduallyreceivefrom
theeffectsofthecurrentofthewaters.Thearticlecitedisclearlyinapplicablebecauseitrefersto
accretionordepositsonthebanksofrivers,whiletheaccretioninthepresentcasewascausedbyaction
oftheManilaBay.
FACTS:
Ignacioappliedforregistrationofaparceloflandadjacenttohisland,claimingthathehasacquired
thelandbyrightofaccretion.DirectorofLands,Valerianoopposed,insteaditaversthatportionsought
toberegisteredispropertyofpublicdomain.ARGUMENTS:1.

Appellantcontendsthattheparcelbelongstohimbythelawofaccretion,havingbeenformedby
gradualdepositbyactionoftheManilaBay,andhecitesArticle457oftheNewCivilCode2.

AppellantnextcontendsthatArticles1,4and5oftheLawofWatersarenotapplicablebecause
theyrefertoaccretionsformedbythesea,andthatManilaBaycannotbeconsideredasasea.

AURORAALCANTARADAUS,vs.SpousesHERMOSOandSOCORRODELEON
GRNo.149750.June16,2003
Facts:
Respondentsallegedthattheyaretheownersofaparceloflanddescribedas:No.4786of
theCadastralSurveyofSanManuelsituatedintheMunicipalityofSanManuel,
BoundedontheNW.,byLotNo.4785;andontheSE.,byLotNos.11094&11096;
containinganareaofFourThousandTwoHundredTwelve(4,212)sq.m.,moreorless.
CoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.22134oftheLandRecordsof
Pangasinan.whichHermosodeLeoninheritedfromhisfatherMarcelinodeLeonby
virtueofaDeedofExtrajudicialPartition.Sometimeintheearly1960s,respondents
engagedtheservicesofthelateAtty.FlorencioJuantotakecareofthedocumentsofthe
propertiesofhisparents.Atty.Juanletthemsignvoluminousdocuments.Afterthe
deathofAtty.Juan,somedocumentssurfacedandmostrevealedthattheirproperties
hadbeenconveyedbysaleorquitclaimtoHermososbrothersandsisters,toAtty.Juan
andhissisters,whenintruthandinfact,nosuchconveyanceswereeverintendedby
them.HissignatureintheDeedofExtrajudicialPartitionwithQuitclaimmadeinfavor
ofRodolfodeLeonwasforged.Theydiscoveredthatthelandinquestionwassoldby
RodolfodeLeontoAuroraAlcantara.Theydemandedannulmentofthedocumentand
reconveyancebutdefendantsrefusedAuroraAlcantaraDausthatsheboughtthelandin
questioningoodfaithandforvalue.[She]hasbeenincontinuous,public,peaceful,open
possessionoverthesameandhasbeenappropriatingtheproducethereofwithout
objectionfromanyone.
Issue:
1.WhetherornottheDeedofAbsoluteSale\executedbyRodolfodeLeonovertheland
inquestioninfavorofpetitionerwasperfectedandbindinguponthepartiestherein?
2.Whetherornotthepossessionofpetitionerincludingherpredecessorininterest
RodolfodeLeonoverthelandinquestionwasingoodfaith?
Ruling:
Petitionhasnomerit.
1.Acontractofsaleisconsensual.Itisperfectedbymereconsent,uponameeting
ofthemindsontheofferandtheacceptancethereofbasedonsubjectmatter,priceand
termsofpayment.Atthisstage,thesellersownershipofthethingsoldisnotanelement
intheperfectionofthecontractofsale.
Thecontract,however,createsanobligationonthepartofthesellertotransfer
ownershipandtodeliverthesubjectmatterofthecontract.Itisduringthedeliverythat
thelawrequiresthesellertohavetherighttotransferownershipofthethingsold.In
general,aperfectedcontractofsalecannotbechallengedonthegroundofthesellers

nonownershipofthethingsoldatthetimeofthe
perfectionofthecontract.
2.Itiswellsettledthatnotitletoregisteredlandinderogationofthatoftheregistered
ownershallbeacquiredbyprescriptionoradversepossession.
Neithercanprescriptionbeallowedagainstthehereditarysuccessorsoftheregistered
owner,becausetheymerelystepintotheshoesofthedecedentandaremerelythe
continuationofthepersonalityoftheirpredecessorininterest\Consequently,sincea
certificateofregistrationcoversit,thedisputed
landcannotbeacquiredbyprescriptionregardlessofpetitionersgoodfaith.

GSISvs.Santiago

G.R.No.155206October28,2003

FACTS:
DeceasedspousesJoseZuluetaandSoledadRamosobtainedvariousloansfromGSIS
from1956to1957inthetotalamountofP3,117,000.00securedbyrealestatemortgages
overtheirparcelsofland.
TheZuluetasfailedtopaytheirloanstodefendantGSISandthelatterforeclosedthe
real estate mortgages. OnAugust 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public
auction with defendant GSIS being the highest bidder.Not all lots covered by the
mortgagedtitles,however,weresold.Ninetyone(91)lotswereexpresslyexcludedfrom
theauctionsincethelotsweresufficienttopayforallthemortgagedebts.
ACertificateofSalewasissuedlateronandanAffidavitofConsolidationofOwnership
wasexecutedbydefendantGSISoverZuluetaslots,includingthelots,whichasearlier
stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure. On March 1980, GSIS sold the
foreclosedpropertiestoYorkstownDevelopmentCorporationwhichsalewasdisapproved
bytheOfficeofthePresident.ThesoldpropertieswerereturnedtoGSISandtheland
titlesissuedinfavourofYorkstownweresubsequentlycancelled.
Thereafter,GSISbegandisposingtheforeclosedlotsincludingtheexcludedones.
OnApril 7, 1990, Representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic
ZuluetaexecutedanagreementwherebyZuluetatransferredallhisrightsandinterests
overtheexcludedlots.PlaintiffSantiagoslawyerwroteademandletterdatedMay11,
1989todefendantGSISaskingforthereturnoftheeightyone(81)excludedlots.
OnMay7,1990,AntonioVicZulueta,representedbyEduardoM.Santiago,filedwiththe
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofPasigCity,Branch71,andacomplaintforreconveyanceof
realestateagainsttheGSIS.SpousesAlfeoandNenitaEscasa,ManuelIIIandSylviaG.
Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales moved to be
includedasintervenorsandfiledtheirrespectiveanswersinintervention.Subsequently,
thepetitioner,asdefendanttherein,fileditsansweralleginginteraliathattheaction
wasbarredbythestatuteoflimitationsand/orlachesandthatthecomplaintstatedno
causeofaction.Subsequently,ZuluetawassubstitutedbySantiagoastheplaintiffinthe
complaintaquo.UponthedeathofSantiagoin1996,hewassubstitutedbyhiswidowas
theplaintiff.Afterduetrial,theRTCrenderedjudgmentagainstthepetitionerordering
ittoreconveytotherespondent,RosarioEnriquezVda.DeSantiago,insubstitutionof
herdeceasedhusbandEduardo,theseventyeightlotsexcludedfromtheforeclosuresale.

ISSUES:

I.Whetherornotthepetitioneractedinbadfaithinconsolidatingownershipand
causingtheissuanceoftitlesinitsnameoverthesubjectlots,notwithstandingthatthese
wereexpresslyexcludedfromtheforeclosuresale.
II.WhetherornotPetitionersdefenseonprescriptionistenable.
HELD:
FirstIssue:
YES.TheactsofdefendantappellantGSISinconcealingfromtheZuluetastheexistence
of these excluded lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the
excluded lots from thetime it consolidatedits titles on theirforeclosed properties, in
failingtoinformthemwhenitenteredintoacontractofsaleoftheforeclosedproperties
toYorkstownaswellaswhenthesaidsalewasrevokedbythenPresidentduringthe
sameyear,demonstratedacleareffortonitsparttodefraudthespousesZuluetaand
appropriateforitselfthesubjectproperties.
Eveniftitlesoverthelotshadbeenissuedinthenameofthedefendantappellant,stillit
could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them because
indefeasibilityoftitleundertheTorrenssystemdoesnotattachtotitlessecuredbyfraud
or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendantappellant in the form of
concealmentoftheexistenceofsaidlotsandfailuretoreturnthesametotherealowners
aftertheirexclusionfromtheforeclosuresalemadedefendantappellantholdersinbad
faith.Itiswellsettledthataholderinbadfaithofacertificateoftitleisnotentitledto
theprotectionofthelawforthelawcannotbeusedasashieldforfraud.

SecondIssue:
NO.Ontheissueofprescription,generally,anactionforreconveyanceofrealproperty
basedonfraudprescribesinfouryearsfromthediscoveryoffraud;suchdiscoveryis
deemedtohavetakenplaceupontheissuanceofthecertificateoftitleoverthe
property.Registrationofrealpropertyisaconstructivenoticetoallpersonsand,thus,
thefouryearperiodshallbecountedtherefrom.Ontheotherhand,Article1456ofthe
CivilCodeprovides:
Art.1456.Ifpropertyisacquiredthroughmistakeorfraud,thepersonobtainingitis,by
forceoflaw,consideredatrusteeofanimpliedtrustforthebenefitofthepersonfrom
whomthepropertycomes.
Anactionforreconveyancebasedonimpliedorconstructivetrustprescribesintenyears
fromtheallegedfraudulentregistrationordateofissuanceofthecertificateoftitleover
theproperty.
Thepetitionersdefenseofprescriptionisuntenable.AsheldbytheCA,thegeneralrule

thatthediscoveryoffraudisdeemedtohavetakenplaceupontheregistrationofreal
propertybecauseitisconsideredaconstructivenoticetoallpersonsdoesnotapplyin
thiscase.
Contrarytoitsclaim,thepetitionerunarguablyhadthelegaldutytoreturnthesubject
lotstotheZuluetas.Thepetitionersattemptstojustifyitsomissionbyinsistingthatit
hadnosuchdutyunderthemortgagecontractisobviouslyclutchingatstraw.Article22
oftheCivilCodeexplicitlyprovidesthateverypersonwho,throughanactof
performancebyanother,oranyothermeans,acquiresorcomesintopossessionof
somethingattheexpenseofthelatterwithoutjustorlegalground,shallreturnthesame
tohim.

AGUIRRE,ETAL.vs.COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.
G.R.No.122249January29,2004
FACTS:
LeocadioMedranoandhisfirstwifeEmiliaownedapieceofland.Afterthe
deathofEmilia,LeocadiomarriedhissecondwifeMiguela.WhenLeocadiodied,allhis
heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and
administerthesaidproperty.AfterSixtodied,hisheirslearnedthathehadexecutedan
AffidavitofTransferofRealPropertyinwhichhefalselystatedthathewastheonlyheir
ofLeocadio.ItturnedoutthatwhileSixtowerestillalive,hesoldaportionofthesubject
landtpTiburcioBalitaanandanotherportiontoMariaBacong,MariaBaconglatersold
thesaidportiontoRosendoBacong.Petitioners,allheirsofLeocadiowhowereaffected
by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees
refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the
documentsandpartitionthereof.Thevendeescontendedthattheyacquiredtheproperty
underthevaliddeedofsaleandpetitionerscauseofactionwasbarredbylachesand
prescription.Tiburcioalsocontendedthatheisaninnocentpurchaserforvalue.
ISSUE:
WhetherornottherewasavalidsalebetweenSixtoMedranoandthethree
purchasesconsideringthefactthatitwasmadewithouttheconsentofthecoowners.

HELD:
UnderArticle493oftheNewCivilCode,asalebyacoownerofthewhole
propertyashiswillaffectonlyhisownsharebutnotthoseoftheothercoownerswhodid
notconsenttothesale).Theprovisionclearlyprovidesthatthesaleorotherdisposition
affects only the sellers share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantorsshareinthepartitionofthepropertyownedincommon.Sinceacoowneris
entitledtosellhisundividedshare,asaleoftheentirepropertybyonecoownerwithout
theconsentoftheothercoownerisnotnullandvoid;onlytherightsofthecoowner
selleraretransferred,therebymakingthebuyeracoowneroftheproperty.Itisclear
thereforethatthedeedofsaleexecutedbySixtoinfavorofTiburcioBalitaanisavalid
conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the coownership is concerned. Acts
whichmaybeconsideredadversetostrangersmaynotbeconsideredadverseinsofaras
coownersareconcerned.Ameresilentpossessionbyacoowner,hisreceiptsofrentals,
fruitsorprofitsfromtheproperty,theerectionofbuildingsandfencesandplantingof
trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership,ifitisnotborneoutbyclearandconvincingevidencethatheexercisedsuch
actsofpossessionwhichunequivocallyconstitutedanousterordeprivationoftherights
oftheothercoowners.

Thus,inorderthatacoownerspossessionmaybedeemedadversetothecestuiquetrust
ortheothercoowners,thefollowingelementsmustconcur:
(1)thathehasperformedunequivocalactsofrepudiationamountingtoanousterofthe
cestuiquetrustortheothercoowners;
(2)thatsuchpositiveactsofrepudiationhavebeenknowntothecestuiquetrustorthe
othercoowners;and
(3)thattheevidencethereonmustbeclearandconvincing.
Testedagainsttheseguidelines,therespondentsfailedtopresentcompetentevidence
thattheactsofSixtoadverselyandclearlyrepudiatetheexistingcoownershipamong
theheirsofLeocadioMedrano.Respondentsrelianceonthetaxdeclarationinthename
ofSixtoMedranoisunworthyofcreditsincewehaveheldonseveraloccasionsthattax
declarationsbythemselvesdonotconclusivelyprovetitletoland.Further,respondents
failedtoshowthattheAffidavitexecutedbySixtototheeffectthatheisthesoleownerof
the subject property was known or made known to the other coheirs of Leocadio
Medrano.

CALICDANvsCEDENACaseDigest
CALICDANvsCEDENA
[G.R.No.155080.February5,2004]
FACTS:ThelandinquestionwasformerlyownedbySixtoCalicdan,whodiedintestate
andwassurvivedbyhiswife,Fermina,andthreechildren,namely,petitionerSoledad,
JoseandBenigno,allsurnamedCalicdan.
Ferminaexecutedadeedofdonationintervivoswherebysheconveyedthelandto
respondentSilverioCendaa,whoimmediatelyenteredintopossessionoftheland,built
afencearoundthelandandconstructedatwostoreyresidentialhousethereon,wherehe
resideduntilhisdeath.
Petitioner,throughherlegalguardianGuadalupeCastillo,filedacomplaintfor
RecoveryofOwnership,PossessionandDamagesagainsttherespondent,allegingthat
thedonationwasvoid;thatrespondenttookadvantageofherincompetenceinacquiring
theland;andthatshemerelytoleratedrespondentspossessionofthelandaswellasthe
constructionofhishousethereon.
Respondentalleged,bywayofaffirmativedefenses,thatthelandwasdonatedtohimby
Fermina;andthathehadbeenpublicly,peacefully,continuously,andadverselyin
possessionofthelandforaperiodof45years.
RTCruledinfavorofpetitioner.OnAppeal,theCAreversedtheRTCsdecisionholding
thatthedonationwasvalid.
ISSUE:Whetherthedonationinfavorofrespondentwasvalid?
HELD:NO.Ascorrectlyheldbythethetrialcourt,thedonationofthelandwasvoid
becauseFerminawasnottheownerthereof,consideringthatitwasinheritedbySixto
fromhisparents.Thus,thelandwasnotpartoftheconjugalpropertyofthespouses
SixtoandFerminaCalicdan,becauseundertheSpanishCivilCode,thelawapplicable
whenSixtodiedin1941,thesurvivingspousehadarightofusufructonlyovertheestate
ofthedeceasedspouse.
However,notwithstandingtheinvalidityofthedonation,theCourtfoundthat
respondenthasbecometherightfulownerofthelandbyextraordinaryacquisitive
prescription.

GRNo.155090
SoledadCalicdanvsSilverioCendana
February05,2004

FACTS:
OnAugust25,1947,Ferminaexecutedadeedofdonationintervivoswherebyshe
conveyesthelandtorespondentSilverioCendana,whoimmediatelyenteredinto
possessionoftheland,buildafencearoundthelandandconstructedatwostorey
residentialhousethereonsometime1949,whereheresideduntilhisdeathin1998.

HELD:
GesmundovsCourtofAppealsprovidesthat:Prescriptionisanothermodeofacquiring
ownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovableproperty.Itisconcernedwiththelapse
oftimeinthemannerandunderconditionslaiddownbylaw;thatthepossessionshould
betheconceptofowner,public,peaceful,uninterruptedandadverse.

AcquisitivePrescription:
1. OrdinaryAcquisitivePrescriptionrequirespossessioningoodfaithandwithjust
titlefortenyears.
2. ExtraordinaryAcquisitivePrescriptionacquiredthroughuninterruptedadverse
possessionthereoffor30yearswithoutneedoftitleofgoodfaith.

Thegoodfaithofthepossessorconsistsinthereasonablebeliefthatthepersonform
whomreceivedthethingwastheownerthereof,andcouldtransmithisownership.

PALOMOv.CA

G.R.No.95608January21,1997

FACTS:
DiegoPalomoistheownerof15parcelsoflandcoveredbyExecutiveOrderNo.
40.On1916,heorderedtheregistrationoftheselandsanddonatedthesametohisheirs,
IgnacioandCarmenPalomotwomonthsbeforehisdeathinApril1937.
ClaimingthattheaforesaidoriginalcertificatesoftitlewerelostduringtheJapanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
CertificatesofTitleNos.3911,3912,3913and3914sometimeinOctober1953.Sometime
in July1954 President RamonMagsaysay issuedProclamation No.47 converting the
area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park,"
under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
CommissionofParksandWildlife,nowadivisionoftheBureauofForestDevelopment.
Theareawasneverreleasedasalienableanddisposableportionofthepublicdomain
and,therefore,isneithersusceptibletodispositionundertheprovisionsofthePublic
Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however,
continuedinpossessionoftheproperty,paidrealestatetaxesthereonandintroduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitionerCarmendeBuenaventuraandspousesIgnacioPalomoandTrinidadPascual
mortgaged theparcels oflandtoguaranteea loan ofP200,000 from the Bank ofthe
PhilippineIslands.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotforestlandmaybeownedbyprivatepersons.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmationofimperfecttitlecasesappliesonlytoalienablelandsofthepublicdomain.
Itisinthelawgoverningnaturalresourcesthatforestlandcannotbeownedbyprivate
persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposableandalienable.Thereisnoquestionthatthelotshereformingpartoftheforest
zonewerenotalienablelandsofthepublicdomain.Astotheforfeitureofimprovements
introducedbypetitioners,thefactthatthegovernmentfailedtoopposetheregistrationof
thelotsinquestionisnojustificationforpetitionerstopleadgoodfaithinintroducing
improvementsonthelots.

LEONARDOv.MARAVILLA
GRNo.143369November27,2002
FACTS:
MarianoTorres,predecessorininterestofrespondents,ownsaparceloflandcoveredby
TCTNo.2355(34515).ThesaidlandwassoldbyMarianotoEusebioRoxasbutthelatter
wasnotabletoregisterthesameduetoalegaldisputebetweenMarianoandacertain
FranciscoFernandez.Marianoeventuallywonthatcasein1972.
PetitionernowbuysthelotfromEusebioRoxasandaskedthatitberegisteredunderhis
name.HewasnotabletodosobecausetheOwnersDuplicateCertificateofTitle(ODCT)
wasstillinthehandsofrespondentsandthattheRegisterofDeedsmadeanaffidavit
thattheoriginalcopyofTCTNo.2355(34515)couldnotberetrievedorlocatedintheir
office.Petitionerfilesanadverseclaim.OnMay1993,theRegisterofDeedsfoundthe
originalTCTofthelandandannotatedthereontheadverseclaimfiledbypetitioneron
May20,1993.
Petitioner claims that he is the lawful owner of said land having purchased it from
EusebioRoxasandhavingprotectedhisrightsthroughtheannotationofadverseclaim
whentheregisterofDeedsfoundtheOriginalTCT.Respondentscounterthattheaction
hasbeenbarredbyprescriptionandlaches,itbeingfiledonly21yearsfromthetimethe
right of action has commenced. Petitioner claims that his action is an accion
reivindicatoriawhichprescribesin30years.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotpetitionersactionisbarredbyprescriptionandlaches.
HELD:
Yes.Petitionersactionisactuallyanactionforspecificperformance.Itisa
fundamentalprinciplethatownershipdoesnotpassbymerestipulationbutbydelivery.
The delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the
purposeofacquiringtheownershipofthesamebyvirtueofacontract.Theexecutionof
the contract is only a presumptive, not conclusive delivery which can be rebutted by
evidence to the contrary, as when there is failure on the part of the vendee to take
materialpossessionofthelandsubjectofthesaleintheconceptofapurchaserowner.
Sinceinthisjurisdictionitisafundamentalandelementaryprinciplethatownership
doesnotpassbymerestipulationbutonlybydelivery,andtheexecutionofapublic
documentdoesnotconstitutesufficientdeliverywherethepropertyinvolvedisinthe
actual and adverse possession of third persons, it becomes incontestable that even if
includedinthecontract,theownershipofthepropertyindisputedidnotpass.
Clearly,thecasefiledbypetitionerwasanactionforspecificperformanceofawritten

contractofsalewhich,pursuanttoArticle1144oftheCivilCode,prescribesin10years
fromtheaccrualoftherightofaction.theannotationonMay20,1993oftheNovember
13,1972affidavitofadverseclaimonTCTNo.2355(34515)affordednoprotectionto
petitionerforthesamereasonthatsaidbelatedassertionofhisallegedrightoverthe
propertyisbarredbyprescriptionandlaches.
Moreover,theaffidavitofadverseclaimregisteredbypetitionerin1972wasineffective.
ThelawenforcedatthetimepetitionerfiledanadverseclaimwasSection110ofAct496,
alsoknownastheLandRegistrationAct.
Likewise,thereisnomeritinpetitioner'sassertionthattheprescriptiveperiodshould
commencetorunonlyonMay18,1993whentheoriginalcopyofTransferCertificateof
TitleNo.2355(34515)wasretrievedbytheRegisterofDeeds.Thelossoftheoriginal
title will not prevent petitioners pursuit to enforce his right. Otherwise stated, the
recoveryoftheoriginaltitleorthereconstitutionthereofisnottheonlymeansbywhich
petitioner could protect his right. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code "[t]he
prescriptionofactionsisinterruptedwhentheyarefiledincourt,whenthereisawritten
extrajudicialdemandbythecreditors,andwhenthereisanywrittenacknowledgement
ofthedebtbythedebtor."Petitionerthereforemaypursueeitherjudicialorextrajudicial
means manifesting his interest in the questioned property in order to interrupt the
prescriptiveperiod.
Certainly, petitioners action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year
prescriptiveperiodfromtheaccrualofhisallegedrightofactiononSeptember29,1972.
Inthesamevein,saidactionisbarredbylacheshavingallowed21yearstolapsebefore
enforcinghisallegedright.Lachesisdefinedasfailureorneglectforanunreasonable
andunexplainedlengthoftime,todothatwhich,byexercisingduediligencecouldor
shouldhavebeendoneearlier.Itisnegligenceoromissiontoassertarightwithina
reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoneditorhasdeclinedtoassertit.

LEOPOLDOC.LEONARDO,representedbyhisdaughterEMERENCIANA
LEONARDO,petitioner,vs.VIRGINIATORRESMARAVILLAandLEONORC.
NADAL,asAdministratricesoftheEstateofMARIANOTORRES,assubstituted
byFENADALVENTURINA,respondents.
G.R.No.143369.November27,2002
FACTS:
MarianoTorresyChavarria,thepredecessorininterestofrespondents,ownsaa
1,151.80squaremeterlotlocatedinPasayCity.LeopoldoLeonardoclaimsthatheisthe
lawfulownerofthedisputedlot,havingpurchaseditfromacertainEusebioLeonardo
Roxas,whointurnacquiredthesamelotbypurchasefromMarianoTorresyChavarria.
EusebioLeonardoRoxassentaletterrequesttotheRegisterofDeedofPasayCity
askingfortheregistrationofthedeedofsaleallegedlyexecutedinhisfavorbyMariano
TorresyChavarria.TheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeeds,however,didnotregisterthe
deedasitwasawaitingthefinaldispositionofapendingcasebetweenMarianoTorresy
ChavarriaandacertainFranciscoE.Fernandezinvolvingtitleofthelot.Incidentally,
thesaidcasewasdecidedinfavorofMarianoTorresyChavarria.
LeopoldoLeonardolikewiseaskedtheRegisterofDeedstoregisterthedeedsofsaleand
theinvolvingTransferCertificateofTitleandtoissuethecorrespondingtransfer
certificateoftitleinhisname.Petitionerdidnotpresenttheownersduplicatecopyof
TransferCertificateofTitlewhichremainedinthepossessionofrespondents.The
RegisterofDeeds,however,certifiedthattheoriginalcopyofTCTcouldnotberetrieved
orlocatedintheofficeoftheRegisterofDeedsofPasay,hence,therequestedregistration
couldnotbeeffectedpetitionerexecutedanaffidavitofadverseclaimtheRegisterof
DeedsofPasayCitywasabletoretrievetheoriginalcopyofTCT.LeopoldoLeonardo
causedtheannotationofhisaffidavitofadverseclaimonTCTandaskedtherespondents
todeliverpossessionoftheownersduplicatecopyofTCTWhenthelatterignoredhis
demand,LeopoldoLeonardofiledacomplaintforDeliveryofPossessionofProperty,
OwnersDuplicateCertificateofTitle,RentalsandDamages.IntheirAnswer,
respondentscounteredthatsince1938uptothepresent,thelotinquestion
hasbeenregisteredinthenameofthelateMarianoTorresyChavarria,Respondents
contendedfurtherthatthedeedsofsalearefalsifieddocumentsandthatthesignatureof
MarianoTorresyChavarriaonthedeedofabsolutesalewasaforgery.
ISSUE:
WhetherornottheownershipofthelotwastransferredtoLeopoldoLeonardo.
HELD:
Itisafundamentalprinciplethatownershipdoesnotpassbymerestipulationbutby
delivery.Thedeliveryofathingconstitutesanecessaryandindispensablerequisitefor
thepurposeofacquiringtheownershipofthesamebyvirtueofacontract.UnderArticle

1498oftheCivilCode,whenthesaleismadethroughapublicinstrument,theexecution
thereofshallbeequivalenttothedeliveryofthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontract,
iffromthedeedthecontrarydoesnotappearorcannotclearlybeinferred.Thus,the
executionofthecontractisonlyapresumptive,notconclusivedeliverywhichcanbe
rebuttedbyevidencetothecontrary,aswhenthereisfailureonthepartofthevendeeto
takematerialpossessionofthelandsubjectofthesaleintheconceptofapurchaser
owner.
Inthecaseatbar,itisnotdisputedthatthelotinquestionwasneverdeliveredto
LeopoldoLeonardonotwithstandingtheallegedexecutionofadeedofabsolutesale.From
1972to1993,petitionerneitherhad,nordemanded,materialpossessionofthedisputed
lot.Itwastherespondentswhohavebeenincontrolandpossessionthereofintheconcept
ofownerssince1938uptothepresent.Itfollowsthatownershipofthelotwasnever
transferredtopetitioner.Hence,hecannotclaimthattheinstantcaseisanaccion
reivindicatoriaoranactiontorecoverownershipandfullpossessionoftheproperty
which,inthefirstplace,nevercameintohispossessionforlackoftherequisitedelivery.

ASEDIGEST:
LeopoldoC.Leonardovs.VirginiaTorresMaravilla
(Digestedby:FrancesKatherineG.Miraflor)
Facts:
Petitionerclaimsthatheisthelawfulownerofa1,151.80squaremeterlotlocatedin
PasayCitywhichiscoveredbyTCTNo.2355(34515).Saidlotwasconveyedbythe
respondentspredecessorininteresttoEusebioLeonardoRoxasonAugust28,1972by
executingadeedofabsolutesale.EusebioLeonardoRoxasthensoldsaidlottopetitioner
onSeptember29,1972.
OnSeptember6,1993,petitionerfiledacomplaintagainsttherespondentsforDelivery
ofPossessionofProperty,OwnersDuplicateCertificateofTitle,RentalsandDamages.
Petitionerallegesthathefiledthecaseagainstrespondentsonlyin1993becausehewas
livingabroad.
Respondentscounteredthatsince1983,theyhavebeeninopenandpeacefulpossession
ofsaidlotintheconceptofowners.
OnJuly25,1995,thetrialcourtdismissedpetitionerscomplaintonthegroundof
prescriptiononlaches.PetitionerappealedtotheCourtofAppealswhichaffirmedthe
trialcourtsdecision.ThemotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedonMay19,2000.
Hence,theinstantpetitiontosetasidethedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals

Held:
Petionersactionisbarredbyprescriptionandlaches.
Petitionersactionisanactionforspecificperformance,i.e.,toenforcethedeedof
absolutesaleallegedlyexecutedinhisfavor.PursuanttoArticle1144oftheCivilCode,
anactionforspecificperformanceprescribesin10yearsfromtheaccrualoftherightof
action.Inacontractofsale,thereisareciprocalobligationtopaythepurchasepriceand
thecorrespondingdeliveryofthethingsold,whichobligationsgiverisetobreach.Here,
petitionersrightofactionforspecificperformanceorrescissionarosewhendeliveryof
thethingsoldwasnoteffectedonSeptember29,1972,despitethepaymentofthe
purchaseprice.Hence,from1972to1993,whenpetitionerfiledtheinstantcase,21years
hadelapsedbarringtheinstitutionofpetitionersactionwhichisdefinitelybeyondthe10
yearprescriptiveperiod.