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SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE FILED 1560 Broadway, Suite 675 ; Denver, Colorado 80202 MAR 25,2010 ——} mmpcoscrnury ance Complainant: SERA eo ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO A COURT USE ONLY & Respondent: —eooem] JULIA DAVIDSON RILEY Case Number: James 8. Sudler, #8019 10PDI034 Assistant Regulation Counsel Attorney for Complainant 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, Colorado 80202 ‘Telephone: (303) 866-6400 ext. 6466 Fax No.; (803) 893-5302 Andrew B. Reld, #25116 ‘Attorney for Respondent Springer & Steinberg 1600 Broadway, Suite 1200 Denver, Colorado 80202 (803) 861-2800 ‘STIPULATION, AGREEMENT AND AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING THE RESPONDENT'S CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT on this 254! day ot (MARCH. __, 2010, James 8. Sudler, Assistant Regalation Counsel and attorney for the complainant, and Julia Devideon Riley, the respondent, enter ints the following. stipulation, agreement, and idavit containing the respondent’ conditional admiosion ‘ef misconduct (stipulation) and submit the seme t the Presiding Discpinary Judge fr his Consiceration RECOMMENDATION: A 90-day suspension all stayed upon succt completion of a one-year period of probation, with conditions. 1. The respondent has taken and subscribed the oath of admission, ‘was admitted to the bar of this court on October 23, 1981, and is registered as an attorney upon the official records of this court, registration no, 11462. The respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of this court and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge in these proceedings. 2. The respondent enters into this stipulation freely and voluntarily, No promises have been made concerning future consideration, punishment, or lenience in the above-referenced matter. It is the respondent's personal decision, and the respondent affirms there has been no coercion or other intimidating acts by any person or agency concerning this matter. 3. This matter has not become public under the operation of C.R.C.P. 251.31(e) as amended, However, the respondent specifically acknowledges that, if the Presiding Disciplinary Judge should decide to accept this stipulation, and impose the agreed-to discipline contained herein, then this stipulation and the discipline imposed will he matters of public record, 4. The respondent is familiar with the rules of the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the procedure for discipline of attorneys and with the rights provided by those rules. The respondent acknowledges the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing on the above-referenced complaint. At any such hearing, the respondent would have the right to be represented by counsel, present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine the witnesses presented by the complainant. At any such formal hearing, the complainant would have the burden of proof and would be required to prove the charges contained in the complaint with clear and convincing evidence. Nonetheless, having full knowledge of the right to such a formal hearing, the respondent waives that right. 5. The respondent and the complainant specifically waive the right to a hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.22(¢)(1). 6. The respondent and the complainant stipulate to the following facts and conclusions: ARC MATTER ‘McMINIMEE MATTER 09-0198 09-0247 a. These two matters involve alleged misconduct by respondent in her involvement with Griffin Dickens ("Mr. Dickens”). Mr. Dickens is now deceased, He had been married to Rosie Dickens (‘Ms. Dickens”) for 42 years. ‘They had no children. Mr. Dickens had a daughter, Diane Juniel (‘Diane’), by a previous marriage, Diane has two daughters, Shalanda Juniel (Shalande”) and Moinette Dickens (*Moinette”) who will sometimes be referred to as "the granddaughters’. b. Before respondent's involvement with Mr, Dickens, his wife had a conservator appointed for her through the Denver Probate Court. Her conservator was her niece. In 2007, Ms. Dickens was living in an assisted living facility and Mr. Dickens was still living at their marital residence. He was having financial difficulties, and in 2007 Mr. Dickens through his first attorney Linda Cohn, filed a petition in Ms. Dickens’ probate matter to obtain support for Mr. Dickens from his wife's assets. c. Magistrate Gallegos of the Denver Probate Court conducted a hearing on Mr. Dickens’ petition. After the hearing, the magistrate issued an order on July 12, 2007. Among other things, the magistrate found that Mr. Dickens had been diagnosed with dementia and he was unable to care for himself or comprehend the consequences of his actions. Magistrate Gallegos said in her order that it “is anticipated that (Mr. Dickens’| sisters and/or adult children) from a prior marriage will apply for guardianship and/or conservatorship over (Mr. Dickens] and that he will continue to live in the marital home.” The magistrate did grant support for Mr. Dickens to be paid oul of Ms, Dickens assets 4. Ms, Cohn filed a motion to withdraw from representing Mr. Dickens in June 2007. The court granted the motion on July 16, 2007. €. On July 23, 2007, respondent met at her office with Mr. Dickens, his daughter and his ‘two granddaughters. At that meeting, according to respondent, Mr. Dickens and his relatives expressed concerns about conduct by the conservator for his wife. They alleged that the conservator was entering Mr. Dickens’ residence without permission, and that Mr. Dickens was afraid of hher. Respondent stated that the conservator was impoverishing Mr. Dickens, and taking property from the marital home. Respondent has also stated that the primary concern was maintaining adequate care for Mr. Dickens. {Respondent drafted an hourly fee agreement in this matter but it was never signed. The proposed fee agreement names the client as “Diane Juniel, Attorney in Fact for Griffin Dickens (‘the Client}.” The legal services respondent stated she was to provide to the Client wer Representation of the Client with respect to: estate planning for Griffin Dickens and representation of Mr. Dickens in the conservatorship proceedings concerning his wife, Rosie Lee Dickens, 8. According to respondent, she expected to be paid by “the family” when Mr. and Ms. Dickens’ marital residence was sold. Her fees would come from the sale proceeds. Nevertheless, respondent did not put any language in her fee agreement about that expectation, h. Respondent has stated that her client was “the family.” She stated that it was clear when the four people all arrived in her office they were in agreement. Their needs were to obiain financial assistance for Mr. Dickens and protect the marital assets. She stated that the interests of Mr. Dickens and “his family” in her services were not at any time or in any manner adverse. She stated that to the contrary they were always unified and did not express any disagreement. For that reason, she did not advise them about any possible conflict of interest nor obtain a waiver of any possible conflict of interest from Mr. Dickens, his daughter or his granddaughters. i According to both granddaughters, at the first meeting with respondent, they told respondent what the magistrate had told them at the hearing two weeks earlier. Specifically, they stated that they needed a conservator or guardian for their grandfather. According to the granddaughters, respondent advised them that they should have powers of attorney from their grandfather. They stated that respondent advised them not to proceed with conservatorship or guardianship because it was too expensive. J. According to respondent, she advised them, in her words, about “formal and often relatively expensive probate proceedings or informal and less expensive powers of attorney" and that the power of attorney “was not an attempt to wrest control of Mr. Dickens’ assets, but to obtain assistance for him.” Respondent recommended the preparation of powers of attorney naming “the family.” She prepared one power of attorney which was executed by Mr, Dickens. The power actually named Mr. Dickens’ daughter and two granddaughters as agents without designating how to handle any conflicts among them. kk. At some point after the power of attorney was executed, Mr. Dickens’ sister came to Denver to visit him. Mr. Dickens and his sister were either confused about the power of attorney or disagreed with it. They went to Wells Fargo Bank and attempted to void the power of attorney by opening a different account for Mr. Dickens. The granddaughters learned about this and told respondent. Respondent knew at this point that Mr. Dickens was not in agreement with the exercise of the power of attorney over that bank account. According to one of the granddaughters, Moinette, her grandfather did not remember signing the POA and he thought the granddaughters were stealing from him, She said her grandfather wanted “it’ changed. 1. According to respondent, she spoke to Mr. Dickens about the situation, and she stated that he agreed that he still wanted the power of attorney despite having opened a new account. m. Respondent entered her appearance in the conservatorship proceeding for Ms. Dickens in August 2007. In October 2007 the conservator for Ms. Dickens filed a proposed amended financial plan. Respondent filed a response to the conservator's proposed Amended Financial Plan. On January 10, 2008, the court ordered sale of the Dickens’ home; however, there were problems. n. On about March 13, 2008, in part because of problems getting the home sold, Ms. Dickens’ conservator filed a petition in probate court for protective proceedings for Mr. Dickens. Among other things, the petition stated that there had been no efforts by the family of Mr. Dickens to initiate protective proceedings for Mr. Dickens’ health, safety and welfare despite the court’s urgings to the family about this situation. Additionally, the conservator for Ms. Dickens alleged that there had been difficulties caused by respondent or her clients in finalizing the sale of the home. According to respondent, she had. advised the broker that the family was in agreement about the sale of the property, but that there were difficulties because the conservator for Ms. Dickens had obtained a temporary restraining order against Mr. Dickens, and that she was secking access to the home without notifying anyone that she was, coming; and, further, that Mr. Dickens was leery of any of Ms. Dickens’ possessions being removed from the property. Respondent stated that Mr. Dickens and his family were concerned that the conservator for Ms. Dickens would seize the proceeds of the sale of the home; and, thus, any conflict was actually about division of the procceds and access to the home by Ms. Dickens’ conservator. Respondent further stated that she and her clients all agreed with Ms, Dickens’ conservator about the sale of the home; and that the question was whether Mrs. Dickens’ conservator could have unimpeded access to the home, ©. On March 19, 2008, respondent entered her appearance in the protective proceeding about Mr. Dickens. She entered on behalf of Mr. Dickens, his daughter and the two granddaughters, Judge Stewart’s clerk called respondent after receiving this entry of appearance. Apparently, the clerk told respondent that she could not represent all of the persons named. ‘Then Judge Stewart entered an order dated March 19, 2008, stating that respondent was to file a legal brief explaining to the court how, in light of Rule L7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct one lawyer could represent these multiple clients; and she was to consider what impact Mr. Dickens’ alleged impairments might have had on his ability to give the requisite informed consent, ._ _ Respondent did not respond as the court had ordered but instead on March 20, 2008, she filed an amended entry of appearance stating that she was entering her appearance only on behalf of Mr. Dickens. Respondent stated that at this time she knew the family was going to hire new counsel because she had been unable to accomplish anything with counsel for Ms. Dickens’ conservator. Respondent stated that she was a ‘place holder” at this point until a new attorney would come into the ease. The court determined later that this amended entry of appearance was a way to finagle around the judge's order, and that respondent had essentially informed the family that's what she was doing. The respondent maintains that she was simply obeying what she tunderstood to be the concern of the court's order, that she not enter an appearance on behalf of the family, but rather on behalf of Mr. Dickens as the named party in the proceeding. Because the family lacked financial resources, to pay for respondent's services, the respondent maintains that it was much easier to merely change the entry of appearance than to submit a legal brief on the representation of multiple persons in a proceeding and conflicts of Interests. At the same time, respondent was advised by the family that they located and were obtaining new counsel. New counsel had not yet entered an appearance in the case at the time of the hearing, but was on the telephone with one of the family members at the time of the hearing 4. _At this time one of the granddaughters, Shalanda was talking to or had hired Tammy Conover to represent her. Ms. Conover filed a response to the petition for appointment of the conservator stipulating to such appointment and asking that Shalanda be named conservator for her grandfather. 1. On March 27, 2008 respondent filed a Response to Petition for Forthwith Appointment of Special Conservator. In that pleading she stated that Mr. Dickens was in “complete accord with the Response filed by Shalanda.” In the same pleading respondent asked for an order allowing her withdrawal. Four days later she filed a Motion to Withdraw. The court approved her motion to withdraw on April 24, 2008. 5. About ten months later, on January 23, 2009, respondent filed a Petition for Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs. Respondent requested an order that she be paid $5,791.39 by Mr. Dickens’ conservator. She stated in her petition that she was retained by Mr. Dickens and his family on or about January 23, 2007, to determine whether conservatorship and guardianship was necessary and appropriate or whether suitable alternatives were available and to pursue his interest in his wife’s conservatorship estate. (The date she stated was probably a mistake because all evidence shows the relationship began July 23, 2007). She attached a copy of the blank fee agreement, discussed above that was never signed. L. Objections were filed to respondent's petition and a hearing was held on April 29, 2009. Alter that hearing Judge Stewart entered an order denying respondent any fees and stating that: ‘There was no signed fee agreement by Griffin Dickens and respondent; ‘The evidence established that respondent purported to represent the family, but it was never entirely clear who she thought her clients were; Respondent testified she met with Mr. Dickens separately, but other persons testified she never did so, and respondent's testimony was not credible; ‘There was no evidence that there was an attorney-client relationship between respondent and Mr. Dickens; Respondent conveyed no benefit on Mr. Dickens or members of his family; Respondent's legal advice regarding Mr. Dickens was legally flawed because: a power of attorney is a document signed by a fully competent adult; but at the time of the advice, and at the time of the drafting of the power and its execution, Mr. Dickens was a person suffering from dementia, Additionally, respondent according to her own testimony was representing the person who was being appointed as the agent under the power which was a blatant and impermissible conflict of interest; Respondent's amended entry of appearance in the conservatorship proceeding for Mr. Dickens was not an accurate statement by respondent because she was telling other members of the family group that the amended entry of appearance was only for the court and that she was still representing everyone. u. Judge Stewart denied respondent’s motion for attorney fees in total v. Respondent's advice to Mr. Dickens, his daughter and his granddaughters were not competent. Respondent admits that she violated Colo, RPC 1.1 w. Respondent should have advised them that 1) she could not represent all four of them; 2) Mr. Dickens’ conduct vis-a-vis the power of attorney essentially revoked the power as to the management of his Wells Fargo bank account; 3} they should have considered conservator and then guardianship proceedings; 4) she would represent one of Mr. Dickens’ relatives and proceed to move the probate court to appoint one of Mr. Dickens’ relatives 1s conservator and guardian. x. Respondent admits that she violated Colo. RPC 1.7(b) in effect before January 1, 2008, because she represented multiple parties in a matter and her judgment might have been, and indeed was materially limited by her responsibilities to other clients. For her conduct after January 1, 2008, respondent admits she violated Colo. RPC 1.7 (a) VEIGA-PARKER MATTER 09-0313 y- Respondent had represented Shirley Kay Pacheco since about 1982. Ms. Pacheco is the sister of the complaining witness, Georgia Veiga- Parker. These two women were the daughters of George C. Hill. 2a. Mr. Hill owned property not far from Steamboat Springs, Colorado. In 1998, Mr. Hill decided to do some estate planning and Ms. Pacheco recommended respondent to him, bb. After much discussion involving Mr. Hill's CPA, it was decided that the best estate plan was to prepare a limited liability company which would own the real estate near Steamboat Springs. Respondent prepared the documents to establish the George C. Hill, LLC. The LLC was formed and title to the property was transferred to the LLC, The members of the LLC were the two sisters, both 50% owners. cc. Respondent takes the position that in preparing the legal documentation for the LLC she represented George Hill, Shirley Pacheco, and the LLC. She asserts that she never represented Ms. Veiga-Parker. Ms. Veiga- Parker believed that respondent represented all of them and in particular the LLC. As discussed below, there is evidence in writing that respondent represented Ms. Veiga-Parker consisting of a letter the respondent wrote to Wells Fargo about the use of the power of attorney but not about the limited liability company. dd. Mr. Hill died in 2004. At that time, Ms. Veiga-Parker lived on the property. She needed money to pay for various expenses for the property. Ms. Pacheco would not contribute mainly because her sister was living there rent- free. Ms. Veiga-Parker borrowed money from a bank for property expenses. In order to secure the loan, she quit claimed the property from the LLC to herself, (The legal effect of this deed was to exclude Ms. Pacheco from the property.) ‘This action led to problems with her sister because she had been excluded from the title. Other problems had arisen between the sisters — personal property issues, payment of real estate taxes for the property; insurance Payments, utility payments, ete. The respondent stated that this action led to problems with her sister because Ms. Veiga-Parker had unilaterally decided about the disposition of Mr. Hill’s personal effects after his death, but did not raise that as an issue for a legal resolution, ex. _ Respondent began to advocate on behalf of Ms. Pacheco against Ms. Veiga-Parker. On March 6, 2009, respondent wrote a memo to Ms. Veiga- Parker in an attempt to resolve the issues. Among other things, respondent stated that the property should be sold. She stated that Ms. Veiga-Parker could not transfer the property or mortgage it without the consent all the managers (her sister) and that Ms. Veiga-Parker needed to transfer the property back to the LLC. She advocated that Ms. Veiga-Parker’s share of the proceeds from the sale should be reduced by the rental value of the property, ‘meaning that Ms. Veiga-Parker owed rent for living there. She stated that Ms Veiga-Parker was responsible for all of the costs related to the property while living there, ff, Respondent also wrote in the memo: Lastly, you are incorrect if you think I am the enemy. I don't actually think that anyone is the enemy here. Your parents acquired and held an incredibly valuable, not to speak of beautiful asset. You have had the sole benefit of it for the last couple of years. Now, I think that the two of you make the property work for the two of you. gg. Two months later, on May 6, 2009, respondent wrote another memo to Ms. Veiga-Parker. ‘This memo stated that she was demanding arbitration pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Operating Agreement of the LLC. She attached to the memo a draft complaint she might file against Ms. Veiga- Parker if she did not agree to arbitration. In her last sentence of the memo respondent stated: | suggest unless you prompily return the Routt County Property to George C. Hill, LLC, and agree to find a broker to immediately list and sell the Property, that you retain an attorney. hb. At this point, Ms. Veiga-Parker hired attorney Ted Sells to represent her. Respondent stated that Mr. Sells advised respondent that Ms. Viega-Parker had agreed to return the title to the property to the LLC, and to lease the property pursuant to a written lease, and that the expenditures that, Ms. Viega-Parker had made would be considered to be her rent during the time that Ms. Viega-Parker had lived at the property. Respondent further stated that after three weeks with no word from Mr. Sells, the respondent contacted him, and learned that things between the sisters had not settled, and that Ms. Viega-Parker had changed her mind, i, Respondent withdrew from representing Ms. Pacheco and suggested that Ms. Pacheco retain different counsel. Another attorney took over representation of Ms. Pacheco, and suit was then filed in Routt County district court on her behalf against Ms. Veiga-Parker. jj. _ Respondent stated in response to this investigation, “I have never represented [Ms. Veiga- Parker] and don’t pretend to now, and at the time 1 prepared the LLC I did so on behalf of Mr. Hill.” Ms, Veiga-Parker disagrees. She believed that respondent represented all of them in the formation of the LLC. Respondent has not produced any letter or writing in which she told Ms. Veiga-Parker that she did not represent her. Ms. Veiga-Parker points out that she paid respondent for legal services rendered to the LLC in 1998, 2000 and 2004, Kk. More importantly, respondent signed a letter to Wells Fargo on March 5, 2004, stating that she represented George Hill and Ms, Veiga-Parker. In her letter she told Wells Fargo that she wanted to know why Wells Fargo was objecting to a power of attorney. She said, “We all need for you to honor this [power of attorney.” Il _ At the outset of establishing the LLC, respondent never made it clear to those involved that she was not representing Ms. Veiga-Parker 10 although respondent stated that she advised the CPA, Mr. Hill, and the sisters that this work was performed on behalf of Mr. Hill. Ms. Pacheco submitted a letter to Attorney Regulation counsel confirming respondent's statement. Respondent had no fee agreement which might limit respondent's clients to Ms. Pacheco, Mr. Hill and the LLC as claimed by respondent. It was reasonable for ‘Ms. Veiga-Parker to believe that respondent represented her. This belief was substantiated by the letter respondent wrote to Wells Fargo in March 2004 in which respondent said she represented Ms. Veiga-Parker. mm, Respondent admits that it is possible that Ms. Veiga-Parker thought that she had an attorney-client relationship with Ms. Veiga-Parker, and had a conflict of interest in advocating for Ms. Pacheco against her sister. Respondent admits she violated Colo. RPC 1.7(a)(1). Respondent represented one client who was directly adverse to another client. 7. _ Pursuant to C-R.C.P, 251.92, the respondent agrees to pay costs in the amount of $91.00 (a copy of the statement of costs is attached hereto as. Bxhibit A) incurred in conjunction with this matter within thirty (80) days after acceptance of the stipulation by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, made payable to Colorado Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Offices. The respondent agrees that statutory interest shall accrue from the date that the Presiding Disciplinary Judge aceepts this stipulation, Should the respondent fail to make payment of the aforementioned costs and interest within (30) days, the respondent specifically agrees to be responsible for all additional costs and expenses, such as reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection incurred by the Ms. in collecting the above stated amount. The complainant may emend the amount of the judgment for the additional costs and expenses by providing ‘a motion and bill of costs to the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, which identifies this paragraph ofthe stipulation and the respondent's default on the payment. 8, This stipulation is premised and conditioned upon acceptance of the same by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge. If for any reason the stipulation is not accepted without changes or modification, then the admissions, confessions, and stipulations made by the respondent will be of no effect. Either party will have the opportunity to accept or reject any modification. If either party rejects the modification, then the parties shall be entitled to a full evidentiary hearing; and no confession, stipulation, or other statement made by the respondent in conjunction with this offer to accept discipline of a 30-day suspension all stayed during a one-year period of probation with conditions may be subsequently used. If the stipulation is rejected, then the matter will be heard and considered pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.18. 9. The Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel has notified or will notify shortly after the parties sign this agreement, the complaining witness in the ‘matter of the proposed disposition. PRIOR DISCIPLINE, 10. None. ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINE 11. Pursuant to American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 1991 and Supp. 1992 (‘ABA Standards"), §3.0, the Court should consider the following factors generally: a. The duty violated: Respondent violated her duty of loyalty to clients in both matters addressed above, She also provided inadequate advice in the first matter. b. The lawyer's mental state: Knowing or should have known. ¢. The actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct: Respondent's misconduct in the first matter caused delay in the ultimate appointment of a conservator and guardian. In the eecond matter reepondent’s misconduct caused Ms. Viega-Parker to feel betrayed and a lack of loyalty from respondent. d._ The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors: Factors in aggravation which are present include: vulnerability of victim and substantial experience in the practice of law, ABA Standards §9.22(h) and (i). Factors in mitigation inchde: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and cooperative attitude toward proceedings, ABA ‘Standards §9.32(a)(b) and (e) 12, Pursuant to ABA Standard §4.32: “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully Gisclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potentially serious injury to a client.” 13. Pursuant to ABA Standard $4.52: “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” 14, Pursuant to ABA Standard §5.13: “Reprimand is generally n appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.” 15. Pursuant to ABA Standard §7.2: “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages conduct that is a violation of a duty as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system.” 16. The discipline agreed to herein is supported by case law. In People v. Cimino, 3 P.3% 398 (Colo. 2000), the Supreme Court held that the presumed sanction is suspension where the attorney knew of a conflict of Interest and did not fully disclose it or the potential effect of that conflict. 17. Considering all of the factors described above, as applied to this case, a suspension of 90 days, all stayed for a probationary period of one year with conditions is an appropriate sanction. Respondent meets the eligibility requirements for probation set forth in C.R.C.P. 251.7(a) CONDITIONS 18. Probation. ‘The partics stipulate that the respondent is cligible for probation pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.7(a). Successful completion of all these terms shall stay the imposition of 90 days of the suspension. fa, The respondent shall be on probation for a one-year period of time. b, Mandatory Rule Condition. During the period of probation, the respondent shall not engage in any further violation of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See C.R.C.P. 251.7(b) ("The conditions fof probation}...shall include no further violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct”. ©. The respondent shall attend and successfully pass the one-day ethies school sponsored by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel within one year of the date this stipulation is approved ‘The respondent shail register and pay the costs of ethics school, within thirty (80) days of the date this stipulation is approved. Attendance at ethics school will count as 8 general CLE credits, including 7 ethics credits, ‘The respondent may obtain the registration form for the ethics school on-line at, B www.coloradosupremecourt.com, “Ethics School.” Instructions Tor registering are on the registration form. 19. Violation of Conditions. If, during the period of probation, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel receives information that any condition may have been violated, the Regulation Counsel may file a motion with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge specilying the alleged violation and seeking an order that requires the attorney to show cause why the stay should not be lifted and the sanction activated for violation of the condition. See C.R.C.P. 251.7(e). The filing of such a motion shall toll any period of suspension and probation until final action, Id. Any hearing shall be held pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.7(e). When, in a revocation hearing, the alleged violation of a condition is the respondent's failure to pay restitution or costs, the evidence of the failure to pay shall constitute prima facie evidence of a violation. Id. 20, _ Suecessful Completion of Conditions, Within thirty days and no less than fifteen days prior to the expiration of the period of probation, the respondent shall file an affidavit with the Regulation Counsel stating that the respondent has complied with all terms of probation and shall file with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge notice and a copy of such affidavit and application for an order showing successful completion of the period of probation. See C.RC.P. 251.71). Upon receipt of this notice and absent objection from the Regulation Counsel, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge shall issue an order showing that the period of probation was successfully completed. Id, The order shall become effective upon the expiration of the period of probation. 1d. RECOMMENDATION FOR AND CONSENT TO DISCIPLINE Based on the foregoing, the parties hereto recommend that a 90-day suspension, all stayed during a one-year period of probation, with conditions as described above, be imposed upon the respondent. The respondent consents to the imposition of said discipline. The parties request that the Presiding Disciplinary Judge order that the effective date of such discipline be immediate. Julia Davidson Riley, the respondent; and James S. Sudler, attorney for the complainant, acknowledge by signing this document that they have read and reviewed the above and request the Presiding Disciplinary Judge to accept, the stipulation as set forth above. 4 julia Davidsoft Riley Respondent 2247 Kearney Street Denver, CO 80207 ‘Telephone: (720) 974-0683 iycoemis xs Deere STATE OF COLORADO ) ) ss, cOuNTY OF ) Subscribed and swom to before me this IA day of tMaveln , 2010, by Julia Davidson Riley, respondent. Witness my hand and official seal. My commission expires: (2/04 /_ae\0 eau Ve Po Notary Public SN James S. Sudler ‘Assistant Regulation Counsel ‘Attorney for Complainant 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, Colorado 80202 (803) 866-6400 x6466 Aiforney for Respondent Springer & Steinberg, 1600 Broadway, Suite 1200 Denver, Colorado 80202 (303) 861-2800 15 ‘SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE ‘THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 675 DENVER, CO 80202 Complainant: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondent: JULIA DAVIDSON RILEY. ORDER APPROVING CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT ‘AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 251.22 ‘This matter is before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("the Court’) on a “Stipulation, Agreement and Affidavit Containing the Respondent's Conditional Admission of Misconduct” filed by James S. Sudler, Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ("the People’), and Andrew B. Reid on behalf of Julia Davidson Riley ("Respondent") on March 25, 2010. In this stipulation, the parties walve their right to a hearing under C.RC.P. 251.22(6), The Court, having reviewed the case file and the stipulation, and being fully advised of the issues presented, ORDERS the following: 1, The stipulation is accepted and approved. 2. JULIA DAVIDSON RILEY, Attorney Registration No. 11462, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of NINETY (90) DAYS, ALL STAYED upon the successful completion of a one-year period of probation subject to the following conditions: A. Mandatory Rule Condition. During the period of probation, the Respondent shall not engage in any further violation of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See C.R.CP. 251.7(b) (‘The conditions [of probation]...shall include no farther violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct’) B. Respondent shall attend and successfully pass the one-day ethics ‘school sponsored by the People within one year of the date of this order. Respondent shall register and pay the costs of ethics school ‘within thirty (80) days of the date of this order. Violation of Conditions. If, during the period of probation, the People receive information that any condition may have been violated, the People may file a motion with the Court specifying the alleged violation and secking an order that requires the attorney to show cause why the stay should not be lifted and the sanction activated for violation of the condition. See C.RC.P. 251.7(e). The filing of such a motion shall toll any period of suspension and probation until final action. Id. Any hearing shall be held pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.7(¢). When, in a revocation hearing, the alleged violation of a condition is the Respondent's failure to pay restitution or costs, the evidence of the failure to pay shall constitute prima facie evidence of a violation. Id. ‘Successful Completion of Conditions. Within thirty days and no Jess than fifteen days prior to the expiration of the period of probation, Respondent shall file an affidavit with the People stating that Respondent has complied with all terms of probation and shall file with the Court notice and a copy of such affidavit and application for an order showing successful completion of the period of probation. See C.R.C.P. 251.71. Upon receipt of this notice and absent objection from the People, the Court shall issue an order showing that the period of probation was successfully completed. Id. The order shall become effective upon the expiration of the period of probation. Id. Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.32, Respondent shall pay costs incurred in conjunction with this matter in the amount of $91.00 within thirty (0) days of the date of this order. Costs are payable to the Colorado Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Offices. Statutory interest shall accrue from the date of this order. Should Respondent fail to make payment of the aforementioned costs and interest within thirty (80) days, Respondent shall be responsible for all additional costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the People in collecting the above-stated amount. ‘The People may amend the amount of the judgment for additional costs and expenses by providing a motion and Dill of costs to the Court, THIS ORDER IS ENTERED THE 26"™ DAY OF MARCH, 2010. ‘THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE PROBATION IS THE 26™ DAY OF MARCH, 2010. WILLIAM R. LUCERO PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE Respondent's Counsel Andrew B. 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