>= ‘SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE FILED BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1560 Broadway, Suite 675 MAR 04 2010 Denver, Colorado 80202 Pawsoc isc SUPHDte COURT OF COLOLADO Complainant ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO A COURTUSE ONLY & Respondent: EDWARD L. LEDERMAN Case Number: 09PDJO59 Nancy L. Cohen, #11846 Chief Deputy Regulation Counsel Attorney for Complainant 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, Colorado 80202 ‘Telephone: (303) 866-6400 ext. 6577 Fax No.: (303) 893-5302 Robert Justin Driscoll, #05729 Driscoll Law Office 455 Sherman St., Suite 110 Denver, Colorado 80203 ‘Telephone: (303) 534-3233 Fax No.: (803) 534-9235 ‘STIPULATION, AGREEMENT AND AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING THE RESPONDENT'S CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT on this 294 day ot Fab 2010, Nancy L. Cohen, Chief Deputy Regulation Counsel and stomey BF the complainant, and Baward L Peden the sespondent, who is represented by atiomey Robert stn Driscoll i these proceadings enter inte the folowing stipulation, agreement, fd alidavis containing the reopondents conditional edsnasion of misconduct fotipalaton®) and submit the same tothe Presiding Disciplinary Judge for his RECOMMENDATION: 6 month served suspension with the requirement to petition for reinstatement pursuant to C.R.CP. 251.29(¢}-(e) 1. The respondent has taken and subscribed the oath of admission,was admitted to the bar of this court on December 20, 1993, and is registered ‘as an attorney upon the official records of this court, registration no. 23629. ‘The respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of this court and the Presiding Disciplinary Judge in these proceedings. 2, The respondent enters into this stipulation freely and voluntarily. No promises have been made concerning future consideration, punishment, or lenience in the above-referenced matter, It is the respondent's personal decision, and the respondent affirms there has been no coercion or other intimidating acts by any person or agency concerning this matter. 3, This matter has become public under the operation of C.R.C.P. 251.31(c) as amended. 4, The respondent is familiar with the rules of the Colorado Supreme Court regarding the procedure for discipline of attorneys and with the rights provided by those rules. The respondent acknowledges the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing on the above-referenced complaint. At any such hearing, the respondent would have the right to be represented by counsel, present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine the witnesses presented by the complainant. At any such formal hearing, the complainant would have the burden of proof and would be required to prove the charges contained in the complaint ‘with clear and convincing evidence. Nonetheless, having full knowledge of the right to such a formal hearing, the respondent waives that right. 5, The respondent and the complainant specifically waive the right to a hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.22{c)(1). 6. The respondent has read and studied the complaint denominated as People v, Edward L. Lederman, 09PDJOS9, and is familiar with the allegations therein. A true and correct copy of the complaint is attached to this stipulation as Exhibit A. With respect to the allegations contained in the complaint, the respondent affirms under oath that the following facts and conclusions are true and correct: a. James Lynch (‘Lynch’) retained the respondent in November 2007 concerning a dissolution of marriage action. Lynch's former wife is ‘Albena Alla (‘Alia’). 'b. At the time Lynch retained respondent, he asked respondent to review the Services Member Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §501, et seq. (Act’) and advise him of his rights under the Act. At the time of the divorce, Lynch was on active duty in the U.S. Army stationed inAfghanistan. The respondent did not immediately utilize the Act to put the divorce proceedings in abeyance. c. On December 17, 2007, the respondent requested financial information from Lynch. However, although the respondent provided a form used for the financial affidavit and a form for making mandatory disclosures, he did not press Lynch to complete the mandatory disclosures, He also did not tell Lynch the consequence for failing to ‘timely fle the financial information, d. At that time, Lynch was in Afghanistan and in a combat zone 0 it was difficult for him to access the Internet. It took Lynch more than ‘a month to provide a financial affidavit to respondent. e. The permanent orders hearing was scheduled for the week of January 21, 2008, Alla’s lawyer, Lisa Sabi (‘Sahli") wrote respondent on at least two different occasions requesting Lynch's financial affidavit. { Shortly before permanent orders, the parties agreed to reschedule the hearing for the week of March 24, 2008. Beginning February 7, 2008, Lynch was redeployed from Afghanistan to Germany 80 he had easy access to the Internet and to banlk account information. g Respondent did not fully comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements. Sahli then sent discovery requests. Although Lynch provided a financial affidavit, it was incomplete, hh. Respondent failed to provide discovery responses so Sabi filed ‘a motion to compel, Sahii also asked the court to issue an authorization for financial disclosure so Sahli could obtain direct access to Lynch's bank accounts. Sahli also designated a witness ("Memfo"), whom the respondent made no effort to interview. i, Although the respondent responded to the motion to compel, he provided no explanation as to why the discovery responses were late. [As part of his response, he requested a 90-day continuance of the divorce case pursuant to the Act. However, he failed to comply with the provisions of the Act. j. The court held a hearing on the motion to compel and ordered Lynch to provide certain financial information. The court ordered that the discovery be provided by March 21 at 5:00 p.m. since permanent orders were scheduled for the following week.kk. Respondent sent Lynch the discovery requests on March 14, He did not, however, inform Lynch about the hearing on the motion to compel or the divorce court's order until approximately one month later. Respondent did not communicate with Lynch before the permanent orders hearing about the implications of the information contained in the discovery responses, bank statements and other documents. 1. The respondent sent Lynch’s written discovery responses which included copies of bank statements from two different banks. However, respondent did not carefully review the statements or discuss them with his client before he produced them to Sahli. Had he reviewed them, he would have noticed that one set of the bank statements was missing every other page. m, Lynch stated in swom discovery responses that he had not disposed of any property having a value of $1,000.00 or more during the preceding 12 months, He also did not identify any transfers of money and other assets. The bank records provided by respondent appear to confirm these statements because respondent did not produce complete copies of the statements. He omitted the even-numbered pages from the hank statements, Thus, Sahli was not alerted to the fact that Lynch had made several transfers of funds over $1,000.00. Respondent also did not realize this because he did not carefully review either set of the bank statements. n, The permanent orders hearing was held on March 24. Both parties and their counsel appeared. At the hearing, Lynch testified that ‘he made a $3,000.00 loan to Memfo. Memfo also testified by telephone fat the hearing. She testified that Lynch transferred money to her that she did not need to repay and that they were involved in a romantic relationship. Lynch testified that he and Memfo were not involved in a romantic relationship. o. A day after the hearing Sahli received a response directly from the bank that revealed approximately $32,687.00 in wire transfers were made by Lynch during the relevant time period. Sahli moved to reopen the permanent orders which motion was granted. Thereafter, Sali obtained additional bank records that showed undisclosed transfers in excess of $85,000.00 from 2004 to March 2008. p. Sahli then requested additional financial disclosures from Lynch. Although respondent disagreed with the disclosure requests, hedid not seek a continuance based on the extent of the supplemental disclosures. q. In May 2008, Lynch was again in Afghanistan. On May 6, 2008, Sahli hand-delivered a complete set of her exhibits to respondent ‘and requested immediate written confirmation that respondent would forward the exhibits to his client. Respondent did not respond to her request 50 Sahli sought an emergency status conference. The court held an emergency hearing and ruled that Sabli had no responsibility to email the exhibits to Lynch. 1. Sahli emailed the exhibits to respondent so he could easily forward them to his client. However, respondent did not do so. AS a result, respondent did not discuss the exhibits with Lynch or prepare Lynch for cross-examination. At the May 9, 2008 hearing, Lynch testified (by telephone) that he had not received copies of the hearing exhibits, The respondent then stipulated to the authenticity and admissibility of exhibits. Lynch was forced to testify without the benefit of having reviewed the exhibits or having them before him as he testified. Respondent also failed to put on any evidence as to the purpose for which Lynch had transferred or used the funds. s. The court found that respondent's behavior was ‘completely and utterly outrageous.” Thereafter, the court entered permanent orders stating that the case had been made difficult despite the simplicity of the issues because of respondent's inadequacy in the presentation of the evidence and his lack of understanding of the law of domestic relations. ‘The court awarded attomey’s fees to Alla under the domestic relations statute and the frivolous, groundless or vexatious statute, C.R.S. §18-17- 101, and found by clear and convincing evidence that both respondent and Lynch engaged in conduct that delayed the proceedings. ‘Through the respondent’s conduct described above, the respondent has ‘engaged in conduct constituting grounds for the imposition of discipline pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.5. The respondent has also violated Colo, RPC 1.1, 1.3, 14, 3.4(c), and 3.4(@). The respondent violated these Rules of Professional Conduct that were in effect in 2007 and prior, and the same rules that were in eflect for 2008 thereafter. 7, Parsuant to C.R.C.P, 251.92, the respondent agrees to pay costs in ‘the amount of $796.05 (a copy of the statement of costs is attached hereto as Exhibit B) incurred in conjunction with this matter within thirty (30) days after acceptance of the stipulation by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, madepayable to Colorado Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Offices, The respondent agrees that statutory interest shall accrue from the date that the Presiding Disciplinary Judge accepts this stipulation. Should the respondent fail to make payment of the aforementioned costs and interest within (30) days, the respondent specifically agrees to be responsible for all additional costs and expenses, such as reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection incurred by the complainant in collecting the above stated amount. The complainant may amend the amount of the judgment for the additional costs and expenses by providing a motion and bill of costs to the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, which identifies this paragraph of the stipulation and the respondent's default on the payment. 8. This stipulation is premised and conditioned upon acceptance of the same by the Presiding Disciplinary Judge. If for any reason the stipulation is not accepted without changes or modification, then the admissions, confessions, and stipulations made by the respondent will be of no effect Either party will have the opportunity to accept or reject any modification. If cither party rejects the modification, then the parties shall be entitled to a full evidentiary hearing; and no confession, stipulation, or other statement made by the respondent in conjunction with this offer to accept discipline of a six month served suspension wits the requirement of reinstatement proceedings pursuant to C.R.CP, 251.29(¢)-(e) may be subsequently used. If the stipulation is rejected, then the matter will be heard and considered pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.18 9. The Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel has notified or will notily shortly after the parties sign this agreement, the complaining witnesses) in the matter(s) of the proposed disposition. 10. Respondent's counsel, Robert Justin Driscoll, hereby authorizes the respondent, Edward L. Lederman, and the non-lawyer individual in the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel who is responsible for monitoring the conditions set forth herein to communicate directly concerning scheduling and administrative issues or questions. Respondent's counsel will be contacted concerning any substantive issue that may arise, PRIOR DISCIPLINE 11, None. ANALYSIS OF DISCIPLINE 12, Pursuant to American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 1991 and Supp. 1992 (‘ABA Standards’), §3.0, the Court 6should consider the following factors generally: fa. ‘The duties violated: the respondent was incompetent in his representation of Lynch by failing to comply with the Act and by failing to prepare Lynch for either one of the hearings. The respondent neglected Lynch's case by failing to timely forward the discovery requests to Lynch, by failing to provide the exhibits to Lynch before the May 9, 2008 hearing, and by failing to forward the financial information to Sahli. The respondent failed to communicate with his client and violated rules of the tribunal by failing to comply with Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent also failed to diligently comply with reasonable discovery requests, b, The lavyer’s mental state: knowing. c. The actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct: there was actual injury to Lynch because of the respondent's incompetent representation, neglect and lack of communication. There was actual injury to the system because the court had to hold additional hearings as a result of the respondent’s misconduct. d._ The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors: Factors in aggravation which are present include: multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law, ABA Standards §9.22(d) and (j) Factors in mitigation include: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems and remorse, ABA Standards §9.32(a), (b),(c) and (j) 13. Pursuant to ABA Standard 4.42, suspension is appropriate when (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. See People v. May, 745 P.24 218, 222 (Colo. 1987), See also, ABA Standard §7.2, which provides that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to aclient, the public or the legal system Finally, under ABA Standard §6.22, suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding, In People v, Williams, 824 P.24 813 (Colo. 1992), Williams was suspended for six months with a requirement to petition for reinstatement, for continued ‘and chronic neglect and failing to respond to disciplinary counsel's discoveryrequests. Although the respondent in this case only neglected one case, it was over a period of time and he engaged in other serious misconduct, See also People v. Bugg, 200 Colo. $12, 616 P.2d 133 (1980) that concemed a lawyer's failure to: process an estate; file an action; and communicate with his clients. When considered with the mitigating factor of personal problems, the court concluded that a six-month suspension was warranted. In this case, the respondent engaged in conduct involving more than neglect and failing to communicate with clients. He also failed to file financial information, failed to respond to discovery requests and failed to prepare his client of his case for the two hearings. In People v. Carvell, 99PDJO96 (September 11, 2000), the lawyer was suspended for a year and a day based on a default. Carvell violated Colo. RPC. 1.3, 1.5(@), 14(a) and 1-16(d). Carvell also failed to respond to the investigation by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel. ‘The Hearing Board determined that Carvell neglected his client's case and failed to communicate over a period of time, Since Carvell failed to perform work or communicate, he essentially abandoned his client and therefore violated 1.16(@). The Rule 1.5 claim was dismissed, For this misconduct, Carvell received a year and a day suspension, In this case, the respondent's misconduct is not as serious since he did not abandon his client and had personal problems at the time. Furthermore, the respondent is presently on disability inactive status. 14. In light of the misconduct and considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, a six month served suspension with the requirement of reinstatement proceedings pursuant to C.R.C.P, 261.29(c)-(e} is in accordance with case law and the ABA Standards. :OMMENDA’ RAND 70 Based on the foregoing, the parties hereto recommend that a six month served suspension with the requirement of reinstatement proceedings pursuant to C.R.C.P, 251.29{¢)-(e) be imposed upon the respondent. The respondent consents to the imposition of said discipline. ‘The parties request that the Presiding Disciplinary Judge order that the effective date of such discipline be immediate. Edward L, Lederman, the respondent; Robert Justin Driscoll, attorney for the respondent; and Nancy L. Cohen, attorney for the complainant, acknowledge by signing this document that they have read and reviewed the "While nearing board opinions do not have precedential value, they do offer guidance on what other hearing boards have concluded ander similar circumstancesabove and request the Presiding Disciplinary Judge to accept the stipulation as set forth above, Edward L. kf: a e— 44 Cook Street, Suite 300 Denver Co} ‘Telephone: [30SONV¥AONCHUON-LEE one ne STATE OF COLORADO ) FOR’ OF city AnD } 2s COLORADO COUNTY OF DENVER} Commision ep OWI Lh subwcibed ant emom to twine me thin OST say of i , 2010, by Edward L. Lederman, respondent. Witness my hand and official seal. My commission expires: (6 / Ray Public Nancy L. Cotien, #11846 Robert Justin Driscoll, #05729 Chief Deputy Regulation Counsel Driscoll Law Firm 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Sherman Street, #110 Denver, Colorado 80202 Denver, Colorado 80203 (303) 866-6400 x 6577 (303) 534-3233 Attorney for Complainant Attomey for Respondent‘SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE FILED ‘ie PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 40 16 20 1560 Broadoay, Sue 678 Denver, Colorado: cra ewer, Colorado, 80202 Te Complainant: ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO ‘ACOURT USE ONLY A Respondent: EDWARD L. LEDERMAN Kim B. Tkeler, #15590 Assistant Regulation Counsel Jobn S. Gleason, #15011 Regulation Counsel Attorneys for Complainant 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, Colorado 80202 Telephone: (803) 866-6440 Fax No.: (803) 893-5202 E-mail: k.ikeler@esc.state.co.us THIS COMPLAINT s filed pursuant to the authority of CRP. 251.9 through 251.14, and it Is alleged as follows: Jurisdiction 1. The respondent has taken and subscribed the oath of admission, was admitted to the bar of this court on December 20, 1993, and is registered upon the official records of this court, registration no. 23629. He is subject to the Jurisdiction of” this court in these disciplinary proceedings. ‘The Fespondent's registered business address is 44 Cook St., Ste. 100, Denver, CO 80206. General Allegations 2. Background. James Lynch (‘Lynch") was married to Albana Alla Calla"), Lynch was in the military. Alla was a student. ‘They were married ‘seven years. They had no children and owned no real estate,9. Alla decided to divorce Lynch. She filed her Petition in August 2007. Albana Alla v. James Lynch, Boulder County District Court, Case No. 07DR942 (the ‘divorce case"). ‘The principal issues for determination by the divorce court were maintenance and division of a relatively small marital estate. On November 6, 2007, the divorce court awarded temporary maintenance to Alla of $1,600 per month. 4. At the time of the divorce, Lynch was on active duty in the U.S. Army stationed in Afghanistan. Lynch's home base was Stuttgart, Germany. At relevant times, he also was training in Mali, Africa. 5. Respondent Retained. Lynch retained respondent in November 2007. ‘Thus, an attomey client relationship was formed, thereby forming an obligation. to perform the agreed-upon services. By agreeing to perform the requested services, the respondent inherently represented that he would provide the ‘services in accordance with the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. 6, Respondent entered his appearance in the divorce ease on November 21, 2007. 7. At the time Lynch retained respondent, he asked respondent to review the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 501 et seq. and advise hhim of hia righte under the act. The act provides a number of protections to servicemembers including staying court proceedings if military service materially affects servicemembers’ ability to defend their interests. SO App. U.S.C. §§ 502(2), 522. Respondent did not immediately utilize the Act to put the divorce proceedings in abeyance, 8. Prestrial Discovery. On December 17, 2007, respondent made his first request for financial information from Lynch. Respondent by e-mail directed Lynch to complete a sworn financial statement and send it to respondent. Respondent attached a form to use for the financial affidavit. Respondent also attached a form for making the mandatory disclosures required in a divorce? However, respondent did not press Lynch to complete the mandatory disclosures. Instead, respondent stated: Just eyeball the mandatory disclosures and know that if ¥ On November 22, 2007, Lynch's commanding offer, Captain Clstopher Joes, wot tothe Boulder County Disrct Cour, referencing the diverse ce Capa nes stated hat Lynch would be wale to end earings, resent defese, or efecvely poet his interests unl Lynch was redeployed ia Apr 2008, Resposet chins he didnt receive a copy of his letra dint kno that Kad been fied wit he cor FCREP, 162() request the partis oa dvrce cae atimatively cote all infomation at ‘aati tthe resoition of te case without awaiting igury om the ote party. Each ary isto provide aswern ‘amc staiement und rake mandetory estos within 40 days ae the service of peton Responder ws ‘ar of hs le th tins ha entre his ppearance for Lynch toe ders cseanybody wants to get tough then BOTH parties and attorneys have to generate that tedious, counterproductive (but billable) pile of distraction. At this point Sahl! (as Bond [Alla's prior counsel) had done) is making noise about wanting the disclosures. Dont worry. about it, 9. At the time, Lynch was in Afghanistan. In this combat zone, it was iffieult for Lynch to access the Internet to locate financial information or to obtain a notarization for the financial affidavit. It took Lynch more than a month to provide a Financial AMdavit to respondent.? January 21, 2008 for half a day. 11, _On January 2, 2008, Sahli wrote to respondent, requesting Lynch's Ananclal affidavit. On January 8, Sahil wrote to respondent, expressing her frustration with her lack of information about Lynch's whereabouts and the fact that he had not produced a financial affidavit. 12, On January 9, 2008, the parties agreed to reschedule the Permanent Orders hearing. It was reset for the week of March 24, 2008. 18. Because respondent had not fully complied with the mandatory disclosure requirements of C.R.C.P, 16.2(¢), on January 9, 2008, Sahl Propounded Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Lynch. The written discovery requested that Lynch disclose his disposal of any assets of $1,000 or more, and any transfers of money or other assets out of accounts previously held jointly with Alla, during the previous twelve months, Sahl also requested copies of all bank statements from Lynch’s accounts for the last three years. On January 15, respondent notified Lynch that he had received these discovery requests. However, respondent did not send the discovery requests on to Lynch, 14. | On January 27, 2008, Lynch provided a sworn Gnancial statement to respondent. Lynch attached three recent monthly leave and earnings statements and his Form W-2's for the years 2003 through 2006. ‘However, the leave and earnings statements were difficult to read. ‘The financial affidavit was incomplete, e.g, it did not set forth a specific monthly amount for Lynch's retirement benefit. Lynch also failed to produce bank statements. 2 Ly was redeployed fom Aus to Germany on Febriay 7, 2008, Afr that point, Lye had cay acess ote Tater ae to bank aot inforston,15. On February 15, 2008, respondent produced Lynch's sworn Anancial statement to Sahil. It was still incomplete, as noted above. Although the discovery responses also were due, respondent did not provide these to ‘Sahil. Respondent stil had not sent the discovery requests on to Lynch. 16. On February 18, 2008, Sahll wrote to respondent asking him to comply with the discovery rules, She reminded him that she had sent him discovery requests on January 9, 2008. These responses were due on February 11, 2008. Sahit informed respondent that, if responses were not forthcoming by February 20, 2008, Sahli would move to compel. 17. _ On February 26, 2008, Sahil fled a Motion to Compel. On March 3, 2008, Sahili asked the divorce court to Issue an authorization for finanetal disclosure, with which Sahl! could obtain direct access to Lynch's bank accounts. 18. In late February or early March, 2008, Sahl! designated as a witness at the Permanent Orders hearing a Ms. Menfo (‘Mento’), a resident of Malt. Respondent made no effort to interview this witness to learn what her testimony would be. 19. On March 10, 2008, respondent responded to the Motion to Compel. However, respondent did not offer the court any explanation of why. the discovery responses were late. Instead, respondent complained he had made a settlement offer to which the other side had not responded. 20. As part of his response to the Motion to Compel, respondent Fequested a 90-day continuance of the divorce case, pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, discussed above, However, respondent did not explain how Lynch's location or military duties prevented him from making, disclosures, responding to discovery requests, or appearing for the Permanent Orders hearing, Nor did respondent attach a letter from Lynch's commanding officer, as required by 50 App. U.S.C. §522.5 21. On March 14, 2008, the divorce court held a hearing on the Motion to Compel. The court ordered Lynch to provide: (a) legible paystubs for the last three months; (b) a copy of his mulitary orders for 2008; (c) bank statements as required by Rule 16.2; (4) documents reflecting any transfer of assets since the case was filed; and (c) identification of any real property Lynch owned. The Judge also issued a Court Authorization for Financial Disclosure, an order that gives one spouse access to the other's bank account information. The court's minute order concerning the hearing states in pertinent part: “Husband is ‘Respondent inconecty ced wo te Act as“52 USC 52”. * Respondent etifed a his depsion tat he Gi ot think of obtaining « eter fom th conning fies,Working to Answer Discovery Propounded to Him ~ Discovery Will be Provided to Wife's Attorney before 5:00 PM on Friday 3-21-08 - Permanent Orders Remain Set for the Week of 8-24-08." 22, Also on March 14, for the first time, respondent sent to Lynch the discovery requests that had been propounded to him on January 9, 2008, Respondent did not inform Lynch about the hearing or the divorce court's ordey ‘until about a month later. Respondent also did not communicate with Lynch Prior to the Permanent Orders hearing to discuss the implications for the divorce of the information in the discovery responses, bank statements and other documents. 23, Sahil served copies of the Court Authorization for Financial Disclosure on all banks with which Lynch was known to have accounts, 24. "On March 19, 2008, respondent sent to Sahil Lynch’s responses to the written discovery requests, which had been propounded in early January. He Jncluded what appeared to be coples of Lynch’s Community Bark statements. On March 21, 2008, respondent produced copies of statements from a second bank, Bank of Amerlca/Military Bank, Respondent did not 25. In the sworn discovery responses, Lynch stated that he had not disposed of any property having a value of $1,000 or more during the preceding twelve months. “He failed to identify any transfers of money or other assets. ‘The bank records provided by respondent appeared to confirm these statements, because respondent did not produce complete copies of the hank statements, Respondent omitted from his production of the Bank of America statements the even numbered pages of the bank statements, 26. As a result, Sahilt was not alerted to the fact that Lynch had made several transfers of funds over $1,000 out of this account. Respondent also did not realize this, because he did not carefully review the bank statements, As a Fesult, respondent did not discuss the transfers with Lynch or prepare a rebuttal to Sahi’s accusations that Lynch had dissipated marital funds, 27. | Permanent Orders Hearing. ‘The Permanent Orders hearing was held March 24, 2008. Alla and her counsel, Sahll, appeared in person. Respondent appeared in person. Lynch was able to obtain leave, ily to Colorado and appear in person. 28, At the hearing, Lynch testified that he had made loans of $3,000 to ‘Menfo. Lynch denied having had an affair with Menfo. Menfo also testified at the ‘hearing, by telephone. She testified that Lynch had transferred approximately $5,000 to $6,000 to her and told her that she did not need torepay the money. She also sald that she and Lynch were involved in a romantic relationship. 29. Motion to Reopen. On March 25, 2008, Sahil received a response to the Court Authorization for Financial Disclosure directly from Bank of America/Military Bank. The records revealed approximately $32,687 in wire transfers by Lynch during the pertod from August 2007 to March 24, 2008, Comparing the Bank of America's production with respondent’s production of Lynch's bank statements from that bans, Sahli discovered that the portions of the bank statements showing these transfers had been omitted from Tespondent’s document productions of March 19 and 21. Respondent had only included every other page (the odd-numbered pages) of the bank records int his disclosure, 80. Because of the previously undisclosed financial information, on March 26, 2008, Salhi moved the divorce court to reopen the Permanent Orders hearing, which motion the court granted. The reopened evidentiary hearing was scheduled for May 9, 2008, 81. Additional Discovery. Sahl subsequently obtained records from Community Bank through the court authorization requests. These records. revealed additional previously undisclosed tranafers in excess of $85,000 from 2004 to March 2008. 82. Sahil then requested additional financial disclosures from Lynch for the time period 2004 to March 2008. Respondent stated in an email to ‘opposing counsel that he would not provide all of the bank statements prior to the May 9, 2008 evidentiary hearing. Respondent also took issue with the scope of Alla’s supplemental disclosures, which ran to over 300 pages, were unpaginated, and had no narrative about how they related to Lynch's alleged. wasting of marital assets. Respondent wrote in an email to Sahil, “That's not the practice of law, that’s vomit.” However, respondent did not request a continuance based on the extent of Alla's supplemental disclosures, 33. Lynch, who was in Afghanistan, was scheduled to appear by phone at the reopened May 9, 2008 evidentiary hearing, Sahli wanted to make sure ‘that Lynch got copies of all of Alla’s exhibits so that Lynch could fully and inteligently participate in the hearing. On May 6, Sahil hand delivered a ‘complete set of her exhibits to respondent. She requested immediate waitten confirmation that respondent would forward the exhibits to his cllent. Respondent did not respond to her request so Sah sought an emergency status conference to establish the procedure for transmission of All's hearing exhibits. 34. _On May 7, 2008, the divorce court ruled on Sahit’s emergency request. ‘The court's minute order states:Regarding Mtn Filed by Atty for Petitioner. Ms. Sahli has No Responsibility to E-mail Exhibits to Mr. Lynch. Mr. Lederman Has, That Responsibility. Mr. Lynch Has Received the Telephone ‘Number to Call Into the Hearing. 85. That same day Sahlt emailed the exhibits to respondent so he ‘could easily forward them on to his client, However, respondent did not do so, As a result, respondent was not able to discuss the exhibits with Lynch or Prepare Lynch for cross-examination by Sahil about the information in the exhibits. 86. Continued Permanent Orders Hearing. At the May 9, 2008 hearing, Lymeh testified (by telephone) that he had not received copies of the hearing exhibits, Respondent objected to their admission, When the court asked respondent why he did not simply hit the “forward” button on the email sent to him by Sabi with the attached documents, respondent replied that he just didn't do it, Respondent then stipulated to the authenticity and admissibility of the exhibits. "Lynch was forced to testify without the benef of having reviewed the exhibits or having them before him as he testified. 37, Alla presented evidence pointing to Lynch's having transferred and/or dissipated approximately $40,000 of marital funds. Respondent, apparently failing to understand which party had the burden of proof and/or persuasion in a dissipation hearing, did not put on evidence as to the purposes for which Lynch had transferred or used the funds, 88. Rather, respondent merely argued during closing argument that Alla’s evidence was speculative. Respondent's rambling closing argument also included matters outside the record. As his principal argument, respondent ‘suggested that the court allow Lynch to restore dissipated sums to Alla through monthly maintenance payments. After this argument, the Judge asked him, “What is wrong with you that you behave this way in a courtroom? Judge Bailin then stated: ‘This 1s about your behavior. And your behavior is completely and utterly outrageous. I understand that Ms, Sahl! 1s zealously advocating for her client, but she is able to conform her behavior to the norms of the courtroom. You have been arguing for the last ten ‘minutes things which are not legal, which are not consistent with the law of domestic relations, which are not understandable to me in any way. I can’t understand how we got to $20,000 of marital property, ‘how we got to dividing Ms. Alla’s $10,000 under your measure into ‘$1,600 and paying it to her over six months as maintenance. None of that Is even close fo domestic relations law.99. On May 18, 2008, the divorce court (Judge Ballin) entered Permanent Orders. “Judge Bailin wrote in her Order: “Deciding this case has been difficult despite the relative simplicity of the issues because of the startling inadequacy of the Husband's lawyer's presentation of evidence and his apparent lack of understanding of the law of domestic relations including the manner in which maintenance can be paid and including which party has the burden of proof when one party presses a claim for wrongful dissipation or hiding assets.” Judge Bailin awarded Alla $1,600 in transitional maintenance through the end of 2009. The Judge also awarded Alla her proportionate share of Lynch's military pension. In addition, Judge Bailin directed Lynch to make an approximately $28,000 cash payment to Alla, to reimburse her for Lynch's transfers and/or dissipation of marital funds, which Judge Ballin found to have been approximately $37,000 between August 2007 and the date of the Permanent Orders hearing. 40. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Alla, ‘The court held that the award of fees was appropriate under both CRS, §14-10-119 {which Permits the allocation of fees between partles to a divorce depending on their Fespective financial circumstances) and C.R.S. §13-17-101 et seq. (which prohibits conduct that is frivolous, groundless or vexatious). The court found that Alla had to expend thousands of dollars obtaining discovery and that Alla hhad to incur additional fees after the March 24, 2008 hearing to analyze information she received after that date. Accordingly, the court held that fees were available under C.RS. §13-17-101 et seq. because respondent's and Uymeh’s conduct had needlessly expanded the proceedings. 41. After the permanent orders hearing, Lynch terminated respondent's representation. Lynch retained new counsel, Patrick Lalor (‘Lalor’), ‘On May 26, 2008, Lalor moved for post-trial relief, to set aside the May 9, 2009 Order and for new trial. His basis for the motion was that the client relied on an incompetent attorney. 42, On August 14, 2008, Judge Ballin entered her Order re: Attomey’s Fee Hearing and Motion for Post Trial Relief. The court set the matter of attorney's fees for a hearing to determine whether the award of fees should be levied against Lynch only or against respondent and Lynch jointly and severally. The court denied Lynch's request for post-trial relief. ‘The court ruled that reliance on an incompetent lawyer is not a basis for relief. The court further found that Lynch was not blameless, having lied about his affair, withholding bank records, and altering bank records that had been submitted. 43. On November 24, 2008 and again on February 12, 2009, the divorce court (Judge Bailin) held hearings on Alla’s request for attorney's fees. lla claimed to have incurred fees with Sahil of over $40,000.44. On April 20, 2000, Judge Bailin issued her Order re: Attorney's Fees. The Judge found that respondent was “a lawyer who has no respect or the rules or the court system and who allowed his client to pursue hls goal of creating as much difficulty as possible for his wife.” The Judge found by clear and convincing evidence that both respondent and Lynch engaged in conduct that delayed the proceedings. The court has not yet ruled on the total amount Of fees to be assessed against respondent. CLAIM ‘A Lawyer Shall Provide Competent Representation To A Client - Colo, RPC 1.1] 45. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 48. Colo. RPC 1.1 (2007 and prior) provided that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client, and that competent representation requires the legal Knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Colo, RPC 1.1 (2008 and thereafter) provides the same, 47. The respondent failed to provide his client competent legal representation in the following respects. a Including because of his inexperience with military divorces, and his overestimation of the protections afforded to service members, respondent failed to direct his client to timely make mandatory disclosures. Respondent also failed to timely forward to his client Alla’s discovery requests. Respondent failed to timely obtain from his client bank statements for the client's accounts. b, AS a result of respondent's fallures in these regards, Sablt ‘was required to move to compel. Respondent's response to the ‘motion to compel did not address the reasons why discovery was. late, Instead, respondent complained that the case had not settled, © Respondent failed to support his March 2008 motion for continuance with a letter from Lynch's commanding officer, as required by 60 App. U.S.C. §522(b)(2). Respondent failed to research the statute to lear the requirements for seeking a stay on behalf of a service member. 4. Respondent failed to adequately prepare for the March 24, 2008 hearing. Respondent did not press his cllent to tellrespondent what Menfo's testimony likely would be. Respondent did not interview Menfo, Respondent did not carefully review the bank statements. Respondent did not go over with his elient tn. detail the bank statements and other information concerning the marital assets, so that Lynch would be prepared to answer ‘questions about possible dissipation of marttal funds. ©. Respondent failed to adequately prepare for the May 9, 2008 continued Permanent Orders hearing. Respondent failed to forward to Lynch the exhibits that Sahli planned to introduce at the hearing. As a result, respondent was unable to prepare Lyneh for cross-examination by Sahl, Respondent was unprepared for the May 9, 2008 hearing. In articular, respondent failed to present evidence concerning the Purpose for which Lynch had transferred marital funds and the tuse Lynch had made of the funds. Respondent apparently failed. to appreciate that Lynch had the burden of proof to demonstrate that he had not dissipated funds. & Respondent's closing argument at the May 9, 2008 hearing ‘that the court should allow Lynch to restore dissipated funds to Alla through making monthly maintenance payments was based. on a mistake as to domestic relations law. Property division and maintenance are separate issues in a divorce. Pursuant to CRS. §14-10-113(1), the court divides the marital property. Pursuant to C.RS. §14-10-114(9), the court then determines whether to order maintenance at the time of permanent orders, ‘The determination is based on whether the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property, including marital Property apportioned to her, with which to provide for her reasonable needs, and whether she 1s able to support herself through appropriate employment. Each of these failures by the respondent constitutes a separate incident of failure to provide competent legal representation, as do all of them together. 48. ‘The respondent knew or should have known that he was failing to provide competent legal representation to the client, but made no effort to Temedy the situation, 49. ‘The respondent's failure to provide competent legal representation to the client caused serious or potentially serious injury to the client. 50. By such conduct, the respondent violated Colo. RPC 1. 10WHEREFORE, the complainant prays at the conclusion hereof, CLAIM \A Lawyer Shall Act With Reasonable Diligence and Promptness in Representing a Client ~ Colo. RPC 1.3] 51. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth, 52. Colo. RPC 1.3 (2007 and prior) provided that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptess in representing a client, and that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to that lawyer. Colo. RPC 1.3, (2008 and thereafter) provides that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. 53. The respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and Promptness and neglected the client's legal matter in each of the following respects, ‘a. Respondent delayed in sending Alla’s discovery requests to Lynch. for over two months from the date they were propounded. Respondent did not send the discovery requests to Lynch until about ten days before the Permanent Orders hearing scheduled for March 24, 2008. This meant that both Lyneh’s time to respond and respondent's time to prepare for the hearing were unnecessarily compressed. In addition, Sablt was disadvantaged, imcluding because she did not have sufficient time to review the bank records in detail and discovery the missing pages, which contained important information about Lynch's transfer of funds. ‘When Sahlt discovered the omitted pages a few days later, she was required to request that the Permanent Orders hearing be reopened. Alla incurred substantial additional attorney's fees a5 a result, 'b. Respondent failed to diligently obtain and promptly review the bank statements from Lynch’s accounts at Community Bank and Bank of America/Military Bank. Had respondent done so, he ‘would have recognized that Lynch had made $10,000's of transfers in the years preceding Alla's filing for divorce and up through the Permanent Orders hearing. That knowledge would have placed respondent in a better position to advise his client and to make the disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 16.2. cc. Respondent failed to inquire of his client about the testimony ‘Menfo might give. Respondent also failed to interview or depose: Mento prior to the Permanent Orders hearing, Had respondent "done s0, he would have learned of her damaging testimony and been able to prepare his client accordingly. 4. Respondent produced to Sahil only the odd-numbered pages of the Bank of America statements prior to the March 24, 2008 hearing, © Respondent failed to send on Alla’s exhibits for the May 9, 2008 hearing to his client, despite having received the exhibits from Sahlt in both paper and electronic form in sufficient time to deliver them. Im his response to OARC, respondent stated that he is not comfortable with electronic transmission. As a result of respondent's failure to forward the exhibits, Lynch did not have a cchance to review the exhibits before the hearing and was required to testify at the hearing without the benefit of having the exhibits before him, ‘The respondent was required to complete each of the specific tasks described above. Each of these failures by the respondent constitutes a separate Incident of lack of diligence and promptness as do all of them together. 54. The respondent knew or should have known that his lack of diligence and promptness continued to occur over a period of months and ‘involved a pattern and practice of lack of diligence and promptness. 55. The respondent's lack of diligence and promptness caused serious or potentially serious injury to the client. 56. By such conduct, the respondent violated Colo, RPC 1.3. WHEREFORE, the complainant prays at the conclusion hereof. ‘CLAIM {Communtcations - Colo. RPC 1.4(a) and (b)] 57. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 58. Colo. RPC 1.4(a) (2007 and prior) provided: “A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” Colo. RPC. 1.4{a) (2008 and thereafter) provides: *A lawyer shall (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined by in Rule 1.0(¢), is required by these Rules: (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 2‘matter: (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the clfent about any Irelvant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. Colo, RPC 1.4(b) {2007 and prior) ‘A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to decisions regarding the representation.” Colo. RPC 1.4(b) (2008 and thereafter) provides the same. 59, This respondent failed to comply with this duty of communication {in the following respects: a. Respondent failed to adequately advise Lynch concerning his obligations to make full disclosure in the divorce case of his financial affairs. To the contrary, respondent advised Lynch “not to worry about” completing the mandatory disclosures. . Respondent failed to transmit Alla’s discovery requests to Lynch for over two months from the date they were propounded. Respondent did not send the discovery requests to Lynch until about ten days before the Permanent Orders hearing scheduled for March 24, 2008, This meant that both Lynch's time to respond and respondent's time to prepare for the hearing were unnecessarily compressed. ©. Respondent did not communicate with Lynch prior to. the Permanent Orders hearing concerning the implications for the ivorce of the information in the discovery responses, bank statements, Sahi’s supplemental disclosures and other documents, and the likely testimony of Mento. 4. Respondent failed to transmit Alla’s exhibits to Lynch prior to the May 9, 2008 hearing. ¢. Respondent failed to advise Lynch on the risk of not adequately complying with discovery in the divorce case. Each of these failures to communicate adequately with the dient constitutes a separate violation of Colo. RPC 1.4(a) as do all of them together. 60. The respondent knew or should have known that he had failed to communicate with and to explain matters adequately to his client over an extended period of months. 61. The respondent's pattern and practice of failing to communicate with and explain matters adequately to the client caused serious or potentially serlous injury to the client. 1362, By such conduct, the respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a) and (b), WHEREFORE, the complainant prays at the conclusion hereof. CLAIM IV (A Lawyer Shall Not Knowingly Disobey an Obligation Under the Rules of a ‘Tribunal - Colo. RPC 3.4(c}] 63. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 64, Colo. RPC 3.4(¢) (2007 and prior) provided: “A lawyer shall not Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” Colo. RPC '3.4(c) (2008 and thereafter) provides the same. 65. C.RC.P. 16.2(e) provides in pertinent part: “Parties to domestic relations cases owe each other and the court a duty of full and honest disclosure of all facts that materielly affect their rights and interests ... . The court requires that, in the discharge of this duty, a party must affirmatively disclose all information that is material to the resolution of the case without awaiting inquiry from the other party. This disclosure shall he conducted in accord with the duty of candor owing among those whose domestic issues are to be resolved under this Rule 16.2.” 66. Respondent as Lynch's counsel had a duty to take steps to ensure that Lynch was fulfilling the obligation of full disclosure owed by a party in a divorce case. Respondent failed to do so. Instead, respondent discouraged Lynch from making full disclosure, including by ‘stating in his e-mail of December 17, 2007: “Don't worry about it.” 67. _ Respondent ignored his obligations as an officer of the court to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 16.2(¢). 68. By such conduct, the respondent violated Colo. RPC 3.4( WHEREFORE, the complainant prays at the conclusion hereof, CLAIM lA Lawyer Shall Not Engage in Discovery Abuses ~ Colo, RPC 3.4(4)] 69. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth, 470. Colo. RPC 3.4{d) (2007 and prior) provided: “A lawyer shall not, in. Pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fall to, make a easonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” Colo, RPC 8.4(@) (2008 and thereaher) provides the same 71. Respondent failed to provide timely and complete responses to Sahl’s January 9, 2008 discovery requests. Respondent did not provide. discovery responses until March 19 and 21, 2008, just before the Permanent Orders hearing and, even then, the responses were incomplete. Respondent's delay and incomplete production of documents caused Alla to incur additional fees to reopen the evidence. The parties also were not able to negotiate a settlement, because respondent did not provide full disclosures ina timely manner 72. Respondent thereby violated Rule 3.4(4), WHEREFORE, the people pray that the respondent be found to have engaged in misconduct under C.RC.P. 251.5 and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct as specified above; the respondent be appropriately disciplined for such misconduct; the respondent be required to take any other remedial action appropriate under the circumstances; and the respondent be ‘assessed the costs of this proceeding. DATED this _ Ls. day of June 2009. Reapectfllysubmatie Wyk ‘Kim ©. Tkeler, #15500 Assistant Regulation Counsel John S. Gleason, #15011 Regulation Counsel Attorneys for Complainant bis deposition, respondent admite that he fed to ell Eyoch what Lynch tad to do to make iscosues and intend old Lynch nto make clone sl eer deeton om responset 18a |surmene courr, starz oF coiorapo | ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE | FILED BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE | JUN 16 2009 1560 Broadway, Suite 675 | Denver, Colorado 80202 Fpncpecr oan nee ‘Eran cOnT OP Ona Complainant ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO ACOURT USE ONLY A Respondent: EDWARD L, LEDERMAN Case Number: Kim B, tkeler, #15590 ‘Assistant Regulation Counsel O9PDJ 059 John 8. Gleason, #15011 Regulation Counsel Attorneys for Complainant ome, eee COPY Fax No.: (303) 893-5302 E-mail: k.ikeler@ese.state.co.us CITATION ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO TO: Robert Driscoll, Esq. Certified Mail No.7160 3901 9845 9625 6717 Driscoll Law Office also sent Regular Mail ‘455 Sherman St., #110 Denver, CO 80203 GREETINGS: You are hereby ordered and directed to file with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge [at 1560 Broadway, Suite 675, Denver, CO 80202] an original and three copies of an Answer to the Complaint herein, a copy of which is attached hereto and served herewith, within twenty days after service of this Citation upon you. Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.15(@), you are also required to file one copy of your answer with the Office of Attorney Regulation at the herein below stated address. If you fail to do so, the Supreme Court Office of AttorneyRegulation will take such action as may be proper under the rules regarding, lawyer discipline and disability, including the remedies set forth in C.R.CP. 251,15(b). GIVEN under the seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado in the City and County of Denver this 16% day of June 2009, Assistant Regulation Counsel JOHN 8. GLEASON, #15011 Regulation CounselStatement of Costs Edward L. Lederman 09PDJ059/08-01859 4/10/2009. Depositon/Lederman 705.05 1/26/2010 Administrative Fee 91.00 Total Due S 796.05 EatFave NICK / ‘ Srenstnom sue tefl ttn pte 3131 South Vagh Wo, S224 ewe crosses INVOICE parE 472402909 invoice # ‘Aant Bil To: TE IELER, ESQ Office of Atorey Regulation Counsel 1560 onda {soe 800 [Denver Coto e202 Re [People v. Edward L, Lederman Supreme Court, State of Colorado Investigtaion Conducted by Attorney Regulation Counsel [Case No, 08-01859 [ bvepate [REPORTER| sHIP DATE | SHIP VIA sizanooe |__| 4nano09 | URS quanriry | _ re DESORIPTION pare _| AMOUNT TI3_]Depe ARC Depositon of EDWARD L. LEDERMAN, aa) 42375 eso Original Tensrp Pepaation apa 10,209, sr [eivts fst Copying 30} 10730 28 ‘index Tabs inex abe ais} 420 1 [AEAILDay Appearance Fee ~All Day tsoao] 150.00 JOH Deivery_| Deter (Original and copy) nao] 20.00 Ass te yn avert wb charged at the rate of 3% por month ow any |amount not paid within 30 days. Total / smosos‘THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE EDWARD L, LEDERMAN, SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 675 DENVER, CO 80202 Case Number: ‘Complains ‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, O9PDI059 Respondent: ORDER APPROVING CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT 'AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 251.22 ‘This matter is before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (‘the Court’) on a “Stipulation, Agreement and Affidavit Containing the Respondent's Conditional Admission of Misconduct” filed by Nancy L. Cohen, Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ("the People’), and Robert J. Driscoll on behalf of Edward L. Lederman (‘Respondent’) on March 4, 2010. In this stipulation, the parties, waive their right to a hearing under C.R.C.P, 251.22(0). ‘The Court, having reviewed the case file and the stipulation, and being fully advised of the issues presented, ORDERS the following: 1 2. ‘The stipulation is accepted and approved. EDWARD L. LEDERMAN, Attorney Registration No. 23629, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with the requirement of petitioning for reinstatement pursuant to C.R.C.P. 261,29(c} Pursuant to C-R.CP. 251.92, Respondent shall pay costs incurred in conjunction with this matter in the amount of $796.05 within thirty (80) Gays of the date of this order. Costs are payable to the Colorado Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Offices. | Statutory interest shall accrue from the date of this order. Should Respondent fail to make payment of the aforementioned costs and interest within thirty (90) days, Respondent shall be responsible for all additional costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the People in collecting the above-stated amount. The People may amend the amount of the judgment for additional costs and expenses by providing a motion and ‘ill of eosts to the Court.THIS ORDER IS ENTERED THE 18" DAY OF MARCH, 2010. ‘THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE SUSPENSION IS THE 18" DAY OF MARCH, 2010. WILLIAM R. LUCERO PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGECounsel for Respondent Robert J. Driscoll 455 Sherman Street, Suite 110 Denver, CO 80203 Via First Clase Mail Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel Naney L. Cohen 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, CO 80202 Via Hand Delivery American Bar Association ¢/o Nadine Cignoni Olfice of Attorney Regulation Counsel 1560 Broadway, Suite 1800 Denver, CO 80202 Via Hand Delivery Board of Continuing Legal Education Karen Bradley Assistant Bxecutive Director 1560 Broadway, Suite 1820 Denver, CO 80202 Via Hand Delivery Colorado Attorney Registration Elvia Mondragon 1560 Broadway, Suite 1810 Denver, CO 80202 Via Hand Delivery Colorado Bar Association Charles Turner Executive Director 1900 Grant Strect, Suite 950 Denver, CO 80203-4309 Via First Class Mail Colorado Supreme Court Susan Festag 2 East 14% Ave., 4% Floor Denver, CO 80203 Via Hand Delivery IRS, Office of Professional Responsibility Attn: Kathy Gibbs SE: OPR, 1111, Constitutional Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20224 ‘Via First Class Mail Martindale Hubbell Law Directory Attn: Joe Rudy, Rating Consultant P.O. Box 31 New Providence, NJ 07974 ‘Via First Class Mail ‘Metro Lawyer Referral Service 3000 South Jamaica Court, Suite 120 Aurora, CO 80014 Via First Class Mail ‘Supreme Court of the United States Perry Thompson Admissions Office 1 First Street Northeast Washington, D.C. 20543 Via First Class Mail United States Bankruptcy Court Brad Bolton, 721 19% Street, Room 117 Denver, CO 80202-2508 Via First Class Mail United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Byron White United States Courthouse 1823 Stout Street Denver, CO 80257 Via First Class Mail United States District Court, District of Colorado Alfred A. Arraj U.S. Courthouse Mark Fredrickson 901 19% Street, Room A-105 Denver, CO 80294-3589 Via First Class Mail