Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)

Jimenez vs Francisco (2014)
Facts:
Atty. Edgar Francisco was the legal counsel of Mark
Jimenez. What happened was Mark Jimenez filed a
complaint for estafa against Caroline Jimenez
(complainant) and several others. Jimenez alleged that
he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of
stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation,
which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park,
Makati. In order to achieve its purpose of purchasing
the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the
complainant in the amount of P80,750,000.00.
Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in
the amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo
Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in
the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez.
The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of
sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property
was purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the
money used as the purchase price was not reflected in
the books of Clarion.
Caroline (complainant) was shocked with the
complaint. More so, she felt betrayed by Atty. Francisco
who helped Jimenez filed the estafa case. So, Caroline
filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional responsibility
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Caroline claimed that Atty. F represented conflicting
interests. According to her, she usually conferred with
Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarions transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarions
property were all prepared and drafted by Atty.
Francisco or the members of his law office.
In his defense, Atty. F denied that he was ever the
personal lawyer of Caroline. He admitted that he acted
as legal counsel of Clarion, but then again, the
corporation has a personality separate from that of
Caroline. He also said that he helped Caroline under
the impression that it was what Jimenez would have
wanted.
The CBD sided with Caroline and recommended that
Atty. F be suspended from the practice of law for one
year. This was upheld by the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. F was guilty of violations of
the CPR.
Held: Canon 1 and Rule 1.0 was violated, but he was
not guilty of representing conflicting interests.
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco
clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct
when he admitted to having allowed his corporate

client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the

significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and
subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his
professional capacity, feigned the validity of these
transfers of shares, making it appear that these were
done for consideration when, in fact, the said
transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the
deeds of assignment which he executed as corporate
counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is
indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is
knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law
and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate
secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to
register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he
chose to advance the interests of his clientele with
patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered
into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes
property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty.
Francisco participated in a series of grave legal
infractions and was content to have granted the
requests of the persons involved.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers
that their support for the cause of their clients should
never be attained at the expense of truth and justice.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the
law.
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
lawyer-client relationship. But here, there was no proof
of such lawyer-client relationship.
Elements of lawyer-client privilege: (1) There exists
an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication;
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney
in his professional capacity.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the
Court holds that the evidence on record fails to
demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed,
the complainant failed to establish the professional
relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The
records are further bereft of any indication that the
"advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was
there a demonstration of what she had communicated
to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under
which the confidential communication was relayed. All
that complaint alleged in her complainant was that
"she sought legal advice from respondent in various
occasions." Considering that complainant failed to
attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is,
therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if
there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of
the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert
the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid
then that complainant, who has the burden of proving
that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.

Foster vs Agtang (2014)

Facts:
Complainant Erlinda Foster had a legal problem
over a deed of sale she entered with Tierra Realty. Atty.
Jaime Agtang agreed to represent her as her counsel
for the filing of the appropriate case in court, even
though he was the one who notarized the deed of sale.
In the course of being Fosters lawyer, Agtang
committed the following acts: (1) Borrowed money
from Foster in the amount of P100,000 anp P220,000;
(2) Misrepresented the amount (P150,000) of filing fee;
(3) Asked for P50,000 purportedly to be given to the
judge as a bribe; and (4) Failed to notify Foster that the
case was dismissed in September 2010. Foster found
out when he checked it herself in December of that
same year. Also, it turned out that Agtang had legal
relationships with Tierrar Realty.
Hence, Foster filed a complaint against Agtang with
the Commission of Bar Discipline (CBD) which found
Agtang guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year. The IBP-BOG reduced the one-year suspension to
three months.
Issue: Whether or not Agtang violated the CPR.
Held: Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that
[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It is well-established
that a lawyers conduct is not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he
clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing
fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed
amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as
the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other
words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the
amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the

same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it

was complainant who suggested that amount deserves
no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable
that complainant, who was then plagued with the
rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming
that the complainant was more than willing to shell out
an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with
the trial court, still, respondent should not have
accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not
only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of
filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to
his client the actual amount due, consistent with the
values of honesty and good faith expected of all
members of the legal profession.
Respondents
unbecoming
conduct
towards
complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR,
which states that [a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client. In his private capacity, he
requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his
client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the
repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to
extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in
the moment of urgency or emergency but was only
given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the
authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by respondent
in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his
relationship with complainant, but were indubitably
acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP.
There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for representing conflicting interests in handling the
case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the
past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent
admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which
was the very document being questioned in
complainants
case.
While
the
Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case
No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said
contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as
to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court
still finds that the purpose for which the proscription
was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the
dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra
Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he
was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of
its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence
in action when he accepted complainants case,
knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating
counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is
apparent that respondent was retained by clients who
had close dealings with each other. More significantly,
there is no record of any written consent from any of
the parties involved. The representation of conflicting
interests is prohibited not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree, but also because of the principles of
public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty
to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Navarro vs Solidum Jr (2014)
FACTS
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer
agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of
the payment for the latters 2.7-hectare property
located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the
payment of the debts of Presbiteros late husband to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the
retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants.
It appeared that the DAR was supposed to
payP700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by
Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for P1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNBs claim had already
prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent
proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against
PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorneys fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or
the sale of the property, with the expenses to be
advanced
by
Presbitero
but
deductible
from
respondents fees. Respondent received P50,000 from
Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case,
but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbiteros daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo
(Yulo), also engaged respondents services to handle
the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in
Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo
convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses
for the registration of the property. Respondent
undertook to register the property in consideration of
30% of the value of the property once it is registered.
Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the
registration decree over the property was already
issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro
alleged that she would not have spent for the
registration of the property if respondent only apprised
her of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan

of P1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the
loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn
interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be
secured by a real estate mortgage over a property
located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also
agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to
cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the
interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to
Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence
of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan
of P1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA
with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA.
Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger,
postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of
Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise
discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no
agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan
of P1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA,
except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing,
Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated
checks drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263square-meter property mortgaged under the third
MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real
estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of
land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he
mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the
additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few
months. He was able to pay complainants a total
of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the
principal amount or the interest thereon. In September
2006, the checks issued by respondent to
complainants could no longer be negotiated because
the accounts against which they were drawn were
already closed. When complainants called respondents
attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction
of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for
Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the
services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgages executed by respondent in their favor.
Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest
on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also
filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against respondent.

respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first

batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent
the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third
batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger,
and complainants believed that the checks belonged to
accounts in respondents name.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to

grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He
also prepared and signed the checks which turned out
to be drawn against his sons accounts. Complainants
further alleged that respondent deceived them
regarding the identity and value of the property he
mortgaged because he showed them a different
property from that which he owned. Presbitero further
alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-squaremeter property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold
it for only P150,000.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that
conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the
performance of a lawyers professional duties. A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?
RULING
The records show that respondent violated at least four
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established
that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on
the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet,
when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to
nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the
interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-squaremeter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he
later sold the property for only P150,000, showing that
he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondents allegation that the
sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the
fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real
value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued
to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his
son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to
his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that
he could no longer open a current bank account, and
that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the
checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with
the IBP-CBDs finding that he made complainants
believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were

done in respondents private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulos lot,
respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client
relationship. However, respondent was Presbiteros
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was
established that respondent misled Presbitero on the
value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for
his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent
even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give
her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity
with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private
capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the
terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the
MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant.
Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the
validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued
checks that were drawn from his sons account whose
name was similar to his without informing
complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records
that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay
the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
received for or from his client. We agree with the IBPCBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this
case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received
various amounts from complainants but he could not
account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulos 18.85hectare lot, claimed that respondent received P265,000
from her. Respondent countered that P105,000 was
paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any
receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed
that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt
was only for P15,000. Respondent claimed that he
paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other
expenses but again, he could not substantiate his
claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
respondent had been less than diligent in accounting
for the funds he received from Navarro for the
registration of Yulos property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether
respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had
since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the
clarificatory hearing that respondent received P50,000
from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the
records do not show how respondent spent the funds
because he was not transparent in liquidating the
money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly
accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, the client.
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the clients interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.
Here,
respondent
does
not
deny
that
he
borrowed P1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the
time he secured the loan, respondent was already the
retained counsel of Presbitero.

issued were not drawn from his account but from that
of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms
of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground
that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the
accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully
protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the
client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In
his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took
advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years.
Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to
deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD
imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment.
Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of
him as a member of the legal profession. Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the
law and took advantage of his client to secure undue
gains for himself that warrants his removal from the
practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP
Board of Governors recommendation ordering
respondent to return his unpaid obligation to
complainants, except for advances for the expenses he
received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member
of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondents administrative liability.
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against
each other. Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives
money from a client for a particular purpose involving
the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for that particular purpose. If the lawyer
does not use the money for the intended purpose, he
must immediately return the money to his
client. Respondent was given an opportunity to render
an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full
amount of the advances given him by Presbitero,
amounting to P50,000.

Tabang vs Gacott (2013)

While respondents loan from Presbitero was secured
by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage,
it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value
of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he

Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985,

complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacotts
father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of
thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in
Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which
consisted of several parcels belonging to different
owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the
governments agrarian reform program, Tabang was
prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural
land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge
Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under
the names of fictitious persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven
parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious
persons.
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang
decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need
of funds for their medication and other expenses.
Claiming that he would help complainants by offering
the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn
Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering
the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and
after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants
confronted respondent. Respondent then told the
complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants,
respondent advised them to file petitions in court for
re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized
agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the
seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for reissuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor
noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed
owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia
Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his
observation, asked the court to have the supposed
owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the
petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to
their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions.
This time, she changed the fictitious owners
signatures in the hope of making them look more
varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of
petitions, respondent executed several documents that
included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of
recovery purportedly signed by the parcels (fictitious)

owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of

these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices
where he represented himself as the owner of the
parcels and announced that these were for
sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the
seven parcels.
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their
complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on February 3, 2003.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of
the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had
voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia
Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven
parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a
"balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of
the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she
had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang
had threatened to defame him and seek his
disbarment.13
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus
warranting his disbarment?
RULING
After a careful examination of the records, the Court
concurs
with
and
adopts
the
findings
and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the
IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent
committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the
revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in
arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7)
subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang
herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainants
own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the
repugnancy of respondents offense. Quite the
contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a
lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is
expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to
prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did
he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only
did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus,
We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of
disbarment.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)

De Jesus vs Sanchez-Malit (2014)

Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon

1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility

FACTS

RULING

In the Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant before

the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted
and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public
market stall that falsely named the former as its
absolute and registered owner. As a result, the
mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government
unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware
that the market stall was government-owned. Prior
thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts
that caused complainant legal and financial problems.
One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the
signature of the lessees. However, complainant only
found out that the agreement had not been signed by
the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was
a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which
complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala
(Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still covered by the
period within which it could not be alienated.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be

overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with substantive public
interest. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.

In addition to the documents attached to her

complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three
Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino
(Tolentino), complainants secretary/treasurer. The SPAs
were not signed by the principals named therein and
bore only the signature of the named attorney in-fact,
Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit
corroborated
complainants
allegations
against
respondent.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the AffidavitComplaint was actually new. She gave the courts copy
of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latters request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent
prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainants assurance that the lessees would sign it
and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on
her promise.
ISSUE

Where the notary public admittedly has personal

knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must
not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in
notarial
documents
diminished. In
this
case,
respondent fully knew that complainant was not the
owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for
tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondents conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 1999 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy
of the agreement bore the lessees signatures, she
could have given complainant a certified photocopy
thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is
not a rarity in respondents practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to
2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that
were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the
parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground
for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his or
her presence.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that
the parties personally came and appeared before her,

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer
that she shall do no falsehood. Certainly, respondent is
unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary
public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate
to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly
oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries
public. Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a
lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end. The blatant disregard by respondent
of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less
severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned
as a notary public.

Ecraela vs Pangalangan (2015)

FACTS
Complainant and respondent were best friends and
both graduated from the University of the Philippines
(UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates.
After passing the bar examinations and being admitted
as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit
relations with married and unmarried women between
the years 1990 to 2007.
These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP
College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant
had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994
or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to
Jardiolin;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during

the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition,
while still being romantically involved with CCC.
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and
without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by
representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby
convincing the two women to start a love affair with
him, when in. truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that
sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000,
respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented
the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA
against Kendrick Development Corporation (KOC).
However, despite being a public officer and a
government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty.
Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted
KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and,
m effect, that of the Philippine Government.
Complainant further claims that respondent even
attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for
the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the
cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for
his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case,
respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota
Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo.
The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's
classmates and officemates being driven and parked
by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC
premises itself.
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his
authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon
University, San Sebastian College, College of St.
Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent
induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal
preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures
of his female students in exchange for passing grades.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent committed gross
immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment?

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while

also being romantically involved with DDD;

RULING

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to

2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while
still being romantically .involved with CCC; '

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court

agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding
that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was
fully supported by the evidences offered.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable

social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with

Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent
violated Canon 1 0 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03
thereof.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD

THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who
possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral character
is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must
also be retained in order to maintain one's good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension proceedings against a
member of the Bar. Thus, the Comi has consistently
held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a
member of the Bar.
The
IBP-CBD
Report
sufficiently
showed
by
preponderant evidence the grounds by which
respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.
In the present case, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as
the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish
respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit
relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued
that complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did
not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the/ suppoting
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend
the hearings and even submit his own position paper,
the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD
and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that
respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND

GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent
was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending
case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan.

Perez vs Catindig (2015)

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty.
Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960s when
they were both students at the University of the
Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr.
Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married
the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist
Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a
Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes
in Quezon City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he
only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that
he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of
her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard
Law School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process
of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve
his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually
marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured
her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their
marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage
to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree
that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the
latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their
union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines.
He also promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of
his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her
that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to
the said petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received
an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter written
and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April
25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his
love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his
impediment is removed. Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig
to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is
able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On
August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to
declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr.
Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where
Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he
married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however,
that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed
signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy
problems; and that while their union was blessed with
four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to
their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted
Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on
how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple
adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide
them.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig
likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was
ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12,
1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23, 1984.

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the

foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed
by the Dominican Republic court does not have any
effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she
knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez
still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig
marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July
1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married
Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid
of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a
modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr.
Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left
Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that
Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999;
and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did
not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise
pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in
January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair
with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm.
She however rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate
his feelings since he was married and that he was too
old for her. She said that despite being turned down,
Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations
of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because vast interests are committed to his care; he
is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character,
honesty,
probity
or
good
demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment
arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not
simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of
a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the
parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is
grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled,
but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a
wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In
1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his
first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig
claimed that his first marriage was then already falling
apart due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de
facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a
court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez
in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so
enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved
heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away
a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the
divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our
jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens
at that time. He knew that he was still validly married
to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.

Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.

This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs
sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a
blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on
marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering
that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage
remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted
to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs
claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he
resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a
faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to
Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled
that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and
despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order
to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty.
Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time
that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of
his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then
already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo,
an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate
from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot
be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact
forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood,
the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged
not on Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage. In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty.
Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar,
which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the

Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never
be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness
of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations
against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission
provides ample basis for the Court to render
disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between
the
respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the

respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented

by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents
were indeed having an affair and the purported love
letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension
or
disbarment
proceedings
is
preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was
received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the
supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty.
Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love
for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship with Atty. Catindig.