Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
THEORY AND
WORLD POLITICS
CRITICAL
THEORY AND
WORLD POLITICS
EDITED BY
b o u l d e r
l o n d o n
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
vii
xi
23
45
61
79
vi
Contents
91
111
127
10
11
149
161
171
13
191
205
References
The Contributors
Index
About the Book
225
249
253
259
Preface
Critical Theory and World Politics is a book about the dialectical engagement of critical theory and the study of world politics. It also represents a
momentone hopes a significant onein that engagement.
A critical theoryinspired strand of thinking has been apparent within
international relations since the early 1980s. It has formed a key part of a
wider tendencynow known under the rubric of postpositivismthat has
sought to challenge the metatheoretical assumptions of traditional international relations thinking and attempted to articulate and operationalize
other principles and precepts in their place. But despite its many links, both
intellectual and disciplinary, to other postpositivist strands of international
relations thought such as poststructuralism and constructivism, critical
international relations theory is seen by both proponents and opponents as
representing a distinct and distinctive set of views and concerns.
Simultaneously, and strikingly mirroring developments within international relations, critical theorists working within their more traditional
domains of social theory and sociology have become increasingly aware of
and engaged with the sphere of the international. This direction, in turn, has
led to a significant break with the state-bound, and almost invariably
Eurocentric, patterns of thought associated with traditional critical theory
a break whose radical implications are still being worked through.
This book represents the first attempt to bring together key figures in
these parallel moves to discuss the implications of their work both for the
study of world politics and for critical theory. That this is the first such
attempt despite almost twenty years of intellectual activity is a somewhat
curious anomaly. Nevertheless, it remains the case that proponents of critical theory seem to be better at engaging with those who hold to very different intellectual viewpoints than with those with whom they share, ostensibly at least, common ground. This noninteraction, in turn, may well reflect
the intractability of both inter- and intradisciplinary boundaries, even
vii
viii
Preface
Preface
ix
tional relations theory. Thus several of the chapters focus on more praxisoriented issues.
Following an introductory chapter wherein I seek to locate critical IR
theory within broader trends in social theory and international relations, the
book has been organized into four parts. In Part One, three of the figures
most prominently associated with the critical theory intervention in international relations, Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox, and Craig N. Murphy,
trace the contours of critical IR theory. All three chapters not only reflect in
different ways on the development of contemporary critical IR theory but
also set out agendas for its future development.
In Part Two, Kimberly Hutchings, N. J. Rengger, Jeffrey Harrod, and
Mark Neufeld discuss the various forms of critique in critical IR theory.
The discussion ranges from immanent critique to negative dialectic, from
Kant to Marx, and serves to underline the diversity of approaches and opinions prevalent among contemporary critical theorists.
In Part Three, The Practice and Praxis of Critical International
Relations Theory, Sandra Whitworth, Kenneth Baynes, and Deiniol Lloyd
Jones illustrate the potential payoffsand problemsassociated with
thinking about world politics from perspectives informed by critical theory.
In the fourth and final part, Commentaries, Chris Brown and Alexander
Wendt provide penetrating discussions of the preceding chapters and offer
their own views on some of the central concerns of critical IR theory.
The focus in each of the four parts is not mutually exclusive of the others. Rather, by the very nature of their subject matter, the discussions in the
chapters inevitably tend to overlap to some extent. Taken together, they testify to the intellectual vibrancy of critical international relations theory. The
primary purpose of this collection is not, however, simply to demonstrate
that interesting work is being generated under the rubric of critical IR theory. Rather it is to encourage critical dialogue and interaction with and within this work. It is this aim that has underpinned the organization of Critical
Theory and World Politics from the outset. The ultimate success of the
project will thus be measured by its ability to inspire or incite further
responses.
Richard Wyn Jones
Acknowledgments
This project was made possible by the Cadogan Research Initiative of the
Higher Education Council for Wales. Its financial support allowed those
involved to be brought together for an initial conference at the University
of Wales, Aberystwyth. The initiative subsequently supported the production of the manuscript. I would like to offer my sincere thanks to the
trustees of the fund for their vision and generosity.
Steve Smith was the main catalyst for the project and has remained
centrally involved throughout. He has been unstinting in his support and
sagacious in his advice. I am very grateful to him.
Two other people have played key roles in the project. Eurwen Booth
provided invaluable editorial assistance. Eli Stamnes gave selflessly of her
time and expertise in order to help the manuscript take its final shape. I am
grateful to them both.
This volume was originally to have been edited jointly by Roger Tooze
and myself. Sadly, however, Roger was forced to withdraw from involvement as a result of illness. I would like to thank him for his contribution to
the overall success of the project.
I would also like to thank Paul Williams, who produced the index, and
all at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their usual good-humored efficiency.
R. W. J.
xi
1
INTRODUCTION:
LOCATING CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Richard Wyn Jones
When as an undergraduate student I attended my first international relations lecture, the professor commenced by announcing baldly that there
were two kinds of theory, positive theory and normative theory. The former
was concerned with facts and certainties and was the proper business of
scholars of international relations (IR). The latter dealt with values, opinions, and aspirations and should be left to philosophers, theologians, and
other moralizers. Since then, however, the subject of international relations, and indeed the object of its study, world politics, have been transformed. It is certainly hard to credit that the current head of any intellectually respectable department of international relations could introduce
students to the discipline in quite the same way as I encountered it in the
1980s.
Nevertheless, the professors introduction did capture one of the central elements in the disciplines self-image from at least the mid-1960s
onward, if not before. During this period international relations was almost
completely in thrall to the attempt to develop and formulate a theory of
world politics along positivist, scientific-objectivist lines (see Smith 1992).
True, as highlighted in Craig Murphys rendering of an alternative history
of the discipline in this volume, there were always other voices; true, as
Murphy also reminds us, the commitment to the rigors of positive science
was often more notional than actual, and indeed, the tools of positivism
could be turned against the mainstream to some effect. But those who dissembled from the dominant approach were always a marginalized minority.
There was no doubt where the center of gravity lay.
In retrospect, however, it appears that the publication of the book that
marked the high point of the endeavor to develop international relations as
1
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
pation (Hopf 1998: 185) when this emancipation is precisely one of the
central points at issue between critical theorists and postmodernists (see
below).
But should critical theorists be concerned by these and other examples
of confusion and misinterpretation? It is tempting, perhaps, to conclude
not. After all, critical theory can hardly claim to have been singled out for
special treatment in this regard: All the alternative approaches have suffered the same fate (for what Checkel [1998: 339f.] has described as a particularly egregious piece of caricaturing see Mearsheimer 19941995;
the treatment of postmodernism in Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner
1998 represents another low point). Indeed, in a discipline where the creation of typologies is so often a substitute for rather than a prelude to real
analysis and engagement, it may be that the apparent ability of critical theory to escape easy categorization should be considered a positive advantage.
N. J. Rengger (in this volume) suggests that the lack of any real response
from the mainstream to Linklaters criticisms of neorealism reflects the difficulties that the keepers of the positivist flame have had in pigeonholing
his standpoint. And after all, it was Theodor Adorno, one of the founding
fathers of Frankfurt School critical theory, who attempted to write in such a
way as to avoid easy categorization (Jameson 1990).
But it would be foolish to draw too much comfort from these observations. Adorno notwithstanding, confusion, let alone caricature, is clearly a
barrier to understanding and intellectual development. Furthermore, I
would argue that it would also be a mistake to conclude that all misunderstanding and misrepresentation is somehow part of a deliberate strategy to
blunt the challenge of alternate approaches (a view implicit in Weber
1994a; cf. Neufeld in Ch. 8, this volume). In the case of critical theory at
least, my contention is that there is already enough scope for confusion
inherent both in the wider (extradisciplinary) tradition itself and in the specific ways it has developed within international relations. Reflecting on
these somewhat tangled roots is necessary not only to understand how we
have come to the present stage of development but also to allow the critical
theory approach to grow and mature further into the future.
In the first part of this introductory chapter, I seek to locate critical theoryinspired writing on international relationscritical IR theoryin relation to the critical theory tradition more broadly drawn. The reading offered
suggests that rather than understand critical theory as a particular approach,
it is more appropriate to view it as a constellation of rather distinctive
approaches, all seeking to illuminate a central theme, that of emancipation.
Working from this basis, I then explore the relationship between critical
theory and two alternative approaches, namely poststructuralism and constructivism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the distinctive con-
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
The second strand of critical theory is concerned to trace why the possibilities for emancipatory transformation had (apparently) been extinguished. Its main elements were first elaborated in the now classic study
Dialectic of Enlightenment, published in 1944 (Adorno and Horkheimer
1944/1979). This work reformulated critical theory as a critique of instrumental rationality and argued that the civilizational process itself had created a hermetic society suffused with a domination and terror from which
escapein any social sensewas impossible. The third, and almost certainly the most influential version of critical theory, has attempted to develop a critical theory of society within the context of a theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984, 1989a). Much more obviously post-Marxist
than the other two strands, this approach claims to transcend the Marxian
focus on productive relations and their immanent problems and to highlight
instead the emancipatory potential inherent in communication. As a shorthand the three strands will be identified with three thinkers, namely
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, respectively. This shorthand is not
entirely accurate inasmuch as Horkheimer collaborated in the development
of Adornian critical theory through his coauthorship of Dialectic of
Enlightenment, but it is nevertheless a reasonably fair reflection of where
the intellectual center of gravity has lain for each of the three strands.
Given the major differences among these three strands in critical theory, the question arises, What, then, is the unifying thread that allows us to
talk of a school at all? This issue is explored in Stephen Eric Bronners
marvelous study of the Frankfurt School tradition, Of Critical Theory and
Its Theorists (1994). His argument is that in the final analysis, the only
thing common to all critical theorists, and fundamental to all critical theories, is a concern to explore the barriers to and possibilities for human
emancipationhence Bronners definition of critical theory as a cluster of
themes inspired by an emancipatory intent (Bronner 1994: 3).
Where does this leave our discussion of critical IR theory? The first
point is that the same threefold distinction can also be usefully applied to
the work of those seeking to utilize the insights of Frankfurt School critical
theory in the field of international relations. Whereas the majority of those
theorists are best understood as Habermasians, some are much closer to
both the letter and spirit of Horkheimers model of critical social theory.
(As will be discussed in the next section, Adornos critique of instrumental
rationality also resonates in contemporary international theory, but in the
work of poststructuralists.) Again, using some of the authors in this book as
examples, Linklater, Baynes, and Jones are Habermasian critical theorists.
To their number we can also add another influential proponent of critical IR
theory, Mark Hoffman (1987, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995). Neufelds work is
arguably much more Horkheimerian in spirit. This is also the case for some
of those writers working in the field of critical security studies. Ken
Introduction
Booths discussion of utopian realism, for example, contains many striking overlaps with Horkheimerian critical theory, even though Booth did not
at that stage draw on the work of the Frankfurt School (Booth 1991b).
More recently, I (1999) write explicitly within the problematique established by Horkheimers Traditional and Critical Theory (1972).
But again, it would be wrong to overdraw these distinctions. Linklater
has certainly used the work of Horkheimer and the early Frankfurt School,
although less so in his more recent work (cf. Linklater 1990b and 1998),
and indeed is now noticeably more radical than the increasingly liberal
Habermas. Similarly, Neufeld has drawn on Habermas (for example, in this
volume), whereas none of the contemporary Horkheimerians share the
expectations of the revolutionary proletariat that underpinned Traditional
and Critical Theory. Nevertheless, the categorizations do capture important differences in orientation and outlook. Habermas, after all, views his
own work as representing a fundamental break with that of Horkheimer and
Adorno (see Habermas 1984: 366399; 1987: 106130). It is not surprising, therefore, that this break is also manifested in critical IR theory. So, for
example, in his chapter in this volume, Rengger utilizes some of the core
ideas developed in Adornos critique of instrumental rationality to outline
far-reaching objections to Linklaters Habermas-inspired project.
Once we view Frankfurt School critical IR theory not as a unified
whole but as a series of different and indeed contradictory strands, it is then
possible to clarify its relationship(s) with Gramscian critical theory. The
fundamental point here is that Gramscian critical theory is much closer to
one Frankfurt School strand than the others. Specifically, the differences
between Gramscis work, especially in the way it has been interpreted in
international relations, and Horkheimers critical social theory are small.
True, the latter abjures the formers concern with political economy to concentrate almost exclusively on superstructural phenomena. Nevertheless,
both approaches are rooted in the same Marxian productivist paradigm, and
both seek to develop a social theory orientated toward social transformation. They are recognizably variations on a theme rather than different in
any fundamental way. (More work remains to be done on the commonalities and differences between the work of Gramsci and that of the Frankfurt
School; in the interim see Holub 1992.)
It might be added, parenthetically, that it is this convergence between
the Horkheimer of Traditional and Critical Theory and Gramscian critical
IR theoryas if to emphasize the point, Cox (1981) makes an almost analogous distinction between problem solving and critical theorythat initially made critical IR theory (as a whole) appear to many observers to be
more unified and coherent than has actually proven to be the case.
The distance between Gramscian critical theory and work conducted in
the Adornian or Habermasian veins is much greater. Gramsci and Adorno
Introduction
are separated by a vast gulf. Through the critique of instrumental rationality, Adorno rephilosophized critical theory (Dubiel 1985). He effectively
abandoned all hope in the possibility of developing a critical social theory
and instead posited that the purpose of critical theory is to interpret the
capacity of avant garde art to mimetically transmit those echoes of humanitys emancipatory impulses that have now completely fled the social realm
(Wellmer 1983; Zuidervaart 1991; Bronner 1994). Even if Gramsci was a
drama critic of some distinction, this is not a formulation with which he
could ever have sympathized!
In the case of Habermasian critical theory, the situation is more complex, but in the final analysis, Gramsci and Gramscians are working in a
paradigm fundamentally different from that of Habermas and the
Habermasians. Even if Gramsci was concerned with linguistics, communication, and the construction of intersubjective understanding (hegemony)
all familiar Habermasian themeshis concern was situated within the context of a social theory that regarded productive relations as (ultimately)
determinant and that viewed humanitys emancipatory capacity as being
immanent within the productive sphere rather than in language. The communicative turn in critical theory pioneered by Habermas represents as fundamental a break from the ideas of Gramsci as it does from those of
Horkheimer.
Given differences and distinctions among the different strands of critical IR theory that have been identified here, we are left with the same fundamental question raised earlier in the context of the Frankfurt School.
What, if anything, unites or links these strands? The answer is substantially
the same as in the former case. Those developing critical IR theory clearly
share in, and partake of, the same broad intellectual heritage of Hegelian or
Western Marxism (Anderson 1979). Beyond that, however, as has already
been made clear, little positively unites them. Whereas critical IR theorists
may largely agree with each other in terms of their critique of the mainstream, there is little agreement among them as to what should take its
place. Critical IR theory is not characterized by a commitment to a particular epistemology (contra S. Smith 1996) or to a specific ontology. Neither
do its proponents subscribe to a common political program. Ultimately
rather, as in the case of Frankfurt School critical theory, the ties that bind
are a shared commitment to exploring and elucidating the theme of human
emancipation as it is highlighted in the study of world politics.
Critical IR theory is thus best understood as a constellation of different
approaches, all seeking to illuminate the question of emancipation in world
politics. The constellation metaphor first developed by Adorno and
Benjamin, and later utilized to great effect by Martin Jay (1984a) as an
organizational device for his short introduction to the ideas of Adorno, is
particularly apposite (see also Bernstein 1991). Its usagethen as now
10
Introduction
Introduction
11
in Murphys (Ch. 4 in this volume) alternative history of international relations is the view that critical theory and poststructuralist international relations theory are both manifestations of the same radical sensibilitywhat
he describes as the democratic impulse in international relations.
How are we to understand these two apparently contradictory views of
the relationship? Are those who stress differences to be dismissed as sectarian dogmatics, or are those who focus on commonalities simply engaged in
a more or less sinister exercise in co-option? I would argue that to pose the
question in this way is to succumb to a form of binary thinking that in this
case, as in most others, is distinctly unhelpful. Rather, when critical IR theory is understood in terms of a constellation, it is clear that both views of
the relationship are, in a sense, correct.
Some elements in the constellation of critical IR theory do have a great
deal in common with some of those in the constellation of poststructuralism
(poststructuralist thought is no more unified than critical theory and is also
best understood in these terms). So, for example, when the poststructuralist
R.B.J. Walker writes that it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible
kinds of political, military and economic power, in this case at least, his
thinking is in complete harmony with Gramscian critical theory (Walker
1984: 3). The congruence between key elements of Adornos critique of
instrumental rationality and Foucaults genealogies of domination are even
more striking and were remarked upon by Foucault himself (see Foucault
1991: 115129). Indeed, it is plausible to argue that writings on international relations in a Foucauldian vein are the closest we have at present to an
Adornian critical IR theory. There is also substantial convergence between
some poststructuralists and Habermasians. As Linklater persuasively
argues, for example, little of substance separates the Habermasians normative stress on unconstrained communication and Lyotards support for
equal rights of participation in a universal speech community (see Ch. 2
in this volume).
Of course, there are also differences in influences, in focus, and in orientation. Most fundamentally perhaps, poststructuralist writing in international relations remains deeply suspicious of the critical IR theory stress on
emancipation (see Wyn Jones forthcoming).
But when we understand critical IR theory and poststructuralism in
terms of constellations, it remains a moot point whether the differences
between them are any greater than the differences within them. Moreover,
it must be remembered that it is only a very attenuated version of modernism that has been defended by any of the strands within the critical theory tradition, and that version has become more attenuated over time. When
one also considers Jacques Derridas refusal to renounce the great classi-
12
Introduction
Introduction
13
14
Introduction
fundamental convergence between their project and both that of Cox and of
Habermas, but it is with the latter rather than the former that common
ground can most easily be identified. Cox, as has been noted, remains fundamentally rooted in a productivist paradigm, and most constructivists
would almost certainly demur from the historical materialist premises of
his work even if they might agree with aspects of his critique of the mainstream. The same is arguably the case for Horkheimerian critical theory.
When we turn to Habermasian critical theory, commonalities become
much more apparent. Thinkers such as Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf are
recognizably ploughing the same furrow as Habermas (Kratochwil 1989,
Onuf 1989; see also Zehfuss 1997). They too are concerned with speech
acts, communicative action, and, in the case of Kratochwil, communicative
rationality (1989: 1516). Of course, that they use the same literature as
Habermas, and Kratochwil, at least, quotes Habermass work approvingly,
does not necessarily mean that these authorsor other constructivists who
share their intellectual concernsare Habermasians (see Kratochwil 1987:
304). Nevertheless, it does make it difficult to draw any hard and fast lines
between them and other critical theorists who have followed Habermass
communicative turn.
Moreover, if the argument is accepted that the only common theme
among the disparate strands of critical IR theory is a concern with emancipationand I readily acknowledge that this is a big if and that others,
including contributors to this volume, will almost certainly wish to set
more exclusive or demanding criteria for entry into the critical campthen
it is hard to see how Wendt, for example, might be excluded if (another big
if!) he chose to identify himself as a critical theorist. True, his description
of his project as involving a commitment to emancipation and science
will certainly grate with almost all self-identified contemporary critical theorists to the extent that science is still conceived of in traditional mainstream terms. But Wendt is surely correct to argue that his formulation is
roughly analogous to that employed by the Frankfurt School (Bon 1993
provides a most insightful discussion; see also Dubiel 1985). And at any
rate, Wendt, like the many of his constructivist colleagues (see Price and
Reus-Smit 1998), is apparently well aware of the arguments of contemporary critical theoristsand other postpositiviststhat theory as well as
practice (of the early Frankfurt School, among many others) suggests that
when normative concerns are simply bolted on to analysis conducted
according to the principles and precepts of positive social science, the presumptions as to what constitutes knowledge underpinning the latter will
eventually undermine the former. The question that both critical IR theory
and constructivism have to face is how to move beyond this insight. Again,
as Renggers discussion of Adorno suggests (Ch. 6 in this volume), there is
no consensus among critical theorists as to how to answer that question.
Introduction
15
But to the extent that contemporary critical theorists eschew the Adornian
great refusal, the kind of discussion that ensues is exemplified by Sandra
Whitworths thought-provoking meditation (in Ch. 9) on fieldwork. This is
also an issue where proponents of critical IR theory can benefit from the
work of the constructivists, even if the claims by Price and Reus-Smit
(1998) that critical theorists have failed to produce the goods in terms of
empirical work are overstated (cf. Linklater 1996b).
Thus there are clearly overlapsand striking ones at thatbetween
the key elements in the constellation of critical IR theory and the equally
central elements of constructivism. Moreover, to the extent that some constructivists seek to illuminate the question of emancipation in and through
the study of world politics, it is valid to consider their work as part of the
broad constellation of critical IR theory. As Wendts insightful discussion
of emancipation (in Ch. 13) indicates, they have much to contribute to the
enterprise.
16
Introduction
tribute in the future, that is, a forum in which attempts can be made to
bridge the gap between the productivist and communicative paradigms.
To elaborate, this discussion has highlighted that although concern
with emancipation may well be compatible with forms of constructivism
and is almost certainly implicit in poststructuralism, it is foregrounded by
neither. Even such stalwart defenders as Price and Reus-Smit are forced to
concede that constructivism has provided little in the way of normative
direction, and poststructuralist IR theory has, generally speaking, failed to
move beyond denaturalization and deconstruction to the kind of reconstructive politics that a concern with emancipation eventually requires. By
relentlessly focusing on the question of emancipation and by questioning
what this might mean in terms of the theory and practice of world politics,
critical IR relations theorists are playing a currently irreplaceable role.
It is also important to recognize that by focusing on emancipation, critical theorists (of all strands) are setting themselves extraordinarily demanding targets. Implicit in the orientation toward emancipationin the recognition, after Marx, that the point is not only to understand the world but to
change itis that it is in the crucible of practice that critical theories meet
the ultimate test of vitality (Fraser 1989a: 2). For critical theorists, therefore, the ultimate criteria by which the adequacy of a theory is measured is
extradisciplinary. Thus it is all too easy for the concern with emancipation
to fall by the wayside, especially given that the disciplinary mainstream is
quick to measure alternative approaches by its own standards of adequacy
(as evidenced in Checkel 1998, among many others), and some alternative
thinkers are apparently more than willing to adapt to the criteria set out for
them (witness, for example, the extraordinarily conciliatory way in which
Price and Reus-Smit [1998: 282283] respond to the demands that Checkel
seeks to place on constructivism).
To orientate theorizing toward emancipation is, necessarily, to raise a
series of difficult and intractable questions concerning audiences and
agency. The question is not just, after Wendt, What is international relations
for? but also, Who is it for? and, How can a process of dialogue with that
audience be initiated? Craig Murphy (Ch. 4 in this volume) is almost certainly correct in arguing that critical IR theory has supplied less convincing
answers to these questions than previous manifestations of the democratic
impulse in the study of world politics. In all honesty, proponents of critical
IR theory have barely begun to ask them (for an attempt to think through
some of the issues involved, see Wyn Jones 1999: ch. 6). Nevertheless, it is
only the orientation toward emancipation that renders these questions
worth asking in the first place, and it is precisely that orientation that critical theory can and does bring to a consideration of world politics.
The argument for the continuing importance of critical IR theory as a
broad project also spans metatheory and matters of more immediate practi-
Introduction
17
cal and political import and concerns the potential of critical IR theory to
act as a site in which the insights of the paradigms of communication and
production can be better integrated.
Nancy Fraser (1995) has argued lucidly that contemporary political
struggles are conducted along two main axes, redistribution and recognition. Redistributionary struggles are concerned primarily with issues of
economic welfare. They form the arena of class struggle (a phrase whose
very quaintness is eloquent testimony to the success of the theory and practice of neoliberalism since the early 1980s). Struggles for recognition
involve attempts by members of various groupsidentified by sex, sexuality, race, national identity, language, and so onto gain justice as members
of those groups. These latter types of struggle are often considered to be a
more recent phenomenon than old-fashioned redistribution politicsthere
are regular references in the literature to the rise of identity politics. Those
of us who, for example, inhabit the Celtic periphery of the British Isles
might beg to differ from this analysis.
Be that as it may, the point I want to emphasize here is that there is a
tendency in critical theory (and, I think, social theory more generally) to
analyze and understand these two different types of political struggle
through two different metatheoretical paradigms. Work conducted through
the paradigm of productionthat is, the paradigm that underpins the
Gramscian and Horkheimerian strands of critical IR theorytends to focus
on redistributory struggles. Work based on the paradigm of communicationHabermasian critical IR theory, for exampleis concerned with
questions of identity and community.
The fundamental problem is that neither paradigm is adequate for the
task of understanding the problematique of the other. The arguments as to
why identity cannot simply be reduced to questions of productive relations
have been well rehearsed by feminists and many others. Very few would
now argue that patriarchy, racism, and the domination of one nation or linguistic group by another are simply the epiphenomena of particular sets of
productive relations that would somehow disappear should those relations
be swept away or fundamentally reconfigured. Neither, by extension, can
these phenomena be understood solely through focus on relations of production and political economy more generally. (This is not, however, to
suggest that such an analysis could not shed important light on these
issuesmerely an argument that they reveal nothing like the whole story.)
Arguments as to why work conducted through the communicative paradigm (as it is presently understood) is inadequate to the task of understanding redistributionary strugglesand the emancipatory impulses that
are undoubtedly a key element within themhave been heard less frequently (but see Honneth 1982, 1994, 1995b; Postone and Brick 1993;
Calhoun [1995] even questions the usefulness of Habermasian theory for
18
Introduction
Introduction
19
between those working in both paradigms. Both sides recognize the need
for such a dialogue and, crucially, recognize themselves to be part of the
same intellectual project. Moreover, one of the most pleasing aspects of the
critical move in international relations has been its open, undogmatic quality, and as such the dialogue will almost certainly prove to be fruitful. But
even more fundamentally, the most striking feature in contemporary world
politics is the rapid increase in global inequality. For the poor and defenseless the results are nothing less that cataclysmic. And yet despite this, those
forces that resonate to the progressive democratic impulse are apparently
catatonic. With very few exceptions, the left has little to offer. It has no
credible alternative to an inhuman and environmentally catastrophic global
economic order, no way beyond the most transient of linking different particularized struggles concerning issues of identity, and no conception of
how to link or synthesize elements on the axes of recognition and redistribution to facilitate the development of a broader progressive politics.
Although bridging the gap between the paradigms of production and communication can play only a very small part in answering some of the very
difficult questions that those committed to emancipatory politics currently
face, it is an important and necessary task, and proponents of critical IR
theory have the opportunity to make a significant contribution. Critical IR
theory may well have already helped to disrupt some of the complacency of
professors of international relations, but that achievement, such as it is,
pales into absolute insignificance beside the challenges that itthat we
face in the real world of world politics.
Notes
I would like to thank Ken Booth, Tim Dunne, Eli Stamnes, and Michael Williams
for their perceptive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. My thanks also to
Maja Zefuss for her advice. All the usual disclaimers apply.
PART ONE
THE CONTOURS OF CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
2
THE CHANGING
CONTOURS OF CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Andrew Linklater
When Frankfurt School critical theory first made its mark on the study of
international relations (IR) in the early 1980s, the terms of the debate were
narrower than they are today. At that time, the advocates of critical theory
were mainly concerned to refute the principal arguments of neorealism.
Drawing on Marxian themes, critical perspectives offered an account of the
nature of social inquiry with explicitly normative goals; they proposed
modes of sociological inquiry oriented toward enlightenment about, and
emancipation from, unnecessary constraints. Unsurprisingly, given the
intellectual debt to Marxism, much of the analysis criticized global inequalities of economic and political power. Critical theory started from the paradigm of production and, in so doing, reflected the influence of the broad
problematic, but not the detailed argument, of the neo-Marxian analyses of
global dominance and dependence, which enjoyed their greatest influence
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A robust alternative to the neorealist
analysis of immutable geopolitical imperatives was built on these theoretical foundations (Ashley 1981; Cox 1981).
Critical theory has not stood still in the intervening years, but the
nature of its foundations has been keenly debated since the mid- to late
1980s. As a result, Frankfurt School critical theory no longer represents the
main challenge to orthodoxy within the field. It is important to recall that
members of the first generation of the Frankfurt School criticized the paradigm of production over a half-century earlier and that Adorno, in particular, foreshadowed some of the more recent moves to the paradigm of identity and difference (see Coles 1995). However, the parameters of the debate
have shifted even more dramatically in the past decade. Postmodern critical
theory, which has taken the initiative in developing the paradigm of identity
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and difference, does not try to reconstruct historical materialism or to complete the emancipatory project as defined by Western Marxism, although it
is worth noting Derridas observation that strategies of deconstruction proceed in the spirit of Marxism (Derrida 1994). But far from championing
that project, postmodernism is generally thought to challenge or problematize the conceptions of enlightenment and emancipation favored by those
who belong, however loosely, to the Marxist tradition (Devetak 1996a,
George 1994).
Above all else, disputes surrounding the project of modernity or the
project of the Enlightenment have transformed the disciplinary debate
(Devetak 1995). A great deal has been written in the wake of Foucaults
writings about the extent to which modernity contributes to the progress of
human autonomy or simply reconfigures social confinements and constraints; and much has been written about how far the language of critical
social theoryuniversality, rationality, autonomy, progress, enlightenment,
and emancipationactively empowers the marginalized or sows the seeds
of new structures of social power and political domination. Postmodern
responses to these questions strike at the heart of many of the aspirations of
critical theory within the broadly Marxian tradition, although they also aim
to uncover and criticize the dark side of modernity.
Most of the key issues in these debates have been thrashed out in a
series of encounters between Habermas and his critics. These debates continue, but as Foucault argued early on, it would be erroneous to assume that
one must be either for or against the project of the Enlightenment (Rabinow
1986). The more Marxian of contemporary writers do not dispute this
point. Habermas is reported to defend an enlightened suspicion of the
Enlightenment in which partial redemption from the dark side of modernity remains possible, but all notions of historical finality and completion are
abandoned (Roderick 1986: 134). There are some parallels here with
Foucaults project, which defended local rather than globalizing critical
projects and was ever mindful that everything may not be bad, but everything is potentially dangerous (Rabinow 1986: 343). Those shifts within
radical thinking indicate that the classic pretensions of Marxian critical theory, including the belief in irreversible and unilinear progress toward the
fully autonomous society, have been cast aside. An awareness of the ambiguities of modernity, which has its origins in Hegels reflections on the
modern state and revolutionary terror and in Marxs writings on industrial
capitalism, is pronounced across the critical spectrum. From that premise,
the goal of critical theory is to release the progressive side of modernity
from stifling constraints. But the critical project forgoes the assumption
that practices of liberation are innocent or unambiguous and guaranteed to
remove rather than reconstitute the forms of power; it dispenses with the
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tolerated cultural difference, not least because they generally lacked the
social reach or intensive power to assimilate entire subordinate cultures
within the prevailing order (Mann 1986). Any vision of equal dialogue with
the alien other would have been anathema to the members of the ruling
strata, as would the ethical commitment to reducing material inequalities in
order to create social arrangements in closer harmony with the ideal of a
universal speech community. Similar themes appear in Nelsons sociology
of civilizational structures and intercivilizational relations (Nelson 1973).
Breaking down some of the invidious differences between insiders and outsiders within their boundaries was one of the great achievements of the
major world civilizations, in Nelsons view. But non-Western civilizations,
he argued, hardly developed dialogic potentials internally or in their relations with the rest of the human race. With their deep-seated assumptions
about the moral significance of the differences between insiders and outsiders, those civilizations were committed to hegemonial conceptions of
international society (see also Bull and Watson 1984).
Societies of states provide an interesting point of contrast not least
because a dialogic element is intrinsic to their nature. Hellenic international
society, for example, possessed the institution of diplomacy, though not the
idea of dialogue between equals, until quite late in its history (Wight 1977:
23). Modern visions of a speech community with the potential to become
universal would have seemed an absurd proposition to the vast majority of
the inhabitants of ancient Greece. Whereas conceptions of moral and political universalism emerged, they invariably assumed the superiority of
Hellenic culture and the ideal incorporation of the alien other within its
supposedly more rational worldview (Kristeva 1991: 59). Relations with
Persia revealed the tension between the egocentrism of Hellenic culture and
the pragmatic requirement to enlarge the diplomatic dialogue so that Persia
was recognized as a different but equal member of international society
(Wight 1977: ch. 3). What is more, the Greek city-states system, along with
the intersocietal systems that predated it, did not develop an ethic of transferring power and wealth to subordinate groups to ensure parity of participation in a widening dialogic community (Resnick 1992).
It is tempting to draw the conclusion that support for lifting restrictions
on the equal enjoyment of political rights, for respecting the radically different and redistributing wealth and power to the members of systematically excluded groups, is greater in the modern era than in any past intersocietal system. This is a proposition that can be advanced only with serious
qualification. Support for these principles has not always been matched by
radical changes in practice, and, needless to say, it varies enormously within and between societies. Greater support has not occurred because modern
societies are more clever than their predecessors but because in many
respects they are as, if not more, oppressive and have engendered powerful
34
opposition to their negative properties and tendencies as a result. The seemingly unique qualities of modernity are evident in the achievements of
modern citizenship, around which struggles to universalize rights, respect
differences, and reduce inequalities continue to revolve. Modernitys qualities are also evident in the recent development of the international society
of states. Scope restrictions that prevented non-Europeans from gaining
admission to European society have been lifted, at least for those groups
with the power to constitute themselves as separate states. Advances in
respect for cultural differences and progress in reducing material inequalities within many nation states have failed to stir collective action to reduce
international inequalities, but it would be foolish to conclude that there had
been no progress at all on these fronts. Arguably, the commitment to pacify
the society of states without converting it into empire is a more pronounced
theme in the modern society of states than it was in ancient Greece or
China. Still more radical changes in the structure of international society
are made possible by these normative commitments.
These are conjectural statements that further research will either confirm or disconfirm. Whatever their long-term fate, some observations about
the condition of modernity can be safely made. As previously noted, the
progressive side of modernity is not the outcome of the unassisted development of reason but the product of political struggle against terrible forces.
The main influences on Frankfurt School critical theory knew as much.
Immanuel Kants observation that war had taught human beings by experience what the use of reason could have foretold, namely that their primary
political goal ought to be association within a cosmopolitical association
dedicated to promoting permanent peace, conveyed the essential point
(Kant 1970). Hegels account of the dialectical interplay between the development of reason and the struggle for freedom in the face of arbitrary state
power and the destructive effects of industrial capitalism reworked the crucial theme (Avineri 1972). Marxs claim that the fate of human freedom
depended entirely on the outcome of the struggle against capitalist exploitation was the version that defined critical theory for much of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Many of the most insightful trends within social
and political theory continue this tradition by providing critical theory with
a more profound understanding of the strange ambiguities of modernity
(see Smart 1985). Again, this is one point where the different paths of
Frankfurt School critical theory, postmodernism, and feminism intersect.
Current efforts to reconstruct the sociology of the ambiguities of
modernity include the literature on the unprecedented territorial concentrations of power that have emerged over the past 200 years. The relationship
between this phenomenon and the struggle to acquire legal rights against
the state and rights of representation and participation has been one of its
central concerns, as has the analysis of the impact of warfare on the evolu-
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36
dialogue that are sensitive to cultural differences and economic inequalities. The historical evidence suggests that different forms of world political
organization exhibit different properties in this regard (Linklater 1998: ch.
4). To summarize, the first empires promoted selective advances in universality but remained deeply exclusionary and inegalitarian. Lifting restrictions on access to elite positions enabled egocentric cultures to administer
sprawling empires, but hierarchical worldviews prevented any major breakthrough in the shape of egalitarian commitments to universal dialogue.
Similar worldviews are evident in the relations among the major empires or
civilizations. Imagining their association within a universal communication
community that overcame the deepest forms of social exclusion rarely
emerged as an ethical ideal. Movement to new structures of consciousness
is evident in societies of states with their commitment to dialogue among
their constitutive parts. Hellenic international society broke through the
limitations of early empires, but hegemonic conceptions of international
relations hampered the evolution of modern conceptions of the equality of
states and clashed with the Kantian notion of a universal kingdom of ends.
Ethnocentrism prevented the radical extension of dialogic commitments in
relations with non-Hellenic societies, although some movement toward
more universalistic structures of consciousness was evident in the gradual
expansion of international society to include Persia. A preliminary survey
of the historical evidence suggests that the vision of forms of political community that are more universalistic than their predecessors and more sensitive to cultural differences and material inequalities is a uniquely modern
idea and an expression of the progressive side of modernity.1 It is not
entirely fortuitous that this vision has emerged in a civilization that may be
unique in attaching deep moral significance to differences of race; that has
been as, if not more, assimilationist than past intersocietal systems; and that
has been the site for the development of seemingly unprecedented inequalities of wealth and power. But modernity is not reducible simply to this dark
side; whether it can create political arrangements that represent its progressive side is the crucial question.
37
practice, which have always been central to those working within the
Marxist tradition. One recent critique of postpositivism fails to mention,
even in passing, Coxs important and influential distinction between problem solving and critical approaches to international relations (Wallace
1996). This distinction is an important reminder that sophisticated policyrelevant research must confront the question of which interests are privileged and which are conveniently ignored by the urge to address issues of
current practice (Cox 1981; Booth 1997). Critical theories of all descriptions are especially alert to these considerations, which are at the forefront
of a range of inquiries into policy matters, political structures, and alternative forms of human governance.
Critical theory in the revolutionary Marxist tradition was concerned
with large questions about current political structures and alternative modes
of social organization rather than with incrementalist policy recommendations associated with revisionist solutions to the problems of modern capitalist society. But in more recent times, few would deny the importance of
shuttling between long-range questions about the prospects for alternative
forms of political community and shorter-term policy debates that determine whether societies evolve in the normatively preferred direction. The
commitment to the discourse theory of morality, for example, necessarily
combines grand visions of more dialogic cultures and human subjects with
support for concrete measures (such as freedom of information) that will
contribute to the realization of that goal. Approaches to current policy have
to be linked, then, with longer-term normative objectives that link critical
theory with classical political philosophy and its reflections on the good
society and the good life. This is the specific domain of critical praxeology.
Raymond Aron introduced the term praxeology in the course of his
reflections on the antinomies of statecraft (Aron 1966: 577579). He maintained that the tension between Machiavellian calculations of opportunity
and the Kantian problem of acting ethically and securing progress toward
universal peace is at the heart of foreign policy. Arons writings highlighted
the allegedly unending struggle between the realist conviction that the purpose of foreign policy is to enhance national power and prestige and the
idealist commitment that the function of foreign policy is to promote cosmopolitan goals. In so doing, he stressed the recurrent tension between the
ethics of conviction and responsibility that Weber analyzed in the final sections of Politics as a Vocation (Weber 1948). These realist approaches to
praxeology are at odds with the Kantian alternative in Perpetual Peace,
which informs the argument of the present section. In Perpetual Peace,
Kant recognized that the struggle for power and security could not be eradicated overnight but might be eliminated gradually in a process of international political change lasting several centuries (Kant 1970). Kant believed
that the bitter experience of war had taught human beings the need to bring
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39
reemergence of past forms of unjust exclusion, and they are a vital element
in the collective memory of earlier struggles to remove them. These rights
are a key moral resource that progressive social forces continue to exploit
in contemporary efforts to reconfigure political community. They ensure
that a culture of sensitivity to unjust exclusion remains important to a significant proportion of the citizenry of modern societies. Whereas a realist
account of praxeology stresses the tension between these normative commitments and the logic of power, a critical approach focuses on the higher
possibilities that they build into the structure of modern societies. From the
latter point of view, the moral capital invested in citizenship is not in a state
of permanent tension with the logic of anarchy but confirms the Kantian
theme that these societies possess the moral resources for narrowing the
sphere of social interaction that has been ceded to the dominion of force
and power.
Universalizing suffrage by dismantling scope restrictions has been an
intriguing feature of modern societies, all the more so because of the coexistence of deeply embedded particularistic norms that deny aliens representation and voice. Most societies have assumed that the distinction between
insiders and outsiders has obvious moral relevance, at least as far as the
right of democratic participation is concerned. Increased opportunities for
and incidences of cross-boundary harm pose the question of whether the
differences between insiders and outsiders are any more morally relevant
than the distinctions of gender, class, ethnicity, and race. A profound moral
contradiction arises for democracies that cause harm to outsiders by polluting their environment and endangering their health. The logic of their moral
beliefs requires them to widen the boundaries of democratic government so
that insiders and outsiders come together as associates in joint rule.
Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have offered a cogent defense of
this argument, and the growth of regional organizations and the emergence
of a global civil society encourage the belief that the history of democratic
governance is entering a new phase of development (Archibugi and Held
1995; Held 1995; Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 1998). It is abundantly clear
that national commitments to citizenship have already generated powerful
arguments for creating a transnational democracy in Europe. Interestingly,
these visions of expanded democracy often stress the need to devolve
power to domestic regions and local communities. Most of them do not
predict the end of the nation state, but they anticipate new forms of political
community in which significant national powers are shared with substate
and transnational institutions, and national loyalties exist alongside
stronger subnational and transnational allegiances (Camilleri and Falk
1992; Meehan 1993; Beiner 1995; Turner 1993).
Thus the moral capital that has been accumulated in the struggle
against unjust exclusion is more than a way of preserving past achieve-
40
ments; it can also be used as a resource for creating new forms of political
community and citizenship that institutionalize the dialogic ideal in a more
complex ensemble of democratic public spheres. Praxeology in the Kantian
tradition considers the implications of normative analyses of the highest
ethical ideals and sociological explorations of the ambiguities of modernity
for matters of current policy and practice. Significantly, praxeological
inquiry considers large-scale questions about the possibility of new forms
of human governance and reflects on the more important developments that
can help realize this ideal. Visions of the modes of governance that ought to
appeal to societies with deep moral commitments to citizenship are combined with critical reflections on the concrete measures that deserve support. The latter include the right of individual appeal against the state not
only in national but in European courts; the international protection of
minority rights; the devolution of power to domestic regions; and the development of richer conceptions of European citizenship that embrace legal,
political, and welfare rights (Linklater 1996a).
The recent critical or postpositivist turn has not attempted to shift the
study of international relations away from issues of current policy and practice toward the higher reaches of detached philosophical analysis. One of
its central ambitions has been to recapture something of the ethical spirit
that existed when the field first came into existence, and to do so without
repeating the mistakes of early idealism. Very complex issues attend this
process, and it is unsurprising that much of the recent literature has
addressed them in their own terms and for their own sake in relative isolation from questions of current practice. Those who have taken these philosophical issues seriously have often abandoned the familiar territory of
conventional international relations for the less familiar world of social and
political theory, a necessary step if the field was to advance quickly. No
serious understanding of the complexity of the issues involved could conclude that the theoretical retreat had gone far enough and was in danger of
imbalancing the subject. A more profound assessment of the meaning of the
critical turn would note how far it runs parallel with the wider literature on
the prospects for new modes of human governance and new forms of political community.
It is not possible to undertake a detailed examination of these parallel
lines of investigation here, but for present purposes, it may suffice to comment briefly on some recent writings that envisage forms of political community that break the nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality,
and citizenship. In The Other Heading, Derrida defends a European polity
that avoids the monopolization of power and its dispersal to the representatives of exclusive particularisms (Derrida 1992: 41). In The Past as Future,
Habermas supports moves to transnationalize democracy and to invest
authority in substate and transnational authorities in a more democratic
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42
Conclusion
Few efforts to develop connections among social theory, moral and political philosophy, and the study of international relations existed even by the
early 1980s. Resistance to exploring these connections was commonplace,
not least because of realist arguments that the violent conflicts of the century had crushed the project of the Enlightenment. Dissenting voices were
heard from various liberal or socialist standpoints that retained their faith in
the idea of international progress. They prepared the way for the more systematic assault on realist and neorealist thought that has taken place since
the mid-1980s. In the early stages, critical approaches reflected the influence of Marxist conceptions of society and politics. These approaches
questioned many of the classical Marxian assumptions about the demise of
nationalism, the epiphenomenal character of the state, and the nature and
possibility of world socialism. But they were not exposed at that time to the
radical challenges of postmodernism and feminism. They were equally critical of the conventional theory and practice of international relations, but
they were deeply troubled by perceived similarities between realism and its
43
critical opponents. The totalitarian potentials residing within universal histories and global projects of emancipation were among the chief concerns.
The intriguing question is where this leaves the tradition of critical theory with its Marxian commitment to creating an overarching perpective
that unites normative, sociological, and praxeological modes of inquiry.
Many have doubted the wisdom or possibility of recovering a project of
modernity that holds on to these convictions. Perhaps they are right to do
so, although this is not the conclusion drawn here. What has been proposed
instead is an approach to critical IR theory that remains universalistic while
recognizing that some forms of universalism have wished to submerge or
extinguish the difference of the other. Here it is essential to stress that various accounts of the universal speech community are explicitly concerned
not only with tolerating difference but with enlarging human diversity.
They have a normative commitment to dialogic relations in which human
beings can explore the possibility of forms of life simultaneously more universalistic and more diverse than preceding arrangements at the domestic
and international levels. They invite further sociological studies that consider the condition of modernity with all its tensions and ambiguities in the
broadest historical perspective, and they call for additional praxeological
inquiries that reflect on how the progressive side of modernity can be
embodied in new forms of political community that continue the struggle
against all forms of unjust exclusion. Historical awareness is a central feature of critical theory, which recognizes that all categories and perspectives
have to be amended, even abandoned entirely, as societies change. Contemporary critical IR theory in the Marxian tradition has not lost sight of this
basic truth. Its changing contours are evident in its attempt to rebuild the
project of modernity around the themes of dialogue, difference, and exclusion.
Notes
1. It is important to note some similarities here with the English School, which
stressed the tensions between the dialogic element in systems of states and their
exclusionary practices (see especially Bull 1977, 1983; Bull and Watson 1984;
Wight 1977). For the purpose of exploring these issues in more detail, the English
School is a convenient point of departure.
2. Critical foreign policy analysis can reflect on existing policy decisions and
alternative possibilities in the light of the normative commitments and sociological
observations discussed in this chapter. The latter would need considerable refinement in any detailed commentary on specific policy options.
3
THE WAY AHEAD:
TOWARD A NEW ONTOLOGY
OF WORLD ORDER
Robert W. Cox
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tion toward the social order: They are supportive in their concern to find
and keep a job but potentially hostile when insecurity strikes.
The excluded pose a potential threat to the globalization order. But certain conditions may diffuse that threat: the fact that excluded peoples energies are directed to personal and family survival rather than protest and the
proclivity of rejected people often to direct their violence against their
excluded neighbors rather than against the established society.
Nevertheless, the potential for challenge to the globalization order
exists among both the excluded and the precarious segments. There are also
contradictions among the integrated, many of these generated by ecological
concerns that affect jobs in forestry, fisheries, and energy industries. The
challenge to globalization, if it is to become activated, would require the
formation of a common will, a vision of an alternative future, and the transcendence of the manifold divisions of ethnicity, religion, gender, and
geography that cut across the three-level social hierarchy being created by
globalization.
This restructuring of world society brought about by globalization
challenges the primacy of state-oriented identities as people become aware
that transnational economic organizations determine their livelihood and
populations become increasingly heterogeneous from migration. It also
challenges the Marxist schema of the primacy of class-oriented identities.
The nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century concepts of class have been
muddied by the emerging social structure. The working class as it is conventionally thought of is now divided among the three levels of the social
hierarchy, and these three components can be shown to have very divergent
interests. Where the sense of class remains strong today, it may be more a
cultural matter than defined by a property relationship. Yet the concept of
class retains vigor and calls for reformulation in early-twenty-first-century
conditions as a means to the formation of a common front of resistance
toward an alternative to the future that is being prepared by globalization.
Class would have to embrace comprehensively the various identitiesethnic, religious, gender, and so onmanifested by those groups that have initiated pockets of resistance.
50
been applied specifically to countries of the former Soviet sphere and also
to countries in what was formerly called the third world. The primary
emphasis of dominant power has been on the market reform aspect, which
in practice has been held to mean deregulation and privatization accompanied by measures to combat inflation and to achieve and maintain currency
stability. The practical consequences have been the gutting of public services, increased unemployment, and rampant corruption. The democracy
aspect has meant an emphasis on elections in the hope that they will legitimate market reform and on human rights in the sense of individual rather
than collective rights.
The cumulative consequence of these pressures has been to propagate
the idea that the primary function of states is to adjust domestic economic
practices to the functional requirements of the neoliberal global economy. I
have called this process the internationalizing of the state (Cox 1987: 253
265). It contrasts with the postWorld War II concept of the state as mediator between the international economy (understood as flows across national
boundaries) and domestic concerns about economic growth and employment. According to the newly dominant doctrine, domestic interests are
best served by allowing free rein to the global economy, and new efforts at
regulation, such as those embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), are
designed to limit the capacity of states to interfere with the working of the
neoliberal global economic order.
In terms of social relations, the global economy is led by and benefits
mainly the top segment of the world social hierarchy just discussed. This
segment, the integrated, is both inside and outside the state. It is outside the
state insofar as it is embodied in agencies like the Group of Seven (G7, or
now G8 with the inclusion of Russia) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the WTO, or even in such unofficial conclaves as the Trilateral
Commission and the World Economic Forum, which meets annually in
Davos, Switzerland. It is inside the state insofar as the interests that are represented in these bodies are present within different countries and can put
pressure on states at the national level.
At the interstate level, two main functions are performed: First is the
propagation and legitimization of neoliberal global economic practice by
international institutions, mainly the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO
but now increasingly the UN itself. The UN used to be differentiated from
these international economic agencies, which have operated clearly within
a neoliberal logic, being seen as more open to the expression of heterodox
views about world economy, particularly in the interest of less-developed
countries. However, the success of the United States in securing the election of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General after excluding Boutros BoutrosGhali from reelection indicates a shift in the UN toward alignment with the
51
The Biosphere
Alongside social restructuring, environmental degradation is an accompaniment to economic globalization. The conventional study of international
relations has heretofore recognized only human actors, but in recent years
some nonhuman forces have appeared, threatening to constrict the realm of
human action: global warming, the hole in the ozone layer, deforestation
and soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity, and the collapse of fish stocks,
among others. These forces express the response of nature to the cumulative consequences of human activities. They are new phenomena that signal
dangers to the physical environment in which human activities take place.
They can lead to conflict, for example, over scarce vital resources such as
water, and they challenge accepted modes of understanding humanitys
place in the world.
Monotheistic religions with their notion of a transcendent deity encouraged a separation of human beings, the image of the divine, from nature,
created by God for the use and enjoyment of humans. Scientific modernism
inherited this idea in conceiving nature as something to be dominated,
tamed, and shaped by human beings. The irruption of forces of nature into
human affairs, not as the occasional flood or earthquake but as a deterioration of the planets life-support system, now suggests the need to revise this
notion by seeing humanity as one component of the natural world, interacting with other forms of life and life-sustaining substances. The biosphere is
this larger interactive realm, an envelope circling the earth and stretching
from the seabeds to the higher atmosphere.
In the modernist tradition, economics reduced nature to land and considered land a commodity (what Karl Polanyi [1944] called a false commodity, since land is not produced for sale on the market). Nature has been
subordinated to economic logic, to the market mentality, which is based on
52
the proposition that everything is for sale. The basic problem for market
logic is getting the prices right. Nature, however, has a logic of its own that
is not comprehended by economics and that functions independently of
economics. The basic problem for natures logic is equilibrium among the
different forms of life and life-supporting substances.
So long as there is enough slack in nature, market logic is tolerated by
nature; but when the effect of economic logic is to strain nature to the limit,
nature responds with its veto (Harries-Jones, Rotstein, and Timmerman
1992, 1998). The problem here is to rethink economics within a science of
nature so that economic prescriptions are attentive to signals from nonhuman nature. This rethinking implies a departure from the modernist epistemology that separates human capacity for knowledge from the world of
nature and conceives nature as a manipulable object. The dilemma for
humans now is to think through the consequences of understanding ourselves as part of nature rather than as dominant over nature.
One implication of this understanding is a fundamental contradiction in
economic globalization and perhaps also in movements of democratization.
The dynamic of globalization is consumer demand. The consumption
model of North America and Western Europeconsumerismis what the
other peoples of the world have aspired to. To extend this model universally would likely have catastrophic consequences for the biosphere, but to
suggest that relatively poor societies should drop this aspiration incurs the
charge of imperialism. It seems obvious that those societies that have pioneered the quest of consumerism would have to show the way toward an
alternative model that would be consistent with biosphere maintenance.
This is where the challenge to democracy arises. Former U.S. president
George Bush anticipated it when, in preparing for the Earth Summit at Rio
in 1992, he was reported as saying: Our lifestyle is not open to negotiation. He was implicitly acknowledging that change of lifestyle is necessary to biospheric survival and at the same time recognizing that political
survival in modern democracies makes change highly risky for politicians
to advocate. If such a basic change in peoples aspirations and behavior
cannot be changed by political leadership, let alone by exhortations at international conferences, the change must come from within civil society. The
issue then becomes whether the reconstruction of peoples understanding of
their place in nature and of what is necessary to maintain the biosphere can
outpace and reverse the progress of ecological degradation.
Intersubjectivity:
Civilizations and Forms of Political Economy
The problem of the biosphere brings out the relationship between objective
material conditions (ecological degradation) and subjective, or, more accu-
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lithic global force. In one sense capitalism is, of course, a global force: Big
corporate organizations based in different parts of the world compete for
shares in a world market, and finance flows freely across territorial boundaries. But people in different places are organized in somewhat different
ways, not only mainly to participate in this global capitalism but also sometimes to exist outside of it. These differences are important for the people
who live within different coexisting forms of capitalism. Thus we can
speak in one sense of global capitalism as the dynamic force of globalization; but at the same time, it must be recognized that capitalism, the competitive drive for profits and expansion, takes different social forms shaped
by different civilizational imperatives, some of which place limits on
unconstrained profit seeking. Concepts of society and organization can
express different notions as to what is natural and proper in human relations. These differences cannot be reduced just to a matter of ideology.
Ideologies are conscious constructions with specific programs.
Intersubjectivities are less conscious and more deeply rooted, the common
sense of a people as to what is right and proper in collective life.
Karl Polanyis concept of substantive economies is a way of seizing
these differences within the more abstract notion of global capitalism.
Polanyi was concerned with the ways in which economies were embedded
within societies (Polanyi 1944; Polanyi et al. 1957). He rejected the notion
that the economy can be abstracted from society in such a way as to make
society subservient to the economy. Where this is attemptedhe spoke of
the nineteenth-century attempt to impose the rule of a self-regulating market as a utopian projectit provokes a reaction from society that is usually
expressed through political action. In Europe, the reaction began with labor
legislation and ultimately led to the welfare state. Utopian projects are still
current; the most obvious is the hyperliberal attempt to construct a deregulated global market. But other distinctive forms of economic-social organization also exist, and rival forms contest the terrain on which hyperliberalism has claimed predominance (see, for example, Albert 1991).
Three salient existing forms of political economy are (1) the AngloAmerican individualistic-competitive form, (2) the European social market
form, and (3) the East Asian mercantilist form (Fallows 1994; Tsuru 1993).
Each of these has generated ideologized representations. Hyperliberalism is
the ideology of the Anglo-American form, envisaging an untrammeled
global movement of goods and money. The social market is the characteristic European form, ideologically derived from Christian democracy and
social democracy. Asian capitalism has been constructed, often with attribution to Confucianism, as an ideology supportive of authoritarian politics
or bureaucratized paternalism. Yet the forms are more deeply rooted than
these ideologies; they can be seen as constructions that find a more or less
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tems have not received much attention. Yet this realm of political activity
has great implications for popular control. A weak civil society leaves a
wide political space for occult influences. Probably the best way to enhance
democratic accountability is to narrow the space open to the covert world
through the development of an active civil society.
Struggles shaping different forms of capitalism illustrate the divergent
and conflicting tendencies among top-down forces: differences between the
United States and Japan over economic practices; the conflict over social
policy in Europe, epitomized once as Margaret Thatcher versus Jacques
Delors; conflicts over who has the right to harvest depleted fish stocks.
These conflicts are indicators of the problematic nature of global capitalist
hegemony and of the potential for the emergence of a world of not one capitalism but several. I am not here referring to economic blocs or the socalled triad of rivals: Europe, America, and Japan. I am referring rather to
different basic concepts of social economy and the ethics of how production and distribution should be organized. Such different concepts have historical-geographical bases but are not necessarily unified or coherent entities engaged in a trade war.
The bottom-up forces are many and various but have rarely achieved a
degree of coherence that could plausibly be considered a basis for counterhegemony. The prospect for counterhegemony is, however, the focal issue
for the study of structural transformation. The French strikes of December
1996 were notable not only in rallying workers despite the weakening over
recent decades of the labor movement but also in gaining the sympathy and
support of a public that was willing to put up with a shutdown of public
transport in a big city in the cause of combating an economic policy perceived as sacrificing ordinary people in favor of dominant global-economy
interests. A comparable effort at mobilizing opposition to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was initiated by labor movements in the United States, Canada, and Mexico with the support of
womens and environmentalist organizations. This effort failed but did
demonstrate a degree of political efficacy.
Increasingly, new social movements have become the vehicles of
protest and means of prospecting for alternative forms of social economy.
They have only partially been directed toward the state and have rarely
operated through formal electoral channels. They express more a will to
reconstitute civil society, and in some cases to construct what Yoshikazu
Sakamoto has characterized as a civic state on the basis of a strengthened
civil societya state that would be more fully responsive to the bottom-up
forces of civil society. This would be the direction in which one could
envisage a society that could reestablish harmony within the biosphere. It
must be recognized that this aspiration remains utopian. One intriguing
model is presented by the Zapatista rebellion in the Mexican state of
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Notes
1. Giambattista Vico, a philologist working in Naples in the early eighteenth
century, may be regarded as the first countermodernist (neither a premodernist nor a
postmodernist). It was very clear to him that the human mind was not adapted to
understanding the truth of the universe. It was, however, he thought, well adapted to
understanding the processes of historical change (Vico 1970).
2. I have sought to avoid imputing clandestine power to this partially visible,
or transparent, complex: The visible form is a photo opportunity accompanied by
an anodyne press communiqu. Far from being a sinister occult power, the
nbuleuse may turn out to be a Wizard of Oz. Perhaps no one, or no coherent structure, is really in control (Cox 1996d: 27).
4
CRITICAL THEORY AND THE
DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE: UNDERSTANDING
A CENTURY-OLD TRADITION
Craig N. Murphy
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Many other schools of scholars, lets call them uncritical scholars or problem-solving scholars (to follow Robert W. Cox), separate any meliorative
concerns they may have as citizens, religious devotees, and so on from
judgments about the success of their work in what they conceive of as a
value-neutral realm of social science. Many of the same scholars also see
little reason to judge their work on the democratic basis of the breadth of
the unconstrained consensus that it might enjoy. Quite the contrary, many
understand the history of more mature sciences as evidence that true scientific progress may lead to a progressive narrowing of the intellectual caste
that is capable of understanding the new truths as they are revealed.
Despite the fact that an uncritical view of science often has been the
one accepted by mainstream IR scholars, it is significant that the major progressive disciplinary changes that are recognized by almost all accounts of
international relations were not wrought by these uncritical, problem-solving schools, no matter how much more conventional their view of scientific
progress may be. The key changes were wrought by men and women who
both wanted the discipline to speak to an ever wider audience and were certain that the field had a socially progressive, meliorative function. Between
those moments of critical innovation, the academic discipline usually deteriorated along dimensions 3 and 4 even though more parsimonious, more
consistent, and (to a lesser extent) more encompassing work was produced
from year to year by the increasingly uncritical mainstream.
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the Soviets, proposals that were echoed in the interwar studies of some critical liberal internationalists, such as David Mitrany and Mary Parker
Follett, who, significantly, were never labeled as idealists or utopians by
the early canonical realists (Murphy 1998).
Finally, the early realist views suffered from neither of the sets of contradictions that typified many of their academic or policy-making contemporaries. As Jawaharlal Nehru argued in his brilliant contemporary analysis
of World War II, a key part of the political background both of the actual
appeasement policy of Britains conservative government and of the failure
to use the League to counter earlier fascist moves was the continuing sympathy that many reactionary policymakers had for the racist ideology
underlying fascism (Nehru 1985: 418, 481482). But no dewy-eyed, antiscientific Anglo-Saxonism clouded the early realists analysis. Nor, of
course, did the realists suffer from what we now might call the psychological denial that affected the interwar liberals whose own Wilsonian vision
had proven so flawed.
Of course, today, realism is rarely remembered as the international theory of the left. In the Cold War United States the theory became attached to
the name George Kennan, the formative intellectual of the postwar U.S.
world empire, and to such aging progressives as Niebuhr and Walter
Lippmann, who turned their backs on the socialist ideals that had guided
them throughout their most politically active years. By the late 1950s one
version of realism had become, in part, a justification for shielding foreign
policy makers from public scrutiny; it was the so-called realism of the
national-security expertsalong with their special, publicly inaccessible
knowledgethat made it best to let them make all those vital decisions
about the nuclear arms race, the NATO buildup, and land wars in poorly
understood parts of Asia.
Behaviorist Peace
Research as Democratic Challenge
Almost as soon as this uncritical form of realism gained ascendancy within
the journalistic and policy communities in the English-speaking world, it
was challenged from inside the academy. The challenge came in part from
scholars who are, often somewhat strangely, not considered part of the
canonical tradition of international relations. Most notable in this group are
the revisionist historians of U.S. foreign policy (see, for example, Williams
1959, LeFeber 1963, McCormick 1967). The challenge also came from
some, such as linguist Noam Chomsky and socialist activist Michael
Harrington, whose exclusion from the canon is more easily understood.
Chomsky and Harrington never based their critiques of uncritical realism
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on their academic expertise but asked simply that they be treated as the
observations of informed citizens within a democracy (Chomsky 1969;
Harrington 1977).
Nonetheless, there was one group within the academy that is still treated as part of the IR canon and that did link its critique to its academic
expertise: the early generation of behaviorist peace researchers. Elise
Boulding recalls the intellectual hothouse of the early years of scientific
peace research, especially at the University of Michigan, where she and
Kenneth Boulding crossed paths with J. David Singer, Anatol Rapoport,
Johan Galtung, and many others who shared a commitment to scientific
method and distrust of Cold War policymakers and their incoherent, superstition-laden, war-promoting observations about the world (Boulding
1997). She reports that in the still unquestionably sexist academic world of
the day, it fell to herthe woman with free timeto comb through the
scrap baskets and put together the newsletter that began to link the Ann
Arbor group to like-minded groupsRobert Norths astonishingly productive group of students at Stanford; Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, and
Hayward Alker at Yale; and others. This was the beginning of the
International Peace Research Association, the Peace Science Society, and
the research sections on foreign policy, peace studies, and the scientific
study of international processes within the International Studies
Association.
That these groups began with an essentially meliorative aim is hardly
questioned within the standard histories of the field. That their epistemological concerns were essentially democratic may surprise some in the current generation of critical theorists, but consider Ole Holstis paradigmatic
study of John Foster Dulless beliefs (Holsti 1962). Holsti hoped with his
research to help explain why Cold War foreign policy experts failed to live
up to their promise. The study shows that Dulles, far from being realistic,
was a rigid ideologue, someone incapable of having his core beliefs about
the Soviet Union moved by any change in Soviet behavior. Holsti demonstrates his conclusion by referring to information and forms of analysis
accessible to any citizen; to public documents, not secret insider knowledge; and to easily replicable systems of counting and readily calculated
correlations. With Holsti and the other behaviorist peace researchers, as
with Habermas, truth is largely that which is judged to be true by the
largest possible consensus of free women and men. Science, rather than the
much less accountable policy expertise, is the road to truth about international affairs, in large part simply because science is democratic.
The story of another wonderful article, from the waning years of the
Vietnam War, makes the point even more pointedly. J. David Singer and
Melvin Small used the generalizations about international affairs contained
in the presidential state-of-the-world messages to evaluate the theories
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including those whose interests and aspirations are not served by global
structures as they arethe excluded, the powerless, the hitherto unheard.
When contemporary IR critical theory is understood in this larger
wayas a movement concerned with vastly increasing the number of voices, the number of standpoints, reflected within the fieldthe movement,
too, can be seen as producing scientific progress within the discipline.
Almost invariably, todays critical theory accounts for more than uncritical
positivist studies of the same phenomena, if only because the critical theorist includes a wider range of people as objects to explain and as sources of
explanation. Liberal feminist Mona Harrington, for example, often can
explain much more than canonical liberal institutionalists, including her
mentor, Stanley Hoffmann, simply because she demands that her theories
account for the actions of women as well as they account for the actions of
men (cf. Harrington 1981 with Hoffmann 1968). Similarly, the internal
logic of much of todays critical theory is quite a bit more coherent than
that of much uncritical IR positivism simply because uncritical work often
must rely on loosely connected ad hoc arguments to explain away its failure
to include the entire universe of cases under its universal generalizations.3 And, of course, the inclusion of a wider range of people within critical theorys understanding of global politics mirrors its epistemological
commitment to wide, unconstrained consensus as a primary gauge of truth.
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order to identify quite clearly whom the order is not for, who is bound to be
peripheralized no matter which side wins the hegemonic debate over the
near-term global future (Vale 1995). And within international political
economy, Roger Tooze has written about the unwritten prefaces to neorealist and neoliberal classics, their authors silences about the quite restricted, often inherently undemocratic cultures in which they believe reliable
knowledge must be constituted (Tooze 1988).
Vales contribution is like many of those made by earlier IR critical
theorists when they followed the silences in the uncritical mainstream of
their day. The earliest academic IR scholars followed silences about imperialism that made it possible for policymakers to ignore the issue of undercompensated labor at home. The interwar realists saw Wilsonian denial
about the failure of the League and the rosy-eyed view of Adolf Hitler as a
sort of closet liberal internationalist as a useful mask for the unpleasant
reality that there were real alternatives to free-market liberalism on both the
left and the right. Cold War peace researchers uncovered the Western interests in maintaining the system of antagonistic blocs that lay behind the
mainstreams unwillingness to examine evidence of changing Soviet motivations. Anatol Rapoport, for example, wrote that it was foolish to look to
empirical peace research to provide expertise to end the bipolar conflict
simply because the problem was not that scholars knew too little about the
conflict but that the bipolar powers did not want to end the conflict. The
role of peace research was, instead, to undermine the legitimacy of the war
system via critical enlightenment in areas where obsolete thinking and
habits and vested interests perpetuate superstitions that stand in the way of
removing a very real threat to civilization (Rapoport 1988).
Each group of critical scholars also included those who, like Tooze,
examined the knowledge-constituting culture that generated the silences of
their day. The early anti-imperialists and the Cold Warera peace
researchers emphasized the way in which traditions of expertise led to the
denial of public scrutiny and, from there, to blindness to questions about
the systemic sources of competitive imperialism and superpower rivalry.
The interwar realists also explored the impact of a knowledge-constituting
culture that afforded scholars and policymakers an intellectual basis on
which to deny the evidence of the failure of the League and of the liberal
fundamentalist economic policies that had been imposed on weaker
nations. This culture is not dissimilar, as the distinguished Mexican economist Victor Urquidi argues, from the knowledge-constituting culture of
todays neoliberal economics and neoliberal international political economy (Urquidi 1992).
Early generations of critical IR theorists also reflected on the epistemological problem of disinterested objectivity in the social sciences. Hobson
and Carr both wrote that the key distinction between the natural and social
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sciences arose from the fact that doing social science was itself social
action that was bound to influence the things the (positivist) scientist merely wished to observe. The insight did not lead them to discard traditional
scholarly methods of question generation, evidence gathering, and verification, but it did lead them to caution themselves and their colleagues about
the potential, often unpredictable, impact of their own words, which could
become self-fulfilling prophecies or (perhaps more usefully) one of those
strange kinds of social myth that become a reality if they are believedfor
example, the myth of the collective power of the working class to transform
capitalism by the withdrawal of its labor power (Augelli and Murphy
1998).
Peace researchers Rapoport and Adam Curle took a similar set of
issues even further by noting that there are significant sets of real-world
conflicts that are unresolvable in the form of strategic games: asymmetric
conflicts (conflicts involving distributional inequalities) and ideological
conflicts, including conflicts of identity. Both are resolvable only in the
nonstrategic mode that Rapoport called debate, but social scientists cannot
explain (or predict) the successful outcome of debates. If we could, if we
could point to a specific sequence of actions that would invariably result in
one party convincing another party of the firsts way of seeing an issue of
identity or justice, actors would be able to use that pattern in a deceitful
way, as a strategy to win compliance, thus turning the debate back into a
strategic game in which the conflict is unresolvable. As a result, Rapoport
argued, we social scientists really cannot produce any positive theory relevant to the general problem of making peace in most of the conflicts that
plague the world, but we can say something about the ethics of debate,
about the type of discourse situation that must be maintained if we want to
have any hope that a conflict involving questions of injustice or identity
can be resolved (Rapoport 1962: 128; Curle 1971: 183189).
Mark Hoffman, one of the leading figures in the new generation of IR
critical theory, has taken that conclusion to heart in his actions and research
as a third-party facilitator within protracted social conflicts. Conflict workshops create the possibility of Rapoport-style debate that may allow conflicts of injustice or identity to be resolved by the parties involved
(Hoffman 1992). This type of debate is, in fact, one significant way in
which contemporary critical theory has had programmatic impact on the
practice of some egalitarian social movements, specifically those that have
become explicit parties in protracted conflicts in which violence has been
one of a number of strategies used to promote the interests and aspirations
of the least advantaged. I believe it is also significant that this important
input into egalitarian practice simply continues and replicates one of the
inputs of the previous generation of scholars whose work reflected the
democratic impulse within the field.
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Notes
1. In terms of the history of postwar IR, it is interesting that the Kegley and
Bretall volume was edited by the father of positivist foreign policy, analyst Charles
W. Kegley Jr., whose recent work has come out of a critical peace research tradition
and emphasizes liberal-internationalist democratic peace arguments that are more
typical of Hobson or Balch. See Kegley and Raymond 1994.
2. This link is recognized by a number of those who admire Robert W. Coxs
work and is, perhaps, reflected in his choice of a designation for the eclectic combination of insights from Gramsci, Polanyi, and others (Cox 1997).
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PART TWO
CRITIQUE IN CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
5
THE NATURE OF CRITIQUE IN CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Kimberly Hutchings
In this chapter the aim is to focus attention on the nature of critique in the
kind of international relations theory that refers to itself as critical. I begin
by drawing attention to the fact that there are different forms of critical
international relations theory. What is sometimes identified as critical theory proper tends to rely heavily on Marxist or Frankfurt School sources. In
contrast, postmodernist and feminist IR theory, which also sees itself as
critical, draws on a range of post-Marxist inspirations. In spite of this diversity of theoretical grounding, however, I argue that it is possible to identify
a common element that helps to identify all these theoretical approaches as
critical. It is my contention that this common element reflects a logic that
can be traced back to the origins of the idea of critique in the work of Kant.
I then go on to suggest that, as with Kantian critique, there are both dangers
and possibilities inherent in the kind of critical theoretical turn in international relations (IR) that is the subject of this book. The dangers can be
summed up as those of lapsing back into the wars of reason between realist
and idealist perspectives, which critical theory in international relations is
actually supposed to have transcended. These dangers, I argue, are largely
responsible for the tendency of critical IR theory to remain trapped within
unsolvable theoretical debates rather than turning attention toward redirecting empirical research and specific explanation. The possibilities of critical
IR theory relate to the ways in which it opens up our understanding of the
scope and potential of developments in international politics. There are two
dimensions to critical theorys contribution here: On the one hand, by challenging the traditional limitations on explanation, critical theory extends
the capacity of social scientists to account for particular phenomena; on the
other hand, by never taking the limitations and conditions of possibility of
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contemporary world politics as given, critical theorists elucidate the possibilities and probabilities of change.
There are at least four general positions that can claim to be examples
of critical theory in the international relations context. First, there is neoGramscian work on global political economy and international politics,
most notably exemplified by the work of Robert W. Cox (see, for example,
1996a). Second, there is explanatory and normative theory, such as that of
Andrew Linklater (Linklater 1990a, 1990b, 1998), which draws on the
work of the Frankfurt School and of Jrgen Habermas in particular. Third,
there is postmodernist worksuch as that of Richard Ashley (1988), R.B.J.
Walker (1993, Ashley and Walker 1990), James Der Derian (1987, Der
Derian and Shapiro 1989), and Jens Bartelson (1995)that draws on a
range of poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophers, of which Michel
Foucault and Jacques Derrida are the most significant (on Foucault, see
Hutchings 1997). Fourth, there is feminist work, such as that of Jean
Elshtain (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1989), Christine Sylvester (1994), V. Spike
Peterson (1992a), Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (1991), and Ann
Tickner (1992), which draws on a very wide range of traditions (including
Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and postmodernism) but always insofar as
those traditions have been mediated by the insights of the diversity of theoretical traditions peculiar to feminism (see also Hutchings 1994). In none of
these four categories is there an exact consensus about what that particular
version of critical theory should look like. This means that it is no easy
matter to pin down what being critical means or to work out whether there
is anything in common among the perspectives that all see themselves as
critical. I suggest, however, that there is a certain common logic at work in
these different critical positions. This is not an argument that all these different perspectives are saying the same thing but simply that insofar as they
involve a critical aspect, they share certain formal characteristics that have
particular theoretical and practical consequences.
The best way of summing up what all the previously mentioned critical
theories have in common, I would suggest, is to say that they are all
engaged in tracing and challenging given limits, most obviously the limits
given in the dominant neorealist perspectives on the explanation and judgment of international politics but also, particularly in the case of some postmodernist and feminist work, those inherent in more liberal, idealist
approaches. There are two interrelated ways in which critical theories
accomplish this. One is by focusing on the ways in which the object of
investigation in international relations fails to fit within the limits prescribed for it by more orthodox approaches. This approach involves a challenge to the ontological assumptions that have governed prevalent thinking
about what constitutes and accounts for international relations (in realisms
case a particular conception of the state and the interstate system operating
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kinds of explanation are seen to derive from the norms embedded in either
hegemonic or counterhegemonic discourses. This observation directly challenges the line drawn by traditional international relations theory between
facts and values. In addition, the identification of norms as within history
rather than located in the conscience of the historian undermines the
assumption common to both realism and idealism that the spheres of politics and morality are inherently distinct. For Cox, moral ends are a potential
of his object of investigation and are open to being recognized and encouraged by the critical theorist but are not invented by him or her.
Linklaters work has much in common with Coxs. In Beyond Realism
and Marxism, Linklater also argues that analysis in international relations
that is restricted to interstate relations fails to recognize the role of sub- and
transstate political and economic forces in conditioning the possibilities of
international politics (Linklater 1990b: 17). As with Coxs work,
Linklaters argument is not designed to dismiss the insights of realism but
to identify their partiality and examine the role of what has been excluded
in order to enhance explanation and understanding in the field. Like Cox
again, Linklater seeks to bring history into the ahistorical assumptions of
traditional international relations theory and to challenge the claim to neutrality in its theoretical and methodological framework. In Linklaters case,
however, there is a specific variant of the challenge to the fact/value and
politics/morality distinctions that are constitutive of classical realism and
idealism. Whereas Cox works with the notion of hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses, Linklater draws on Habermass discourse ethics and
theory of historical development to identify the potential of modern states
to transcend the logic of the state system reflected by realism (Linklater
1990b: 163164; see also 1992b: 3536). Among the conditions of possibility that realism takes as eternally given (i.e., the state) is a notion of right
that points beyond particular interest. Over time, a pattern of collective
learning oriented by the logic of communication itself may enable the transcendence of the anarchy problematique. Thus the presumptions of realist
analysis have to be rethought not only in terms of the ways they have been
historically produced or constructed but also in terms of their capacity for
self-transcendence, conceptually and in practice.
Postmodernist approaches to international relations depart from the
work of Cox and Linklater insofar as postmodernists are suspicious of any
reference to or reliance on notions of progress in history, whether of a
Marxist or Habermasian kind. In addition, postmodernist work focuses less
on the specification of what international politics is than on the ways it has
been discursively constructed by the discipline of international relations
itselflargely because postmodernists insist on the impossibility of disentangling questions of what is from discourses about what Is. This conviction is evident in the work of Der Derian on diplomacy and Bartelson on
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sense or as postmodernist and that therefore reflect many of the characteristics of the positions previously noted (Hutchings 1995: 169185).
Feminists, like other critical theorists, question the existing ontological and
epistemological assumptions of international relations theory. In particular
they draw attention to the consequences for those assumptions of considering gender as one of the crucial conditions of possibility both for contemporary interstate relations and for the realist worldview. The work of critics
such as Elshtain and Enloe has drawn attention to the fact that gendered
divisions of labor and constructions of femininity and masculinity underlie
many practices in contextsfrom diplomacy to the militarythat are central to the realist perception of international politics. The work of Tickner
and Peterson has challenged the positivist claim to neutrality by pointing
out the gendered assumptions that help to construct the building blocks of
positivist analysis and methodology (Tickner 1991; Peterson 1992b). Once
more it is argued that the assertion of a fact/value split and of a
morality/politics distinction collapses in the face of investigation of how
that distinction is produced and sustained within theory. With regard to the
morality/politics split, one of the most significant strands in feminist thinking about war has been a set of claims about the normative standard inherent in the caring work most commonly carried out by women and its potential both to maintain and to subvert the possibility of war as an acceptable
last resort in international politics (Ruddick 1990).
The previous brief overview has served to illustrate my initial claim
that at least one significant feature is shared by the different theoretical
approaches to international politics that see themselves as critical: They all
trace and challenge the ontological and epistemological limits given in traditional realist analysis. However, a certain tension has become evident
between the critical perspectives that might be seen as in the mainstream of
critical theory and the postmodernist approach. This tension has its ground
in the different answers the alternative critical theories would give to the
question of how their own critique is possiblethe question, in other
words, of the conditions of possibility of the critical theorists challenge to
the conditions of possibility of realism. It is fairly clear from the previous
account that Cox and Linklater suggest a dual answer in accounting for
their own critique: First, they both operate with a concept of emancipation
that functions as a principle for judgment of the contemporary world order;
second, they both argue that this normative principle of critique is immanent, even if by no means necessarily realizable, within history. This dual
ground, which each would account for differently by reference to the theoretical sources on which they draw, enables a more definite account of better-worse judgments and outcomes than is offered by postmodernist theorists. The way postmodernist theorists answer the question of how their
critique is possible involves no such reference to values immanent within
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suggested that critical theory of international relations, like Kantian critique, is an attempt to transcend the wars of reason in which realist analysis
is countered by idealism and vice versa. In accounting for its own authority,
however, critique in international relations also follows Kant in threatening
to fight the battles of reason all over again. Characterizing the critical other
as a modernist dogmatist or a postmodernist skeptic merely returns theory
to a tedious and unwinnable war. At the same time it encourages critics to
identify their own critical practice as having overcome the difficulties of
critique rather than as preserving and acknowledging its tensions, thus rendering critique uncritical once again.
The problems critique encounters when it attempts to ground its own
authority represent the dangerous road that is all too easy for critical IR
theory to take, whether it goes in a skeptical or dogmatic direction. For the
critical theorist, it is impossible either to ground critique securely or to
abandon the notion of critical authority. The mark of critique is precisely a
fundamental insecurity about its conditions of possibility. This insecurity is
best summed up as a capacity for constant theoretical self-reflection in
which the vulnerability of the conditions of possibility of critique is
acknowledged even as its claim to authoritative judgment is made. The preoccupation with the ground of critique is dangerous because it forces critical work into a philosophical argument that, as Kant shows, is both violent
and unresolvable. Thus the energies of critique get caught up in a backward-looking theoretical debate rather than being pushed outward into the
exploration of how critical insights may be used to strengthen understanding and explanation in the realm of international politics. This regressive
debate occurs in critical IR theory when the tension between different ways
of grounding critique becomes the focus of attention. If no ultimate
accounting for the authority of the judgments of critical theory is possible,
the only way critical theory can prove itself is through more modest and
pragmatic means. These means amount, I suggest, to a critique of orthodox
theoretical frameworks and methodologies on the one hand and on the
other to a clear indication of the explanatory benefits and costs of moving
beyond those frameworks and methodologies in specific contexts.
In the previous brief discussions of the different forms of critical IR
theory, I focused principally on the critique of orthodoxy, which is characteristic of critical theory. Essentially, this critique demonstrates that realisms account of its own assumptions is open to question and that those
assumptions may be better accounted for by a rethinking of the conditions
of possibility of realist work. How can this rethinking be carried out? One
way would be to seek to demonstrate that the validity of the judgment of
the critical theorist can be proved by its being traced back to ground superior to that on which the realist rests his or her case, a move that involves the
critical theorist demonstrating his or her epistemological and ethical
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The third kind of work would focus on phenomena that realism tended
to exclude or see as marginal to mainstream explanation of interstate
behavior, such as transnational organizations, new social movements,
nationalism, and democracy. Here critical theory is likely to find much in
common with contemporary work in development studies, global political
economy, sociology, and political science, which all testify to the difficulty
of operating on the presumption of the state as the crucial constitutive limit
on the analysis of economic and social order or normative political agendas.
For many critical theorists of international relations it would seem as if
the previous discussion misses one very important dimension of critical
theory: I have focused on what critical explanatory work in international
relations might look like but have not mentioned the normative element
that is common to this sort of critique. Critical theorys quarrel with realism
has never been a purely social scientific one; it has also always been about
values and their importance not just as phenomena that are part of international politics but as something that acts as a focus or orientation for social
scientific work and the kinds of policy priorities that may follow from it.
Above all, critical theorists of all persuasions, including postmodernists,
have stressed that critique is necessarily bound up with freedom (Hutchings
1995: 158165). In what sense does the kind of work I have mentioned
incorporate this dimension? Here, once again, it is tempting to see historicist and Habermasian critics as lined up against postmodernists, with the
former claiming a grasp of at least some of the determinate conditions of
freedom (emancipation) and the latter arguing that freedom can be understood only negatively, in terms of resistance to determination (transgression). According to these responses, the link between critique and freedom
would be realized in terms of condemnation or prescription depending on
whether a particular analysis did or did not fulfill either emancipatory or
transgressive criteria. This answer to the question of the normative dimension of critical theory returns us to the wars of reason, since it reopens the
unresolvable debate about the grounds of critique, this time in terms of
rival accounts of freedom.
However, there is a more minimal normative sense in which historicist,
Habermasian, postmodernist, and feminist critical theorists can all claim
that their theoretical work is grounded in and oriented toward freedom.
This sense derives from the commitment of all critical theorists to always
consider the question of the conditions of possibility of both the theory and
practice of international politics. This question has infinite implications, it
can never be definitively answered, and it rests on the assumption that no
conditions are simply given but all are produced and constructed. By stressing this claim as a universal presumption of critique, critical theorists are
also committed to the revisability in principle of any given theoretical posi-
90
tion or state of affairs. When critical theorists move beyond this claim to
the specific prescription of one path rather than another or the condemnation of what is in terms of what might or ought to be, they are building on a
deeper insight that is fundamental to all critique. What cannot be revised is
the assumption of the revisability of conditions itself. I would argue, therefore, that it is possible for IR theory to be critical without being specifically
prescriptive as long as it involves the exposure of conditions of possibility
in the sense already discussed. Specifically, prescriptive critical theory is
certainly not ruled out, but as long as it remains critical it must continue to
make explicit the fundamental assumption on which it rests. Thus prescriptive critical theorists need to be cautious and to articulate as clearly as possible their own (revisable) basis for the claims they are making. Moreover,
prescriptive critical theorists must always acknowledge that no normative
position is nonexclusive or unchallengeable. Perhaps most important, all
critical theorists should be clear that the possibility of revision of things as
they are is purely theoretical unless and until revision either is or becomes
the burden of actual economic, social, or political movements and forces.
The actual effects of critical theorizing are not guaranteed and cannot be
known in advance.
The irony of the previous discussion, of course, is that it is theoretical
and may therefore be seen as falling foul of the common complaint about
critical theory, that is, that it has failed significantly to further the explanation and understanding of an increasingly complex and obscure world of
international politics. What I have tried to argue in this chapter is that this
charge can be made reasonably against critical theory only insofar as it
allows itself to be distracted by philosophical debates about the ground of
critique, debates that actually rest on a fundamental misconception of what
critique means. Critique is premised on the impossibility of a definitive
answer to the conditions of its own possibility and can only content itself
with the acknowledgment of the revisability of any grounds on which its
specific claims are based. The positive potential of critical theory lies in its
widening the range of phenomena relevant to the explanation of international politics and a range of questions that a realist agenda rules out in
advance. The significance of critical theory will be demonstrated in two
ways in the future: first, in the empirical work that is being and will be carried out in the wake of its theoretical challenge; second, in the extent to
which critical theorys constant reminder that the world need not be as it is
chimes in with world historical, social, economic, and political forces
forces that are way beyond the control of the critical theorist.
6
NEGATIVE DIALECTIC?
THE TWO MODES OF CRITICAL
THEORY IN WORLD POLITICS
N. J. Rengger
Almost coterminous with the birth of the modern states system has been the
development of the many attempts to transcend it. At its conceptual inception in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were many who
bitterly opposed it, seeing it as little better than a law of the jungle and a
denial of everything they felt Christian Europe stood for. Perhaps the most
eloquent, and still among the most interesting, of these figures is Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (Riley 1992, 1996; see also Nardin, Brown, and Rengger
1998). However, Leibnizs affection for the medieval conception of the
Respublica Christiana was not the route that disaffection with the states
system was increasingly to take in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
even though, significantly, it is perhaps increasingly relevant today.
For those who felt that the order created by the states system most
strongly resembled the order of the grave, the procession of attempts,
begun by the Abbe de St. Pierre, to find a way of converting the system into
one of perpetual peace is perhaps the best-known attempt to transcend the
states system. Commented on at the end of his long life by Leibniz and
throughout the eighteenth century by writers such as Rousseau, perhaps the
most famous version of this attempt today is Kants justly celebrated essay
Perpetual Peace, first published in 1795 (in Reiss 1970). Kant sketched a
program for the gradual transcendence of the states system in all but name
and its replacement by a system of cosmopolitan law.
Kant, of course, is usuallyand often rightlyseen as a liberal.
However, there is in Kants thinking a radicality that many liberals shy
away from. It is perhaps most clearly displayed in his writings on international relations; it was, after all, Kant who famously referred to his predecessors in the fieldGrotians and realists alikeas sorry comforters
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Negative Dialectic?
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94
Thus in this chapter I want to offer a general argument connecting certain key Frankfurt School themes with the use to which they have been put
in critical international relations theory. I will return in my concluding
remarks to what this general argument might imply for other critical literatures in contemporary international theory.
Negative Dialectic?
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96
Outhwaite 1994; Held 1980). Habermass influence on contemporary critical theory in all of its variants is almost impossible to overstate. Both in his
native Germany and elsewhere, especially in the United States, Habermas
has become a major influence.2 Most especially in the current context, he
has been far and away the most influential critical theorist as far as critical
theory in international relations is concerned. With rather more qualifications and hesitations, such optimism is shared by the minence grise of critical IR theoryand by the most influential Gramscian, Robert Cox, as well
as by some of his friends and followers, such as Stephen Gill. It is also the
view of some of the most robust feminist scholars of international relations,
for example, Ann Tickner (Tickner 1992); and it is shared with various
emendations of content or temper by many working in what is now called
critical security studies, for example, and especially, Ken Booth (Booth
1991a, 1991b, 1995). And though this is less relevant here, it is a common
assumption of virtually all the related critical theories I have referred to.
Mark Hoffman, in his essay on the trajectory of critical theory in international studiesCritical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debatehas
called this optimistic impulse utopian and, notwithstanding the extremely
bad press this term has had in twentieth-century international relations, I
suggest that he is right to do so (Hoffman 1987).3 It is utopian in the sense
that all the best emancipatory theory is utopian, and as the early Frankfurt
School was, following the sense of utopia made famous in the work of
Adornos friend Ernst Blochs magnificent The Principle of Hope (Bloch
1986; also useful is Geoghan 1995).
I want to suggest, in fact, that the emancipatory project of critical theory in IRas opposed to, for example, its value as a salutary discourse
depends on this optimism. Indeed, I want to suggest that notwithstanding
all their differences, all those committed to an emancipatory project in contemporary world politics share this optimistic impulse. Thus, however
much they might differ from Frankfurt School critical theory in emphasis
and orientation, they will perforce share the belief that the progressive
transformation of society is possible. They must.4
However, I suggest that there are problems inherent in this view, that
the project of emancipation in critical theory at one and the same time
develops what we might call a dark side. It is this dark side that was the
source of Adornos pessimism and it is this side, I suggest, that critical theory in international relations must confront if it is to make good on its
emancipatory project.
Negative Dialectic?
97
theory. I shall do so first through the work of the foremost critical theorist
of international relations, Andrew Linklater. Linklater is, without doubt, the
most penetrating critical IR theorist writing in the tradition of the Frankfurt
School. Inasmuch as the future of critical theory lies with critical international relations theory, a view subscribed to by a number of noninternational critical theorists as well asas you might expectby a number of
international critical theorists, it seems certain that Linklaters influence
will grow.5
Linklater has recently provided a useful and powerful interpretation of
what he considers to have been the achievements of critical theory, and he
has amplified this interpretation in his most recent book (Linklater 1996b,
1998). He thinks, in brief, that critical theory has four main achievements.
First, it has taken issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge always
reflects preexisting social purposes and interests. In the context of IR theory this argument has led to powerful criticisms of rationalist theory and
what Linklater calls a gradual recovery of a project of enlightenment and
emancipation reworked to escape the familiar pitfalls of idealism. Second,
critical theory stands opposed to claims that the existing structures of the
social world are immutable and examines the prospects for greater freedom immanent within existing social relations. Third, critical theory
learns from and overcomes the weaknesses inherent in Marxism, emphasizing forms of social learning, drawing very heavily on Habermass reconstruction of historical materialism, and opening up new possibilities for
constructing a historical sociology with an emancipatory purpose.
Fourth,
critical theory judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace
open dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political community which break with unjustified exclusion. . . . Critical theory . . .
envisages the use of unconstrained discourse to determine the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine the possibility of postsovereign forms of political life. (Linklater 1996b: 279280)
98
He goes on to point out three things about discourse ethics: It is universalistic, it is democratic, and it is a form of moral, practical reasoning that is
not simply guided by utilitarian calculations or expediency, nor is it guided by an imposed concept of the good life. Rather, it is guided by justice
(169).
Negative Dialectic?
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The implications of this view for world politics have been developed in
differing ways by different critical theorists. However, in general terms, as
Devetak says, three broad implications stand out. The first is concerned
with the evolution of more generally democratic forms of global governance and is predicated on an explicit critique of the state as simply inadequate, both practically and ethically, for contemporary decisionmaking. As
David Held, the critical theorist who has perhaps done most to develop this
line of argument, notes, Whose consent is necessary and whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for instance, AIDS, or acid rain, or
the use of non-renewable resources? What is the relevant constituency,
national, regional or international? (cited by Devetak 1996b: 171; see also
Held 1992, 1995). Second, and perhaps potentially most immediately fruitful, discourse ethics offers a way of thinking about and regulating conflict.
The critical theorist who has developed this line of argument most thoroughly and interestingly is Mark Hoffman (Hoffman 1992). Again, discourse ethics offers a way of being inclusive without denying difference.
Third, Devetak suggests that discourse ethics offers a means of criticising
and justifying the principles by which the species organizes itself politically, that is it reflects on the principles of inclusion and exclusion (Devetak
1996b: 172). Since in principle no one should be excluded from any
process that affects them, actually or potentially, this becomes a very clear
cosmopolitan universalism that suggests that the problem of order can
openly be overcome through the progressive evolution of what Linklater
calls the social bond of all with all (Linklater 1993: 119).
Critical IR theory is thus committed, I think, to a version of institutional as well as moral cosmopolitanism, to use Charles Beitzs well-known
terms (Beitz 1993). 6 Indeed, Linklater, toward the end of both Beyond
Realism and Marxism and The Transformation of Political Community, has
made explicit that in his view the future of critical theory depends on its
ability to develop analyses and institutions that actually help to restructure
world politics along the lines suggested by this analysis.
Negative Dialectic?
The question arises, however, How can critical theory, even on its own
terms, be emancipatory in the required sense? I suggest that in fact critical
theory has a profound ambiguity about the question of emancipation, that
critical theory is engaged, in a sense, in a negative dialectic with itself on
this question. This ambiguity can be most clearly seen in the work of
Adorno, and so I shall turn to him before assessing the implications of this
reading for critical IR theory.
It would obviously be impossible to offer even a sketch of a thinker as
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Negative Dialectic?
101
nology [and one must add here most contemporary poststructural thinking
as well] . . . directs itself to the problem of nihilism. . . . Adornos original
insight . . . was the identification of the common root . . . and hence the
demand for a theory that would address each dilemma without losing sight
of the other. (Bernstein 1995: 28; emphasis added)
In terms of the basic criteria that Bernstein lays out for a critical theory, it is
clear that the first requirement, a noninstrumental conception of reason,
addresses the first problem and that the second, a nonfunctionalist conception of culture, addresses the second. However, as Bernstein puts it, The
harmonization requirement constrains the satisfaction of the first criterion
such that it becomes answerable to the demands of the second (Bernstein
1995: 28).
This discussion provides Bernstein with a way of reviewing the obvious differences between Habermas and Adorno. Fundamentally, he says,
they differ with respect to the weight and focus they offer to the justice
and meaning questions: Habermas believes that Adorno slights the question of justice in his engagement with the nihilism question, hence giving
undue significance to the role of art in his theory and, by implication,
espousing a position which could only be satisfied through a Utopian reenchantment of the social and natural worlds. From an Adornoesque perspective, Habermas focus on the justice problem entails surrender over
the question of nihilism, falsely assuming that total disenchantment would
not be existentially equivalent to total reification. (Bernstein 1995: 29)
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Negative Dialectic?
103
104
Negative Dialectic?
105
106
project in its dominant modes in contemporary international relations theory is notit is, and must be, proactive.
Conclusion
If all of the preceding argument is plausible, then the emancipatory project
in IR theory faces a fatefuland possibly a fataldilemma. To make good
on its emancipatory agenda, critical IR theory will have to show both that
the Adorno problem can be resolved and that it can add something to other
ways of dealing with the task of social change that distinguishes it from the
more radical forms of liberalism, without tipping it back into the clutches
of instrumental rationality.
I do not suppose for a moment that critical theory is without the
resources to perform this task. As Linklater himself suggests, one of its
great strengths is the alliances it can build with other forms of critique.
There is therefore much that critical theory might do to seek to overcome
this negative dialectic. The various strands of so-called postpositivist theory in international relations do indeed reinforce each other on certain key
issues, and it might be that this is one issue where the insights of some
poststructural thoughtso close often to Adornos ownmight usefully be
brought to bear. Critical theorists, even Habermas in practice if not always
in theory, could also point to their emphasis on totality. It is the emphasis
on the whole, on interaction and interrelations, that can, they might suggest, help them avoid various forms of reification. Surely in this context
they might avoid collapsing tactics into strategy (in de Certeaus sense) but
hold them together dialectically.
My response would be to admit that it is perhaps a fruitful avenue for
critical theory (and indeed for some aspects of post-Nietzschean, poststructural thought) to explore. However, it crucially depends on the initial
assumptions developed by critical theory being truedepends, in other
words, on the common root being a necessary rather than a contingent
problem of modernity.
This claim is rooted in the philosophical parentage of critical theory
and poststructuralism, of course; they are profoundly the children of
Nietzsche and Weber, however much they might have rebelled at parental
authority. Along with much twentieth-century thought, they are deeply suspicious of and ambivalent about the rise of the methods and institutions of a
science that seems unstoppable and unanswerable and yet that constantly
threatens, they think, to depersonalize and dehumanize. It is this threat that
gives rise chiefly, I think, to Adornos despair at the modern world. If
instrumental rationality is the villain and the two greatest and most protean
forces of the modern world, capitalism and science, are precisely the areas
Negative Dialectic?
107
Notes
This is an extensive revision of a paper originally given at the Critical Theory and
World Politics Conference at Aberystwyth. All participants to the conference should
be thanked (and none blamed) for the use to which I have put their very helpful
comments. I must also thank Hayward Alker, Jay Bernstein, Chris Brown, Ian
Forbes, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater, Craig Murphy, Onora ONeill, Maurizio
Passerein DEntreves, Ann Tickner, and Richard Wyn Jones for many helpful discussions over several years on all aspects of critical theory, both in general and in
the IR context. It almost (but not quite) makes me think there might be something in
Habermass notion of an ideal speech situation of unconstrained communication! If
there was, these worthies would certainly be ideal citizens for it.
108
1. And sometimes an even wider use is intended. Many contemporary international relations theorists, for example, refer to other constructivists as critical theorists as well. This is clearly the view that lies behind the recent critiques of critical
theory by John Mearsheimer (19941995) and Stephen Walt (1996).
2. It is probably true, and not irrelevant in the present context, that we are now
witnessing the effective emergence of a third generation of critical theorists in both
Europe and North America whose concerns are still wider than those of Habermas
and certainly include, increasingly, questions that are traditionally central for international relations (such as development, globalization, democratization). This third
generation of theorists would include, by my reckoning, Axel Honneth, who has
inherited Habermass chair at Frankfurt, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, Ken
Baynes, James Bohman, David Held, and possibly such scholars as Maurizio
Passerein DEntreves. Many of these have written on IRfor example, the essays
in Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (1997)and Held has been a powerful advocate of
cosmopolitan democracy, one of the real growth areas in contemporary IR. Taken
together with the work of scholars such as Linklater, who is more or less of an age
with these figures, these developments presage a real growth in critical IR theory
over the next few years.
3. See the subsequent exchange in Rengger 1988 and Hoffman 1988. Since
there has been some comment on this exchange (see, for example, George 1994 and
Smith 1995) and since, despite the fact that Hoffman and I later published a joint
essay amending our respective positions (Rengger and Hoffman 1992), some of this
comment has been rather inaccurate, it seems appropriate to correct any misperceptions there might have been. Hoffman is usually seen (correctly) as an advocate of
critical theory, I often (and incorrectly) as an opponent of it from a broadly poststructural position. At the risk of sounding like a witness to the House Un-American
Activities Committee, I am not now, nor have I ever been a poststructuralist. Of
course, there is a good deal in poststructural IR theory with which I agreeas I do
indeed with critical theorybut there is also much that I dissent from. My intention
in my original response to Hoffman was merely to point out that critical theory in
IR studies was already a mixture of the emancipatory and the poststructural and
that, as a result, Hoffmans version of critical theory (i.e., Frankfurt School and
Gramscian-inspired emancipatory critical theory) was unlikely to be the next stage
of international relations theory. I would now put this view rather differently, and
indeed, that is what I am doing in this chapter.
4. It is worth pointing out that a number of the early critical theorists became
increasingly mystical, even theological, in their old age (this is true even of Adorno,
though he also remained a resolute atheist, a mixture very reminiscent of Bloch). I
suggest that the reason is simply that one of the strongest ways of being utopian in
the required sense is a theological way, even if there is the minor inconvenience of
(probably) having to believe in God. Contemporary critical theorists, for example,
Habermas and Linklater, do not do this, of courseat least not yet.
5. It is interesting in this context that Linklater is virtually ignored in mainstream attacks on critical theory. There might be any number of reasons for this. I
suggest that one powerful one is simply how difficult it is for mainstream scholars
to attack Linklater without engaging in genuine debate with his Habermasianderived project. It is much safer and far easiergiven their own assumptionsto
restrict their criticisms to constructivists they can co-opt (or try to) or poststructuralists they can patronize (or try to). As Linklaters own brilliant demolition job
on neorealism shows, critical theory is extremely difficult to do, partly because it
seeks to radicalize the very project mainstream scholars such as Keohane see themselves committed to.
Negative Dialectic?
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7
GLOBAL REALISM:
UNMASKING POWER IN THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Jeffrey Harrod
After the defeat of the aristocratic government, the middle classes developed a system of indirect domination. They replaced the traditional division into the governing and governed classes, and the military method of
open violence characteristic of aristocratic rule, with the invisible chains
of economic dependence. This economic system operated through a network of seemingly equalitarian legal rules which concealed the very existence of power relations.
Hans J. Morgenthau (1967)
Nevertheless, economic considerations derive such weight as they have
from the fact that economics are oneand an essentialaspect both of
political and military power. The activities of monopolist enterprises on
the national and international levels deserve attention by the student of
international relations for an additional reason. He can analyse here the
workings of power politics in a field in which all means of power, short of
military power, are applied.
Georg Schwarzenberger (1951)
In this chapter it is first argued that realism as an approach to the comprehension of society and politicsa real, or societal, realismmust be distinguished from a realism that emerged as central to the study of interstate
relations, or international relations (IR) realism. Realism as an approach
and a philosophy was essentially developed for and directed at relations
within societies, and its application to relations between societiesnation
statesnot only has introduced confusion in the discussion of international
politics but also has hindered its more useful application to global society.
The second claim is that the contemporary rise of the power of the corpora111
112
tion at the expense of the state has produced in the current period powerdisguising rationalities that, more than ever, require the application of the
original realism project of unmasking social and political power. In conclusion, it is noted that a global realism, as part of critical theory, is needed as
an approach to comprehend contemporary developments and thereby lay
the foundations to change them.
Global Realism
113
These two authors influenced a whole generation of writing within academic international relations and, in the case of Morgenthau through the
impact of his books, the practice of U.S. foreign policy in the training of
diplomatic and political personnel. Georg Schwarzenbergers Power
Politics (1951, first published in 1949) saw three editions and many translations and was particularly important in Japan and Latin America. Hans
Morgenthaus Politics Among Nations (1967, first published in 1948) was,
it hardly bears to repeat, the basic university text in the United States
(whether used positively or negatively) for international relations courses
for more than two decades.
In understanding their approach, we must consider the similarity of
their backgrounds. Both were German, both left Germany in the 1930s
essentially as escapees, and both had studied law. Thus they both wrote in
English for a primarily Anglo-American readership. Naturally, both were
influenced by the writers of early-twentieth-century Germany and continental Europe. For Morgenthau, Max Weber was important, whereas
Schwarzenberger used Arthur Schopenhauer and Ferdinand Tennies to
elaborate the concepts of society and community, which for him yielded the
crucial distinction between a power-oriented society based on interest and
fear and an idealistic community based on self-sacrifice and love
(Schwarzenberger 1951: 12).
In basing their writings on the elements of realism found within the
works of these writers and such others as Joseph Schumpeter, Karl
Mannheim, and Bertrand Russell, they were societal realists, that is, as
with most of their own intellectual mentors, their original focus was on
the discrete societal level. This observation applies more to Morgenthau
than to Schwarzenberger, although in lectures the latter was most insistent on a power approach at all levels. Furthermore, Schwarzenbergers
definition of international relations hints at the origin of the tools of
analysis and the problems it would bequeath. For him the study of international relations was the branch of sociology which is concerned with
international society (Schwarzenberger 1951: 8), of which nation states
were members.
It is perhaps significant, then, that neither of them were greatly concerned with the intellectual input to classical IR realism. Niccol
Machiavelli, for example, is one such source (although, in fact, his writing
was more about the internal governance of principalities than the relationships among them [Hale 1996]), and there is sufficient material within The
Prince to make it a founding text for IR realism. Yet Morgenthau was
overtly critical of Machiavellis discounting of the importance of the
opposing force of morality and principle within power relations
(Morgenthau 1967: 220), and Schwarzenberger was inclined to see the
Machiavellian view as too simplistic (Schwarzenberger 1951: 219) and
114
therefore respected him more for revelation of the disguises of power rather
than as a guide to action.
In seeking to reveal the nature and source of power and its mechanism
of operation, they were to some extent like other realists reacting to the
excessive romanticism, legalism, and ideology that sought to disguise
them. E. H. Carr, considered to be another realist, noted in his Twenty
Years Crisis, written in 1939, that it was written with the deliberate aim of
counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly all thinking, both
academic and popular, about international politics in English-speaking
countries from 19191939the almost total neglect of the factor of power
(Carr 1946: vii). But Schwarzenberger and Morgenthau were as much concerned about the disguise and operation of power as the fact that power was
being ignored. Morgenthau, for example, was particularly scathing about
those who believed in the essence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,
under which all the fifty-four signatory states agreed to renounce war as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another
(Morgenthau 1967: 265); Schwarzenberger noted that the origin of this pact
was the French desire to prevent U.S. use of force against France, whereas
in response, the US State Department served warning that more than one
power could play the game of drafting seemingly innocuous pacts with
arrire-penses of its own (Schwarzenberger 1951: 505).
Schwarzenbergers central question in revealing power was to ask the
heuristic question, Qui bono?Who benefits? Asking the question, Who
benefits? was the first step to unraveling what he called power politics in
disguise. Morgenthau went further in moving toward developing an axiom
about social power itself:
Actually, however, the very threat of a world where power reigns not only
supreme, but without rival, engenders the revolt against power which is as
universal as the aspiration for power itself. To stave off this revolt, to
pacify the resentment of opposition that arises when the drive for power is
recognised for what it is, those that seek power employ, as we have seen,
ideologies for the concealment of their aims. What is actually an aspiration for power, then appears to be something different, something that is
in harmony with the demands of reason, morality and justice.
(Morgenthau 1967: 219)
Global Realism
115
116
Global Realism
117
was the most overt expression of physical power. Thus international relations as a new area of social and political studies was relatively receptive to
the application of realism and, in particular, to the notion that such an
approach was necessary to reveal Schwarzenbergers power politics in
disguise and end Morgenthaus depreciation of political power.
In societal realism the objective of power analysis was to reveal the
sources and mechanisms of power. Analysis would be needed to determine
if the dominant power might be a single elite or group; a coalition of elites;
a cadre located within a party, an institution, or organization; or a wide constellation of different entities. Mechanisms of power at the society level
could be psychological, physical, or material or subtle and not-so-subtle
combinations of all three. The analysis of power by societal realism was
therefore a complex process. However, when applied to international relations, already defined as interstate relations, there was no need to search for
the true source of power, for almost by definition the nation state could be
the only source of power. Further, there were really few complexities of
power mechanisms to investigate because the traditional means of the exercise of state powerdiplomacy and warremained exclusively central to
international relations.
For a better fit of societal realism to interstate relations, the state had to
be made analogous to, or declared the same as, common constructs used to
comprehend societies. If, as Schwarzenberger argued, international relations was a branch of sociology and the nation could not be disaggregated
into individuals, classes, and groups, the nation state had to play the role of
all three. Thus the personification of the state emerged as very much the
language of the IR realiststhe state does, the state says, the state thinks,
and the state will do. Schwarzenberger went further in constructing a hierarchy out of the power endowments of the states. In this hierarchy the
great powers were essentially the aristocratic class, or elite, as opposed to
the middle and minor powers of the lower classes.
But an even more important logical problem of applying societal, or
real, realism to international relations concerned the objectives of such
internationally wielded power. Morgenthau as a societal realist had no
problem with the objectives of power within societiespower was class
based and, through using the concept of the economic system,
Morgenthau implied that power was used for economic gain. Thus he
states:
After the defeat of the aristocratic government, the middle classes developed a system of indirect domination. They replaced the traditional division into the governing and governed classes, and the military method of
open violence characteristic of aristocratic rule, with the invisible chains
of economic dependence. This economic system operated through a network of seemingly equalitarian legal rules which concealed the very existence of power relations. (Morgenthau 1967: 33)
118
If the objectives of power were not direct or indirect material gain, the
aim of discovering the objectives of power by the results obtained could
not be easily applied to the modern nation state at the international level. At
the individual level the final acquisition of a promotion, a swimming pool,
or a privileged position may help reveal the power relations and dynamics
that preceded it. But such a procedure could not be applied to even a per-
Global Realism
119
sonified nation state. First, to seek results of power acquisition at the interstate level was too much of a short-term project, as the issues at that level
of peace, war, and imperialism were of historic dimensions. Second, if the
state was not disaggregated into groups or classes and status and prestige
were only elements of the search for power, the only statelike objective
could be territorial aggrandizement, and this was not sufficient to explain
all the so-called actions of states.
The way out of these dilemmas was, first, to argue that power was an
objective in itself. This meant that the real objective need not be discussed
or revealed. The second was that if there was to be an objective, it would be
the national interest for Morgenthau and self-interest for Schwarzenberger,
both of which were equally undefinable.
It may be possible that these vagaries and distortions could be excused
as necessary deviations justified by developing the more important project,
namely of awakening the world to the dangers of legally, ethically, and ideologically disguised power relations. Morgenthau and Schwarzenberger
were reacting to the excessive legalism of the interwar period in Europe
and the mass ideologies of the 1930s and in particular the acceptance by
intelligent people that solemn declarations and signatures had substantive
political impacts. Thus Schwarzenberger was concerned by the community language of the UN under conditions of society in which such language would be misleading. Morgenthau and Schwarzenbergers warning
was born of their own life experience, in which they had seen the cynical
manipulation of the symbols of liberal democracy and rule of law in the
pursuit of absolute power.
The imprecisions and illogicalities engendered by applying a societally
generated, power-oriented approach to the international level produced the
contemporary international relations realism, as (endlessly) discussed
within the IR profession. The derivatives of IR realism were the personification of the nation state, ill-defined national interest, and the elimination
of the prosaic motivations of elites in command of states rooted in discrete
socioeconomic circumstances. This was not the real realism that sought to
understand and reveal the sources of powerits instruments, lackeys, and
sycophantsand to investigate its distinct objectives, all as an antidote to
the rationalizations of philosophy, theology, ideology, and romanticism,
which could be used to divert the perception of reality.
This negative conclusion is not to fault either of the authors discussed.
Reading their works in terms of social analysis rather than international
relations is valuable and insightful. They were correct in the need for an
antidote to unreal solutions being proposed at the time. An incisive
power analysis at the international level was essential in that period. As
already noted, any power analysis, even ones so distorted as that in international relations, inevitably becomes unpopular, if not subversive. Its practi-
120
tioners break myths that others are constructing or are making a living from
upholding; they reveal to those who feel they are free that they are governed, to those whose rationalizations of their own actions have been internalized that they are tyrants or victims, dominated or subservient, manipulators or manipulated. Morgenthau was accused by his colleagues in
Chicago of having a Germanic way of looking at things (Thompson
1979: 547) and came out against the Vietnam War on moral grounds.
Schwarzenberger was called a professor of immorality and denied security
clearance, possibly because of his refusal to accept the conventional reasons for the commencement of the Korean War. As societal realists, their
original project was laudable and their insights formidable, but the area to
which they applied their realism and their reluctance to identify the motives
of the states elites bequeathed the intellectual monster of IR realismthe
absolute, power-seeking, personified, nation state.
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In using this concept I am aware that in a variety of forms, such a perception of the structure or process of social and political reality has been
used by almost all those who have set out to consider the nature of society
and governance. Thus what I have called rationality could be seen also in
Weberian unauthentic legitimization, in Foucauldian governmental rationality (Gordon 1991), or in the concept of a dominant discourse. Likewise,
it may be the internalization of the norms of ruling-class governance, as in
Gramscian hegemony or the Marxist superstructure. Morgenthau gave no
name to his power-disguising construct, preferring to refer to it as something: What is actually aspiration for power, then appears as something
different, something that is in harmony with the demands of reason, morality and justice (Morgenthau 1967: 119).
Rationalities are, then, constructed by groups and individuals in power.
As they are intended for internalization, they must be rational at least to an
extent greater than the (arbitrary) exercise of power. This rationality usually takes the form Morgenthau suggests, in which reason, morality, and justice are made central. The process of the creation of a rationality varies in
the time taken to form it and in its complexity. In those of the church and
state, mentioned further on, the rationality developed over centuries and
was all-pervasive. But others are more temporal and geographically limited
or may be limited in operation, such as those of political parties, enclave
organizations, or distinct sets of power relations surrounding different
forms of production. From such rationalities are derived legal constructs,
social institutions and norms, and as such, they are the source of the control
of human behavior.
The need for a rationality may lie deep in bioneurological processes
that, although not necessarily producing rational thought, nevertheless react
negatively to illogicalities. Ongoing research in neurology and its relation
to consciousness and studies of power and stress in bureaucracies points in
this direction (for example, Edelman 1994). Overtly applied, power
inevitably produces through its seeming or real arbitrariness stress that biochemical systems normally seek to reduce. Rationalities may temporarily
disguise or block versions of the truth that the human brain would find
stress producing. Rationalities are the Freudian dreams that disguise the
disturbing real in symbols in order that the sleeper not be awakened.
Realism challenges rationalities and awakens people from dreams. In the
1970s, feminist analysts adopting a realist perspective challenged the
rationality of womens work and biological determinism to reveal the ubiquitous power of patriarchy.
It is evident that there is a constant antagonism between societal realism and power-constructed rationalities. Rationalities are necessary and
may have effects that, by the standards of justice and equity, may be positive or less negative. The purpose of realism is not to destroy a rationality,
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but in analyzing and revealing it, realism may often do so. The durability of
rationalities, the success with which they absorb, reject, or marginalize the
realist challenge, may be the factor that determines historical epochs in
which rationalities are constructed and destroyed and different constellations of power are developed. Once a realist critique is extant, the rationality and the power it hides are never the same. Rationalities and their dissemination are a major part of functional (problem-solving) theory, and the
analysis of them is a major part of critical theory.
Global Realism
123
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Global Realism
125
power that is incapable, even under the best possible governing scenario, of
producing any of these norms.
The complexity of the rationality, the emergence of layered instruments of power, makes the task of a societal, or real, realism in world politics both more needed and more complex than it was for the early real realists applying their approach to interstate relations and adjusting them to fit
the different level of the approach. The answer to the Qui bono? question,
or What is the source of power? was always another state or alliance of
states. Today the answer to that same question may be a consortium of corporations, state agencies, individuals in command of financial power,
organized crime and interest groups, and professional groups increasingly
operating globally. The global outcomes of the use of power are measurable
and concrete as, for example, the universal tendency of redistribution of
income toward the higher-income groups, the universal degradation of the
environment, and increased incidences of new maladies. The complexity of
power sources and mechanisms at the global level is such that an application of a real or societal realism would now have to be based on false
analogies, as in the case of IR realism. What is needed, then, is a global
realism that recognizes and analyzes the multiplicity of power sources and
mechanisms at the global level and that approaches constructed rationalities critically. Such a global realism may well confirm Morgenthaus aphorism of half a century ago that the revolt against power . . . is as universal
as the aspiration for power itself.
8
WHATS CRITICAL ABOUT CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY?
Mark Neufeld
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cal means of theorizing world politics. At the same time, it can also be
argued that a greater sensitivity to the insights of critical social and political
theory can be of significant benefit to the effort to develop critical IR theory.
To that end I propose to undertake a review of some recent efforts in
critical IR theory (see also Neufeld 19951996). It is my hope that this
effort will contribute to greater awareness of the achievements in the realm
of critical IR over the past few years. At the same time, I would also hope
that a critical review of critical IR theory that draws on some of the insights
of critical social and political theory more generally will contribute to the
development of more adequate theorizing about world politics.
Specifically, I hope this exercise will contribute to deepened reflection on
what it means to approach the subject of world politics in a critical wayin
short, Whats critical about critical IR theory, and how might its critical
content be strengthened?
Whats Critical?
129
attempts to redeem what is valuable and useful in the views of the other
(Kellner 1999b). Of course, the self-cultivation of powerful egos by the
advocates of marginal(ized) approaches is an understandable (masculinist)
defense mechanism in the face of literally years of relentless attacks from
the mainstream; for all of that, it is no less destructive in its effects on interlocutorsnot to mention potential allies.1
Happily, we are not limited to disciplinary exemplars to guide our
efforts. There exists outside of IR a number of critical theorists who have
learned to tread the fine line of rigorous criticism without stepping over it
into destructive dismissal of the efforts of others (see, in particular, Fraser
1989b; Bernstein 1983, 1991). It is the standards of solidarity and fairness
set by these efforts that I will try to emulate in the pages that follow.
This kind of exercise can provoke a number of objections. One possible objection is that the works chosen to review do not provide a true picture of critical theorizing about world politics. In response, I can only say I
have tried to be catholic in my notion of critical theory and have not
restricted my examples in terms of narrow, predetermined limits. One
might also object that the judgments arrived at are problematic because the
standards of what constitutes a critical theory have not been applied fairly.
Here again, I can only respond by saying I have attempted to be as evenhanded as possible in my application of standards, though every conclusion
remains, of course, open to contestation.
Finally and most important, one might raise questions about the nature
of the standards themselves and the very definition of critique from which
they are derived. This potential objection requires a substantive response.
Clearly, it is incumbent on authors of this kind of essay to be explicit about
their notion of critique, thereby to invite reasoned debate about its adequacy.
The notion of critique that informs this chapter is not neutral; it is the
product of a particular intellectual tradition and reflective of the assumptions and normative commitments constitutive of that tradition. Appending
a label to this tradition is not easy, though several alternatives suggest
themselves. On the one hand, Frankfurt School critical theory, although
certainly a major influence, is too narrow, as it excludes the theorizing of
other influential figures such as Antonio Gramsci. On the other hand, to
term this tradition modernist critical theory in order to distinguish it from
its postmodernist counterpart, although not incorrect, is too broad. For want
of a better term, the Western Marxist tradition will have to suffice.
This term raises the question of which characteristics a body of theorizing would have to have to qualify as critical (in Western Marxist terms).
Here it will be suggested that these can best be formulated by thinking of
critical theory as the determinate negation of the dominant form of technical reason in mainstream IR and, arguably, mainstream social science gen-
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Whats Critical?
131
cisms of the existing order are the policytakers and not the policymakers. In
this way critical theory places itself in the service of emancipatory practice.
Finally, in combination these three elements of critical theorizing allow
for more than the determination of the degree to which a given body of theory approximates critical theory understood as an ideal type. They also
point to the overall criterion of adequacy by which critical theory must ultimately be judged. In Horkheimers words, The value of a theory is not
decided alone by formal criteria of truth. . . . The value of a theory is decided by its connection with the tasks, which in the particular historical
moment are taken up by progressive social forces (in Held 1980: 192). It
might be objected, of course, that this criterion begs the question of what
characterizes a progressive social force. The answer, of course, is that the
understanding of progressive is connected to the assumptions of critical
theory, which are tested, in turn, in the process of analysis and practice.
This admittedly circular form of reasoning is that of a hermeneutic circle,
which cannot be escaped either by critical or noncritical theorists, as much
as objectivists of various stripes might strive to find a way out.
I will move now to an assessment of the work of three figures in IR
theory whose work can be read as providing a critical orientation to world
politics: Alexander Wendt, Justin Rosenberg, and Cynthia Weber.
Alexander Wendt
Alexander Wendts work has proven to be immensely influential in contemporary IR theorizing, particularly in constructivist circles. Indeed, he stands
as the youngest of what has been hailed as a new generation of masters of
international thought (Neumann and Wver 1997). Equally important in
terms of this discussion is that from the beginning Wendt has made the
notion of critical theory central to his intellectual project. From the agentstructure debate (Wendt 1987: 370) through his engagement with the
social construction of international anarchy (Wendt 1992) and beyond
(Wendt 1996), critique and critical theory have figured prominently in
Wendts theoretical formulations. In his words, critical theory (in a broad
sense) is essential to the development of social science, and by extension
international relations (Wendt 1987: 370). Here too he has made his mark:
In a recent debate held in the pages of International Security it was Wendt
who was invited to provide a defense of critical theory in international relations (see Mearsheimer 19941995; Wendt 1995). This does raise the question, however, of what is critical about Wendts constructivist approach.
There are a number of attractive features about Wendts theorizing. His
work reflects very much the insight, lamentably still too rare in our discipline, that the claim that International Relations is a discrete area of action
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and discourse, separate from social and political theory can no longer be
sustained (Hoffman 1987: 231). Drawing in particular on the work of
Anthony Giddens and Roy Bhaskar, his exposition and application of structuration theory and the epistemology of scientific realism demonstrates an
impressive facility with contemporary social and political theory. Also
praiseworthy are Wendts considerable efforts to spell out his starting
assumptions and clearly define his terms. In short, Wendts work evidences
a concern with theoretical reflection on the process of theorizing itself,
which, in important respects, qualifies it as a reflexive approach.
The account balance is not straightforward, however. From the beginning Wendt has been clear that by critical he means looking beyond given
appearances to the underlying social relationships that generate (in a probabilistic sense) phenomenal forms (Wendt 1987: 363). Thus consistent with
his scientific-realist epistemology, Wendt defines truth in objectivist
termstruth is not correspondence to the facts, as in the case of positivism,
but it is correspondence nonetheless. Truth is correspondence to the underlying structures that generate observable facts. Thus hypotheses are understood to be interparadigmatically falsifiable. Nor is there any question
about Wendts commitment to a wholly conventional epistemology. As he
argued in his defense of critical IR theory, Constructivists . . . are modernists who fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against
evidence (Wendt 1995: 75).
It is the commitment to interparadigmatic falsification that shows
Wendts notion of critique has less in common with critical theorys distinction between critical and traditional, problem-solving forms of theorizing
than with the Popperian critical rationalist tradition (see Horkheimer 1972;
Cox 1981). In Popperian terms, critical thinking stands in opposition to
dogmatic thinking, with the former adapting to refutation by experience
and the latter ignoring all counterevidence (Hollis 1994: 72). In short,
notwithstanding his replacement of positivism with scientific realism,
Wendt replicates mainstream IRs objectivism and, therewith, its unreflexive limiting of reason to episteme.
The same mixed balance sheet can be seen in terms of the other elements of critical theory. On the one hand Wendt stresses the role of intersubjective meanings in constituting social relations. As he notes, what
unites the various members of the critical IR family, that is, postmodernists,
neo-Marxists, feminists, and constructivists, is their common concern with
the socially constructed nature of world politicsa concern that results in a
shared interest in how identities and interests are shaped by structures and,
in turn, influence international behavior (Wendt 1995: 7172). Structures,
argues Wendt, are dependent on shared ideas: What makes these ideas
(and thus structure) social . . . is their intersubjective quality (Wendt
1995: 73). Thus Wendts constructivism seems to qualify as a nonnaturalist,
Whats Critical?
133
134
Whats Critical?
135
Clearly, for Rosenberg, writing better history means developing a theory that fits the facts better than its rivals (see also H. Smith 1996: 205). As
we have already seen in regard to Wendt, however, the notion of truth as
correspondencewhether to facts or to underlying nonvisible structures
brings with it some serious liabilities. Kuhnian objections aside, an objectivist understanding of truth has as its consequence that central assumptions
remain unexamined; important questions not only are not answered, they
are not even asked.
For example, the statement that international relations theory should
concern itself with substantive problems raises a number of difficult issues.
136
First, how is one to meet the objections of the champions of basic research,
who respond by saying that many if not most of the significant discoveries
of science that have proven useful for addressing substantive problems
were made by people whose first order of business was anything but the
solving of those problems (see, for example, Rapoport 1964)?
Alternatively, even if one agrees that substantive problems should be our
focus, there remains the question of which problems are by nature substantive and which are not. We could, of course, simply adopt Millss view that
the one huge substantive problem that needs to be addressed is the interpretation of the rise, the components, the shape, of the urban industrial
societies of The Modern West (cited by Rosenberg 1994b: 88). But in that
case the question is merely transposed down to the level of the subproblems
whose solution is necessary for solving the one huge substantive problem. To take a concrete example, is the gendered nature of global society a
substantive subproblem or not? How are we to know?
In sum, in critical theorys terms the identification of substantive problems is not incorrect in and of itself. It must be understood, however, as
derivative of the assumptions of the theoretical orientation being pursued.
Any undertaking that moves directly to stipulating substantive problems
without reflecting on the necessarily relativized nature of the starting
assumptions is inherently problematic.
Similarly, questions must be raised about Rosenbergs conceptualization of the related elements of history and totality. Put simply, how is history to be treated? How is the holistic viewpoint to be conceived? The tradition of Western Marxism, for example, offers many different formulations
of totality (Jay 1984b). Rosenberg tells us history should not be used to try
to model and predict (Rosenberg 1994b: 105). But if totality is something
we establish through observationsomething we find out empirically by
looking at the world (Rosenberg 1994b: 105)why should we not be
looking for the invariant transhistorical regularities sought by positivist
social science? Why should we not define explanation as subsuming
observable regularities under a general covering law?
These questions become particularly apposite in terms of critical theorys second defining characteristic of an interpretive approach, which
rejects the assumption of naturalism to underscore the intersubjective constitution of the social world by self-interpreting human beings. Such an
approach is not adopted, first and foremost, because of any putatively better
fit with the facts but because it helps us to determine when theoretical
statements grasp invariant [i.e., transhistorical] regularities of social action
as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence
that can in principle be transformed (Habermas 1971: 310).
Rosenberg is not wrong when he argues that writing better history is
not identical with consideration of the immanent logics of emancipation
Whats Critical?
137
138
als, and the promise of Enlightenment values such as reason and freedom in
an age when those promises have too often proved to be justifications for
established power and privilege.
Lamentably, it would appear that Rosenberg does not consider these
metatheoretical efforts to be of much value. Critical theory, he tells us,
seems in constant danger of ditching into a sea of philosophical generalities. As for postmodernism, it hardly bear[s] thinking about (Rosenberg
1994b: 86f.)though it does, at least, get thought about enough to be mentioned. Feminist theory is, unfortunately, not so lucky. It should be noted in
this regard that Mills, while employing the sexist terminology of his time,
did acknowledge that gender was important for understanding social phenomena (Mills 1951: 75, 172178).
The consequences of not engaging these metatheoretical offerings,
however, is that Rosenberg misses out on a number of insights that are crucial for his plan to put the discipline of international relations on a more
adequate footing. Perhaps most crucially, there is the issue of an adequate
diagnosis of what ails the discipline. Rosenberg is fairly straightforward
about what he sees as the problem: It is the continuing dominance of realism. And there is a certain plausibility to this; realism is guilty of the many
sins that Rosenberg (and others) have attributed to it.
But for those who have engaged seriously with the arguments of critically oriented philosophical traditions such as the Frankfurt School, postmodernism, and feminist theoryand there is more agreement among them
than is often recognizedthere is also something unsatisfying about this
diagnosis. After all, it is not only international relations that has been
marked with (1) a lack of attention to history, (2) a failure to provide substantive explanation, and (3) a tendency to atomize the social relationships
it studies. Nor is international relations alone in lending support to social
structures of domination and injustice. These criticisms have been made of
a wide range of social sciencesdisciplines in which the tradition of political realism does not exist.
Accordingly, international relations is not unique. More important, the
similarities between it and other social sciences would suggest that realism
is, at best, the disciplinary manifestation of that which (mis)orients mainstream social science as a wholenamely instrumental reason, most clearly manifest in the positivist logic of investigation, which continues to
inform so much of the research in contemporary social science.
Now it should be noted that the elements of the positivist logic of
investigation(1) the correspondence theory of truth, (2) the methodological unity of the sciences (natural and social), and (3) the quest for valuefreedomalthough identifiable in realism, are independent of the traditional realist emphases on anarchy, states as actors, and endemic conflict in the
resulting self-help system. This is significant. For what it means is that
Whats Critical?
139
140
IR theorys essential modifier for the state: sovereignty. She does this
through a rereading of foreign policy discourse on intervention. Her analysis takes as its starting point the essentially uncontested nature of the concept of sovereignty. Yet as variations across time and place indicate, state
sovereignty is anything but stable or uniform. Therefore, argues Weber, one
should view sovereignty less as a state of being than as something inferred
from practice. Accordingly, sovereignty
marks not the location of the foundational entity of international relations
theory but a site of political struggle. This struggle is the struggle to fix
the meaning of sovereignty in such a way as to constitute a particular
stateto write the statewith particular boundaries, competencies and
legitimacies available to it. (Weber 1995: 3)
Weber pursues her analysis of state sovereignty by focusing on a particular question: How is the meaning of sovereignty fixed or stabilized historically via practices of political intervention? It is Webers contention that
the practice of intervention is a crucial site for the stabilization of sovereignty given that discussion of intervention invariably raises questions
about whether sovereignty is invested in particular localities, leaders, or
sets of practices. When state practices do not fit the shared understandings
of what a sovereign state must be, interference is legitimate; when, however, state practices are in accordance with intersubjective understandings of
statehood, intervention is prohibited (Weber 1995: 4). Thus when we focus
on intervention practices, it is possible to identify what kinds of practices
constitute legitimate forms of being, for example, sovereign states.
Weber argues that the sovereign state must be understood in terms of
two distinct kinds of representation. The first is political representation, by
which the domestic community authorizes the government to speak on its
behalf. Less familiar but equally vital is symbolic representation, by which
questions are settled regarding who is and is not a member of the domestic
community and what the range of authority of a domestic community is. In
short, symbolic representation, when successful, produces a meaningful
referent invested with sovereign authority, the effect of which is the sovereign state.
To investigate the process of symbolically producing the state, Weber
reviews the interventions in Spain and Naples by the Concert of Europe,
U.S. interventions in the Bolshevik and Mexican revolutions during the
Wilson era, and the interventions in Grenada and Panama by the Reagan
and Bush administrations. For the first two sets of cases, Weber works in
terms of an interpretive approach derivative of the work of Michel
Foucault. Here the questions posed are the following: How is truth produced by a diplomatic and scholarly community of judgment, and how is
truth (a sovereign foundation or a community) represented? In the latter
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141
142
Whats Critical?
143
Conclusion
This analysis has proceeded from the assumption that metatheoretical attentiveness to the question of what constitutes a critical theory is an important
part of ensuring that current efforts to develop a critical approach to world
politics meet with success. It is true, of course, that metatheoretical discus-
144
sions can never satisfy on their own. Metatheoretical debates about what
constitutes a critical theory do not automatically provide an adequate theoretical account of historical developments that can, in turn, shed light on
addressing substantive problems. Accordingly, theoretical-empirical explorations must be carried on parallel to metatheoretical ones (see, for example, Cox 1987; Enloe 1993). Neither suffices in the absence of the other.
But then this is precisely the point.
It is interesting to consider how the interests of mainstream social science stand in relation to metatheoretical discourse. If it is true that metatheoretical critique is necessary to challenge mainstream theorizing at the most
fundamental level, then is it any wonder that so many mainstream theorists
seem intent on inculcating new generations of social scientists with the
strongest possible antipathy to metatheory? And who can doubt that the
theoretical mainstream has been extremely successful in this regard? How
else to explain the widespread hostility to all things metatheoretical? How
else to account for the neglect ofand even the barely disguised impatience withmetatheoretical discussion even within the work of those with
an explicit commitment to critical inquiry?
Ultimately, Max Horkheimers observation is still a valid one: Though
there may be periods when one can get along without metatheory, in the
present context its lack denigrates people and renders them helpless
against force (Horkheimer 1968: 308). Significantly, Horkheimer also
supplies what may be the most appropriate response to the animosity
directed at metatheory: Insist that today the whole historical dynamic has
placed philosophy at the centre of social actuality, and social actuality at
the centre of philosophy (308) and appreciate that hostility to metatheory
is really directed against the transformative activity associated with critical thinking (Horkheimer 1972: 232). Fulfilling the promise of the critical
study of world politics requires recognizing that his statements hold true
for the discipline of international relations as much as any otherand perhaps more than most.
Nancy Fraser has observed that no one has yet improved on Marxs
1843 definition of critical theory as the self-clarification of the struggles
and wishes of the age (Fraser 1989b: 113). What is undeniable is that in
the current context, the struggles and wishes of the age are increasingly
intertwined with global-level structures and processes. As a consequence,
the self-clarification of emancipatory struggles and wishes at the beginning
of the twenty-first century perforce must be conducted in globally sensitive
terms. And here there is certainly cause for optimism. Notwithstanding
existing limitations and lacunae, it does not seem unreasonable to expect
that critical IR theory will soon be in a position to make a meaningful contribution to this broader quest for human dignity in our global polis. And
when it does, we shall finally have the definitive answer to the question,
Whats critical about critical IR theory?
Whats Critical?
145
Notes
The title of this chapter alludes to Nancy Frasers Whats Critical About Critical
Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender (Fraser 1989b).
1. Bertolt Brechts poem, An die Nachgeborenen, which hangs on my office
wall, makes this point most poignantly:
To Those Who Come After
You, who will surface
Out of the flood
In which we went under
Bear in mind
When you speak of our failings
Also the dark times
That you escaped.
We walked after all
Changing countries more
Often than our shoes
Through class wars
Despairing
When there was only injustice
And no outrage.
Of course we know:
Even hatred
Of baseness
Distorts ones disposition.
Even anger
About injustice
Makes ones voice hoarser.
Alas, we
Who wanted to prepare the ground
For kindness
Were ourselves incapable
Of being kind.
You however
Once the stage has been reached
Where human beings are
One anothers helpers
Consider us
With forbearance.
Bertolt Brecht (1939: 143; translation, M. Neufeld)
2. The parallel with Rosenberg is striking. In one case we have a Marxist theorist who does not interpret history in terms of class struggle; in the other, we have a
feminist theorist who does not interpret history in terms of gender. What is particularly puzzling is that Weber does provide elsewhere a gender-framed analysis of one
of the case studies featured in her book (see Weber 1994b).
PART THREE
THE PRACTICE AND
PRAXIS OF CRITICAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
9
THE PRACTICE, AND
PRAXIS, OF FEMINIST RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Sandra Whitworth
What happens when critical and feminist international relations (IR) theorists go out into the world and actually talk to the people they study? This
chapter argues that the most important contribution of feminist and critical
theories of international relations has been to open up, as Steve Smith
writes, just what counts as the subject matter of international relations (S.
Smith 1996: 38), but there has been little corresponding analysis of the
political and practical implications of conducting critically informed
research in IR.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first is a brief outline of the
way in which critiques of the mainstream discipline of IR have resulted in a
self-consciousness about how we ask questions in IR, about what gets
included and what remains excluded. The second provides a summary of
some of the directions my own research is taking and some of the ways this
reflection on the posing of questions has permitted me to ask feminist and
critical questions about UN peacekeeping.
In the third section, I use some of my own research experiences to
argue that critical and feminist IR theories have been almost completely
silent on theorizing about or thinking through the political implications of
conducting research on so-called marginalized communities. Part of this
silence reflects the focus by critical theorists on the theoretical challenges
that have been developed thus far; considerably less work has been done
on actual research. It is important to emphasize that the point here is not to
lament, as Robert Keohane has done in the past and Alexander Wendt
more recently, the absence of an identifiable research program in critical
IR (Keohane 1988; Wendt 1995). Rather, the point is to take up an observation by Mark Neufeld that the translation of the meta-theoretical gains
149
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The Contributions
As has been noted, critical IR and feminist IR have focused on the ways
questions are asked and on the fact that some issues in international relations are problematized, whereas others are not. This focus has been
accomplished, as Steve Smith notes, through what began as an epistemological critique and the observation that the subject is implicated in and not
separable from the object of study (S. Smith 1996; see also Linklater
1996b). As Mark Neufeld writes, It is because of the possibility of
methodologically factoring out the identities of the individual researcher
that objective knowledge, politically neutral knowledge, was assumed to
be possible at all (Neufeld 1995: 33; see also Smith, Booth, and Zalewski
1996a, 1996b: 6). Likewise, the rejection of positivism has meant a rejection of the notion that there can be such a thing as a politically neutral
analysis of external reality (Linklater 1996b: 281). In other words, and following Robert W. Coxs classic 1981 observation, theory is always for
someone and for some purpose (Cox 1981: 128).
Whereas mainstream theorists have always theorized in order to provide policy-relevant advice to state elites, critical and feminist IR theorists
engage with the lived injustices or lived suffering of marginalized
groups. Feminist IR and critical IR theorists are concerned with those
processes of domination made invisible by the mainstreams concern with
states, power, and anarchy and committed to those who, as Cynthia Enloe
writes, are deeply affected by international politics but arent in a position
to call the tune (Enloe 1989: 2). Uncovering the impact of international
relations on those previously rendered invisible will give us, she notes, not
only a richer and more accurate empirical sense of the world but also some
insight into the more theoretical question of how politics are made. This
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The Project
In my own work on peacekeeping, I begin with the argument that the image
of peacekeeping as a benign, altruistic, and morally superior form of military force, which is so pervasive in multilateral and certain national contexts, tells us more about self-identificationabout how the UN or certain
contributor peacekeeping countries seek to present themselvesthan it
does about what actually happens when peacekeeping missions are
deployed to various countries around the world (Whitworth 1995, 1998). I
have tried to illustrate this argument in part by asking Cambodian women
about the impact of the peacekeeping mission (the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC) on their lives.
I am concerned, for example, about the fact that a whole series of questions about peacekeeping never get asked. Peacekeeping itself is never
problematized in mainstream literatures; instead, peacekeeping is taken to
be an unproblematic and obviously good thing, an important instrument in
maintaining peace and order in the postCold War world. As Alan James
describes it, peacekeeping is an enormously useful device (James 1995:
265). For Steven Ratner, it is a way of and process for securing important,
shared values (Ratner 1995: 1). With considerable consistency, a similar
picture is depicted in most mainstream accounts: The collapse of the political stalemate of Cold War politics has created new opportunities for the UN
at the same time that new sources of conflict have emerged; through peacekeeping missions, the UN has been called in to address an ever-increasing
number of these conflicts; these missions are sometimes successful, but a
series of problems have emerged that must be addressed by academics and
policymakers.
These are problems of efficiencies, finances, and control. They are, in
short, technical problems, and technical problems are answered by technical experts. Thus not only are a whole series of questions not asked but
whole groups of people(s) are never consulted when questions about peacekeeping are raised. It is not at all unusual within mainstream accounts of
peacekeeping, for example, that evaluations of peacekeeping missions are
published without the authors ever bothering to go to the country in which
the peacekeeping mission was deployed to seek the opinion of the people
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who lived through the mission, to find out whether local experience conforms in any way to expert opinion (see, for example, Heininger 1994;
Utting 1994 is an important exception).
Thus I went to Cambodia hoping to develop an analysis of the gendered nature of the peacekeeping mission. I also went there with a sense,
from writers such as Chandra Mohanty, Caren Kaplan and Aihwa Ong, of
the tendency of Western feminists to homogenize and universalize the
experiences of third world women and in particular to portray them
strictly as victims of various processes, whether imperialism, capitalism, or,
in my case, peacekeeping (Mohanty 1991a, 1991b; Kaplan 1994; Ong
1988). As Mohanty writes, Few studies have focused on women workers
as subjectsas agents who make choices, have a critical perspective on
their own situations, and think and organize collectively against their
oppressors (Mohanty 1991a: 29; emphasis in original). Thus I hoped also
to learn, by going to Cambodia, of the ways in which women (and men)
were involved in the UNTAC mission, whether acting in or against it.
UNTAC is cited by the UN and regarded by many mainstream
observers as something of a success story for the UN.2 William Shawcross,
speaking at the general assembly of the International Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGO) Forum on Cambodia, called it an international triumph (cited by Jennar 1994: 145; see also Ledgerwood 1994; Heininger
1994: 18; Utting 1994: 3 and passim), and UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali has written that the international community can take satisfaction from the peacekeeping operation it mounted and supported in
Cambodia (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 55; see also the Economist, June 19,
1993: 36).
The success, achieved in an eighteen-month mission in Cambodia,
included the reduction of violence, the repatriation of some 370,000 Khmer
refugees, and the conduct of a relatively free and fair election in which
some 4 million people, or 85 percent of Cambodias registered voters, participated (Munthit 1993: 3; Thayer and Tasker 1993: 10; see also Doyle
1995; Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994). The UN claimed as well, again in
the words of Boutros-Ghali, that the mission boosted Cambodias economy by raising funds internationally for economic rehabilitation and expansion throughout the country (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 54; see also Curtis
1994: 5658).
The UNTAC effort also achieved some important successes with
regard to women in Cambodia. Most notably, the freedom of association
that prevailed in many respects during UNTAC and the efforts of the UN
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to incorporate womens issues
into the general election resulted in public education and information campaigns in the print media and on radio and television. Additionally, the
four-day National Womens Summit brought together Cambodian women
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from all sectors of society to identify and prioritize womens issues in order
to lobby political parties contesting the election and then later the government itself (Report of the National Womens Summit 1993; Channo 1993a).
The Womens Summit has been credited with facilitating the emergence of
an indigenous womens movement in Cambodia as well as a number of
indigenous womens NGOs, which in turn have been credited with a very
effective lobby of the Cambodian government such that important equal
rights provisions eventually made it into the new Cambodian constitution
(interviews by the author, Phnom Penh, March-April 1996).3
Though UNTAC was considered a success in many respects, there are
also some discussions of problems associated with the mission. For example, the UN failed to achieve a situation of political neutrality, as pledged in
the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, in part because the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the demobilization and cantonment process and threatened
throughout the mission to disrupt the election campaign (Amer 1993;
Curtis 1994: 59; Doyle 1995: ch. 4; Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994:
124127). Likewise, the presence of UNTAC may have diminished, but did
not stop, political violence, which was aimed at both political party members and ethnic Vietnamese and resulted in a mass exodus of ethnic
Vietnamese, many of whom were second- and third-generation
Cambodians (Curtis 1994: 60; Eng 1992: 4; Barrington 1993: 1; Jennar
1994: 148).
These are obviously very serious concerns, but another series of issues
emerged throughout the UNTAC mission that are seldom discussed in UN
documents or mainstream accounts of the mission. Though credited with
helping to create the emergence of a fledgling womens movement as well
as a number of womens NGOs, the UNTAC mission also resulted in a
number of important negative consequences for women in Cambodia.
These include the reported exponential increase in prostitution to serve
UNTAC personnel. The Cambodian Womens Development Association
estimates that the number of prostitutes in Cambodia grew from about
6,000 in 1992 to more than 25,000 at the height of the mission (Channo
1993b; Arnvig 1994: 166169; Kirshenbaum 1994; interviews, Phnom
Penh, March-April 1996). Some reports indicated that the majority of prostitutes were young Vietnamese women, though these estimates are more
likely a result of anti-Vietnamese sentiment than any reflection of reality
(Swain 1992; Asian Recorder, May 2127, 1993; interviews, Phnom Penh,
March-April 1996).
While the presence of prostitutes was not new, and by many accounts
frequenting prostitutes is a regular feature of many Cambodian mens
behavior, Cambodians were nonetheless alarmed by the dramatic increase
in prostitution and noted that prior to UNTAC it was quite hidden in
Cambodian society but became something that was very prevalent and open
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abandoned as far away as Bangkok and left to make their way home. In
addition to these emotional traumas, fake marriages were enormously
shameful for women in a society that, like most societies, has very strict
norms about what is appropriate behavior for good women (interviews by
the author, Phnom Penh, March-April 1996).
In part as a response to the sexual harassment that prevailed during the
UNTAC mission, an open letter was delivered to the UN SecretaryGenerals Special Representative in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi. In the letter, 165 Cambodian and expatriate women and men accused some UNTAC
personnel of sexual harassment, of violence against women and against
prostitutes, and of being responsible for the dramatic rise of prostitution
and HIV/AIDS (Phnom Penh Post, October 11, 1992: 2; Business Wire,
January 11, 1993). Akashi responded by saying that it was natural for hotblooded young soldiers who had endured the rigors of the field to want to
have a few beers and to chase young beautiful beings of the opposite sex
(Colm 1992; Swain 1992). After an outraged response, Akashi pledged to
assign a community relations officer to hear the complaints of the
Cambodian community (Colm 1992; Phnom Penh Post, November
20December 3, 1992: 2).
Finally, and in contrast to the claims by Boutros-Ghali about UNTAC
contributions to economic development in Cambodia, the UNTAC mission
has been blamed for economic dislocation. Grant Curtis reports that with
skyrocketing inflation, the price of a kilogram of high-quality rice rose
from 450 riels to a high of 3,000 riels and settled eventually at 1,8002,000
riels; the price of fish and meat rose by 80 percent; housing rental prices
increased at least four times, and UNTAC personnel often paid Phnom
Penhbased rents at the provincial level, resulting in increases there also.
UNTAC did contribute somewhat by hiring locals but also drew most of the
few trained or experienced Khmer away from Cambodian administrative
structures and into UNTAC, and salary payments to local staff composed
less than 1 percent of total local expenditure. Finally, the riel was devalued
by 70 percent during the UNTAC mission (Curtis 1994: 5965; see also
Davies 1993; Klintworth 1993; Berdal 1993: 46). In situations of economic
dislocation and inflation, the most vulnerable members of society become
even more vulnerable, and within Cambodia women compose a large proportion of the vulnerable.
The Argument
The ways in which critical and feminist approaches to international relations have opened up what counts in IR permitted me to ask a series of
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questions about peacekeeping that are rarely posed within the mainstream
literature. It is worth noting, however, that whereas the mainstream literature might ignore these kinds of questions, the account here comes as little
surprise to local activists and NGOs. Talking to activists and to men and
women who lived in Cambodia during the UNTAC missionshifting ones
gazemade it possible to untangle and challenge depictions of peacekeeping as a straightforward success.
This kind of analysis has a series of implications. For one, it permits
activists and progressive academics in both contributor and host countries
to resist the almost homogeneous depictions of peacekeeping as a self-evidently positive military activity. It allows us to challenge what has become,
through peacekeeping, the reassertion of militaries and militarism in only
slightly altered guise. It can make visible the enormously complex circuits
of power that are entailed in any security mission, whether it is an invasion
or a peacekeeping deployment, and reminds us that the politics of peacekeeping concerns as much thinking through the politics of gender, race, and
class relations as it does UN finances, the implementation of peace treaties,
or chains of command.
There are, then, important insights to be gained by this kind of
research; actually conducting the research to make these claims led me to
reflect on the extent to which we have not begun to problematize doing
research in a way that is consistent with political, ethical, and theoretical
commitments to which we lay claim by being critical or feminist IR scholars. What do we do as researchers in countries such as Cambodia? The
worst-case scenario evolves as follows: We parachute in to a very poor
country, probably carrying around our waist or otherwise hidden in pockets
distributed throughout our clothing (because we are afraid) four or five
times as much money as the average local person makes in a year. We live
cheaply, but we can still afford the best of what is available and so live well.
Having lived cheaply, we receive the added benefit of praise from our universitys financial administrators for our economic efficiencies. We ask people for their time and their stories, which we take away (we steal them) and
write up in a language we (but not necessarily they) understand, in a manner
that serves our (but not necessarily their) research interests and political
agendas. After we write up their stories, we become famous or, at the very
least, get tenure, promotion, more money, a book contract, and so on.5
Whereas some anthropologists and sociologists (especially but not
exclusively feminist anthropologists and sociologists) have begun to debate
the political and ethical implications of conducting research in such situations, there is relatively little such debate or concern raised within IR.
There is, for one, far less of a tradition of fieldwork (itself a contentious
term) in IR, and to the extent that there is, this work has usually entailed
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interviews with elite decisionmakers. This lack of debate is true of mainstream IR but also of critical and feminist work. Although this lack does
not mean that the dilemmas of conducting research go entirely unremarkedfor example, Cynthia Enloe notes the importance of the women
we research speaking for themselves, and Simona Sharoni problematizes
the political and ethical dilemmas of being both an insider and an outsider
in her own work on women in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Sharoni
1995)there is little in the way of a sustained discussion of the various
ways to acknowledge and negotiate some of these dilemmas.
In some cases the debates in anthropology and sociology suggest that
because of the numerous concerns and issues surrounding fieldwork,
anthropologists and sociologists should study up, that is, reject the discipline-defining practice of conducting research on primitive or exotic
othersthose who have relatively less powerand study those who have
power (D. Wolf 1996: 2; Mohanty 1991a: 31). But this approach provides
no solution to the feminist or critical IR researcher because to the extent we
have studied people in IR at all, we have generally studied upwhether
we have focused on presidents, secretaries of defense, chief executive officers, or venture capitalists. Studying the powerful is thus not very helpful
in a discipline that is only just beginning to discover that there are marginalized groups and peoples in the world who are as much a part of world
politics as, for example, the president of the United States or the chief executive officer of a multinational corporation.
So what can be done? Debates in anthropology have looked to empowering research subjects, conducting participatory research, breaking down
positivisms distinction between subject and object, coauthoring between
the researcher and the researched, and so on. But such responses have also
been subject to critiques with many asking how effective such approaches
are (D. Wolf 1996: 1948). Some writers such as Judith Stacey have
observed that the breakdown of the distinction between researcher and
researched and the pursuit of more empathetic research techniques could, in
some ways, be even more exploitative, such as when a feminist researcher
becomes friends with the women she is researching. Under such circumstances, she notes, the friendresearch subject may reveal far more than she
would have otherwise, far more than she may want to reveal, as a result of
the greater intimacy that has been established (Stacey 1991; cf. D. Wolf
1996: 20).
Some researchers offer to give back to local womens organizations,
providing time, skills, and services in exchange for the time and effort
those researched have taken away from their own work. But there is some
consensus that such contributions are ultimately transitory, and no matter
what a researcher contributes to the researched, the researcher still has
enormous power, not the least of which is to leave, to go home. The same
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tant insight that can be gained from conducting critical or feminist research
in IR: We are as implicated in prevailing relations of power and domination
as our mainstream predecessors, and because we view ourselves as oppositional and critical, we are in many ways less prepared than they to acknowledge this implication.
This insight makes more complicated our perception of the circuits of
power with which we are engaged, whether they be in relation to the subjects we research or the professionals we interact with. It reveals the need
to see these interactions as integrally related and to politicize and historicize, as Caren Kaplan writes, the relations of exchange that govern literacy, the production and marketing of texts, the politics of editing and distribution, and so on (Kaplan 1994: 139). More important still, it means,
again in Kaplans words, turning the terms of inquiry from desiring, inviting and granting space to others to becoming accountable for ones own
investments in cultural metaphors and values (139; my emphasis).
Accountability will never mean that we can rest comfortably with our role
as researchers and writers, but it can mean extending our critical concerns
beyond the questions we ask to include the politics of how we askand
answerthem.
Conclusion
The argument in this chapter has been that although critical and feminist IR
scholars have opened up what counts in the study of international relations,
they have not begun to think carefully about the politics of conducting
research on groups of people with relatively less power and privileges.
They have noted that the investigator is implicated in the object of study,
but only as they begin to give substance to this claim will they come faceto-face with the material lived reality of its implications. The debates and
discussions of feminist anthropologists and sociologists suggest some practical ways of thinking through these dilemmas, but it is important to underline the extent to which their responses will always remain, at best, partial.
Indeed, they must. The invisibilities and silences of which we accuse mainstream theorists will too quickly become our own if we do not soon engage
in a sustained discussion of the practical and political implications confronting us in the conduct of critical and feminist research in IR.
Notes
The author is grateful to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada for financial assistance received in support of this project.
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10
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, THE PUBLIC
SPHERE, AND GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
Kenneth Baynes
A great deal of recent work in normative political theory dealing with international relations (IR) seems to have taken a decidedly cosmopolitan tone.
I have in mind not only the important work of Charles Beitz and Thomas
Pogge but also many recent books, among them David Helds Democracy
and the Global Order (1995), James Rosenaus Along the DomesticForeign Frontier (1997), Richard Falks On Humane Governance (1995),
and Benjamin Barbers Jihad vs. MacWorld (1995). Whether they place a
renewed emphasis on human rights and the need for global constitutionalism, recognize the increasing globalization of the economy and the important role for both governmental and nongovernmental international organizations in new forms of cosmopolitan governance, or call anew for a
global civil society to counter the expansion of both global consumerism
and national tribalisms, the trend seems to be away from the exclusive or
unrestricted sovereignty of nation states toward some form of cosmopolitanism. My purpose in the following remarks is to relate some of the concerns in these discussions to the recent work by Jrgen Habermas in legal
and democratic theory. My guiding hypothesis is that each may have something to gain from the other: Habermas has not devoted a great deal of
attention to international relations in his work on democratic theory
(Mertens 1996), although in some of his more recent work, he has begun to
compensate for this deficit (see, e.g., Habermas 1996a, 1997). This recent
work has, in turn, given rise to a certain ambivalence in his position: On the
one hand, he has expressed some support for the idea of a world government with coercive authority (Habermas 1996a, 1996b: 514, 1997). On the
other hand, his general discussion of democracy in Between Facts and
Norms (1996b) seems more or less to consider the nation state to be the
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the republican, or communitarian, notion of a shared ethical-political dialogue also seems inappropriate.
According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depend
not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the
corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on
the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally
constituted public opinions. (Habermas 1996b: 298)
What is central for this conception is not a shared ethos but institutionalized discourses for the formation of rational political opinion.
This idea of a suitably interpreted deliberative politics lies at the center
of Habermass model of a procedural democracy. In a deliberative politics,
attention shifts away from the final act of voting and the problems of social
choice that accompany it (see also Manin 1987; Miller 1992). The model
represents an attempt to take seriously the fact that often enough preferences are not exogenous to the political system but are instead adaptive to
a wide range of factorsincluding the context in which the preference is
expressed, the existing legal rules, past consumption choices, and culture in
general (Sunstein 1991: 5; see also Elster 1983). The aim of a deliberative
politics is, accordingly, to provide a context for a transformation of preferences in response to the considered views of others and the laundering, or
filtering, of irrational or morally repugnant preferences in ways that are not
excessively paternalistic (Goodin 1985). The conditions for a more rational
politics (that is, a political process in which the outcomes are more
informed, future oriented, and other-regarding) can be improved, for example, by designing institutions of political will formation so that they reflect
the more complex preference structure of individuals rather than simply
register the actual preferences individuals have at any given time. Specific
proposals for realizing the ideals of a deliberative politics could range from
something like James Fishkins idea of a deliberative opinion poll to
alternative procedures of voting and modes of representation (Fishkin
1990; McLean 1991; Young 1989). One could, in this sense, even speak of
an extension of democracy to preferences themselves, since the question is
whether the reasons offered in support of them are ones that could meet the
requirements of public justification.2 What is important for this notion of
deliberation, however, is less that everyone participateor even that voting
be made publicthan that there is a warranted presumption that public
opinion is formed on the basis of adequate information and relevant reasons
and that those whose interests are involved have an equal and effective
opportunity to make their own interests (and the reasons for them) known.
Two further features serve to distinguish Habermass model of procedural democracy and deliberative politics from other recent versions of a
deliberative democracy. First, this version of deliberative politics extends
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beyond the more formally organized political system to the vast and complex communication network that Habermas calls the public sphere.
[Deliberative politics] is bound to the demanding communicative presuppositions of political arenas that do not coincide with the institutionalized
will-formation in parliamentary bodies but extend equally to the political
public sphere and to its cultural context and social basis. A deliberative
practice of self-determination can develop only in the interplay between,
on the one hand, the parliamentary will-formation institutionalized in
legal procedures and programmed to reach decisions and, on the other,
political opinion-building in informal circles of political communication.
(Habermas 1996b: 274275)
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cation that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation, the
question can be asked what role, if any, more traditional territorial political
boundaries ought to play in his conception of democracy (Habermas 1996b:
486). I have already referred to a certain ambivalence on this issue in
Habermass work. Nonetheless, it is also the case that recent reflections on
some possible forms of a cosmopolitan democracy might find additional
conceptual resources in Habermass own two-track, procedural approach.
For example, his distinction between strong and weak publics might also
perform an important function at the international level, and his remarks on
the self-limitation of democracy would seem to support recent calls for a
more differentiated or dispersed conception of sovereignty. Let me first
recall some of this discussion concerning a new cosmopolitanism.
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the parties affected by their actions. Such authorities would also have to be
constituted in a way consistent with basic individual rights and principles
of democratic legitimacy. I have no more specific recommendations to
offer in this regard other than to refer again to some of the tentative proposals for a democratic neocorporatism. At a minimum, however, the conception of differentiated (internal and external) sovereignty would seem to
require both a corresponding cosmopolitan and pluralist public sphere
capable of taking up in different ways and at various levels problems and
thematic issues bearing on the formation of international policies and institutional forums of decisionmaking that would guarantee accountability to
those most affected by the decisions made.
Notes
1. Habermas cites Frank Michelmans Laws Republic as an example of this
sort of republicanism; he might also have referred to some of the writings of
Charles Taylor. Habermass own position seems closest, however, to the
Madisonian republicanism of Cass Sunstein (Sunstein 1988).
2. Although I think Donald Moon overestimates the dangers of unconstrained
conversation, especially for individual privacy rights, he points to the difficult
question concerning the kinds of institutional design that are appropriate to help
ensure that the deliberations conducted in unconstrained conversation influence the
process of decisionmaking. Should there, for example, be a system of public voting
(see Moon 1991)?
11
CREATING COSMOPOLITAN POWER:
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AS
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
Deiniol Lloyd Jones
In his Keywords, Raymond Williams notes that the term mediation has
long been a relatively complex word in English and that it has been
made very much more complex by its uses as a key term in several systems
of thought (Williams 1988: 204). As Williams points out, mediation has
been used in a political sense to describe the reconciliation of adversaries,
in a metaphysical sense to describe the reconciliation of humans with their
own nature, and in a religious sense to describe the reconciliation of
humanity with a transcendent God. The meaning of mediation is traditionally complex, and in this chapter I discuss some of these complexities.
Unfortunately, perhaps, I wish to complicate things further by demonstrating how new thinking about international relations (IR) creates an alternative account of agency and international mediation. I hope that the critical
account of mediation introduced in this chapter will become a keyword
in the now prevalent postpositivist, realist international relations vocabulary.
In this chapter I discuss the topic of international mediation from a perspective informed by critical IR theory. Concentrating on questions of
agency and practice, I attempt to answer the following questions: What
agents in international politics are mediators? What strategies or tactics do
they employ? Three sets of answers to these questions are explored: the
power political, or geostrategic; the facilitative, or problem solving; and the
critical, or cosmopolitan. The first two approaches are traditional in the
sense that they represent a fairly well known body of writing. The third
approach is a new paradigm based on insights into the practical and theoretical failures of the existing debate.
A brief definition of the new approach might proceed as follows.
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affect the lives of millions, entails the need for serious critical analysis and
debate within the theory of international relations.
Forms of critique can be fruitfully applied to international mediation.
Critical IR theorists should always strive to peer beyond what Noam
Chomsky calls language in the service of propaganda (Chomsky 1992).
As George Orwell writes in his essay Politics and the English Language,
Adjectives like epoch-making, epic, historic, unforgettable, triumphant,
age-old, inevitable, inexorable, veritable, are all used to dignify the sordid
processes of international politics (Orwell 1984: 352). Typically, and
unfortunately, these ideological and honorific adjectives are all used in connection with mediated peace processes, new world orders, and the like
and obscure more than they illuminate. The media may parrot peace
process as if in a tranceto refer, for example, to the mere fact that some
sort of negotiations are taking place. However, the theory of international
relations is rightly charged with giving some normative direction and sense
to the empty tokens of popular conflict-resolution discourse.
But despite mediations unhealthy relationship with what Orwell calls
the sordid processes of international politics, serious commitments to maintaining international order are going to have to rely, at least in part, on relatively informal mediation processes. For in the absence of any clear form of
global government, mediations, sanctioned by the rules of a normatively
structured international order, could represent an informal diplomatic tool
capable of pursuing just and workable political settlements to contemporary international conflicts.
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also tends to emphasize absolute rather than relative gains. On this understanding, mediation is a form of bargaining where actors trade tangible
goods. Thus for power politics, the cultural or moral ends of a society have
to be transformed into a tradable item if they are to enter into the mediation
process. For example, national rights over a historic capital could be traded
for concessions on trade terms or lower interest rates. Culture and morality
are rationalized by the power political mediation.
There are problems facing the power political approach. Power
politicalgeostrategic agency rests on what Linklater has called the
immutability thesisthe view that the international system is a structure of
competitive strategic relationships; this structure is immune to historical
change and banishes questions of the good or the right from international
politics (Linklater 1996b). However, there is no conclusive evidence,
whether historical, empirical, or philosophical, to support the structuralist
argument. It is commonly recognized within the theory of international
relations that the conditions of moral agencyought to implies canare
not systematically banished from international discourse altogether.
Whether they like it or not, mediators are moral agents.
A further problem is that societies in conflict experience severe or
acute forms of crisis that affect social relations at levels below the state.
Crises of societal reproduction both threaten and involve the store of cultural knowledge, the individual personality, and the possibility of social
integration (Habermas 1984, 1989a). However, power political agency
works on a state-to-state level. States and the realities and facts of power
constitute the stuff of society and history for the power political view
what Barry Buzan calls the timeless wisdom of realism (Buzan 1996).
There is thus a danger that power political agency will create political
orders without social roots or a historical basis. Edward Said discusses the
Camp David agreements in these terms. Said argues that the agreements in
the Middle East in the late 1970s were an artificial structure imposed on the
natural course of history and events (Said 1979: 171).
A fundamental problem is that power political approaches subsume the
regional dynamics of a conflict under a wider struggle for global mastery
and power; thus they prime a local conflict with all the tensions of global
politics. We can see that process occurring during the late 1960s and early
1970s when U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger intervened in the
Arab-Israeli struggle on the basis of a Cold War mentality. Sinai I and II
plus the Camp David agreements lifted the local conflict between Israel and
the states on its borders above the concerns of international law. They also
reduced the autonomy of the regional actors who found themselves unable
to pursue local policies without the necessary blessing from the superpower
patron. Though the Cold War is over, these regional reflections of global
dynamics continue to influence history, and they render conflict resolution
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extremely difficult. Israel, for example, still benefits from massive financial
and military aid dispensed by the remaining superpower, and many, including those within Israeli society itself, argue that this aid makes the possibility of compromise with Israels Arab neighbors, particularly the
Palestinians, more rather than less remote. Where all forms of local political life are forced to link themselves to a global mind-set that has remote
origins, there often follows a lack of regional responsibility. All sorts of
strange ideologies that purport to explain and unify the complex realities of
global society are created, and these ruin the chances of a sensible regional
politics. As we shall see, the Oslo process tried to remedy these difficulties
by placing responsibility for conflict resolution in the laps of regional
actorsthe Israeli Labor government and, more significant, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). The collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991
naturally assisted this goal. Yet the resurrection of regional autonomy
was also an intentional political act. The Americans were not informed
about the success of the secret backchannel in Oslo until it had actually
produced an agreement. Supporters of the Oslo channel trace its success, at
least in part, to the resurrection of regional autonomy through facilitation.
Although local politics can never be entirely separated from global concerns, in the case of Oslo the aim was to short-circuit the political and
media circus in Washington by bringing the disputants face-to-face.
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normative goals, and (4) retain the strong links with the tradition of interpretative sociology.
Although these recent developments in the theory of facilitation are a
step in the right direction, facilitation faces a fundamental problem.
Facilitation theory works with the assumption that conflict is based on the
inability to engage in forms of dialogue rather than on an unwillingness to
engage in forms of democratic dialogue. Or rather, any unwillingness to
engage in democratic dialogue is the result of social-psychological obstacles rather than a political or moral commitment. I call this argument the
objection from rational intransigence. In facilitation theory, intransigence
toward dialogue is the result of distortions in communication that the parties may themselves view as irrational in the sense that their existence is
recognized by a disputant to impede the pursuit of goals that the disputant
actually identifies as an interest. In this situation, the facilitator acts like a
psychoanalyst assisting the disputants own efforts to move the political
process forward. However, the objection from rational intransigence points
out that intransigence toward the creation of, for example, the dialogic
community can be, for one or more disputant, a political or moral end in
itself. Here, obstacles to the intersubjective construction of political reality
are the result of conscious or deliberate obstructions to the democratic
process. Thus one or more disputant (1) may understand, cognitively, the
conflict situation perfectly and (2) may have the social and psychological
ability to recognize the other yet (3) may still have no desire to enter into a
politics more attuned to dialogic relations. In a situation of rational intransigence, the application of a facilitative technique may merely give the
upper hand to the intransigent party. Edward Said puts the point in the following way. Assessing the efficacy of the problem-solving workshop, he
writes: Can one imagine endorsing similar discussion between a few well
intentioned German and French intellectuals during the occupation of
France? (Said 1995: 35). Said argues that dialogue must be rooted in
action. In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, Said prefers
the intifada to the Oslo process and argues that the former is an authentic
intellectual idiom and not merely a discourse of politics (Said 1995).
The references to Jrgen Habermas in the literature of facilitation to
date have more in common with Habermass earlier model of critical social
theory that was based on the idea of unconscious, systematically distorted
communication. They neglect the later emphasis on moral-deontological
theory. For the critical analyst, however, violent social conflict can also
occur because there are political forces oblivious to the moral duty that
demands that political orders be redeemed with reference to the right. This
stance is rational intransigence, and it is hard to see how facilitators could
combat it given that their power is limited to the application of social-psy-
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facing the introduction of the principle of universalization. A discourse theory of morality has a vision of an ideal society in which all parties can enter
the political process as equals. These parties judge any claim that may be
advanced, and they do so without any prior assumption about the nature of
ultimate outcome other than the desire that it should embody the results of
democratic procedure. In Habermass terms, cosmopolitan morality presupposes postconventional reasoning. The problem, however, is that his ideal
can be approximated only in realityif it can be realized at all. For example, disputing parties may not be able to discuss certain positions in the
context of the dialogic community without immediately losing public
office. It is unlikely that a political party in Israel, for example, could campaign for national rights for Palestinians and also remain in power. Thus the
application of democratic law and the attempt to realize the ethics of the
dialogic community may result in a hopeless antagonism between the mediator and one or more of the disputants with the result that the mediator is
disqualified as an impartial outside agent. One of the strengths of facilitation, it might be argued, is that it works with a concept of politics more
attuned to the real problems of protracted social conflict. One of the
strengths of power politics, it might be argued, is that it does not have overly idealistic ambitions for the international world. These objections are
important. Does it follow, however, that all forms of mediation practice are
facilitative or power political?
The answer to this question is no. Mediation can combine might with
right, to put the matter colloquially, if it aims at the creation of cosmopolitan power. I mean this term in two senses. First, the mediator can become a
cosmopolitan power, a power capable of commanding resources and influencing outcomes, even in a situation marked by rational intransigence.
Second, the mediator can work to create cosmopolitan power in the context
of the dispute. If we conceive of the mediator as a cosmopolitan power, it is
possible to avoid both the problem of amorality that is posed by the power
political approach and the problem of weakness in the face of rational
intransigence, which is posed by the facilitative approach. The mediator
intervenes as a resourceful, strategic third party that aims to strengthen the
forces of democracy and dialogue within the region in dispute.
This approach is similar to what one writer has recently called a governance-based approach to international mediation. F. O. Hampson writes:
Governance-based approaches see the challenge of peacebuilding and
third party involvement in terms of the creation of participatory governance
structures, the development of new social norms, and the establishment of
the rule of law and democracy (Hampson 1997: 737). The critical
approach attempts to ensure that those parties who are committed to negotiations in a dialogic community receive all the diplomatic, technical, economic, and political support necessary to defeat the forces of intransigence.
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There are, of course, risks associated with this approach. The intransigent parties are likely to regard the external power as hostile and might aim
to disrupt its plans. And rather than forcing a compromise, the mobilization
of democratic power may actually lead to an escalation of the conflict.
Hampson notes: Governance-based approaches underestimate the difficulties of democratisation and the unstable political forces that may be
unleashed by democratic institutions and processes in societies unaccustomed to democracy and the rules of law (Hampson 1997: 737).
Furthermore, this type of intervention is likely to be expensive and difficult to manage. It would involve long-term commitment and expense
measured in political, economic, and diplomatic terms. For these reasons,
cosmopolitan forms of mediation practice are best managed by coalitions
of states embedded in regional security frameworks. This type of organization would have the resources needed for cosmopolitan mediation. The
likely agents of critical mediations would be coalitions of states, international institutions, organizations, and nonstate actors bound together
through treaty and mutual obligation whose foreign policies are motivated
by the creation of cosmopolitan democratic public law.
Like the power political paradigm, the critical approach involves
states. Yet there are significant differences between the critical and the
power political approach in terms of identifying the relevant actors. First,
the critical or cosmopolitan mediator does not exist in a neorealist moral
philosophy or history. The cosmopolitan mediator believes in the possibility of profound and meaningful historical change. Second, the activities of
these states are subject to moral and political standards enshrined in treaty
and law that are derived from cosmopolitan political principles, for example, those detailed in the thought of theorists such as Habermas, Held, and
Linklater. Basically, critical mediators are neo-Kantians on the international stage. Third, the critical approach emphasizes the importance of building
coalitions. In the power political paradigm, the mediator is normally a sovereign, unitary, and discrete actoreither, for example, a single state or a
superpower. The critical mediator, however, is not a solitary unit, and the
hope is that the process of coalition building will avoid the worst sins of
national self-interest and that egoism and political projects containing more
generalizable interests will emerge as a result.
Like the facilitative paradigm, the critical approach works with a more
culturally sensitive social philosophy, and it shares the ambition that mediation can create social change and a normatively desirable outcome.
However, unlike the facilitative paradigm, the critical approach insists that
change in international conflict involves large-scale historical processes
that can be altered and harnessed only by medium-to-large international
entitiessuch as coalitions of states embedded in regional security frameworks. International politics requires political, economic, legal, and even
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military resources that are beyond the reach of facilitating small states and
certainly beyond the reach of private individuals. Strategy for communication involves the creation of cosmopolitan power. This is not the neorealist
power of the solitary international actor. But it is a power that has more in
common with the traditional, realist understanding of mediating power than
the facilitative reliance on the power to induce communication through successful social psychology. This type of power is made manifest when coalitions of large-scale international actors, mediated through international
institutions, are created in pursuit of common goals. It is a form of power
akin to what political philosophy calls action in concert (Arendt 1958). In
addition, and unlike the facilitator, the critical mediator will not work
through private backchannels. For the most part, the activities of the critical mediator will be open to public scrutiny. Because these activities
involve highly visible international actors, they will be impossible to conceal.
Thus, in some small measure, I attempt to offer a distinct set of
answers to the practical questions of agency. First, I have detailed the types
of actors who can be identified as critical mediators. Second, and in contrast to power political and facilitative approaches, I have defined a unique
set of strategies. The critical mediator is a coalition of states embedded in a
regional security framework that is committed to a world order based on
cosmopolitan principles. In its attempt at conflict resolution, this actor
would attempt to mobilize the forces committed to the creation of democratic public law. The critical mediator is cosmopolitan power creating cosmopolitan power. I wish now to highlight some of the points already made
and expand on the analysis by turning toward the question of the Oslo
Accords and process and the role of the Norwegian small-state facilitation.
This minicase study should cast further light on how a critical approach to
international mediation can make itself a reality. Future progress in this dispute will require critical, or cosmopolitan, mediation.
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those who supported the accords in 1993 fastened onto this issue of mutual
recognition. They argued that although the accords had many flaws and
although many stumbling blocks would arise, mutual recognition had
changed the basic dynamic of the conflict. Efraim Karsh, for example,
echoes the arguments about symbolism and mutual recognition:
The Declaration of Principles . . . signed on the White House Lawn on 13
September 1993, was a watershed in the one-hundred-year war between
Arabs and Jews. After a century of denial and rejection, of bloodletting
and bereavement, Arabs and Jews have finally agreed to bury the hatchet
and settle for peace, based on mutual recognition and acceptance. (Karsh
1994: 1)
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munity receive outside aid and that intransigent forces feel the material
consequences of their unwillingness to compromise and engage in dialogue.
Where might we find this cosmopolitan mediating power in the world
in which we actually live? Future research in this area should perhaps concentrate on the potential role of the European Union (EU). The EU is
unlikely to act against the wishes of the United States; nor, given
Germanys past, is it likely to put real pressure on Israel. However, there
are signs that the EU is becoming frustrated by its exclusion from a political process that it funds to a greater degree than any other organization.
And all the countries of the EU realize that they are affected by any instability on the EUs borders. The question arises, Can European politicians
afford to leave the peace process to the Americans? I think that the answer
is no. Peace requires not just security but a measure of justice, and the history of U.S. mediation tends to suggest that Israeli demands for security in
an expanded state are privileged over Palestinian claims for justice.
Although the EU will not, in the immediate future, step into the role of the
cosmopolitan mediator, it will have to develop a policy of some sort toward
this part of the Middle East. Doing nothing is not really an option. And
anything short of secure national rights for both parties is a recipe for further instability in the Middle East as a whole. A cosmopolitan approach to a
possible third-party role is a necessity in this context. It is not a result of
abstract academic theorizing.
It has to be admitted that we are unlikely, in the short to medium term,
to see such a power emerge. However, it is the role and purpose of critical
thinking in international relations to examine the case for the emergence of
such a power, its likely shape and nature, and the tactics and strategies it
may employ. Philosophy works with the future. It judges the present in the
light of the possible. But philosophy also works with the past. It is vitally
important to remember that the international world has changed beyond
recognition over time. If there is a source of hope for critical thinking in the
theory of international relations, it is the thought that the sheer pressure of
events will always create the unexpected. Life, whether chemical, biological, or political, exists in a state of flux. Equilibrium is inherently unstable.
Although theory must always be rooted in the actual, it is not unrealistic to
ask some pressing questions about the international institutions that define
the politics of the present day.
Notes
1. Habermas creates a distinction between moral and ethical discourses. Of
course, the distinction needs to be made with reference to particulars. Nevertheless,
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the broad idea is that moral discourses pertain to a set of goods that no human being
can reasonably live without, whereas ethical discourses pertain to the self-understanding of a particular community. Many political disputes are actually about
whether an issue represents a generalizable interest and, therefore, ought to be open
to a wider consensus. For example, the issue of Jerusalem is seen by opinion in
Israel to be a matter for Israel to decide, whereas the Palestinians and the international community, at least in theory, claim that this issue requires consensus. The
fact that people dispute a particular rendition of the principle does not, however,
detract from the validity of the general distinction.
PART FOUR
COMMENTARIES
12
OUR SIDE? CRITICAL THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Chris Brown
Critical Theorysee, Frankfurt School
Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich 1995)
Contemporary critical theory in English-language international relations
may best be understood as todays manifestation of a long-standing democratic impulse in the academic study of international affairs.
Craig N. Murphy in this volume
You ought to read Marx, he is the only completely scientific economist on
our side.
William Morris to a friend and comrade
(cited in Thompson 1977: 761)
As the other chapters in this volume make very clear, there is no general
agreement as to the contribution that critical theory can make to the study
of international relations (IR). None of the authors represented here can
quite match the precision of the editor of the Oxford Companionwhose
determination to restrict critical theory to a narrow meaning no doubt
reflects accurately the predilections of a particular kind of analytical philosophybut Andrew Linklater and Kenneth Baynes are certainly writing
in the shadow of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt; and N. J.
Rengger and Kimberly Hutchings are clearly influenced by the scholarly
tradition that produced the Frankfurt School. In contrast, although even
Craig Murphy himself would not wish to argue that all contemporary manifestations of the democratic impulse could be described as critical, his
chapter, along with those of Robert Cox, Jeffrey Harrod, and Sandra
Whitworth, is eclectic in its sources and influences. Mark Neufeld reviews
three writersAlexander Wendt, Justin Rosenberg, and Cynthia Weber
none of whom could be described as critical theorists in any narrow sense
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box and increasingly skeptical of Marxian economic theory. The 1930s saw
a new softer communist strategy in the face of fascismsocial democrats
moved from being social fascists to potential partners in a Popular
Frontbut, if anything, the two wings moved further apart. Franklin
Roosevelts New Deal in the United States and the emergence of Keynesian
economic theory (owing more to radicals such as Hobson than to Marx)
seemed to offer a third way between communism and capitalism.
It is in this context that critical theory in its original, Oxford
Companion to Philosophy sense emerges. The founders of the Institute for
Social Research in Frankfurt were consciously attempting to preserve,
extend, and deepen a tradition of nondogmatic Marxian thought. In an
attempt to counteract the simplicities of Soviet-style scientific socialism,
they developed the Hegelian roots of Marxs thought. Unwilling to become
Stalinists but alienated from the increasingly reformist German Social
Democratic Party, they turned away from politics and economics and
toward philosophy and culturea step Perry Anderson sees as characteristic of Western Marxism (Anderson 1979). At the heart of their enterprise
remained the project of emancipationthe Enlightenment commitment to
freedom, the belief that social thought and political action ought to be oriented toward liberationeven though the unfolding disasters of the 1930s
and the flight of the Institute for Social Research to the United States
induced a culture of pessimism that ultimately resulted in Theodor Adorno
and Max Horkheimers Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/1979), in which
the Enlightenment project is put into question and found wanting. What is
less clear about the Frankfurt School is not its commitment to but rather its
account of the agency of emancipation. A good part of the schools deviation from Marxism lay in its skepticism about the positive role of the proletariatthere were too many working-class Nazis in Germany in the early
1930s for illusions on this scorebut if not the proletariat, who, or what?
Arguably the founders of the Frankfurt School were too close to Marx to
provide an answer to this question.
Eventually it is the successors of the founders who provide a kind of
answer to the problem of agency, at the expense of greater distance from
Marx. Herbert Marcuse, from the older generation, rather implausibly
invested the lumpenproletariat and dclass students with the historic role
of the working class (Marcuse 1972b), whereas writers such as Habermas,
and later still Axel Honneth, look elsewhere altogether than class and productive relations for the driving force behind social change. Insights
derived from developmental psychology, discourse ethics, and a neoHegelian struggle for recognition provide a moving force in human relations, a role that class conflict no longer can perform (Habermas 1990a;
Honneth 1995b). Ultimately, the heirs of the Frankfurt School and critical
theory in this restricted sense leave Marx well behind; he becomes one
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influence among many, perhaps less significant than Kant, albeit more significant than anyone else.
How does this shift work with critical theories of international relations? Here we see one of the many divides in the field. Critical theorists
such as Linklater and David Held have, for the most part, followed the
standard Frankfurt trajectory and left Marx some way behind themtheir
current concerns with cosmopolitan democracy and post-Westphalian political community have everything to do with late-Frankfurt themes such as
inclusion and exclusion, recognition and moral development, but very little
to do with traditional Marxian notions of class and production (Linklater
1998, Held 1995). Critical international political economists, in contrast,
remain largely wedded to Marxian categories, albeit updated where appropriate. The title of Robert Coxs major work, Production, Power and World
Order: Social Forces in the Shaping of History (1987), tells its own story
without calling on that authors not-altogether-serious description of himself as your friendly neighbourhood Marxist-Leninist subversive (Cox
1986: 249). Coxs seminal 1981 article, cited previously, although one of
the foundation documents of critical IR theory, does not draw on the
Frankfurt School, and its inspiration is clearly classical Marxism with
Antonio Gramsci rather than the Institute for Social Research as the main
interwar reference point.
This affiliation is at the programmatic level, but much of the actual
political economy of this branch of critical international relations theory is
Marxist-Leninist in inspiration rather than Marxist as such, filtered through
the dependency school of center-periphery analysis, which was in turn
heavily influenced by the U.S. Marxist Paul Baran (Baran 1957). Bill
Warren, a more orthodox Marxist, traces this link in his Imperialism:
Pioneer of Capitalism (1980), in which he relates 1960s and 1970s writings
on the development of underdevelopment to Lenins declaration of 1917
that capitalism had reached its highest stage and was now a degenerate
social form. This point cannot be pressed too far; as the chapters by Cox,
Harrod, and Murphy in this volume make clear, there is more to critical
international political economy than the point would suggest, but the basic
thrust behind this work is clearly more in line with the Marxist tradition
than is the case with critical IR theory as such.
The position of writers such as Cox and Harrod appears to be based on
the argument that it is possible to employ a great deal of Marxist (Leninist)
economic thought without accepting responsibility for Marxist (Leninist)
political practice; one can, as it were, unpackage Marxism and pull out the
good bits (the account of the laws of motion of capitalist economies) while
leaving the bad, totalitarian, bits behind. Whether this is in general a viable
strategy is contestableespecially in the light of the doubts about a politics
largely based on production, which will feature in the following discussion
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of our sidebut it has become particularly difficult to follow in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the peoples democracies in
19891991. Although these societies clearly suffered a political crisis
partly induced by pressures from outsidethey also fell because the root
idea upon which they were constructed, that it is possible to plan an economy by reference to need rather than purchasing power and without employing the mechanism of the market, proved false. As Alec Nove demonstrated
before the fall, a feasible socialism cannot be constructed on the basis of a
fully planned economy (Nove 1983). Moreover, the idea of a world in
which scarcity has been abolished seems even less credible in an era of
environmental consciousness than it did a generation or two ago, when the
leaders of the Soviet Union committed that country to the hubristic
schemes for physical transformation, the debris of which their successors
are still struggling to cope with.
In short, whereas it might once have made sense to think that Marxian
economics are part of the solution to the worlds ills, it now seems clear
that they are no more than another way of posing the problem of industrialism. As with Frankfurt School thought on agency, however, it is by no
means clear what the implications of this point are, that is, what a nonMarxist critical international political economy might look like. An understandable desire to resist the human suffering caused by too rigid an application of neoliberal economic remedies by institutions such as the IMF
obviously constitutes part of the new problematic but is no substitute for a
positive take on the world economy. What a plausible positive economic
policy for our side might look like today is by no means clear if the aim is
to distinguish an explicitly critical theory of the world economy from the
work of radicals such as Will Hutton or Paul Hirst (Hutton 1995; Hirst and
Thompson 1996). The problem is deepened by the difficulties with the
notion that we have a side anymore. This issue will be discussed further
on, but first some thoughts on the nature of science need to be aired.
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but also those complexities that were the product of the existence within
capitalist social formations of precapitalist strata (Marx 1968a). Nonetheless, a certain Manichaeanism pervades their work. Things are moving in
the direction of a world in which our side will directly confront their side;
in the name of science Marx tries to avoid portraying this confrontation as
one between good and evil, but that thought is rarely far from the surface of
his work. A world penultimately composed of two sides seems the only logical result of the theory of history espoused by Marx. The notion that
human development takes the form of successive modes of production
(stages)ancient slavery, medieval feudalism, modern capitalism, a
socialist-communist futureis central to historical materialism, and this
idea explains why Marx could be so dismissive of societies that had not
been part of this trajectory (Marx 1968b). Asia had been stagnant, outside this dynamic sequence of human development; it needed to be brought
into world history by European imperialismnot, of course, that the imperialists understood that this was what they were doing. In the end, or rather
just before the end, our side will consist of all the oppressed and dispossessed, all the downtrodden, the wretched of the earth, led by the proletariat, the industrial working class; their side will consist of all oppressors of
every kinda shrinking band led by capitalistswho will be swept away
in the revolution, after which there will be no sides at all. Famously, Marx
himself refused to be drawn in on the nature of postcapitalist society, but
William Morris, in News from Nowhere, provides a compelling fictional
picture (along with an account of how this utopia emerged that is Leninist
avant la lettre).
How did twentieth-century critical theory respond to this scenario? As
already noted, the Frankfurt School in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s was
understandably skeptical about the emancipatory role of the working class.
The workers were too readily seduced by Nazi or, for that matter, Stalinist
propaganda. Moreover, the cultural resources available for the development
of an emancipatory working class had dried up. Here is the real dialectic of
enlightenment: The very material forces that Marx had seen as the basis for
a future emancipation lay behind this cultural desert. Under the influence of
capitalism and the uneducated taste of the bourgeoisie, culture divides into
a high culture that is increasingly inaccessible and avant-garde and a low
culture of diminishing worth whose greatest achievement today is the
advertising jingle.2 The Frankfurt School did not, however, abandon the
idea of a unidirectional linear history; indeed, its pessimism was precisely
based on the view that this history, the only one available, was turning out
badly. And whatever might be said about the difference between critical
and traditional theory, it remained the case that the scientific knowledge
developed in the West was qualitatively superior to that produced else-
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where and that, as Habermas and his followers still insist, Western rationality is central to the prospects for emancipation.
Habermas and his IR followers no longer think in terms of revolution
as the precondition for emancipation, and as noted previously, their dialogic commitment extends to all comers of all genders, continents, and cultures. It remains moot whether this strategy is as open as it seems. It is certainly the case that whereas in the nineteenth century the Enlightenment
project of emancipation seemed dominated by, if not officially limited to,
white males, today different genders and races are incorporated; neither
sexism nor racism can play any part in determining who is on our side, and
multiculturalism on the left attempts to make our side as open as possible to
the contributions of other cultures. However, a basic problem remains: Our
side in the Marx-Morris sense was based on the notion that all forms of
oppression could ultimately be contextualized and organized by the relationship of individuals to propertythe ownership of the means of production in Marxs terms, wealth more generally for Morris. It is this context
that lies behind Marxs metanarrative and that still informs the more Marxinfluenced of contemporary critical theorists.
But is it really the case that this metanarrative still stands? Postmodern
politics suggests not; indeed, one might note, not altogether frivolously,
that Britains New Labor Party, the most successful of postmodern political
groupings, is explicitly dedicated to the notion that there is a third way
between our side and their side (Giddens 1998). This notion is in the context of politics in a postindustrial society, but there is a less frivolous, much
wider point to be made here. Our current world order produces many losers
as well as a few winners, but it is by no means clear that all the losers are
on the same side, part of some global rainbow coalition in which the newly
industrialized workers of the South join hands with the displaced industrial workers of the North, oppressed women in northern India make
common cause with demonized radical Islam, Hindu nationalists develop
affinities with gays in Zimbabwe or inner-city African Americans, and so
on. On the face of it, emancipation for some of these subordinate groups
may involve the continued oppression of others; in any event the simplicities of the world of William Morris and Karl Marx seem gone forever.
Here lies the most significant divide in critical international relations
theory. Those critical theorists closest to the Frankfurt School and, a fortiori, those closest to Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci hold to the faith that ultimately there is only one side for usthat through dialogue difference can
be preserved and exclusion ended or, in the latter case, that, contrary to
appearance, differences in gender, race, and culture in the last resort are
significant only because of politico-economic structures. Other critical theoristspostmodernists and their ilkfurther from Marx and skeptical of
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Notes
This overview of the debate on critical theory and IR is based loosely on my contribution to the proceedings of the conference held at the University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, in 1996, which was the starting point for this volume. I have also had
the opportunity to review most of the other chapters in this volume in draft form. I
am grateful to all the contributors and participants in the discussions at that most
productive and convivial weekend, and in particular to Richard Wyn Jones, who has
had the unenviable task of shaping the proceedings into book form.
1. This may be a convenient point at which to clarify the relationship between
critical IR theory and constructivist IR theory. Briefly, constructivism and critical
theory share an opposition to positivism, but the radical impulse associated with
critical theory is not necessarily to be found in the writings of constructivists. Thus,
for example, Friedrich Kratochwil has employed the Wittgensteinian notion of a
constitutive rule in ways that are clearly and necessarily antipositivist but that
endorse many of the existing rules of international society (Kratochwil 1989, 1995).
Similarly, Alexander Wendts employment of structuration theory is antipositivist,
but his work remains essentially within a state-centric framework (Wendt 1987,
1992). It should be noted that the structuration theory favored by Wendt is wholly
incompatible with the Wittgensteinian distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, on which Kratochwils work is based. That two of the most important figures in constructivism differ at such a fundamental level casts severe doubt on the
coherence of the school; perhaps the best way to understand constructivism is as yet
one more oppositional tendency within the U.S. academy, a banding together of
scholars who have little in common other than their opposition to the prevailing
positivist orthodoxy in U.S. international relationsthough, as previously suggested, much the same might be said of critical IR theory.
2. Adorno traces this process in terms of the history of music, arguing that
after The Magic Flute [1791] it was never again possible to force serious and light
music together and that thereafter, bourgeois philistinism took over (Adorno
1938/1982). Roger Scruton has recently commented on the absurdity of this claim
(Scruton 1997: 468474). Apart from the obvious fact that the bourgeoisie has been
the main patron of serious (including atonal and avant-garde) music for the past
two centuries and that many nineteenth-century composers wrote tunes that were
whistled in the streets by ordinary folk as well as listened to at La Scala and Covent
Our Side?
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Garden, there has rarely been so rich and varied a combination of serious and light
music as in the United States of the 1930s and 1940s, when Adorno wrote his jeremiads. From Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington to George Gershwin, Cole
Porter, and a host of lesser talents, this was a time of extraordinary creativity, and
Adornos inability to recognize this richness can only be attributed to a sad snobbishness or the closure of a mind at the end of its tether.
13
WHAT IS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR?
NOTES TOWARD A POSTCRITICAL VIEW
Alexander Wendt
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There are various ways to think about the kind of control sought in
such a project: constitutional design, social engineering, evolutionary
guidance, system steering, collective character planning, and so on
(see, respectively, Goodin 1996, Turner 1998, Banathy 1998, Luhmann
1997, Elster 1983). These metaphors have different inflections and requirements that might be interesting to compare. But here I address only one,
steering, and use it to illustrate the larger problematic.
The spirit of my inquiry is postcritical, by which I mean a view of what
social science is, for that view combines emancipation, which can occur
only by deep transformation of the existing order over the long run, with
the positivist willingness to think scientifically about that task. In a sense
this combination of science and emancipation is what critical theory, in the
early Frankfurt School, was originally all about, and to that extent the argument of this chapter is very much in a traditional critical vein. However,
among critical theorists today, those with postmodernist sensibilities tend to
reject the idea of science altogether, and even most of those who are
opposed to postmodernism (such as Marxists) tend to shy away from the
science part of the equation because of its association with positivism.
Given the antipositivist, antiscience connotations of contemporary critical
theory, therefore, adding post to critical seems necessary to capture my
meaning, even if that means merely getting back to square one. Thus this
chapter echoes some of the themes expressed in Nicholas Renggers and
Andrew Linklaters contributions to the volume, and indeed it might be
seen as taking off from Linklaters suggestive remarks about praxeology. In
the next section I define what I mean by steering and locate it in the context
of two views of where social order comes from. I then discuss three questions that a science of steering raisesWhos driving? Where should we
go? How do we get there?and show how these questions create difficulties for traditional positivist and critical conceptions of social science. I
conclude with some thoughts about what a science of steering would need
to look like.
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Pettit 1993). Here the question is the degree of freedom and voluntarism
versus structural determinism in the historical process; there it was whether
agents or structures can be reduced to each other.
The spontaneous-order tradition holds that social orders are an unintended consequence of various actions. Order emerges spontaneously from
the complex concatenation of human activities, structured by preexisting
institutions but over time unwittingly transforming those institutions as
well. The reasoning here is evolutionary, depicting a process that operates
behind the backs of actors, and indeed one of the principal mechanisms by
which it is thought to work is through the selection of certain practices and
institutions over others (on Hayeks theory of cultural selection, see
Vanberg 1986 and Hodgson 1991a; cf. Adler 1991). Practices and institutions that meet the needs of agents tend to survive, whereas those that do
not are selected out. Competition is therefore a good thing, since as a discovery procedure it helps societies determine what works and what doesnt.
We can think of this argument as putting structure before agency,
determinism before voluntarism, since it locates the ultimate mechanism of
historical change in the logic of social structures rather than in the foresight
of purposeful agents. To that extent it reflects a welcome humility about the
human condition. However, despite its focus on structure, it would be a
mistake to interpret this view as saying that agents are irrelevant (which
would be odd for the libertarian Hayekians), for two reasons. One is that
social structures have the effects they do only because of the activities that
instantiate them. Human behavior is necessary to carry all social structures, and so even the most structurally determined outcomes happen only
because of what people do. But creating outcomes unintentionally is different from doing so intentionally; thus it might be useful to call the former
action and the latter agency, or something like that. The other way in
which agents matter is that human beings are purposeful creatures who in
their daily lives are constantly intervening in history, trying to bend bigger
or smaller parts of it to their will. And often they succeed: On the local
level, over the short term, many outcomes are intended. Thus the point
being made by spontaneous-order theorists must be that it is only on the
more macroscopic level, over the longer term, that deliberate control is not
really possible.
A constructed order, then, is one in which institutional and perhaps distributive outcomes are deliberately chosen by some agency.3 The parameters of social order are intended rather than unintended; freedom rather than
determinism drives evolution; agency rather than structure is what counts.
There are relatively few successful pure constructed orders historically,
domestic or international, but there are some. The U.S. Constitution is perhaps the most brilliant example, and Western academics and policymakers
are now busily trying to replicate its success with constitutional engineer-
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ed-order approach, but for critical theorists, who often seem uncomfortable
with any kind of instrumental rationality, it may still smack of the putatively technocratic ethos of positivism. Much of this unease stems from the fact
that instrumental rationality is often used to control others, usually without
their consent. Steering, however, is largely about controlling the self, the
collective, global self, over time (how that self is constituted is an important issue raised further on). Although having an instrumentally rational
component, self-command is less problematic normatively because in being
applied to the self that component is intrinsically more accountable
(Schelling 1984). If I make the ends-means calculation that going to college will improve my job prospects, I will have to coerce or discipline
myself in the short run, but that is a matter very different from making such
a decision for others.
Second, the point of the control sought in steering is to bring about better outcomes than would naturally, or spontaneously, occur. One steers in
order to go somewhere, and thus steering presupposes purpose, goal directedness, intentionality. Now, this statement in itself says nothing about the
content of our purposes; a capacity for evolutionary steering could be used
for good or evil. This is where the critical part of postcritical thinking
comes in with a key normative constraint: Steering should be about emancipation, about freeing ourselves from the problematic social structures that
cause war, human rights violations, racism, poverty, and so on. Critical theory, of course, already says this, but it tends to be better on emancipation
from than emancipation to, and still weaker on how to get from here to
there. Combining an emancipatory intent with an instrumental approach
toward the future seems more likely to get us where we want to go.
Finally, evolutionary steering depends on another important critical
theory concern, namely reflexivityunderstanding the role that our own
beliefs and practices play in sustaining the social structures in which we are
embedded. Here the connotations of the steering metaphor might be misleading. Steering a car on the road does not require much reflexivity. One
should ideally know where one is going, of course, but since it is an external object (a car) that one is steering, there does not seem to be much need
to know thyself to succeed. If steering a social system is ultimately about
the evolution of a collective self, however, then knowing that selfhow it
is constituted, how it functions, and how it can be transformedis crucial.
Problems of Steering
Even if we interpret a construction problematic in world politics in the relatively modest terms of evolutionary steering, we still face hugely complex
problems. In the first instance, it is not clear who the agent of global steer-
213
ing should be, and, in the second, what kind of constitution it should try to
create. In other guises these two issues are already the subject of considerable scholarship in IR, and all I do in the following is reflect on them from
a steering point of view. Something else that has been neglected in the literature is more interesting to me here: Regardless of who is steering or where
they want to go, lurking in the background is an epistemological problem
of knowing how to get from here to there, of long-range choice. In different
ways all of these problems, and especially the last, challenge traditional
positivist and critical conceptions of social science. I pretend no solutions
here; my goal is merely to identify some questions that a science of steering
naturally poses.
Whos Driving?
If steering the international system presupposes a driver, then perhaps the
first problem, analytically if not temporally, is constituting the subject, the
intentional agent, who will be doing the driving. This problem has both
practical and normative aspects.
The intentionality of social systems is different from the intentionality
of individuals in that it involves not a single agent but a collective one, a
we or plural subject (Gilbert 1989). Plural subjects can take two basic
formscentralized, formally unitary organizations such as firms or states
(a corporate identity or self) or decentralized teams of formally independent actors working together on a regular, harmonious basis (a collective
identity or self).6 Both forms of agency might be relevant to steering the
international system. Corporate steering agencies could be either greatpower hegemons who try to run the show on behalf of the system or international organizations with authoritative powersuch as, increasingly, the
EUin which states merge their bodies. These would constitute international steering agencies on the centralized, domestic-analogy model. But
the subject of international steering could also be a collective, a group of
states and/or nonstate actors who retain their formal individuality but in
practice cooperate closely in guiding the system. The great-power concert
is an early manifestation of such a decentered agency; its spirit is found
today in informal arrangements such as the Group of Seven (G7). A more
institutionalized version of teamwork is represented by the idea of an international statea formal structure of political authority that lacks an authoritative center but that can discipline its elements to cooperate, for example,
the WTO or, perhaps, the EU (Picciotto 1991, Wendt 1994; also with specific reference to the EU, Caporaso 1996). And finally, also relevant to the
constitution of a collective steering agency at the international level are
transnational public spheres trying to keep states democratically accountable (Lynch 1999, Mitzen 1999). In short, the requirements of plural sub-
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jectivity impose some limits on the individual elements (e.g., they have to
work together), but these requirements can be met in various ways.
No matter what their internal constitution, however, as every student of
collective action knows, creating plural subjects is difficult and is compounded in international politics by the absence of centralized authority
(anarchy). On top of the usual problems of free riding that make collective
action difficult, anarchy creates incentives to pursue relative rather than
absolute gains, making such action all but impossible. Indeed, realists have
devoted much of their energy in recent years to showing why we should
never expect anything more than episodic collective action in international
politics. In contrast, nonrealists have worked equally hard to show that
under certain conditionswhere there is concern for the future, an expectation of continued interaction, relatively few actors, little likelihood of violence, and so onactors can cooperate under anarchy, as they in fact often
do in real life (much of the resulting debate can be found in Baldwin 1993).
With deepening economic interdependence and a widening democratic
peace, these conditions are gaining strength in the early twenty-first century, holding out the prospect that a capacity for international steering will
coalesce.
This prospect calls up the normative side of the question, however,
namely who should be the subject of steering. Steering at the international
level involves choices that could affect literally everyone in the world and
thus raises serious questions of democratic accountability. This is especially true if steering is done at least in part by the currently most powerful
actors in the systemstates. States might be democratic at home, which
would permit some accountability at the domestic level, but hardly any
mechanisms exist yet at the system level to regulate their actions. This lack
has already led to significant worries about a democratic deficit in the
European Union, worries that are being allayed only partly by the gradual
strengthening of the European Parliament, and there is every reason to
think that other transnational accountability problems are going to become
more intense over the coming decades as well (Held 1995).
For this and other reasons, some critical theorists might object to the
idea of states as subjects of international steering (if they didnt object to
the whole idea of steering in the first place), perhaps putting their faith in
empowering global civil society instead. Indeed, although I cant argue the
point here, I suspect the issue that most reliably marks off scholars in IR as
critical theorists is hostility toward the state (which makes sense, since
states are the core of the given in international life that must be problematized). Those who see themselves as positivists are generally inclined to
work with the state, whereas those who count themselves as critical theorists tend to treat states as the problem.7
From the standpoint of transnational democracy, antistatism might be a
215
good thing, but there are also other values at stake in steering, perhaps the
most important of which is just getting things done, and that will require
including states in the constitution of any future international steering
agency. No other actor has remotely the potential for steering the international system as do states, and thus if we want to steer the systema debatable goal, to be surewe should exploit that fact. That still leaves us with
the problem of making steering accountable, which is why it is important to
make global civil society and public spheres part of the process. But the
critical theorists concern with constituting a democratic subject of steering
should not come completely at the expense of the positivists concern with
constituting a viable one.
Where Should We Go?
Assuming that a capacity for system steering can be created, the question
then arises of where we should use it to go. The answer is partly constrained by where we can go, since the evolution of the international system, like any social system, is path dependent. The world today is emerging
from a deeply embedded state-centric approach to political community, and
thus many places we might like to gofor example, a pure cosmopolitanism of open borders and human rights for allare simply not available
to us in the foreseeable future. And indeed, trying to create such a world
before the conditions are right could lead to precisely the kind of imposed,
illegitimate, and ultimately unstable order that critics of constructed order
have long emphasized.
Nevertheless, narrowing our vision to what is possible still leaves us
with many options. These choices are in important part normative, reflecting competing values and visions of what such an order should look like.
They have been the subject of considerable debate in political theory
between cosmopolitans and communitarians, a debate in which the relative
weight of the rights of individuals, groups, and states is at stake (for good
overviews, see Brown 1992b and Van Dyke 1977). I dont have anything
special to contribute to this debate here, except two observations suggested
by a concern with steering.
First, more so than other conceptions of what IR is for, a steering problematic brings positive and normative inquiries naturally together. The positivist emphasis on separating facts and values encourages the isolation of
normative thinking to political theory, whereas critical theorys reluctance
to think instrumentally and scientifically leaves empirical inquiries largely
to positivists. Under the traditional models of what IR is for, in other
words, there is not much for students of facts and of values to talk about.
Each have their own domain, and there is little to bring them together.
Figuring out where to go, in contrast, cannot be done except by talking
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about facts and values together, and to that extent the steering problematic
gives content and direction to both.
Second, the problem of deciding where to go raises the question of
whether the criteria we use to evaluate destinations should be substantive or
procedural. Should we think about the goal of steering in an outcome-oriented way, aiming for particular goods, or more modestly in terms of
process, worrying only about who is involved in decisionmaking and how it
is carried out? A substantive approach seems more faithful to the basic idea
of steering, but the existence in world politics of significant contestation
about values argues for a procedural approach. And more interesting, so do
the epistemological problems of knowledge and rationality in long-range
choice, to which I now turn.
How Do We Get There?
Arguably the most fundamental problem of steering is choosing the right
means to achieve long-term ends, because it exists no matter who the subject of steering is or where it wants to go. Even a perfectly accountable and
politically correct driver faces the problem of navigating through time from
a complex present to an uncertain future. Whereas the first two problems
have been the subject of considerable IR scholarship, that is not true of this
third one. The problem is at base epistemological in the sense that once we
start thinking about the futureabout timein a way that gives meaning to
our choices today, it becomes unclear what counts as informed, rational
choice. The kinds of knowledge that positivists and critical theorists want
to create are of relatively little help in thinking about how to relate the
future to the present, and thus the problem of steering is most likely to yield
new insights. The problem has various aspects, which I have grouped under
two headings.
The knowledge problem. This problem refers to the fact that it is simply
very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to know how to control the evolution of social systems.8 We just dont have the kind of knowledge, or at
least not anywhere near enough of it, to successfully relate means to ends,
at the system level, over the medium to long term. This constraint has both
subjective and objective aspects concerning properties of the observer and
of the observed.
On the subjective side, the knowledge problem is the familiar one of
bounded rationality. The issues here are the limited information-processing
capabilities and cognitive biases of the human mind. Even if social systems
are in principle knowable, creatures of our limited physical constitution
cannot fully exploit this fact to achieve steering capacity.
Serious as it is, however, bounded rationality is probably not the hard-
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est part of the knowledge problem, which is that social systems might not
be knowable in the first place. If the problem were ultimately subjective,
we could hope that over time, with the march of social science and computer technology, we will be able to compensate for our cognitive limits and
get better at steering. But there may be significant objective constraints on
that prospect. The reason stems from the fact that to say we can know the
future is to say it is already determined in the present. A knowable universe
is a deterministic universe, or an ergodic universe, as Paul Davidson
(1996) puts it. Yet there seem to be at least two features of social systems to
suggest that they may ultimately be nondeterministic. One is complexity:
nonlinear and chaotic dynamics that create randomness and unpredictability, stemming not from inadequacies in our cognitions or instruments but
from reality itself. The other is uncertainty, where this is defined as distinct
from riskrisk being a situation where one can define a probability distribution over future states, whereas uncertainty exists when such an effort is
impossible because the domain of possible future states does not yet exist
(on the differences between uncertainty and complexity, see Langlois and
Everett 1992, and on the risk-uncertainty distinction, see Knight 1921). The
theoretical and practical implications of uncertainty in this sense are quite
radical and have been the subject of considerable debate in economics
between mainstream Keynesians and heterodox Austrians and postKeynesians (see, for example, Lawson 1988, Kelsey and Quiggin 1992,
Runde 1995). Complexity and uncertainty together support the famous
epistemological argument against socialism, which shows that markets
will inevitably be more efficient than command economies because central
planners can never have as much knowledge of an economy as the decentralized knowledge produced by the price mechanism (see especially Hayek
1945), and this argument seems equally relevant to the problem of steering.
In any case, it seems likely that since complexity and uncertainty will grow
exponentially with the scale of the system and distance from the present,
the knowledge problem involved in steering at the global level will be as
difficult as it could possibly be.
Paradoxically, however, it also seems to be the case that a nondeterministic, and therefore unknowable, environment is a precondition for
steering in the first placeat least if the idea of steering implies, as I think
it must, any sense of choice, intentionality, or free will. This is because in
order to be meaningful as choice, an action cannot be predetermined. If it
were the case that all our actions today were determined 100 years agoas
knowing the future today would seem to implythen in what sense are
those actions choices as opposed to just mechanical enactments of structural conditions? And if the future is already determined, in what sense could
choices today make any difference? In short, the idea of steering seems to
embody a contradiction: It assumes that what we do today makes a differ-
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ence to the future; at the same time it requires foreknowledge of what will
happen if we make those choices that vitiates their being choices at all. I
dont know how to resolve this contradiction, but it is the kind of paradox
that emerges once we start thinking about time in a systematic, historical
way (on historical conceptions of time, see Bausor 1983, Setterfield 1995).
The rationality problem. Problems of time are perhaps even more salient for
a second challenge of relating short-term means to long-term ends, which is
that the definition of rationality, and therefore of rational choice, is ambiguous in that context. In day-to-day decisionmaking it seems useful to assume
that to rationally choose means to maximize expected utility. But in decisionmaking over time, two of the three elements of this decision rule,
expectations and utility, become problematic.
Utility is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, it is not clear how
future utility should be weighed against present utility. We might all agree
that, other things being equal, it is better to consume utility today rather
than tomorrow, but how much better, and what if things are not equal?
External or structural conditions may sometimes provide an answer, but
only sometimes. Thus in a Hobbesian war of all against all we are essentially forced to discount the future heavily, or else we wont live long enough
to enjoy it. But that external constraint is no longer present in the emerging
constitutional order were talking about here, and thus we are more free to
assign whatever value we like to future utility. How we do that will depend
at least partly on normative judgments about our responsibilities to future
generations, which reasonable people can disagree about. The issue of
intergenerational justice brings up the second problem with measuring utility over time, which is that the subject to which we are attributing utility,
who has utility, is not constant. Plural subjects are actually groups of individuals whose membership changes over time, so that even if there is a
sense in which a future international steering agency is the same as one
today, there is also a sense in which it is different (Wendt 1999: ch. 5). To
that extent, decisions that we make about our long-term utility are actually
decisions about the utility that others will get. As with the problem of
weighing future utility, it is not clear what the criterion of rational should
be under such conditions.
The second component of the expected-utility framework, expectations, is equally problematic in historical time. The problem here is determining what constitutes a rational expectation about the future. What we
have to go on is our past experience, and so some would say that the rational thing to do is simply extrapolate from that experience to the future. That
assumption gains further support from the self-fulfilling nature of social
expectations (Wendt 1999: ch. 4), which helps create institutional inertia
and path-dependent development. However, we have already noted the par-
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positive analysis of steering. This problem stems from the relatively poor
fit of its ideal of science with the reality of the historical world. The goal of
social science, according to positivism, is axiomatic theory based on lawlike generalizations about past experiencea worthy objective, to be sure,
but one problematic for a science of steering for at least three reasons.
First, the fact of complexity is likely to frustrate efforts to find the allimportant generalizations. The significant exception of the democratic
peace aside, IR scholarship to date has failed to turn up many interesting
behavioral laws on which we can ground theories. Second, even if IR
scholars manage to find such laws, they will by definition be about the past
and as such not a particularly reliable guide to the future, given the complex and uncertain nature of the world. Indeed, as weve seen, that the past
would be a reliable guide to the future in some sense undermines the whole
idea of steering, which presupposes a capacity to break with the past. And
finally, making the discovery of behavioral laws a key objective of science
is likely to make our theories more conservative, to blunt their critical edge,
because in order to find laws we will have to take the institutions that generate them as given. Thats fine if our goal is problem solving within the
existing order, but the point of steering, at least if we want to go anywhere,
is to emancipate ourselves from that order (or its problematic aspects);
thats hard to do if we have taken the order as given. Behavioral laws are
great to have, since they tell us something important about how the system
in which we now find ourselves works, but if we want to change that system we also need knowledge of the deep social structures that make those
laws possible.
This last point reminds us that the troublesome requirement that a science of steering be based on behavioral laws is not intrinsic to positivism,
understood broadly as the view that the scientific method is our best guide
to how the world works, but only to the logical empiricist version of positivism, which is rooted in a Humean view of causality that makes laws necessary for knowledge. In recent years an alternative, scientific realist form
of positivism has become dominant in the philosophy of science. Scientific
realism is non-Humean and so less concerned with regularities of experience (for discussion of these issues, see Wendt 1999: ch. 2). In the realist
view the emphasis in science should be not on behavioral regularities but
on often unobservable causal mechanisms and deep structures, which in
some conditions might generate regularities at the level of experience but in
other conditions might not. There are various epistemological arguments
for this proposal, but whatever their merits, it has the additional virtue here
of coping more effectively than logical empiricism with the knowledge and
rationality problems in evolutionary steering. Here, the basis on which we
steer should be an understanding of structural logics and tendencies, even if
we cant predict specific events (Lawson 1995), and even if this requires
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Conclusion
It is obvious that these remarks barely scratch the surface of some very
complicated issues. But given the relative neglect of critical praxeology in
IR scholarship, perhaps even a preliminary survey is useful.
I want to make a last point about time and the role of expectations
about the future in international politics, and about the kind of IR scholarship that would contribute to shaping those expectations. If policymakers
(or -takers) think that the future will be just like the past, they will make
choices today on that basis. And whether intentionally or not, those choices
will generate the self-fulfilling prophecies that drive the evolution of the
world system over the long run. What I want to emphasize here is the paradox of choices being made on the basis of expectations about the future, the
actual character of which will depend on those very choices. If the concept
of choice is to be meaningful, we have to assume that the future is open,
and our expectations about it should therefore be treated as endogenously
rather than exogenously determined. And that approach in turn creates a
space for IR scholars to try to create expectations in much the same way
that advertisers try to create tastes (see Parsons 1991). Because of path
dependency those efforts are constrained in important ways by where the
system is today. Yet because social evolution depends so much on the
choices that people make, there is always room in principle for creating
expectations that are not simply extrapolations from the past but that also
reflect where we want to be in the future. To fully exploit this potential,
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Notes
1. The plural here is important; even more so than positivism, critical theory
today encompasses a wide range of epistemological, ontological, and political commitments, virtually the only common thread in which is rejection of positivism.
Schools of thought often grouped under this heading include Gramscian and
Frankfurt School Marxism, radical feminism, and postmodernism, among others.
The characterizations of critical theory in this chapter apply more or less well to
these different theories, and in some cases not at all.
2. Applied to constitutional evolution, Hayeks distinction seems parallel to
McIlwains (1940) between ancient and modern constitutions.
3. Hayek calls advocates of this approach constructivists, which may be confusing because the term means something different today in IR. Constructivists in
IR also emphasize the role of agency in creating social orders but make no assumption that institutional outcomes are or should be intended.
4. In fact, Hayek himself has advocated constitutional designs (e.g., 1979); the
problem, as otherwise sympathetic critics have noted (Witt 1994: 185186), is that
it is hard to justify this kind of interventionism within a spontaneous-order approach
(cf. Vanberg 1994b: 190195).
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5. However, to the extent that I understand his treatment, he uses it to very different effect (see Luhmann 1997). My thinking on the balance between spontaneous
and constructed orders is based on Prisching (1989), Hodgson (1991b), Wilke
(1992), and Vanberg (1994b).
6. On teams, see Sugden 1993, and on corporate versus collective identity, see
Wendt 1999: ch. 5.
7. This raises the question discussed by Neufeld (Ch. 8 in this volume) of the
extent to which my own work can be considered critical. Although I have long seen
myself as working in a critical vein (1987, 1992) and have once been asked to stand
in for critical theory (1995), my thinking has always been state-centric and positivistic, on both counts giving it dubious credentials as critical theory. For a good
discussion of the relationship between critical theory and constructivism in IR, see
Price and Reus-Smit (1998).
8. The phrase the knowledge problem is Lavoies (1985); my treatment is
somewhat broader.
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The Contributors
250
The Contributors
The Contributors
251
Index
253
254
Index
Checkel, Jeffrey, 12
Cheysson, Claude, 48
China, 55; ancient, 34
Chomsky, Noam, 67, 173
citizenship, 3435, 3841
civilization, 53
civil society, 52, 57, 59, 164, 165, 169,
205, 221; global, 39, 161, 169,
214215, 221. See also public sphere
class, concept of, 49, 137
Cold War, 46, 68, 69
communicative action, theory of, 98,
172, 198. See also Habermas
Communist International, 193
conflict resolution, 172175, 185
Connolly, William, 199
constructivism, vii, 3, 4, 10, 1215, 16,
93, 98, 103, 108, 131134, 196, 202,
223
consumerism, 52, 53, 161
corporate elites, 122. See also
transnational corporations (TNCs)
cosmopolitanism, 92, 109, 166, 180,
184, 185, 215. See also democracy,
cosmopolitan
counterhegemony, 56, 57, 59
covert world, 5657
Cox, Robert W., 2, 5, 14, 18, 37, 63, 70,
80, 8185, 96, 120, 122, 150, 192,
195, 205
critical social theory, 6, 9, 24, 35,
Curle, Adam, 73, 74
Curtis, Grant, 155
Darwin, Charles, 197
Davidson, Paul, 217
Dialectic of Enlightenment, 7, 95, 194
de Certeau, Michel, 104106
deliberative politics, 163165
Delors, Jacques, 57
democracy: cosmopolitan, 39, 169, 195;
deficit, 214; procedural, 162163,
169; theory of, 18
Der Derian, James, 80, 82, 199
Derrida, Jacques, 11, 24, 40, 80
de St. Pierre, Abbe, 91
Deutsch, Karl 68
Devetak, Richard, 98, 99
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 116
discourse ethics, 9899, 198. See also
Habermas
Index
138, 191, 194200, 202, 208; early,
14; influences on, 34
Fraser, Nancy, 17, 32, 144, 164, 165
Freud, Sigmund, 94, 104
Friere, Paulo, 93
Fromm, Eric, 5, 94, 95
Frost, Mervyn, 137
G7. See Group of Seven
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 28, 176
Galtung, Johan, 68
Gershwin, George, 203
Giddens, Anthony, 32, 132
Gill, Stephen, 96
globalization, 4749, 52, 58, 122, 127,
161, 167, 168; of production, 48
Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 6, 9, 75, 129, 195,
201. See also Gramscian tradition;
neo-Gramscian approach
Gramscian tradition, 8, 11, 15, 17, 93,
137. See also Gramsci, Antonio;
neo-Gramscian approach
Grant, Rebecca, 80
Greece, ancient, 33, 34
Greene Balch, Emily, 63, 65, 66, 70, 75
Green Movement, 55
Grotius, Hugo, 91
Group of Seven (G7), 50, 56, 213
Gunder Frank, Andr, 93
Habermas, Jrgen, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14,
17, 18, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 40, 41,
62, 68, 80, 82, 85, 96, 97, 101, 103,
106, 108, 161, 162166, 169, 170,
176179, 180, 183, 186, 194, 198,
199, 201. See also communicative
action; discourse ethics
Halliday, Fred, 93
Hampson, F. O., 179, 180
Harding, Sandra, 141
Harrington, Michael, 67
Harrington, Mona, 71
Harrod, Jeffrey, 5
Hayek, Friedrich, 208, 223
Held, David, 99, 161, 166169, 178,
180, 195
Hegel, G. W. F., 2, 24, 34, 94, 104
Hegelian-Marxist tradition, 5, 9,
hegemony, 56, 57
Heine, Christian, 196
Heiner, Ronald, 219
255
256
Index
Jay, Martin, 9
Jennar, Raoul, 154
Jospin, Lionel, 55
Kaplan, Caren, 152, 159
Kant, Immanuel, 34, 37, 79, 9192,
104, 116, 195, 197
Kantian tradition, 5, 3841, 8687, 166,
178
Karsh, Efraim, 182
Kellog-Briand Pact (1928), 114
Kennan, George, 67
Keohane, Robert, 3, 31, 69, 108,
141142, 149
Keynes, John-Maynard, 194, 217
Khmer Rouge, 153154
Kissinger, Henry, 69, 174
Korea, war, 120
Korsch, Karl, 94
Kratochwil, Friedrich, 12, 14, 202
labor, concept of, 18
land mines, 206
League of Nations, 65, 66, 72, 120,
210
Ledgerwood, Julie, 154
Lenin, Vladimir Illich, 195, 198, 201
Liebnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 91
Linklater, Andrew, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11,
13, 18, 80, 8285, 93, 97, 98, 99,
102103, 106, 108, 174, 178, 180,
195, 198, 206
Lippmann, Walter, 67
Lowenthal, Leo, 94
Luhmann, Niklas, 211
Lukcs, Georg, 94
Luxemburg, Rosa, 193
Lyotard, Jean-Franois, 11, 28, 29, 41
Machiavelli, Niccol, 113. See also
Machiavellian
Machiavellian, 37. See also
Machiavelli, Niccol
Madeuf, Bernadette, 47
MAI. See Multilateral Agreement on
Investment
Mann, Michael, 32
Mannheim, Karl, 113
Marcuse, Herbert, 5, 94, 95, 127, 194
market mentality, 5152, 124. See also
economics; hyperliberalism;
Index
Neufeld, Mark, 7, 8, 10, 149, 150, 198,
224
New Deal, Roosevelts, 194
New Labour Party (UK), 201. See also
Blair, Tony
Newland, Kathleen, 80
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 61, 66, 67
nihilism, 100102
Nixon, Richard, 69
normative theory, 1, 2, 5, 161
North, Robert, 68
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 5758
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 167, 207
Nove, Alec, 196
Ong, Aihwa, 152
ontology, 4546, 59
Onuf, Nicholas, 14
Orwell, George, 173
Oslo peace process, 175178, 181185
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), 175, 181, 185. See also
Camp David agreements; IsraeliPalestinian dispute
Paris Peace Agreement (1991), 153
Pati, Daphne, 158
peace research, 68, 7273
Peres, Shimon, 182
Perkin, Harold James, 123
Peterson, V. Spike, 80, 84
Plato, 103105
PLO. See Palestine Liberation
Organization
Pogge, Thomas, 161, 168, 169
Polanyi, Karl, 51, 54, 66
Popper, Karl, 116
Porter, Cole, 203
positivism, 1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 70, 71, 81,
83, 84, 97, 115, 116, 130, 132, 135,
136, 138139, 150, 157, 173, 198,
205208, 212, 214, 215, 219221
post-Fordism, 48
post-Marxist approach, 25, 27, 30
postmodernism. See poststructuralism
Postone, Moishe, 18
postpositivism, vii, 12, 31, 32, 40, 97,
106, 171, 223; problems of, 3637
poststructuralism, vii, 3, 4, 1012, 15,
257
258
Index
This book represents the first attempt to bring together the leading critical
theorists of world politics to discuss both the promise and the pitfalls of
their work. The authors range broadly across the terrain of world politics,
engaging with both theory and emancipatory practice. Critiques by two
scholars from other IR traditions are also included. The result is a seminal
statement of the critical theory approach to understanding world politics, an
essential point of reference for future work in the field.
Richard Wyn Jones is senior lecturer in international politics at the
University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He is author of Security, Strategy, and
Critical Theory.
259