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JOSE V. LAGON, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 135657
January 17, 2001
349 SCRA 363
Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is a businessman and owner of a commercial building in Tacurong,
Sultan Kudarat, while respondent HOOVEN is a domestic corporation known to be the
biggest manufacturer and installer of aluminum materials in the country with branch office
at E. Quirino Avenue, Davao City.
In April 1981, Lagon and HOOVEN entered into two (2) contracts, both denominated
Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and
install various aluminum materials in Lagon's commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat. Upon execution of the contracts, Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,00.00 in advance.
On February 24, 1987, HOOVEN filed a complaint against Lagon before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City alleging the deliveries and installation of several construction materials
in the commercial building of Lagon pursuant to their contracts. The total cost of the labor
and materials of the completed project amounted to P117,329.00, out of which P69,329.00
remained unpaid despite repeated demands of HOOVEN. In support thereof, HOOVEN
presented its OIC, Alberto Villanueva, and its employee, Ernesto Argente, other witnesses,
and several documentary evidence.
Lagon denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of breach of contract
by failing to deliver and install some of the materials specified in the proposals which
compelled him to procure the undelivered materials from other sources. As to the materials
duly delivered and installed by HOOVEN, Lagon contended that they were fully paid.
On October 9, 1987, upon request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of Lagon's commercial building to determine whether the items alleged in the
complaint and appearing in the invoices and delivery receipts had been delivered and
installed on the premises. The trial court rendered a decision partly on the basis of the
result of the ocular inspection finding that the total actual deliveries and installations made
by HOOVEN cost only P 87,140.00.
On April 28, 1997, the Court of Appeals resolved the case in favor of HOOVEN. It set aside
the judgment of the trial court and faulted the court for relying solely on the results of the
ocular inspection, which were not conclusive since the delivery and installation of the
materials in question started as early as 1981, while the ocular inspection was conducted
only in 1987 or six (6) years later, after the entire mezzanine was altered and the whole
building renovated. The appellate court also stressed that the testimonies of HOOVEN's
witnesses were straightforward, categorical and supported by documentary evidence of
the disputed transactions, and that all Lagon could offer was a mere denial, uncorroborated
and self-serving statements regarding his transactions with HOOVEN.
Upon careful and diligent consideration by the Supreme Court of the vital documentary
evidence which respondent HOOVEN based its claims that consisted mainly of the two (2)
proposals marked Exhibit F, and Exhibit F-1, invoices marked Exhibit A to E, and
delivery receipts marked Exhibit A-1 to A-3, B-1, C-1, C-3, D-1, and E-1, the court
find the foregoing exhibits with patent irregularities and material inconsistencies on their
faces. Thus, the flaws inevitably depleted the weight of the evidence and results to the lack
of the requisite quantum of evidence.

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Whether or not all the materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and installed
by respondent HOOVEN in petitioner Lagon's commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan
No. Respondent HOOVEN having the burden of establishing its affirmative allegations of
complete delivery and installation of the materials, and petitioners failure to pay therefor,
had not satisfactorily proved its case. The mass of documentary evidence adduced by
respondent HOOVEN suffered from patent irregularities and material inconsistencies that
depleted the weight of the evidence. As a result of the lack of the requisite quantum of
evidence, respondent dismally failed to discharge its burden necessary to prove that all
materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and installed in Lagons commercial
building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.

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G.R. No. 177407
February 9, 2011
642 SCRA 523
On February 4, 1995, respondent Editha Sioson had her lumbar pains checked-up in Rizal
Medical Center (RMC). With the same problem arising sometime in 1999, she was referred
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC. The latter ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests which
revealed that Edithas right kidney is normal, while his left kidney was ascertained to be
non-functioning and non-visualizing. Editha later underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, before the Board of Medicine (BOM), a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence that consists the removal of Edithas fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney was filed by Edithas
husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant) against the doctors who allegedly participated in
the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
The complaint was heard by the BOM where Editha Sioson, also named as complainant,
filed her formal offer of documentary evidence after his husband, Romeo Sioson presented
his evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to
"D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. The formal offer of documentary
exhibits was admitted by the BOM per its Order dated May 26, 2004.
Petitioner Atienza contended Editha Siosons formal offer of exhibits, alleging the
inadmissibility of the said exhibits because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay; and that
the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered. However,
BOM denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Atienza in its Order dated October
8, 2004.
Petitioner Atienza, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and for which the
Court dismissed for lack of merit.
1. Whether or not the exhibits presented by the respondent are inadmissible in
1. No. In the petitioners contentions on the inadmissibility of Editha Siosons exhibits,
the court emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. That, admissibility of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is
to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to
the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

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The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her
"kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her
operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the
truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which
are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice,
both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things
such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their
proper anatomical locations.

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G.R. No. 128538
February 28, 2001
353 SCRA 70
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (hereinafter SCC) through its chairman,
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo Pablito Bermudo, obtained a
loan from State Investment House Inc. (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P29,824.58
which carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the
remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To
secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to
pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta
and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner SCC contended that the promissory
note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect
for lack or failure of consideration. It posits that the non-production of the originals of the
documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following
stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant
and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that
plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this
present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even
date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount
of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The
case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to
appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to
cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
SCC contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a
witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the
truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in
violation of Sections 36 and 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that no proof of
genuineness was adduced since the sole witness did not profess to have seen the document
presented in evidence executed or written by SCC.

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1. Whether or not the testimony of the witness introduced by SIHI as documentary
evidence is admissible pursuant to the hearsay rule;
2. Whether or not the promissory note adduced by SIHI as documentary evidence is
admissible pursuant to the best evidence rule;
3. Whether or not SIHI is entitled for the award of attorneys fees.
1. Yes. The court correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as
he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the
rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence,
then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the
right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of Petitioner SCC to cross-examine the witness despite several opportunities
provided by the trial court is an implied waiver of such right.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
2. Yes. SCCs admission as to the execution of the promissory note through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermudo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission of having been made in stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties must be treated as a judicial admission wherein
under Section, 41 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof. Thus, SCCs reliance on the best evidence rule, will not advance its cause
since there is no need to present the original of the documents as there was already
a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note
and receipt of the demand letter.
3. No. It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
rule; hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.
Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale
for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a
perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of
attorney's fees. Wherefore, the award of attorneys fees to SIHI should be

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G.R. No. 158203
March 31, 2005
454 SCRA 719
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of July 24, 1991, at Pamplona Coconut Plantation,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines, the accused Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang,
armed with bolos, conspired with each other and feloniously attack, assault, stab, and hack
spouses, Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay, thereby inflicting upon Alicia Catipay and
Santiago Catipay various injuries which led to the death of both spouses.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr. Rogelio Kadili, and
Alexander Ebias.
On the contrary, the defense presented their witnesses: Analyn Andagan, Conchito Nilas,
Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that appellants were nowhere near the waterway at
the precise time that Santiago and Alicia Catipay were murdered.
The defense of alibi was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was a weak
defense, while Magno Gomez testimony as sole eyewitness of the crime was given grave
credence by the trial court as it offers a complete picture of the incident of that only an
eyewitness could supply; hence, proved appellants guilt for double murder.
The appellants however, argue the resolution of the case and contends that reasonable
doubt concerning the guilt of the appellants exist in this case. The OSG stresses that
material inconsistencies exist between Magnos testimony in court and his affidavit, which
he executed during the preliminary examination.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants "hacked Alicia Catipay first"
and that Santiago was attacked after "he attempted to save his wife." Magno declared that
Santiago "attempted to run away but he was chased" and "was overtaken and was hacked
by both accused." Magno also claimed that appellants tried to hack him after they had
hacked Santiago.
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of how the murders
happened. Magno testified at direct examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago and that Alicia was hacked only by appellant Omatang. More important, he
averred that the victims were attacked simultaneously.
1. Whether the testimony of lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez is credible as direct
testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of murder of appellants Calumpang and
Omatang beyond reasonable doubt.
1. No. Pursuant to Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the prosecution presented
the sole eyewitness, Magno Gomez who testified the murder of the spouses, Alicia
Catipay and Santiago Catipay. However, due to the material inconsistencies that
exist between Magnos testimony in court and his affidavit executed during the
preliminary examination, there casts doubt on the veracity of the testimony and

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thus, does not satisfy the requirement of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
as to the admissibility of his testimony.
The testimony of the lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez is not credible and therefore, a
weak evidence against the appellants, Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang.
Wherefore, Appellants Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.

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G.R. No. 175692
October 29, 2008
570 SCRA 251
On October 30, 2001, Petitioner Ubales was accused of homicide before the Assistant City
Prosecutor. On or about October 17, 2001, the accused Ubales, armed with a .38 caliber
paltik revolver marked Smith and Wesson, allegedly shot the forehead of victim, Mark
Tanglaw Santos y Opriana causing the latters death.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Eduardo Galvan, SPO1 Eduardo E. Ko, Laila Cherry
Cruz, SPO2 Rosales M. Fernandez, P/Chief Inspector Carlos G. Mendez, and Efigenia Santos.
The prosecution also presented as evidence Medico Legal Report No. W-737-2001 and the
receipt of the funeral expenses incurred.
The prosecution seeks to establish Ubales motive in killing Mark by the alleged altercation
between the two during their drinking spree. However, as testified by Laila Cruz herself,
the argument was soon apparently resolved, with Ubales patting the shoulders of Mark
Eduardo Galvan (Galvan), a 65-year old balut vendor and the best friend of the deceased
Mark Santos, testified that at 3 a.m. in the morning of 17 October 2001, while he was selling
balut near the Malacaang area, he saw Mark and Ubales quarreling around a meter away
from him. The argument lasted for about three minutes, culminating with Ubales taking out
his gun and shooting Mark on the head. Galvan is certain about this, as he was still only one
meter away from Mark and Ubales when the former shot the latter, and the place was wellilluminated. When Mark fell, Ubales ran towards Atienza Street. Galvan also testified that
he was an acquaintance of Ubales for about five months prior to the incident.
As argued by the defense, there can be only two ways by which Galvan could have
witnessed the altercation based on his testimony that he saw the whole thing within one
meter from him. First, Galvan walked towards the protagonists and stopped within one
meter from them during their three minutes of altercation. Second, Galvan was already at
the place where he saw the protagonists, who walked towards him, and stopped within one
meter from him to engage in their quarrel.
Not seem impressed with the testimony of Eduardo Galvan, the original judge himself,
Judge Romulo Lopez asked several clarificatory questions in order to test Galvans
credibility which Galvan failed the test miserably. Eduardo Galvan repeatedly changed his
answer on whether he told anyone about the incident before he executed his statement
with the police station. Furthermore, during the cross examination, Eduardo Galvan failed
to remember a lot of things about the places involved in his testimony.
Petitioner Ubales claims that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in giving credence to Galvans testimony which allegedly defies common
experience. He also assailed the warrantless arrest by SPO2 Fernandez.
On the other hand, SPO2 Fernandez admitted during cross examination that the arrest of
Ubales came before witness Galvan appeared and executed a sworn statement.

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1. Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner committed
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
1. No. For the evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances, which in the case at bar,
the testimony of Galvan consists inconsistency with human nature. The fact that the
lone eyewitness, Galvan cannot remember things in general raises a strong
presumption of error in his testimony. Thus, the ordinary evidence adduced by the
prosecution does not pass the tests in determining its probative value. Wherefore,
petitioner Ubeles is acquitted of the crime of homicide on account of reasonable

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TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155208
March 27, 2007
519 SCRA 251
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favour of Nena. Subsequently, title over the
subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her
name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973,
1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession with Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually
no intention of selling the property; that the true agreement between her and Nena was
simply to transfer title over the subject property in favour of the latter to enable her to
obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her
business expenses. She later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage
the property. She wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1,
1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement
she executed on December 28, 1977 and as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena
the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did
not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, her son filed a complaint with RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour of the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.
1. Whether or not the Sworn Statement should be given probative value.
1. No. The distinction between admissibility and probative weight should be given
emphasis. In this case, there is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn
statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and
its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the
witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given
probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Wherefore, the assailed Decision and Resolution of CA, affirming the Decision of the
RTC, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is

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G.R. No. 107518
October 8, 1998
297 SCRA 402
When M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation (Fishing Corp.), was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu,
Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which
at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). After investigation was
conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault was
rendered. Based on this finding, Fishing Corp. sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain,
Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of
the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the
legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees. The Fishing Corp. amended the complaint to
include the value of the hull. PNOC acquired LSC thus making him a party to the case.
During the trial, Fishing Corp. presented evidence consisting of the testimony of its general
manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario testifying on the cargo carried by the
vessel at the time it collided and the damages they suffered because of the collision. They
also presented documentary evidence which includes quotations of prices for the
construction of the broken parts of the vessel.
In objecting to the pieces of documentary evidence, petitioner commented that these were
not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge
on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
Moreover, it presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering
Corporation, as sole witness but did not however, bother at all to offer any documentary
evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by
private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations
of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his
estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme.
1. Whether or not the price quotations may be admitted in evidence.
1. No. Price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of
Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof.
Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings
even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the
one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his
personal knowledge.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay
evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as
witnesses. On this point, the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions
provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.

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Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a
statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation (2) such
statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation,
and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on these requisites, the price quotations are not commercial lists for these do
not belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45.
Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence.

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G.R. No. 151857
April 28, 2005
457 SCRA 482
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks. It filed an
Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 declaring a net taxable
income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of
P3,311,559.00. It also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of
1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.
Petitioner filed an administrative claim on April 10, 1997 for the refund of P3,159,687.00
representing excess or unused creditable withholding taxes for the year 1995 which was
allegedly resulted from the unused taxes withheld by its clients from their income
payments during the year 1995, thus, due to its income/loss positions for the three
quarters of 1996, petitioner was unable to use tax paid for and in its behalf by its
withholding agents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The instant petition was
subsequently filed on April 18, 1997.
Respondent denied petitioners claim for tax refund or tax credit. To buttress its claim,
petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence. Respondent, on the other
hand, presented the revenue officer who conducted the examination of petitioners claim
and found petitioner liable for deficiency value added tax. Petitioner also presented
rebuttal evidence.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners claim for tax refund on the ground that no
evidence other than that presented before the CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax
payments had been made in 1995. From the inception of the case to the formal offer of its
evidence, petitioner did not present its 1996 income tax return to disclose its total income
tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine whether such excess tax payments were
utilized in 1996.
1. Whether or not it was proper for the court to take judicial notice of attached return.
1. Yes. The CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment
return which had been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. "Judicial notice takes the
place of proof and is of equal force."
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were
heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, as when reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection
from the opposing parties:
". . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as
read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of

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the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the
record of the case then pending."
The appellate court should have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on
the basis of such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to "take judicial notice
of its records and of the facts that the record establishes."
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts "may take judicial notice of matters x x x
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." If the lower courts
really believed that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily
required respondent to ascertain its veracity and accuracy and to prove that petitioner
did not suffer any net loss in 1996.

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ANTONIO BARAOIL, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 194608
July 9, 2012
676 SCRA 24
Antonio Baraoil was charged with two counts of rape. Both rapes happened on July 8, 2004
in the comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill in Natividad, Pangasinan. The first was
committed at 2pm through insertion of the penis and the finger into the vagina of AAA
(Statutory Rape), a five-year-old minor, while the second happened at 2:30pm by sucking
the vagina of AAA (Sexual Assault).
Baraoil pleaded not guilty during arraignment for both charges.
During the trial, AAA narrated the facts that (1) while walking near the house of Baraoil,
who was an honorary uncle for her family, the latter invited her to ride with him in his
bicycle (2) Baraoil drove her toward the rice mill and was seen by her elder sister (3) after
parking his bicycle on the wall of the mill, accused pulled AAA into the comfort room, sat on
the toilet, and pulled her pants off as she was no underpants, unzipped his pants and lifted
the girl to insert his penis into her vagina and later inserted a finger into her vagina.
The three sisters of the victim hard thumping sounds coming from the comfort room then
the accused went out and was followed by AAA. AAAs sister told the accused that she will
take AAA home but he replied that he will bring her home after buying slippers. The
accused and AAA took off and after 30 minutes went back to the same comfort room where
the accused undressed AAA again and sucked her vagina.
The next day, AAAs sister asked her about what happened and she did not answer but after
it she cried to her mom and told everything that transpired.
Baraoil told the court that he was out at the fish pod with his friend during 7:30 to 10:00am
and drank gin at 3pm and went home at 4pm. He also added that the accusations against
him were due to the revenge for the disconnection of AAAs familys jumper.
The trial court sentenced Baraoil to:
a. six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor medium as maximum, for the rape committed under sexual
b. reclusion perpetua, for the rape committed under statutory rape.
The Court of Appeals modified the sentence of the direct assault to Acts of Lasciviousness
and sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty 20 days of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
1. Whether or not the testimony of the child sufficient to overturn the accuseds right
to be presumed innocent.
1. Yes. Under the Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3 (a) that a person is presumed
innocent of crime or wrong, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
AAA testified in a spontaneous and straightforward manner and never wavered in

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positively identifying appellant as her rapist despite grueling cross-examination.

The trial court thus found the testimony of AAA to have been amply corroborated...
who bravely, unabashedly, straightforwardly and consistently narrated in court her
harrowing ordeal, vexation and pain in the hands of the accused. In this case, the
childs testimony proved to guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the
crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this
crime, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony
provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.

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COMORPOSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 152807
August 12, 2003
408 SCRA 692
This case arose from a complaint of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC by petitioners
against respondents involving possession of a parcel of petitioners land by respondents.
Respondents argue that they have acquired just and valid ownership of the premises and
that the Regional Director of DENR has already upheld their possession over the land in
question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors. MTC ruled in
favour of the heirs, but the RTC reversed such decision favouring respondents.
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment, ruling that respondents had the better right
to possess the subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of the petitioners witnesses
for being self-serving.
Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court,
contending that the Rules on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits and that
the failure of respondents to file their position papers and counter-affidavits before the
MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
1. Whether or not the affidavits in issue should have been considered by the Court of
1. No. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the
facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their
cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.