ARTICLE 333 AND ARTICLE 334 OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN

Researchers:
Caincay, Ma. Cyrel
Cornejo, Ann Jill Katherine
Magno, Jon Gilbert
Paquibot, Joan Marie
Sanchez, Rodmarc

Chapter I The Problem and its Setting

Introduction
King Solomon is a famous character of the Old Testament of the Holy Bible, who,
aside from his enlightening wisdom and knowledge, was also well-known for his sexual
escapades with numerous women who became either his wives or concubines. In the
Book of Kings, it expressly mentioned that King Solomon had seven hundred wives,
princesses and three hundred concubines. It is mind-boggling to even think that a
single man can have such a multiple number of women to do as he pleases. This is, but
understandable because the era in which Solomon lived in was an era that strictly
adhered to a patriarchal form of society in which it placed a primary importance on the
role of the man and diminished the status of women. This is totally in contrast with the
women who were strictly forbidden from such actions and were required to serve their
husband in silence and in utter obedience. Women, in contrast to men who are
unpunished for their adulterous deeds, were stoned to death once found to be guilty of
committing adultery.
Today, in an age of technological advancement and where the civil liberties and
rights of every human being have been properly addressed, in such a way that the
status of men and women and the roles of each in society have been drastically altered
to the point of equilibrium. We would never think that in todays modern society that the
remnants of an ancient age, such as the Solomonic era, where there was disparity of
the treatment of the opposite sex, would still leave its mark upon the laws of modern
states. But yet it has.

Philippine laws, more specifically, the adultery and concubinage laws still have
residues of inequality and disparity. This is the gist of this study: to assess, scrutinize
and reason the applicability of the adultery and concubinage laws in the Philippines; to
properly address the need for amendment or revision of the aforementioned laws for the
satisfaction of the equal protection clause.

Statement of the Problem

This study investigates the propriety of the existing laws on adultery and
concubinage with regards to the equal protection clause enshrined in the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Various bills have been passed in the Philippine Congress to try
to amend these provisions of the Revised Penal Code. However, up to this point, none
of those House Bills have been passed as a law. This research paper questions the
difference of the elements and penalties of the adultery and concubinage laws, as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, considering the adoption of the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Magna Carta of
Women in the Philippines.

This study intends to raise awareness in approving a

pending amendment that adheres to the equal protection clause, CEDAW, as well as,
Magna Carta of Women.
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following questions:
I.

Do the adultery and concubinage provisions in the Revised Penal Code violate

the equal protection clause?

1.
reasonable?

Do the laws in question rest on substantial distinctions, which must be

2.

Is the distinction between the provisions of Article 333 and Article 334 with

regards to their respective applicable penalties relevant to the purpose of the law?
3.

Does Article 333, in relation to Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code,

not apply equally to each member of the same class?

4.

Are the adultery and concubinage laws of the Revised Penal Code limited

in its application for they only apply to the time of its enactment and not applicable to the
current era?
II.

Does the Philippines comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women

1.

The Magna Carta of Women have been enacted by the Philippines to

support the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women.

Thesis Statement
Article 333 Adultery, and Article 334 Concubinage of the Revised Penal Code
are unconstitutional for having violated the right to equal protection of the women before
the law since these provisions greatly favors the husband. Adultery, which punishes
women for marital infidelity, is proven by circumstantial evidence. However, for
concubinage, there is an express enumeration as to what constitutes the commission of
concubinage which needs to be proven before guilt is decided. The penalty for adultery
is much heavier compared to that of concubinage. Likewise, these provisions have
violated the Magna Carta of Women in the Philippines and the Convention on the

Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for being

discriminatory against the female spouses.

Significance of the study

This study intends to instill into the readers a broad and informative view of the
adultery and concubinage laws in the Philippines, including the advantages and
disadvantages of its implementation. This study aims to increase awareness upon the
readers of the unequal nature of these said provisions. Such public awareness may
contribute to the implementation of amending laws and upholding of the equal
protection. The study hopes to enlighten readers that the provisions provide for unequal
elements and penalties imposed upon the violators of adultery and concubinage.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

It should be stressed that in raising awareness upon the public of the unequal
nature of adultery and concubinage laws penalizing husbands, wives, and paramours
who live and sojourn in the Philippines, the proponents will not review the other issues
on adultery and concubinage. Rather, the proponents will focus in the correction of the
qualifying circumstances and penalties that are currently imposed under the adultery
and concubinage laws in the country.
The researchers will look into the equal protection clause, as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution, including national legislations such as the Magna Carta of Women
and unapproved House Bills regarding the amendment of the adultery and concubinage
provisions in the Revised Penal Code. Jurisprudence regarding the standards provided

by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on citing a law unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause is also tackled in this study. The researchers also ventured to
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) to check if the Philippines, as a state party to the Convention, is
faithful in its obligation in relation to the adultery and concubinage provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.

The researchers will gather data regarding adultery and concubinage starting
from the enactment of the Revised Penal Code until the present time.

Chapter II Review of Related Literature

The equal protection clause is enshrined in the 14 th Amendment of the United
States of America as well as the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. The clause
represents the ideals of men and women who have resounded to the call of equal
treatment of all humans regardless of age, sex, race or gender.
There is not a more fitting example of how equal protection was vigorously fought
for as an ideal than in the American Civil War. In the Battle of Gettysburg, which was
widely considered as the bloodiest chapter of the war, and a turning point for the Union
forces in their campaign against black slavery, 1 the multitude of lives lost, prompted
then President Lincoln to deliver the famous Gettysburg Address. In the Gettysburg
Address, he declared in his own words of how the birth of the United States of America
was grounded upon the equal protection of all men. Four score and seven years ago
our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. 2
The influence of the events that unfolded in the United States of America cannot
be discounted, for it gave birth to the proposition that all men and women are created
equal. History tells us that from the Organic Laws established by the American regime
in the Philippines up to the 1987 Constitution, the ideals represented within these laws
are heavily borrowed from the American Constitution.3 Thus, the study of American and
Philippine jurisprudence is essential to get a better understanding of the equal
protection clause.
1

Rawley, p. 147; Sauers, p. 827; Gallagher, Lee and His Army, p. 83; McPherson, p. 665; Eicher, p. 550. Gallagher
and McPherson cite the combination of Gettysburg and Vicksburg as the turning point. Eicher uses the arguably
related expression
2
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address
3
Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine Constitutional History and Constitution of Modern Nations (1970)

In Plessy v. Ferguson4 stemmed forth from a Louisiana statute in 1890 which

segregated the white and non-white passengers, providing penalty for sitting in the
wrong compartment for a fine of $25 or twenty (20) days in jail. In 1892, Homer Plessy,
who was one-eighth black, purchased a first-class ticket and sat in the white-designated
railroad car. He was arrested for violating the Separate Car Act and argued in court that
the Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
He lost twice in the lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court said in its decision,
upholding the decision of the lower courts, that, The object of the Amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."5
The 1952 case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 6 overturned the
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson saying, In the field of public education, the doctrine of
separate but equal has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition
makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 This decision declared the segregation

Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 537, May 18, 1896

Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 537, May 18, 1896, Justice Browns Opinion
6
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 344 U.S 1, October 8, 1952
7
Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5

of people based on color and race unconstitutional and in violation of the equal
protection clause.
Justice Cruz stated that, like the due process clause, the equal protection clause
is also couched in indefinite language. This is because the guaranty is also dynamic.
The purpose of the intentional ambiguity is the same as in due process, to provide for
more adjustability to the swiftly moving facts of our society.8
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.9
Standards were provided to satisfy the applicability of the equal protection
clause. For a law not to be declared unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, it must (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class. 10

Isagani Cruz, Constitutional Law, p.123

2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825
10
People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
9

Despite the call to equality, the existing adultery and concubinage provisions in the
Philippine Revised Penal Code discriminates women. Former Representative Pablo P.
Garcia opined in his introduction of the House Bill 376111 that the provisions on adultery
and concubinage are biased in favor of the husband. He said that it seems impossible
for an offended wife to convict her husband because of the given set of elements for
proving concubinage.
However, the restrictions on the wife are so strict that it creates the image that
infidelity is an illness affecting only the women. Former Rep. Garcia concludes that
marital infidelity in the Philippines is a phenomenon happening among males citing
various studies which showed that 36% of married men engage in extra marital sex in
contrast to the 2% of married women committing the same offense.
Despite the survey that many are engaged in such infidel acts, Filipinos do not
condone nor consent to its doing.
The Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) contends that the country is
bound to implement the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which urges the government to review
existing policies and remove provisions which discriminates women.
House Bill 101712 which is introduced by GABRIELLA says that, Despite the
right to equal treatment under the law, a wife can be convicted for a single act of sexual
intercourse under Article 333, while the husband is only liable for concubinage if he
does any of the following acts specified in Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code.

11
12

http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/basic_15/HB03761.pdf
www.gabrielawomensparty.net/sites/gwp/files/HB1017.pdf

Moreover, a wife in an adultery case incurs a heavier penalty than a husband in a

concubinage case.
An article published in the official website of the PCW

13

commented that the law

places much burden on the wife to prove the guilt of the husbands infidelity. The
disparity can be seen in the evidentiary requirement for the two crimes. For the wife,
adultery means one act of sexual intercourse provable through circumstantial evidence
while for the husband, evidentiary requirement for concubinage is higher by proving that
(1) the sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife is under scandalous
circumstances; (2) that he is keeping another woman in the conjugal home; or (3) that
he is cohabiting with her in another dwelling.

The RPC imposes higher penalty to

married women who commit adultery as compared to married men. The reasoning for
the distinction is (1) that the infidelity of the wife can result in the introducing of alien
blood into the family; 14 (2) that an illegitimate child could be passed off as the
husbands;15 and (3) he will end up supporting and giving his name to the said child. 16 It
is also claimed that this probability does not arise if it is the husband who commits
concubinage.
In Canada, the crime of adultery applies to both a man and a woman when
either of them has sex with someone outside the marriage. In many countries such as
the United States, Russia, Canada, Israel and Poland, adultery represents as ground for
divorce. Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen punish adultery by death. However,
there have been no recent executions unless other crimes were involved. 17
13

http://www.pcw.gov.ph/wpla/marital-infidelity-law
th
Reyes, Luis, The Revised Penal Code Book Two, 2012 18 Edition, Rex Book Store, page 906
15
Macadangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980
16
Article 195, Family Code of the Philippines
17
Supra, Note 13
14

Chapter III Methodology

When the researchers of this study came up with the topic, most of the members
had in mind that the research would constitute a review on the reason and intent of the
current laws on adultery and concubinage. After learning of the different kinds of
methods to gather research data, the members were quick to decide what method will
be used. The researchers found the current provisions on adultery and concubinage to
be biased in favor of men. In order to prove the inequality that the researchers saw
between these provisions, there was a need to look into the previous bills, decided
cases, related laws, and the reasons behind them, as well as international conventions
that govern laws on marital infidelity. Given the limited time and necessity, there was no
need to neither interview nor create a survey on the matter since the researchers only
seek to prove the unconstitutionality on the current laws on adultery and concubinage.
Thus, the researchers will use the Legal Historical Method to delve into question of
constitutionality of Article 333 and Article 334 with regards to the equal protection
clause, CEDAW and Magna Carta of Women.

Chapter IV Analysis, Presentation, and Interpretation of Data

Marital infidelity violates good faith and confidence between spouses to their
matrimonial vows. It is one of the major reasons which cause the deterioration of
marriages and families.18 The existing laws on adultery and concubinage in the Revised
Penal Code punish marital infidelity on women and men, respectively. However, these
provisions promote gender inequality and misogyny, by placing a higher burden of proof
on wives to prove concubinage than husbands to prove adultery.
The current provisions on adultery and concubinage are as follows:
Art.333. Who are guilty of adultery Adultery is committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being
abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next
lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding paragraph shall
be imposed.

Art.334. Concubinage Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the

conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her
18

Cicero says: "An oath is an assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God
as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the god (for there is no
such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith" (off 3.29.104).

in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its

minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of diestierro.

I.

Do the adultery and concubinage provisions in the Revised Penal Code

violate the equal protection clause?

In this current time, Article 333 and 334, are in contrast with the calling to equality
before the law. The Supreme Court has given standards in determining if a law is in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In the case of People v. Cayat, it has been
established that for a law not to be declared unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause, it must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally
to all members of the same class.19
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination

19

People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.20
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 21 The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 22 All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that, the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.23 The Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

24

Thus, the adultery and concubinage laws as defined in Article 333 and Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code should be put to the test in order to scrutinize if it has
fully complied with the equal protection of the law. Thus:
1.

Do the laws in question rest on substantial distinctions, which must

be reasonable?
Article 333 and Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code does not satisfy the first
requirement put forth in numerous jurisprudence that a law must rest on substantial
20

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 1282.
22
Atchison T.S.F.R Co. v Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, L. ed. 1276, 1282
23
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126; People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
21

24

People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 542, citing 16 C.J.S. 997

distinctions which must be reasonable. The classification of adultery as separate from

the crime of concubinage connotes a distinction based upon gender and is not even a
valid classification. The idea of distinguishing the act of having sexual relations with
another person other than your wife or husband and further classifying such act as
separate when committed by a married woman and a married man; as in this case
when adultery and concubinage is designated as separate crimes of a single common
act.
Gender should not be made to affect the application of penal laws towards a
particular sex. If there should be such a bias; it should favor the woman rather than the
man, the former being more vulnerable. The glaring difference between Philippine law
and the laws of other countries regarding the bias against women in a particular law is
made manifest in the prosecution for the crime of adultery.
Take for example, New York State law defines the crime of adultery as a person
who engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living
spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. 25 A Massachusetts law defines
adultery as a married person who has sexual intercourse with a person not his spouse,
or an unmarried person who has sexual intercourse with a married person, shall be
guilty of adultery and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more
than three years or in jail for not more than two years or by a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars.26 Let us then take note that two state laws within the United States do
not even put a distinction between a man and a woman with regards to the commission
of the crime of adultery. It only says that any person who has sexual relations with
25
26

http://law.justia.com/codes/new-york/2014/pen/part-3/title-o/article-255/255.17
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter272/Section14

another person other than his spouse is guilty of the crime of adultery. It does not
separate the crime of adultery into two categories, unlike in the Philippines wherein
adultery is for the women, and concubinage is for the men and either sex receives
different penalties and modes for conviction. There is no logical reason to differentiate
the crime of adultery and split it into two separate crimes and creating a distinction
based only upon gender.
There is no difference between the act of committing adultery and the act of
committing concubinage. Both adultery and concubinage require that sexual intercourse
take place between a married person and a person which is not the lawful spouse of the
former. Why then split into two different crimes an act which is entirely the same but the
only logical difference is the performer of such act a married woman in the case of
adultery and a married man in the case of concubinage.
In Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. v. The Treasurer of Ormoc City27, a tax ordinance
was declared in violation of the equal protection clause because it was directed
specifically at a certain company producing and exporting centrifugal sugar and none
other. The Court reasoned that the tax should apply to all sugar mills to satisfy the equal
protection clause rather than specifically directed towards a certain sugar milling
company.
By analogy, when a provision of law which penalizes women differently than the
men for the same wrongful act committed, then it is a law which is unfairly directed
towards women in general.

Adultery and concubinage have essentially the same

wrongful acts when you put it into context -- the act of a married person having sexual
relations with a person other than her husband or his wife.
27

Thus, if the acts are

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc v. The Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968

essentially the same, then the man should also receive the same penalty as the woman
because the gender of an individual cannot be a lawful ground to create a substantial
distinction with regards to the penalties imposed and persons to be held liable.
Thus, these distinctions put forth in Article 333 and Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code are clearly unreasonable and illogical to say the least. It does not satisfy the
first requirement put forth in numerous cases pertaining to the satisfaction of the equal
protection clause.
2. Is the distinction between the provisions of Article 333 and Article
334 with regards to their respective applicable penalties relevant to the
purpose of the law?
In comparing the penalties imposed in the crime of adultery as to the crime of
concubinage, there is a clear difference between the prescribed penalties provided for
in the law. What is more concerning is the relevance of such differences and how it
relates to the purposes of the law. In Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of adultery has been defined as:
Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void. Adultery shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Now, concubinage is defined as:
Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a

woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
It is clear and evident that in the crime of adultery as defined in Art.333 of the
Revised Penal Code, that it penalizes both, the adulterous wife as well as her paramour
and that the prescribed period for the punishment imposed is prision correcional in its
medium and maximum periods. In contrast, concubinage only punishes the philandering
husband with an afflictive penalty of prision correcional in its minimum and medium
periods while his mistress may only suffer the penalty of destierro which is not even
an afflictive penalty.
The Revised Penal Code imposes higher penalty to married women who commit
adultery as compared to married men. The reasoning for the distinction is (1) that the
infidelity of the wife can result in the introduction of alien blood into the family;28 (2) that
an illegitimate child could be passed off as the husbands; 29 and (3) he will end up
supporting and giving his name to the said child.30 It is also claimed that this probability
does not arise if it is the husband who commits concubinage.
Even presuming that the purpose of the framers in classifying the act of adultery
into a separate crime that is uniquely distinct when committed by a married man as
compared to when it is committed by a married woman; that its based upon the notion
that it is the husband that would be prejudiced when a woman commits adultery. If the
enactments of these laws were based upon such a bias purpose, then it does not and
cannot be able to serve as a valid enactment when it essentially violates the equal
28

Reyes, Luis, The Revised Penal Code Book Two, 2012 18th Edition, Rex Book Store, page 906
Macadangdang v. CA, G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980
30
Article 195, Family Code of the Philippines
29

protection of laws. Are we then implying that the woman is less affected when his
husband is an adulterer? That when a husband commits adultery, it would be less
prejudicial to the wife as compared to the husband? That the law implores that the
husband must be protected more because of the fear that he may be supporting an
illegitimate child which is fathered by another man -- but refuses to protect the wife in
the same context? This is prima facie evidence that the distinction between Article 333
in relation to Art.334 of the Revised Penal Code is discriminatory towards women and
even the purpose of the framers of the law in enacting the contested provisions about
adultery and concubinage is sexist in nature. The provisions of the Family Code that
empowers the husband to impugn the legitimacy of a child and the technological marvel
of DNA testing can serve the purposes of the framers of the adultery and concubinage
laws. Thus, the practicability of enforcing tougher sanctions over the wife to protect the
interests of the husband has been nullified by improvements in technology and the laws
empowering the husband to impugn the legitimacy of his child.

3. Does Article 333, in relation to Article 334 of the Revised Penal

Code, not apply equally to each member of the same class?

It is not disputed that the Revised Penal Code is heavily based upon the Spanish
Penal Code and was enacted on December 8, 1930. It is then plausible to think that it
is getting closer to a century since the Revised Penal Code has undergone needed
revisions to fit the spirit of the current age. Only two nations remain in Asia (which are
not Muslim) to still criminalize adultery namely: the Philippines and Taiwan. South

Korea has just recently decriminalized adultery. All European nations have
decriminalized adultery; In the United States only about 21 states still has adultery laws
enacted.31 It should be noted that the situation here in the Philippines is fairly different
to that of the Western nations whose society is more attuned to a liberalized approach
towards marriage than that of the Filipinos conservative cultural viewpoint with regards
to marital ties.
However, it cannot be contested that the current applicability of Article 333 and
Art 334 in todays age is extremely outdated and in need of revision. For it to satisfy the
equal protection clause, then there should not be any more distinctions and prohibitions.
Both the adulterous wife and the philandering husband must be given the same
penalties in the commission of the crime of adultery. The husbands mistress must also
be punished the same way the womans paramour is held liable. We now live in an age
where the traditional patriarchal view of marriage and the family has been blurred and is
undergoing substantial change. Women cannot be discounted anymore for they
represent an integral pillar in the family and marriage. The traditional view of women as
mere housewives and subordinate to women is an outdated concept. Thus, women
should not be prosecuted nor punished differently than the men. W omen are entitled to
be afforded the equal protection of the law to fit the spirit of the times.
Thus in Central Bank Employees v. BSP

32

, the concept of relative

constitutionality was properly explained to declare a statute or provision thereof as

unconstitutional when its continued application would be unreasonable or oppressive.

31
32

http://www.theweek.co.uk/62723/adultery-laws-where-is-cheating-still-illegal
Central Bank Employees v. BSP, G.R. No 148208, December 15, 2004

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a

mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since
the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.33

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. 34 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.35

Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount

Vernon, 36 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and
arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district,
although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the
ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of
automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance
to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due
process. It ruled:

While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws
respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive

33

Medill v. State, 477 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1991) (followed with reservations by, In re Cook, 138 B.R. 943 [Bankr. D.
Minn. 1992]).
34
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. Ed. 949 (1935); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So.2d 244, 139 A.L.R. 973 (1941); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Faulkner, 3 G.R. No.L-29646 07
S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1957); and Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
35
Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992)
36
307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).

plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or
unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the
property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an
ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a
later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for
instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will
afford relief in an appropriate case.(citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid
law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances.
Rutter v. Esteban upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and
operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power - but also ruled that the
continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and
oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and
agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be
grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling
states:37

The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which
Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the
last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine
War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?

37

Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, 93 Phil. 68 (May 18, 1953).

It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of
prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim
for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that
said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and
after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of
the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving
them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them
from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since
liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to
those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy
that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force.

But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending
since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at
present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No.
342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain
language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12)
years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as
1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of
Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to
creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the

injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay
interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to
be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the
only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued
operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable
and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
should be declared null and void and without effect.
Likewise, the adultery and concubinage laws from the date of its enactment on
January 1, 1932 and its continued operation to this present date can be declared
unconstitutional when its continued enactment would be rendered oppressive and
unreasonable. The provisions set forth in Article 333 and Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code may have served their purpose during the time of their enactment. It may
have satisfied the needs and will of the people in the era wherein it was promulgated.
But these discriminatory provisions cannot hope to serve the will of the people
especially when it can only serve a certain gender in an age where women are put on
the same level as men. To wit, the altered circumstances of this day and age and the
inapplicability of the adultery and concubinage laws in this current time, coupled with its
violation of the equal protection clause would definitely justify in declaring these laws as
unconstitutional.

4. Are the adultery and concubinage laws of the Revised Penal Code
limited in its application for they only apply to the time of its
enactment and not applicable to the current era?
If we are to regard women as an integral part of the family, marriage, society and
the nation as a whole, then we should treat them fairly, equally and justly in the
application of laws -- especially penal laws. Women should not be regarded as secondclass citizens nor be discounted as the inferior gender. In assessing Article 333 in
relation to its controversial provisional differences towards Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code, the evident conclusion would be that the framers of the aforementioned
laws have unequally favored the men and have imposed unjustifiable penalties towards
women and thus have fell short of the standard of equal protection.
If equality is the standard and that the distinctions should be justifiable, then
Article 333 in relation to Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code definitely failed that
standard. How is there equality when the penalty of the adulterous woman is greater
than that of the philandering husband? How is there equality when the wifes paramour
is punished while the husbands mistress or mistresses cannot be prosecuted but only
exiled by the penalty of destierro? It is inconceivable that these laws in its current
state should even exist in this current age and time. It is outdated, unequal, unfair and
inapplicable to this modern age.
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. 38The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
38

McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 367.

made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the
law to him.39
Now, let us take note that Article 333 in relation to Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code does not distinguish between certain classes of people. But rather classifies
a married woman and a married man and the paramour of the former and the mistress
of the latter. The classification envisioned to satisfy the equal protection clause is a
classification not based on pure equality but a fair classification that applies to a certain
class of people; that the law must be applied equally to all members of the same class.
However, to classify a married woman and married man in the commission of the
crime of adultery is not a valid classification. It is even tantamount to sexism; the
discrimination based upon gender and sex. It implies that a married woman and her
paramour, is being penalized with a heavier period of penalty simply because she is a
woman. That the adulterous woman should receive the greater guilt and exacted the
heavier penalty than the unfaithful husband because of her sex is a classification that
cannot even remotely satisfy the equal protection of the law.

39

Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., pp. 135-136.

II.

Does the Philippines comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination against Women

The United Nations, through its Charter, has affirmed to the calling of equality
and has encouraged its members, which includes the Philippines, to uphold equal rights
of men and women.40 The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) has been adopted by the United Nations to serve as a
moving agent to this calling of anti-discrimination against women. The Philippines, as a
state party of the CEDAW,41 is obligated to undertake the following: (1) embody the
principle of equality in constitution and laws; (2) ensure practical realization of the
principle of equality; (3) prohibit discrimination against women; (4) refrain from
discrimination; (5) eliminate discrimination by any person, organization or enterprise; (6)
modify or abolish laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination;
and (7)repeal discriminatory penal provisions.42
CEDAW has defined discrimination against women as any distinction, exclusion
or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.43
The Philippines have been very responsive to this stir to equalize men and
women. In fact, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines expressly provides for equal

40
41

Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, Paragraph 1

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en, Date retrieved,

Sept. 22, 2015
42
Article 2, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.
43
Article 1, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.

protection among any person in the eyes of the law. 44 Additionally, Philippines has
recognized the role of the women in nation-building and must make sure that the
fundamental equality before the law of men and women. 45
However, there are still a number of laws that discriminate women such as the adultery
and concubinage provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 333 and Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code are provisions which
contemplate discrimination against women as defined by CEDAW. Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code defines adultery as follows:
Art.333. Who are guilty of adultery Adultery is committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man
not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being
abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty
next lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding
paragraph shall be imposed. (emphasis provided)
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art.334. Concubinage Any husband who shall keep a mistress
in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,

44
45

Article III, Section 1 of The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his

wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (emphasis
provided)
These two provisions provides for two different felonies chargeable to a certain
sex, adultery for the women and concubinage for the men. Likewise, adultery is
punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while
concubinage is punished, still with prision correccional but in its minimum and medium
period. For adultery, one act of sexual intercourse, provable through circumstantial
evidence, 46 is enough to prove the guilt of a wife. However, for the husband to be
convicted for concubinage, it must be proved that there was sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstance, or that the husband has kept the mistress in the conjugal
dwelling or that the husband cohabited with his mistress in any other place.47
The typical reasoning for this distinction is that the infidelity of the female spouse
can result in introducing alien blood into the family; that an illegitimate child could be
passed off as the husbands and he will end up supporting and giving his name to the
said child. This probability does not exist if it is the husband who commits
concubinage.48

46

Ramon C. Aquino, Carolina C. Grino-Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 2008 Edition, Vol. 3, p.380.
Article 334, Revised Penal Code
48
HENRYLITO D. TACIO, The Bigger Picture - Dangerous Liaisons, EdgeDavao, September 09, 2014 20:52,
http://www.edgedavao.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17452:the-bigger-picturedangerous-liaisons
47

However, the advancement of technology can already help eradicate this typical
reasoning. Through DNA testing, a husband can easily impugn the legitimacy of a child.
Thus, there is no more need for the husband to fear that he might end up supporting a
child that is not his and giving his name to a child that is not of his blood.
1.

Have the Magna Carta of Women been enacted by the Philippines to

support the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women?
Republic Act 9710, An Act Providing for The Magna Carta of Women, also
known as the Magna Carta of Women, has been enacted into law on the fourteenth of
August two-thousand and nine. The Magna Carta of Women has been passed in
adherence to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) where the Philippines has been a signatory since 1980 until its
effectivity in 1981. As it is stated in the Magna Carta of Womens Declaration of Policy,
The State condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and pursues by all
appropriate means and without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination against
women in keeping with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments consistent with Philippine
law. The State shall accord women the rights, protection, and opportunities available to
every member of society.49
The abolition of discrimination against women mentioned in both the CEDAW
and the Magna Carta of Women includes the elimination of inequality in the laws on
adultery and concubinage in the Philippines. The State realizes that equality of men
and women entails the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate
49

Magna Carta of Women Section 2: Declaration of Policy, Paragraph 2

discrimination and inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to develop plans,
policies, programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality
in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women and men. 50 Additionally,
The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.

51

All individuals are equal as human beings by virtue of the inherent dignity of
each human person. No one, therefore, should suffer discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity, gender, age, language, sexual orientation, race, color, religion, political, or
other opinion, national, social, or geographical origin, disability, property, birth, or other
status as established by human rights standards.

52

The current laws on adultery and

concubinage in the Philippines are evidently discriminating against women, but until
now it has not been amended to keep with the instructions under the Magna Carta of
Women.
"Discrimination Against Women refers to any gender-based distinction, exclusion,
or restriction which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field. It includes any act or omission,
including by law; policy, administrative measure, or practice, that directly or indirectly

50

Magna Carta of Women Section 2: Declaration of Policy, Paragraph 1

Magna Carta of Women Section 19: Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations Paragraph 1
52
Magna Carta of Women Section 3: Principles of Human Rights of Women, Paragraph 1
51

excludes or restricts women in the recognition and promotion of their rights and their
access to and enjoyment of opportunities, benefits, or privileges. 53
Equality of the law does not mean the equal application of laws to all types of
people as if they are the same. But, said provisions in the Revised Penal Code are
being criticized to being bias in favor of the husband considering that given the set of
elements that make the act of concubinage, it is almost impossible for an aggrieved wife
to obtain a conviction. On the other hand, restrictions on the wife are so stringent that it
creates the impression that infidelity is an ill only women can be afflicted of.

54

"Gender Equality" refers to the principle asserting the equality of men and
women and their right to enjoy equal conditions realizing their full human potentials to
contribute to and benefit from the results of development, and with the State recognizing
that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.

55

To reiterate, equality

does not mean the same application of laws to different kinds of people. But, it does not
mean that the law can discriminate women thus diminishing the latters dignity and
human rights. benefit from the results of development, it has been mentioned in the
Philippine Commission on Women site that, The usual reasoning for the distinction is
that the infidelity of the wife can result in introducing alien blood into the family; that an
illegitimate child could be passed off as the husbands and he will end up supporting
and giving his name to the said child. It is also claimed that this probability does not
arise if it is the husband who commits concubinage.

53

Magna Carta of Women Section 4: Definitions, Paragraph 2

House Bill No. 3761, Paragraph 1
55
Magna Carta of Women Section 4: Definitions, Paragraph 23
56
http://www.pcw.gov.ph/wpla/marital-infidelity-law
54

56

Which reason is no more

tenable considering the existing advent in Science.

Deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA

matching between children and parents can be easily checked.

The State, as the primary duty-bearer, shall refrain from discriminating against
women and violating their rights and promote and fulfill the rights of women in all
spheres, including their rights to substantive equality and non-discrimination. 57 Since
the enactment of the Magna Carta of Women there have been a lot of laws promulgated
to empower women in our society. Unfortunately, Articles 333 and 334 has remained
the same since its first enactment.
The State shall take steps to review and, when necessary, amend and/or repeal
existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3) years from the effectivity
of this Act. 58 It has been six years since the enactment of the Magna Carta of Women
in 2009 but until now, though, there has been no amendment approved for the laws in
question. A number of proposals has been passed to amend Articles 333 and 334 but
none has been approved yet.

57
58

Magna Carta of Women Section 5: The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer, Paragraph 1, 2 and, 4
Magna Carta of Women Section 12: Equal Treatment Before the Law, Paragraph 1

CHAPTER V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings
I.

Articles 333 and 334 are unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause
The Supreme Court has established in the case of People v. Cayat four

requisites that must be complied by a law for it not to be declared unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause. However, Articles 333 and 334 have not complied
with these four requisites.
1. The law must rest on substantial distinctions which must be
reasonable.
Articles 333 and 334 both provide punishment for marital infidelity. In different
States, only a single penal provision penalizes the commission of the crime of marital
infidelity. In contrast, the Philippines gives us two distinct penal provisions varied only
because it is committed by a different sex. The distinction made due to the difference in
the sex of the person committing the crime is not reasonable because the act committed
is significantly the same, which is marital infidelity.
2. The distinction between the provisions of Articles 333 and 334 with
regards to their respective applicable penalties is not relevant to the
purpose of the law.
The purposes in enacting the provisions revolve around protecting the mens
interest in the family because whenever the wife gets pregnant, presumption is that the
husband is the legitimate father of the child the wife is bearing. Circumstances have

already changed in our modern world because of the presence of DNA testing. Through
this test, husbands can now easily impugn the legitimacy of a child. The current time
has already eradicated the difficulty placed on the men in case his wife gets pregnant.
3. The adultery and concubinage laws of the Revised Penal Code are
limited in its application for they only apply to the time of its
enactment and is not applicable to the current era.
The Revised Penal Code has took effect on January 1, 1932. The words of
Articles 333 and 334 are still part of the original text of the same Code. It is, therefore,
outdated. During the time that the said Code has been enacted, the legislators believe
that if women committed marital infidelity it is much worse that if a man commits it. Even
though it cou ld have been applicable in the 20 th century, it cannot be concluded that it
still applicable to the 21st century.
4. Article 333 in relation to Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code does
not apply equally to each member of the same class
The distinction placed by the Articles 333 and 334 on men and women is not
equated to classification according to a certain class. Classifying men from women is
tantamount to being sexism which is clearly prohibited by our laws and even in the
international community. Womens rights have been upheld in our Constitution.
Similarly, every person is afforded equality before the laws without placing any gender
classification. Thus, it must follow that statutes should not place any.

II.

The Philippines does not comply with the Convention on the Elimination of
all forms of Discrimination Against Women because of Article 333 and 334
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination

Against Women calls every State party to (1) embody the principle of equality in
constitution and laws; (2) ensure practical realization of the principle of equality; (3)
prohibit discrimination against women; (4) refrain from discrimination; (5) eliminate
discrimination by any person, organization or enterprise; (6) modify or abolish laws,
regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination; and (7)repeal
discriminatory penal provisions.
Philippines have already embodied the principle of equality in the 1987
Constitution. The Magna Carta of Women has been enacted to promote womens
empowerment. However, Articles 333 and 334 of the Revised Penal Code discriminates
women from men. Clearly, adultery is severely punished with prision correcional in its
medium and maximum periods compared to concubinage which is only punished with
prision correcional in its minimum and maximum periods. Adultery, which punishes
wives, can be proven with circumstantial evidence but concubinage must be proved with
the exclusively enumerated circumstances in Article 334.
1. The Magna Carta of Women has been enacted by the Philippines to
support

the

Convention on

the

Elimination of

All

Forms

of

Discrimination Against Women.

The Magna Carta of Women was promulgated to impose CEDAW in the
Philippines. While there have been many bills signed into law to promote equality and

eliminate discrimination on women through the Magna Carta of Women but the laws on
adultery and concubinage has been an exception, so far. It has been six years after the
promulgation of Magna Carta of Women in the Philippines but there have not been any
changes on the laws in question. The glaring inequality with regards to gender and the
discrimination against wives still exist.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
It is, therefore, the stand of the researchers to support the amendments
proposed by the House Bill No. 1017 introduced by GABRIELA Party List. The said
House Bill has amended Article 333 and 334 in the following words:
Article 333. Who are guilty of Marital Infidelity is committed by any married
person who shall have sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with
another person not his or her spouse and by the person who has carnal
knowledge of him or her, knowing him or her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void.
Marital Infidelity shall be banished by prision correcional in its minimum
and medium periods.
Article 334. Maintaining a Paramour Any married person who shall keep a
paramour in the conjugal dwelling or shall cohabit with a paramour at any other
place, shall be punished by prision correcional in its minimum and medium
periods.
The paramour shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

The researchers support the said House Bill because it has clearly complied
with the equal protection clause provided in the Constitution. Likewise, it has complied
with the provision of the CEDAW on elimination of laws that places discrimination
against women.

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