DOCUMENT B Japanese Survivor

Mr. Isao Kita was 33 years old when the bomb fell. He was working for the Hiroshima District Weather
Bureau 6.2 miles from the hypocenter. (Location of nuclear explosion) He was the chief weather man and
his shift fell on August 5th. He kept observing the weather even after he was exposed.

I was in the receiving room and I was facing northward. I noticed the flashing light. It was not really a big
flash. But it still drew my attention. In a few seconds, the heat wave arrived. After I noticed the flash,
white clouds spread over the blue sky. It was amazing. Then came the heat wave. It was very very hot.
Even though there was a window glass in front of me, I felt really hot. It was as if I was looking directly
into a kitchen oven. I couldnt bear the heat for a long time. Then I heard the cracking sound. I dont know
what made that sound, but probably it came from the air which suddenly expanded in the room. By that
time, I realized that the bomb had been dropped. As I had been instructed, I pushed aside the chair and lay
with my face on the floor.
Then I heard the groaning sound. The window glass was blown off and the building shook from the bomb
blast. There is a path which leads by where I was standing. On that day, a large number of injured persons
walked this way along the path toward the Omi Hospital. They were bleeding all over and some of them
had no clothes. Many of them were carrying people on their shoulders. Looking at the injured, I realized
how seriously the town had been damaged. The fire was its peak around that time. The sound of thunder
was not so great but I could still see the lightning over the fire. When I looked down on the town from the

top of that hill, I could see that the city was completely lost. The city turned into yellow sand. It turned
yellow, the color of the yellow desert. The smoke was so thick that it covered the entire town.
For the next few hours it started to rain. It was a black and sticky rain. It stuck on everything. When it fell
on trees and leaves, it stayed and turned everything black. When it fell on peoples clothing, the clothing
turned black. It also stuck on peoples hand and feet. And it couldnt be washed off.
The atomic bomb does not discriminate. Of course, those who were fighting may have to suffer. But the
atomic bomb kills everyone from little babies to old people. And its not an easy death. Its a very cruel
and very painful way to die. I think that this cannot be allowed to happen again anywhere in the world. I
dont say this just because Im a Japanese atomic bomb survivor. I feel that people all over the world must
speak out.

Document D President Truman

President Truman reflecting on the use of the bomb in August, 1963.

President Truman wrote to Richard Russell (Georgia Senator), August 9, 1945, the day of the Nagasaki
atomic attack.

Document C Leo Szilard, Atomic Scientist

Oak Ridge Petition, July 1945
Leo Szilard sent copies of his petition to the President. The petition was signed at the Manhattan Project
laborotatory at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Below is the petition which called for the atomic bomb to be
adequately described and demonstrated before use. The petition received 67 signatures.

Leo Szilard discussing the

Manhattan Project with
Albert Einstein.

July 17, 1945

A PETITION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in
the near future. The liberation of atomic power which has been achieved places atomic bombs in the
hands of the Army. It places in your hands, as Commander-in-Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to
sanction the use of such bombs in the present phase of the war against Japan.
We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently, we have
had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only
defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is
averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:
The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by atomic bombs may very well
be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at
least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and
Japan were given an opportunity to surrender.

If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look forward to a life devoted
to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in
certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought
not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.
The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic
bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the
destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation
which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may
have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in
uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the
cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United
States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its
prevention is at present the solemn responsibility of the United States -- singled out by virtue of her lead
in the field of atomic power.
The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of
restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the
world and in our own eyes. It would then be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of
bringing the unloosened forces of destruction under control.
In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as
Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war
unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing
these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use
atomic bombs be decided by you in light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as all the
other moral responsibilities which are involved.

Document A- Henry Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War

The following is an excerpt from an article written by Henry Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War in 1947.

Secretary of War Stimson

discussing the atomic bomb
with President Truman in
the summer of 1945.

On June 1, after its discussion with the Scientific Panel, the Interim Committee unanimously
adopted the following recommendations:
1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
2) It should be used on a dual target that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded
by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and
3) It should be used without prior warning (of the nature of the weapon).
In reaching these conclusions the Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed
advance warning or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these suggestions were
discarded as impractical. They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a
surrender of Japan, and both of them involved serious risks. Nothing would have been more
damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud
and this was a real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste.
The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the President rested upon me. The
conclusions of the committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I
felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisors, they must be
administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the

Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and
Japanese that it would cost.
The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945
was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military
power could open the way to lasting peace.

There was a strong possibility that the Japanese government might resist to the end. In such an
event, the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five
million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply
demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death.
We had been planning for the invasion of Japan in July 1945. The total U.S. military and naval
force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5 million men. We estimated that such
operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone.
Additional large losses might be expected among our allies, and, of course, if our campaign were
successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger
than our own.
We had developed a weapon of such a revolutionary character that its use against the enemy
might well be expected to produce the kind of shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy which we
desired, strengthening the position of those who wished peace, and weakening that of the military
party.
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men
in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate,
were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding
in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives,
could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.