althoughthewarhadbeenwonbyacoalitionwhosecorememberswerealreadyatwar:

ideologicallyandgeopolitically(maybemilitarily)withoneanother
Gaddisholisticview
tickingtimebombintheheartofSovietUnion

Part1
bothsuperpowersembracedideologieswithglobalaspirations
leadersassumedthattheseideologieswouldbeabletoworkintherestoftheworld,
purelybecausetheyarefunctioningintheirownrespectivecountries
HitlerusedanexcusetodeclarewarontheUnitedStatesafterJapanstruckPearlHarbour
Americansmanagedtobuildanextraordinarilypowerfulstatebyseverelyrestrictingtheir
governmentscapacitytocontroleverydaylife:disseminationofideas,theorganizationofthe
economy,theconductofthepolitics
KarlMarxclaimedthatindustrializationcapitalistshadsetinmotionwassimultaneously
expandingandexploitingtheworkingclass,whichwouldliberateitselfsoon
LeninattemptedtoimposeMarxismonRussia,statusquoofstatefailedtofitthe
frameworkofMarxsprediction
revolutionwouldonlyoccurinanadvancedindustrialsociety
StalinMarxistLeninistideology:forcedagrariannationwithnolibertyatall
USSRmostauthoritariansocietyintheworld
USwasgeographicallydistantfromwherethefightingwastakingplace,mostsignificantone
wasPearlHarbourunder300,000AmericansdiedduringtheconflictinWW2
abletochoosewhenandwheretofight
minimizedcostandrisksoffighting
Americansemergedfromthewarwithathrivingeconomy
wartimespendingpushedtheirGDPupdoubledinlessthanfouryears
USSRperformedmuchmoreterriblyincomparisontoUSAduringWW2
cities,townsandcountrysideravaged
industriesruinedorhurriedlyrelocated
desperateresistance,onterrainandincircumstancesselectedbyenemies
27millionsovietcitizensdeaths
USSRin1945=shatteredstate
Acontemporaryobserverrecalled,wasboththemostfearfulandtheproudest
memoryoftheRussianpeople.
AlthoughtheasymmetriesmightsuggestthatUSgainedmoreadvantageoutoftheWW1,
thereweremanyproblemsthatsuggestedtheopposite.
USAdidnotreverseitsstanceintermsofremainingaloofinEuropeanaffairs,
therewasnoguaranteethatthewartimeeconomicboomcouldbesustainedespecially
afterthe1930depression,
therewasevidentlynotmanysignsthatdemocracywouldbeabletotakerootbeyond
theveryfewnumberofcountrieswhichadoptedthissystem,
therefore,suggestingthatthiswarwasonlyavictoryagainstFascismaswellas,
evidentlyshowingthatthewarcouldnothavebeenwonwithoutStalinsassistance,a
signaltotherestoftheworldthatauthoritarianismwasstillgrowingandexpanding.
USSRgainedlotsofadvantagesfromtheWW2victory,
itscommandeconomyprovedtosustainfullemploymentinwhichcapitalist
democracyhadfailedtodoso,

theUSSRsideologygainedpopularityandwidespreadrespectwithinEurope,
duetoitseffortsintermsofdefeatingHitler,itgavethesovietsamoraljustification
foritsinfluenceinshapingEuropespostwarsettlement.
ThepoliticalstruggleineachrespectivesuperpowercountrygaveUSSRtheupperhandas
well,Trumandescribedasinexperiencedandillinformed,cameintoofficeClementAttlee
wonagainstChurchillduringelections
incomparisontoStalinslongstandingandunchallengedperiodofruling,Stalin
achievedmuchmorestabilitywithinhisgovernmentandhadafocusedperceptionon
whathewantedtoachieve.

PartII
Stalinspostwargoals:hisregimehiscountryhisideology
nointernalchallenges
interestofcommunistintheoutsideworldwouldnotoutweightheprioritiesofthe
Soviet
Narcissism,paranoia,andabsolutepowercametogetherinStalin
Stalinfirmlybelievedthatduetoitswartimeeffortsandsacrifices,itshouldtherefore
deservealotinreturn,thisincluded:
regainingterritoryinwhichithadlosttoGermanyduringWW2,aswellas,retaining
territoryfromthenonaggressionpactwithHitlerinAugust,1939BalticStates,
statesbeyondtheseborderswouldremainundersovietssphereofinfluence,
territorialconcessionsattheexpenseofTurkeyandIran,
navalbasesinMediterranean,
punishGermanythroughmilitaryoccupation,propertyexpropriations,reparations
paymentsandideologicaltransformation.
disproportionatelossesduringwarentitledUSSRtodisproportionatepostwar
gains?
StalindependedonpostwarAngloAmericangoodwillinordertoobtainthesepostwar
objectivesatareasonablecostUSSRneededpeace,economicassistanceandthe
diplomaticacquiescenceofitsformerallies
MarxistLeninistideologyinfluencedStalinashisunderstandingofhiswartimeallieswas
basedmoreon
wartimethinkingthanonanaccurateassessmentofpriorities
,hisbeliefs
includedthatthecooperationbetweencapitalistswouldnotbesustainableduetoitsinherent
greedandurgetoplaceprofitsabovepolitics,whichwouldultimatelyleadtotheirownself
destruction
Stalinjustifiedthatthereasonwhybothdemocraticcapitalistsandcommunistswereableto
succeedwaspurelybecausetheaforementionedhadtheincentiveofpreventingHitlers
domination,therefore,suggestingthatbothfactionscannevercoexistandtheydidnottruly
coexisttogetherduringthewartimeperiods
Duringwartimeperiodsitdidevidentlysupporttheideaofconflictwithinthecapitalist
systemthegreatdepressioncausedtheemergenceofNaziGermanyascapitaliststatesdid
nothavethenecessaryresourcestoprotecttheglobaleconomy.
USSRhadplentyofbargainingpowerduringpostwartimes,itexpectedUStolendseveral
billionsofdollarstoitseconomyasStalinbelievedtheeconomiccrisiswasboundtohappen
againandthatthecapitaliststateswouldrequirethehelpofUSSR
Stalininsistedin1952,
theinevitabilityofwarsbetweencapitalistcountriesremainsin
force

StalindidnotwishtorestorebalanceofpowerinEuropebutrathertodominatethecontinent,
similartowhatHitlerattemptedtodoitsgrandvisionwastherefore,peacefullyaccomplish
buthistoricallydetermineddominationofEurope
StalinfailedtounderstandtheevolvingpostwarobjectivesoftheUnitedStatesas
suggestedabove

PartIII
UnitedStateswantedtoobtainsecurityafterthewarhadendedbutitwasmuchlesscertainof
whattheywouldhavetodoinordertoobtainit,incomparisontoStalinsregime
UnitedStatescouldnotcontinuetoserveasamodelfortherestoftheworldwhile
remainingapartfromtherestoftheworld
ThroughoutthehistoryoftheUnitedStates,theyworriedlittleintermsoftheirownsecurity,
theindependenceofGreatBritainthereforesuggestedthe
implausibilitythatacontinent
couldbeperpetuallygovernedbyanisland.
nofurthercolonizationinthewestthereforeallowedtheUnitedStatestomaintaina
vastsphereofinfluencewithouttheriskthatbydoingsotheywouldbechallenging
anyrisksofothergreatpowers.
TheUnitedStatesdidattempttoseekgreaterinfluenceintermsofglobally,theirradical
claimthat
allmenarecreatedequal,
assuggestedsointheDeclarationofIndependence
Americanpracticeswereisolationist
didgrasptheideathatitssecurityrequiredtransplantingitsprinciplesforeignand
militarypolicyfarlessambitiousinrelationtoitssizeandstrength
W.WilsonattemptedtopersuadeAmericansthatitwascrucialtorestoreAmericanmilitary
powerinordertorestorethebalanceofpowerwithinEurope
proceededontoproposingthefoundationsforapeacesettlement,whichincluded
imposingtheideaofLeagueofNationsonrespectivestatesapostwarcollective
securityorganisation
howevertheideaofrestorationofbalancewasprovedtobepremature
itsfailuresagainsttheBolsheviksfailuresoftheTreatyofVersaillesglobal
depressionriseofaggressorstatesinEuropeandEastAsiasendAmericansbackto
avoidinginternationalinvolvements
rarewithdrawalofapowerfulstatefromresponsibilitiesbeyonditsborder
FDRattemptedtopersuadethenationthatitssecuritycouldbethreatenedbywhathappened
halfwayaroundtheworld
eventsofWW2thatbroughtaboutAmericancommitmenttothetaskofrestoringa
balanceofpowerbeyondthewesternhemisphere:
fallofFrancebattleofBritainJapaneseattackonPearlHarbour
Rooseveltswartimeprioritieswentaboutasthefollowing:
sustainalliesknewperfectlywellthatUScouldnotfightGermanyandJapanalone
securealliedcooperationinshapingpostwarsettlmentineffortstoachievelasting
peace
natureofsettlementnewcollectivesecurityorganization(economic+national
security)
settlementwouldhavetobesellabletoAmericanpeopleaslearntfromthe
failuresofW.Wilson
Britishobjectives:surviveallcoststhroughthemeansof:
relinquishingleadershipofAngloAmericancoalitiontoWashington

weakeningBritishempire
collaboratingwithUSSR
aspiredtotheroleofGreeks,tutoringnewRomans(inotherterms,influencingUSA)

PartIV
CoalitionbetweenRoosevelt,ChurchillandStalinwasameansofbothcooperatingtodefeat
theAxisandaninstrumentthroughwhicheachofthevictorssoughttopositionitselffor
maximuminfluenceinthepostwarworld
Issuesthatarose:
ThesecondFrontandaseparatepeace
oneofthegreatestAngloAmericanfearwasthattheSovietUnionmightcutadeal
withNaziGermanyRooseveltandChurchilltriedtokeepSovietUnioninthewar
thereforedidnotcontesttoStalinsdemandsfortherestorationoflostterritories
postponementuntilsuccesswaslikelyatanacceptablecost
secondfront:materializedslowly
June1944LandingsinNormandy:AngloAmericanmilitarystartedtaking
significantpressureofftheRedArmy
UnitedStatesonlyparticipatedinSecondFrontwhenitcouldeasilyaffectthe
outcomeofthewar,completelyensuringitsinterests
StalinwastodenyAmericansandBritishanymeaningfulroleinoccupationof
Romania,BulgariaandHungary
StalinandChurchillagreedthatSovietswouldhaveapredominantinfluenceinthese
regions
Stalinrealisedhowlittlereassurancethesecondfrontshadprovidedhim
SpheresofInfluence
AsaresultoftheChurchillStalinagreement,Rooseveltworriedthatdivisionsof
europewereshapedintospheresofinfluences,therefore,notleavingmanyoptions
forEuropeansintermsofdeterminingtheirfuture
AngloAmericanobjectivewastoreconciletheseidealswithStalinsterritorial
demands
RooseveltandChurchillurgedStalintoallowfreeelectionsintheBalticStates,
PolandandotherregionsofEasternEurope
USAandUKhopedthatthesecountriescouldbeabletochoosetheirown
governmentse.g.PolandGermanysfirstvictiminWW2
StalinsactionshadeliminatedanypossibilitythataPolishgovernment
subservienttoSovietscouldsustainpopularsupport
StalinagreedtothisduringtheYaltaConferencewithoutanyintentonactingupon
thisagreement
territorialacquisitionsachieved
StalinsupportedPolishcommunistsbasedinLublin(1943)
StalindidnothingwhenNazisbrutallysuppressed1944WarsawUprisings
organizedbyLondonPoles
Stalin'sinsistenceintermsoftakingonethirdofPolandsregionfurther
embitteredthenation
StalinimposedaproSovietgovernmentbecausePoleswouldneverelectonein
turnledtoapermanentlyresentfulPoland
DefeatedEnemies

AlliesendedupcontrollingofGermanyduetothegeographicalproximitiestotheir
advancingarmiesaswellasthefactthatStalinhadgivenasubstantialpartofeastern
GermanytothePoles
SovietzonecontainedofGermanpopulationandanevensmallerpercentageof
industrialfacilities
Stalinacceptedtheagreementforthefollowingreasons:
TheinstallmentofaMarxistLeninistgovernmentwouldbeamagnetfor
westGermans,thuscausingthemtochooseleaderswhowouldeventually
unifytheentirecountryunderSovietcontrol(idealisticview)
Firstproblemwiththisstrategy:RedArmysbrutalityintermsofoccupationwithin
EasternEurope
expropriatedpropertyandextractedreparationsonanindiscriminatescale
indulgedinmassrape
alienatedmostGermans
theregimethatStalininstalledlackedthelegitimacyitscounterpartinthe
westquicklygained
Secondproblemwiththisstrategy:unilateralismmannerofhowSovietshandledtheir
affairsinGermanyandEE,madeUKandUSAwaryofrelyingoncooperationwith
SovietsinoccupyingrestofGermany
attemptedtopreserveasmuchofGermanyaspossibleunderwesternrule
gaveUSlittleincentivetoincludeSovietsinoccupationofJapan
theneedforSovietmilitaryassistancevanishedwhenUShaditsfirst
successfulatomicbombtesting
AtomicBombissueintensifyingSovietAmericandistrust
Stalinmountedamajoroperationtospyonhisallieswhichisastrongindicationof
hislackoftrustinthem
theroleoftheatomicbombshortenedthewaranddeniedSovietsanysignificantrole
indefeatingandoccupyingJapan
theirhopeswereparallelbuttheirvisionswerenot
RooseveltandChurchillenvisagedapostwarsettlementwhichwouldbalancepowerwhile
embracingprinciples
preventanynewwarbyavoidingmistakesthatledtoWW2
ensurecooperationamonggreatpowers
Unitednations
maximumpossiblepoliticalselfdeterminationandeconomicintegration
Sovietsvisionwasasettlementthatwouldsecurehisownandhiscountryssecuritywhile
simultaneouslyencouragingtherivalriesamongcapitaliststhathebelievedwouldbringabout
anewwar