Political Studies (1997), XLV, 260-274 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany. Contemporary Dilemmas Jost HALFMANN Technische Universitat Dresden “The paper starts from 4 paradox of contemporary German politics: after the unifica- tion of the two Germanics the ethnocultural grounding of German citizenship has lost its historical meaning; at the same time violent conflicts and heated debate over the rights to full membership for immigrants in the German state have developed. Alter theoretical discussion of the notions of nation state, citizenship. and immigration, the development of the contemporary paradox of citizenship is sketched historically using two pairs of distinctions: nationhood v. statehood and political v. social (state- mediated) inclusion. The paradox of “ethnicized” conflicts over Germans v. foreigners is interpreted as a discrepancy between membership in the state on the one hand and ‘membership in the welfare state system on the other ~ a discrepuney which currently is “overdetermined’ by the socio-economic consequences of unification, Over the last ten years, the German public has engaged in a debate on the questions of immigration and citizenship; only since the unification of the two German states has this controversy taken a violent turn. During the 1980s, this conflict came as a surprise to many because Germany had immigrants, but seemingly no problem with national identity because of immigration. Until unification, the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic dealt with problems of national identity and nationhood on two completely different terrains. First, during the 1950s and 1960s West German public debate was preoccupied with the Alleinvertretungsanspruch — with the question of which (if either) of the two separate states could legitimately claim to be the German nation state. Second, throughout the history of the Federal Republic the problem prevailed of how to deal with the Auslandsdeutsche (Germans abroad), the Vertriebene (the expellees from the former German territories), the ‘Aussiedler (the settlers of German origin in the former Soviet Union), and the Ubersiedler (those Germans who crossed the border between the two: German states). Bath debates related nationhood and citizenship in a peculiar way public awareness was directed toward the question of ‘incomplete’ German statehood; but even though these controversies were prompted by cross-border movements of large numbers of people, a public debate about the connection between immigration and citizenship sprang up only after unification Since unification and since the extensive migration of Aussiedler into Germany, the territory controlled by a German state and the territory where Germans! live have become more and more identical. In many respects, " Or more precisely: those who are considered by German law as Germans. + PonkalSusies Atweition 1997 Pulse hy Bickel Publier, 18 Coney Road, Oxford OG TIF, UK and 380 Min oramcnnrpa sete aceJost HALEMANN 261 Germany has completed its historic project of building a nation state only very recently. After unification, the treaty with Poland on the inviolability of the common borders. the *re-settling’ of the Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Furope, and the ceding of the powers of the vietors of World Yar I (especially over Berlin), Germany has finally reached some viable territorial shape and a legitimate structure as a nation state Within this historical context the re-emergence of the question of German nationhood has political connotations which differ substantially from. those during the petiod of ‘incomplete’ statehood. While many highly industrialized ountries have experienced rising immigration and increasing ‘interethnic’ conflict over the last decade, in Germany the question of how to deal with immigration is conflated with the question of how to define citizenship under the new historical conditions. Neither the foreign “guest workers’ nor the asylum- seckers were subject to hostility deriving from national reaffirmation in the past history of the Federal Republic. Since the early 1990s however. the question of membership in the German nation has regained a definite ethnic note. This holds true for those who defend a very restrictive policy towards admitting foreigners’ (Germany as a self-defined non-immigration country) as well as for those who favour an open immigration policy and the idea of ‘multi culturalism’.* The question is: why? In this paper. attention will be focused on the relationship between immigra- tion and citizenship in Germany. Citizenship divides those who live on a national territory into citizens and non-citizens; and in turn divides non-citizens into legal and non-legal forcigners. A problem arises when large numbers of legal foreign residents live on a nation state's territory without access to full citizenship Empirical research on migration shows that a large share of migrants who come as temporary workers eventually settle down in the receiving country. This neral finding holds also true for Germany, especially in the period after the 960s. Bade states that ‘of those foreigners who lived in the Federal Republic on 31 December 1987, 45.8 per cent had stayed there for 10-20 years and 13.9 per cent for more than 20 years already"s! at the end of 1990, 24 per cent of the foreign residents had lived in Germany for more than 20 years. By the end of 1990, the share of foreigners among the resident population in Germany surpassed 8 per cent and in 1991 the number of foreigners almost touched the 16 * ‘his restrictive attitude is based on the principle, shared by many citizens and politicians, that srmany is not and should not be “an immigration country’, The Federal Einbirgerwgsrichlinien of 197 Administrative guidelines on naturalization’) state in 92.3 that “the Federal Republic is ot a country of immigration (and) docs not strive to inerease the number of its citizens through naturalization” (Qranstation taken from R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridee. MA and London, Harvard University Press, 1992), p.174). For references to this official policy of the German goverament see D. Kanstfoom * “Wer sind wir wieder?” Laws of ‘asylum, immigration and citizenship in the struggle for the soul of the new Germany’. Yale Journal of fnternational Lav, 18 (1993), 185-211, pp. 162, 201-4 *C. Leggewic, a widely published proponent of “multiculturalism demands that the Turks living {in Germany should be formally acknowledged as an “ethnic minoriiy’ and granted the same status of “cultural autonomy” that the German-Polish treaty of 1991 provides for ‘ethnic Germans” in Poland, sec C. Leggewie, "Das Ende der Geduld. Zehn Gebote fiir das deutsch-tlrkische Verhaltnis', Die Tageszeivung, 18 September (1993), p. 10. * K. J. Bade, ‘Paradoxon Bundesrepublik: Einwnlerungsituation ohne Einwanderungsland* in K.3. Rade ted ), Deutsche im Ausland ~ Feemde in Deuischland Minchen, Beck, 1992), pp. 293-401, p97, Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.262 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany 6 million mark, continuing a trend of steady growth of foreign residents since the 1970s, The presence of large numbers of legal foreign residents without full membership in the nation state indicates problems of regulating membership in a state; if many legal residents are not full members of a nation state, conflicts may arise. These conflicts tend to have ‘ethnicist’ overtones, especially if large numbers of the resident population enjoy the benefits of the welfare state system, but not of the nation state. In times of shrinking welfare budgets, ethnic differences may be introduced to safeguard privileged access of the citizens to welfare benefits, and to exclude foreigners. If states attribute citizenship accord- ing to ethnic criteria, these conflicts may threaten seemingly uncontroversial concepts of nationhood, that is, of shared descriptions of society as a commun- The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany defines a ‘German’ as follows: “unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of the Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship’. Article 116(1) of the Basic Law, however, considers Volkszugehdrige (persons belonging to the German people) from former German eastern territories to be Germans even though they are not citizens of Germany. Volkscugehdrigkeit stems either from German descent or from cultural and linguistic loyalty to German nationhood.' This ethno-cultural addendum to the definition of German citizenship dates back to the emergence of the German nation state in the late nineteenth century. The recent conflicts over immigration remind the Germans of the changes in statchood and nationhood that have taken place in the course of the difficult establishment of a German nation state. These conflicts put the ethno-cultural definition of nationhood on trial. Nation State, Citizenship, and Immigration Before discussing the dilemma of modern Germany in reconciling a history of ethno-cultural definitions of citizenship with its post-ethnic nationhood, it is necessary to examine some theoretical considerations about the relationship between the notions of nation state, citizenship and immigration, Nation State The basic political units of ‘world society’ are nation states. Despite supra- national organizations and international legal and political *regimes’, nation states still claim autonomy and exclusive authority over many important fields of decision making such as taxation or national defence. Another such prerogative is state authority over the regulation of membership in nation states. Membership in a nation state is called citizenship. Citizenship will be defined in 5 Kanstrom, “Wer sind wir wieder’ p. 170. © Asa 1953 statute (the Geset= uber die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flichlinge) declares (see Kanstroom, ‘Wer sind wir wieder, p. 165). Kanstroom’s characterization of this concept of Setman nationhood as wilkisch (or racial rather than ethno-cultural) (Kanstroom, “Wer sind wir wieder’, p. 173) blurs the differences between the concept of German nationhood of the Nazi period enship and land the pre-and post-Nazi periods (fora critique of this eonfiation see R. Brubaker, Cit ‘Nationhood, p. 16).Jost HaLeMANN 263 this context as ‘a legal institution regulating membership in a state’.” This abstract and formal definition of citizenship seems especially helpful in under- standing the German case of nation state building. The German history of developing a nation state was characterized by the long lasting disjunction of state-building ftom that of nation-building: membership in the state differed substantially from the constructed membership in the German nation.® The consequences of these two different histories will be discussed later. Citizenship Citizenship (as Staarsangehdrigkeit) constitutes a legal relationship between the state and a person or a group of persons which (as a rule) is exclusive, perma- nent and immediate.’ This relationship is exclusive in the sense that in principle membership is restricted to one state only; it is permanent in the sense that with few exceptions states cannot disengage from their legal commitment to citizens; and it is immediate in the sense that no other obligations (such as familial, caste or class loyalties) may intervene in the state-citizen constellation. Nation states emerged from imperial state orders and corporatist forms of membership. The formation of nation states was (and still is) a precarious act which required the coordination of two very different processes: the building of states and the transformation of feudal subjects into (free) citizens. States emerged from the attempts of political leaders and bureaucracies to gain uninhibited control over a territory and to replace traditional loyalties by political membership in the state. The transformation from personal subordination to rulers to impersonal forms of domination was eventually grounded in the principle of “people's sovereignty’."° The atiribution of membership by the state will be called political inclusion. Citizenship is inclusion into the state. This process of attribution may take the form of benevolent granting of the rights of inclusion, but it may also be the result of the popular struggle for active participation in the state. The historical differences in constituting citizenship will not be discussed in this context.!' Modem society provides yet another form of inclusion: staie-mediated inclusion, which is inclusion into social systems other than the state, such as the economic or the educational system. Political inclusion refers to the legal and political nefits which a state attributes to the members of the political system (i.e. the rights to vote. to assembly and speak freely ete.). State-mediated inclusion refers to the fiscal and legal provisions which 2 state provides for most residents (excluding foreign military personnel, tourists or diplomats): by managing or supervising labour markets, educational institutions or health * Brubaker. Citienship and Nationhood, p. Sl; see also R, Grawert, “Staatsangehdrigheit und Staatsbiirgerschaft, Der Staot, 23 (1984), 179-204. [ will Iter explain why L will follow Brubaker’s and not Marshall's definition of citizenship which embraces the idea of active participation in a (nacional) community * Brubaker. Citizenship and Nationhood, pp. 51-2. * Grawert, ‘Staatsangchorigkeit und Staatsbdrgerschal’, p. 183 "R Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Berkeley CA. California University Press, 1964), 1 '" As for the (normatively overdetermined) distinctions between individualistic libertarian and collectivistic-authoritaran ways toward citizenship see L. Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Rouds 10 Modernity (Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard University Press, 1992) Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.264 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany care organizations the state offers opportunities for inclusion into social systems other than the political system. State-mediated inclusion is most relevant in the case of labour markets. Welfare state measures intervene in labour markets by protecting or compen- sating workers with respect to work-related risks. The contours of labour markets, however, do not necessarily coincide with the contours of states. Thus, members of markets and members of states do not necessarily belong to the same group. States may, by managing the social inclusion of residents on theit territory, extract taxes from, grant social benefits to, or impose schooling laws on, residents who are not citizens. While legal residents enjoy social inclusion. citizens are not only entitled to state support in social inclusion, but also to full state protection and political participation. Residents in a country and citizens of a state thus form (wo different types of memberships which largely overlap. Under certain conditions conflicts may arise between these classes of members, which result from tensions between the principles of the nation state and the welfare state Another important problem of citizenship stems from the semantics of community which have accompanied the transformation of citizens into members of a state:!? the community of citizens is the people (das Volk). Historically, two main semantics of constructing solidarity between persons (who by becoming persons with rights and interests turn into strangers to one another)! can be observed: one referring to “ethnos’, the other to “demos’.'* During the history of nation states!* the semantics which reflected the creation of nation states either conceived the idea of a community of citizens in terms of a socio-political contract or of cultural and blood bonds. In terms of the logic of inclusion, those persons who enjoy political and state-mediated inclusion may perceive themselves as members of a nation. Immigration At this very abstract level of discussion we may say that the larger the number of non-citizens, and the longer their time of residence, the bigger the problems of nationhood will be for states and societies. Nationhood can be, or can become. precarious when the territory over which a state claims control is challenged or is in constant flux: or when states are insecure about how to establish political and state-mediated inclusion. The first source of instability may result from civil war or from controversies with neighbouring nation states over common borders. The second insecurity results from the fact that immigration takes place and results in a resident foreign population. in other words: with the establish- ment of nation states, borders become barriers which create different levels of 12 Geliner argues that the semanties of community were highly suggestive in the process of transforming allegiances 1o local contests of kinship into those of national contexts of membership ina state. To Gellner, the semantics of fellowship in a national community (and the exclusion of foreign non-fellows’) facilitated the experience of becoming member in a community of strangers luring the process of modernization; E. Gellner, Narions and Narionatism (Oxford. Basil Blackwell 1983) 1A. HahncIdentitat und Nation in Europa’. Berliner Journal far Soziologie, 2 (1993), 193- 203. '4 Soe E., Francis, Ethnos wnd Demos (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot. 1963). 'S At least the history of nation states in Europe and the Americas: B. Anderson, Inagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Narionativm (London. Verso, 1983). “Cicpernen a aerpeaoren arcsec EEJost HALEMANN 265 political and social benefits on cither side of the border. When immigration takes place the border between different categories of benefits will be erected inside of a nation state. Viewed from this perspective. migration is a test of the stability of nationhood. Shoring up borders and preventing resident immigrants fiom ‘naturalization’ indicates insecurity about the conditions of inclusion of a people ina state. ‘Tensions between foreign residents and citizens may arise along the lines dividing members from non-members in the national community; these tensions may be interpreted as a result of ethnic differences. The role of the semantics of community becomes apparent when conflicis over immigration emerge: the procedures and justifications governing the question of whom to grant access to the nation state, betray not only the origin of the myths of nationhood, but also the political weight of the idea of a nation, when it comes to conflicts over the distribution of benefits created on a territory controlled by a nation state. Modern ‘ethnicist’ conflicts over immigration are sparked by the diserepan- cies bebveen the two different modes of inclusion in modern societies: inchision in the (nation) state and inclusion in the welfare system. Inclusion in the state (citizenship) constitutes entitlements and duties which result from the political relationships between citizens and the state. Inclusion in the welfare system is mediated by the state through legal or fiscal means, but does not constitute a direct relationship between the state and residents on a state territory. While ion in the state can be connected with ideas of a societal community, no ideology attached to the economic or educational system could develop and maintain an integrative power comparable to nationalism. Consequently. membership in a nation seems to legitimize a privileged access to the benefits and rights of modern societies while entitlements resulting from membership in non-political social systems are not supported by some construct of community. The notion of citizenship employed here is strictly limited to the definition of membership in a state; the concept of nation as a community of citizens refers to this membership in a state. Since membership of social systems other than the state are common in modern societies, citizenship does not necessarily include all persons who live on a state's territory, and enjoy the rights and benefits of the social systems of a society. Marshalt’s famous discussion of the development of citizenship, therefore, does not seem appropriate for understanding the relation- ship between immigration and citizenship. Why this is so I next discuss. Marshall's Concept of Cit nship In Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall defines citizenship as full membership of a community’.'* By constructing society as a community,'” Marshall viewed citizenship as a mechanism of inclusion in a community (as distinct from: inclusion in a society). In Marshall's sense, citizenship means active participa- tion of citizens in the ‘social heritage” of a society, By viewing society as a community of active citizens, Marshall could construct a conflict of principles between those associated with citizenship and those connected to social class. In his view, the extension of citizenship rights from civil to political and social "TH. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class. in T. H. Marshall ed.), Class, Citizenship, and Soa! Development (Chicago and London. Chicago University Press, 1977), pp. 71-134. p.76. Marshall. ‘Citizenship and Social Class, p76. Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.266 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany entitlements eventually fosters social equality, such that “the preservation of economic inequalities has been made more difficult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship’.'* Marshall's concept of citizenship as participation in a community of equals has provoked a rich tradition of research, but also much criticism. In his critique of Marshall's notion of citizenship Giddens rightly points at the other side of citizenship entitlements: as the relationship between the state and the citizens was born out of conflicts over sovereignty, it is also one of ™ Turner suggests that the historical divergence in the development of citizenship can be captured by distinguishing between two different dimen- sions: on the one hand, citizenship can be established as the outcome of proactive movements or of the will of the aristocratic leadership; on the other hand, the concept of citizenship is influenced by either a public or a private tradition of defining ‘a public space of political activity’?! The notion of citizenship comprises very different historical developments: first, the transfor mation of dynastic empires to republican nation states and the emergence of the “people” as historical actors; second, the transformation of kinship-based, local forms of inclusion into translocal forms of inclusion which are based on symbolically generalized media such as money or power. Citizenship, therefore, has different meanings whether it is viewed from the perspective of the ‘people’ or of states and whether from the perspective of private or public ‘communities’. Thus the notion of citizenship itself as introduced by Marshall, and adapted by Giddens and Turner, is a conflation of two different meanings of sovereignty: sovereignty of the state and sovereignty of the citizens. Only from the perspect- ive of citizens might citizenship denote membership in a community; in this view the association of citizens forms the people who then constitute a nation by constructing a common denominator (cither descent or contract, ‘ethnos’ or demos’). From the perspective of the state, citizenship simply indicates legal membership; what dominates here is the need to identify people who belong to a territory that the state controls. Inclusion, therefore, always also. means exclusion, Marshall could not anticipate that the inclusionary politics of the welfare state would create new inequalities and disparities which do not follow the logic of class divisions. Immigration is a case in point: the political exclusion of foreigners may take place as a consequence of establishing those political rights for the formerly deprived social classes, a process which Marshall believed would lead modern society toward more equality; but more justice for the underprivileged segment of the citizenry coincided with a sharp separation from the foreign residents in a nation state, European societies with expansive welfare ' Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class’, p. 128 © For aeritical view see A. Giddens, The Nation Stare and Violence (Cambridge, Polity. 1987). ch.& M. Roche, “Citizenship, social theory and social change’, Theory and Society. 16 (1987). 363-99, and M. Mann, “Ruling class strategies and citizenship’, Sociology, 3 (1987), 339-54; for a “defence of Marshall's views see D. Held, *Citizenship and Autonomy’ in D. Held, Political Thears land the Modern State (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 189-213. 2 Giddens. The Nation State and Violence, p-20S. 3 B'S, Turner, Outline of a theory ofeiizenship*, Sociofogs, 2 (1990), 189-217, p.209. Turner's ideal typical classification of states according to these two dimensions is not fully convincing. All historical cases of nation states - be it England, France, the USA or Germany ~ exhibit traits of sath sides of the two dimensions which precludes the establishment of clear cut differences between these eases, This is the traditional crux of Weberian ideal types ““Eopvright ©2001 All Rights ResevedJost HALFMANN. 267 state systems face stronger discrepancies between political and state-mediated inclusion; nations with smaller welfare state programmes such as the United State of America have fewer problems in accommodating immigrants.” Germany’s Dilemma The two developments of nation state and welfare-state building reflect the diferent logics of politics and social welfare. While the legal and administrative processes of state-building responded to the territorial aspects of modern states, welfare systems emerged to reconcile the disruptive and chaotic character of industrialization with the needs of states to establish legitimate forms of political domination. Germany's Sonderveg consists, if one wishes to use this label, in the disruptions which resulted from the strong tensions between the nation state and welfare-state principles: high insecurities about the territorial contours and the political regulations of the German nation state coincided with an early, far- reaching build-up of a welfare system. From these tensions originates the current political dilemma in Germany: how to accommodate the heritage of an eihno-cultural definition of nationhood with the modern need to define citizenship exclusively in legal and political terms. Without such aecommoda- tion the gap between those residents who enjoy political and social inclusion in the state and those who are excluded from one or the other form of membership cannot be closed. Recent immigration by Aussiedler and asylum-seekers, and the large foreign resident population of so-called “guest workers’, have pointed at the discrepancy between Germany’s history as a country of emigration and its contemporary status as a country of large-scale immigration The history of the German nation state is a history of insecurity about the Jers of the state territory and about the institutions and rules of inclusion into the state and into those social systems (like markets and schools) which are mediated by the state. While the territorial borders of Germany were subject to substantial changes after the first successful attempt at founding a nation state in 1871, the main unresolved question concerned the legal and political status of those large numbers of Germans who lived outside the German territory. As a consequence, a German state (that is the institutional and legal framework for controling a territory and including a population) never evolved in harmony with the German nation (that is the concept of a community of citizens as a people’). Since a nation was evoked in Germany before a state was con- structed, the idea ofa ‘societal community’ coutd not be based on the concept of a societal contract constituting a nation state, but had to resort to the idea of common descent and culture. When the first German nation state was founded in 1871, it became immediately clear that the contours of membership in the German nation (the areas where people lived who were identified as Germans by the state) were not identical with the territory of the German state. The Kleindeutsche Lésung of the Imperial Empire created ‘ethnic’ problems from the beginning: the Bismarckian state for example excluded the Germans of the ‘Die aktuelle Zuwanderung — cine Herausforderung flr den Wohlfahtsstaat” in B, Blanke (ed.). Ziosinderung und Asy1 in der Konkurrenzgeselfschaft (Opladen, Leske und Budtich, 1993), pp. 274. 300. 2 Bendis, Nati Bral Polite Staies Asecition. 19 n-Building and Citizenship taker, Citizenship aind Nat Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.268 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany Hungarian-Austrian Empire, but included ethnic Poles from the eastern provinces of Prussia To understand the present dilemma of German citizenship policy a brief reconstruction of the two main problems of state-building and nationhood in German history as expressed in the construction of citizenship is necessary: the first problem resulted from the history of emigration from Germany until the founding of a nation state, the second from the transformation of Germany into a country of immigration after the foundation of a nation state. These problems were reflected in the strategies of inclusion into the nation state (1) and into the welfare system (2). (1) The kleindeutsche origin of German statehood in 1871 created confusion over the meaning of citizenship: since state (Bundesstaat) citizenship was prior to federal citizenship, the German nation state did not control citizenship until the Reichs- und Staatsangehdrigkeits-Gesetz (the Citizenship-Law) of 1913. The need for this law was twofold: (a) Under the old statutes Germans living in foreign countries could lose their state citizenship; the new citizenship law guaranteed permanent citizenship to these Ausfandsdeursche. “This law introduced the use of the term “German” as a category broader than citizen.” Section 1 of the new law stated: “a German is one who has citizenship in a federal state or who posseses direct imperial citizenship’ (Deutscher ist, wer die Staatsangehrigkeit in einem Bundesstaat oder die unmittelbare Reichsan- gchorigkeit besitzt’). Direct imperial citizenship might be granted to certain foreigners who lived in German colonies or to former Germans or their descendants living outside of Germany’? (b) A second ground for clarifying the rules of political inclusion was rising immigration into Germany. After the founding of Imperial Germany in 1871, Germany turned slowly from a country of emigration into one of immigration.°* When Germany at the turn of the twentieth century changed from an agrarian to an industrial society and attracted workers from neighbouring countries measures were taken to control the process of workers’ migration.’ By 1914 about 1.2 million foreigners worked in Germany.* Imperial Germany lacked a clear-cut concept of citizenship because of its origin in independent states with differing rules of access. The insceurity about the federal regulation of citizenship was reflected in the very different treatment of Polish and Italian immigrants into the Reich. State control of immigration had an ethnic bias - but only toward Polish workers. Polish workers were allowed to work in the Eastern provinces of Prussia, but not in the Ruhr ar where the so-called *Ruhr-Poles’ ~ ethnic Poles with Prussian citizenship ~ had settled to work in the coal mines. The ‘Ruhr-Poles' were viewed suspiciously because of their alleged fierce nationalism; their loyalty as Prussian (German) citizens was in doubt. As a consequence, the “Ruhr-Poles’ were subject to a campaign of forced ‘assimilation’: the teaching of the Polish language in schools 2 Kanstroom, Wer sind wir wiedes’, p. 173, fn. 134 % K_ J. Bade, * “Billig” und “willig™ ~ die “auslindischen Wanderarbeiter” im kaiserlichen Deutschland’ in Bade, Deutsche im Ausland ~ Fremde in Deutschland, pp. 311-24, p. 311 K. J. Bade, ‘Transnationale Migration und Arbeitsmarkt im Kaiserreich Vom Agrarstaat mit starker Industrie zum Industrestaat mit starker agrarischer Basis’ in T. Pierenkemper and R. Tilly (eds), Historische Arbeitsmarktforscluag, Enistehung, Entwicklung und Probleme der Vermarkrune von Avbeitskraft (Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982, pp. 182 211 Bade, “Billig” und “willig” *, p.312. paeanornnacea tenn bearer RHE pa -—renirremJost HALEMANN, 269 and associations was prohibited.”” No such measures were taken against Italian migrant workers who had been recruited as temporary workers in the construc- tion business of the Rhine area This indicates that the discrimination against Poles was not so much motivated by a positive image of German nationhood as by insecurities about how to establish state authority over the citizens and how to develop viable descriptions of Germany as a nation. State distrust of the loyalty of its citizens also extended to ethnic Germans when they showed sympathy for the labour movement or belonged to non-Christian religions. Social Democrats, Liberals and Jews were, therefore, denounced as Reichsfeinde (enemies of the Reich) and subjected to formal and informal political or legal discrimination.” The Nazi regime also reflected the unresolved relationship between state and nation, but deviated from the Bismarckian (and even more radically from the Weimar) citizenship policy in one decisive respect. Citizenship was based on ‘ethnoracial’ instead of ‘ethnocultural’ grounds.*! The Nazi state changed the Citizenship Law of 1913 in one important point: national socialist legislation distinguished between Reich and State citizenship. Reich citizenship was available only to ‘persons of German blood’. The Jews like other Artfremde (foreigners to the German kind) were eventually stripped of their state citizenship. Thus they were devoid of possible legal protection when subjected to persecution."? While formal inclusion in the state was restricted to Reich members, and radical programmes of expelling the non-German population from the occupied territories were implemented during war time, the Nazi regime at the same time forced more than 8 million civilian foreigners, war captives and inmates of concentration camps to work in the war industries."* Afier World War II, the idea of Germans abroad again played a decisive role in the self-description of the Federal Republic of Germany as an ‘incomplete’ nation state, This time it was the large number of ethnic Germans who were expelled from their respective states after the collapse of the Nazi Regime. Article 116 of the Basic Law refers to these Germans when it states that a German is not only a citizen of Germany but also a person who “has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock (Volkszugehér- igkeit) or as the spouse or descendant of such person’. Next to the expellees ovo further categories of ‘Germany abroad’ were entitled to citizenship or held citizenship without passport: the Aussiedler in the former Soviet Union who were treated as expellees because of their persecution under Stalin; and the Uhersiedler (citizens of the German Democratic Republic) who received a West German passport when they managed to cross the border. ® Ch. KlcGmann, “Finwanderungsprobleme itm Auswanderungsland: das Beispiel der “Ruhr poten’ in Bade, Deutsche im Ausland ~ Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte wi Gegenwart, pp. 303-19, p.306, © HU. Webler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 (Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1988), pp. 96- 100, "Brubaker. Citizenship and Narianhood. p, 16. ® Kanstroom, “Wer sind wir wieder’, pp. IT6-7. see also Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood. P.166-7, 2 Brubaker, Citizenship and Navionhood. p. 167-8. % U. Herbert. * "Auskinder-Einsatz” in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, 1939-1945', in Bade, Deutyche im Ausland ~ Fremde in Dewischland. pp. 354-67 * Kanstroom, "Wer sind wir wieder’, p. 185. Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.270 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany (2) State-mediated inclusion into educational and welfare systems and labour markets (‘social inclusion’) was an invention of the Weimar Republic even though the origins of the German welfare system date back to the Bismarckian social security systems. In the Imperial Reich unemployment and health insur- ance were designed to undermine the growing strength of the labour movement: in the Weimar Republic the welfare system was linked to citizenship rights. The growing influence of the unions and the Social Democratic party prompted state intervention in labour markets. Inclusionary (and exclusionary) policies now had primarily an occupational rather than an ethnic thrust.** The rejection of naturalization policies on the left was motivated by a shift of the labour movement from internationalist stances to protective measures for the national labour force.*” Social inclusion was the result of the union’s interest in creating equal conditions for all workers on the national labour markets. AS a con sequence, for those foreign workers who were allowed to immigrate social inclusion was more or less fully granted: social inclusion of all workers on national labour markets on the other hand led to tighter controls of the flow of immigrant workers. However, the discrepancy between inclusion in the welfare system and inclusion in the state remained latent in the Weimar Republic, because of low levels of immigration, After the collapse of the Nazi regime the Federal Republic of Germany restored the Weimar legislation with its policy of social inclusion and political exclusion of resident foreigners. By contrast with the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic until the mid-1970s boasted an expanding economy in need of foreign workers. Initially foreign workers enjoyed the rights to social inclusion in the welfare system only as long as they stayed in Germany; but over time many workers acquired permanent residency and the right to enjoy fully the benefits of the welfare system. Political inclusion, however, never appeared on the political agenda until the 1980s, When the West German government ended its programme of foreign workers’ recruitment it seemed to have expected that most foreign workers would return to their countries of origin. A decade after the Anwerbestopp, however, it became obvious that many of the “guest workers" meant to stay. This revealed the underlying tension between social and political inclusion: the definition of German nationhood as larger than citizenship and of citizenship as smaller than residency in Germany. This latent politics of inclusion provided the fertile ground in the 1990s for the re-emergence of a debate over the ethno-cultural definition of German nationhood. The experi- ence of shrinking labour markets and rising immigration prompted a debate about the different rules of inclusion into the state and into the welfare system. The debate turned quickly into a conflict over the legitimacy of access to the welfare state system for non-citizens of the Federal Republic. It is against this background that the need to redefine citizenship after unification and to devise a transparent immigration policy appeared on the political agenda % See also Kansttoom, “Wer sind wir wieder’, p.175, who emphasizes continuities from Bismarckian to Weimar citizenship policies OV Hentschel, Geschivte der dewtschen Soxtalpolink 1NS0—1980 (Frankfurt a. M., Subrkamp, 1983) "E, Bichenhofer, “Die Stellung der Auslander im deutschen Sozialrecht’, Zeitsehrift far Anbeitsreckt, 3 (1987). 108-15, Grae a aeJost HALPMANN 271 Changes in Germany's Citizenship Policy? story of German state- and nation-building came to an end with the unification of the Federal Republic with the German Democratic Republic on 3 October 1999. Unification not only restored full international sovereignty for the German state (as a consequence of the so-called ‘Two-plus-Four’- negotiations between the two German states and the victors of World War I], France, England, the Soviet Union and the United States); it also led to a treaty with Poland which confirms the inviolability of the common borders.*” When the German government declared publicly that it had no further territorial claims toward other states, the end of the history of German security about its territorial shape was in sight. Germany also signed treaties with Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and with Romania, which guarantee the protection of ethnic minorities in those countries! ‘The re-settlement of ‘ethnic Germans’ from the former Soviet Union and Eastern, Europe (started under Adenauer, but fully effective only after Gorbachev took power in 1985) will eventually produce a viable solution to the second big problem of German nationhood, how to bring its contours into line with those of the German state. Even though there are supposedly still three million ‘ethnic Germans’ in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” the ressive thrust of extending state protection over these members of the German nation has been spent. Since 1990 Germany has started to control the fiow of Aussiedfer into the country by issuing the Aussiedler-Aufnahmegesetz (1 July 1990); this law requires that Aussiedler apply for an Aufnahmebescheid (reception-permit) at German consulates or embassies in their country of origin before they can settle in Germany." These events have reopened the debate about the problematic relationship between immigration and citizenship in Germany. Three recent changes in the uslinderpolitik can be taken as cautionary steps toward a departure from a sirict ius Sunguinis definition of citizenship. © J, Halfisann, After the Unification: a New German Assertiveness. in B. Crawford and P. W. Schulze (eds), The New Europe Asserts feself. International and Area Studies, Research Series No. 77 Berkeley CA, University of California at Berkeley. 1990), pp.284—304. ¥ Soo §2 of the treaty (Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen liber alo Resitiguny de isch then hestettenden Gren, signed in Warsaw 14 November 1990) in the Eurona-Archir. 13 (1991), p. D310. 4 See the Vertrag aber freundschufitiche Zusammenarbeit (Treaty on benevolent cooperation) with Hungary of 2 February 1992, with the CSER of 27 February 1992 and with Romania of 21 April 1992 (sos the documents in Eurnpa-archit, 10 (1992), pp. D382, D390, D399), A joint declaration oF the German Chancellor Kohl and the Russian President Jelzin on 21 November 1991 states that the Germans living in Russia should enjoy the freedom of cultural expression and ‘eventually join in a re-established Wolea Republic within the Russian confederation (Europa Archiv, | (1992), p22), * W. Klauder, “Deutschland im Jahr 2030: Modellrechnungen und Visionen’, in Bade, Deutsche in tusiond—Fremae it Dentschland, pp.435_ 64. p 461 ©" K. Pohl, B SiSrizbach and H. Wendt, “Die demographische Lage in Deutschland und in der Europiischen Gemeinschal’, Zeitschrift Bewitkerungsrissenschaft, | (1992), 3-94, 9.35, “The importance ofthis problem not only results from political changes, bu from demographic developments as well. The population of ‘ethnic Germans is in the process of shrinking and ageing, Aramativelly. a the hypothetical case of a complete immigration stop Germanys population wil our millions uetil 2010 and by fourteen millions until 2030, The expected demand of the ill grow by 2.5 million until 2000 (ses Ktauder, ‘Dewischland in Jaht 2030. pp. 458 6). From this, one may conclude that Germany will have to rely on large-scale immigration i i wishes to secure or enhance its present ecocomic status Pt Stade Asan, 1997 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.272 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany First, in 1990 the Gesetz tiber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von Ausldndera im Bundesgebiet ( Auslandergeset=) (the Aliens Law) was revised with respect to naturalization regulations. The hitherto rather restrictive naturalization policy was relaxed in two important points: foreigners between the age of sixteen and twenty-three having resided in Germany for eight years, having attended school for six years and willing to give up their former citizenship were invited to be naturalized; foreigners residing in Germany for fifteen years who applied before 31 December 1995 were also invited to naturalize. The costs of the naturalization procedure have been reduced from three monthly incomes (max. DM 5000) to DM 100.4 As a consequence, the number of Anspruch- seinbiirgerungen (naturalizations based on a legal claim) has been rising substantially since 1990. Second, over the last few years, the Ausldnder- behorden (foreigners administrations) have become more inclined to tolerate double citizenship as the figures on naturalization show.” Double citizenship for Turks living in Germany has become acceptable since 1984 because of the strict Turkish citizenship law. Since the early 1990s there has been public support for granting double citizenship to all long-term foreign residents. The Auslinderbeaufiragte of the Federal government, which has a tradition of deviating from the official position on foreigners, has made similar sugges- tions.** Finally, in 1991, the Aliens Law was revised in several respects with the explicit intent of limiting the discretion of the Foreigners’ Administration. The law formulates four residence statuses: “The Aufenthaltserlaubnis is a general residence permit which may be extended: the Aufenthaltsherechtigung is the rough equivalent of US permanent resident alien status; the dufenthalishewilli- gung isa specific, short-term residence permit, which requires a specific purpose; and the Aufenshaltsbefiugnis is a residence permit based on humanitarian or political grounds’. These new provisions improve the standing of foreigners vis-d-vis the administration in legal disputes. This revised law improves the legal position of long-term foreign residents and their children.” While these recent measures indicate the willingness of the German authorities to pave the way for the resident foreign population to become citizens, the Federal Republic of Germany still maintains the policy of restricting further immigration from non-EC countries.*! This is the context of the recent tightening of the asylum policies closing the only remaining legal path of immigration into Germany. In 1993, Germany revised the asylum paragraph of the Basic Law such that refugees coming from so-called ‘safe * Sce Die Beaufiragte der Bundesregicrung fltr die Belange der Auskinder. Mitteilungen Nr. 1 In der Dishussion: Das Einbiirgerungs- und Staatsangehdrigkeitsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutsch Zand (Bonn, 1993), pp. 7-8 “ Die Beaufiragte der Bundesregierung fir die Belange der Auslinder, Das Einbirgerungs- und Staatsangehdrigheitsrehr,p. 11, Table 2. “Die Beaufiragte der Bundesregicrung fur die Belange der Auslinder, Das Einbirgerungs- und Staatsangehsrigkeitsrecht.p. 12. Table 3, Naturalization rates ia Germany. however, are still among the lowest in Europe (see Kanstroom, "Wer sind wir wieder’ p.182). “8°, Winkler, Einheimische und sugewanderte Besdlkerung in der Bundesrepublik, Problemaufiif wr Vermcidung einer weiteren Verschdrfung der Siwuavion. Typescript, (Bonn, Arbeitsstab der Beaufltagten der Bundesregierung fir Auslinderfragen, 1990), *® Kanstroom, “Wer sind wir wieder’ p. 192. 9 KJ. Bade. Auslinder, Aussicdler, Asvl ix der Buadesrepublik Deutschland (Hannover, Landes: zeatrale fir politische Bildung, 1992). p. 19. SUK. J. Bade, Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Hannover, Landeszentrale Bildung, 1993), p.17 ir politische rrvonmgnenrnmmrmemnncttannes tect mags ace y con ESTES SoJost HALFMANN 2B countries’ can be returned home without being allowed to await the results of court appeals in Germany. Parallel to these legal revisions, the German government took measures to prevent asylum seekers from entering German territory. Legal accords with neighbouring non-EC countries were sought to make sure that refugees are refused transfer through these countries into Germany; agreements with the neighbouring EC-countries allow the return of refugees to those EC-countries which received them first. Since the revision of the asylum paragraph on I July 1993 the number of persons seeking asylum in Germany has fallen by half. Facilitating ‘naturalization’ and shoring up the borders against immigration seem to be contradictory policies. The hesitant steps toward easing the proce- dures for foreign residents to become citizens indicate, however, a departure from the ethnic grounding of citizenship in Germany. The tightening of asylum on the other hand, points at the lack of a transparent immigration This then is the current status of the German dilemma: while the completion of nation-state building makes it possible to conceive a political (rather than ethnocultural) grounding of German citizenship, the current economic situation and the political conflicts over the kind and degrees of inclusion of foreigners prevent Germany from devising an appropriate immigra- Conelusion The present conflicts over immigration and citizenship result from the coincid- ence of two separate developments. First, throughout the history of the Federal Republic the ethno-cultural bias in defining German citizenship provided the central foundation for the politics of overcoming ‘incomplete’ statehood. The unification of the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany has removed this basic element of German citizenship policy, Second, the economic and political consequences of unification have brought to the attention of the German public a problem which seemingly had nothing to de with Germany's politics of statchood and nationhood: large-scale immigra- tion. The process of immigration begun in 1960 has resulted in a significant foreign resident population. Immigration into Germany has revealed the discrepancy between the two logics of inclusion in the state and in the welfare system. It may come as a surprise to learn that the ethno-cultural grounding of Gorman nationhood is a cause of conflict over the politics of political and social inclusion. As long as membership in the German state is defined in part by ethnocultural criteria, the concept of citizenship will be contested in Germany Violent conflicts over membership in the German nation state may arise until appropriate measures are taken to reduce these tensions in the concept of citizenship. There are, however, limits to the possibility of easing “ethnicized” conitiets over inclusion, because of the structural tension between the principles of the nation state and the welfare state: the territorial base of the nation state and transnational scope of welfare provisions permanently create different (and in some respects conflicting) types of inclusion. ® From 36.729 persons in January 1993 10 16,660 in October 1993, see Bundesministerium des Inneren Asvibowerber-ahlen fir den Monat Oktober 1993 (Bono, 4 Novernbet 1993). Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved.274 Immigration and Citizenship in Germany Our initial question ~ why the unification of the to German states has revitalized ethnicity in arguments about membership of the German nation can now be answered as follows: in times of economic crises, the exclusion of immigrants from citizenship invites controversy about the legitimacy of their social inclusion. The conflict over the rules and implications of admission to the social and political systems has been couched in ethnic terms. These controversies revealed the ethno-cultural grounding of the concept of political inclusion in Germany. Governmental policies of citizenship which are aimed at reducing ‘ethnicized’ conflicts would have to be oriented at departing from ethno-cultural definitions of nationhood and at trying to match political and social inclusion. Because of the inherent tension between inclusion in the political and the welfare state system, conflicts over inclusion may, however, emerge as long as ‘world society’ is made up of nation states. (Finally accepted: 22 October 1995) Pog Stoies Aswan. 17 ‘Gopuright @ 3001 All Rights Reseved.