Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No.

154598
August 16, 2004, J. Corona

Facts: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A year
later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and
bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree
ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without
notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but
this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then
went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not
find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3 that
respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing
calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ
of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to

the latter.

Issue: WON there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 by RA 8369.

Held: Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than
one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in
grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under
the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must
prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA
8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
 maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must
be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject."

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,
it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since
RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

Petition granted.

Samson vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113166

February 1, 1996, J. Regalado

Facts: Petitioner has been employed with private respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.,
Manila, Inc. (AG & P) in the latter's various construction projects since April, 1965, in the course of
which employment he worked essentially as a rigger, from laborer to rigger foreman. From 1977 up to
1985, he was assigned to overseas projects of AG & P, particularly in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
On November 5, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for the conversion of his employment status
from project employee to regular employee. Petitioner alleged therein that on the basis of his
considerable and continuous length of service with AG & P, he should already be considered a regular
employee and, therefore, entitled to the benefits and privileges appurtenant thereto.
Respondent AG & P then insists that petitioner is merely a project employee for several
reasons. First, the factual findings of respondent commission, which is supported by substantial
evidence, is already conclusive and binding and, therefore, entitled to respect by this Court. Second,
Department Order No. 19 amended Policy Instruction No. 20 by doing away with the required notice of
termination upon completion of the project. Hence, non-compliance with the required report, which is
only one of the "indicators" for project employment, no longer affixes a prescription of regular
employment, by reason of which the doctrine laid down in the Caramol case no longer applies to the
case at bar. In addition, Department Order No. 19 allows the re-hiring of employees without making
them regular employees, aside from the fact that the word "rehiring" connotes new employment.
Third, on the basis of petitioner's project employment contracts, his services were engaged for a fixed
and determinable period which thus makes each employment for every project separate and distinct
from one another. Consequently, the labor arbiter supposedly erred in taking into account petitioner's
various employments in the past in determining his length of service, considering that upon
completion of a project, the services of the project employee are deemed terminated, his employment
being coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which he is assigned.
The Solicitor General fully agrees with petitioner, with the observation that the evidence
indubitably shows that after a particular project has been accomplished, petitioner would be re-hired
immediately the following day save for a gap of one (l) day to one (1) week from the last project to the
succeeding one; and that between 1965 to 1977, there were at least fifty (50) occasions wherein
petitioner was hired by private respondent for a continuous period of time. He hastens to add that
Department Order No. 19, which purportedly superseded Policy Instruction No. 20, cannot be given
retroactive effect because at the time petitioner's complaint was filed, the latter issuance was still in
force.
Issue: WON Department Order No. 19 should be given retroactive effect in order that the
notice of termination requirement may be dispensed with in this case for a correlative ruling on the
presumption of regularity of employment which normally arises in case of non-compliance therewith.
Held: When the present action for regularization was filed on November 5, 1989 and during
the entire period of petitioner's employment with private respondent prior to said date, the rule in
force then was Policy Instruction No. 20 which, in the fourth paragraph thereof, required the employer
company to report to the nearest Public Employment Office the fact of termination of a project
employee as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which he is employed.
Furthermore, contrary to private respondent's asseveration, Department Order No. 19, which was
issued on April 1, 1993, did not totally dispense with the notice requirement but, instead, made
provisions therefor and considered it as one of the "indicators" that a worker is a project employee.
This is evident in Section 2.2 thereof which provides that:
(e) The termination of his employment in the particular project/undertaking is reported to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
workplace within 30 days following the date of his separation from work, using the prescribed
form on employees' terminations dismissals suspensions.
More importantly, it must be emphasized that the notice of termination requirement has been
retained by express provision of Department Order No. 19 under Section 6.1 thereof, to wit:
6.1. Requirements of labor and social legislations. (a) The construction company and the
general contractor and/or subcontractor referred to in Sec. 2.5 shall be responsible for the
workers in its employ on matters of compliance with the requirements of existing laws and
regulations on hours of work, wages, wage related benefits, health, safety and social welfare
benefits, including submission to the DOLE-Regional Office of Work Accident/Illness Report,
Monthly Report on Employees' Terminations/Dismissals/Suspensions and other reports. . . .
(Emphasis ours.)
Perforce, we agree with the labor arbiter that private respondent's failure to report the
termination of petitioner's services to the nearest Public Employment Office, after completion of every
project or a phase thereof to which he is assigned, is a clear indication that petitioner was not and is
not a project employee.
On the bases of the foregoing, the retroactivity or prospectivity of Department Order No. 19
would normally be of no moment. At any rate, even if the new issuance has expressly superseded
Policy Instruction No. 20, the same cannot be given retroactive effect as such an application would be
prejudicial to the employees and would run counter to the constitutional mandate on social justice and
protection to labor. Furthermore, this view that we take is more in accord with the avowed purpose of
Department Order No. 19 "to ensure the protection and welfare of workers employed" in the
construction industry, and which interpretation may likewise be inferred from a reading of Section 7
thereof, applied corollarily to this case, which provides that "nothing herein shall be construed to
authorize the diminution or reduction of benefits being enjoyed by employees at the time of issuance
hereof."
It is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. The interpretation herein handed down gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code that "all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."7
The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, which pertinently prescribes that "the provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer" and that "any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists," should apply in
the case of herein petitioner.
NLRC decision is reversed and set aside.

PAGCOR vs. PEJI, G.R. No. 177333

April 24, 209, J. Carpio Morales
Facts: Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23,
1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the
following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:
 Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others,
tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the
application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such
licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails
the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f)
thereof, does not give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR maintains that Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate games of chance in the
area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed therein do not include "games of chance."
Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private respondent PEJI
encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated
special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
Issue: WON the authority of ZAMBOECOZONE to operate/license games includes “games of
chance/gambling.”

Held: The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its
own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech
is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in
a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently.
For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and
to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which
are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an
uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value."
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 8 Not any of these
instances is present in the case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and
"amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction,
or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily
employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant
the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922
enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of
tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling
activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-
racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
 Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the
latter’s interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of
respect for administrative or practical construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to
several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors include the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which
the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and
practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate
and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Petition granted.

Compagnie Financiere Sucres Et Denrees vs. CIR

G.R. No. 133834, August 28, 2006, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts: On October 21, 1991, petitioner transferred its eight percent (8%) equity interest in the
Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Incorporated to Kerry Holdings Ltd. (formerly Sligo Holdings Ltd),
as shown by a Deed of Sale and Assignment of Subscription and Right of Subscription of the same
date. Transferred were (a) 107,929 issued shares of stock valued at P100.00 per share with a total par
value of P10,792,900.00; (b) 152,031 with a par value of P100.00 per share with a total par value of
P15,203,100.00; (c) deposits on stock subscriptions amounting to P43,147,630.28; and (d) petitioner’s
right of subscription. On November 29, 1991, petitioner paid the documentary stamps tax and capital
gains tax on the transfer under protest.
On October 21, 1993, petitioner filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, herein
respondent, a claim for refund of overpaid capital gains tax in the amount of P107,869.00 and
overpaid documentary stamps taxes in the sum of P951,830.00 or a total of P1,059,699.00. Petitioner
alleged that the transfer of deposits on stock subscriptions is not a sale/assignment of shares of stock
subject to documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax.
However, respondent did not act on petitioner’s claim for refund. Thus, on November 19, 1993,
petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review,

In its Decision dated October 6, 1995, the CTA denied petitioner’s claim for refund. The CTA
held that it is clear from Section 176 of the Tax Code that sales "to secure the future payment of
money or for the future transfer of any bond, due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock" are taxable.
Furthermore, petitioner admitted that it profited from the sale of shares of stocks. Such profit is
subject to capital gains tax.
Issue: WON assignment of deposits on stock subscriptions is subject to documentary stamps
tax and capital gains tax.
Held: Along with police power and eminent domain, taxation is one of the three basic and
necessary attributes of sovereignty. Thus, the State cannot be deprived of this most essential power
and attribute of sovereignty by vague implications of law. Rather, being derogatory of sovereignty, the
governing principle is that tax exemptions are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; and he who claims an exemption must be able to
justify his claim by the clearest grant of statute.
In the instant case, petitioner seeks a refund. Tax refunds are a derogation of the State’s
taxing power. Hence, like tax exemptions, they are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the State. Consequently, he who claims a refund or exemption from taxes has the burden of
justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.
Significantly, petitioner cannot point to any specific provision of the National Internal
Revenue Code authorizing its claim for an exemption or refund. Rather, Section 176 of the
National Internal Revenue Code applicable to the issue provides that the future transfer of shares of
stocks is subject to documentary stamp tax, thus:
SEC. 176. Stamp tax on sales, agreements to sell, memoranda of sales, deliveries or transfer
of due-bills, certificates of obligation, or shares or certificates of stock. – On all sales, or agreements to
sell, or memoranda of sales, or deliveries, or transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation, or shares or
certificates of stock in any association, company, or corporation, or transfer of such securities by
assignment in blank, or by delivery, or by any paper or agreement, or memorandum or other
evidences of transfer or sale whether entitling the holder in any manner to the benefit of such
due bills, certificates of obligation or stock, or to secure the future payment of money, or for
the future transfer of any due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock, there shall be collected a
documentary stamp tax of fifty centavos (P1.50) on each two hundred pesos(P200.00), or fractional
part thereof, of the par value of such due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock: Provided, That only
one tax shall be collected on each sale or transfer of stock or securities from one person to another,
regardless of whether or not a certificate of stock or obligation is issued, indorsed, or
delivered in pursuance of such sale or transfer; and Provided, further, That in case of stock
without par value the amount of the documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be equivalent to
twenty-five percentum (25%) of the documentary stamp tax paid upon the original issue of the said
stock. (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, under the above provision, sales to secure "the future transfer of due-bills, certificates
of obligation or certificates of stock" are liable for documentary stamp tax. No exemption from such
payment of documentary stamp tax is specified therein.
Petitioner contends that the assignment of its "deposits on stock subscription" is not subject to
capital gains tax because there is no gain to speak of. In the Capital Gains Tax Return on Stock
Transaction, which petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the acquisition cost of the
shares it sold, including the stock subscription is P69,143,630.28. The transfer price to Kerry Holdings,
Ltd. is P70,332,869.92. Obviously, petitioner has a net gain in the amount of P1,189,239.64. As the
CTA aptly ruled, " a tax on the profit of sale on net capital gain is the very essence of the net capital
gains tax law. To hold otherwise will ineluctably deprive the government of its due and unduly set free
from tax liability persons who profited from said transactions."
We reiterate the well-established doctrine that as a matter of practice and principle, this Court
will not set aside the conclusion reached by an agency, like the CTA, especially if affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. By the very nature of its function, it has dedicated itself to the study and consideration of
tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an
abuse or improvident exercise of authority on its part, which is not present here.
Petition denied.

Manaya vs. Alabang Country Club, Inc

G.R. No. 168988, J. Chico-Nazario

Facts: Petitioner alleged that on 21 August 1989, he was initially hired by the respondent as a
maintenance helper receiving a salary of P198.00 per day. He was later designated as company
electrician. He continued to work for the respondent until 22 August 1998 when the latter, through its
Engineering and Maintenance Department Manager, Engr. Ronnie B. de la Cruz, informed him that his
services were no longer required by the company. Petitioner alleged that he was forcibly and illegally
dismissed without cause and without due process on 22 August 1998. Hence, he filed a Complaint
before the Labor Arbiter. He claimed that he had not committed any infraction of company policies or
rules and that he was not paid his service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and 13 th month pay. He
further asserted that with his more or less nine years of service with the respondent, he had become a
regular employee. He, therefore, demanded his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights with full
backwages and all monetary benefits due him.

In its Answer, respondent denied that petitioner was its employee. It countered by saying that
petitioner was employed by First Staffing Network Corporation (FSNC), with which respondent had an
existing Memorandum of Agreement dated 21 August 1989. Thus, by virtue of a legitimate job
contracting, petitioner, as an employee of FSNC, came to work with respondent, first, as a
maintenance helper, and subsequently as an electrician. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint insisting that petitioner had no cause of action against it.

The NLRC found that respondent’s counsel of record Atty. Angelina A. Mailon of Monsod,
Valencia and Associates received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on or before 11 December
2000 as shown by the postal stamp or registry return card. Said counsel did not file a withdrawal of
appearance. Instead, a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26 December 2000 was filed by the
respondent’s new counsel, Atty. Arizala of Tierra and Associates Law Office. Reckoned from 11
December 2000, the date of receipt of the Decision by respondent’s previous counsel, the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal by its new counsel on 26 December 2000 was clearly made beyond the
reglementary period. The NLRC held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the statutory period is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional. The appeal having been belatedly filed, the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter had become final and executory.

Issue: WON it is right to give due course to the Appeal of respondent even if said appeal was
filed beyond reglementary period of ten (10) days for perfecting an appeal.

Held: In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the case of Aguam v.
Court of Appeals, where this Court held that litigation must be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. The appellate court further justified the grant of respondent’s petition by saying that
the negligence of its counsel should not bind the respondent.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to respondent’s claim that its lawyer abandoned the case;
hence, they were not effectively represented by a competent counsel. It further held that the
respondent, upon its receipt of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter on 15 December 2000, filed its appeal
on 26 December 2000 through a new lawyer. The appeal filed by respondent through its new lawyer
on 26 December 2000 was well within the reglementary period, 25 December 2000 being a holiday.

It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to

client. In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume
that the counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the
reckoning point of the reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file
any notice of withdrawal. Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time that it was
terminating the services of its counsel.

For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must constitute gross negligence as to
amount to a deprivation of property without due process. This does not exist in the case at bar. Notice
sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him
of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment, valid and regular on its face

Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of appeal.

In Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of a
notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon
appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. Her new
counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period
was over. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of
an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage
of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in
its name and had since then been devoted for educational purposes. In Olacao v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled,
with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of
the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.

We pronounced in those cases that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.

In all these, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the extraordinary circumstances that
justify a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.

Clearly, emphasized in these cases is that the policy of liberal interpretation is qualified by the
requirement that there must be exceptional circumstances to allow the relaxation of the rules.

Absent exceptional circumstances, we adhere to the rule that certain procedural precepts
must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for
review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail oneself of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be
strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to
perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.

In this particular case, we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for the following
reasons:

Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made which rendered the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter as final and executory.

Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code
that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including
its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”

In the case of Bunagan v. Sentinel we declared that:

[T]hat the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to
entertain the appeal. The underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a
circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the efforts and meager resources of
the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle for less than what is due him. This
Court has declared that although the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure
and is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of the rules in deciding labor cases, such liberality
should not be applied where it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of
liberality is adopted. The liberal interpretation stems from the mandate that the
workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. We see no
reason in this case to waive the rules on the perfection of appeal.

The Court is aware that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of rules in deciding labor
cases. However, such liberality should not be applied in the instant case as it
would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is
adopted. The liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the
workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. x x x.
(Emphases supplied.)

Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case “as it would render futile the very
purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted.” As so rightfully enunciated, “the liberal
interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration.” This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement
of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival of an employee and his
loved ones who are dependent on him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine and education; it also wears
down the meager resources of the workers to the point that, not infrequently, they either give up or
compromise for less than what is due them.

Without doubt, to allow the appeal of the respondent as what the Court of Appeals had done
and remand the case to the NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the petitioner. In
Narag v. National Labor Relations Commission, citing Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission we held that delay in most instances gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with well-paid talented lawyers they
can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not
infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

Nothing is more settled in our jurisprudence than the rule that when the conflicting interest of
loan and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be
counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the under-privileged worker.

Petition granted.