i a ¥ a, an i eS Ni Sin di eee — Puictayats ae | vis is dn ea States of India | CO a”All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any ‘means, electronic or mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner and the publisher. ISBN:81-7022-553-1 First Published in 1995 Reprint 1905, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES B.7/18 Safdarjung Enclave ‘New Delhi-110 029 Published and Printed by: ‘Ashok Kumar Mittal Concept Publishing Company * A/15-16 Commercial Block, Mohan Garden, New Dethi-110 059 The socio-economic profiles, district statistics and the chart on panchayat raj institutions were compiled by the Research Team of the Institute of Social Sciences on the basis of records and papers furnished by the respective stale governments. ‘The maps used in this book are sketch maps; they arenot to scale.CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ANDHRA PRADESH 5 ARUNACHAL PRADESH 2 ASSAM 3B BIHAR GOA 5B GUJARAT ol HARYANA B HIMACHAL PRADESH 81 JAMMU & KASHMIR 87 e KARNATAKA % KERALA 105 MADHYA PRADESH 117 MAHARASHTRA 123 MANIPUR 133 MEGHALAYA. 139 MIZORAM 145 NAGALAND 151 ORISSA 157 PUNJAB 167 RAJASTHAN 15 SIKKIM 183 TAMIL NADU 189 TRIPURA 199 UTTAR PRADESH 205 WEST BENGAL 213 ABBREVIATIONS 227 GLOSSARY 28 CONTRIBUTORS TO THE VOLUME 231INTRODUCTION Tr Is widely recognised that self-governing village communities characterised by agrarian ‘economies had existed in India from the earliest times. Not only are they mentioned in the Rig Veda, which dates from approximately 1200 BC, there is also definite evidence available of the existence of village ‘sabhas" (councils or assemblies) and “gramins’ (senior persons of the village) until about 600 B.C. These village bodies were the lines of contact with higher authorities on matters affecting the villages. Panchayats: Pre-Colonial Period In course of time, these village bodies took the form of panchayats (an assembly of five persons) which looked after the affairs of the village. They had both police and judicial powers. Custom and religion elevated them to a sacred position of authority. Besides the village panchayats, there were also caste panchayats, to ensure that persons belonging to a particular caste adhered to its code of social conduct and ethics. If this was a general pattern in the Indo-Gangetic plains, in the south, village panchayats generally had a village assembly whose executive body consisted of representatives of various groups and castes. It will not be wide off the mark if we say that these village bodies, both in north and south India, had been the pivot of administration, the centre of social life, and, above all, a focus of social solidarity. Even during the medieval and ‘Mughal periods, this characteristic of the village panchayats remained unchanged. Although under the Mughals their judicial powers were curtailed, local affairs remained unregulated from above and village officers and servants were answerable primarily to the panchayats. Sir Charles Metcalfe, the provisional governor general of India (1835-36), had called the Indian village communities "the little republics.” This does not mean that these democratic "republics" were ideal institutions working with the participation of all the people. Given the caste-ridden feudal structure of the village society of those days, they left much to be desired. BR. Ambedkar did not think highly of these village communities, and, in fact, his ‘own experience had given him a negative view of the caste-ridden villages and their panchayats. He had remarked in the Constituent Assembly on 4 November 1948: I hold that these village republics have been the ruination of India. 1 am, therefore, surprised that those who condemn provincialism and communalism should come forward as champions of the village. What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as its unit." Ambedkar may have summarised the condition of the village communities too sharply. What is significant here is to guard against @ romantic view of the ancient village system, especially in relation to the values of ‘equality and democracy. Jayaprakash Narayan had once perceptively commented that the old village communities had survived in nothing else except their physical existence. They were no longer living communities acting jointly for the solution of individual or communal problems and for the development of their moral and material life.2 Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 British Colonial Period With the advent of the British, the self-contained village communities and their panchayats ceased to get sustenance. In course of time, they were replaced by formally constituted institutions of |_—_—village administration. It is a historical fact that local self-government in India, in the serse of an accountable representative institution, was the creation of the British. It may be emphasized here that village panchayats were not the first priority of the British rulers. Concentrated as they were mainly around the trading centres, their interest in the beginning was limited to the creation of local bodies of nominated members in the major towns. It was thus that as early as 1687 a municipal corporation came to be formed in Madras. Set up on the British model of a town council, this body was empowered to levy taxes for building a guild hall and schools. With the passage of time, the sphere of activities of this corporation and similar bodies set up in other major towns and also their taxation powers widened. Although symbolising local government of a sort, the bodies continued to comprise nominated members with no elective eleshent whatsoever. It was in 1670 that the viceroy, Lord Mayo, got a reschition passed by his council for decentralisation of power to bring about administrative efficiency in mecling the demands of the people and to add to the finances of the “existing imperial resources which will not suffice for the growing needs of the country."? As Samuel Laing, member (Finance) of the viceroy’s council, had put it, the revolt of 1857 had put imperial finances under considerable strain and it was found necessary to finance local. services out of local taxation. Tt was, therefore, cut of a fiscal compulsion that Lord Mayo’s resolution on local self-government came to be adopted. Stil, it was a landmark in the evolution of the British regime's policy in this sphere. It was in the wake of this resolution that the first significant step to revive the traditional village panchayat system in Bengal was taken in 1870 through the Bengal Chowkidari Aci. This act empowered district magistrates to set up panchayats of nominated members in the villages. These nominated panchayats could levy and collect taxes to pay for the chowkidars or watchmen engaged by them. The Famine Commission of 1680 had pointed to the absence of local bodies as a major impediment in reaching relief supplies to the famine-stricken people and had underlined the need to expand self-government to the villages also. It was in this backdrop that the appearance ‘on the scene of a liberal like Lord Ripon as the viceroy proved to be a watershed in the structural evolution of local government in the country. The government resolution of 18 May 1882 during his viceroyalty. providing for local boards consisting of a large majority of elected non-official members and presided over by a non-official chairperson, is considered to be the Magna Carta of local democracy in India. The role of local a ‘utinistration was elevated by the introduction of this resolution. Designed to make use of that intelligent class of public- spirited men whom it is not only bad policy but sheer waste of power to fail to utilise, the resolution proposed the establishment of local tural boards, two-thirds of whose membership was composed of elected representatives. Although the progress of local self government on the lines of the Ripon resolution of 1882 was tardy with only some half-hearted steps taken in setting up municipal bodies and boards at the district level, the term "self- government" had begun to gain currency. In 1906, the Congress, under the presidentship of Dadabhai Naoroji, accepted "self-government" as the political goal for the country. In 1907, the government constituted a Royal Commission on Decentralisation which, in its report released in 1909, elaborated further the principles enunciated in the Ripon resolution. Although this commission comprised five Englishmen and only one Indian, Ramesh Chandra Dutt, it recognised the importance of panchayats in the Indian context. The commission recommended that “it is most desirable, alike in the interests of decentralisation and in order to associate the people with the local tasks of administration, that an attempt should be made to constitute and develop village Panchayats for the administration of local village _affairs."> Although the commission visualised certaindifficulties in the success of such an effort, like ‘caste and religious disputes” or the influence of the landlord with large estates which "may prevent free action by the tenantry,” it agreed that these difficulties were “far from insurmountable." In the same year (1909) the twenty-fourth session of the Congress at Lahore adopted a resolution urging the government to take carly steps "to make all local bodies from village panchayats upwards elective with elected non-official chairmen" and "to support them with adequate financial aid."* But, like the Ripon resolution, the recommendations made by the Royal ‘Commission on Decentralisation also remained largely on paper, a fact underlined by the Congress in a resolution adopted at its twenty- eighth session in December 1913 in Karachi. Dr. Annie Besant, in her presidential address at the Congress session in Calcutta in 1917, blamed the "inefficient bureaucracy" for not doing even the little that was suggested in the report of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation. Tt was in this background that the ‘Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, under the proposed scheme of dyarchy, made local self-government a “transferred subject." This meant that local self-government was brought under the domain of Indian ministers in the provinces. It was a promising move and an advance in this sphere. To make local self-government both fully representative and responsible, the reforms had suggested that “there should be, as far as possible, complete popular control in local bodies and the largest possible independence for them of outside control’ Notwithstanding this professed objective of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, it did not make the panchayat institutions truly democratic and vibrant instruments of, self-government at the level of the villages, due to various constraints, both organisational and fiscal. Stil, in almost all provinces and a number of native states acts were passed for theestablishment of village panchayats. By 1925, eight provinces in British India had passed such acts. These provinces were: Madras (Panchayat Act of 1920), Bombay (Village Panchayat Act of 1920), Bengal (Self-Government Act of 1919), Bihar (Self-Government Act of 1920), Introduction 3 Central Provinces and Berar (Panchayat Act of 1920), Uttar Pradesh (Village Panchayat Act of 1920), Punjab (Panchayat Act of 1922), Assam (Self-Government Act of 1925). By 1926, six native states had also adopted village panchayat laws. These states were Cochin (Panchayats Regulations Act 1919), Indore (Panchayct Act, 1920), Travancore (Village Panchayat Act, 1925), Baroda (Village Panchayat Act, 1926), Kolhapur (Panchayat Act, 1926), Mysore (Village Panchayat Act, 1926). In subsequent years, similar laws were adopted by some other states. These were: Bikaner (Village Panchayat Act, 1928), Karauli (Village Panchayat Act, 1939), Hyderabad (Village Panchayat Act, 1940), Mewar (Gram Panchayat Act, 1940), Jasdan (Village Panchayat Act, 1942), Bhavnagar (Village Panchayat Act, 1943), Porbandar (Village Panchayat Act, 1943), Bharatpur (Village Panchayat Act, 1944), Mawar (Gram Panchtyat Act, 1945), Wadia (Village Panchayat Act, 1946), Dharangadhra (Village Panchayat Act, 1946), Morvi (Village Panchayat Act, 1946), Sirohi (Village Panchayat Act, 1947) and Jaipur (Village Panchayat Act, 1948). However, these statutory panchayets covered only a limited number of villages and had, generally, a limited number of functions. The 1935 Gevernment of India Act, and the inauguration of provincial autonomy under it marked another important stage in the evolution of panchayats in the country. With popularly elecied governments inthe provinces, almost all provincial administrations felt duty-bound to enact legislations for further democratisation of local _self- government institutions, including the village panchayats. Although the popular governments in the provinces govemed by the Congress vacated office following the declaration of the Second World War in 1939, the position as regards local _ self-government institutions remained unchanged till August 1947 when the country attained independence. National Movement, Indian Constitution As stated earlier, village panchayats were central to the ideological framework of India’s national movement. Gandhiji had categorically defined his vision of village panchayats thus:4 Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 199 My idea of village Swaraj is that it is a complete republic independent of its neighbours for its own vital wants and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity. . . . The Government of the village will be conducted by the Panchayat of five persons annually elected by the adult villagers, males and females, possessing minimum prescribed qualifications. These will have all the authority and jurisdiction required. Since there will be no system of punishment in the accepted sense, the Panchayat will be the legislature, judiciary and executive combined to operate for its year of office. Any village can become such a republic today without much interference even from the present government whose sole effective connection with the villages is the execution of the village revenue... . Here there is perfect democracy based upon individual freedom. The individual is the architect of his own Government It is a sad commentary on India’s national commitment to democratic decentralisation that despite the village having a history a5 the basic unit of administration and despite the nationalist. movement's commitment to panchayats and Gandhijis unequivocal Propagation of the ideal, the first draft of India’s, constitution did not include a provision for panchayats. When Gandhiji leat that the Proposed constitution did not provide for panchayats, he remarked that this was certainly an omission calling for immediate attention, if India’s independence was to reflect the voice of the people. Countering Ambedkar’s arguments against panchayats. in the Constituent Assembly, Madhava Rau of Mysore had said: "It is true, some villages are chronically faction-ridden and indulge in petty tyrannies, or remein the strongholds of untouchability. A considerable number are pathetic or even moribund.’? However, he insisted that even if 30 percent could be classed as good, they could not be ignored. He quoted the example of the efforts being made by the then popular government in Mysore as “encouraging and, in some cases, quite gratifying.”’ The argument of those who pleaded for the inclusion of village panchayats in the constitution finally prevailed, albeit in a modest measure. They managed to get a provision included in Part IV of the Constitution (in the Directive Principles of State Policy), which, however, is not justiciable. Article 40 reads: "The state should take steps to ‘organise village panchayats and endow them with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government." There is another place in the constitution where “local government" is mentioned Schedule Seven, List II (State List) 5 reads: “Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers. of — municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of. local self-government or village administration.” Obviously, this is a curious way of defining local government without giving due place to panchayats. The Gandhians considered panchayats both a means as also an end and sincerely believed in their immense potential for demo- cratic decentralisation and for devolving power to the people. OF course, Ambedkar’s objection had not been to democratic decentralisation or to the concept of giving power to the people, which would have been the outcome of an ideal panchayat system. He was speaking from his experience of what a casteridden village society in India had meant to him and to millions like him. No doubt his perception was as realistic as that of others, The basic conviction that _village panchayats could play an important role in the social transformation and implementation of development programmes could not be ignored so easily. But the pertinent question still remains unanswered. Why did panchayats not come under the legally enforceable part of the constitution? Why was it not given the constitutional status and recognition it, deserved? The answer is that the urban and the rural lites, their representatives in politics (from the time of the national freedom movement onwards), and a bureaucracy conditioned by its class character, had a disdain for panchayat and this has ever since remainedintact. Whatever genuine attempts were made for the devolution of power, these interests saw to it that the attempts did not succeed. The story of panchayat institutions since independence is precisely this. Post-Independence Period: The Rise and Decline till 197 India’s development in the early fifties was planned without taking —_cognisance of Gandhiji’s idea of gram swaraj. It did not take long to realise the folly of this line of approach. The Community Development projects, inaugurated in 1952 and modelled after the experiments at Marthandam, Shantiniketan, Baroda, Btawah and Nilokheri, soon found themselves in a blind alley in the absence of effective instruments for people’s participation. In order to suggest an institutional set up to secure this participation in the Community Development and National Extension Service programmes the committee on plan projects in 1957 constituted a team for the study of the two programmes. The study team was headed by Balwantrai Mehta, a Member of Parliament. The study team’s view was that without an agency at the village level "which could represent the entire community, assume responsibility and provide the necessary leadership for implementing development programmes,"® real progress. in rural development could not come about at all. Its recommendation that "public participation in community works should be organised through statutory representative bodies,” gave a fillip to the prevailing nationwide sentiments. The recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta study team, favouring democratic decentralisation through the setting up of panchayati raj institutions, accelerated the pace of constituting panchayati raj institutions in all the states. It may be recalled here that subsequently the National Development Council also affirmed the basic principles of democratic decentralisation enunciated in the Balwantrai Mehta report and left it to the states to work out the structures suitable to each state. During this stage, the term "panchayati raj" came into vogue. Panchayati raj is a process of Introduction 5 governance; it refers to a system organically linking people from the gram sabha to the Lok Sabha, Etymologically, it is derived from Urdu. In one of his meetings with the author, S. K. Dey had disclosed that the term was coined by Jawaharlal Nehru. It is distinct from the term panchayat, which connotes a local body limited toa geographical area. Rajasthan was the first state to inaugurate panchayati raj after the Balwantrai Mehta study team’s recommendations. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru inaugurated independent India's first panchayati raj on 2 October 1959 at Nagaur, about 260 kms from Jaipur, the capital of Rajasthan. Nehru hailed the system as "the most revolutionary and historical step in the context of new India." Democracy at the top would not be a success unless it was built from below, Nehru had felt. He expressed similar sentiments while inaugurating the new panchayati raj at Shadnagar, about 60 kms from Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) nine days later. 8. K. Dey, Minister for Community Develop- ment in Nehru’s cabinet and the architect of panchayati raj after independence, elevated the whole idea to a philosophical level and viewed it as an instrument which linked the individual with the universe. Within the sphere of national democracy he visualised an organic and intimate relationship between the gram sabha and the Lok Sabha. By 1959, all the states had passed panchayat acts, and by the mid-1960s, panchayats had reached all parts of the country. More than 217,300 village panchayats, covering over 96 percent of the 579,000 inhabited villages and 92 percent of the rural population had been established. On an average, a panchayat covered 2 population of about 2,400, in two to three villages. There was enthusiasm in rural India and the people felt that they had a say in alfaire affecting their daily lives. Those were the promising days of panchayati raj institutions in India. It is worthwhile locking into some of the official reporis to get a picture of the positive aspects of the system. The report of the Ministry of Community Development had stated in 1964-65 that younger and better leadership was emerging through the panchayati raj institutions and there was a fairly highStatus of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 2994 degree of satisfaction among the people with their working. L. P. Shukla, a noted writer on panchayati raj, had underscored the significance of this new leadership. According to him, the establishment of panchayati raj institutions had given a boost fo the emergence of local leadership by creating new seats of power to be filled by the competitive mechanism of democratic elections. This had enabled a large number of people to acquire leadership at the local levels, as in the earlier traditional, socio-political set up they had no access to the political or administrative organs. Another perceptive writer, RV. Jathar, had noted: If the policy of the government in giving impetus to the panchayati raj movement is implemented foithfully and fully, it will surely bring about the political, social and economic revolution which will rot only strengthen the democratic character of our society, but will also prove a perennial source of energetic, honest and competent leaders with potentialities to change the entire face of the country and guide the destinies of the people most efficiently and effectively." Jathar expressed this view in 1964 after looking closely at the working of panchayati raj institutions in India, In yet another comment, & study team, appointed by the Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development (AV.ARD)) in 1962 to evaluate panchayati raj in Rajasthan, had made the following observation: It was reported that the people felt that they had sufficient powers to enable them to mould their future. ‘They are fully ‘conscious of the fact that such privileges and favours which were formerly under the control of the BD.O. are now under their control. In this sense full advantage of democratic decentralisation hasbeen. secured.” The study team then proceeded to say that the conferring of power on people's representatives had improved the attendance of teachers in primary schools, while block administration had become more responsive, people were voicing their grievances before the pradhans and obtaining relief through them, and, above all, petty corruption, both among the subordinate staff as well as among the newly elected leaders, had declined; the former because the block staff had come under the panchayat samiti and the latter because the public reputation of the pradhans was crucial for them to get re-elected. In other words, panchayati raj institutions fulfilled all the functions of a local government and acted as the nurseries or even the primary schools of democracy. Due to the interest generated by the panchayati raj institutions several states set up committees to assess their working and to recommend measures for improvement. The states and committees were-Andhra Pradesh: Purushottam Pai Committee, 1964; Ramachandra Reddy Comumittee, 1965; and Narasimhan Committee, _1972-Kamataka: Basappa Committee, 1963-Maharashtra: Naik Committee, 1961, and Bongiwar Committee, 1963~Rajasthan: Mathur Committee, 1963; Sadiq Ali Committee, 1963; and G.L. Vyas Committee, 1973-Uttar Pradesh: Govind Sahai Committee, 1959; and Murti Committee, 1965. Nevertheless, the panchayati raj system had been moving downhill. In Abhijit Datta's view, panchayati raj institutions had become only a “living caricature of local government." In an editorial comment in Democratic World (22 January 1978), Thomas Mathai had despaired that the village panchayat had been reduced to "a focus of frustration. The gram sabha is something of a joke” Of course, the gram sabha’s resources were meagre. That could have been set right if there had been the political will ‘The critical problem was the domination of panchayati raj institutions by the economically and socially privileged classes. This was essentially a socio-political problem and could have been tackled to a great extent by holding elections at regular intervals. The resulting political education of communities, oppressed for ages, would have certainly changed the scenario. ‘An example comes from the elections to the Tamil Nadu local bodies held in 1986 after alapse of sixteen years. It is interesting to note the social consequences of this democratic exercise. For instance, in Kamudhi Town Panchayat in Ramanathapuram District, the Muslims and the Nadar community had been arch enemies for the previous fifty to sixty years. For more than thirty years they had opposed each other in the elections to the local bodies but in the 1986 elections, they got together and fielded a common cendidate and got him elected. This only shows that if regular elections are held, permutations and combinations change, traditional rivalries disappear and issue-oriented groupings emerge. In this process, simple mechanical solidarity gives way to more organic solidarity where individual freedom of opinion and group decisions emerge. In another case, a Muslim defied the local Muslim Jamaath (organisation), contested the poll and secured 276 out of the four hundred votes in the three Muslim wards, ‘Multiple examples of this nature can be found all over the country. It is precisely this process that had been arrested for years by the state governments, by either postponing elections frequently or not holding them at all, The committee set up by the national Planning Commission, with G.VK. Rao as chairperson, had stated in its report: Apart from inadequate resources, elections to these bodies have not been held regularly. In fact, elections have become overdue for fone or more tiers of the panchayati raj institutions in eleven States, and in eight States even elections to Gram Panchayats are overdue. Elections have been put off on one Pretext or another. . . and the term of the existing bodies have been extended or the bodies have been superseded. Evidence suggests that- there was a deliberate plan by the bureaucracy, local vested interests and their elected representatives in the state legislatures and in the Parliament to cripple and eventually discard panchayati rai, because its ascendancy was feared. The roots of this hidden agenda could be traced to 1960 when the govemment launched an intensive agricultural district programme Introduction 7 (ADP), by-passing the Community Development programmes. The Jayaprakash Narayan committee of 1961 had detected double-thinking and contradictory positions developing within the government in the creation “of an independent intensive programme. The committee noted that after having accepted panchayati raj as the agency responsible for planning and execution of plans, “there is no longer any valid reason for the continuing individual allocations subject-wise even to serve as a guide". Evidently, the Community Development Ministry was uneasy with the launching of the intensive agricultural district programme. But soon schemes like the ‘Small Farmers Development Agency (S.ED.A.), the Drought Prone Areas Programme (DP.AP.) or the Intensive Tribal Development Programme (LT.D.P) were also introduced outside the purview of the elected zilla parishads. Plan allocations for schemes under the latter's jurisdiction were tapered off. In 1966-67, the Ministry of Community Development was reduced to the status of a department and brought under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Coupled with this the government launched a few schemes of integrated district plans in twenty-eight districts of twelve states and abandoned two instruments for appraisal, that is, the annual development conference and the annual evaluation by the programme evaluation organisation. "This lent support to the view that not only the C.D. ministry but the CD. project itself had been downgraded.”” In 1971, the very ttle, "Community Development," was dropped and replaced by "Rural Development.” "This was not just a cosmetic change. It marked the end of both the ‘community’ and ‘panchayats’ as agents of change and agencies of development,” observes LC. Jain.¥* In the words of the Asoka Mehta committee: "The essential idea that all developmental. activities should flow only through the block-level organisation lost ground, though the panchayat samiti as a key unit of decentralisation was, in ‘most cases, coterminous with the block". It may be emphasized here ‘that all the development programmes became bureaucracy centred with hardly any participation of the people. Eventually, panchayati raj became part& Status of Panchayati Rsj in the States of India 1994 of the Ministry of Rural Development at the centre and with a joint secretary appointed for looking after it. This situation continues even today. Thus, the bureaucracy gained the upper hand in a grand alliance with the state and central level political elite. The role of the bureaucracy in bringing down panchayati raj to its present plight is brought out sharply by the Asoka Mehta committee: [The] bureaucracy had probably its own role in dissociating the P.RIs from the development process. Several factors seem to have conditioned their perception. The system of line hierarchy would find favour with them as an orgenisetional principle. The officers would feel that they are primarily accountable for results and financial proprieties to the state government. ‘The officials knew no better than to trust their own fraternity. They would, on the one hand, therefore be averse to the PRs being entrusted with additional functions and, on the other, would not easily get adjusted to working under the supervision of elected representatives.” This was not just a phenomenon typical of independent India. Even in the British period, whatever semblance of local self-government existed in India was destroyed by officialdom. For example, the report of the Village Panchayat Committee of the All-India Congress Committee (ALC.C), in analysing the main reasons for the disintegration of village panchayats in the British period, had stated that, "the inordinate greed of the Fast India Company caused slow but steady disintegration of these Village Panchayats. . . . The excessive centralisation of the executive and judicial powers in the hands of the Government officials deprived the village functionaries of their age long powers and influence." We have noted that Lord Ripon made an eamest effort to introduce local self-government, but it failed. Why? The Indian Statutory Commission of 1929 had stated that whatever might have been the intentions of Lord Ripon, his reforms in the sphere of local » self-government were not free from official control and “no real attempt was made to inaugurate a system amenabie to the will of the local inhabitants." Why did the political elite play to the tune of the bureaucracy? The reason is not far to seek. After all, politicians would not like to see the erosion of their power by a breed of new, local leadership. Thus it is legitimate to conclude that a combination of the bureaucracy, commercial interests, the professional middle class, the police and the political elite "ganged up" against democratic decentralisation. A thesis was developed and popularised that a centralised bureaucracy can benefit the rural poor better than local elected "vested interests." The result? "We have ended up creating an impregnable alliance of urban officialdom and the rural rich, and have excluded the rural poor from it" says Rajni Kothari. ® ‘The bureaucracy, in alliance with local powers, state and’ central-level politicians, bogan to discredit the new system by highlighting its shortcomings. It saw in these local bodies the domination of the upper or dominant castes, corruption and total ineptitude. Had Nehru been around, he would have made his characteristic response: "Let village authorities function and let them make a million mistakes” The village panchayats became an epitome of frustration. We can consider panchayati raj of the Nehruvian era as of the first generation because in this period the panchayati raj institutions were conceived as local bodies meant to ensure people's participation in development. Asoka Mehta Committee ‘The appointment of the Asoka Mehta committee in 1977 marked a turning point in the concepts and practice of panchayati raj. The ‘Asoka Mehta committee was set up to enquire into the working of the panchayati raj institutions, and to suggest measures to strengthen them so as to enable a decentralised system of planning and development to be effective. The comumittee’s report (1978) is a seminal document which seeks to make panchayats an organic, integral part of our democratic process. The panchayati raj institutions which came into being in certainstates after the Asoka Mehta committee's recommendations could be considered the second generation panchayats. ‘The second generation of panchayati raj institutions can be said to have started when the West Bengal government took the initiative in 1978 to give a new life to its panchayats on the lines of the Asoka Mehta committee's recommendations. West Bengal, Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir either revised their existing panchayat acts or passed new acts, in theory accepting the Asoka Mehta commitize report. These states adepted the recommendations to suit their conditions and learnt from each other's experience in bringing forth new legislations or amendments to the prevailing acts. ‘The most important thrust of the second phase was that the panchayats emerged from a development organisation at the local level into a political institution. The emphasis. shifted from the bureaucracy to the political elements. This was a welcome trend. The Balwantrai Mehta study team had made development central to the panchayat system, while in West Bengal, Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh, and later in Jammu and Kashmir following the Asoka Mehta committee report, the attempt had been to make panchayats into genuine political institutions. Thus they were a microcosm of the state itself with all its ravaifications. ‘Need for Constitutional Support It is well established that constitutional support and legislative measures are necessary for bringing about social change, but they are not a sufficient condition to achieve the goal. Our experience in the more than forty-seven years since independence bears witness to this fact. This is true of democratic decentralisation also. OF course, one can argue that there was no constitutional support for self-government below the state level till April 1993, and therefore, we were in the state of affairs in which we find ourselves now. The other side of the same coin would be: we have constitutional guarantees and laws for many vexed problems we face in the society but are not in a position to say that we are better off because of these safeguards. Political will and people's political Introduction 9 awareness are crucial for bringing about democratic decentralisation—local__self- governments-below the state level, and constitutional support or legislative measures can create only the necessary conditions. A three-dimensional approach—political will, people's awareness, and building healthy conventions and traditions undergirded by constitutional and legislative measures-is a must for any far-reaching changes to be brought about in our society, and when one of these is weak the entire measure may remain in form without content. It was evident that the non-functioning panchayati raj institutions brought disrepute to the entire concept and its practice. There was a growing realisation that it was lack of constitutional support that had led to the sad state of affairs. For instance, Malcolm Adiseshiah, while commenting on Tamil Nadu not holding panchayat elections for fifteen years, raised a pertinent question (Tamil Nadu had announced elections twenty times and postponed them as many times, giving as many easons.) I must say that this is a situation not peculiar to Tamil Nadu. It exists in most states. There are no elections to local bodies. As a result of this, corruption becomes rampant in all programmes affecting the people. I would like to ask the question: Why is it that we cannot have a constitutional amendment which will make it obligatory for local elections to be held on time? He felt that all the twenty reasons given to postpone the Tamil Nadu local elections could also be given for withholding elections to the Lok Sabha and the state assemblies. He continued, "Here I add my plea that we should eamestly work for a constitutional amendment to put the panchayati raj elections on the same footing as the Lok Sabha and state Assembly celections."> State_governments, though, could not establish fullfledged panchayati raj without adequate constitutional safeguards. In all the states where devolution of power to the villages was attempted, the concentration of power at10 _ Status of Panchayati in the States of India 1994 the centre worked as an impediment. For instance, in 1985 Abdul Nazir Sab, the minister for panchayati raj in Karnataka under the Janata government, had stated: ‘Soon we realised that within the limitations imposed by the constitution, the ideology of a "Four Pillar State'-village, district, state and centre-could not be implemented in toto by the state government... . Without a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the “Four Pillar State,’ our efforts may not be as fruitful as we desire. ‘At a seminar organised by the Institute of Social Sciences in Delhi in 1985, Nazir Sab had pleaded with intellectuals to ponder over this question and to initiate a public debate on the necessity of aconstitutional amendment. It may be recalled here that the Asoka Mehta committee made the first official recommendation for including panchayati raj in the constitution in keeping with its approach that panchayats should be regarded as political rather than mere developmental institutions. This committee also favoured participation of political parties in panchayat elections with their symbols. Since the second generation panchayats ‘gave more powers to the local bodies and as their orientation was more political than developmental, they evoked widespread enthusiasm both in their implementation as well as their working. The West Bengal pattem was considered a success story. The single major reason for the 1985 victory of the Janata party in Karnataka was attributed to the party's conunitment to implement the “power to the people” promise. Abdul Nazir Sab, the minister for panchayati raj and rural development had said that he had witnessed a real awakening in the people when they realised that they could share power at the lower level. The remarkable enthusiasm among the ordinary people in West Bengal and Karnataka on the implementation of panchayati raj strengthened the moves to incorporate constitutional provisions for it. Four dominant views on this issue could be identified during the mid eighties: 1. The constitutional amendment to guarantee elections to local bodies at the expiry of their term is a sufficient condition for bringing life into the local bodies. 2. The constitutional guarantee of elections is not a sufficient condition but only a necessary condition. What is really needed is a “quantum jump" in political democracy providing for a three or four-tier government, that is, the centre, state, district and village governments. 3. Local self-governments must be strengthened, but not through rigid and uniform constitutional provisions. Freedom at the state and regional levels for experimenting and evolving suitable systems is a must. 4. A “marriage” of district governments and parchayati raj is possible. The concept of people’s participation must be considered an ideological commitment and, therefore, the need is to take up legislative and structural measures to give legitimacy to people's participation, It may be mentioned here that in the mid-1980s the idea of district government came into vogue. This was mainly because of the writings of Nirmal Mukagji on the subject during this period.” In fact, it was Nirmal Mukas}i who introduced for the first time the concept of "district government.” The relative success of zilla parishads in West Bengal and Kamataka also gave the much needed boost to the district government approach Constitutional Amendment By the end of 1988, a sub-committee of the consultative committee of parliament under the chairmanship of P. K. Thungon made recommendations for _ strengthening the panchayati raj system. One of its important recommendations was -that panchayati aj bodies should be constitutionally recognised. It was against this backdrop that on 15 May 1989 the Constitution (64th Amendment) Bill ‘was drafted and introduced in Parliament. By and large, it was modelled on the bill (drafted by L. M. Singhvi) appended to the Asoka Mehta committee report. Although the 1989 bill in itself was a welcome step, there was serious opposition to it on two basic grounds and dueto its political overtones. These were: a) the bill overlooked the states and was seen as an instrument of the centre to deal directly with the panchayati raj institutions; and, b) that it was imposing a uniform pattern throughout the country instead of permitting individual states to legislate the details, keeping in mind the local circumstances. There was an outcry against this bill not only from the political parties but also from the intellectuals and concemed citizens. In response to this widespread criticism of the measure, the combined opposition under the National Front appointed a committee headed by S. R. Bommai to prepare an alternative legislation. The report of this committee, which was released on 10 July 1989, gave the much needed focus to the issues and generated an intense debate. Its findings were reflected in the subsequent bills on panchayats introduced in Parliament.2* Although the Constitution (Sixty-fourth Amendment) Bill got a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha, in the Rajya Sabha on 15 October 1989 it failed to meet the mandatory requirement by two votes. The National Front govemment introduced the 74th Amendment BI (a combined bill on panchayats and municipalities) on 7 September 1990 during its short tenure in office but it was never taken up for discussion. In September 1991, the Congress govemment under Narasimha Rao introduced the 72nd (Panchayats) and 73rd (Nagarpalikas) constitutional amendment bills. They were referred to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament. The Lok Sabha passed the bill on 22 December 1992 while the Rajya Sabha passed it the following day. Following its ratification by more than half the state assemblies, the president gave his assent on 20 April 1993, and the act was brought into force by a government notification on’ 24 April 1993 as the 1992 Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act. The main features of the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act are: 1. Panchayats will be institutions of self-government. 2. There will be a gram sabha for each village or group of villages comprising all the adult members registered as voters in the panchayat area. 10. un. Introduction 11 ‘There shall be a three-tier system of panchayats at village, intermediate block/ taluk and district levels. Smaller states with population below 20 lakhs will have the option not to have an intermediate level panchayat. Seats in panchayats at all the three levels shall be filled by direct election. In addition, chairpersons of village panchayats can be made members of the panchayats at intermediate level and chairpersons of panchayats at intermediate level can be members of panchayats at the district level. Members of Parliament, M.LAs and MLCs could also be members of panchayats at the intermediate or the district level. In all the panchayats, seats would be reserved for $.Cs and S.Ts in proportion to their population. Offices of the chairpersons of the panchayats at all levels. shall be reserved in favour of $.Cs and S.Ts in proportion to their population in the state. One-third of the total number of seats will be reserved for women. One third of the seats reserved for S.Cs and S.Ts. will also be reserved fer women. One-third offices of chairpersons of panchayats at all levels shall also be reserved for women. State legislatures have the liberty to provide reservation of seats and offices of chairpersons in panchayats in favour of backward classes. Every panchayat shall have a uniform five year term and elections to constitute new bodies shall be completed before the expiry of the term. In the event of dissolution, elections will be compulsorily held within six months. The reconstituted panchayat will serve for the remaining period of the five-year term. Tt will not be possible to dissolve the existing panchayats by amending any act before the expiry of its duration. A person who is disqualified under any law for election to the legislature of the state or under any law of the state will not be entitled to become a member of panchayat.12 __Statusof Panchayat Raj in the States of India 1994 12. An independent Election Commission will be established in the state for superintendence, direction and control of the electoral process and preparation of electoral rolls. 13. Specific responsibilities will be entrusted to the panchayats to prepare plans for economic development and social justice in respect of 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh, Schedule. The 74th Amendment provides for a District Planning Committee to consolidate’ the plans prepared by the panchayats and municipalities. 14. The panchayats, will receive adequate funds for carrying’ out their functions. Grants from state governments will constitute an important source of funding but state governments are also expected to assign the revenue of certain taxes to the panchayat. In some cases, the panchayat will also be permitted to collect and retain the revenue it raises. 15. In each state a Finance Commission will be established to determine the principles on the basis of which adequate financial resources would be ensured for panchayats. Thus the joumey from the “local self-government’ idea of Lord Ripon to the “institutions of self-government" concept in the 73rd constitutional amendment took more than a century. This evolution in the federal polity of the country must be specially underlined. For the panchayati raj institutions to function as institutions of self-government, the essential prerequisites are: (a) clearly demarcated areas of jurisdiction; (b) adequate power and authority commensurate with responsibilities; (¢) necessary human and financial resources. to manage their affairs; and (d) functional autonomy within the federal structure. Since the constitutional amendment ‘opens possibilities for fulfilling these conditions the new panchayati raj must be seen as "third tier of governance." Critical Issues Ahead There are some who express serious doubts about the wisdom of a constitutional amendment for making panchayati raj insti tutions functional and effective. For instance, Nirmal Mutkarji had asked: (1) Can a consti- tutional provision by itself be an adequate substitute for political will? (2) Given the harsh realities of the states, would these statutes be implemented in letter and spirit or would they remain laws on paper only? (3) Is implementing decentralisation below the state level through the most centralising of all conceivable instruments-a' constitutional amendment- desirable? Moreover, Mukarji was of the view that a constitutional amendment could well mean thrusting a uniform prescription on states which are widely disparate in administrative culture, in historical background and in demogrephic size. Although the arguments are valid, there is no doubt that the constitutional amendment was a must for creating vibrant panchayati raj institutions in the country. But some issues raised by the amendment need to be highlighted here The major flaw of the new act of December 1992, as suggested by Nirmal Mukarji, is that it has adopted a uniform three-tier system below the state level. Even in bigger states like Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Assam, which had three tiers, there were structural differences in the system of panchayats. Haryana, Manipur, Kerala, Sikkim and the Union Territory of Lakshadweep had only two tiers. Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura and several other union territories had only one tier. It would have been better to leave the states to decide the number of tiers they required in line with their specific socie-historical milieu. It appears artificial to create a fixed number of tiers irrespective of a state's history and tradition. The only concession given was that at the intermediate level, panchayats need not be constituted in states with a population of less than twenty lakhs (2,000,000). The, constitution amendment bill, when introduced, had provided for direct elections to the post of chairperson at the village and intermediary levels. At the district level, it was left to the legislatures to decide. The Joint Commitee of Parliament went into this question, but advocated direct elections only at the village level. The Marxist members of thejoint committee had objected to direct elections at any level. But in order to achieve a consensus the Marxists had suggested that the issue of the election of the chairperson at the village level may be left to the state legislatures, In the end, the stand of the Left prevailed. Without arguing about the plus and minus of indirect or direct elections, it may be said that direct elections to the post of chairpersons are more in consonance with the presidential form of government and indirect elections in conformity with the cabinet system of government, the latter being the one adopted in India. A major lacuna in the act is the contradictory and inconsistent approach to the idea that panchayats are institutions of self-governinent. The bill had rightly defined the panchayat as an institution of self-government but later, in defining the functions of this institution, had narrowed them down to developmental functions, as in article 243 G (a) and (b). Without policing (law and order) és a function at each level, no institution of self-government is worth the name. When the 1983 act of Kamataka was discussed at a meeting of the Institute of Social Sciences, Swami Agnivesh (the noted social activist) had asked Nazir Sab, the prime mover of that historic bill, "Who will wield the lathi in villages? Whose orders will the police take to use force?” Nazir Sab’s answer was, "It is our intention that the police should come under the control of the zilla parishads. But we cannot do all these things simultaneously. We will do it step-by-step ‘when the district government is constituted Now that the "district government” or the “third tier of governance” idea has come into vogue, this crucial point is sadly missing. In the words of Nirmal Mukarji, this dilution of the concept of institutions of self-government is ‘flawed thinking and drafting.’ Wherever panchayats have not taken root or wherever they have been uprooted after brief spells of success, it has been observed that thé MPs and M.L.As have been not too friendly to these institutions. Not only have these persons been indifferent to local governments, but at times they have also been hostile to these bodies. No one likes to see another centre of power emerging as a challenge, nor does one like to see one’s existing powers being diluted. Introduction 13 In an attempt to assuage their feelings and to pre-empt any mischief from them, the MPs and MLAs have been given membership and voting rights in the panchayats in the statutes now passed. This will undermine the panchayats which we are now aiming to strengthen. E. M. S. Namboodiripad’s observations, incorporated in the Asoka Mehta committee report, are worth recalling here. ‘Namboodiripad was in favour of purely elected bodies at all levels of panchayati raj. Having co-opted members, he believed, was a hangover of the idea that panchayati raj institutions are ‘concemed with development alone and are not the elected organs of administration at the appropriate level. A crucial question not yet confronted realistically is: with the states being asked to give more powers and departments to panchayats, when will the centre devolve more powers to the states? This question will have to be confronted and answered, if not today, then in the near future. Reservation of one-third seats and offices for women will lead to a silent revolution. It is this author's firm belief that a social transformation aimed at women could be achieved by panchayati_raj Institutions. But the initial task is beset with enormous difficulties for women, : There is no substitute for healthy conventions and traditions in democratic politics and we must recognise them as the backbone of our society and polity. We have to build healthy, desirable conventions and if that happens it will be extremely difficult for any one, singly or collectively, to subvert them. The county and city local government institutions below the state level in the U.S.A. have had a satisfactory existence for so many decades and one of the reasons. cited for their success is the tradition of democracy that they have preserved with extreme care. In India, however, from independence onwards, violations of conventions have been of a very high magnitude. In such a context, what is the sanctity of constitutional amendments or legislations alone? All the states passed their acts before 24 April 1994, in conformity with the 73rd Amendment. They have also appointed state14 _Statusof Panchayati Raj inthe Statee of Indis 1994 election commissions and finance commissions. However, experts feel that in many cases the states have not lived up to the expectations of the people in giving powers to the three tiers of panchayats. In other words, they have tried to follow the letter of the amendment and not its spirit. Maybe, as years go by, when regular elections take place and about 30 lakh elected members all over the country, both in panchayats and municipalities, attend to their work as expected, the state laws will also be amended. The country will then witness a full-fledged grassroots level democracy and a genuine federal structure, NOTES 1. HD. Malaviya, Village Panchayats in India, Economic and Political Research Department, All India Congress Committee (New Delhi, 1956), p. 258. 2. -M, Venkatarangaiya, and M. Pattabhiram (ede). 1969, Local Government in India: Select Rendings, Allied Publishers (Bombay, 1969). 3, HD. Malaviya, opsit, p. 221 4. Ibid, pp. 215-16 5. R. L. Khanna, Panchayati Raj in India, The English Book Depot (Ambala Cantt, 1972) 6. M.K. Gandhi, "My Idea of Village Swarg Harjan, 26 july 1942 7. M. Venkatarangaiya, and M, Pattabhiram, ‘opcit,, pp. 97-103 Ibid. 9. Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service (Balwantrai Mehta Committee) 1959. 10, Ibid. 11. The Hindustan Times (Delhi), 3 October 1959, 12. R.V. Jathar, Evolution of Panchayati Raj in India. Institute of Economic Research, (Dharwar, 1964), p. 10,12. 13, Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development (A.V.A.RD.), Report of a Stuly Team on Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan (New Delhi, 1962). u. 7, 18, vp. 24. RB 2. Abhijit Datia, “Decentralisation and Local Government Reform in India," Indian fournat of Public Administration. p 562. Commitee to Review the Existing ‘Administration Arrangements for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation Programmes (CAARD), Report, Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture (New Delhi, 2985), p. 41. L. C. Jain, et al. Grass without roots, Sage Publications (New Delhi, 1985), p. 39. id, p44. ‘Asoka Mehta Committee. Report of the Committee on Parchayati Raj Institutions, (New Delhi, 1977), p. 4 Ibid, pp.5-6. All India Congress Committee (A.LC.C), Report af the Congress Village Panchayat Committee (New Delhi, 1954), p. 10-11. L. P. Shukla, A History of Village Panchayats in India, Insitute of Economie Research (Dharwat, 1964). L.C Jain, et al, opcit. For the role political expediency has played in stifling the growth of anchayati rj institutions, see George Mathew, Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement, Concept Publishing Company (New Delhi, 1994) Malcolm $. Adiseshiah, "The need for constitutional safeguards” in George Mathew (ed). Panchayati Raj in Karnataka ‘Today. Its National Dimensions, Concept Publishing ‘Company (New Delhi, 1985) p.25. Ibid, p. 2. Abdul Nazir Sab, "Towards a fourrpillar state,” in George Mathew opcit, p. 50. Nirmal Mukayj, "The Alternative District Government,” in M. L. Dantwala et al. (eds), Rural Development. The Indian Experience, Oxford, IBH, (New Delhi, 1986). The Basics of Democratic Decentralisation. Report on Panchayats and SelfGevernmeni, Janata Dal Publication (New Delhi, 1989). Abdul Nazir Sab, opt, p. 58. GEORGE MATHEWaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.24 Status Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 old zilla parishads and establish mandel panchayats by abolishing the panchayat samitis and gram panchayats. As this proposal did not find "favour, it was decided to introduce a fourier system, that is, the gram panchayat, the mandal praja parishad, the villa parishad and the Zilla Pranalika Abhivrudai Sameeksha Mardal (District Planning and Development Council). The Andhra Predesk Mandala Praja Parishads, Zilla Praja Parishads and Zilla Pranalika Abhiorudhi Sameeksha Mandals Act, 1986, came into effect from January of the following year. Efforts were also made to bring about changes in the organisation of the gram panchayats. As already stated, the initial thinking was to do away with the gram panchayats altogether and —_establish upa-mandals as adjuncts to the mandal parishad. However, due to criticism from within and outside the ruling party, the gram panchayats were left intact. They continued to be governed by the 1964 act. The act of 1986. The 1986 act made significant changes in the panchayati raj setup. It abolished 330 panchayat samitis and created 1,104 mandala praja parishads (M.P-Ps) in their place. While a gram panchayat had been constituted for a village. the mandala praja parishad was created for a group of villages with a population of thirty-five to fifty thousand, and the zilla parishad, which was renamed as zilla praja parishad, was made coterminous with the district. The size of the middle unit was reduced by one-third, and more units-roughly three to four mandala praja parishads for each panchayat samiti-were created, with the proclaimed aim of teking administration “nearer the people. It was intended to develop these as units of a decentralised administrative system where all important departments, like revenue, police, cooperation, education, health and agriculture were to operate. They were given the powers and functions of the erstwhile panchayat samitis. ‘The sarpanches, M.L.As and MPs were made ex-officio members of the mandala praja parishads. A new provision for co-option of a member from the linguistic or religious minorities to the MP-P. was also made in the 1986 act. The president was to be directly elected by the registered voters in the mandal. In addition to the earlier reservation of 15 percent and 6 percent respectively for the SCs and S.Ts, a further quota of 20 percent and 9 percent was reserved for the backward classes and women respectively. ‘Thus, the total reservation quota was raised from 21 percent to 50 percent. ‘The mandal president convened, presided over and conducted the meetings and exercised administrative control over the mandal development officer. The major sources of income for the mandal were government grants and funds relating to various schemes. It also got a share of the land revenue and other state taxes. The government could remove the president or the vice-president of a mandal if he misused his powers or refused to carry out its orders. The zilla praja parishad (Z.P.P.). The chairperson of the Z.P.P. was to be directly elected by the voters of the district and had the status of a minister of state. Of the twenty-two posts of ZP.P. chairpersons in the state, ten were reserved for the weaker sections as follows: Scheduled Tribes, 1; Scheduled Castes, 3; Backward Classes. 4° women, two. All the presidents of the M.P-Ps in the district, as well as the ML.As and M.Ps of the district were members of the zilla praja parishad. One member belonging to either a linguistic or a religious minority could be co-opted, while the district “collector was also retained as a member. Six standing committees carried cut the work of this body. The chairperson presided over the committees and the district collector was an exofficio member. The members of the parishad were divided equally among the standing committees. The new act had diluted the powers of the district collector by divesting him of the position of ex-officio chairperson of all the standing committees, unlike in the old act. ‘The ZPPs five year term could be extended by one year by the government. The district development officer was its chief executive officer, and was responsible for implementing its resolutions, as well as thoseof the standing committees. He attended its meetings but was not entitled to vote or move any resolution, The ZP.P. examined and approved the budget of the mandala praja parishads in the district and supervised their activities. It also distributed the funds, and coordinated the plans of the mandals. It was also responsible for establishing, maintaining or expanding secondary, vocational and industrial schools. Its chairperson convened and presided over the meetings. He exercised administrative control over the district. development officer. The important sources of income of the ZPP. were central and state government funds, share of the land cess and other taxes and donations and income from endowments. ‘As in the case of the mandala praja parishad, the government had the power to remove or to suspend the chairperson, vice-chairperson or members of a zilla praja parishad, in case of misuse of power by them or their inability to comply with its orders. Zilla pranalika abhivrudhi samecksha mandal. Each district, excluding Hyderabad, had a statutory Zilla Pranalika Abhivrudhi Samecksha Mandal (ZP.ASM) charged with the function of advising and reviewing the developmental activities undertaken by the Z.P.P. from time to time. This body was headed by a minister nominated by the chief minister. The ZP.?. chairperson, the district collector, all the legislators from the district and some expert members nominated by the government were the members of this body. The district collector was its member secretary. Due to criticism from the general public about the creation of such a nominated body over and above the ZP.P, the government had initially thought of lowering the position of the ZP.ASM,, but it could not do so because of considerable pressure from the ministers and legislators of the state. Bureaucratic Domination Even after these reforms, bureaucratic domination prevailed over panchayati aj bodies in the state. The district collector was AndhraPradesh 25 still accorded a prominent position in the system. He was not only a member of all the standing committees of the ZP.P, but he substituted the ZP.P. chairperson in his absence. He was empowered to write to the government to suspend the resolutions of the zilla praja parishad. These powers given to the district collector tended to weaken the democratic process. ‘The government also retained the power to suspend or remove any member of the panchayeti raj bodies including the chairperson of the Z.P.P. and the president of the mandala prajaparishad. Further, certain provisions like party-based elections and reservations for the weaker sections (that is, for the backward classes and women) were not extended to the post of sarpanch of the gram panchayats. Though the government made some reforms at the mandal and ZP-P. levels, the gram panchayat system remained intact. Though a large number of mandals were created, they lacked accommodation, infrastructure and sufficient staff. Majority of the mandals did not even have a full-fledged development officer. ‘The objective behind the creation of the ‘mandals had been to take administration to the doorstep of the common man. However, doubts were expressed, especially after the defeat of the Telugu Desam party and the return of the Congress(l) to power int 1989, whether this objective was being realised. Scarce resources and inadequate staff at the disposal of the mandals had certainly been impediments to the realisation of this objective, but the mandals undoubtedly proved more accessible to the people than the earlier panchayat samitis. Elections From the inception of panchayati rej bodies in 14959 till 1970, that is, over a period of eleven years, elections had been conducted only thrice (1959, 1964 and 1970) in the state. In 1959, elections had been held to all the panchayat samitis and zilla parishads. Several members of the state legislature had been elected as chairpersons of the zilla parishads and26 _ Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 panchayat samitis, in many cases unanimously. In the elections of 1964, all the rural voters had participated, as the entire state by then was covered by the panchayat samitis Unanimous elections had been encouraged for the sake of maintaining a harmonious atmosphere in the villages. In 7,177 gram panchayats, members had been elected unanimously and in 13,287 gram panchayats the sarpanches had been elected unanimously. ‘The elections had been peaceful in all but twenty-two gram panchayats. However, the elections conducted in 1970 had not been so peaceful. There had been instances of violence ina few places. ‘The next elections to panchayati raj bodies in the state had been scheduled for 1979, but were deferred owing to a writ petition filed in the High Court challenging certain statutory provisions pertaining to the reservation of elective office for the Scheduled Castes. After the disposal of the writ petition, the elections had been slated for 1980, but were again postponed in view of the impending reorganisation of taluks to make them coterminous with blocks. This apart, the approaching decennial census (1981) and a writ filed in the High Court had also necessitated postponement of elections to panchayatl raj bodies to a later date. In 1981, after a long wait of more than a decade, elections were finally held. The next elections were held after the coming into effect in January 1987 of the 1986 act. Elections were held in March 1987 to panchayati raj bodies at all levels except the gram panchayat, since these had already been held in March 1986, and as stipulated, had not boen on party lines. At the mandal and zilla praja parishad levels, instead, elections had been party-based with a ban imposed on defections. This ban was not applicable in the case of a split in the party. The vice-president of the mandal had tobe elected by members of the mandala prajaparishad from among, themselves. With the introduction of direct elections for the post of chairperson (Z.P.P.) and president (M.P.P.) and with the provision of ex-officio membership to these bodies, an intemal conflict had been built into the organisation. There were cases where a majority of the members of the Z.P.P. belonged to one party, for example, the Telugu Desam party, while the chairperson belonged to the other party (in this instance the Congress party). ‘There were also instances where a majority of the members of the M.P.P. belonged to the Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJ.P.) but the president belonged to the Telugu Desam part In view of this in-built conflictual mechanism, the govemment constituted an expert committee headed by B.P.R. Vithal, deputy chairperson of the State Planning Board, to study and make recommendations on the structute, ‘content and mode of elections to panchayati raj bodies in the state. The committee, which submitted its report in 1992, had recommended: (a) the creation of five hundred to 550 taluks in place of the present 1,101 mandals; (b) the creation of taluk panchayat samitis for every eighty thousand to one lakh (100,000) population; (c) the merging of two to three mandals into one taluk panchayat samiti; (d) the handing over of all the development programmes implemented by various agencies to the taluk panchayat samitis; (e) the need for a system of negative voting, with members who polled more than 50 percent of votes being declared elected: (f) elections to. panchayati raj bodies to be fought on a non-partisan basis; (g) prohibition on political use of party symbols in elections: (t) six standing committees to be constituted at the samiti level, one each for planning, economy, agriculture and rural development education, social welfare, womens welfare, and works; (i) the appointment of a taluk development officer in the taluk panchayat samiti who would be assisted by extension officers; (j) in the title “zilla praja parishad,” the word praja (populace), which had been introduced by the Telugu Desam government, be removed; and finally, (k) indirect elections for the post of chairperson of the zilla parishad. The Vithal committee's recommendations were referred to a cabinet sub-committee which accepted the recommendations for the abolition of the mandals and creation of the taluk panchayat samitis instead.‘These changes resulted in the postpanement of elections fo panchayati raj bodies. The govemment, which had promised to conduct elections to these bodies in 1992, kept postponing them on one pretext or the other. Conclusion Although there had been several attempts to improve the functioning of panchayati raj in the state, they had failed because of their half- hearted nature. In spite of the recommendations of several committees there was no improve- ment in the financial conditions of panchayati raj bodies. Development programmes relating to the economy, the tribal people, the SCs and women had continued to be implemented by special agencies. This had undermined the importance of panchayati institutions. The bureaucracy on the one hand and the state level politicians on the other also shared a common fear of losing power if panchayati raj was to become astrong, vibrant institution. To conform with the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, Andhra ‘Andhea Prades 27 Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, on 21 April of the same year. SUGGESTED READINGS DIALE RAO,C. 1965, Panchayati Raj in Andhra Prades Report of the Rajan Sastry Study Team. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, 1960. Government By the People: An Assessment of Panchayati Raj on the Eve ofthe Fist Anniversary of Its Introduction in Andira Pradesh, Hyderabad. Department of Information and Public Relations. ANDHRA PRADESH CONGRESS LEGISLATURE PARTY (APC. LD). 1968. Report of the Committee on Panchayéti Re}. (Chairmen: |. Vengala Rao). Hyderabad: A.PC.LP. REDDY, C. RAM 1982, "Panchayat Raj and Rural Development in Andhra Pradesh’ in J. Milfon and Noman T. Uphofi (ed). Rural Development and Local Organisation in Asia. New Delbi: Macmillan and Compary. _VENKATARANGAIAH, M. and M. PATTABHIRAM (eds). 1969. Local Government in India: Select Readings. Delhi: Allied Publishers. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH. 1972. Report of the High Power Committee on Panchayati Raj. Hyderabad: Department of Panchayat! Raj- G. HARAGOPAL G. SUDARSHANAMaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.30 _Statusof Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 and also the power to impose a fine up to a maximum of fifty rupees on persons ‘committing petty crimes, It was thus a variegated pattern of tribal management that the territories comprising the present Arunachal Pradesh had at the time of independence. The first attempt to change this pattem was made in 1967 through the Panchayat Raj Regulation. Under this regulation, on 2 October 1968 a three-tier structure was constituted. It comprised gram panchayats at the village level, anckal samitis at the anchal level and zilla parishads at the district level. Gram Panchayat According to the Panchayati Raj Regulation, 1967, there was to be a gram panchayat member for every hundred persons and each gram panchayat was to have a minimum of three hundred electors, whose lists were to be prepared and notified by the deputy commissioners of the districts. The members were to be elected through a secret ballot. Besides the elected members, some village level government functionaries were also made ex-officio members. Although these official ex-officio members had no voting rights, their ' Map Showing District Boundaries (Numbers Indicate Districts a per Serial Namber in the Table on the Opposile Page)aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.‘32_ Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 capacity with the sponsorship of schemes pertaining to their respective areas. The deputy commissioner was the president of the zilla parishad while its vice-president was elected by its members in their first meeting. Six members from tribes unrepresented in the parishad could also be nominated to it by the deputy commissioner. ARUNACHAL PRADESH Panchayati Raj Institutions ata Glance Tiers, Members Total and Electorate Gram Panchayats L158 Anchal Samitis 79 Zilla Perishads 2 Members of Gram Panchayats NA ‘Members of Zilla Parishads Nu Electorate NA The zilla parishad was mainly an advisory body and had no executive function. There were 12 zilla parishads, 79 anchal samitis and 41,158 gram panchayats in the state. In view of the dominant position that officials continued to occupy in the panchayati raj bodies at all the three levels and the iniluence they exercised in these councils, it would be unrealistic to call them self-governing institutions in the real sense of the term. Remembering that it was in the context of Arunachal Pradesh that Jawaharlal Nehru had made his famous pronouncement about protecting the tribals’ right to land and interfering the least in the way they administered their territories, this indeed was unfortunate, even more so. when a shift in the demographic composition of the state since 1947 had made adherence to these principles really imperative. The tribal population in Arunachal Pradesh had come down from 95 percent of the total population to a mere 45 percent over the last four decades. Yet, the Sixth Schedule of the constitution continued to apply in the state. The latest (1994) state act in fact excludes the Sixth Schedule areas in the state from its purview. Since Arunachal Pradesh has a population below two million, it had the option of constituting only two tiers under the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, but an ordinance framed on this basis and promulgated on 18 April 1994, that is, the ‘Arunachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Ordinance, has authorised the constitution of three tiers in the state. c R. BISWASaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS While historically Assam had a mosaic of tribal and non-tribal institutions, it was principally the system prevailing under the ‘Ahoms which had provided the background in which the panchayati raj institutions in the state evolved, Under Ahom Rule ‘The Ahoms who had ruled Assam for nearly six hundred years (1228-1826 A.D.) had built up a social structure and) a system of local administration wherein a rudimentary sort of panchayat for handling focal matters could be found. Constituted by elderly experienced representatives of the people in the rural areas concerned, the panchayats were generally utilised for settling local disputes. But such local bodies were overshadowed by the personal mule of the feudal nobles who constituted the hierarchy of the Ahom administration, as well as by a system of centralised monarchy, ‘The mel and the Khel systems were prevalent in medieval Assam, but some traces of these in one form or the other can still be Map Showing District Houndaries (Numbers Indicate Districts as per Serial Number in the Table on the Opposite Page)aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.36 _ Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 over the work of the khels. The village economy prospered under the khel system and compulsory physical service by all adult males up to the age of sixty years did away with problems of unemployment or indolence. ‘Ahom administration acted on the principle that since every ryot up to a certain age was, liable to personal service, or to a commutation thereof in money, he was entitled to a certain quantity of land for his maintenance. Historical records note that as a remuneration for his services to the state, each Pyke (Paik) wes entitled to two puras of the best description of rice lowlands (roopit) rent free, or to an equivalent proportion of inferior lands. In the event, however, of his services not being required, each Paik was liable toa capitation tax of two or three rupees. All lands occupied by the Paiks were registered as pyker lands, and were inalienable from the Paik. At the same time, these lands were not hereditary. Rather than dividing the state into smaller divisions or sub-divisions, the Ahom kings preferred to appoint local governors to look after the affairs of different areas and also act as, agents of the administration, and of centralised coordination. Among them, the barphutan of Guwahati occupied a distinctive position. The tie of barphukan (royal representative or governor) could only be given to a fellow ‘Ahom. The other three local governors or the datialia gokains (border lords), were known as the Sadiya Khowa Gobain, Marangi Khowa Gchain, and Salal Gohain. The rajas of different mels of estates constituted another category of local governors. Basically, the mel system was introduced as ‘a measure of financial support to the members of the royal family. It rave rise to three hereditary estates at Charing, Tipam and Namrup. In due course of time, the appellation "Charing Raja” came to be applied to an hier-apparent (yuoraj)-of the Ahom ruler. Mels were also granted to the sons and other near relations of a reigning monarch. In order of importance, each mel was managed by officers bearing tities like Phukan, Barua, and so on. Two more princely rankings were created: the Sarumelia Raja and the Majumelia Raja. The ‘Majumel embraced three hundred men and was managed by a Barua. Female mels or estates were also created: the Raidangia Mel was granted to the chief queen, the Pareatia Mel to the second queen, the Pureni Mel and Na-Mel to other consorts, the Gabharu Mel to the daughters, nieces, sisters and daughters-in-law, while the Khangia Mel and the Mahi Mel were granted to the grandmother and the stepmother of the king respectively. Between twelve to sixteen mels functioned under the Ahom system of goverment. The female mels were not constituted as, principalities. All these royal mels did not fall under the category of local self-government in the usually accepted sense of the term: At the popular level, ad hoc mels functioned: these were assemblies of village elders engaged in settling minor disputes. The idea of the adult citizens’ obligation to the kingdom (state) was consciously cultivated in the Ahom system of administratio.s. This habit of doing things in ‘common gave rise to consequences in course of time which could not have been intended by the rulers who had founded the khel system as the basis of administration and government. ‘At the non-governmental level, there were other institutions which promoted community feelings and common decision making. There were the namghars (prayer houses of the Assamese Vaisnava sect) and the satfras (the Vaisnavite monasteries). The namghars and the sattras, which were integral parts of the social reform measures of the renowned saint, Sankaradeva (1449-1568), gave a new orientation to the medieval society. ‘The namghar was not a mere prayer house. It also served as a village assembly hall, to discuss all social problems and issues affecting village society openly, and to take related decisions. It also served as a centre fer rehearsals for mass cultural activities through hymns and songs, dance drama and theatrical performances (bhona) in the traditional Assamese style. An integrated society was built up centering around a namghar. Followers of other indigenous faiths or folk cultural forms had equal access to a namghar’s precincts. The sattras were narrower in scope. While the namghar of Sankaradeva's time was not as such an institution of local self-government, it possessed quite a few of its features at the non-governmental level.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.38 Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1958 Committee. But these did not function in the manner desired mainly because attendance in committee meetings was less than one-fifth of the total membership. Some planters also defaulted in payment of their share of the expenditure on roads. In 1879, the Assam Local Rates Regulations were enforced. For the first time, local rates for local purposes came to be levied. All lands now were to be subject to the payment of a cose in addition to land tax and local cesses. Out of the proceeds of this cess, three-eighth was earmarked for expenditure on works of a provincial nature while the rest was placed at the disposal of district committees each of which consisted of not less than six persons. The regulations came to be introduced in all the eight districts in the plains. Branch committees also came to be formed. All the committees turned out to be functional committees. Experience of working in these bodies made some people feel that branch committees should take the place of district committees, although a general committee at the level of the district could be retained for coordinating matters with representatives from the local committees. In 1881, the government of India proposed certain reforms for local boards including an + increase in the strength of non-officials as members from onehalf to twothirds. It recommended that certain services and revenues, the grants-in-aid being given to schools and dispensaries, and the entire local ate together with a sizeable portion of the provincial expenditure be transferred to the local boards. The government ‘opposed the proposals on the plea of the province being backward. It also maintained that the district committees should only be advisory in character and not vested with real powers. Almost following this ultra-royalist reaction of the Assam goverment, there came the famous Ripon resolution of 1882 on local self-government. Ripon had stated: “It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable ‘as an instrument of political and popular education.” Administrative efficiency could come after in Assam first generating popular initiative at the local level. The Ripon resolution is a fine essay in local self-government, containing directives for maintaining and ‘extending a wide network of local boards in every district, taking care that the jurisdictional area of every’ local board wes small enough so that bath local knowledge and local interest on the part of the people could be secured The reforme envisaged in this resolution faced rough weather in Assam due to the inveterate conservatism of the hard core of the bureaucracy, headed by the Assam valley commissioner, William Ward, who believed that the soil of the Brahmaputra valley was not fertile enough for the growth of institutions of local self-government. A much watered- down version of the Ripon reforms was proposed in the govemment of Assam resolution of 17 November 1882 on the subject The resolution agreed that the administrative area of the local boards should be the sub-division. The interests of the tea planters were adequately looked after; for instance, it ‘was resolved that their number should not be less than one-half of the board’s non-official members in the districts of Cachar, Lakhimpur, Sibsagar, Darrang, and Nowgong. Following this “resolution, district committees were abolished and only those sub-divisional boards, which were constituted by an executive order, ‘were authorised No effort was spared in Assam to scuttle the Ripon reforms in letter and spirit, The sub-divisional boards continued to exist till 1915, while the Public Works Department (PWD) came to assume vast powers extending up to the local level. It became obvious that since 1887 an explicit centralisation of functions had been taking place. ‘The Assam Local Self-Government Act, 1915, provided for the establishment of the village panchayat system, for the first time on a formal and legal basis. It also provided for an elective nor-official majority in the panchayat and for election of non-officials as chairperson and vice-chairperson. Subsequently, in 1926, another act was passed, this time as a panchayat act because of the failure of the panchayat scheme under the 1915 act. The functions of theaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.40 Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 felt that since there was very limited scope in the body of the act of 1959 to incorporate a ‘scheme of necessary reorganisation of such bodies to the extent desired, it was necessary to introduce the bill. The existing three tier panchayati raj bodies were to be reorganised into a two-tier system with gaon panchayats at the base and miohkuma parishads at the sub-divisional level. The proposed bill became the act of 1973, which came into force in April 1974: a gaon panchayat was established for a larger area and population than that of the existing gaon panchayat, with a view to making this body an economically, viable and efficient unit of self-government as well as to achieve the objective of democratic decentralisation by entrusting more powers and responsibilities to it, The mohkuma parishad was to be established and given more powers and executive functions than the existing mohkuma parishad. In view of the fact that the responsibility of all developmental programmes, by and large, had devolved on the functional departments at the sub-divisional level, it was felt that the mohkuma parishad should have enhanced executive and financial powers to enable it to exercise an effective control on expenditure of such departments and coordinate their developmental activities. This could also ensure effective guidance to, and cohesion and coordination amongst the panchayati raj bodies, that is, with the gaon panchayats at the lower level. In the reorganised set up, the element of direct election was introduced for both the tiers. For the first time, the role of the panchayati raj bodies was sought to be transformed from advisory to executive through the 1974 act. A chief executive councillor was provided for, apart from the chairperson, in every mohkuma parishad, to be elected from amongst the non-official councillors. This non-official chief executive councillor was to be its executive authority. A government official deputed as secretary to the mohkuma parishad was to act under the chief executive councillor. The act abolished the middle tier of anchalik panchayat to enable the two-tier bodies to have more financial resources. Gaon panchayat. The gaon panchayat at the village level covered a population of between fifteen to twenty thousand, Thus a sub-divisional level mohkuma parishad was to have about thirty to forty gaon panchayats with powers to levy taxes and fees in their respective areas, so as to be self-sufficient financially. The act barred M.Ps and M.L.As from nomination or election as councillors. Provisions were made for reservation of seats in panchayats for the S.C/S.7. population. A token reservation for women was also made. Mokkurea parishad, The mohkuma parishad was the second tier in the new two-tier system. The act had provided for transfer of all development schemes of different departments, with their funds and staff, to the mohkuma parishads for execution. In addition, the mohkuma parishad also planned and implemented its own schemes. Excluding the staff deputed by the state govemment from time to time, the executive committee of a mohkuma parishad was empowered to build up a permanent cadre of panchayat employees whose salaries, promotion and other conditions of service were determined by it. Both the tiers could impose taxes and fees on a wide range of subjects. They also received a share of one-rupee per capita of land revenue The state government's responsibility was to establish and maintain a fund called the Assam Rural Development Fund. ‘There was alsoa planning and review board for each mohkuma parishad. It consisted of MLAs and MPs from the sub-division and the chairperson and chief executive councillor of the mohkuma parishad. Further, subject to the provisions of any other laws in force, the state government was empowered to establish a panchayat adalat for each gaon panchayat area. ‘Theactof 1973had many novel features. The state government had acquired comprehensive powers over the gaon panchayats and mokkuma parishads under the act under Section 129 (1), which stated: "the State Government and such officers as are empowered by the Government in this behalf shall have power of inspection, supervision and control over the performance of theadministrative duties of a Gaon Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad." Only in-depth studies can show how fer the gaon panchayats and mohkuma parishads actually functioned on their own, in view of the comprehensive powers of the state government. The electoral roll of the Assam Legislative Assembly served as the voters list for the gaon panchayat and mohkuma parishad elections. The Act of 1986 The act of 1973 was repealed by the Assan Panchayati Raj Act, 1986 (Assam Act XVIII of 1986), which though was “adopted” with effect from 5 September 1990 only. With this new act the state again reverted to a three-tier set up— gaon panchayat, anchalik panchayat and the mobkuma parishad. The gaon panchayat at the village level was now to consist of a population between six to eight thousand; this reduction in size of the gaon panchayat paved the way for a larger number of gaon panchayats. The term of office for all the three tiers was fixed at five years. In the name of inspection, coordination, supervision and other duties, the powers of the state government and the bureaucracy wore enhanced. Departing from the earlier practice, the power to appoint their own staff was taken away from the panchayati raj bodies. Now the panchayats could have only such staff as was prescribed by the state government and appointed by the director of panchayats from time to time. Their salary, promotion and other conditions of service were to be determined by “rules to be made for the purpose,” obviously by the state government. The act of 1986 was amended by the Assam Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Ordinance, 1992, which was replaced by the Assam Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Act, in the same year. The few amendments that were made were not done with a view to further democratisation but to make the structure even more bureaucratic. Elections In February 1992, the first elections under the act of 1986 were held. For the earlier Assam 41 elections, the electoral rolls of the Assam Legislative Assembly had served as the voters list for gaon panchayats and mohkuma parishads. Due to various reasons including, ‘most importantly, the controversy over an acceptable electoral roll in the wake of the movement against the presence of foreign nationals in Assam, panchayat elections had been stalled for more than a decade. After the last elections held under the act of 1973 (which had provided for elections every four years), an official publication had recorded that in 1989 twenty ‘mohkuma parishads and 664 gaon panchayats ‘were existent in the state. It had been officially claimed that (a) the services of 4,565 gaon panchayat employees had been provincialised with effect from 2 October 1991, (b) 50 percent of the plan funds were "being diverted” to the panchayats, and (c) that developmental activities of twenty-nine goverment departments had been placed under the supervision of the panchayats. But the reality was very different vis-a-vis the timely allocation of resources. Itis. evident that the amended panchayati raj act of 1992 required many more basic amendments, in view of the Constitution (Seventy third Amendment) Act. Tt also required fresh elections to fulfil the constitutional obligations under the new central amendment. The chief minister had announced in May 1993 that 2 separate panchayat election commission for the state would be established and that panchayat laws would be suitably amended to ensure that elected panchayats were not dissolved without any reason with every change of government. ‘Although the last panchayat elections were held in 1992, reports revealed thet many newly elected panchayati raj institutions had yet to become functional. Secretaries had not been appointed by the state govemment to various gaon and anchalik panchayats. In the absence of the secretaries, no grants could be released to panchayats. The apathy of the state govemment regarding these matters had naturally caused widespread concer and dismay. Broadly in conformity with the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, the Assam Panchayati Rej Act, 1994, came into force42. status of Panchayat jin the States of india 1994 through an ordinance on 2 April of the same year. SUGGESTED READINGS BHARGAVA, B. $. 1979. Panchayati Raj System and Political Parties. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House. RAJPUT, R. S. and D. R. MEGHE (eds). 1984. Panchayati Raj in India. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications. SARMA, S.C. 1986. Tai Ahom System of Government. Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation. ROBINSON, WILLIAM, 1841. A Descriptior Account of ‘Assam. London. VENKATA RAO, V., and NIRU HAZARIKA. 1986, Local Self Government in India. New Delhi: 8. Chand & Co. AGARWALA, 5. K. 1964, "The Federal Principle in Indian Polity,” in &. S. Rajput and D.R. Meghe (eds). Panchayati Rej in Indie. New ‘Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications. DEBO PRASAD BAROOAHBIHAR SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE AREA. 173,877 sq. kins. DEMOGRAPHY (1991). Population: 86,374,465. Population Growth; 2349 percent. Density: 497 per sq. km. Sex Ratio: 912 females for every 1,000 males. ECONOMY. Labour Force (1991): 32.56 percent of which 82.36 percent in the primary sector, 4.64 percent in the secondary sector and 13 percent in the tertiary Per Capita: Annual Consurption (1989-90): (1990-91): Rs. 21,789 crores (quick estimates). EDUCATION (1991). Literacy: 38.48 percent. 17.95 percent (seven years and above). Enrolment (1989) Re. 2,017.13 at current prices (provisional. Rural, 338 Primary Schoo's (1989-50): $2,917. Upper pri 11,260,409 (including nursery schools). Primary schoois, sector. Per Copia income (1989-90): Rs. 2,186 at current prices. ‘State Domestic Product percent; Urban, 67.9 percents Female Rural Litemcy: j, 13,121. School 8157054; schools, 3,073,153. Primary School Teacers (1992-93): One for every 52 students HEALTH. Lift Expectancy (1988-91): 57.63 years. Infant Mortality Rate (1990-92): 72 per 1,000 bom. There is one physician for every Heaith Centres (1992): 2,494. OTHERS. Access 10 Potable Water (1991): 3411 (1989) inhabitants and one hospital for every 289,£472 inhabitants (1989), Rural, 5655 percent; Primary Urban, 7339 percent. Number of Fair Price/Ration Shops (1992): Rural, 35,023; Usban, 9,236. Road Mileage (1987-88): 438 per 1,000 sq. kms. Poverty Ratio (1987-88): 40.8 percent. Villages Electnfied (1993): 70.3 percent. ‘THE MOST ancient republics in indiathe Lichhavi and Sakya ganatantras—existed in the region that today constitutes the state of Bihar. Panchayats, thus, in their earliest form as selffinencing and self-governing unite had ancient roots in the state. Their success had been due to the fact that they were left to govem themselves, and also partly due to a particular state of economic development when village communities had no infrastructure and were isolated from the rest of the world. This made these units manage their agriculture, industry, trade and markets within their own areas. As a consequence of a weakening economic base, and when the seats of courts and administration shifted to district towns, the influence of the panchayats declined. Later, Muslim rulers introduced a system of revenue collection through contractors (malgujars) which continued in different forms during British rule. ‘The British East India Company introduced a new class of intermediaries and also a ryotwari system (as against the existing ‘mmauzmwari or village tenure system) which dealt a death blow to the corporate life of the villages. Bihar, as a part of Bengal, had experienced the earliest British experiments in village rule. British rulers needed some local base to generate revenue and panchayats were used as revenue units. This concept of panchayats, introduced by the British, had persisted and the rationale of these bodies continued to be linked mainly with the administration of land revenue. ‘The weakened functions of panchayats in Bihar were mainly a consequence of the zamindari settlement of 1793 and of a system Which made land revenue the only stake of the higher governments in villages, and zamindars the only institutions in the village sector. For seventy-five years after the zamindariaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.50_Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 continuing in their posts for fourteen years without elections ‘Village volunteer forces and village kacheris (courts) were, however, the two unique units under, the panchayats ‘which had given the latter a truly self-goveming character and a popular base. These institutions had involved the gram panchayats in police and judicial functions, which the villages very much needed. The lack of popularity of the sarpanch, however, tended to divert complaints to the sub-divisional court. Development functions were mostly assigned to block panchayats which worked through the sthayee samitis and with the B.D.O as the chief executive officer. The members of the block panchayats consisted of the mukhiyas of gram panchayats and other co-opted persons from cooperatives and organisations engaged in social work, who elected the pramukh and up-pramukh. The sthayee samitis mainly dealt with agriculture, cooperation, cottage industries, irrigation, roads, communication and education. "As grants and loan financing constituted the major source of the blocks income, works undertaken by them were generally assigned and aided. The role of the zilla parishads was primarily that of, coordinating and supervising the work undertaken. Decentralised Planning The planning function was mainly relegated to the zilla which had to coordinate the block plans. In the absence of block panchayats or district panchayats, however, the collector constituted the Praktand Vitas Samiti and the Zilla Vikas Samiti. In practice, however, planning was not a panchayat subject and was undertaken by the District Planning and Development Council (DP.DC) under a minister as chairperson and a development commissioner as the executive head. In 1984, a provision for the transfer of 30 percent of the state plans to this body had also been made. The rationale of the council was to associate the adhyaksha of the zilla parishad and all pramukhs of the samitis as members, as also the BDOs, but there was no separate cell for development planning at the block levels. Since the 2illa parishad functionaries had no real responsibility in planning, the council became a talking foram for them, and district planning ‘was bereft of the participation of the people. Further, distriet plans did not include land reforms, in which the panchayats had a major stake. Consequently, decentralised planning in Bihar was at a vory rudimentary stage and relied more on the schematic pattern suggested in the guidelines of the Planning Commission. It formed only a part of the state plans. A shift to rural planning with primary concern for agriculture and to a “limited target sector approach” or a “target group approach,” with greater involvement of blocks and panchayats had yet to take shape. Recent Enactments In spite of the iveak functioning of panchayats, Bihar had perfected its panchayat legislation through a series of amendments in 1956, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1982 and 1990, the last amendment incorporating many of the reforms included in the 64th Constitution Amendiment Bill, initiated in 1989 under the Rajiv Gandhi regime. The Bihar Panchayati Raj Act of 1990 had provided for reservation for women up to 30 percent and also for the S.Cs and S.Ts in proportion to their population. It had also provided for the creation of a panchayati raj election commission and a panchayati raj finance commission. It had recommended eight wards in each panchayat, with two members to be directly elected to the panchayats and two for gram kacheris in each ward. Further, the mukhiya and the sarpanch also had to be directly elected. Another two members in each panchayat had to be directly elected to form the electoral college for panchayat samiti elections. The new act, thus, removed the earlier provisions of co-option. "another special Gama of the: natal 1990 was that it created gram sabhas consisting of all the voters of the village. The gram sabha was empowered to consider the progress of works and the budget of the panchayats and to constitute implementation committees of experts and experienced persons to help monitor and recommend different projects undertaken by the executive committee,Gram dan act. It may be mentioned here that an attempt to transfer all the powers of panchayats to the gram sabha had been made in 1965 under the Gram Dan Act. The powers of a gram panchayat could shift to the gram sabha of a village if it could acquire the status of a gramdani village. For any village to qualify as gramdani, 51 percent of the village land had to be donated. By 1992, 4,256 villages in 147 blocks had applied for grant of gramdani status, out of which 3,344 cases conformed to the required specifications. But only 1,776 villages got the approval while only 1,368 villages were notified in the gazette. Eventually, only thirty-two gram sabhas were empowered with a panchayat’s status, while 182 did not get it even after complying with all the formalities. Though more directly related to land reforms, there is a possibility that this special status to the gram sabha in 2 gramdani village will be dropped. A different system of panchayats was also in vogue in the Adivasi areas of Chotanagpur (Gantal Parganas and Singhbhum areas). In these areas tribal panchayats were functioning but they were primarily concerned with social functions, and to some extent with revenue ‘matters. They had mo say in development and in Judicial cases which were handled by government officials Harmonising the two systems was an important issue the administration faced. ‘The provision for grading panchayats on the 51 basis of performance, tax effort and unanimity in conducting meetings, and so on, under the Bihar Panchayat Miscellaneous Rules, 1961, needs a special mention. If the panchayats, which started invariably in Class Il, got promoted to Class Il or to Class 1, they had an increased tenure of four and five years respectively. If they remained in Class Til, their tenure ended after three years. All this demonstrates that though panchayats were working since 1947, and panchayati raj had been instituted after 1957, the entire set up was nominated and administered. The local self-government aspect was missing. The constitutional amendment of 1992 will make mandatory all those provisions which existed on paper but were never implemented in Bihar. On 23 August 1993, the new Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, conforming with the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, came into force. SUGGESTED READINGS GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR. 1948 Report on the Implementation of Bihar Panchayat Raj to the First LSG Ministers’ Conference. (August) Bihar. Directorate of Panchayat. SINHA K. K. 1988, "Sut-Regional Planning, in India: Blocks versus Districts," Indian Economic Journal, Conference Issue. (December). GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR. 1984 District Plan. The Second Circular. (May). Patna: Office of the District Plamning Officer. K. K. SINHAaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.68 _Stitus of Panchayati Raj in the States of India 1994 recommendations (instead of the usual practice of diluting or shelving them), indicated the incremental progress of panchayati raj. Social justice committees, Social _justice committees were first set up in 1975 at all levels of panchayats with a statutory tenure of five fears, to pre-empt any political interference in their working. The weaker sections were given a mejority of seats in these committees. There was a provision against the withdrawal of functions and authority given to them under the law. There was some budgetary allocation for them which was increased in later years. In fact, 8 percent of the district panchayat fund had been set aside for them with a non-lapsable budget. On the whole, the working of these committees was not quite satisfactory. In a survey conducted by the Harijan Sevak Sangh on the practice of untouchability, it was found that in nearly 50 percent of the villages untouchability’ prevailed in relation to use of waterworks or wells. In spite of a government resolution prohibiting the practice of untouchability, the grant given to such defaulting panchayats was not stopped, The social justice committees had succeeded to some extent in providing altemative sources of income for the Harijans. Many such committees had been given house sites and some had constructed pucce (permanent) houses for the homeless poor. Like Karnataka, Gujarat had been in the lead in providing rural housing and land sites for the poor. In the process, the S.Cs began to accept panchayati raj with a view to using it to their advantage. Much, however, still remained 10 be done in the field of social change and distributive justice. The social justice committees at the village and taluka levels had been found to be ineffective in solving the problems of the underprivileged. At the district level, they were found to be effective only in a few cases. For example, simple facilities like meeting rooms for these committees had not been provided in the case of two zilla panchayats and fourteen taluka panchayats, Certain arrangements and modifications, made following the Darji committee report (1972), in the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1973, had helped leaders of the backward castes and tribes in building links with the villages and thereby assisting the process of inducting the village and its backward communities into the larger political system. Though formal structural linkages between different tiers were weakened with the reinstitution of direct elections to the taluka panchayats and zilla parishads as per the new acts, and the ex-officio, principle diluted, the changes had also helped to increase the political mobilisation of the backward castes and classes to. the detriment of the elites. Social audit, as proposed by the Shah committee (1978), could have helped in making the panchayats accountable for their performance in matters of social justice. To some extent, panchayati raj seemed to have succeeded in making the established dominant castes concede certain changes and accept some sharing of power with the other communities. Democratic participation in the panchayats had provided opportunities to work ‘out new equations between traditional social groups. Of late, the lower levels of the social hierarchy had become more assertive. In the process, the dominant tzaditional elite, largely supported by wealth, capacity and status, was trying to contest and control other social groups, where pessible, and accommodate them if necessary. And necessity was proving to be more compelling than possibility. Performance of Panchayats In concrete terms, certain areas of functioning of the panchayats, with mixed performance, could be marked out. Regular meetings of the gram sabha, though properly “recorded,” remained a ‘mere formality. The gram sabha was totally inactive, while the judicial nyaya panchayats, though provided, had never functioned. Many of the sarpanches had managed to capture office through the use of force and money and through the manipulation of caste arithmetics. Some, along with their associates, had encroached on village grazing lands and those meant for other public purposes. Many panchayats, particularly in southem Gujarat, professed helplessness when local bullies Gisregarded reir orders and directives. Theaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.70 _ Status of Fanchayati Rj the States of India 1994 panchayat secretary, who was generally never tobe found in the seja, that is, the village where his office was situated. Major points of friction were those relating to the transfer of teachers and other employees of panchayati raj, and regularisation of certain procedures to prevent the elected president from being influenced by the political as opposed to the administrative aspect. ‘Some Evaluations The fact that the more outstanding isionaries and architects of panchayati 13), such as Gandhiji, Balawantrai Mehta and Asoka ‘Mehta, had hailed from Gujarat is, perhaps, not unimportant for understanding the record of these institutions in the state. Equally important is the solid work put in by panchayat engineers’ like Jadavji Mody, G. 5. Palel, Jhinabhai Darji, Rikhavdas Shah, Trikamlal Patel, and Ratnasinh Mahida. However, in terms of popular _ participation, social mobilisation and extension of social justice to the underprivileged and the rural poor, the performance of panchayati raj, though commendable, left much to be desired. It had singular success in the fields of relief work, family planning, development, afforestation, distribution of home sites, and construction of houses for the weaker sections. It also had a very good record in relief work during droughts and floods. As is evident, panchayati raj as an idea had become widely legitimised both at the state and village levels. Unlike in Maharashtra, where the creation of district development and planning councils had compromised the autonomy of zilla parishads, panchayati raj in Gujarat had been marked by increasing decentralisation. However, in the eighties there was a steady erosion in the autonomy of panchayati raj institutions. The modification of clauses 123 and 143 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1973, as suggested by the Darji committee (1972), had transferred some of the powers of the elected office ‘bearers to officials like the taluk development officers. The government had also not shown sensitivity to the vocally expressed resentment of the G.P-P. or to the resolutions passed unanimously at its conventions. The state panchayat council had been practically defunct since 1975 and the GPP. greatly devalued. The gram sabha, the basic unit of the panchayati raj system, had not been active in all these decades. Nyaya panchayats, although provided, had been totally non-functional Panchayats had also been unable to perform regulatory functions, particularly in the case of removal of encroachments on land, and assessment and collection of property tax Taluka and zilla panchayats were apathetic in levying taxes despite repeated reminders. ‘Again, the appearance of more endowed structures in the mid-fifties like the District Rural Development Agency (D.R.D.A.), the District Planning Board, and district development centres manned or dominated by collectors and other govemment officials, as well as the creation of centrally-initiated schemes managed mostly by officials, had compromised the autonomy of the panchayats and affected the self-confidence of their leader ship. The intention behind the creation of these bodies had been that of providing infra- structural facilities under the minimum needs programmes and poverty alleviation schemes. Both the DRDA. and the District Planning Board worked closely with the panchayat bodies but were independent of the latter. The D.RD.A. executed its programmes through officers, as it felt that putting these programmes directly under the elected representatives might lead to control by vested interests, and obstruction of flow of benefits to the rural poor. The spirit of panchayat institutions as the foci of grassroots participation or the foci of democratic decentralisation was thuseroded. The latest committee to be appointed, the Rikhavdas Shah committee (1978), had recommended depoliticisation of panchayat raj and restoration of the link between the three tiers to recapture the integrative dimension, with the aim of making panchayati raj more vibrant and a focal point of efficient and autonomous functioning. The report was shelved by the government. Despite all these drawbacks, in an overall perspective and in the all-India context, Gujarat stands out for a comparatively highdegree of performance of its panchayati raj. Provisions to give an honorarium to the chairpersons of the taluka level committees had been made. The scheme of encouraging the best village panchayats in the state (a prize of Rs.100,000 to the best village panchayat) managed in a very impartial manner had been a distinct feature. The award for the best district panchayat in India for 1986 (although Rs5,000 only) was won by the Surat District Panchayat, led by its Adivasi president, Sahadeo ‘Choudhari. Nowhere perhaps was the political mobilisation of the backward classes and Other Backward Classes (O.B.Cs), their induction into the power structures and into leadership at the state level as significant as in Gujarat, where the whole process had been initiated in the mid-seventies. In conformity with the Constitution Gujarat 71 (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1994, came into force on 15 April ofthe same year. SUGGESTED READINGS SHAH, RAMESH, 1994, "The Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993, X-Rayed” Paper presented at the Western Regional Workshop on Panchayats organised by the Rejiv Gandhi Foundation and the Centre for Social Studies, Surat, 23 to 24 February. SHETH, PRAVIN. 1979. “Gujarat: Dynamics of Development.” Seminar (February), SHETH, PRAVIN. 1989. Pencheyati Raj and Vikas (a collection of papers in Gujarati). SHETH, PRAVIN, 1994, "Gujarat: Panchayati Development and Decay." Paper presented at the Western Regional Workshop on Panchayats organised by the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation and Centre for Social Studies, Surat, 23 to24 February. PRAVIN N. SHETH.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.78 of Panchay: i in the State of india 1998, gram panchayats was arbitrarily reduced in 1991 and they were not allowed to complete their running term. There were numerous instances of suspensions and supersessions of these bodies for political reasons. Besides, there were extraordinary delays in the holding of elections. Elections were rarely held at the scheduled time and quite often were deferred for years altogether. The authority of the sarpanch, the chief political executive in the gram panchayat, was also undermined by making provisions for indirect elections to the post. Control over the funds of gram panchayats was transferred to the gram sachivs. Due to all these changes the panchayats were so emasculated that even the restoration of direct elections in 1978 failed to make any difference in the status of the sarpanch. The association of the sarpanch with the D.RD.A. for the identification of the rural poor too failed to improve the latter's position because the choice of the beneficiaries of the poverty alleviation programme was influenced by the M.LAs who wanted their supporters to get maximum benefits. Elections Elections to gram panchayats were held in Haryana in 1972, 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1991, that is, on the due date. The elections for panchayat samitis were, by and large, held on time, except in 1978 and 1988 when they were not held at all In 1972, 1988 and 1992, there had been many instances of postponement of elections of chairperson of panchayat samitis due to political reasons and to stay orders from the courts. Whenever a group enjoying the support of the chief minister was not sure of attaining a majority, it got elections postponed in order to manipulate the panchayats through official patronage and other means. The courts were generally approached by the groups supported by the dissidents in the ruling party or by the opposition parties. However, these groupings often cut across party lines. In numerous cases, the electoral process was never completed as the group supported by the chief minister could not patch together a majority. One of the convenient methods employed was to change the boundaries of the districts, sub-divisions and community development blocks in order to break conventional groupings. But such instances were rare. Enabling Amendments Since the creation of Haryana and till 1993 the Punjeb Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 was amended nineteen times, the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulations) Act, 1961, eleven times and the Punjab Panchayat Sanitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961, seventeen times. Major amendments to the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, included the Haryana Act No. 19 of 1971 which extended the term of Panchayats from three to five years, the Haryana ‘Act No. 3 of 1976, which provided for the removal of the sarpanch in case of failure to old two consecutive meetings of the gram sabha, and the Haryana Act No. 13 of 1987, which made provision for the reservation of seats for the members of the backward classes if their population was 2 percent or more in the gram sabha area. Here it may be mentioned that no sarpanch had ever actually been removed for his failure to hold the meetings of the gram sabha. The most important amendment to the Punjeb Village Common Land (Regulations) Act, 1961, had been made by the Haryana Act No. 9, 1992 with the aim of solving the problem of large-scale unauthorised possession of village common lands, though these ills had persisted despite the amendment. More significant amendments to the Punjab act of 1961 were contained in the Haryana Act No. 22 of 1973, which abolished the zilla parishads and assigned all their powers to the deputy commissioners; the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1983, which increased the term of the panchayat samitis from three to five years, and the Haryana Act No. 14 of 1987, which provited for representation of one member of the backward classes in the panchayat samiti. The performance of the state in the implementation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (LRDP.), Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY.), the Indira Awas Yojana, rural water supply programme and rural sanitation programmes had been quiteaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.84 _ Status of Panchayati Rajin the States of India 1994 had been working in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab legislations of 1952 and 1961 when the Himachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1968, came into force on 15 November 1970, that is, two years later. By then the newly merged areas had already constituted a total of 1,965 gram panchayats, 29 panchayat samit and 3 zilla parishads under the Punjab statutes adopted by them. The 1968 Act ‘The Himachal Pratesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1968, was enacted to incorporate the major recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta committee. Accordingly, a panchayat samiti ‘was constituted for every black. It consisted of primary members who were all the pradhans of the gram panchayats in the block, and of co-opted members. The provision applying to the primary members was, however, changed in 1991 under an amendment act. The amended act laid down that the primary members would be elected by secret ballot by the members of the gram sabhas with one member from every two contiguous gram sabhas, subject to a minimum, of ten members. The 1968 act also provided for representation of women in case there were no primary women members in the panchayat samiti, Only two women were to be co-opted from among the panches from the block. Similarly, a maximum of four panches belonging to the S.Cs were to be co-opted if there was no SC. primary member. ‘The special features of the panchayat samiti in Himachal Pradesh were that it had directly elected primary members and its chairperson wrote the annual confidential report of the block development officer. Elections ‘The pradhans and up-pradhans of the gram sabhas, who were also the pradhans and up- pradhans of the gram panchayats, were elected from amongst the members of the gram sabha, by secret ballot and direct vote. Elections to the gram panchayats were last held in December 1991 and to the sixty-nine panchayat samitis the following January. Although the state had 2,757 gram panchayats at that time, only 2731 of them want to the polls. Elections to twenty-four gram panchayats in the whole of the Roni block had been stayed by the court and the constitution of two gram panchayats in the Kurihar block of the Solan district had been disputed. In Pragpur Panchayat Samiti (Kangra istrict) the elections for the post of chairperson. and vice-chairperson were not held. Till August 1994, elections to the zilla parishads had also not been held in the state. Although the elections to the two panchayati raj bodies were held on a non party basis, the two major political parties in the state, namely, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata party (B..P.) took active interest in them. They put up their candidates as independents and vigorously campaigned for them. The BJP. improved its position vastly, polling nearly 60 percent of the total votes, as against a mere 10-15 percent i-: 1985, with the Congress coming, a poor second. In these elections to the gram panchayats and the panchayat samitis, caste too played a significant role. People of a caste or community tended to vote for the candidate of the same caste or community. For example, in all the five panchayats in the Jubbal tehsil, the Rejputs were in a majority, ‘The elections to the Jahal Gram Panchayat were held for the first time in 1962, while the second elections were held in 1972, after a gap of ten years. It may be noted here that the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1968, conferred about twenty-seven administrative duties on gram panchayats but the funds made available to them were extremely limited. It was just not possible for a gram panchayat with hardly any source of income to perform even administrative duties like sanitation and maintenance of public utilities. In fact, the 1968 act had vested real powers in the district collector, sub-divisional magistrate and the district panchayati raj department. The slogan of democratic decentralisation was misteading. There was no real power either with the pradhans of the gram panchayats or with the chairpersons of the panchayat samitis. Every section of the act of 1968, whether it related to powers, duties, functions or taxation, required prior approval or sanction of the state government, in otheraa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.96 Stars of Panchayat Ray in the States of India 1998 Under the Bombay Act 23 of 1928, district boards with elected presidents. and vice-presidents also started functioning in the Bombay Presidency. The Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1920, underwent a series of changes in 1928, 1933, 1939 and 1947, providing for a gradual enlargement of scope and functions. A unique feature in the Bombay set up was the continued existence of the district school boards to lock after primary and secondary education, with members elected from rural and urban local bodies. From 1941, local government institutions at the village and district levels had also been established in the state of Hyderabad with elected district boards having come into existence. In Coorg, there were only village panchayats established in 1926 under the Coorg Village Panchayats Act. The attainment of independence inttoduced an important dimension of democracy, that is, adult franchise. The demand for strong local self-government had been voiced during the freedom struggle. Such demands called for substantial changes in the statutes, These changes were made in 1950 in Madras and Bombay, and in 1953 and 1956 in Hyderabad. In the old state of Mysore, two committees, namely, the Verkatappa committee Map Showing District Boundaries (Numbers Indicate Districts ax per Serial Number in the Table on the Opposite Page)aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a 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page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.passed on the basis of the report of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation (1909) and the 1913 report of the District Administrative Committee. ‘The act of 1919 had provided for the creation of unions consisting of a group of villages. Each union committee was to have an elected body known as the union board. The electorate was to consist of all adult males having residence within the union and paying local tax, that is, union rates or cess. Thus it was a restricted electorate. Women were made eligible as voters only in 1950, after independence. Each union board had a president and a vice-president elected by its members. The term of office of the members was four years. ‘The union boards were given a variety of functions. There were normal municipal functions, such as sanitation, conservancy, water supply, maintenance of roads or drains, or regulatory functions, such as control on constructing buildings. There were some development functions as well, such as for cottage industry, and establishment of primary schools or libraries. The boards could exercise control over the rural police. Subject to such control as was exercised by the govemment over the boards, specially regarding rules of operation, audit of accounts, power of annulling WestBengal_ 215 proceedings, and supersession in case of default, the union boards had autonomy in their functioning. As regards finance, a union board could levy a rate on the owners or occupiers of buildings within the union. The government showed some sincerity in implementing the provisions of the act. Unlike the union committees, steps were taken to constitute the union boards quickly and to hold elections to them. By 1936-37, the number of elected boards rose to nearly five thousand. A new class of officers, known as circle officers, was appointed by the government to supervise the functioning of a group of boards and to act as a link between the government and the self-governing institutions. ‘Thus from 1919 onwards undivided Bengal had two sets of local government institutions— district boards at the uppermost level and union boards at the lowest. Each tier had a distinct corporate status and a separate statute delineating its powers, functions and obligations, but there was no organic linkage between the two institutions. The union boards continued to function for about four decades, and in the process created such lasjjng influence that even later developments introducing democratic decentralisation could not alter some of the traditions created by them. Yet Ares, Total Population, Density, Rural and Urban Population of Districts in West Bengal stricts ‘Area TotalPopulaton Density ‘Rural ——‘Uiban cam a gene) om) amy L Bankura am 2505 65 4739 1SRSs? ‘Dave 2 Birbhum 3385 2555.4 523 22610 | 953 3 Burdwan 7 6080.05 saa Soya 21982 £ Chleate 1 00510 azar NA. i 5 Coochbehar 338 27 ds ‘aid 200,618 “169487 & Darjeeling 3p 1259518 51280 “9089 59600 2 Biorb : 327459 sears 2710453 417,200 & — Dinajpur (6) ane 2 Hooghly ap 485230 198505 nos979 1388251 12 Howrah last ares 25236 LaBvS30 © LBi0114 1 Jalprigur saz 2500383 a7 pena | 458247 2 Maldah S733 237182 mai 245s 186397 TB Midnapore 1051 S351912 Siz 75s = 05 1. Momhdabad 3am $2409 BOM Quam 44307 13. Nadia Soar 552007 96083 2980279 STLBIB 16. 24 Parganas (N) ipo Zasuse wee Sse © 030 17, 24Parganas 6) 390 sist S379 issces | 76037 18 Paral 5252 aaa, fsa zo 210006 On 1 April 1992 West Dingjpur district was divided to form the Dinajpur (North) and Dinajpur South) districtsaa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.aa You have either reached a page that is unavailable for viewing or reached your viewing limit for this book.Cle brats CyelaueCaacwni tia elo Lesa telecea SU CS a mast Cl-

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